IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA 

AT CHANDIGARH 

267 

               CRM-M-64003-2023 (O&M) 

           Date of decision: 25.09.2025  

SATWINDER SINGH                             ...Petitioner

VERSUS 

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER                         ...Respondents 

CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE  VINOD S. BHARDWAJ 

Present :-  Mr. Rajan Singh Dadwal, Advocate  

    for the petitioner.  

    Mr. Saurav Verma, Addl. A.G. Punjab. 

           *****     

VINOD S. BHARDWAJ, J. (Oral) 

1.    The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for seeking quashing of FIR No. 89 

dated  23.05.1999  registered  under  Section  15  of  the  Indian  Medical 

Council Act, 1956 and Section 26 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 

at Police Station Jagraon, District Ludhiana (Annexure P-1) together with 

all consequential proceedings arising therefrom qua the petitioner. 

2.    The present FIR has been registered against the petitioner

along with thirty-four other individuals on the basis of a communication

addressed by the Civil Surgeon, Ludhiana to the Senior Superintendent of

Police, Ludhiana. The said communication was issued pursuant to the

directions passed by this Hon’ble Court in C.W.P. No. 1696 of 1997,

pertaining to the matter of unregistered doctors practicing within the

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States of Punjab, Haryana, and the Union Territory of Chandigarh.

Pursuant thereto, the instant FIR came to be registered under Section 15 of

the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, and Section 26 of the Drugs and

Cosmetics Act, 1940, at Police Station Jagraon, District Ludhiana.

3. Counsel for the petitioner contends that, till date, no challan

has been presented by the investigating agency in connection with the

present FIR, which, in itself, fortifies the inference that no incriminating

material has been gathered against the petitioner in respect of the offences

alleged therein. It is further observed that despite the lapse of more than

twenty-four years since the registration of the FIR, the investigating

agency has failed to file the challan. Such inaction on the part of the

prosecution is a clear infraction of the petitioner’s fundamental right

guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which

encompasses within its ambit the right to a speedy trial and the right to

fair and timely justice.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the peti tioner

contends that the petitioner intends to travel abroad; however, the Ministry

of External Affairs has declined to process his application for issuance of

a passport owing to the pendency of the present FIR. It is submitted that

the impugned FIR along with all consequential proceedings arising

therefrom, is liable to be quashed as the same constitutes a sheer abuse of

the process of law. It is further argued that the petitioner has been falsely

CRM-M-64003 of 2023 -3-

implicated in the present case without any material to substantiate the

allegations made against him.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent has submitted that the contention of the petitioner regarding

non-filing of the challan is misplaced, inasmuch as the challan in the

present case already stands filed in the year 2024. It is thus submitted that

the investigation has culminated in the filing of the final report, and

therefore, the prayer for quashing of the FIR on the ground of delay or

inaction by the investigating agency does not merit consideration.

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner rebuts

the submission made by the learned state counsel and submits that filing

of the challan in 2024, after an inordinate delay of 25 years, would not

cure the violation of the petitioner ’s fundamental right to a speedy trial

guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is argued that

the filing of the challan after an inordinate delay of twenty-five years,

coupled with the fact that charges have not yet been framed, amounts to a

gross infraction of the petitioner ’s constitutional rights and renders the

continuation of the proceedings wholly unjustified.

7. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary, State

of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81, wherein it was held that a speedy trial is of the

essence of the administration of criminal justice and is implicit in the

CRM-M-64003 of 2023 -4-

broad sweep of Article 21 of the Constitution. It was observed that if a

person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure that is not “reasonable,

fair and just,” such deprivation would be violative of Article 21, entitling

the aggrieved person to enforce his fundamental right and seek relief. The

Court further emphasized that a “speedy trial” is an integral and essential

component of the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21.

Reliance is also placed upon the judgment of the Hon ’ble Supreme Court

in Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., (1992) 1 SCC

225, wherein it was held that every citizen has a right to a speedy trial in

criminal proceedings and that this right extends not only to the trial before

the court but also to the preceding stages of police investigation. It was

reiterated that the right to a speedy trial is an inalienable facet of Article

21 and applies to all categories of criminal prosecutions. The Court, while

delineating the outlines of this right, observed that the determination of its

violation must be made by balancing the attendant circumstances of each

case.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that, in

view of the bar imposed under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973, the cognizance of offences alleged in the present FIR is

legally untenable. It is submitted that none of the offences in question are

punishable with imprisonment exceeding one year, and therefore, the

limitation period for taking cognizance was confined to one year from the

CRM-M-64003 of 2023 -5-

date of the alleged offence. Consequently, any cognizance sought to be

taken after the expiry of the said limitation period stands barred by law. In

the instant case, the FIR was registered on 23.05.1999, and as per Section

469 Cr.P.C., the period of limitation commences from the date of the

offence. The prolonged inaction of the investigating agency, culminating

in the belated filing of the challan after twenty-five years, cannot revive

the limitation period nor vest the Court with jurisdiction to take

cognizance. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Hon ’ble

Court in Hakam Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, 1987 Cri. L.J. 1332,

wherein it was held that the Court is prohibited from taking cognizance of

an offence after the expiry of the limitation period prescribed under

Section 468 Cr.P.C., unless such delay is condoned upon sufficient cause

being shown. The bar under Section 468 operates against the Court and

not against the investigating agency; hence, even if the investigation

continues, the Court remains precluded from taking cognizance beyond

the prescribed limitation period. Further reliance has been placed on the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrs. Sarah Mathew v. The

Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 1 R.C.R. (Criminal) 590,

wherein it was held that, for the purpose of computing the limitation under

Section 468 Cr.P.C., the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint

or institution of the prosecution, and not the date on which the Magistrate

takes cognizance. Applying this principle to the present case, the date of

institution of prosecution being 23.05.1999 i.e. the date of registration of

CRM-M-64003 of 2023 -6-

the FIR, it is evident that the limitation period for cognizance has long

expired.

9. To sum up his arguments, the learned counsel has placed

reliance upon the judgment of the Hon ’ble Supreme Court in State of

Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1991 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 383,

wherein categories were laid down delineating circumstances under which

the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482

Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the process of law and to secure the ends of

justice. It is contended that the present case squarely falls within those

parameters, warranting the quashing of the FIR and all consequential

proceedings thereto.

10. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and

have also gone through the documents appended with the present petition.

11. At the outset, a specific query is posed to the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent-State as to the reasons occasioning

the inordinate delay of twenty-five years in the filing of the challan

subsequent to the registration of the present FIR. The learned counsel,

however, was unable to furnish any satisfactory explanation for the said

delay. It would be apposite, at this stage, to refer to the relevant provision

that are involved in the present case:

INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL ACT, 1956

Section 15 - Right of persons possessing

qualifications in the schedules to be enrolled.

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1. Subject to the other provisions contained in this

Act, the medical qualifications included in the

Schedules shall be sufficient qualification for

enrolment on any State Medical Register.

2. Save as provided in section 25, no person other

than a medical practitioner enrolled on a State

Medical Register:-

a. shall hold office as physician or surgeon or any

other office (by whatever designation called) in

Government or in any institution maintained by a local

or other authority;

b. shall practice medicine in any State;

c. shall be entitled to sign or authenticate a

medical or fitness certificate or any other

certificate required by any law to be signed or

authenticated by a duly qualified medical practitioner:

d. shall be entitled to give evidence at any inquest

or in any court of law as an expert under section 45 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 on any matter relating

to medicine.

3. Any person who acts in contravention of any

provision of sub-section (2) shall be punished with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year

or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees,

or with both;

DRUGS & COSMETICS ACT, 1940

CRM-M-64003 of 2023 -8-

Section 26 - Purchaser of drug or cosmetic enabled to 

obtain  test  or  analysis.—Any  person  [or  any 

recognised consumer association, whether such person 

is  a  member  of  that  association  or  not,]  shall,  on 

application in the prescribed manner and on payment 

of the prescribed fee, be entitled to submit for test or 

analysis  to  a  Government  Analyst  any  drug  [or 

cosmetic] purchased  by him [or  it]  and to receive a 

report  of  such  test  or  analysis  signed  by  the 

Government Analyst.  

26A.  Powers  of  Central  Government  to  [regulate, 

restrict  or  prohibit]  manufacture,  etc.,  of  drug  and 

cosmetic in public interest.—Without prejudice to any 

other  provision  contained  in  this  Chapter,  if  the 

Central  Government  is  satisfied,  that  the  use  of  any 

drug or cosmetic is likely to involve any risk to human 

beings or animals or that any drug does not have the 

therapeutic value claimed or purported to be claimed 

for it or contains ingredients and in such quantity for 

which there is no therapeutic justification and that in 

the public interest it is necessary or expedient so to do, 

then,  that  Government  may,  by  notification  in  the 

Official  Gazette,    [regulate,  restrict  or  prohibit]  the 

manufacture,  sale  or  distribution  of  such  drug  or 

cosmetic. 

26B.  Power  of  Central  Government  to  regulate  or 

restrict, manufacture, etc., of drug in public interest. 

—Without prejudice to any other provision contained 

in this Chapter, if the Central Government is satisfied 

that a drug is essential to meet the requirements of an 

CRM-M-64003 of 2023 -9-

emergency  arising  due  to  epidemic  or  natural 

calamities  and  that  in  the  public  interest,  it  is 

necessary or expedient so to do, then, that Government 

may, by notification in the Official Gazette, regulate or 

restrict  the  manufacture,  sale  or  distribution  of  such 

drug. 

THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

Section 468.  Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of 

the  period  of  limitation.—(1)  Except  as  otherwise 

provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take 

cognizance of an offence of the category specified in 

sub-section  (2),  after  the  expiry  of  the  period  of 

limitation.  

(2)   The period of limitation shall be— 

 (a)   six months, if the offence is punishable with  

  fine only; 

(b)   one  year,  if  the  offence  is  punishable  with 

  imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; 

(c)   three  years,  if  the  offence  is  punishable  with 

  imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but 

  not exceeding three years. 

(3)  For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  the  period  of 

limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried 

together,  shall  be  determined  with  reference  to  the 

offence  which  is  punishable  with  the  more  severe 

punishment  or,  as  the  case  may  be,  the  most  severe 

punishment. 

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Section  469.  Commencement  of  the  period  of 

limitation.— 

(1)   The  period  of  limitation,  in  relation  to  an 

offender, shall commence,— 

 (a)   on the date of the offence; or  

(b)   where  the  commission  of  the  offence  was  not 

known to the person aggrieved by the offence or 

to any police officer, the first day on which such 

offence comes to the knowledge of such person 

or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or 

 (c)   where it is not known by whom the offence was 

  committed, the first day on which the identity of 

  the offender is known to the person aggrieved by 

  the  offence  or  to  the  police  officer  making 

  investigation  into  the  offence,  whichever  is 

  earlier.  

(2)   In  computing  the  said  period,  the  day  from 

which  such  period  is  to  be  computed  shall  be 

excluded. 

12. It is evident from a perusal of the above that in so far as the

Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 is concerned, Section 15 (3) thereof

provides for a punishment of upto one year imprisonment and Section 26

of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940 is only an enabling provision to

submit a drug for test or analysis and is not a punishing section.

13.

Even though there is no other change, however, Section 13

defines punishment for offences to a period upto 03 years. There is no

allegation of the petitioner manufacturing spurious or adulterated drugs,

CRM-M-64003 of 2023 -11-

hence, seemingly offence under Section 26 of the Drugs & Cosmetics Act,

1940 has been wrongly mentioned. In either case, the sentence does not

go beyond the prohibition prescribed under Section 468 Cr. P.C.

14. A Court is prohibited from taking cognizance of the offences

punishable upto three years, beyond a period of three years. Since, the

charge has not been framed even till 2024 i.e. after 25 years of registration

of FIR, due to non-filing of final report for more than 24 years, the law

would prohibit a Court from taking cognizance now. The proceeding

being barred by limitation prescribed in law, deserve to be quashed on this

score alone.

15. Even though the bar under Section 468 Cr. P.C. is not an

absolute bar and the same is subject to the provision of Section 473 Cr.

P.C., however, the same would require a satisfactory explanation for the

24 years of investigation. State has failed to assign any valid cause for

such delay.

16. The statutory duty is cast upon the State not to take

cognizance of the offences of the categories specified in sub section (2),

after lapse of the period of limitation.

17. The said period of limitation is intended to ensure speedy and

time bound completion of investigation in specified minor offences and to

obliviate protracted agony of criminal investigation. Similar principles are

recognized as part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

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18. It is well settled that the High Court would continue to have

the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate a petition filed under Section

482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for quashing an FIR, even

in circumstances where the police have filed a charge-sheet during the

pendency of such a petition. This principle is well established by the

Hon ’ble Supreme Court in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of

Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706 and requires no further elaboration by this

Court. However, in the instant case, the investigation was unduly

prolonged for over twenty-five years and appears to have been concluded

only subsequent to the filing of the present writ petition by the petitioner.

19. In the present case, it is abundantly clear th at the

investigation has been allowed to remain pending for a period exceeding

twenty-five years, culminating in the filing of the charge-sheet only at this

belated stage and the charges are yet not framed, thereby prolonging the

uncertainty and jeopardy faced by the petitioner. It is evident from the

facts on record that the petitioner cannot, in any manner, be held

responsible for the extraordinary delay in the investigation. The protracted

course of proceedings, which has spanned over two and a half decades, is

entirely attributable to the investigative and prosecutorial authorities. In

my considered view, the respondent-State has utterly failed to furnish any

satisfactory explanation or justification for the undue delay in filing the

charge-sheet and in bringing the investigation to its logical conclusion.

Such delay, in the absence of any reasonable cause, constitutes not only an

CRM-M-64003 of 2023 -13-

infringement of the petitioner ’s fundamental right to a speedy trial under

Article 21 of the Constitution of India but also amounts to a gross misuse

and abuse of the legal process. The persistence of proceedings in such

circumstances would result in injustice and oppression to the petitioner,

defeating the very purpose of criminal jurisprudence, which is founded

upon fairness, reasonableness, and timely administration of justice.

20. In Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases,

(2014) 2 SCC 62, Hon’ble Supreme Court has delineated the object and

rationale underlying the bar of limitation as prescribed under Chapter

XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and held as follows:

24. Read in the background of the Law Commission's Report

and the Report of the JPC, it is clear that the object of Chapter

XXXVI inserted in the Criminal Procedure Code was to quicken the

prosecution of complaints and to rid the criminal justice system of

inconsequential cases displaying extreme lethargy, inertia or

indolence. The effort was to make the criminal justice system more

orderly, efficient and just by providing period of limitation for

certain offences. In Sarwan Singh [State of Punjab v. Sarwan

Singh, (1981) 3 SCC 34 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 625 : AIR 1981 SC 1054]

, this Court stated the object of the Criminal Procedure Code in

putting a bar of limitation as follows : (SCC p. 36, para 3)

“3. … The object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting

a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the

parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which

material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of

the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated

CRM-M-64003 of 2023 -14-

prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which

the statutes seek to subserve is clearly in consonance with the

concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the

Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance

that any prosecution, whether by the State or a private

complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of

the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation.”

(emphasis supplied)

21. The Hon ’ble Apex Court, in Pankaj Kumar v. State of

Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 117, quashed the criminal proceedings on

account of “unwarranted prolonged investigations” which had resulted in

an inordinate delay, holding that such undue protraction of the

investigative process constitutes a ground for exercising the inherent

jurisdiction of the Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and to

secure the ends of justice. The court held as under:

24. Tested on the touchstone of the broad principles,

enumerated above, we are of the opinion that in the instant

case, the appellant's constitutional right recognised under

Article 21 of the Constitution stands violated. It is common

ground that the first information report was recorded on 12-

5-1987 for the offences allegedly committed in the year 1981,

and after unwarranted prolonged investigations, involving

aforestated three financial irregularities; the charge-sheet

was submitted in court on 22-2-1991. Nothing happened till

April 1999, when the appellant and his deceased mother filed

criminal writ petition seeking quashing of proceedings before

the trial court.

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25. Though, it is true that the plea with regard to inordinate

delay in investigations and trial has been raised before us for

the first time but we feel that at this distant point of time, it

would be unfair to the appellant to remit the matter back to

the High Court for examining the said plea of the appellant.

Apart from the fact that it would further protract the already

delayed trial, no fruitful purpose would be served as learned

counsel for the State very fairly stated before us that he had

no explanation to offer for the delay in investigations and the

reason why the trial did not commence for eight long years.

Nothing, whatsoever, could be pointed out, far from being

established, to show that the delay was in any way

attributable to the appellant.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

27. Be that as it may, the prosecution has failed to show any

exceptional circumstance, which could possibly be taken into

consideration for condoning the prolongation of

investigation and the trial. The lackadaisical manner of

investigation spread over a period of four years in a case of

this type and inordinate delay of over eight years (excluding

the period when the record of the trial court was in the High

Court), is manifestly clear.

28. Thus, on facts in hand, we are convinced that the

appellant has been denied his valuable constitutional right to

a speedy investigation and trial and, therefore, criminal

proceedings initiated against him in the year 1987 and

pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Latur, deserve to

be quashed on this short ground alone.

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(emphasis supplied)

22. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, FIR No. 89 dated

23.05.1999, registered under Section 15 of the Indian Medical Council

Act, 1956 and Section 26 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, at Police

Station Jagraon, District Ludhiana, is hereby quashed on the ground of

inordinate and unexplained delay in the conduct of the investigation and

in filing of the charge-sheet and the statutory bar under Section 468 Cr.

P.C. (now Section 514 of BNSS, 2023).

23. Since the FIR is being quashed on the aforesaid procedural

and constitutional grounds, this Court does not find it necessary to express

any opinion on the merits or demerits of the allegations contained in the

FIR. The quashing is, therefore, confined strictly to the grounds of delay

and abuse of process, without prejudice to any other legal considerations.

24. In view of the foregoing, the writ petition is, accordingly,

allowed, and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom shall stand

quashed.

Disposed of, accordingly.

              (VINOD S. BHARDWAJ) 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2025                   JUDGE 

Vishal Sharma 

Whether speaking/reasoned   :   Yes/No  

Whether reportable     :   Yes/No