Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1999 OF 2013

(arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.2190 of 2012) 

SARASWATHY       …. APPELLANT

VERSUS

BABU      ….RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

Leave granted.  This appeal has been preferred  

by   the   appellant­wife   against   the   judgment   and 

order dated 13

th

  December, 2011 passed by the High  

Court  of  Judicature at  Madras.    By the  impugned  

judgment,   the   High   Court   dismissed   the   criminal 

revision   case   filed   by   the   appellant   and   thus 

affirmed the order of First Appellate Court.  

2.The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:

The parties to the present dispute are married  

to each other and the said marriage was solemnized  

on 17

th

 February, 2000.  According to the appellant,  

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Page 2 she brought 50 sovereign gold ornaments and 1 kg  

silver   articles   as   stridhan   also   Rs.10,000/­   was 

given   to   the   respondent.     After   marriage   the  

appellant lived in her matrimonial house at Padi,  

Chennai.   After four months of the marriage, the  

respondent­husband   and   his   family   demanded   more  

dowry in the form of cash and jewels. The appellant  

was   not   able   to   satisfy   the   said   demand.  

Therefore, she was thrown out of her matrimonial  

house by the respondent and her in­laws.   Another  

allegation of the appellant is that after sending  

out the appellant from her matrimonial house, the  

respondent­husband   intended   to   marry   again.   On  

hearing such rumour, the appellant filed petition  

under  Section  9 of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955  

(hereinafter referred to as, “the HM Act, 1955”)  

bearing  no.  H.M.O.P.  No. 216  of  2001  before  the  

Principal   Subordinate   Judge,   Chengalpattu,   Tamil  

Nadu for restitution of conjugal rights. 

The respondent­husband on the other hand filed  

H.M.O.P. No. 123 of 2002 under Section 13(1) (ia)  

and (iv) of the HMA Act, 1955 before the Principal  

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Page 3 Subordinate   Judge,   Chengalpattu,   Tamil   Nadu   for  

dissolution of marriage between the appellant and  

the respondent .

On   5

th

  April,   2006,   the   learned   Principal  

Subordinate   Judge,   Chengalpattu,   Tamil   Nadu  

dismissed the petition for dissolution of marriage  

filed   by   the   respondent­husband   and   allowed   the 

petition for restitution of conjugal rights filed  

by the appellant­wife with the condition that the  

appellant should  not  insist  for  setting up  of  a  

separate residence by leaving the matrimonial home  

of the respondent. 

In the year 2008, the appellant filed Crl. M.P.  

No. 2421 of 2008 before learned XIII Metropolitan  

Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai against the respondent  

seeking relief under Section 19, 20 and 22 of the  

Protection   of   Women   from   Domestic   Violence   Act, 

2005   (hereinafter   referred   to   as,   “the   PWD   Act, 

2005”).  The learned XIII Metropolitan Magistrate,  

Egmore,   Chennai   partly   allowed   the   same   and  

directed   the   respondent   to   give   maintenance   of 

Rs.2,000/­ per month to the appellant to meet out  

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Page 4 her   medical   expenses,   food,   shelter   and   clothing 

expenses.     The Magistrate Court’s held that the  

appellant   is   in   domestic   relationship   with   the 

respondent and the appellant being the wife of the  

respondent   has   a   right   to   reside   in   the   shared 

household.   The officer in charge of the nearest  

Police Station was directed to give protection to  

the appellant for implementation of the residence  

orders   and   was   also   directed   to   assist   in   the 

implementation of the protection order.  

The   respondent­husband   being   aggrieved  

preferred Criminal Appeal No. 339 of 2008 before  

the   Sessions   Court     (Vth   Additional   Judge)   at 

Chennai.  

In the meantime, as per the order passed by the  

XIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai the  

appellant­wife   went   to   her   matrimonial   house   for 

staying   with   the   respondent­husband   house   along  

with Protection Officer.   However, the respondent  

did not obey the order of the Court and refused to  

allow   the   appellant­wife   to   enter   the   house   and 

locked the door from outside and went out.  

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Page 5 On 22

nd

  December, 2008, the appellant filed a  

complaint   against   the   respondent   for   not   obeying 

the   order   of   the   learned   XIII   Metropolitan  

Magistrate,   Egmore,   Chennai   and   the   same   was  

registered in Ambatur T3 Korattur Police Station as  

FIR No. 947 of 2008 under Section 31,32 and 74 of  

the  PWD Act, 2005.  The case was committed to the  

learned   XIII   Metropolitan   Magistrate,   Egmore,  

Chennai   and   registered   as   Criminal   Miscellaneous 

Petition No. 636 of 2011.

In the meantime, the Criminal Appeal No. 339 of  

2008   filed   by   the   respondent­husband   was   partly 

allowed by the Sessions Court (Vth Addl. Judge) at  

Chennai on 21

st

  October, 2010. Sessions Courts by  

the said order set aside the order prohibiting the  

respondent­husband from committing acts of domestic  

violence   as   against   the   appellant­wife   by   not  

allowing her to live in the shared household and  

the order directing the respondent to reside in the  

house owned by respondent’s mother and upheld the  

order granting maintenance of Rs.2,000/­ per month  

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Page 6 in favour of the appellant­wife by the respondent­

husband. 

3.Aggrieved   by   the   aforesaid   order,   the  

appellant­wife   filed   Crl.   R.C.   No.   1321   of   2010 

before the High Court.   A criminal miscellaneous  

petition no.1 of 2010 was also filed in the said  

revision application.   On 23

rd

  December, 2010, the  

High Court  granted  an  interim stay to  the  above  

order   passed   by   the   learned   Sessions   Court   (Vth 

Addl. Judge) at Chennai.   

4.In the meantime, while the matter was pending  

before   the   High   Court,   the   learned     XIII  

Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai passed an  

order on 24

th

 February, 2011 in Crl. Misc. Petition  

No. 636 of 2011 (arising out of FIR No. 947 of  

2008)   and   directed   the   SHO,   Ambatur   T3   Korattur 

Police   Station   to   break   the   door   of   the  

respondent’s house in the presence of the Revenue  

Inspector and make accommodation for the appellant  

with further direction to the SHO to inquire about  

the   belongings   in   the   respondent’s   house   in  

presence of the family members of the respondent  

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Page 7 with further direction to submit the report to the  

respondent as well as the Protection Officer.  The  

respondent­husband thereafter filed a petition for  

vacating the order of stay dated 23

rd

 December, 2010 

and vide order dated 9

th

 March, 2011 the High Court  

vacated the order of stay and made it clear that  

appellant­wife can go and reside with her husband  

in his rental residence at Guduvancherry .   As the 

order   aforesaid   was   not   complied   with   by   the 

respondent­husband   the   appellant­wife   filed  

Contempt   Petition   No.   958   of   2011   against   the 

respondent­husband     for   wantonly   disobeying   the  

order   dated   9

th

  March,   2011   passed   by   the   High 

Court.  

5.The   High   Court   closed   the   contempt   petition 

vide   order   dated   21

st

  July,   2011   with   following 

observation:

“In view of the categorical submission made by  

the Ld. Counsel for the respondent as well as  

the statement made by the respondent herein by  

appearing before this court and stating that  

the respondent undertakes not to prevent the  

contempt petitioner from entering inside the  

premises at Door No. 80, Karpagambal Nagar,  

Nadivaram,   Guduvancherry,   Chennai   and   the  

contempt petitioner also agreed to occupy and  

stay   in   the   above   said   premises   from  

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Page 8 01.08.2011,   the   contempt   petition   is   hereby 

closed.”

6.Thereafter   the   appellant   made   representation  

before Sub Inspector of Police, Guduvancherry  and  

stated that the respondent­husband has given false  

address  and  in order  to  comply  with  the court’s  

order,  the  appellant  went  to  the  address  and on  

enquiry came to know that the address was a bogus  

one.   The appellant thereby submitted a complaint  

and   requested   the   police   to   enquire   from   the 

respondent  to  ascertain  the  real  facts  so  as to  

ensure that the court’s order is executed in its  

letter and spirit.  

7.When the matter was pending before the Police,  

the High Court decided the criminal miscellaneous  

case filed by the appellant and held that although  

the   offending   acts   of   the   respondent   could   be 

construed   as   offences   under   other   enactments   it 

could not be construed as acts of domestic violence  

under the PWD Act, 2005 until the Act came into  

force.     The   High   Court   dismissed   the   revisional 

application. 

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Page 9 8.From the bare perusal of the impugned judgment  

passed by the High Court, we find that the High  

Court framed the following question:

“4.  The   primary   question   that   arises   for  

consideration is whether acts committed prior  

to the coming  into force of the Protection of  

Women   from   Domestic   Violence   Act,   2005   and 

which fall within the definition of the term  

‘Domestic   Violence’   as   informed   in   the   Act 

could form the basis of an action.”

9.The High Court after taking into consideration  

the stand taken by the parties held as follows:

“5. This court would first concern itself with  

whether   acts   which   now   constitute   domestic  

violence but committed prior to the coming into  

force   of   the   Act   would   form   a   basis   of   an 

action   thereunder.     With   due   respect   to   the 

authorities   above   cited,   this   court   would  

inform   that   the   fundamental   issue   stands  

unaddressed.  The Act cam into force on 2005.  

It   cannot   be   disputed   that   several   wrongful 

actions which might have amounted to offences  

such   as   cruelty   and   demand   for   dowry   cannot 

have   taken   the   description   of   “Domestic  

violence”   till   such   time   the   act   came   into 

force.  In other words the offending acts could  

have   been   construed   as   offences   under   other 

enactments but could not have been construed as  

acts of ‘Domestic Violence’ until the act came  

into force.  Therefore, what was not ‘Domestic  

violence’ as defined in the Act till the Act  

came into force could not have formed the basis  

of an action.   Ignorance of law is no excuse  

but the application of this maxim on any date  

prior to the coming into force of the Act could  

only   have   imputed   knowledge   of   offence   as 

subsisted   prior   to   coming   into   force   of   the 

Act.  It is true that it is only violation of  

orders   passed   under   the   Act   which   are   made 

punishable.     But   those   very   orders   could   be 

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Page 10 passed only in the face of acts of domestic  

violence.   What constituted domestic violence  

was not known until the passage of the act and  

could not have formed the basis of a complaint  

of commission of ‘Domestic violence’.”

10.  From the judgment passed by the Trial Court  

(XIII   Metropolitan   Magistrate,   Egmore,   Chennai  

dated 5

th

 December, 2008) we find that the appellant  

filed   petition   against   her   husband   Babu   seeking 

relief under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 under the  

PWD Act, 2005.  Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 read as  

follows:

“18. Protection   orders.­The   Magistrate   may, 

after   giving   the   aggrieved   person   and   the 

respondent an opportunity of being heard and on  

being   prima   facie   satisfied   that   domestic  

violence has taken place or is likely to take  

place, pass a protection order in favour of the  

aggrieved   person   and   prohibit   the   respondent 

from­ 

(a) committing any act of domestic violence; 

(b)   aiding   or   abetting   in   the   commission   of 

acts of domestic violence; 

(c)   entering   the   place   of   employment   of   the 

aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is  

a   child,   its   school   or   any   other   place  

frequented by the aggrieved person; 

(d)   attempting   to   communicate   in   any   form, 

whatsoever,   with   the   aggrieved   person,  

including   personal,   oral   or   written   or  

electronic or telephonic contact; 

(e)   alienating   any   assets,   operating   bank  

lockers   or   bank   accounts   used   or   held   or 

enjoyed   by   both   the   parties,   jointly   by   the 

aggrieved person and the respondent or singly  

by the respondent, including her stridhan or  

any other property held either jointly by the  

10

Page 11 parties or separately by them without the leave  

of the Magistrate; 

(f) causing violence to the dependants, other  

relatives or any person who give the aggrieved  

person assistance from domestic violence; 

(g) committing any other act as specified in  

the protection order. 

19. Residence orders.­( 1) While disposing of an  

application   under   sub­section   (1)   of   section 

12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied that  

domestic   violence   has   taken   place,   pass   a 

residence order – 

(a)restraining   the   respondent   from  

dispossessing   or   in   any   other   manner  

disturbing   the  possession   of   the  aggrieved 

person from the shared household, whether or  

not the respondent has a legal or equitable  

interest in the shared household; 

(b)directing   the   respondent   to   remove  

himself from the shared household; 

(c)restraining the respondent or any of his  

relatives from entering any portion of the  

shared   household   in   which   the   aggrieved  

person resides; 

(d)restraining   the   respondent   from  

alienating   or   disposing   off   the   shared  

household or encumbering the same; 

(e)restraining   the   respondent   from  

renouncing   his   rights   in   the   shared  

household   except   with   the   leave   of   the 

Magistrate; or 

(f)directing the respondent to secure same  

level   of   alternate   accommodation   for   the 

aggrieved person as enjoyed  by her in the  

shared   household   or   to   pay   rent   for   the 

same, if the circumstances so require: 

Provided that no order under clause (b) shall  

be passed against any person who is a woman.

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Page 12 (2) The Magistrate may impose any additional 

conditions or pass any other direction which he  

may deem reasonably necessary to protect or to 

provide for the safety of the aggrieved person 

or any child of such aggrieved person. 

(3) The Magistrate may require from the 

respondent to execute a bond, with or without 

sureties, for preventing the commission of 

domestic violence. 

(4)   An   order   under   sub­section   (3)   shall   be 

deemed to be an order under Chapter VIII of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)  

and shall be dealt with accordingly. 

(5) While passing an order under sub­section  

(1), sub­section (2) or sub­section (3), the  

court   may   also   pass   an   order   directing   the 

officer in charge of the nearest police station  

to give protection to the aggrieved person or  

to   assist   her   or   the   person   making   an  

application on her behalf in the implementation  

of the order. 

(6)   While   making   an   order   under   sub­section 

(1),   the   Magistrate   may   impose   on   the  

respondent   obligations   relating   to   the  

discharge of rent and other payments, having  

regard to the financial needs and resources of  

the parties. 

(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in­

charge   of   the   police   station   in   whose  

jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached  

to   assist   in   the   implementation   of   the  

protection order. 

(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to  

return   to   the   possession   of   the   aggrieved 

person her stridhan or any other property or  

valuable security to which she is entitled to. 

20. Monetary reliefs. ­(1) While disposing of an  

application   under   sub­section   (1)   of   section 

12, the Magistrate may direct the respondent to  

pay   monetary   relief   to   meet   the   expenses  

incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved  

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Page 13 person and any child of the aggrieved person as  

a   result   of   the   domestic   violence   and   such 

relief may include, but not limited to,­

(a) the loss of earnings;

(b) the medical expenses;

(c)   the   loss   caused   due   to   the   destruction, 

damage   or   removal   of   any   property   from   the 

control of the aggrieved person; and

(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as  

well   as   her   children,   if   any,   including   an 

order   under   or   in   addition   to   an   order   of 

maintenance under section 125 of the Code of  

Criminal   Procedure,   1973(2   of   1974)   or   any 

other law for the time being in force.

(2)   The   monetary   relief   granted   under   this 

section shall be adequate, fair and reasonable  

and consistent with the standard of living to  

which the aggrieved person is accustomed.

(3)   The   Magistrate   shall   have   the   power   to 

order   an   appropriate   lump   sum   payment   or  

monthly payments of maintenance, as the nature  

and circumstances of the case may require.

(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the  

order   for   monetary   relief   made   under   sub­

section (1) to the parties to the application  

and   to   the   in­charge   of   the   police   station 

within the local limits of whose jurisdiction  

the respondent resides.

(5)   The   respondent   shall   pay   the   monetary 

relief granted to the aggrieved person within  

the period specified in the order under sub­

section (1).

(6)   Upon   the   failure   on   the   part   of   the 

respondent   to   make   payment   in   terms   of   the 

order under sub­section (1), the Magistrate may  

direct   the   employer   or   a   debtor   of   the  

respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved  

person or to deposit with the court a portion  

of   the   wages   or   salaries   or   debt   due   to   or 

accrued to the credit of the respondent, which  

amount   may   be   adjusted   towards   the   monetary 

relief payable by the respondent. 

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Page 14 22. Compensation orders. ­In addition to other  

reliefs as may be granted under this Act, the  

Magistrate may on an application being made by  

the aggrieved person, pass an order directing  

the respondent to pay compensation and damages  

for the injuries, including mental torture and  

emotional   distress,   caused   by   the   acts   of 

domestic   violence   committed   by   that  

respondent.” 

11.The Trial Court having noticed the provisions  

of PWD Act, 2005 and the fact that the appellant­

wife   was   prevented   by   the   respondent­husband   to 

enter the matrimonial house even after the order  

passed by the Subordinate Judge, granted protection  

under   Section   18   with   further   direction   to   the 

respondent­husband   under   Section   19   to   allow   the 

appellant­wife to enter in the shared household and  

not to disturb the possession of the appellant­wife  

and to pay maintenance of Rs.2,000/­ per month to  

meet her medical expenses, food and other expenses.  

However, no compensation or damages was granted in  

favour of the appellant­wife.  

Notices   were   issued   on   the   respondent   but 

inspite of service, no affidavit has been filed by  

the respondent denying the averments made in the  

petition. 

14

Page 15 12.Section   2   (g)   of   PWD   Act,   2005   states   that 

“domestic   violence”   has   the   same   meaning   as  

assigned   to   it   in   Section   3   of   PWD   Act,   2005. 

Section 3 is the definition of domestic violence.  

Clause   (iv)   of   Section   3   relates   to   “economic 

abuse” which includes prohibition or restriction to  

continued access to resources or facilities which  

the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by  

virtue   of   the   domestic   relationship   including  

access   to   the   shared   household   as   evident   from 

clause (c) of Section 3(iv).

13.In the present case, in view of the fact that  

even   after   the   order   passed   by   the   Subordinate 

Judge   the   respondent­husband   has   not   allowed   the 

appellant­wife   to   reside   in   the   shared   household 

matrimonial   house,   we   hold   that   there   is   a  

continuance of domestic violence committed by the  

respondent­husband against the appellant­wife.   In  

view of the such continued domestic violence, it is  

not   necessary   for   the   courts   below   to   decide 

whether the domestic violence is committed prior to  

the coming into force of the Protection of Women  

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Page 16 from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and whether such  

act   falls   within   the   definition   of   the   term  

‘Domestic Violence’ as defined under Section 3 of  

the PWD Act, 2005. 

14.The other issue that whether the conduct of the  

parties even prior to the commencement of the PWD  

Act, 2005 could be taken into consideration while  

passing an order under Sections 18, 19 and 20 fell  

for consideration before this Court in  V.D. Bhanot 

v. Savita Bhanot (2012) 3 SCC 183.    In the said 

case, this Court held as follows:

“12. We agree with the view expressed by the  

High Court that in looking into a complaint  

under Section 12 of the PWD Act, 2005, the  

conduct   of   the   parties   even   prior   to   the 

coming into force of the PWD Act, could be  

taken   into   consideration   while   passing   an  

order under Section 18, 19 and 20 thereof.  In  

our   view,   the   Delhi   High   Court   has   also 

rightly   held   that   even   if   a   wife,   who   had 

shared a household in the past, but was no  

longer doing so when the Act came into force,  

would still be entitled to the protection of  

the PWD Act, 2005,”

15.We   are   of   the   view   that   the   act   of   the 

respondent­husband squarely comes within the ambit  

of Section 3 of the PWD Act, 2005, which defines  

“domestic violence” in wide term.   The High Court  

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Page 17 made an apparent error in  holding that the conduct  

of the parties prior to the coming into force PWD  

Act, 2005 cannot be taken into consideration while  

passing   an   order.     This   is   a   case   where   the 

respondent­husband has not complied with the order  

and  direction  passed  by  the  Trial  Court and  the  

Appellate   Court.   He   also   misleads   the   Court   by 

giving wrong statement before the High Court in the  

contempt petition filed by the appellant­wife. The  

appellant­wife having being harassed since 2000 is  

entitled for protection orders and residence orders  

under Section 18 and 19 of the PWD, Act, 2005 along  

with the maintenance as allowed by the Trial Court  

under Section 20 (d) of the PWD, Act, 2005.  Apart  

from   these   reliefs,   she   is   also   entitled   for 

compensation   and   damages   for   the   injuries,  

including   mental   torture   and   emotional   distress, 

caused by the acts of domestic violence committed  

by the respondent­husband.  Therefore, in addition  

to the reliefs granted by the courts below, we are  

of   the   view   that   the   appellant­wife   should   be 

compensated by the respondent­husband. Hence, the  

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Page 18 respondent is hereby directed to pay compensation  

and   damages   to   the   extent   of   Rs.5,00,000/­   in 

favour of the appellant­wife.  

16.The order passed by the High Court is set aside  

with   a   direction   to   the   respondent­husband   to  

comply with the orders and directions passed by the  

courts   below   with   regard   to   residence   and  

maintenance   within   three   months.   The   respondent­

husband   is   further   directed   to   pay   a   sum   of 

Rs.5,00,000/­   in   favour   of   the   appellant­wife  

within six months from the date of this order.  The  

appeal is allowed with aforesaid observations and  

directions.   However, there shall be no separate  

order as to costs. 

………..………………………………………..J.

        (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

………………………………………………….J.

             (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI,

NOVEMBER  25, 2013.

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