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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 2766-2767 of 2005

PETITIONER:

Secretary, O.N.G.C. Ltd. and Anr.

RESPONDENT:

V.U. Warrier

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/04/2005

BENCH:

Ruma Pal & C.K. Thakker

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

C.K. THAKKER, J.

Leave granted.

The present appeals are directed against the judgment and order passed by

the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated February 15, 2003 in Writ

Petition No. 3947 of 1994 and also against an order dated January 14, 2004

passed in Civil Application No. 63 of 2003.

To understand the controversy raised in the appeals, relevant facts in

brief may be stated.

The respondent herein - petitioner before the High Court - was in service

of Oil and Natural Gas Commission, ("Commission" for short) appellant

herein. He was holding the post of Additional Director (Finance and

Accounts) prior to his retirement. As an employee of the Commission, he was

allotted quarter on December 10, 1982. He retired from service on reaching

the age of superannuation with effect from February 28, 1990. It is the

case of the appellant that after the retirement, an employee has to vacate

the residential accommodation given to him by the Commission. The

respondent, therefore, was informed by the Commission that he had to vacate

the quarter. It was the policy of the Commission to grant four months' time

to retain a quarter by an employee after his retirement. Accordingly, the

respondent was asked to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the

quarter to the Commission latest by 30th June, 1990. It is an admitted fact

that the respondent did not vacate the quarter. It has come on record that

he made representations to permit him to continue to occupy the quarter but

those representations were rejected. Since the respondent did not vacate

the quarter, proceedings were also initiated by the Commission under the

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. In those

proceedings, an undertaking was given by the respondent that he would

vacate the quarter latest by May 30, 1991. Pursuant to the said

undertaking, the respondent vacated the quarter on May 16, 1991. Eviction

proceedings were then dropped.

The respondent claimed an amount of gratuity payable to him. According to

the respondent, he was entitled to Rs. one lakh towards payment of

gratuity. The Commission, however, deducted an amount of Rs.53,632 towards

unauthorized occupation charges of official accommodation from July 01,

1990 to May 15, 1991 at the rate of Rs.5,100 being 75 per cent of the basic

pay of Rs.6,800 per month. According to the respondent, it was not open to

the Commission to deduct any amount payable to him towards gratuity. He,

therefore, approached the High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging

the action. He prayed for quashing of an order of appropriation of

Rs.53,632 as unauthorized occupation charges of official accommodation from

July, 1990 to May, 1991 at the rate of Rs.5,100 by permanently restraining

the Commission from recovering the said amount. A prayer was also made to

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direct the Commission to pay the amount of gratuity with interest.

An affidavit in reply was filed by the Commission. In the counter, the

Senior Deputy Director (Personnel and Administration), stated that the

Commission was a statutory Corporation established in 1960 under the Oil

and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959. The said Act was repealed by the Oil

and Natural Gas Commission (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 1993.

It was stated that the respondent (petitioner before the High Court), had

concealed several material facts. He was working as Additional Director and

retired at the age of 58 years on superannuation after office hours on

February 28, 1990. As Additional Director, he belonged to "gold collar"

class of employee as observed by this Court in O.P. Bhandari v. Indian

Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 337. In the

capacity of an employee of the Commission and for efficiently discharging

his duties, he was allotted accommodation in Building No. D/63, Vidya

Vihar, ONGC Colony, Chittaranjan Nagar, Bombay vide allotment letter dated

December 10, 1982. The said accommodation was on certain terms and

conditions.

Clauses 11 and 12 read as under-

"Cl.11 If the employee to whom a residence is allotted retires or

resigns or is dismissed or removed from service, the allotment

shall be cancelled with effect from two months after the date of

his retirement, and one month after the date of his resignation,

dismissal, or removal as the case may be, or with effect from any

date after such dismissal or removal or retirement on which the

residence is vacated, whichever is earlier."

Cl.12 After cancellation of the allotment, if the premises are not vacated,

the occupation thereof shall be considered unauthorized, and the ex-

allottee shall be liable to pay liquidated damages for occupation of the

premises either twice of the standard rent or at the rate of the rent as

may be determined by the Commission from time to time."

It was also stated by the deponent that the Commission had issued Allotment

of Residences Instructions, 1970. Clause 14(1) of 1970-Instructions reads

as under-

"After cancellation of the allotment, if the premises are not vacated, the

occupation thereof shall be considered unauthorized and the ex-allottee

shall be liable to pay liquidated damages for occupation of the premises

either at the rate of twice of the standard rent or at the rate of the rent

as may be determined by the Commission from time to time."

On retirement from the service of the Commission, the respondent was

entitled to the following benefits :

"(i) Provident Fund Full Paid

(ii) TTA Advance for settling

at Home Town Rs.17,000

(iii) Leave encashment 253 days Rs.49,083

(iv) Gratuity payable under the

Commission's Death-Cum-

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Retirement payment of Gratuity

Regulations 1969, as amended

from time to time. Rs.1,00,000

According to the Commission the gratuity payable on the retirement of

respondent had been paid and appropriated as under :

Total amount of Gratuity payable under

the 1969 Regulations as amended : Rs.1,00,000

Less Appropriations

(i) Outstanding House Building

Advance/Loan as on 28/2/1990 Rs.(-)23,000

(ii) Cumulative overdue interest at 6%

p.a. as on 28.2.90 Rs.(-)27,744

Net amount payable Rs.49,256

(iii) Permissive occupation of staff Rs. 820

accommodation from 1/3/1990

to 30/6/1990 @ Rs.205 p.m. i.e.

205 x 4

(iv) Unauthorised occupancy Rs.53,632

from 1/7/90 to 16/5/91 @

Rs.5100 p.m. (being 75% of

the basic pay of Rs.6800 p.m.) Rs.53,632 (-) Rs.54,452

Deficit amount Recoverable (-) Rs.5,196

The Commission was paying 30 per cent basic pay as HRA to those employees

who could not be allotted accommodation by the Commission at selected

centres like Delhi, Bombay, etc., but used to recover only 7 + per cent

basic pay as HRA from the employees on allotment of accommodation. In the

event of unauthorized occupation of staff accommodation, liquidated damages

are recoverable as double the rent i.e. 37- + x 2 = 75% of basic pay till

the accommodation is vacated by the incumbent. A copy of the office order

dated January 30, 1990 was also annexed to the affidavit in reply. It was

submitted that though the respondent retired on February 28, 1990 and was

allowed four months' time to occupy the quarter as per the policy of the

Commission, he failed to vacate the quarter. His prayer for retention of

quarter was considered by the Commission but in view of non-availability of

quarters to several other employees, the prayer was rejected and the

respondent was asked to vacate it. He was also informed that in case, he

would not vacate the quarter, penal rent at the rate of 75% of basic salary

would be recovered from him. In spite of such communications and letters,

the respondent failed to vacate the quarter. The Commission was required to

initiate eviction proceedings and only thereafter an undertaking was filed

and possession of quarter was given back to Commission. In the

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circumstances, the Commission was within its power to deduct the amount

recoverable from the respondent towards unauthorized occupation of

residential quarter from July 1, 1990 till May 15, 1991 and the employee

had no reason to make grievance against it.

It was also the case of the Commission that the respondent was not covered

by Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 as amended from time to time. Statutory

regulations framed by the Commission are more liberal and beneficial than

the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. It was further stated that

the respondent had constructed a flat bearing No. B-209, Dewan Mansion,

Plot No. 29/36, Vasai, Bombay by taking concessional loan at the rate of 6%

per annum from the Commission. The said quarter was leased by him to the

Commission at the rate of Rs.880 per month. In view of the retirement of

the respondent on February 28, 1990 and in view of the fact that he had to

vacate the residential quarter of the Commission, possession of the quarter

that belonged to the respondent and let out to the Commission was given

back to him on June 3, 1990. For four months from March 1, to June 30,

1990, the respondent was charged nominal rent of Rs.205 per month. Since

the respondent did not vacate the quarter, the impugned action of charging

penal rent was taken and the amount was appropriated from gratuity benefits

payable to the respondent. The said action was legal and valid. It was

further stated that there was a list of senior officers waiting for years

for allotment of staff accommodation in Bombay. The Commission was paying

30 per cent of basic pay as HRA to twelve officers for non-allotment of

residential quarter. Particulars thereof had also been annexed to the

affidavit in reply.

At the time of hearing of the petition, an advocate appeared for the

respondent (petitioner before the High Court). None, however, appeared for

the Commission. According to the High Court, the legal position was no more

res integra that pension and gratuity were rights accrued in favour of

employees on their retirement. Those benefits, therefore, could not be

withheld even if an employee unauthorisedly occupied accommodation and was,

therefore, liable to pay damages or penal rent under the relevant rules.

The only remedy available to the employer was to take appropriate action

but the amount of pensionary benefit could not be set off against the so-

called dues for unauthorized occupation. The Court also referred to State

of Kerala v. M. Padmanabhan Nair, [1985] 1 SCC 429, R. Kapur v. Director of

Inspector (Painting & Publication) Income Tax and Anr., [1994] 6 SCC 589

and Gorakhpur University and Ors. v. Shilla Prasad Nagendra (Dr.) and Ors.,

[2001] 6 SCC 591.

The writ petition was accordingly allowed and the following directions were

issued by the Court;

"(a) It is declared that appropriation of a sum of Rs.53,637 towards

unauthorized occupancy of the official accommodation by the petitioner from

1st July 1990 to 16th May, 1991 at the rate of Rs.5100 per month was

illegal. However, this will not preclude the Respondents from proceeding

against the petitioner for recovery of due amount of unauthorized occupancy

of the official quarter for the period from 1st July 1990 to 16th May, 1991

in accordance with law.

(b) The Petitioner is entitled to payment of Rs.49,924 towards gratuity

under the relevant Regulations along with interest at the rate of 6% per

annum from 1st March 1990 until payment is made. We grant time of two

months to Respondent for making the aforesaid payment to the petitioner.

(c) Since the respondent have not chosen to appear today at the time of

hearing of Writ Petition, we direct the parties to bear costs."

According to the Commission, it was not aware of the decision of the High

Court dated 15th February, 2003, since none appeared on behalf of the

Commission in the High Court at the time of hearing of the petition and the

decision was ex parte. It, therefore, made necessary enquiry. As soon as it

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came to know about the decision of the High Court, it addressed a letter

dated May 22, 2003, to the advocate appearing for the Commission and asked

him under what circumstances he could not attend the matter which came to

be decided ex parte against the Commission. The advocate vide his letter

dated May 24, 2003 informed the appellant that he had been advised to take

rest as he was suffering from Filariasis. According to the appellant, thus,

absence of the advocate appearing for the Commission was neither

intentional nor deliberate but due to his ill health. The appellant

thereafter applied for certified copy of the judgment which was sent to

Head Office, Dehradun. Relevant papers were then collected from the office

of the advocate. After getting approval from the Head Office, new advocate

was appointed on August 11, 2003, who was asked to file Review Petition

which was filed on December 12, 2003. There was thus delay of 116 days in

filing the review petition. The Division Bench rejected the Review Petition

observing that there was no explanation for the period from May 24, 2003 to

September 6, 2003. In the opinion of the Court, there was no cause much

less sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The review application was,

therefore, rejected.

On March 29, 2004, this Court issued notice on the Special Leave Petition

as well as on the prayer of interim relief. On October 25, 2004, an order

was passed to place the matter for final disposal on any miscellaneous day.

The matter was accordingly placed for hearing on January 31, 2005 and

remained part heard. On February 4, 2005, the matter was heard and the

learned counsel for the parties completed their arguments.

The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court was

clearly wrong in allowing the petition and in directing the Commission to

pay the amount of gratuity to the respondent with interest at the rate of

6% per annum. According to the counsel, it was perfectly within the powers

of the Commission to deduct the amount of liquidated damages towards

unauthorized occupation of quarter by the respondent. Such action cannot be

said illegal, unlawful or otherwise improper. The Commission is a statutory

Corporation established by an Act of Parliament and in exercise of

statutory powers it has framed regulations. Those regulations, therefore,

are statutory in character, they are having force of law and are

enforceable. It was also submitted that the provisions of Payment of

Gratuity Act would not apply to the respondent. The counsel urged that

sufficient quarters are not available to the Commission in cities like

Delhi and Bombay. If the employees who had been allotted quarters do not

vacate even after their retirement, it would create serious problems to the

Commission as well as its employees. In the instant case, admittedly the

respondent retired on February 28, 1990. He was allowed four months' time

up to June 30, 1990 to vacate the quarter. His prayer for retention of

quarter was duly considered and rejected expressly informing him that in

view of several officers waiting for quarters it would not be possible to

accede to the request and he must vacate the quarter by June 30, 1990. He

was specifically intimated that in case he did not vacate the accommodation

within the stipulated time, penal rent would be charged from him. He

ignored all those letters and continued to occupy the quarter. So much so

that eviction proceedings had to be initiated against him. It was only

thereafter that the respondent gave an undertaking and vacated the quarter.

The counsel also submitted that the respondent applied for loan for

residential accommodation at concessional rate which was given to him. He

had constructed a house. He let that house to the Commission at the rate of

Rs.880 per month as against Rs.205 per month which he was paying towards

rent. Considering the fact that the respondent had retired on February 28,

1990 and was to vacate the quarter allotted to him by the Commission by

June 30, 1990, the possession of the quarter belonged to the respondent and

let out to the Commission was given back to him on June 3, 1990. In spite

of that, the respondent did not vacate the quarter. In the circumstances,

the High Court was wholly wrong in granting relief to the respondent. The

High Court was also wrong in not reviewing the order passed ex parte

observing that no `sufficient cause' had been made out for condonation of

delay. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed

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by quashing and setting aside the order of the High Court and by upholding

the order passed by the Commission.

The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the

order passed by the High Court. He submitted that as rightly held by the

High Court, pensionary and retrial benefits are the "right accrued" in

favour of an employee and not in the nature of "bounty". It was, therefore,

not open to the Commission to withhold any amount payable to the employee

from gratuity and other terminal benefits. The point is covered by several

decisions of this Court. Following those decisions, an order was passed

which deserves no interference. It was also submitted that the High Court

has granted liberty to the Commission by reserving right to the Commission

to take appropriate proceedings in accordance with law to recover the

amount of unauthorized occupation charges from the respondent. So far as

review is concerned, the counsel submitted that according to the High Court

there was no sufficient cause for recalling/reviewing the order passed ex

parte and even that order also cannot be said to be illegal. He, therefore,

prayed for dismissal of appeals.

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the

appeals deserve to be allowed. It is no doubt true that pensionary

benefits, such as gratuity, cannot be said to be `bounty'. Ordinarily,

therefore, payment of benefit of gratuity cannot be withheld by an

employer. In the instant case, however, it is the specific case of the

Commission that the Commission is having a statutory status. In exercise of

statutory powers under Section 32(1) of the Act, regulations known as the

Oil and Natural Gas Commission (Death, Retirement and Terminal Gratuity)

Regulations, 1969 have been framed by the Commission. In Sukhdev Singh v.

Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and Anr., [1975] 1 SCC 421 the

Constitution Bench of this Court held that regulations framed by the

Commission under Section 32 of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act 1959

are statutory in nature and they are enforceable in a court of law. They

provide for eligibility of grant of gratuity, extent of gratuity, etc.

Regulation 5 deals with recovery of dues of the Commission and reads thus :

"Recovery of Dues :

The appointing authority, or any other authority empowered by the

Commission in this behalf shall have the right to make recovery of

Commission's dues before the payment of the death-cum retirement gratuity

due in respect of an officer even without obtaining his consent or without

obtaining the consent of the members of his family in the case of the

deceased officer, as the case may be."

The above regulation leaves no room of doubt that the Commission has right

to effect recovery of its dues from any officer without his consent from

gratuity. In the present case admittedly the respondent retired after

office hours of February 28, 1990. According to the Commission, he could be

allowed four months' time to occupy the quarter which was granted to him.

His prayer for extension was considered and rejected stating that it would

not be possible for the Commission to accept the prayer in view of several

officers waiting for quarters. He was also informed that if he would not

vacate the quarter, penal rent as per the policy of the Commission would be

recovered from him. But the respondent did not vacate the quarter. It was

only after eviction proceedings were initiated that he vacated the quarter

on May 16, 1991. In the circumstances, in our opinion, it cannot be said

that the action of the Commission was arbitrary, unlawful or unreasonable.

It also cannot be said that the Commission had no right to withhold

gratuity by deducting the amount which is found `due' to Commission and

payable by the respondent towards penal charges for unauthorized occupation

of the quarter for the period between July 1, 1990 and May 15, 1991.

So far as the Payment of Gratuity Act is concerned, according to the

appellant, the said Act was not applicable to the respondent. We are

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concerned with the position as in 1990. Clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act

defined "employee". The said definition read as under :

"S 2(e) - `employee' means any persons (other than an apprentice) employed

on wages, not exceeding two thousand five hundred rupees per mensem, in any

establishment, factory, mine, oilfield, plantation, port, railway company

or shop, to do any skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled, manual,

supervisory, technical or clerical work, whether the terms of such

employment are express or implied, but does not include any such person who

is employed in a managerial or administrative capacity, or who holds a

civil post under the Central Government or a State Government, or who is

subject to the Air Force Act, 1950, the Army Act 1950, or the Navy Act,

1957."

(emphasis supplied)

From the above definition, it is clear that a person can be said to be an

"employee" if his wages did not exceed two thousand five hundred rupees per

month. According to the Commission, the salary of the respondent was

Rs.6800 approximately which was more than Rs.2500 and hence, he could not

be held "employee" covered by the definition. The definition of "employee"

was no doubt amended subsequently and the provision as to amount of wages

had been deleted. But the amendment was made in 1994 and was not

retrospective in nature and thus was not applicable in the case of the

respondent who retired in 1990.

As held by this Court in Union of India v. All India Services Pensioners'

Association and Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 580, an incumbent is entitled to those

benefits as he could claim on the date of retirement. He could not claim

any benefit prior to his appointment or subsequent to his retirement.

It is well settled that gratuity is earned by an employee for long and

meritorious service rendered by him. Gratuity is not paid to the employee

gratuitously or merely as a matter of boon. It is paid to him for the

service rendered by him to the employer [vide Garment Cleaning Works v. Its

Workmen, [1962] 1 SCR 711]. In Calcutta Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Their

Workmen, [1967] 2 SCR 596, after considering earlier decisions, this Court

observed that "long and meritorious service" must mean long and unbroken

period of service meritorious to the end. As the period of service must be

unbroken, so must the continuity of meritorious service be a condition for

entitling the workman to gratuity. If a workman commits such misconduct as

causes financial loss to his employer, the employer would under the general

law have a right of action against the employee for the loss caused and

making a provision for withholding payment of gratuity where such loss

caused to the employer does not seem to aid to the harmonious employment of

labourers or workmen. The Court proceeded to state that the misconduct may

be such as to undermine the discipline in the workers - a case in which it

would be extremely difficult to assess the financial loss to the employer.

In Jarnail Singh v. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs and Ors, [1993] 1

SCC 47, this Court had an occasion to consider the provisions of the

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. The definition of "pension"

included gratuity under Rule 3. Rule 9 conferred on the President right to

withhold or withdraw pension in certain circumstances. The order was passed

against the appellant withholding pension and the entire amount of death-

cum- retirement gratuity otherwise admissible to him. The direction was

given on serious irregularities found to have been committed by the

appellant. The appellant challenged that order unsuccessfully before the

Central Administrative Tribunal. He, therefore, approached this Court. His

contention was that an amount of gratuity could not have been withheld.

Negativing the contention, the Court held that the power to withhold

gratuity was conferred on the President under the relevant rules and hence,

such action could not be said to be illegal. According to the Court, there

could be adjustment of Government dues against the amount of death-cum-

retirement gratuity payable to Government servant.

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The ratio in R.Kapoor, in our opinion, does not help the respondent as in

that case, the claim for damages for unauthorized occupation against the

appellant-retired employee was "pending" and the proceedings were not

finally disposed of. In the present case, the facts clearly reveal that the

last day of lawful occupation of quarter by the respondent was June 30,

1990 and before that date, the appellant Commission had informed the

respondent that his prayer for extension or retention of quarter had not

been accepted and he should vacate by June 30, 1990. If he would not vacate

the quarter, penal rent would be recovered from him. He did not challenge

the action of not extending the period nor the recovery of penal rent. He,

therefore, cannot make grievance against the action of the Commission.

Similar is the case of Gorakhpur University. There retrial benefits were

withheld to adjust amount due from the employee but "disputed" by him. This

Court noted that the employee was keeping a quarter allotted to him and

continued to occupy after retirement. It was, inter alia, observed by this

Court that after the employee retired, his request and application as per

practice for allotment of quarters in the name of his son who was also an

employee in the University remained pending and no orders were passed

thereon. Moreover, there were resolutions of the University to waive penal

rent and such benefits were granted to other employees, but different

treatment was shown to him which constituted "hostile discrimination" and

the act was thus `unreasonable'. Though the employee retired in 1990 and

continued to keep the quarter up to 1996, the University did not choose to

take any action to evict him. On the contrary, it acquiesced in his

occupation "by accepting regularly the normal rent". Thus, there was lack

of bona fides on the part of the University.

In Wazir Chand v. Union of India and Ors., [2001] 6 SCC 596, a retired

employee continuously kept the quarter occupied unauthorisedly. He was

charged penal rent in accordance with rules and after adjustment of dues,

balance amount of gratuity was paid to him. He contended that it was

bounden duty of the Government not to withhold the gratuity amount. The

Court, however, dismissed the appeal observing that it was "unable to

accept" the prayer of the appellant. The Court observed that the appellant

having unauthorisedly kept the government quarter was liable to pay penal

rent in accordance with rules and there was no illegality in adjusting

those dues against death-cum-retirement benefits.

Wazir Chand was considered in Gorakhpur University but the Court stated

that it was not clear from the facts whether the person was allowed to

retain the accommodation on receipt of normal rent as in the University

case.

The matter can be considered from another angle also. It is well-settled

that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution is equitable and discretionary. The power under that Article

can be exercised by the High Court "to reach injustice wherever it is

found". Before more than fifty years, in G. Veerappa Pillai, Proprietor,

Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Porayar, Tanjore District, Madras v. Raman & Raman

Ltd., Kumbakonam, Tanjore District and Ors., [1952] SCR 583, the

Constitution Bench of this Court speaking through Chandrasekhara Aiyer, J.,

observed that the writs referred to in Article 226 of the Constitution are

obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them "in grave cases

where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without

jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of

natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or

there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act,

omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice."

(emphasis supplied)

Similarly, in the leading case of Sangram Singh v. Election Commissioner,

Kotah & Anr., [1955] 2 SCR 1, dealing with the ambit and scope of powers of

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High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, Bose, J., stated-

"That, however, is not to say that the jurisdiction will be

exercised whenever there is an error of law. The High Courts do

not, and should not, act as Courts of appeal under Art. 226. Their

powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed

upon that discretion it must be exercised along recognized lines

and not arbitrarily; and one of the limitations imposed by the

Courts on themselves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in

this class of cases unless substantial injustice has ensued, or is

likely to ensue. They will not allow themselves to be turned into

Courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which

do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense, for, though

no legislature can impose limitations on these constitutional

powers it is a sound exercise of discretion to bear in mind the

policy of the legislature to have disputes about these special

rights decided as speedily as may be. Therefore, writ petitions

should not be lightly entertained in this class of case."

(emphasis supplied)

The above principle has been reiterated and followed by this Court in

several subsequent cases.

As already adverted to by us hereinabove, the facts of the present case did

not deserve interference by the High Court in exercise of equitable

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The respondent-

petitioner before the High Court-, was a responsible officer holding the

post of Additional Director (Finance & Accounts). He was, thus, "gold

collar" employee of the Commission. In the capacity of employee of the

Commission, he was allotted a residential quarter. He reached the age of

superannuation and retired after office hours of February 28, 1990. He was,

therefore, required to vacate the quarter allotted to him by the

Commission. The Commission, as per its policy, granted four months' time to

vacate. He, however, failed to do so. His prayer for continuing to occupy

the quarter was duly considered and rejected on relevant and germane

grounds. The residential accommodation constructed by him by taking loan at

the concessional rate from the Commission was leased to Commission, but the

possession of that quarter was restored to him taking into account the fact

that he had retired and now he will have to vacate the quarter allotted to

him by the Commission. In spite of that, he continued to occupy the quarter

ignoring the warning by the Commission that if he would not vacate latest

by June 30, 1990, penal rent would be charged from him. In our judgment,

considering all these facts, the High Court was wholly unjustified in

exercising extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction in favour of the

petitioner - respondent herein - and on that ground also, the order passed

by the High Court deserves to be set aside.

For the foregoing reasons, the appeals deserve to be allowed and are

accordingly allowed. The order passed by the High Court is set aside and

the petition filed by the respondent-petitioner is ordered to be dismissed.

In the facts and circumstances, however, there shall be no order as to

costs.