REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

(arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl,) No. 6572 of 2022)

SEEMANT KUMAR SINGH … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

MAHESH PS & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) NO. 6253 of 2022)

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA ... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

MAHESH P.S. & ANR. ... RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2023

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) NO. 6573 of 2022)

J. MANJUNATH ... APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. ... RESPONDENT(S)

1 2023 INSC 272

JUDGMENT

KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Leave granted.

2.The present three Appeals are directed against the interim order dated

07.07.2022 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, (hereinafter

referred to as “High Court”) in Criminal Petition No. 4909 of 2022, whereby

adverse remarks were made by the Ld. Single Judge of the High Court

against the Appellants, and a direction was issued to the CBI, mandating them

to investigate the past records of one of the Appellants.

3.The Appellant in SLP (CRL.) No. 6253 of 2022 (hereinafter referred to as

Appellant No. 1), is the State of Karnataka and the Appellant in SLP No.

6572 of 2022, one Mr. Seemant Kumar (hereinafter referred to as Appellant

No. 2), is a senior IPS officer with 26 years of service, and is currently the

Additional Director General of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau. The

Appellant in SLP (Crl) 6573 of 2022, one Mr. J. Manjunath (hereinafter

referred to as Appellant No. 3), is the District Collector for the city of

Bangalore. The Respondent Mahesh PS (hereinafter referred to as

Respondent No.1) .

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4.Briefly, the facts relevant for the present appeals are that during the

pendency of bail proceedings of Respondent No.1, who is a police officer

alleged to have taken a bribe, the High Court vide impugned interim order

dated 07.07.2022 made adverse remarks against the Appellants, who had no

lis in the above-mentioned bail proceedings.

5.On 20.05.2022, an FIR was registered under Section 7(a) of the

Prevention Of Corruption Act against the Respondent No.1 herein, for

allegedly demanding a bribe from the informant. The respondent no.1 was

subsequently taken into custody.

6.The respondent No.1 then filed a bail application under Section 439

Cr.PC in the High Court. Notice was issued by the High Court in the said

case, and on 22.06.2022, during the bail proceedings, the High Court issued

an oral summons against the Appellants herein seeking their appearance in

court. It is important to note that the Appellant 1 and Appellant 2 are not

arraigned as accused persons in the said case and have no connection with the

bail proceedings.

7.During the same bail proceedings, on 04.07.2022, the High Court made

adverse remarks against the Appellants herein. These remarks made by the

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High Court were widely reported in the media and caused injury to the

reputation of the Appellants.

8.Subsequently, on 07.07.2022, the High Court while making further

adverse remarks against the Appellants, also directed the CBI to place a

report of the past investigations conducted against the Appellant No. 2,

without giving an opportunity to the Appellant No.2 to be heard.

9.It is however important to note that Appellant No.3 stands on a slightly

different footing from the other Appellants, in so far as that the Appellant

No.3, after the initial investigation, was arrayed as an Accused in the

abovementioned case. In the same breath however, it must also be kept in

mind that the Appellant No.3, even though is an accused in the said alleged

crime, was not a party to the abovementioned bail proceedings in the High

Court.

10. Through the present Appeals filed before this court, the Appellants seek

for the remarks made by the High Court against them to be expunged.

QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE PRESENT APPEALS

11. At the very outset, we would like to clarify that in the present appeals,

we are only concerned with the adverse remarks made by the High Court

against the appellants and the subsequent directions issued to the counsel of

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CBI against the Appellant No.2. The substantive prayer for bail sought for by

the respondent No.1 is not being entertained by this court at the present, and

the proceedings for the same are ongoing in the High Court.

12.In the aftermath of the aforesaid proceedings, this court is now tasked

with answering two questions in the present Appeals.

I.Whether the adverse remarks made by the High Court against the

appellants during the bail proceedings of the respondent No. 1 is liable to

be expunged?

II.Whether the direction issued by the High Court to seek for reports against

the Appellant No.2 during the bail proceedings of the respondent no.1 is

liable to be set aside?

ANALYSIS

ISSUE I- Whether the adverse remarks made by the High Court during the bail

proceedings of the respondent No.1 is liable to be expunged?

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13. The High Court, on 04.07.2022 and 07.07.2022, on two separate

occasions, during the bail proceedings of the Respondent No.1, made adverse

remarks against the Appellants herein, which is said to have caused great

harm to their reputation. Due to the proceedings being broadcasted on the

High Court’s YouTube channel, the said comments have received wide

publicity, and several media and news outlets have picked up on those

comments and reported the same.

14. It is to be noted that bail proceedings, unlike a full criminal trial, are

burdened with the task of only forming a prima facie view on the merits of

the case. In such a circumstance when the evidence is not fully analyzed, and

a presumption of innocence is still operational in favour of the accused, the

courts must then be extremely cautious in passing adverse remarks against

the accused. This becomes especially important in cases where the party

against whom the remarks are passed do not have a lis in the said

proceedings, for such comments, especially if passed by constitutional courts,

can cause great injury to the reputation of the parties at the receiving end of

such remarks. This burden of caution on the courts has been held in a catena

of judgments by this Court.

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15. In the case of Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar

1

, this Court, while

examining certain remarks made by a High Court stated that the courts, while

passing adverse remarks, must be extremely careful and must resort to

passing such remarks only if it is necessary to come to fair conclusion in

order to meet the ends of justice. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment

is being extracted herein:

“In expressing their opinions, Judges and Magistrates must be

guided by consideration of justice, fair play and restraint, (…)

the judges should not normally depart from sobriety,

moderation and reserve and harsh or disparaging remarks are

not to be made against the parties or authorities unless it is

really necessary for the decision of the case as

integral part thereof”

16. In the case of State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal

2

, wherein this court was

examining certain disparaging remarks made by the High Court against the

State officials held that judges, must refrain from passing adverse remarks, as

the same can cause great mischief and might become an antithesis to the ends

of achieving justice. The relevant observations from the aforesaid judgment is

being reproduced herein:

“We may observe in conclusion that Judges should not use strong

and carping language while criticising the conduct of parties or

their witnesses. They must act with sobriety, moderation and

restraint. They must have the humility to recognise that they are

not infallible and any harsh and disparaging strictures passed by

them against any party may be mistaken and unjustified and if

1 (1986) 2 SCC 569

2 (1986) 4 SCC 566

7

so, they may do considerable harm and mischief and result in

injustice. Here, in the present case, the observations made and

strictures passed by B.M. Lal, J. were totally unjustified and

unwarranted and they ought not to have been made.

17. Further, In the case of Election Commission of India v. M.R.

Vijaybhaskar

3

, while examining certain adverse remarks made by the High

Court, held that judges must exercise extreme caution while passing remarks

in court that may susceptible to misinterpretation. The relevant paragraph of

the judgment is being produced hereunder:

“Having said that, we must emphasise the need for Judges to

exercise caution in off-the-cuff remarks in open court, which may

be susceptible to misinterpretation. Language, both on the Bench

and in judgments, must comport with judicial propriety.

Language is an important instrument of a judicial process which

is sensitive to constitutional values. Judicial language is a

window to a conscience sensitive to constitutional ethos. Bereft of

its understated balance, language risks losing its symbolism as a

protector of human dignity. The power of judicial review is

entrusted to the High Courts under the Constitution. So high is its

pedestal that it constitutes a part of the basic features of the

Constitution. Yet responsibility bears a direct co-relationship with

the nature and dimensions of the entrustment of power. A degree

of caution and circumspection by the High Court would have

allayed a grievance of the nature that has been urged in the

present case. All that needs to be clarified is that the oral

observations during the course of the hearing have passed with

the moment and do not constitute a part of the record. The EC

has a track record of being an independent constitutional body

which shoulders a significant burden in ensuring the sanctity of

3 (2021) 9 SCC 770

8

electoral democracy. We hope the matter can rest with a sense of

balance which we have attempted to bring.”

18. In light of the aforesaid decisions, as far as the Appellant No.2 is

concerned, the remarks made by the High Court against him seem to be

unreasonable and without justification. The Appellant No.2 is merely a

government employee of the department that is conducting the investigation

and has no personal involvement with the case. The Appellant No. 2 is not an

accused and has nothing to do with the transaction of the crime, let alone the

bail proceedings. No evidence against him has been analyzed by the court

and no opportunity has been given to him to explain himself, however,

scathing and egregious remarks have still been passed against him. In such a

scenario, we find the remarks passed by the High Court to be unfair and not

in the interest of justice.

19. In so far as the Appellant No. 3 is concerned, even though he is an

accused in the alleged crime, however, what must not be forgotten is the fact

that he does not have any lis in the bail proceedings, as the same was

exclusive to Respondent No.1. In such a scenario, where Appellant No.3 was

not party to the ongoing bail proceedings, we find it to be extremely

unreasonable for the High Court to pass such adverse remarks against him.

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20. In the bail proceedings of Respondent No.1, because the Appellant No.3

was not a party, he did not have the opportunity to place his submissions on

record for the court to peruse the same. No specific allegations against

Appellant No.3 were made before the High Court, since the bail proceedings,

and the submissions of the counsels in furtherance of the said bail

proceedings, were only limited to Respondent No.1. In this context, when no

allegations were made against Appellant No.3, and the presumption of

innocence is still functional in the favor of the Appellant No.3, we find it to

be a gross abuse of the process of law to pass such adverse remarks against

him, as such remarks do not just cause injury to his reputation, but also has

the potential to cause great prejudice to his actual trial.

ISSUE II - Whether the direction issued by the High Court to seek for reports

against the Appellant No.2 during the bail proceedings of the respondent no.1 is

liable to be set aside?

21. As has been mentioned above, the Appellant No.2, who is merely an

employee of the institution that is handling the investigation of the alleged

crime, had no lis in the abovementioned bail proceedings. The High Court

vide an oral summons directed the presence of the Appellant No.2, to which

he complied. After being summoned, the High Court, without allowing the

Appellant No.2 a chance to be heard, and without going through the proper

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procedure, issued a direction to the counsel of CBI to place reports against

the Appellant No.2. At the sake of repetition, it must be kept in mind that all

of this had happened within Section 439 Cr.PC proceedings, and that too

against a person unconnected to the accused.

22.In the case of RBI v. Cooperative Bank Deposit A/C HR. Sha

4

,the

Reserve Bank Of India challenged an order passed by the High Court during

an application under section 439 of the CrPC, wherein directions were issued

to the bank to distribute the money it recovered from the accused. This court,

while examining these directions held that the High Court must have

confined itself to the issues relevant for the purposes of deciding bail. The

relevant observation of this Court is being extracted hereunder:

“We are of the opinion that the far-reaching consequences of the

directions of the High Court are in a way beyond the scope of

an application for bail filed by an accused under Section 439 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court, as much

as anyone else, must stay confined to the issues relevant to the

matter before it. It was thus not open to the High Court to pass

orders which could affect the working of banks all over the

country. It has been pointed out by Mr Basava Prabhu S. Patil,

the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that it is for this

reason that Reserve Bank of India had filed this appeal.”

23.In the case of State Represented by Inspector of Police v. M. Murugesan

& Anr

5

, this Court held that in cases where a separate mechanism exists, the

4 (2010) 15 SCC 85

5 (2020) 15 SCC 251

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court under its inherent powers, especially in context of bail proceedings,

cannot issue directions that are outside the purview of deciding the grant or

rejection of bail. The relevant observations made by this court are being

reproduced herein:

“We find that the learned Single Judge has collated data from

the State and made it part of the order after the decision [of the

bail application, as if the Court had the inherent jurisdiction to

pass any order under the guise of improving the criminal justice

system in the State. The jurisdiction of the court under Section

439 of the Code is limited to grant or not to grant bail pending

trial. Even though the object of the Hon'ble Judge was laudable

but the jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous. The effort

made by the Hon'ble Judge may be academically proper to be

presented at an appropriate forum but such directions could

not be issued under the colour of office of the court .”

24. Further, in the case of State of Punjab vs Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar

and Others

6

, where after deciding a criminal appeal, the High Court

continued to pass orders with respect to other offenders in unconnected cases,

this court held that such invocation of jurisdiction outside the purview of the

main case at hand was unjust. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is

being produced herein:

“An inherent power is not an omnibus for opening a Pandora's

box, that too for issues that are foreign to the main context. The

invoking of the power has to be for a purpose that is connected

to a proceeding and not for sprouting an altogether new issue.

6 (2011) 14 SCC 770

12

A power cannot exceed its own authority beyond its own

creation.”

25. In light of the abovementioned facts, we are of the opinion that the

actions of the High Court during the bail proceedings of a third party are

manifestly arbitrary and unjust, and the High Court must have confined itself

to the issues relevant to it for the purposes of deciding the bail of the

Respondent No.1. A court of bail, especially in cases where the bail is sought

for by a third party, is not a court that has all the relevant information to pass

an order on the merits of an unconnected party, and such an order, if passed,

has the potential to cause great harm to the said party without them being

afforded an actual and meaningful opportunity to defend themselves. It is a

well settled principle of law that any party, when being accused of an illegal

act, must be given an opportunity be fairly heard. This opportunity to be

meaningfully heard however has not been afforded to the Appellant No.2,

and hence we hold issue 2 in favour of the Appellant No.2.

CONCLUSION

26. The legal system in general, and the judicial system in particular, has

ushered into a new age of accessibility and transparency due to the adoption

of virtual hearings and live telecasting of open court proceedings. These

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changes in the judiciary have ensured that the courts as redressal

mechanisms have become more accessible to the common man than ever

before. The limitations of physical infrastructure, that has constrained the

courts to a physical location, has often been cited as one of the main

roadblocks in the path towards access to justice. This roadblock, however,

has now been cleared due to the availability of technology and the adoption

of the same. This never before seen transparency in the judicial system,

while it brings with it great benefits, it also attaches with it a stricter standard

of responsibility on judges while conducting such court proceedings.

Remarks passed in court, due to the live broadcasting of court proceedings,

now have ramifications that are far reaching, and as can be seen in the

present case, can cause great injury to the reputation of the parties involved.

In such a circumstance, it is essential for the courts to be extremely cautious

while passing adverse remarks against the parties involved, and must do so

with proper justification, in the right forum, and only if it is necessary to

meet the ends of justice.

27. In light of the abovementioned discussions, not only are the adverse

remarks passed by the High Court against the Appellants is liable to be

expunged, but the impugned interim order itself is liable to be quashed.

Accordingly, the impugned order dated 07.07.2022 stands quashed.

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28. Further, in light of the previous order dated 18.07.2022 passed by this

court, we presume that the bail proceedings of the Respondent No.1 stands

concluded. However, since there is no indication of the outcome of the bail

proceedigs, if the same has not already been decided, we request the High

Court to expeditiously conclude the bail proceedings in accordance with law

on its own merits without being prejudiced or influenced by this judgment.

Accordingly, the appeals stand allowed.

…...…...…....….......................…,J.

(KRISHNA MURARI)

……...….…....….......................…,J.

(AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH)

NEW DELHI;

21

ST

MARCH, 2023

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