CM(M) 69/2024 Page 1 of 17

$~22

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: 21.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010583102023

+ CM(M) 69/2024, CM APPL. 1945/2024 (Stay) & CM APPL.

1947/2024 (Ex. From filing lengthy synopsis and list of dates)

SHABNAM KHAN .....Petitioner

Through: Appearance not given

versus

SARFRAZ ANSARI .....Respondent

Through: Appearance not given

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)

1. The present Petition has been filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India [“the Constitution”], assailing the Order dated

25.08.2023 [“Impugned Order”] passed by the learned Judge,

Family Court-01, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi [“learned

Trial Court”] in ML No. 57/2019, whereby the learned Trial Court

has allowed the application filed by the Respondent under Order IX

Rule 7 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

[“CPC”], and, consequently, condoned the delay in filing the Written

Statement and took the same on record.

2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the aforesaid

Application dated 15.05.2023, seeking setting aside of the Order dated

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 2 of 17

07.12.2022, was filed after a delay of 174 days and that the learned

Trial Court erred in condoning the said delay. It is contended that,

having regard to the substantial delay in approaching the learned Trial

Court, the Respondent was not entitled to the indulgence granted by

the Impugned Order.

3. No other ground was pressed into service by the learned counsel

for the Petitioner while impugning the Order passed by the learned

Trial Court.

4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has, in support of the

aforesaid contention, placed reliance upon the Judgment of the

Division Bench of this Court in Smt. K.S. Sumi Mol v. Sh. Suresh

Kumar E.K.

1

, and, in particular, paragraph 6(a) thereof. The relevant

portion of the aforesaid Judgment reads as under:

“6. In view of the above, and in the absence of any specific Rules

regarding the speedy disposal of cases relating to marriage and

family affairs within a time frame, we hereby lay down the

guidelines for strict observance by all the Family Courts in Delhi,

till such time rules are formulated by the State Government in

consultation with the High Court of Delhi.

“ Guidelines

a. Issue of Summons: When a suit has been duly instituted, a

summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and

answer the claim and to file the written statement of his

defence, if any, within thirty days from the date of service of

summons on that defendant:

Provided that no such summons shall be issued when a

defendant has appeared at the presentation of plaint and

admitted the plaintiff's claim:

Provided further that where the defendant fails to file the

written statement within the said period of thirty days, he

shall be allowed to file the written statement on such other

day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be

recorded in writing and on payment of such costs as the

Court deems fit, but which shall not be later than one

1

2023 SCC OnLine Del 4685

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 3 of 17

hundred twenty days from the date of service of summons

and on expiry of one hundred twenty days from the date of

service of summons.

Provided further, the time taken for conciliation, mediation

or interaction shall be excluded.”

***** ”

5. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and

has perused the relevant documents on record, including the Impugned

Order as well as the Application dated 15.05.2023 filed by the

Respondent before the learned Trial Court.

6. Before examining the challenge to the Impugned Order on

merits, it would be apposite to delineate the scope of jurisdiction

exercised by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The

jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is supervisory in

nature and is intended to ensure that subordinate Courts and Tribunals

act within the bounds of their jurisdiction and in accordance with law.

It is not an appellate jurisdiction and is not intended to enable the

High Court to substitute its own view for that of the subordinate Court

merely because another view is possible.

7. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The

power of superintendence is to be exercised sparingly and with a high

degree of judicial restraint. Interference is warranted where the order

under challenge suffers from a patent jurisdictional error, perversity,

manifest illegality, or results in a gross failure of justice. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil

2

,

and Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel

3

has reiterated the

2

(2010) 8 SCC 329

3

(2022) 4 SCC 181

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 4 of 17

aforesaid limitations governing the exercise of supervisory

jurisdiction.

8. In Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

has held that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is to be

exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where interference is

necessary to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their

authority. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

read as under:

“ ****

(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power

of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere

with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in

exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of

the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative

statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also

operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High

Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of

their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by

this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the

principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court

in Waryam Singh

4

and the principles in Waryam Singh (Supra)

have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches

and various other decisions of this Court.

(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (Supra), followed in

subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of

superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals

and courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of their authority”.

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and

courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not

declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.

(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can

interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has

been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts

subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest

failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been

flouted.

4

AIR 1954 SC 215

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 5 of 17

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot

interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because

another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts

subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction

has to be very sparingly exercised.

****”

9. In Garment Craft (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

reiterated that Article 227 of the Constitution does not permit the High

Court to act as a court of first appeal and reappreciate or reweigh

evidence. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

read as under:

“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the

view that the impugned order [Prakash Chand Goel v. Garment

Craft

5

] is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several

reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction

exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution

of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does

not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the

evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is

based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact

or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be

supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on

facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.

[Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar

6

] The

jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to

set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of

fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article

227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is

no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no

reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the

court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary

relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.

16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this

Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.

7

has observed :

(SCC pp. 101-102, para 6)

“6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and

jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number

5

2019 SCC OnLine Del 11943

6

(2010) 1 SCC 217

7

(2001) 8 SCC 97

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 6 of 17

of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this

article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior

courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and

to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a

legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any

unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or

wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of

the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power

and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is

restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant

violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where

if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice

remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High

Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its

power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in

place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error,

which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High

Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an

inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to

justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable

person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the

court or tribunal has come to.”

10. It is in the aforesaid limited jurisdiction that the Impugned

Order is required to be examined. The relevant portion of the

Impugned Order is reproduced hereinbelow:

“I have heard the arguments and perused the record. This case of

divorce under Muslim Law which has been filed by petitioner

against respondent and is pending under adjudication. Though

dispute between the parties was settled and petitioner agreed to

withdraw this petition, yet she failed to withdraw it and decided to

continue, whereas respondent failed to appear or to file WS, due to

his defence was struck off vide order dated 17.12.2022.

Respondent has pleaded that he was not aware about stage of this

case, whereas he is an advocate and was supposed to know about

his case and also to keep constant watch over it, which he failed to

do and suffered adverse order. However, this case is pertaining to

divorce and nature of case requires that it should be contested on

merit and both parties should be given fair opportunity to prove

their pleas. In fact, respondent would suffer irreparable loss, if

opportunity is not extended to defend this case, whereas delay in

moving this application may be compensated in terms of cost.

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 7 of 17

Accordingly, application of respondent is hereby allowed, subject

to cost of Rs. 3,000/- to be paid to the petitioner. Delay in filing

WS is hereby condoned and WS filed by respondent is taken on

record, subject to payment of cost only. With these observations

application disposed off.”

11. The sole grievance of the Petitioner is that the Respondent

approached the learned Trial Court after a delay of 174 days and that,

consequently, the learned Trial Court ought not to have condoned the

delay in filing the Written Statement.

12. There can be no dispute that the timelines governing filing of

pleadings are intended to ensure procedural discipline and expeditious

adjudication. The object of prescribing a time-frame is to prevent a

litigant from delaying the proceedings and to ensure that the opposite

party is not subjected to prolonged uncertainty. This consideration

assumes particular significance in matrimonial proceedings, where the

expeditious resolution of disputes is itself an important legislative and

judicial objective.

13. At the same time, the mere fact that there has been delay

cannot, by itself, conclude the matter. The Court is required to

consider the nature of the proceedings, the consequence of shutting

out the defence and whether the prejudice occasioned by the delay can

otherwise be addressed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Kailash v.

Nanhku & Ors.

8

, while considering the time prescribed under Order

VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, held that the provision is directory and that

the Court retains the power, in an appropriate case and for reasons to

be recorded, to permit filing beyond the prescribed period. The

8

(2005) 4 SCC 480

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 8 of 17

Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, also made it clear that such

discretion cannot be exercised routinely and that the prescribed time-

frame is ordinarily required to be respected. The relevant portion of

the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:

“27. Three things are clear. Firstly, a careful reading of the

language in which Order 8 Rule 1 has been drafted, shows that it

casts an obligation on the defendant to file the written statement

within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him and

within the extended time falling within 90 days. The provision does

not deal with the power of the court and also does not specifically

take away the power of the court to take the written statement on

record though filed beyond the time as provided for. Secondly, the

nature of the provision contained in Order 8 Rule 1 is procedural. It

is not a part of the substantive law. Thirdly, the object behind

substituting Order 8 Rule 1 in the present shape is to curb the

mischief of unscrupulous defendants adopting dilatory tactics,

delaying the disposal of cases much to the chagrin of the plaintiffs

and petitioners approaching the court for quick relief and also to

the serious inconvenience of the court faced with frequent prayers

for adjournments. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to

scuttle the same. The process of justice may be speeded up and

hurried but the fairness which is a basic element of justice cannot

be permitted to be buried.

28. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The

language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be

liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of

prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an

adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the

opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation.

Unless compelled by express and specific language of the statute,

the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not

to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless

to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The

observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v.

State of Bihar [(1975) 1 SCC 774] are pertinent: (SCC p. 777,

paras 5-6)

“The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's

conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law

reformer.

The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to

overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The

humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 9 of 17

mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a

residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the

tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. … Justice

is the goal of jurisprudence — processual, as much as

substantive.”

29. In State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari [(1976) 1 SCC 719 :

1976 SCC (L&S) 118] the Court approved in no unmistakable

terms the approach of moderating into wholesome directions what

is regarded as mandatory on the principle that: (SCC p. 720)

“Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an

obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are

the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in

the administration of justice.”

In Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India [(1984) 3 SCC 46] the

Court reiterated the need for interpreting a part of the adjective law

dealing with procedure alone in such a manner as to subserve and

advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it as all the laws

of procedure are based on this principle.

30. It is also to be noted that though the power of the court under

the proviso appended to Rule 1 Order 8 is circumscribed by the

words “shall not be later than ninety days” but the consequences

flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically provided

for though they may be read in by necessary implication. Merely

because a provision of law is couched in a negative language

implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions.

The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the

provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the

provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though

worded in the negative form.

31. In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah [(1955) 2 SCR

1 : AIR 1955 SC 425] this Court highlighted three principles while

interpreting any portion of CPC. They are:

(i) A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is

“procedure”, something designed to facilitate justice and further

its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties;

not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a

construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable

elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against

(provided always that justice is done to “both” sides) lest the

very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to

frustrate it. (SCR pp. 8-9)

(ii) There must be ever present to the mind the fact that our

laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice

which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that

decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 10 of 17

proceedings that affect their lives and property should not

continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded

from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions

and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to.

(SCR p. 9)

(iii) No forms or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude

the presentation of the litigant's defence unless there be an

express provision to the contrary. (SCR p. 9)

*****

33. As stated earlier, Order 8 Rule 1 is a provision contained in

CPC and hence belongs to the domain of procedural law. Another

feature noticeable in the language of Order 8 Rule 1 is that

although it appoints a time within which the written statement has

to be presented and also restricts the power of the court by

employing language couched in a negative way that the extension

of time appointed for filing the written statement was not to be

later than 90 days from the date of service of summons yet it does

not in itself provide for penal consequences to follow if the time

schedule, as laid down, is not observed. From these two features

certain consequences follow.

*****

36. The Court further held that the provision is more by way of

procedure to achieve the object of speedy disposal of such disputes.

The strong terms in which the provision is couched are an

expression of “desirability” but do not create any kind of

substantive right in favour of the complainant by reason of delay so

as to debar the respondent from placing his version in defence in

any circumstances whatsoever.

*****

41. Considering the object and purpose behind enacting Rule 1 of

Order 8 in the present form and the context in which the provision

is placed, we are of the opinion that the provision has to be

construed as directory and not mandatory. In exceptional

situations, the court may extend the time for filing the written

statement though the period of 30 days and 90 days, referred to in

the provision, has expired. However, we may not be misunderstood

as nullifying the entire force and impact — the entire life and

vigour — of the provision. The delaying tactics adopted by the

defendants in law courts are now proverbial as they do stand to

gain by delay. This is more so in election disputes because by

delaying the trial of election petition, the successful candidate may

succeed in enjoying the substantial part, if not in its entirety, the

term for which he was elected even though he may lose the battle

at the end. Therefore, the judge trying the case must handle the

prayer for adjournment with firmness. The defendant seeking

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 11 of 17

extension of time beyond the limits laid down by the provision

may not ordinarily be shown indulgence.

42. Ordinarily, the time schedule prescribed by Order 8 Rule 1 has

to be honoured. The defendant should be vigilant. No sooner the

writ of summons is served on him he should take steps for drafting

his defence and filing the written statement on the appointed date

of hearing without waiting for the arrival of the date appointed in

the summons for his appearance in the court. The extension of time

sought for by the defendant from the court whether within 30 days

or 90 days, as the case may be, should not be granted just as a

matter of routine and merely for the asking, more so, when the

period of 90 days has expired. The extension can be only by way of

an exception and for reasons assigned by the defendant and also

recorded in writing by the court to its satisfaction. It must be

spelled out that a departure from the time schedule prescribed by

Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code was being allowed to be made because

the circumstances were exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond

the control of the defendant and such extension was required in the

interest of justice, and grave injustice would be occasioned if the

time was not extended.

43. A prayer seeking time beyond 90 days for filing the written

statement ought to be made in writing. In its judicial discretion

exercised on well-settled parameters, the court may indeed put the

defendants on terms including imposition of compensatory costs

and may also insist on an affidavit, medical certificate or other

documentary evidence (depending on the facts and circumstances

of a given case) being annexed with the application seeking

extension of time so as to convince the court that the prayer was

founded on grounds which do exist.

44. The extension of time shall be only by way of exception and

for reasons to be recorded in writing, howsoever brief they may be,

by the court. In no case, shall the defendant be permitted to seek

extension of time when the court is satisfied that it is a case of

laxity or gross negligence on the part of the defendant or his

counsel. The court may impose costs for dual purpose: (i) to deter

the defendant from seeking any extension of time just for the

asking, and (ii) to compensate the plaintiff for the delay and

inconvenience caused to him.

45. However, no straitjacket formula can be laid down except that

the observance of time schedule contemplated by Order 8 Rule 1

shall be the rule and departure therefrom an exception, made for

satisfactory reasons only. We hold that Order 8 Rule 1, though

couched in mandatory form, is directory being a provision in the

domain of processual law.”

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 12 of 17

14. The aforesaid principle, therefore, does not dispense with

adherence to procedural timelines, but recognises that the Court

retains a limited discretion to depart from them where the

circumstances so warrant.

15. The same principle assumes relevance in the context of the

present proceedings. In Bharat Kalra v. Raj Kishan Chhabra

9

, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with a delayed Written

Statement, recognised that the prejudice occasioned by delay may, in

an appropriate case, be compensated by costs and that denial of the

opportunity to file the Written Statement may not necessarily be

justified. The relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced

hereinbelow:

“4. In view of the aforesaid judgment, we find that the delay in

filing of the written statement could very well be compensated with

costs but denying the benefit of filing of the written statement is

unreasonable.”

16. In the present case, the learned Trial Court has not condoned the

delay mechanically. The Impugned Order records that the Respondent

had failed to remain vigilant in respect of the proceedings and, being

an advocate, was expected to have kept track of the case. The learned

Trial Court, nevertheless, took into consideration the fact that the

proceedings pertain to dissolution of marriage and that denial of an

opportunity to defend the proceedings on merits would cause

prejudice to the Respondent. The learned Trial Court thus considered

both sides of the matter rather than treating the delay as either

automatically fatal or wholly inconsequential.

9

2022 SCC OnLine SC 613

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 13 of 17

17. The approach adopted by the learned Trial Court also finds

support from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Shraddha Ashish Deshbhratar v. Ashis h Ramchandra

Deshbhratar

10

, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing

with a delayed Written Statement in matrimonial proceedings,

cautioned against applying procedural requirements in a manner

which eclipses the Court’s duty to render effective justice. The Court

held that procedural discipline has to be balanced with the requirement

of adjudication on merits, particularly in matrimonial matters. The

relevant portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:

“7. In our considered view, the High Court has adopted a strict

approach in declining to interfere with the order of the Trial Court,

placing its reliance on strict procedural rigours. It is a settled

principle that procedural requirements, though essential for orderly

conduct of proceedings, are not intended to be applied in a manner

that eclipses the duty of the court to render effective justice.

Discretion rests with the courts to adopt a pragmatic approach in

cases where rigid adherence may result in denial of a fair

opportunity to parties. Considerations of procedural discipline,

therefore, ought to be balanced with the overarching obligation to

ensure that adjudication proceeds on merits, particularly in

matrimonial matters.”

18. Thus, the principle emerging from the aforesaid decisions is not

that delay in matrimonial proceedings is to be condoned as a matter of

course. Rather, the Court is required to balance the requirement of

procedural discipline against the prejudice that may result from

completely shutting out a defence. In a case where the delay can

adequately be compensated by costs and the defence can still be

permitted to be adjudicated without defeating the object of the

10

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 15073 OF 2025 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(CIVIL) NO. 11282 OF 2025)

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 14 of 17

proceedings, the exercise of discretion in favour of allowing the

Written Statement cannot, by that reason alone, be characterised as

impermissible.

19. In the present case, the learned Trial Court has adopted

precisely such a course. While noticing the lapse on the part of the

Respondent, it has permitted the Written Statement to be taken on

record subject to payment of costs of Rs. 3,000/- to the Petitioner. The

delay has, therefore, neither been overlooked nor treated as

immaterial, rather, the learned Trial Court has sought to compensate

the prejudice occasioned by the delay while preserving the

Respondent's opportunity to contest the matrimonial proceedings on

merits.

20. The aforesaid approach is also consistent with the recent

decision of this Court in WG CDR (Retd.) Rakesh Lal Kapur v.

Sumeeta Tuli Kapur

11

, wherein, in the context of matrimonial

proceedings, this Court recognised the need to balance procedural

discipline with preservation of an effective opportunity of defence and

held that such exercise of discretion would not warrant interference

under Article 227 of the Constitution unless shown to be perverse,

arbitrary or contrary to law. The relevant portion of the aforesaid

Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:

“13. The expression “as far as may be” is of significance and

indicates that the provisions of the CPC are not to be applied to

proceedings under the HMA with inflexible or mechanical rigour.

The procedural framework of the CPC is, therefore, applicable to

matrimonial proceedings to the extent compatible with the nature

11

2026 SCC OnLine Del 6491

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 15 of 17

and object of such proceedings and subject to the discretion of the

Court to advance the cause of substantive justice.

14. The aforesaid principle assumes particular significance in

matrimonial proceedings, where the Courts have consistently

recognised the need for a degree of procedural flexibility. While

procedural timelines cannot be disregarded as a matter of course,

their application cannot also be divorced from the nature of the

proceedings or the consequences which may follow from shutting

out a party from effectively placing its defence before the Court.

The governing consideration remains whether the procedure is

being applied in aid of a fair and effective adjudication, or in a

manner which occasions prejudice disproportionate to the

procedural default.

15. This approach finds specific recognition in the catena of

decisions of this Court, inter alia, in Komal Gupta v. Amrendra

Kumar Gupta

12

. In the said Judgement, this Court, while

considering the closure of the right of a party to file a Written

Statement in a Divorce Petition, observed that “in such matters of

family disputes, the Family Courts have to be a little liberal and

the stringent test, as may be applicable to commercial disputes,

cannot be applied”. The Court further emphasized that closure of

the right to file a Written Statement may have grave personal

consequences and that the approach of the Family Court ought to

be guided by the object of the Family Courts rather than

technicality of law. The relevant portions of the said Judgement,

read as under:

“7. Though the respondent may be correct in his submission

that the petitioner having being served with a notice of the

Divorce Petition on 16.01.2021 should have filed her Written

Statement, at the same time, keeping in view the peculiar facts

of the present case and especially the fact that the Divorce

Petition has been transferred by the Supreme Court to the

learned Family Court, Patiala House Courts, and on such

transfer, notice had earlier been issued to the parties to enter

appearance and thereafter, by the order dated 22.12.2022, a

period of thirty days had been granted to the petitioner to file

her written statement, in my opinion, it was a fit case for the

learned Family Court not to close the right of the petitioner to

file her written statement, but to impose conditions for ensuring

that the petitioner does not cause further delay in the

adjudication of the Divorce Petition.

8. In such matters of family disputes, the Family Courts have to

be a little liberal and the stringent test, as may be applicable to

12

2023 DHC 6784

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 16 of 17

commercial disputes, cannot be applied. It is to be remembered

that closing of the right to file written statement would result in

grave personal consequences to the party concerned. The

approach of the learned Family Court, therefore, has to be

guided by the object of the Family Court, rather than the

technicality of law. At the same time, in case the learned

Family Court finds that the party is intentionally delaying the

adjudication/progress of the proceedings pending before it, it

must pass orders stipulating conditions to ensure that such party

does not succeed in its attempt to delay the proceedings.”

***** ”

21. In the present case, the learned Trial Court has considered the

delay, the circumstances surrounding the Respondent’s failure to file

the Written Statement, the nature of the matrimonial proceedings and

the prejudice that would result from shutting out the defence. It has

thereafter imposed costs while taking the Written Statement on record.

The discretion exercised by the learned Trial Court is thus founded

upon relevant considerations and cannot be said to be either arbitrary

or mechanical.

22. This Court, while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under

Article 227 of the Constitution, is not expected to sit as a Court of

appeal or substitute its own view for that of the learned Trial Court

merely because another view may also be possible. Interference is

warranted only where the Impugned Order suffers from perversity, a

manifest error of law, grave dereliction of duty, or results in a failure

of justice. Having regard to the reasons recorded hereinabove, no such

infirmity is discernible in the exercise of discretion by the learned

Trial Court.

CM(M) 69/2024 Page 17 of 17

23. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no ground

to interfere with the Impugned Order. The present Petition is,

accordingly, dismissed.

24. The present Petition, along with the pending Application(s), if

any, stands disposed of in the above terms.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

SEPTEMBER 21, 2026/rk/ma