2026:HHC:40

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 842 of 2023

Reserved on: 27.11.2025

Date of Decision: 1.1.2026.

Saranjeet Singh Likhare and another ...Petitioners

Versus

State of H.P. and another ...Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Petitioners : M/s Ajay Sipahiya, Tarun Mehta

and Gaurav Chaudhary,

Advocates.

For Respondent No.1/State : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy

Advocate General.

For Respondent No.2 :Mr Divya Raj Singh, Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge:

The petitioners have filed the present petition for

quashing of FIR No. 31 of 2023, dated 2.5.2023, registered at

Police Station Dalhousie, District Chamba, HP, for the

commission of an offence punishable under Section 451 read with

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Brief facts, giving rise to the present petition, are that

the informant/respondent No.2, Kuldeep Singh, made a

complaint to the police that he is the tenant of the property

known as Likhari house, located at Dalhousie. The rent

agreement was duly registered with the Sub Registrar, Dalhousie,

on 27.10.2021. Saranjeet Singh Likhari, his wife, Paramjeet Kaur

Likhari, and one unknown person broke into the property of the

informant on 28.4.2023 and tried to take its forcible possession

by breaking open the locks. He had made a complaint on

24.4.2023, but no action was taken. Hence, it was prayed that

action be taken against them.

3. The police registered the FIR and investigated the

matter.

4. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the

investigation, the petitioners have filed the present petition for

quashing the FIR. It has been asserted that petitioner

No.1/accused, Sardar Saranjeet Singh Likhari, had filed a civil suit

for a declaration that the Will dated 1.4.1998, registered on

11.3.2019 in favour of one Jagdeesh Kaur Rihal, sister of the

petitioner No.1/accused, stated to have been executed by Amolak

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Singh Likhari (father of petitioner No.1/accused and Jagdeesh

Kaur Rihal), was forged and fabricated. An interim injunction was

granted by the learned Civil Judge, Dalhousie, on 19.4.2023.

Jagdeesh Kaur Rihal leased out the property to the

informant/respondent No.2. He hired Gurmukh Singh as

caretaker of the property. The petitioners were entering Likhari

House on 28.4.2023 when Gurmukh Singh stopped them. An

altercation occurred. The police reached the spot. The medical

examination of the accused/petitioner No.2 was conducted by the

police, and one grievous injury, and two simple injuries were

found on her body. FIR No. 30 of 2023, dated 1.5.2023 was

registered against Gurmukh Singh regarding the incident. The

informant lodged the present FIR as a counterblast to the FIR

lodged by the petitioners/accused. The property belongs to the

petitioners/accused, and they had obtained an injunction order

from the Court. The ingredients of Section 451 of the IPC are not

satisfied. Petitioner No.2 was not even present on the spot. The

petitioners are senior citizens, and they could not use any

criminal force against the informant or his caretaker. The

petitioners are the citizens of Canada, and Jagdeesh Kaur Rihal

got the mutation attested in her favour, taking advantage of the

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petitioners’ absence. The petitioners did not enter into the

property with any criminal intent. The civil dispute is pending

between the parties, and the criminal proceedings are not

maintainable. The mutation was attested without serving any

notice upon the petitioner No.1. The FIR was lodged on 2.5.2023

and is belated. The petitioners have also lodged the FIR on

1.5.2023 against Gurmukh Singh. Therefore, it was prayed that

the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.

5. The petition is opposed by respondent No.1/State by

filing a reply making preliminary submissions regarding the lack

of maintainability, and the existence of a prima facie case in the

petitioners’ favour. The contents of the petition were denied on

merits; however, it was admitted that an FIR was registered

against the petitioners. It was asserted that there is a land dispute

between the petitioners and respondent No.2. The police received

information on 28.4.2023 regarding some law-and-order

disturbance near Hotel Geetanjali at Dalhousie. The police went to

the spot and found petitioners No.1 and 2, and one Gurmukh

Singh, present at Likhare’s house. They revealed during

interrogation that a minor altercation had taken place between

them over the entry to the house. Subsequently, the medical

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examination of the petitioner no. 2 was conducted, and a grievous

injury was found on her person. The police registered FIR No.30

dated 1.5.2023. The informant also reported the matter regarding

the taking of forcible possession on 2.5.2023, and the police

registered FIR No.31 of 2023, dated 2.5.2023 based on this

information. The police investigated the matter and found that a

prima facie case was made out against the petitioners; hence, the

police filed a charge sheet before the learned Trial Court.

6. I have heard M/s Ajay Sipahiya, Tarun Mehta and

Gaurat Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr Ajit

Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1-

State and Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for respondent

No.2/informant.

7. Mr Ajay Sipahiya, learned counsel for the petitioners,

submitted that the petitioner No.1 had filed a civil suit against his

sister for seeking a declaration that the Will propounded by her is

forged. The respondent No.2/informant had beaten the petitioner

No.1, and she sustained grievous injuries. The matter was

reported to the police, and FIR No.30 was registered by the police.

Respondent No.2 lodged the present FIR after the registration of

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FIR No.30 as a counterblast. The allegations in the FIR are false.

The complaint and the material collected by the police do not

disclose the commission of any cognizable offence. A civil suit is

pending between the parties. The criminal proceedings are an

abuse of the process of the law. Hence, he prayed that the present

petition be allowed and the FIR be ordered to be quashed. He has

also filed the written arguments, which have been perused by me.

He relied upon the following judgments in support of his

submission: -

(i)Paramjeet Batra Vs. State of Uttrakhand (2013) 11 SCC

673;

(ii)Salib @ Shalu @ Saleem Vs. State of U.P. 2023 INSC 687;

(iii)Usha Chakraborty Vs. State of West Bengal 2023 LiveLaw

(SC) 67;

(iv)Naresh Kumar and another Vs. State of Karnataka and

another 2024 INSC 196;

(v)K. Bharathi Devi and another Vs. State of Telangana and

another 2024INSC750;

(vi)Rikhab Birani Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 512;

(vii)Anukul Singh Vs. State of UP and another 2025 INSC 1153;

(viii)Mala Choudhary Vs. State of Telangana 2025 LiveLaw

(SC) 725;

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(ix)Shailesh Kumar Singh alias Shailesh R. Singh Vs. State of

UP and others 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 726;

(x)S.N. Vijayalakshmi & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & anr.

2025 LiveLaw (SC) 758;

(xi)Anand Kumar Mohatta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 11

SCC 706;

(xii)Charanjit Sharma and Anr. Vs. State of Punjab 2023:

PHHC:145235;

(xiii)Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another 2021 SC

LiveLaw 2021 SC 623;

(xiv)M. Srikanth Vs. State of Telangana and another, Cr.

Appeal Nos. 1587-1588 of 2019, decided on 21.10.2019;

(xv)Radheyshyam and others Vs. State of Rajasthan and

another, Criminal Appeal No. 3020 of 2024, decided on

22.7.2024;

(xvi)Randheer Singh Vs. State of UP and others, Criminal

Appeal Nos. 932 and 933 of 2021, decided on 2.9.2021;

and

(xvii)Syed Yaseer Ibrahim Vs. State of UP and another,

Criminal Appeal No. 295 of 2022, decided on 28.2.2022.

8. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for

the respondent No.1-State, submitted that mere filing of the civil

suit would not authorise the petitioners to trespass on the

property in possession of the informant. The police have filed the

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charge sheet before the learned Trial Court, and the learned Trial

Court is seized of the matter. This Court should not exercise the

extraordinary jurisdiction vested in it. Hence, he prayed that the

present petition be dismissed.

9. Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for respondent

No.2, submitted that the informant was inducted as a tenant by a

valid registered deed. Even if the civil suit of the petitioner no. 1 is

decreed, he would have to accept the terms and conditions of the

lease deed executed by Jagdeesh Kaur Rihal. The petitioners could

not have trespassed into the possession of respondent No.2 even

in the colour of their right. Therefore, he prayed that the present

petition be dismissed.

10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 7 as under: -

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it

is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to

be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the

decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised

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some of the principles under which

FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the

following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the

various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter

XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court

in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the

extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent

powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have

extracted and reproduced above, we give the following

categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such

power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the

process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any

precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and

inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an

exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such

power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if they are

taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or

make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information

report and other materials, if any, accompanying

the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,

justifying an investigation by police officers

under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an

order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in

the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in

support of the same do not disclose the

commission of any offence and make out a case

against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute

a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-

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cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a

police officer without an order of a Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or

complaint are so absurd and inherently

improbable based on which no prudent person

can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the

accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in

any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act

(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to

the institution and continuance of the proceedings,

and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code

or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for

the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

accused and with a view to spite him due to a

private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would

be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the

allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any

offence or make out a case against the accused, then the

FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-

cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a

police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in

such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an

express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the

CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal

proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be

quashed.”

12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its

extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may

issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to

secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are

neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory

provision. However, given the broad and profound nature

of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.

The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded

within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High

Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where

intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of

several decades, has laid down the principles and

guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing

criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-

empting the Prosecution from building its case before the

Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,

contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal

complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR

represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie

offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.)

the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;

and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the

dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp

(1) SCC 335)

13. The present petition is to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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14. Petitioner No.1 asserted that he had instituted a civil

suit against his sister Jagdeesh Kaur Rihal for seeking a

declaration regarding the invalidity of the Will, and an injunction

order (Annexure P-2) was issued in his favour. The order dated

19.4.2023, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Dalhousie, merely

restrains the respondent Jagdeesh Kaur Rihal from alienating the

suit property. No order was passed authorising the petitioner, no.

1, to enter into the property. Thus, not much advantage can be

derived from the institution of the suit and the issuance of the

order.

15. It is an admitted case of the petitioner No.1 that he is

residing in Canada. He had mentioned his address as a resident of

Canada. He asserted in paragraph 11 of the present petition that

the petitioners are non-resident Indians who have obtained

citizenship of Canada and are residing in Canada. Jagdeesh Kaur

Rihal got the mutation attestation in her favour, taking advantage

of the petitioners’ absence. Similar averment was made in the

plaint (Annexure P-1) wherein it was mentioned in paragraph 12

that plaintiff Saranjeet Singh Likhari was residing in Canada since

1992 and was a Canadian citizen. Therefore, prima facie, the plea

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taken by the petitioners that they are in possession of the

property cannot be accepted.

16. The rent agreement (Annexure P-5) executed between

Jagdeesh Kaur Rihal and Kuldeep Singh on 27.10.2021 shows that

the property was leased to the informant for a period of ten years,

subject to the terms and conditions agreed between the parties.

This agreement shows that the possession was delivered to

respondent No.2/informant Kuldeep Singh. Thus, prima facie, the

averment that respondent No.2/informant is in possession of the

property has to be accepted as correct.

17. The FIR specifically mentions that the petitioners

broke into the property and tried to take forcible possession of

the property by breaking open the locks. The police investigated

the matter and filed the charge sheet before the Court, stating

that the police had seized a broken lock, bolt and gate hook which

corroborate the informant’s version that an attempt was made to

take forcible possession by breaking open the lock.

18. It was submitted that the ingredients of the

commission of an offence punishable under Section 442 of the

IPC are not satisfied because there was no intention to insult,

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intimidate or annoy any person or to commit any offence. This

submission cannot be accepted. The petitioners entered into the

property in the informant’s possession by breaking open the lock,

which amounts to mischief. They would be aware of the fact that

forcible entry by breaking open the locks would amount to

mischief, and the necessary ingredients of the criminal trespass

were satisfied. The petitioners were aware of the fact that they

were not in possession; they had filed a civil suit seeking a

declaration regarding the invalidity of the Will, the Court had

only restrained Jagdeesh Kaur Rihal from alienating the property

and had not authorised the petitioners to enter into the property.

Therefore, prima facie, the petitioners had committed mischief by

entering into the property, and the ingredients of the commission

of an offence punishable under Sections 451 and 427 of the IPC

are duly satisfied.

19. It was submitted that the dispute between the parties

is civil in nature, which is evident from the fact that a civil suit is

pending between the parties. This submission is not acceptable.

The petitioner No.1 had filed a civil suit seeking a declaration

regarding the invalidity of the Will, which is different from taking

possession. The act of trespass had nothing to do with the civil

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suit pending before the Court and was an independent wrong.

Therefore, the submission that a civil suit is being given the

colour of a criminal case cannot be accepted, and the judgments

in Param Jeet Batra (supra), Naresh Kumar (supra), Rikhav Birani

(supra), Mala Chaudhary (supra), Charajeet Sharma (supra),

Jaswant Singh (supra), M. Shrikant (supra) and Radheshyam and

others (supra) will not apply to the present case.

20. It was submitted that the incident had occurred on

28.4.2023, whereas the matter was reported to the police on

2.5.2023. Hence, the FIR should be quashed because of the delay.

This submission cannot be accepted. It was held in Punit Beriwala

v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court

exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the

allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed:-

“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a

complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with

circumspection, and while exercising this power, the

Court must believe the averments and allegations in the

complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly

held that, save in exceptional cases where non-

interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the

Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the

stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and

inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely

according to its whims or caprice.”

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21. It was submitted that there are variations in the

statement recorded by the police and the FIR, which makes the

prosecution’s case suspect. This submission will not help the

petitioners. This Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine

the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. It

was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine

SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash

the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the

allegations. It was observed: -

“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court

would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to

the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the

allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of

quashing of the proceedings under Section  482 Cr.

P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if

taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of

an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the

cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made

in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do

not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a

case against the accused. We are of the considered view that

the present case would fall under Category-3 of the

categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan

Lal (supra).

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court

in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),

Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission

of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that

once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for

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quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any

merit in this submission, keeping in mind the

position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of

Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7

SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj

A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC

59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the

question of whether the High Court could entertain

the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the

charge-sheet was filed by the police during the

pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC

p. 63, para 16)

“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the

various sections under which the appellant is

being charged and is to be prosecuted would

show that the same is not made out even prima

facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the

charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single

Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007

SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined

whether the offences alleged to have been

committed by the appellant were prima facie

made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-

sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:

2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-

trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It

was observed on page 397:

“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that

while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of

the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not

supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be

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made to the judgment in  CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan

Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The

relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted

hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of

discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,

while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the

Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising

the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very

limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether

any sufficient material is available to proceed further

against the accused for which the accused is required to

be tried or not’.”

23. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan

(Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: -

22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under

Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of

quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a  mini-

trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.

P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the

Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material

is available to proceed against the accused or not. If

sufficient material is available, the power under Section

482 should not be exercised.

Xxxx

27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law

by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the

credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints

and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be

shown that there exists no prima facie case against the

accused persons…”

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24. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct

a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are

correct or not.

25. It was submitted that the litigations are pending

between the parties, and this Court should read between the lines.

This submission will also not help the petitioners. Even if the FIR

is read carefully, it discloses prima facie that the petitioners had

trespassed into the property of the informant by committing

mischief. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR by

reading between the lines, and the judgment in Salib (supra) and

Usha Chakrabarti (supra) will not apply to the present case.

26. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge

sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the

matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v.

State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when

the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be

left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the

investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is

ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the

FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the

absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged

offences, we are of the view that the appellants should

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prefer a discharge application before the trial court under

Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We

say so because even according to the State, the

investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be

filed before the competent court. In such circumstances,

the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials

which the investigating officer might have collected

forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge

application is filed, the trial court shall look into the

materials and take a call whether any discharge case is

made out or not.”

27. No other point was urged.

28. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the

same is dismissed.

29. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the

miscellaneous applications, if any.

30. The observations made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,

whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

1

st

January, 2026

(Chander)