CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 1 of 20

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on: 09

th

December, 2025

Pronounced on: 10

th

March, 2026

+ CRL.M.C. 297/2021, CRL.M.A. 1531/2021 & CRL.M.A.

6072/2021

1. SH. SANDEEP PATHAK

2. SH. JAYANT PATHAK

3. MS. HEMLATA PATHAK

All R/o BD Complex, Pathak Bhawan,

Ranikhet, District- Almora,

Uttarakhand - 263645.

.....Petitioners

Through: Ms. Jyoti Dutt Sharma, Mr.

Chinmaya K. Bhatt and Ms. Amrita

Pandey, Advocates.

Versus

LALITA TIWARI

R/o House No. 41, Block - 1,

Pocket- 5, 1

st

Floor, Sector-16,

Rohini, Delhi- 110085. .....Respondent

Through: Respondent in person.

CRL.M.C. 485/2021

1. SH. SANDEEP PATHAK

2. SH. CHANDRA SHEKHAR PATHAK

4. SH. JAYANT PATHAK

4. MS. HEMLATA

All R/o BD Complex, Pathak Bhawan,

Ranikhet, District- Almora,

Uttarakhand - 263645.

.....Petitioners

Through: Ms. Jyoti Dutt Sharma, Mr.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 2 of 20

Chinmaya K. Bhatt and Ms. Amrita

Pandey, Advocates.

Versus

1. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

Through Ld. Standing Counsel (Criminal)

Delhi High Court

Sher Shah Marg,

New Delhi - 110003.

Email address dhcprosecutiondelhipolice@qmail.com

Contact No. 9891919168

2. SHO, P.S. KAILASH NATH KATJU MARG

Dr. K.N. Katju Marg, Sector 16,

Rohini, Delhi - 110085.

3. LALITA TIWARI

R/o House No. 41, Block - 1,

Pocket- 5, 1

st

Floor, Sector-16,

Rohini, Delhi- 110085.

.....Respondents

Through: Mr. Ajay Vikram Singh, APP for the

State.

Ms. Lalita Tiwari in person.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

J U D G M E N T

NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.

1. The aforesaid two Petitions under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C”) read with

Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 have been filed on behalf of

the Petitioners seeking quashing of the Complaint Case under Section 12 of

the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter

referred to as “DV Act”) and FIR No. 252/2013 dated 25.06.2013, P.S. KN

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 3 of 20

Katju Marg under Section 498A/406/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and the proceedings arising therefrom.

2. The brief background is that the Petitioner No.1, Sandeep Pathak and

the Respondent/Complainant, Lalita Tiwari got married on 25.01.2005 at

Haldwani, District Nainital, Uttarakhand, as per Hindu rites and customs.

Even though it was mutually agreed that after marriage, the couple would

reside at the Petitioner No.1’s house in Ranikhet, District Almora,

Uttarakhand, but the Complainant, soon found it difficult to adjust in the

small place like Ranikhet, being a girl brought up in Delhi. During her stay

of barely 6 days, from 25.01.2005 to 30.01.2005, her behaviour was

strange. Despite sincere efforts by the Petitioners to make her comfortable,

she remained adamant and refused to discuss the matter with family

members. Consequently, the Petitioner No. 1 escorted the Respondent to her

parental home, in Delhi.

3. The Respondent/Complainant came intermittently to Ranikhet, in

second week of June, 2005 for one week, but again stated that she did not

wish to live in a village with those villagers and insisted on returning to

Delhi and asked the Petitioner No. 1 to live there. He expressed his inability

to relocate and requested her to stay.

4. On 20.06.2005, the Petitioner No.1 accompanied her to Delhi and

requested her parents to intervene. They declined, stating that she had

always behaved similarly. That night, the Respondent allegedly threatened

to commit suicide and falsely implicate the Petitioner, if he complained

about her conduct to her parents. Distressed by this conduct, the Petitioner

No. 1 returned alone to Ranikhet, hoping time would improve the situation.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 4 of 20

5. In February 2006, she visited Ranikhet again, but her conduct

remained hostile. In December 2006, the Petitioner No. 1 visited the

Respondent in her house in Rohini, Delhi seeking reconciliation, but she

allegedly abused and ill-treated him.

6. The Respondent continuously pressurized the Petitioner No. 1 to

relocate permanently to Delhi and allegedly misbehaved with his family

members, to compel him to shift. Due to his family responsibilities and

career obligations, he was unable to shift. On 18.06.2007, the Respondent

came to Ranikhet demanding that he must immediately shift to Delhi. Upon

refusal, she allegedly threatened to implicate him and his family in false

cases, so that they would languish in jail.

7. The Respondent last visited Ranikhet in October, 2007. There was no

cohabitation, thereafter. She deserted the Petitioner No. 1 and warned him

against visiting Delhi. The Petitioners repeatedly made umpteen requests for

reconciliation through meetings and discussions, but without success.

8. After nearly four years of desertion since 2007, the Petitioner No.

1/Husband filed a Divorce Petition No. 54/2011 under Section 13(1)(i-a) of

the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “HMA”) on

30.07.2011 before the Ld. Senior Civil Judge, Almora, Uttarakhand. Despite

service of Notice, the Respondent did not appear, and she was proceeded ex

parte, on 20.04.2012. The Court granted exparte divorce on 05.09.2012.

9. Thereafter, the Respondent filed a Divorce Petition bearing HMA

No. 558502/2012 on 12.09.2012, before the Ld. Family Court, Rohini,

concealing the earlier decree. Upon being apprised of the Decree, the

Respondent withdrew the Petition on 04.03.2013.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 5 of 20

10. Immediately thereafter, she filed a Complaint under DV Act before

Ld. MM (Mahila Court), North District, Rohini Court, Delhi and lodged

FIR No. 252/2013 dated 25.06.2013 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC

against the Petitioners.

11. In CC No. 494/2016 under DV Act, aside from the aforesaid

Petitioners, Smt. Chandrika Pathak (Mother of the Petitioner No. 1) and Sh.

Parkash Pathak (Brother of the Petitioner No.1), were also arrayed as

Respondents. However, Smt. Chandrika Pathak died on 04.12.2016 and Sh.

Parkash Pathak died on 26.06.2019.

12. On 18.08.2017, the Ld. MM passed an ex parte Order awarding Rs.

10,000/- per month as maintenance, without hearing the Petitioner.

13. It is submitted that Ld. Trial Court erroneously observed that the

Divorce Decree was subsequent to the Complaint, whereas the Decree was

passed on 05.09.2012 and the Complaint was filed later. The Petitioner’s

Application to recall the ex parte Order, was dismissed on 04.01.2019. The

Petitioner has paid Rs. 50,000/- towards maintenance, till date.

14. The Petitioners seek quashing of Complaint Case No. 494/2016

under DV Act and FIR No. 252/2013 under Section 498A/406/34 IPC,

on the ground that these proceedings are vexatious, and constitute a gross

abuse of the process of law.

15. The Complaint under DV Act and the allegations in the FIR, are

merely an afterthought and is filed deliberately, intentionally and

maliciously to harass the Petitioners and is bereft of any merits and is

completely based on wrong, incorrect, false facts, pure conjectures and

surmises. It is quite evident that the Respondent was unwilling to cohabit

and misused legal proceedings to harass the Petitioners.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 6 of 20

16. Moreover, the allegations in the FIR and the DV Act Complaint, even

if taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not disclose the

commission of any offence nor make out a prima facie case against the

Petitioners.

17. The criminal proceedings have been maliciously instituted with

ulterior motives, solely to harass, blackmail, and extract money from the

Petitioner, and to wreak vengeance due to personal grudge and failure before

the Family Court, Rohini.

18. Furthermore, the marriage between Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent

stood annulled by Decree dated 05.09.2012 passed by the Ld. Senior Civil

Judge (Senior Division), Almora, Uttarakhand, which has not been

challenged till date. The Respondent concealed this fact in her Divorce

Petition under Section 13(1) (i-a) HMA before the Family Court, Rohini as

well as in the FIR, demonstrating mala fide intent behind the Complaint.

19. Furthermore, the Petitioner No. 1 suffered a brain haemorrhage during

2015-16 and underwent medical treatment. He remarried on 12.05.2014 and

has a child born on 20.03.2018. The remarriage occurred 1.5 years after the

divorce decree, which is also not challenged. Moreover, he is already

burdened with financial responsibilities, and the continuation of these

proceedings is oppressive and unjust.

20. Ld. Trial Court has failed to consider that the decree of Annulment

dated 05.09.2012, was passed prior to the registration of the FIR dated

25.06.2013.

21. Hence, prayer is made to quash/ set aside the Complaint Case No.

494/2016 under Section 12 DV Act and FIR No. 252/2013 under Sections

498A/406/34 IPC.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 7 of 20

22. The Respondent/Complainant has contended that FIR No. 252/2013

dated 25.06.2013 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC, is pending adjudication

and pertains to serious and specific allegations of dowry demand, cruelty,

and unlawful retention of stridhan by the Petitioner No.1 and his family

members. The registration of the FIR itself demonstrates that cognizable

allegations were disclosed and matter is presently sub judice before the Ld.

Trial Court.

23. It is further submitted that the subsequent remarriage of the

Petitioner/Husband, is irrelevant to the present proceedings. The rights and

liabilities arising out of acts of cruelty and domestic violence committed

during the subsistence of the marriage, cannot be defeated or diluted merely

because the Petitioner chose to remarry after obtaining an ex parte decree

dated 05.09.2012. Such act of the Petitioner does not extinguish the statutory

remedies available to the Respondent, under criminal law or under the DV

Act.

24. With respect to limitation, it is submitted that under Section 28 DV

Act read with the applicable procedural framework, the proceedings are

governed by a special statutory scheme. The Respondent had resided in a

domestic relationship with the Petitioner after the marriage on 25.01.2005

and cohabited intermittently; the disputes arose within approximately 1.5

years of marriage, followed by continued acts of cruelty and economic

abuse. The cause of action was recurring and continuous. The limitation

does not operate mechanically, so as to defeat the substantive rights.

Therefore, the Application cannot be dismissed on the ground of limitation

when the effects of domestic violence persisted and the FIR dated

25.06.2013 was lodged within the statutory period.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 8 of 20

25. Thus, it is submitted that the criminal and DV proceedings are

maintainable in law, and the Petitioners cannot evade liability.

Submissions heard and record perused.

Quashing of FIR under Sections 498A/406 IPC:

Allegations under Section 498A IPC:

26. Before embarking on the facts of the case, it would be fruitful to first

understand the contours of Section 498A IPC, which is reproduced as under:

“Section 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman

subjecting her to cruelty.

Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a

woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall

also be liable to fine.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, “cruelty means”—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive

the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to

life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view

to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful

demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of

failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

27. In Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda and Others vs. State of Gujarat,

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3679, the Apex Court while considering the guilt of

the husband under Section 498A, observed that cruelty simplicitor is not

enough to constitute the offence under Section 498A; rather it must be

done either with an intention to cause injury or to drive the person to

commit suicide or with an intention to coerce her and her relatives to meet

unlawful demands. Hence, where the Court finds misuse of the Section, the

Courts must be vigilant and quash the proceedings under Section 482

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 9 of 20

Cr.P.C., whenever it is found to be registered for ulterior reasons or out of

revenge or vindictiveness.

28. Now, in the light of aforesaid law, the facts of the present case may be

assessed to ascertain if the quashing of the FIR under Section 498A/406/34

IPC, is merited in the circumstances.

29. The Respondent/Complainant in her Complaint has stated that that all

eight members of Petitioner/husband’s family, tortured, humiliated, taunted,

and used abusive language against her.

30. As per the Complaint, she remained in her matrimonial Home for

about one month. Thereafter, Petitioner/Husband used to visit her in Delhi

occasionally, for 4-5 days at the intervals of 4-5 months. The Complainant

alleges she was not allowed to live in a cordial atmosphere at the

matrimonial house in Ranikhet. The Complainant had described one incident

of June 2009, wherein she asserted that while the Respondent/Complainant

was sleeping at the matrimonial home in Ranikhet, someone allegedly

attempted to press her neck, through the window at night. She raised an

alarm. She alleges the incident was repeated, leading her to feel unsafe, after

which she returned to Delhi.

31. Such allegations are on the face of it, are not only evidently concocted

but are vague with no description of the suspect, but even if believed to be

true, then too, they are not targeted towards any of the petitioners, and

therefore, are not relevant.

32. She further stated that her in-laws namely Petitioner No.2/Sh.

Chandra Shekhar Pathak, Father-in-law and Petitioner No.3/Sh. Jayant

Pathak, Brother-in-law continuously pressurized her and her mother to

transfer her house in Rohini, in the name of Petitioner/Husband or to

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 10 of 20

purchase another shop/house in Delhi in his name, for business expansion,

failing which they would arrange his remarriage.

33. She, as per own submissions, remained in the matrimonial home for a

few days and most of the time, was in her paternal home, in Delhi. It is the

husband/Petitioner No.1 who used to invariably visit her in Delhi, clearly

reflecting the adjustment issues. From these allegations against the Husband,

father-in-law and the brother-in-law, it is evident that aside from omnibus

allegations that she was tortured, humiliated, taunted, and abused, there is no

specific incident narrated to explain the nature of alleged torture.

34. Further allegations against Petitioner No.4/Smt. Hemlata is that she

was unmarried and resided in the matrimonial house, and controls

Petitioner/Husband’s finances and influencing him regarding property

matters. It is alleged that Petitioner/Husband transferred income, property

interests, FDR income, LIC benefits, and part of the Ranikhet house in her

favour, and she pressurized him regarding the Complainant’s mother’s

property.

35. There is nothing un-natural for a family member to manage the affairs

of a brother, while he was unmarried. Aside from bald assertions, that she

had control over the finances of the husband, there is nothing to show how it

was impacting her; there is no allegation that she was deprived in any way,

by this alleged act of the Sister-in-law or any other family member.

36. The Complainant’s mother-in-law (who is now deceased) allegedly

taunted the Complainant’s family for not performing the marriage according

to their “status” and for not giving sufficient gifts. The in-laws allegedly

compelled the Respondent/Complainant to keep her mother-in-law at her

mother’s house in Delhi every year, from November to March.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 11 of 20

37. Again, there can be no more vague, omnibus allegations that to

sweepingly claim that she was taunted for not bringing sufficient dowry.

Moreover, even if mother-in-law stayed with the Complainant in winter

months, it leaves to ones imagination, how it tantamount to cruelty or

harassment.

38. She also stated that the in-laws were habitual drinkers. It is alleged

that the father-in-law, Chander Shekhar Pathak was of bad character and

after consuming liquor, created an unsafe atmosphere and the Complainant

feared for her security, whenever she stayed at Ranikhet.

39. It is so simple to make such allegations against the family members;

there is no explanation about any specific incident to explain her absolutely

vague allegations. Moreover, is so oppressive and cruel was the behaviour,

there was no Complaint made by the Complainant to any authority.

40. Prakash Pathak, brother of Petitioner No.1, allegedly demanded

money, threatened the Complainant, and allegedly misbehaved and passed

filthy comments, when she was alone. He pressurized the Complainant to

take responsibility for his 11-year-old son, by keeping him permanently at

her mother’s house, in Delhi.

41. Merely asking the Complainant to assist in caring for a family

member cannot, by itself, constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section

498A IPC.

42. The allegations against the Petitioner/Husband allegedly emotionally

blackmailed her by threatening to commit suicide and forced her for

marriage under pressure. The Complainant stated that he is violent and

aggressive, having assaulted an SDM in Ranikhet. It is further alleged that

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 12 of 20

he beat the Complainant several times, threatened to kidnap her, and

demanded transfer of property or purchase of another house, in his name.

43. These allegations, again aside from being omnibus, do not amount to

cruelty and harassment, as envisaged under Section 498A IPC. It cannot

be overlooked that the Complainant had resided with her in-laws only for a

few days after marriage and thereafter, shifted to her mother’s house in

Delhi. According to her, it was Petitioner No.1 who used to visit her in

Delhi.

44. To sum up, is evident that firstly, the Complaint clearly lacks

specificity and lacks any details about the dates/period and are generic,

omnibus and vague. Secondly, the Complainant fails to demonstrate how

the conduct of each accused individually or collectively, contributed to

cruelty. Thirdly, the allegations made in the Complaint, even if accepted in

toto, do not constitute cruelty of the nature as contemplated under Section

498A IPC. There is no allegation of physical violence causing injury, no

medical evidence of mental or physical harm, and no conduct likely to drive

her to suicide. The absence of any allegation regarding dowry demand or

harassment on any account and the presence of only vague references

regarding the alleged acts of cruelty which are in fact, instances of ordinary

wear and tear of marital life, further undermines the Complaint. The

allegations at best reflect ordinary matrimonial discord and lack of

adjustment, but not criminal cruelty.

45. From the entire allegations as discussed above, it emerges that the

essential ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out from the

Complaint made by Respondent No.2.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 13 of 20

46. In light of the above findings, it is concluded that it is clearly a case

which comes in the category of abuse of the process of law, meriting

quashing of the FIR.

Allegations under Section 406 IPC:

47. To comprehend these assertions, it would be relevant to first consider

the contours of Section 406 IPC. Section 405 IPC defines the offence as

under:

“Section 405. Criminal breach of trust.

Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any

dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to

his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that

property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in

which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express

or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or

wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach

of trust”.”

“Section 406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.

Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to

three years, or with fine, or with both.”

48. Section 406 IPC refer to the two foundational elements to constitute

the offense of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC: first, an

entrustment of property, and second, a dishonest misappropriation of that

property.

49. The Respondent/Complainant in her Complaint makes only one single

assertion regarding her jewellery. It is stated that the Petitioners/in-laws

illegally and forcefully retained her gold jewellery/stridhan and expelled her

with only the clothes she was wearing, threatening not to accept her unless

property was transferred in Petitioner/Husband’s name.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 14 of 20

50. Evidently, the Complainant uses general terms like “jewellery”

without providing any description or valuation of the specific items,

allegedly retained. There is no detail regarding what items were given by

whom at the time of marriage, what items constitute stridhan, what is their

nature, description, quantity, quality, etc. The Complaint also reveals

omnibus reference to “in-laws”. Moreover, no specific averments had been

made qua the Petitioners herein.

51. It is pertinent to observe that as per her own averments, she had

stayed in the matrimonial home barely for a month and thereafter, come to

Delhi. There is not a whisper about the person to whom the alleged

jewellery was entrusted and when did she demand back the same and was

not returned.

52. Thus, aside from omnibus allegations, no prima facie case of

entrustment of jewellery has been made out. Thus, no offence under Section

406 IPC is made out in the Complaint against the Petitioners.

53. Recently, the Supreme Court in Sanjay D. Jain & Ors. vs. State of

Maharashtra, Crl. Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.12584/2024 decided

on 26.09.2025 (2025 INSC 1168), while quashing FIR under Section

377/498A/506 IPC, reiterated the settled principle that where allegations in

the FIR or complaint are vague and general without specific instances or

particulars essential to constitute an offence, such FIRs do not disclose a

prima facie case and are liable to be quashed. The Court emphasized that

even if the statements in the FIR are taken at their face value, if the essential

ingredients of an offence like cruelty under Section 498A IPC are not made

out with particularity, quashing is justified to prevent abuse of process.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 15 of 20

54. The guiding tests in regard to the quashing of the FIR, had been

succinctly stated in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp

(1) SCC 335 wherein it is observed, “where the uncontroverted allegations

made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the

same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case

against the accused; or where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with

an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view

to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the FIR may be quashed.”

55. As discussion above in detail, there is not an iota of even a prima

facie case of cruelty or of harassment of the Complainant by the Petitioners.

There is also no element of cruelty or entrustment made out from the facts

alleged by the Respondent in her Complaint. Moreover, as discussed above

from the facts, when comprehensively considered, reflects that it is a case of

abuse of process of law, justifying the quashing of the FIR and the

Chargesheet filed therein.

56. Accordingly, FIR No. 252/2013 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC

dated 25.06.2013 is hereby, quashed.

Quashing of Complaint under Domestic Violence Act:

57. The Petitioners in the present petition, are seeking quashing of the

Complaint Case No.494/2016 filed under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22

DV Act dated 05.03.2013, of the Ld. MM (Mahila Court).

58. The Respondent/Complainant has sought reliefs for Protection,

Residence Order, Monetary Relief as well as Compensation Order in her

Complaint under the DV Act. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the

allegations forming the basis of the Complaint under the DV Act are

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 16 of 20

substantially the same as those forming the subject matter of FIR No.

252/2013 registered under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC.

59. Firstly, similar allegations made in the Complaint are similar to those

made in the FIR. As already examined in detail above, they are vague,

omnibus and devoid of any specific instances of cruelty, harassment, or

unlawful demand or any act of Domestic violence. Thus, even when

considering the allegations made in the Complaint under the DV Act are

taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not disclose

any specific act of domestic violence attributable to the Petitioners. The

Complaint is bereft of particulars regarding the time, nature, and manner of

the alleged acts of violence, and merely contains generalized accusations

against several members of the family. Such bald and sweeping allegations,

are insufficient to sustain proceedings under the DV Act.

60. Secondly, the timeline of events further assumes significance. The

marriage between Petitioner No.1 and the Respondent was solemnized on

25.01.2005. The parties admittedly lived together only for a brief period and

thereafter, remained separated. The Petitioner No.1 instituted Divorce

Petition No. 54/2011 under Section 13(1)(i-a) HMA before the Court of the

Ld. Senior Civil Judge, Almora on 30.07.2011 and was granted an ex parte,

decree of divorce dated 05.09.2012. The said decree has admittedly not been

challenged and has attained finality and evidently the domestic relationship

between the parties came to an end. It is only thereafter, that the Respondent

initiated proceedings by filing the Complaint under the DV Act on

05.03.2013 and Complaint on which FIR was registered on 12.09.2013.

61. Herein, it is pertinent to refer to Section 2(f) DV Act, which defines

“domestic relationship” as a relationship between two persons who live, or

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 17 of 20

have at any point of time lived together in a shared household, and are

related by marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage.

62. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer to Kuldeep Kaur vs. Swaran

Kaur, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 5593, decided on 21.08.2025, wherein a

Division Bench of this Court while examining the right of residence in a

shared household under DV Act, and the effect of dissolution of marriage on

such right, held as under:

“ 27. Nonetheless, the statutory protections under

Section 17 of the PWDV Act are firmly anchored in the

existence of a “domestic relationship.” Section 2(f) of the

PWDV Act defines a domestic relationship as a relationship

between two persons who live, or have at any point of time

lived, together in a shared household when they are related

by consanguinity, marriage, or a relationship in the nature

of marriage. Once the marriage stands dissolved by a valid

decree of divorce, the domestic relationship comes to an

end. Consequently, the substratum upon which the right of

residence is founded no longer survives, unless a contrary

statutory right is shown to persist.

28. ….. In the absence of such a relationship, the

foundational requirement for invoking Section 17 of the

PWDV Act is lacking. Accordingly, the Appellant's

assertion of a continuing right of residence under the Act is

materially weakened, subject of course to the outcome of

her pending appeal.”

63. Furthermore, in the similar facts, in the case of Amit Agarwal and Ors.

vs. Sanjay Aggarwal and Ors., Crl. Misc. No.M-36736 of 2014 (O&M), the

Punjab & Haryana High Court while quashing a Complaint filed under the

DV Act, held that “where the domestic relationship ceases, the provisions

under the D.V. Act cannot be invoked. Furthermore, once the Divorce is

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 18 of 20

granted, The complainant had impleaded relatives who were not living in

the shared house and permitting the Magistrate to proceed with the

complaint would be an abuse of the process of law. The complaint and the

proceedings therein are quashed.”

64. The principles laid down in the aforesaid cases squarely apply to the

facts of the present case. Admittedly, the marriage between Petitioner No.1

and the Respondent stands dissolved by a decree of divorce dated

05.09.2012, which has attained finality. Moreover, the couple resided

together only for a brief period of time. Once the domestic relationship

between the parties ceased to exist, the foundational requirement for

invoking the provisions of the DV Act does not exist.

65. Another aspect of immense significance is that the Parties got married

on 25.01.2005 and essentially, the Complainant, barely after a month, came

to Delhi are resided majorly in her parental home, in Delhi. It was the

petitioner No.1/Husband who used to visit her, in Delhi. Eventually, when

things did not work out, he filed Divorce Petition No. 54/2011 on

30.07.2011, and was granted ex parte decree of divorce on 05.09.2012. The

Complainant failed to contest the proceedings and eventually the Divorce

was granted on 05.09.2012, which was never challenged by the

Complainant. Infact, she herself subsequently filed for Divorce on

12.09.2012 in Ld. Family Court, Delhi but withdrew it on 04.03.2013 when

she came to know about the ex parte Divorce Decree.

66. It was only subsequent thereto, that the Respondent initiated

proceedings by filing the Complaint under the DV Act on 05.03.2013 and

the FIR dated 25.06.2013 under Sections 498A/406/34 IPC.

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 19 of 20

67. Similar situation was considered in the case of Bhushan and Ors. vs.

Sau. Nilesha Bhushan Deshmukh, Crl. Appl. 164/2017 decided on

09.08.2021 by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Nagpur Bench).

While quashing the DV Act Complaint filed by the Respondent/Wife, it was

noted that the Respondent had initiated DV Act proceedings during the

course of the matrimonial discord between the parties. It was after the

Respondent suffered adverse orders in the proceedings concerning the

Divorce petition and the Application for restitution of conjugal rights, which

stood confirmed right upto the Apex Court, that she turned around and

sought to invoke the provisions of the DV Act. This demonstrated that the

manner in which the proceedings were sought to be initiated under the

provisions of the DV Act was nothing, but an abuse of process of law.

68. The Bombay High Court therefore, quashed the DV proceedings

holding that such proceedings were initiated only after the complainant had

suffered adverse orders in earlier litigation and were intended to harass the

Applicants.

69. Thus, the chronology of events clearly indicates that the criminal and

DV proceedings were initiated after the marital relationship had already been

dissolved by a decree of divorce, and is a subsequent attempt to revive

matrimonial disputes through criminal proceedings, which is clearly an

abuse of the process of law and an afterthought.

70. In view of the above discussion, the Complaint under the DV Act is

based on the same vague and omnibus allegations which have already been

examined in the context of the FIR. Further, the Complaint has been

instituted after the decree of divorce dated 05.09.2012, which has attained

finality, thereby bringing the domestic relationship between the parties to an

CRL.M.C. 297 & 485/2021 Page 20 of 20

end. In the absence of any specific allegations of domestic violence and a

subsisting domestic relationship, continuation of the present proceedings

would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

71. Accordingly, the Complaint Case No. 494/2016 under Sections 18,

19, 20, 21 and 22 DV Act and all proceedings arising therefrom are hereby,

quashed.

Relief:

72. The two Petitions i.e. CRL. M.C. No. 297/2021, seeking quashing of

Complaint case No. 494/2016 under DV Act and CRL. M.C. No. 485/2021,

seeking quashing of FIR No. 252/2013 dated 25.06.2013 filed under

Sections 498A/406/34 IPC, P.S. KN Katju Marg, are hereby, allowed and

the Complaint as well as the FIR, along with proceedings therein, are

quashed.

73. The pending Application(s), if any, are disposed of accordingly.

(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)

JUDGE

MARCH 10, 2026/R