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116

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

Date of decision : 13.08.2025

1. CR-4050-2011

2. CR-2715-2017

Sarwan Singh (since deceased) through his LRs. ....Petitioner

Versus

Rajesh Vij (Vig) ....Respondent

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ JAIN

Present : Mr. Arun K. Bakshi, Advocate

for the petitioner.

Mr. A.S. Walia, Advocate

for the respondent.

PANKAJ JAIN, J. (ORAL)

Landlord is in revision aggrieved of order passed by Rent

Controller whereby his application under Section 13-B the East Punjab

Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to ‘the Act of 1949’)

seeking eviction of the respondent/tenant from the premises owned by him,

has been ordered to be dismissed. Along with revision, the landlord has

filed application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, 1908 seeking permission to

lead additional evidence to prove his status as Non-Resident Indian to enure

benefit under Section 13-B of the Act of 1949.

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2. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the document i.e.

passport of the petitioner sought to be proved by leading additional

evidence, is necessary for the adjudication of the matter in hand but the same

could not be produced before the Trial Court in original. The petitioner has

been non-suited only on the ground that the original passport was not

produced. He thus prays for proving the passport by leading additional

evidence before this Court. Mr. Bakshi submits that he is in possession of

the original passport of the revision petitioner. The attested copy thereof has

already been placed on record.

2.1. In the main revision, Mr. Bakshi submits that the landlord along

with his affidavit before the Rent Controller, tendered attested copy of

passport, he proved his status of Non Resident Indian. Mr. Bakshi further

submits that the Rent Controller erred in holding that the bona fide need of

the landlord is not proved merely by referring to his testimony that he was

sowing and reaping potato crop in England. Mr. Bakshi submits that the

petitioner/landlord is 60 years of age. He wishes to come back to India for

which the present petition was filed seeking eviction of the tenant from the

shop. During the time the petition remained pending before Rent Controller,

landlord was not expected to sit idle. He thus submits that both the findings

recorded by the Rent Controller regarding the petitioner having failed to

prove his status as NRI and his need being not proved, cannot be sustained

and need to be reversed.

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3. Per contra, Mr. Walia submits that apart from a bald plea

pleaded in the application that despite due diligence the passport could not

be produced before the Rent Controller in original, no reason has been

assigned. Thus, allowing the application for additional evidence at this stage

would amount to filling up of lacuna which is beyond the scope of revisional

jurisdiction of this Court and Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, 1908.

3.1. In the main revision, Mr. Walia has supported the findings

recorded by the Rent Controller. It has been contended by him that the need

projected by landlord has ceased to exist as he died during the pendency of

eviction proceedings. Landlord failed to prove that he is an NRI which is

primary requirement to invoke Section 13-B of the 1949 Act.

4. I have heard counsel for the parties and have carefully gone

through records of the case.

5. Present eviction petition has been filed under Section 13-B of

the 1949 Act by the petitioner asserting his status as Non-Resident Indian.

The procedure for disposal of the petitions filed under Section 13-B has been

provided under Section 18-A. Section 18-A(9) provides that the procedure

for the disposal of an application for eviction under Section 13-A or Section

13-B shall be the same as the procedure for the disposal of applications by

the Controller. Section 18-A(7) which is a non-obstante clause provides that

notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the Controller while holding

an inquiry in a proceeding to which this section applies including the

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recording of evidence, shall follow the practice and procedure of a Court of

Small Causes. Section 18-B mandates that Section 18-A shall have

overriding effect over anything inconsistent contained in 1949 Act or any

other law.

6. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it amply

clear that the inquiry provided to be conducted by the Rent Controller in

petitions filed under Section 13-B, is summary in nature. The strict

principles of evidence are not applicable.

7. Perusal of the affidavit filed by the petitioner before the Rent

Controller in his examination-in-chief demonstrates that attested copy of

passport was tendered in evidence. The same was admitted in evidence

without any objection. Petitioner was subjected to lengthy cross-

examination wherein no suggestion w.r.t. passport exhibited and tendered in

evidence, was raised. No suggestion was put to the petitioner that he is not

holding a valid passport of United Kingdom.

7.1. Apart from that, this Court finds that passport is not the only

mode to prove that the landlord is Non-Resident Indian. In the present case,

Special Power of Attorney, in original, has come on record which is Exhibit

P-2. The same shows that Sarwan Singh landlord was residing at London at

the time of execution of Power of Attorney. The Power of Attorney was

attested by Notary Public at Erith Kent in England. The same was also

embossed by High Commission of India, London. All these documents have

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been ignored by the Rent Controller which prove that the petitioner-landlord

was resident of England at the time of filing the eviction petition. His origin

as Indian is not in dispute.

8. In view of above, this Court finds that the Rent Controller erred

in non-suiting the petitioner holding that he is not a Non-Resident Indian

merely for the reason that the original passport was not tendered even

though attested copy thereof was tendered. Overwhelming evidence in form

of Power of Attorney has been ignored. Rent Controller ought to have

approached the issue in a more holistic manner.

9. The procedure and the mode of inquiry to be conducted by the

Rent Controller and the ingredients of Section 13-B that need to be satisfied

by the landlord to succeed in proceedings under Section 13-B, have been

elaborately explained by Supreme Court in the case of ‘Baldev Singh

Bajwa vs. Monish Saini’, (2005) 12 SCC 778, observing as under:

“18.From the aforesaid decisions the requirement of the

landlord of the suit accommodation is to be established as a

genuine need and not a pretext to get the accommodation vacated.

The provisions of Sections 18-A(4) and (5) concede to the tenant's

right to defend the proceedings initiated under Section 13-B

showing that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine or bona

fide. The legislative intent for setting up of a special procedure for

NRI landlords is obvious from the legislative text which has been

deliberately designed making distinction between the ordinary

landlords and special category of landlords. The Controller's power

to give leave to contest the application filed under Section 13-B is

restricted by the condition that the affidavit filed by the tenant

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discloses such fact as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining

an order for recovery of possession. It is needless to say that in the

summary proceedings the tenant's right to contest the application

would be restricted to the parameters of Section 13-B of the Act.

He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying on any other

fact which does not fall within the parameters of Section 13-B. The

tenant's defence is restricted and cannot go beyond the scope of the

provisions of the Act applicable to the NRI landlord. Under

Section 13-B the landlord is entitled to eviction if he requires the

suit accommodation for his or her use or the use of the dependant,

who ordinarily lives with him or her. The requirement would

necessarily have to be genuine or bona fide requirement and it

cannot be said that although the requirement is not genuine or bona

fide, he would be entitled to the ejectment of the tenant nor can it

be said that in no circumstances will the tenant not be allowed to

prove that the requirement of the landlord is not genuine or bona

fide. A tenant's right to defend the claim of the landlord under

Section 13-B for ejectment would arise if the tenant could be able

to show that the landlord in the proceedings is not an NRI landlord;

that he is not the owner thereof or that his ownership is not for the

required period of five years before the institution of proceedings

and that the landlord's requirement is not bona fide.

19.The legislative intent of expeditious disposal of the

application for ejectment of the tenant filed by the NRI landlord is

reflected from the summary procedure prescribed under Section

18-A of the Act of 1949 which requires the Controller to take up

the matter on a day-to-day basis till the conclusion of the hearing

of an application. The legislature wants the decision of the

Controller to be final and does not provide any appeal or second

appeal against the order of eviction; it is only the High Court

which can exercise the power of consideration of the case, whether

the decision of the Controller is in accordance with law. Section

13-B gives right of ejectment to a special category of landlord who

is NRI (non-resident Indian); and owner of the premises for five

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years before action is commenced. Such a landlord is permitted to

file an application for ejectment only once during his lifetime. Sub-

section (3) of Section 13-B imposes a restriction that he shall not

transfer through sale or any other means or lease out the ejected

premises before the expiry of the period of five years from the date

of taking possession of the said building. Not only that, if there is a

breach of any of the conditions of sub-section (3) of Section 13-B,

the tenant is given a right of restoration of possession of the said

building. Under sub-section (2-B) of Section 19 the landlord has to

take possession and keep it for a continuous period of three months

and he is prohibited from letting out the whole or any part of such

building to any other person except the evicted tenant and on any

contravention thereof, he shall be liable for punishment of

imprisonment for a term which can be extended up to six months.

These restrictions and conditions inculcate inbuilt strong

presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine. The landlord,

after the decree for possession, is bound to possess the

accommodation. The landlord is prohibited from transferring it or

letting it out for a period of five years. The conditions and

restrictions imposed on the NRI landlord make it virtually

improbable for any NRI landlord to approach the court for

ejectment of a tenant unless his need is bona fide. No unscrupulous

landlord probably, under this section, would approach the court for

ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed

on him by which he is practically deprived of his right in the

property not only as a lessor but also as the owner of the property.

There is a restriction imposed even on the transfer of the property

by sale or any other manner. The restriction imposed on the

landlord in all probability points to the genuine requirement of the

landlord. In our view there are inbuilt protections in the relevant

provisions for the tenants that whenever the landlord would

approach the court he would approach when his need is genuine

and bona fide. It is, of course, subject to the tenant's right to rebut

it but with strong and cogent evidence. In our view, in the

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proceeding taken up under Section 13-B by the NRI landlords for

the ejectment of the tenant, the court shall presume that the

landlord's need pleaded in the petition is genuine and bona fide.

But this would not disentitle the tenant from proving that in fact

and in law the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. A heavy

burden would lie on the tenant to prove that the requirement of the

landlord is not genuine. To prove this fact the tenant will be called

upon to give all the necessary facts and particulars supported by

documentary evidence, if available, to support his plea in the

affidavit itself so that the Controller will be in a position to

adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bona fide

requirement of the landlord. A mere assertion on the part of the

tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in

the landlord's favour that his requirement of occupation of the

premises is real and genuine.

21.The golden rule of construction is that when the words of

the legislation are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to

them. The basic principle on which this rule is based is that since

the words must have spoken as clearly to legislatures, as to judges,

it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the

words plainly say. The legislative intent of the enactment may be

gathered from several sources which are, from the statute itself,

from the preamble to the statute, from the Statement of Objects and

Reasons, from the legislative debates, reports of committees and

commissions which preceded the legislation and finally from all

legitimate and admissible sources from where they may be

allowed. Reference may be had to legislative history and latest

legislation also. But the primary rule of construction would be to

ascertain the plain language used in the enactment which advances

the purpose and object of the legislation. No doubt the legislative

intent in enacting Section 13-B is to provide for immediate

possession of the accommodation owned by the NRI, but it cannot

be assumed that the legislature wants the NRI landlord/owner to

get the possession of the accommodation from the tenant even if he

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does not require it, and the need pleaded is proved to be a mere

pretext to get the accommodation vacated. Had that not been the

intention of the legislatures, the word “required” by the NRI

landlord would not have been used in Section 13-B. The classified

landlords are given the benefit of summary trial under Section 18-

A of the Act. The summary trial is in two parts. Sub-section (4)

provides that after the service of summons the tenant has no right

to contest the prayer for eviction from the residential building, or

scheduled building and/or non-residential building, as the case may

be, unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he

seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from

the Controller as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 13-B to

contest the matter. If the tenant defaults to appear in pursuance of

summons or when he does not get leave to contest, the Controller

shall presume that the statements made by the NRI in his petition

have been admitted by the tenant and pass an order of eviction.

This eventuality is contemplated when a tenant does not appear in

pursuance of the summons issued and served or where the leave to

contest has not been granted by the Controller. The second facet of

the section comes into operation when the leave to contest is

granted by the Controller. Sub-section (6) of Section 18-A

provides that the Controller has to commence the hearing of the

petition not later than one month from the date on which the leave

was granted to the tenant to contest and he has to hear the

application from day to day till the hearing is concluded and the

application is decided. It is further provided that the procedure

which shall be followed in deciding the application would be as is

being practised by the Court of Small Causes. No appeal or second

appeal is provided. From the aforesaid, it is absolutely apparent

that even when leave would be given to the tenant to contest, the

legislature has taken care of expeditious disposal of the petition for

ejectment filed by the NRI landlord. Trial of the issue of bona fide

requirement of the landlord in the procedure prescribed would not

take much time and thus we cannot accept the argument that the

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word “required” used by the legislature in Section 13-B would not

mean bona fide or genuine requirement and the section has to be

construed as and when the allegation is made by the landlord of his

need, it is to be taken as the gospel truth and the tenant's right to

defend on that count is completely extinguished and given a go-by.

We do not think the High Court is right in holding that mere prayer

of the NRI landlord that tenanted premises are required by him or

his dependant living with him entails decree of eviction on the

mere allegation of requirement and no leave to contest can be

given in respect of cases which are covered by various provisions

restricting the right of the landlord to deal with the premises taken

possession of by him in pursuance of the decree for eviction passed

by the Controller under Section 13-B of the Act of 1949. We hold

that allegations made by the NRI landlord of his requirement shall

be presumed to be genuine and bona fide unless rebutted by the

tenant by placement of cogent and material facts and evidence in

support thereof at the stage of “leave to contest” before the

Controller. We feel that any other interpretation would completely

whittle down and deny the tenant's right to show and prove that the

landlord does not in fact, or in law require the suit premises.

22.It is further contended that for according relief under

Section 13-B of the Act of 1949, it must be proved by the NRI

landlord that he has permanently returned to India or that his

intentions are to permanently return to India. That the intention to

permanently settle down in India should be read into the word

“return” used in Section 13-B. That the specific category of NRI

landlord has been created by the legislature with the intention to

provide relief to them who are intending to settle down in India or

take up business in India only. Learned counsel appearing for the

landlords have submitted that from the very definition of NRI in

Section 2(dd) of the Act, it is not necessary for the NRI landlord to

permanently return to India either for the purpose of his residence

or for non-residential purpose.

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23.Definition of “non-resident Indian” (NRI) under the Act

contemplates that any person who is of an Indian origin, and who

has settled either permanently or temporarily outside India for

taking up employment; or for carrying on a business or vocation

outside India; or for any other purpose in such circumstances as

would indicate to stay outside India for an uncertain period, would

be a non-resident Indian. Thus to be an NRI, it is sufficient that a

person of Indian origin establishes that he has permanently or

temporarily settled outside India for his business or on account of

his employment, or for any other purpose which would indicate his

intention to stay outside India for an uncertain period. Therefore,

any person who has gone out of India and temporarily settled there

for the purposes of undertaking certain course or degree of a

university would not be an NRI because his stay could not be said

to be for an uncertain period. A person to be an NRI, first should

be of an Indian origin. The phrase “Indian origin” has not been

defined in the Act of 1949. In the dictionary and in ordinary

parlance the word “origin” refers to a person's parentage or

ancestry. A person whose parents, grandparents, or great-

grandparents were born in India and permanently resided in India

would be an NRI for the purposes of the Act of 1949. It is not

necessary that the person should be a citizen of India and should

have shifted to a foreign country or that because he holds foreign

passport he would not be NRI. In the appeals before us, there is no

challenge that the landlords are not NRIs within the meaning of the

Act because they do not have Indian origin. Submissions of the

learned counsel for the appellants is that to bring the case within

the four corners of Sections 2(dd) and 13-B of the Act of 1949, it is

necessary that NRI has to return to India permanently. We are

unable to agree with the interpretation of Sections 2(dd) and 13-B

sought to be placed thereon by the learned counsel. Return to India

could not be read as return to India permanently with an intention

to settle in India permanently. If we read the phrase “return to

India” along with the definition of “NRI” under Section 2(dd) of

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the Act, it is clear that in the special category of landlords “NRI”

could also be a person who has settled permanently outside India.

Thus a permanent resident outside India being an NRI can claim

ejectment.

24.When we read Section 13-B along with the definition of

NRI it is apparent that a person who is permanently residing

outside India can also claim possession under Section 13-B of the

Act. All that is required under Section 13-B is that an NRI should

return to India and claim the premises for his/her use or for the use

of any dependant ordinarily living with him. There is no

requirement that he has permanently settled in India on his return

or he has returned to India with an intention to permanently settle

in India. An NRI may require the accommodation for expansion of

his business which he is carrying on in another country or requires

the accommodation for his temporary stay. Under Section 13-B, an

NRI can also claim ejectment of the tenant from the premises for

the purposes of any other person who is dependant on him and is

ordinarily living with him, which makes it clear that although an

NRI resides permanently in another country, he could get the

accommodation vacated for the need of his dependant who

ordinarily lives with him and he intends to come to India, choosing

it to be his permanent abode. We do not find any substance in the

submissions made by the learned counsel that the words “return to

India” under Section 13-B of the Act denotes return to India

permanently.

25.On the interpretation given by us and on a plain reading of

the provisions, once in a lifetime possession is given to an NRI to

get one building vacated in a summary manner. A non-resident

Indian landlord is required to prove that: (i) he is an NRI; (ii) that

he has returned to India permanently or for a temporary period;

(iii) requirement of the accommodation by him or his dependant is

genuine; and (iv) he is the owner of the property for the last five

years before the institution of the proceedings for ejectment before

the Controller. The tenant's affidavit asking for leave to contest the

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NRI landlord's application should confine itself to the grounds

which NRI landlord is required to prove, to get ejectment under

Section 13-B of the Act. The Controller's power to give leave to

contest the application filed under Section 13-B is circumscribed to

the grounds and inquiry on the aspects specified in Section 13-B.

The tenant would be entitled for leave to contest only if he makes a

strong case to challenge those grounds. Inquiry would be confined

to Section 13-B and no other aspect shall be considered by the

Controller.”

10. The landlord appeared as PW-1. Paras 3 & 4 of his

Examination-in-Chief by way of affidavit, read as under:

“3. That the deponent is a Non-Resident Indian now living in

England at the address mentioned above. The deponent has retired

from his job in England. The Deponent has decided to return to

India with a view to finally & permanently settle in India in his

native city where he finds his roots. Deponent wishes and has

planned to set up his own reasonably good business for earning his

livelihood. The deponent has working and in-depth knowledge of

business of running a restaurant dealing in various specialities

prepared of Fish and Potato chips. A nephew of the deponent runs

a restaurant in England under the name and style of FISH 'N'

CHIPS where the deponent is providing helping hand to him quite

often. The deponent plans to open a reasonably good restaurant at

the building in question comprising of three shops after its

ejectment and run his business after employing trained staff. The

location of the building in question is absolutely fit for the said

business and I do not want to waste my hard earned money in

purchasing land for setting up my business. The deponent has

sufficient funds, appropriate links & contacts as well as working

knowledge of this business and enough time for its management.

For that purpose the deponent needs the whole building mentioned

above the purposes of setting up his own business mentioned

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above. The shop No.5 let out to the predecessor in interest of the

respondent and now in possession of the respondent forms a part

and parcel of the building required by the deponent for the above

said purpose. The deponent requires the same building for his own

use mentioned above and will start his business immediately after

getting possession of the same.

4. That the deponent has no other property in the Jalandhar

City that may be suitable and appropriate for the above said

purpose and this is the single building owned by the deponent in

Jalandhar City and is required by the deponent for his own use and

occupation as mentioned above. The deponent made a request to

deliver the possession of the shop No.5 to the deponent but he

failed to do the needful hence the present ejectment petition.”

11. Landlord was subjected to cross-examination at length. In

whole of the examination, there is not even a whisper about his need

projected in Examination-in-Chief. Merely for the reason that the tenant

admitted that landlord is working as a farm labour in England and is sowing

and reaping potato crop, his need projected in the eviction petition, cannot

be held to be not genuine.

12. At this stage, counsel for the tenant relies upon ratio of law laid

down by Supreme Court in the case of ‘Hindustan Petroleum Corporation

Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh’, (2014) 9 SCC 78, to submit that findings of fact

recorded by the Courts below need not be interfered in the revision petition.

13. There can’t be any quarrel with the proposition laid down by

Constitution Bench in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.’s case

(supra). Revisional power as contemplated under 1949 Act, cannot be

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equated with appellate jurisdiction. However, wherever the Court finds that

the impugned order suffered from perversity, the Court is well within its

jurisdiction to exercise the revisional jurisdiction.

14. In the present case, this Court finds that merely for non-

production of original passport, the Rent Controller wrongly non-suited the

landlord and ignored other cogent evidence on record. In order to rebut

presumption attached to the bona fide need pleaded by landlord under

Section 13-B, tenant was required to make out much stronger case. He has

failed to do so. The finding recorded by the Rent Controller regarding bona

fide need projected by the landlord being absent merely for the reason that

the landlord is sowing crops in England, also cannot be sustained.

14.1. Death of landlord also does not help the case of tenant. Rights

of parties got crystallized on the day the eviction petition was filed.

Landlord cannot be denied fruits of provision for the reason the matter

remained pending before the courts.

15. In view thereof, this Court finds that the present revision

petition merits acceptance.

16. The other issue involved in the other revision petition i.e., CR-

2715-2017, is regarding ownership of Sarwan Singh over the suit property.

17. In the present proceedings, Rent Controller has rightly returned

the finding that the landlord Sarwan Singh is owner of demised premises. In

the subsequent eviction petition filed under Section 13 of the 1949 Act, the

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findings recorded are otherwise. This Court finds that once landlord has

produced sale deed on record which is admittedly not subject matter of any

challenge by the erstwhile owner/landlord, Sarwan Singh being owner of the

premises cannot be denied his status of landlord qua the premises in view of

‘doctrine of paramount title holder’.

18. In view of above, the present revision petition (CR-4050-2011)

is allowed.

19. Since the revision petition bearing CR No.4050 of 2011 is

allowed, CR No.2715 of 2017 has been rendered infructuous. The same is

ordered to be disposed off.

20. Ordered accordingly.

21. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.

22. A copy of this order be kept on the file of other connected case.

August 13, 2025 (Pankaj Jain)

Dpr Judge

Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No

Whether reportable : Yes/No