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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on: 29

th

January, 2026

Pronounced on: 10

th

April, 2026

+ RSA 22/2026, CM APPL. 6181/2026

SH. AJIT SINGH (DECEASED)

Through his LRs

A. SH. GAJINDER SINGH

S/o Late Sh. Ajit Singh

B. SH. RAVINDER SINGH

S/o Late Sh. Ajit Singh

C. SH. SURINDER SINGH

S/o Late Sh. Ajit Singh

D. SMT. SUSHILA DEVI

W/o Late Sh. Narinder Singh

E. SH. NARESH KUMAR

S/o Late Sh. Narinder Singh

F. SMT. USHA MEHLAWAT

W/o Sh. Sandeep Mehlawat

D/o Late Sh. Narinder Singh

G. SMT. POOJA DALAL

W/o Sh. Sanjeev Dalal

D/o Late Sh. Narinder Singh

H. SMT. REKHA SEHRAWAT

W/o Sh. Sanjay Sehrawat

D/o Late Sh. Narinder Singh

I. SMT. RANI

W/o Sh. Shyam

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All R/o House No.F-189,

Village & Post Office Lado Sarai,

Delhi-110030.

….Appellant

Through: Mr. V.P. Rana and Mr. Aviral Jain,

Advocates.

VERSUS

1. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Through Its vice Chairman

Vikas Sadan, New Delhi-110023.

2. UNION OF INDIA

Through Secretary

Ministry of Works & Urban Development

Govt. of India, New Delhi-110011.

….Respondents

Through: Mr. R. K. Dhawan( Standing Counsel

for DDA), Ms. Nisha Dhawan, Mr.

Pawan Karan Deo, Mr. V. K. Teng,

Mr. K. R. Madhar for Respondent

No. 1, DDA. Mr. Sai Manik Sud

(SPC) along with Ms. Kanchan

Semwal (GP) for Respondent No.2.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

J U D G M E N T

NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.

1. Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 read with Order XLII Rule

1 and Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

(hereinafter referred to as „CPC‟) has been filed by the Appellants,

the LRs of Sh. Ajit Singh (deceased) against the impugned Judgment

and Decree dated 11.12.2025 in RCA SCJ No. 03/2023, vide which

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Ld. ASCJ dismissed the Application under Order XLI Rule 3A CPC

read with Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963, filed by the Appellants,

seeking Condonation of Delay in filing the Appeal under Section 96

CPC against the Judgment and Decree dated 28.10.2021, of the

learned Civil Judge, Delhi dismissing the Suit for Permanent

Injunction of the plaintiff/Appellant, and consequently dismissed the

first Appeal.

2. The Appellant/Plaintiff had filed CS SCJ No.7081/2016, against the

respondents, for Permanent Injunction.

3. The Brief facts are that the Plaintiff/Appellant was the owner and in

exclusive possession of House No.F-189, Village Lado Sarai, Delhi

constructed on a Plot of land admeasuring 252 sq. yards (hereinafter

referred as „Suit Property‟). The house was constructed partly on

Khasra No.269 admeasuring 10 biswa and partly on the adjoining

Makbara / Hajira on the Northern side. The property was assessed to

property tax and water and electricity connection was also provided

therein.

4. The land admeasuring 3 bighas and 2 biswas was ancestral land and

by way of family arrangement amongst the co-owners, the house was

constructed more than 2 decades ago, on the land admeasuring 10

biswas out of Khasra No.269. The remaining portion of the house of

the Plaintiff which is between Khasra No.269 and Makbara, is a

courtyard which is enclosed by a boundary wall. The remaining

portion of Khasra No.269 admeasuring 2 bighas 12 biswas has been

acquired by the Govt. vide Award No.36/80-81 and possession was

taken in 1980. The area of Khasra No. 269, which was in possession

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of the Plaintiff, was left out from the acquisition as it was built-up at

that time.

5. At the instance of certain co-sharers of the Plaintiff, officials of

Defendant No.1 started harassing the Plaintiff for the last some time

claiming that the property belonged to them. Hence, the suit was filed

for Permanent Injunction for restraining the Defendants from forcibly

dispossessing the Plaintiff or demolishing the structure existing

thereon.

6. Defendant No.1/DDA in its Written Statement filed on 03.01.1991

controverted all the averments made in the Plaint. It stated that land

forming part of Khasra No.269 of village Lado Sarai, admeasuring 3

bighas 2 biswas and area of 2 bighas 17 biswas, has already been

acquired vide the Award. The possession of the remaining area

admeasuring 5 biswa, was not acquired as there was a

Makbara/Hazira on the area measuring 2 bighas and there was

construction over the area of 3 biswas. The possession of an area

admeasuring 2 bighas and 12 biswas has already been taken, out of

the acquired land and the same has been placed at the disposal of

DDA, through Notification dated 29.07.1980.

7. It was stated that the House No.F-189 was found to be part of the

land which had been left out from the acquisition. Since the

Notification dated 29.07.1980 under Section 22(1) of the Delhi

Development Act, 1957, had not been challenged by the Plaintiff, the

logical corollary is that the due process for acquiring the land as

mentioned in the Notification, was followed by DDA; as such DDA

was within its right to take possession of the vacant land and in its

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discretion leave built up area, to be regained in due course of time,

after following due process.

8. The DDA claimed that no Notice under Section 53B of the Delhi

Development Act, 1957, was served upon the Defendant.

9. The DDA also stated that the land adjacent to Khasra No.269 is

Khasra No.268 and the same also stands acquired and is under the

control and management of DDA, where the Plaintiff had tried to

encroach by putting a boundary wall unauthorizedly, which has been

removed. It has been further asserted that the boundary wall over the

area measuring 6 biswas forming part of Khasra No.268 village, Lado

Sarai, formed part of Khasra No.268 and it is unauthorized and the

same is liable to be removed.

10. The learned Civil Judge appointed a Local Commissioner, who

visited the Suit premises on 09.10.1990 and submitted a Report about

constructed portion with area and photographs, as shown in the Site

Plan submitted by the Plaintiff.

11. The Local Commissioner in his Report has not reported about the area

of the Suit premises.

12. The issues were framed on pleadings on 11.09.2002 as under:

(i) Whether Plaintiff is owner in possession of land partly

in Khasra No.269 measuring 10 biswa and partly upon

land adjoining the Makbara/Hazira on its Northern side

situated in Village Lado Sarai, Delhi? If so, its effect.

OPP

(ii)Whether Plaintiff is entitled for the relief of injunction,

as prayed for? OPP

(iii)Relief.

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13. The Plaintiff in support of his case examined himself as PW1 and

tendered his Affidavit of Evidence Ex.PW1/X and proved the

documents in support of his case.

14. PW2 (sic) M.L. Meena Patwari produced the record pertaining to

Khasra Girdawari and Jamabandi for the year 2012-13, which were

exhibited as Ex.PW2/1 to Ex.PW2/8.

15. PW2 Naresh Kumar and PW3 Jai Kishan corroborated the testimony

of the Plaintiff/Appellant.

16. The Defendant/Respondent examined DW1 Om Prakash Patwari

who produced the original Aks Shijra of Village Lado Sarai of Khasra

No.268 and 269 Ex.DW1/1.

17. DW2 Om Prakash Patwari, LDC from Land Acquisition Branch,

LAC Office, Saket, New Delhi who produced the copy of the Award

No.36/80-81 Ex.DW2/1.

18. DW3 Jagpal Singh, Patwari produced the record pertaining to Award,

extract of Notification dated 29.07.1980 and other Government

records.

19. DW4 T. Lakra Kanoongo, Land & Building I.P Estate, Vikas Bhawan,

Delhi also produced the records pertaining to the Award and the

original Possession proceedings of Award No.36 Ex.DW4/A.

20. The learned Civil Judge considered the evidence of the witnesses

examined by the parties and concluded that from the documents

namely, the Record, Aks Shijra and the Notification and the Award it

emerged that the Plaintiff/Appellant had no right, title in the Suit

property. Furthermore, from the evidence of the witnesses as well as

the Report of the Local Commissioner, it was established that the

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Plaintiff was not the owner of the Suit property and also could not

establish his Possession. Therefore, the Suit of the Plaintiff was

dismissed by learned ACJ/CCJ/ ARC vide Judgment dated

28.10.2021.

21. The Regular First Appeal RCA/SCJ/3/2023 was preferred before

the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge cum Rent Controller along

with an Application under Order 41 Rule 3A CPC, read with Section

5 Limitation Act for condonation of Delay of 437 days in filing the

Appeal.

22. The learned Appellate Court considered the explanations given by

the Plaintiff/Appellant and concluded that the Appellant was unable to

demonstrate “sufficient cause” or that the reasons given were bona

fide. He considered the exclusion of limitation period on account of

COVID Pandemic, but observed that the Appellant seriously failed to

give any sufficient cause and that in fact the grounds taken in the

Application stood completely unsubstantiated and malafide in regard

to the delay of almost six months, in getting the judgment of the

learned Trial Court.

23. The learned Senior Civil Judge also found that none of the medical

documents which had been annexed, demonstrated that he was ever

advised rest or was ever hospitalized, or that his medical condition

was such that he was not in a position to contact his counsel. Even

otherwise, the last Medical Report was of 22.12.2022, while the

Appeal before the learned Senior Civil Judge had been filed even

beyond 30 days, thereafter. The learned Senior Civil Judge further

noted that the Appeal had been filed by several LRs of the original

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Plaintiff, and there was no explanation provided as to why none of the

other LRs filed the Appeal within the prescribed time, when they

were suffering from no impediment.

24. Hence, the Condonation Application was dismissed and

consequently, the Appeal was also dismissed.

25. Aggrieved by the Dismissal of the Appeal by learned Appellate Court,

the present Regular Second Appeal has been filed on behalf of the

Appellants/Plaintiffs.

26. The grounds of challenge are that the reasonable and plausible

explanations had been given, which were not considered by the First

Appellate Court, which also failed to exercise its discretionary powers

in dealing with the Application seeking condonation of delay.

27. It is established law that when substantial rights are pitted against

procedural law like limitation; the substantial law should prevail over

the procedural law, unless some special prejudice is caused to the

opposite side. In the present case, the Appellants assert that they have

a meritorious case, and therefore, some concession ought to have been

given.

28. The Appellant had explained that on account of the illness of one of

the Appellants which was supported by medical documents, has been

erroneously rejected by the learned Appellate Court by observing that

the said prescriptions neither advised complete bed rest nor suggested

that the Appellant was admitted in the Hospital. In fact, the kind of

disease from which the Appellant was suffering was respiratory which

decreases the working capacity of a person and sometimes restrict his

movement in the outfield.

RSA 22/2026 Page 9 of 15

29. It has not been considered that when there are more than one or

several litigants, the litigants appoint one as the main Parokar or one

of them leads the others. Shri Surender was the main Parokar who

used to brief the Counsel and when he fell ill, the delay occurred.

30. It has also not been appreciated that litigants are villagers and few of

them are semi-literate or illiterate. They were not aware of the

consequences of delay in preferring the Appeal. This factor should

have been considered by the Appellate Court, but it has not been

considered.

31. It has further not been considered that a litigant depends upon the

advice of the Counsel and sometimes the gravity and the

consequences of delay in filing the Appeal are not explained, resulting

in the litigant not being completely aware of the consequences of

delay in filing the Appeal though. However, previous counsel is not to

be blamed, but the perusal of the Application seeking condonation of

delay, shows that there was much more to be explained in the

Application which were available with the learned Counsel, but were

not mentioned in the Application.

32. The learned First Appellate Court had observed that the Application

had not been signed by Sh. Surender, who was stated to be ill. In this

regard, it is submitted that Appeal had been signed by all Appellants

and thus, even if it was not signed by one person who was ill, it would

not erase out the case of the Appellants.

33. It was next contended that the copy of the impugned Judgment dated

28.10.2021 became available only in April, 2022. The learned

Appellate Court concluded that there was nothing placed on record to

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substantiate this aspect and was not considered in favour of the

Appellant.

34. In this regard, it is submitted that there was Covid period when the

system of uploading the Judgment was not working properly and the

lawyers and litigants were also not in touch regularly with the Courts.

The Application was duly supported with the Affidavit. The

Appellants could not bring additional evidence to substantiate this

aspect, as it was completely within the domain of I.T. Branch of the

Court and the Affidavit of the Appellant was sufficient on this aspect.

Access of litigants and lawyers to the Court system, was limited in

those days and therefore, Section 114 Evidence Act, could not have

been applicable.

35. Reliance is placed on Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh2025,

LiveLaw (SC) 339 where it was held that liberal approach must be

adopted in condoning the delay when the merits of the case need

examination and when limitation is about to obstruct substantial

justice.

36. In the present case, the Appellants have been residing in the Suit

property since more than 50 years through their predecessors, who

had raised the construction on the Suit property. The possession is

admitted and the only aspect which needs adjudication is whether the

Suit property is part of the acquisition proceedings or not. Taking the

technical question of limitation would prejudice the right of the

Appellant especially considering their long settled possession.

RSA 22/2026 Page 11 of 15

37. Hence, a prayer was made that the impugned Judgment and Decree

dated 11.12.2025 of learned Senior Civil Judge who has rejected the

Appeal solely on the ground of limitation, be set aside.

Submissions heard and record perused.

38. The Appellant in his Application for condonation of Delay had stated

that there was sufficient cause for the Appellants to entitle them to

condonation of delay.

39. The first aspect, which emerges is that there was six month’s delay in

getting the copy of the impugned Judgment dated 28.10.2021. It was

asserted that the status of the matter was updated on the E-courts

portal in April 2022, following which the Appellants had applied for a

certified copy of the judgment. This certified copy was provided to

the Appellants in the month of August, 2022.

40. The learned Senior Civil Judge in considering this issue has held that

in view of Section 114 Indian Evidence Act 1872, (now Section 119

of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), Illustration (e) sets out

the presumption that all judicial acts have been regularly performed.

Even otherwise, the Appellants have failed to substantiate this by any

Applications for certified copy. The learned Senior Civil Judge has

correctly held that the Appellants have failed to substantiate this claim

as no Application for certified copy of the judgment has been filed.

41. The second ground seeking condonation of delay is the exclusion of

the limitation period for filing during the Covid pandemic as extended

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in In Re: Cognizance for

Extension of Limitation, In re, (2020) 19 SCC 10 : 2020 SCC OnLine

SC 343. As per this decision, a limitation period of 90 days from

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01.03.2022 was available to the Appellants for filing the appeal.

42. The learned Senior Civil Judge has found that the Appellants had

applied for the certified copy of the judgment on 04.04.2022, i.e.,

within the prescribed period, however, a copy was only received on

03.08.2022. Thus, the said period ought to be excluded.

43. This court finds no infirmity in this finding. However, the explanation

given that the Judgment did not get uploaded in time, was not

substantiated and was thus, rightly rejected by the Ld. SCJ.

44. The third ground taken was the medical condition of Shri Surender

Singh who was extremely sick in the month of June 2022 with

respiratory and cardiac illness and was forced to undergo prolonged

treatment. However, his one medical prescription of June, 2022

related to respiratory issue and second dated 25.11.2022 is for fever

and cough. None of these documents reflected his medical condition

of a kind that totally incapacitated him.

45. In the present case, there was not one Appellant, but were eight legal

heirs of Ajit Singh in addition to Surender Singh who were required

to file the Appeal. The medical condition that too, which is not shown

to be absolutely incapacitating from medical records, could not have

been a reason for other Appellants to pursue the matter. While one of

the parties may have been taken leave, there was nothing which

prevented the other Appellants from pursuing the matter and in

getting the Appeal filed in time.

46. The explanation that he was the Parokar or leading the litigation,

cannot be accepted for in a condition when Shri Surender Singh was

unable to pursue the matter, there was nothing which prevented all

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other Appellants from taking charge to agitate their rights.

47. Moreover, the Application for Condonation of Delay was not even

signed by Shri Surender Singh whose medical condition was

projected and was signed by the other Appellants. The Affidavit filed

along with the Application for condonation of Delay was also not

supported with the Affidavit of Surender Singh. Furthermore, absence

of his signatures establish that he was not the one who pursued the

case or got the Appeal filed.

48. Evidently, the affidavit accompanying the Application for

condonation of delay has been signed by Shri Gajinder Singh, while

the affidavit accompanying the appeal has been signed by one Ms.

Rani. Neither of these has been signed by Sh. Surinder Singh and

thus, the Appellants have failed to prove that Sh. Surinder Singh was

the Parokhar, or the lead litigant, as has been claimed in the present

appeal, or even substantiated their claim on the basis of his medical

records.

49. It was rightly held that the condonation cannot be a matter of routine;

rather must be based upon some reasoning. It is intended to cater to

genuine cases and must not be extended to a person oblivious to his

rights and entitlements.

50. The Apex Court in the case of Basawaraj vs. Land Acquisition Officer

(2013) 14 SCC 81 and Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. 1961 SCC

OnLine SC 39 had concluded that it is well settled that sufficient

cause “must be inferred liberally as to ensure that substantive justice

is done but only to the extent where inaction, negligence or lack of

bona fide cannot be imputed to the party seeking condonation of

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delay”.

51. Yet, on the other hand in H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. Krishnaiah (since

deceased) through LRs (2025 SCC OnLine SC 54), Order dated

08.01.2025 of Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.317 of

2025 observed that the concepts such as liberal approach, justice

oriented approach substantial justice should not be employed to

frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation, yet the length of

delay is definitely a relevant factor which must be taken into

consideration while considering whether the delay should be

condoned or not.

52. Moreover, while considering the reasons for condonation of delay the

Court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The Court

owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fide of the explanation offered

by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause

aside by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally

balanced that the Court may bring into it the merits of the matter for

the purpose of condonation of delay.

53. The learned Appellate Court has rightly considered all the grounds

agitated in the Application and has rightly exercised the discretion of

dismissing the Condonation Application. The impugned Order is well

reasoned and there is no arbitrariness or capriciousness evident in the

discretion exercised by the learned Appellate Court in not accepting

the reasons given for condonation of delay, which has been rightly

rejected.

54. It may also be observed that there is no Substantial question of Law

which has been raised in the present Appeal. The challenge is only to

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the facts, which is beyond the scope of a Second Regular Appeal.

55. There is no merit in the present Appeal, which is hereby dismissed.

The pending Applications if any stands disposed of, accordingly.

(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)

JUDGE

APRIL 10, 2026

va