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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 366 OF 2018

(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 5777 of 2017)

Shafin Jahan …Appellant(s)

Versus

Asokan K.M. & Ors.          …Respondent(s)

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.]

  Rainbow   is   described   by   some   as  the   autograph  of   the

Almighty   and   lightning,   albeit   metaphorically,   to   be   the

expression   of   cruelty   of   otherwise   equanimous   “Nature”.

Elaborating the comparison in conceptual essentiality, it can be

said that when the liberty of a person is illegally smothered and

strangulated and his/her choice is throttled by the State or a

private person, the signature of life melts and living becomes a

bare   subsistence.   That   is   fundamentally   an   expression   of

acrimony which gives indecent burial to the individuality of a

person and refuses to recognize the other’s identity.   That is

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reflection of cruelty which the law does not countenance. The

expos

é of facts in the present case depicts that story giving it a

colour of different narrative. It is different since the State that is

expected to facilitate the enjoyment of legal rights of a citizen has

also supported the cause of a father, an obstinate one, who has

endeavoured immensely in not allowing his daughter to make her

own choice in adhering to a faith and further making Everestine

effort to garrotte her desire to live with the man with whom she

has entered into wedlock.  The thought itself is a manifestation of

the idea of patriarchal autocracy and possibly self­obsession with

the feeling that a female is a chattel. It is also necessary to add

here that the High Court on some kind of assumption, as the

impugned   judgment   and   order   would   reflect,   has   not   been

appositely guided by the basic rule of the highly valued writ of

habeas corpus and has annulled the marriage.  And that is why

the order becomes a sanctuary of errors.

2.On 08.03.2018, this Court had allowed the appeal passing

the following order:­

“Leave granted. 

Heard Mr. Kapil Sibal and Ms. Indira Jaising,

learned senior counsel along with Mr. Haris Beeran,

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learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,   Mr.   Maninder

Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General for the

National Investigation Agency (NIA) and Mr. Shyam

Divan,   learned   senior   counsel   along   with   Ms.

Madhavi   Divan,   learned   counsel   for   respondent

No.1. 

The   reasoned   judgment   will   follow.   The

operative part of the order reads as follows:­ 

Considering the arguments advanced on both

sides, in the facts of the present case, we hold that

the   High   Court   should   not   have   annulled   the

marriage between appellant No.1, Shafin Jahan and

respondent No.9, Hadiya alias Akhila Asokan, in a

Habeas Corpus petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. We say so because in the

present appeal, by special leave, we had directed the

personal presence of Hadiya alias Akhila Asokan;

she appeared before this Court on 27th November,

2017,   and   admitted   her   marriage   with   appellant

No.1. 

In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   the   appeal   stands

allowed.   The   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the

High Court is set aside. Respondent No.9, Hadiya

alias   Akhila   Asokan   is   at   liberty   to   pursue   her

future endeavours according to law. We clarify that

the   investigations   by   the   NIA   in   respect   of   any

matter of criminality may continue in accordance

with law.”

3.Presently, we proceed to state the reasons.

4.The facts which are necessary to be stated are that Ms.

Akhila alias Hadiya, respondent No.9 herein, aged about 26 years

at present, the only child of Sh. Asokan K.M., respondent No.1

herein,   and   Smt.   Ponnamma,   had   completed   a   degree   in

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Homeopathic   Medicine,   BHMS   (Bachelor   of   Homeopathic

Medicine   and   Surgery)   from   Shivaraj   Homeopathic   Medical

College, Salem in Tamil Nadu. While pursuing the said course,

she was initially residing in the college hostel and later she

started staying in a rented house near her college together with

five other students among whom were Jaseena and Faseena,

daughters of one Aboobacker. During the college holidays, Hadiya

used to visit the house of Aboobacker and there was also an

occasion when both Jaseena and Faseena came to reside with

Hadiya at the house of Asokan, respondent No.1 herein. On 6

th

December, 2015, Hadiya’s paternal grandfather breathed his last.

Hadiya on that day came back to her house and it is alleged that

at that time, the family members and relatives of Asokan noticed

some changes in her behaviour as she was showing reluctance to

participate   in   the   rituals   performed   in   connection   with   the

funeral of her grandfather. Thereafter, she went to Salem for her

internship along with Jaseena and Faseena. Till 5

th

  January,

2016, she was in constant touch with her family. Thereafter, on

the next day, i.e., 6

th

 January, 2016, Asokan received a telephone

call from one of the friends of Hadiya informing that Hadiya had

gone   to   the   college   on   that   day   wearing   a   ‘Pardah’.   The

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respondent No.1 was further informed that Hadiya was inspired

by someone to change her faith.

5.Upon   receiving   the   information,   Asokan   fell   ill.   Smt.

Ponnamma,   wife   of   Asokan,   called   Hadiya   and   informed   her

about the illness of her father.  Jaseena and Hadiya left for Salem

about 8 p.m. on 6

th

 January, 2016 but Hadiya did not reach her

father’s house. Later Asokan went in search of Hadiya and came

to know from one Ms. Archana that Hadiya was living at the

house of Aboobacker. Thereupon, Asokan contacted Aboobacker

for meeting his daughter Hadiya. Aboobacker promised Asokan

that he would bring Hadiya to the house of Ms. Archana, a friend

of   Hadiya,   but   this   never   happened   and   later   Asokan   was

informed that Hadiya had escaped from the house of Aboobacker

and had run away somewhere. Disgusted and disgruntled, as he

was, Asokan filed a complaint before S.P. Malapuram District,

but   as   there   was   no   progress   made   by   the   police   in   the

investigation of the matter, Asokan filed a Writ Petition of Habeas

Corpus before the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala

being W.P. (Criminal) No. 25 of 2016.

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6.On 14.01.2016, when the case came up for admission, the

Division   Bench   directed   the   Government   pleader   to   get

instructions regarding the action, if any, taken on the aforesaid

complaint of Asokan. Thereafter, on 19.01.2016, when the case

was taken up for further consideration, Hadiya appeared through

a lawyer and filed an application for impleadment being I.A. No.

792 of 2016. The said application for impleadment was allowed

and Hadiya was impleaded as a respondent. An affidavit dated

26.11.2016 was filed on her behalf stating, inter alia, the facts

and circumstances under which she had left her house. The

aforesaid affidavit mentioned that she had communicated to her

father as well as Director General of Police by registered letter

regarding the actual state of affairs. Further, she along with one

Sainaba  filed  Writ  Petition being  W.P.  (C)  No.  1965  of  2016

seeking protection from police harassment. 

7.The   Division   Bench   in   W.P.   (Criminal)   No.   25   of   2016

persuaded Hadiya to go along with her father, Asokan, to her

parental house but the said persuasions were all in vain as

Hadiya was not willing to go with her father. The Division Bench,

thereafter,   interacted   with   Sainaba   who   expressed   her

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unequivocal willingness to the Division Bench to accommodate

Hadiya   in   “Satyasarani”   institution   and   that   Sainaba   would

render all necessary help to Hadiya to pursue her internship in

BHMS degree course. As Hadiya had taken a stand that she

wanted to join Satyasarani and she was not, in any case, willing

to go back to her parental home along with Asokan, the Division

Bench permitted Hadiya to stay with Sainaba at her house till

she joined Satyasarani. The Division Bench thereafter adjourned

the case for further hearing directing to produce proof regarding

admission of Hadiya in Satyasarani.

8.The case was taken up for consideration by the Division

Bench where the counsel appearing on behalf of Hadiya produced

documents   to   show   that   Hadiya   had   got   admission   on

20.01.2016   in   an   institution,   namely,   ‘Markazul   Hidaya

Sathyasarani Educational & Charitable Trust’ at Karuvambram,

Manjeri in Malappuram District. The counsel for Hadiya also

submitted before the writ court that Hadiya was staying in the

hostel of the said institution.

9.The   Division   Bench,   vide   judgment   dated   25.01.2016,

directed as follows:­

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“8. Under the above mentioned circumstances, we

are convinced that the alleged detenue is not under

any illegal confinement. She is at present staying in

the above said institution on her own wish and will.

She   is   not   under   illegal   confinement.   Therefore,

there   exists   no   circumstances   warranting

interference   for   issuance   of   any   writ   of   Habeas

Corpus.   Hence   the   original   petition   is   hereby

disposed of by recording the fact that the alleged

detenue is staying in the above said institution on

her own free will. It will be left open to the petitioner

and her family members to make visit to her at the

above   institution,   subject   to   regulations   if   any

regarding visiting time."

10.In view of the aforesaid order, the writ petition filed by

Hadiya was withdrawn.

11.When  the matter stood thus, the  1

st

  respondent  filed a

second Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 297 of 2016 alleging that his

daughter was likely to be transported out of the country and the

High Court, vide interim order, directed the respondent to keep

her under surveillance and to ensure that she was not taken out

of   the   country   without   further   orders   of   the   Court.     The

averments made by the father in the writ petition need not be

stated   in   detail.   Suffice   it   to   say   that   Hadiya   alias   Akhila

categorically declined to go with her parents and stated in the

affidavit filed by her that she was not being permitted to interact

with anyone.  Hadiya further stated that she wanted to reside at

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a place of her choice and that she had not been issued a passport

and, therefore, there was no likelihood of her being taken to

Syria.   The High Court, considering the affidavit, passed the

following order:­

“After hearing learned counsel on both sides, we are

of the opinion that in the light of the finding entered

by this court in the earlier round of litigation that

this Court cannot compel the petitioner's daughter

to go and reside with her parents and that she is

not   in   the   illegal   custody   of   anyone,   this   court

cannot   any   longer   direct   that   the   petitioner's

daughter   should   continue   to   reside   at

Santhinikethan Hostel, Pachalam. When we asked

the petitioner's daughter as to whether she is willing

to appear on another day, she submitted that she

will   appear   on   the   next   hearing   date.   Learned

counsel  for  the   detenue  also  submitted  that   the

detenue   will   be   present   in   person   on   the   next

hearing date. We accordingly permit the detenue to

reside at a place of her choice. We also record the

statement of Ms. Akhila that she proposes to reside

with   the   seventh   respondent,   Smt.   A.S.Sainaba,

whose   address   is   mentioned   in   the   instant   writ

petition.   Sri.   P.K.Ibrahim,   learned   counsel

appearing   for   the   seventh   respondent   submitted

that the seventh respondent will cause production

of   the   petitioner's   daughter   on   the   next   hearing

date,   if   she   proposes   to   reside   with   her.   If   the

petitioner's daughter proposes to shift her residence

and to reside elsewhere, we shall inform that fact to

the   Deputy   Superintendent   of   Police,

Perinthalmanna   in   writing   and   furnish   her   full

residential address and the telephone number if any

over   which   she   can   be   contacted.   Call   on

24.10.2016. The Deputy Superintendent of Police,

Perinthalmanna   shall   cause   production   of   the

petitioner's daughter on that day. It will be open to

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the parents of Ms. Akhila to meet and interact with

her.”

12.On the basis of the aforesaid order passed by the High

Court, Hadiya was permitted to reside with the 7

th

  respondent.

On 14.11.2016, the counsel for the writ petitioner before the High

Court expressed serious apprehension regarding the continued

residence of his daughter in the house of the 7

th

  respondent

therein.  On 19.12.2016, the High Court noted that she had not

completed   her   course   and   acquired   competence   to   practise

homeopathy and, accordingly, expressed the opinion that she

should complete her House Surgeoncy without delay and obtain

eligibility to practice.  A statement was made on her behalf that

she   has   to   complete   her   House   Surgeoncy   at   the   Shivaraj

Homeopathic   Medical   College,   Salem   which   has   a   hostel   for

women   where   she   was   willing   to   reside   for   the   purpose   of

completing her House Surgeoncy.  On the basis of the aforesaid,

the High Court passed the following order:­

“We   have   heard   the   learned   Senior   counsel   Sri.

S.Sreekumar, who appears for the detenue. We have

perused the affidavit dated 26.11.2016 filed by the

detenue   producing   documents,   Exts.   R8(d)   and

R8(e).   We   are   not   prepared   to  rely   on   Ext.R8(d)

which   purports   to   make   it   clear   as   though   a

registered   Homeopathic   Medical   Practitioner   has

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permitted   the   detenue   to   work   as   a   trainee   in

Homeopathic   Medicine   on   a   remuneration   of

Rs.2000/­ per month for her day today expenses.

We fail to understand how the detenue, who has not

obtained a degree in Homeopathy can be permitted

to train under him. The detenue has admittedly not

completed   her   House   Surgeoncy   or   obtained

eligibility   to   practice.   Therefore,   it   is   only

appropriate   that   she   completes   her   House

Surgeoncy   without   further   delay   and   obtains

eligibility   to   practice   Homeopathic   Medicine.   Her

Senior counsel Sri. S.Sreekumar informs us that,

the detenue is desirous of completing her House

Surgeoncy.   However,   we   place   on   record   our

dissatisfaction   at   the   continued   residence   of   the

detenue with the 7th respondent, who is a stranger.

The counsel for the petitioner also expresses anxiety

and concern at her continued residence with the

7th respondent. He is anxious about the safety and

well being of the detenue. His anxiety and concern

as   the   parent   of   an   only   daughter   is

understandable. Therefore, it is necessary that the

detenue shifts her residence to a more acceptable

place,   without   further   delay.   According   to   the

learned Senior counsel Sri.S.Sreekumar, she has to

complete   her   House   Surgeoncy   at   the   Shivaraj

Homeopathic Medical College, Salem. The college

has a hostel for girl students where she is willing to

reside   and   complete   her   House   Surgeoncy.   The

petitioner   offers   to   bear   the   expenses   for   her

education and stay at the Medical College Hostel.

He offers to escort her to the Medical College and to

admit her into the Hostel there. The detenue is also,

according to the learned Senior counsel, willing to

accompany her. 

2. In view of the above, there shall be a direction

to the detenue to appear before this Court at 10.15

a.m. on 21.12.2016. The petitioner shall also be

present in person in Court on the said date. The

petitioner who is stated to be in possession of the

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certificates   of   the   detenue   shall   bring   such

certificates   also   to   Court.   We   shall   pass   further

orders in the matter, regarding the manner in which

the detenue is to be taken to the Medical College

and admitted to the ladies hostel, on 21.12.2016. 

Post on 21.12.2016.”

13.On 21.12.2016, Hadiya appeared before the High Court and

a statement was made that she had entered into marriage with

Shafin Jahan, the appellant herein.   The High Court, at that

juncture, as the order would reflect, noted that her marriage was

totally   an   unexpected   event   and   proceeded   to   ascertain   the

veracity of the statement made.  It has recorded its displeasure

as to the manner in which the entire exercise was accomplished.

It passed a detailed order on 21.12.2016.  The relevant part of

the order reads thus:­

“This court exercising its Parens Patriae jurisdiction

is anxious and concerned about the safety of the

detenue and her well being, viewed especially in the

light of the allegations made in the Writ Petition and

the continued obstinance of the detenue to return to

her parents. The person who is stated to have got

married   to   the   detenue   has   appeared   before   us

today, for the first time. He claims to be a graduate

and a person who is employed in the Gulf. It is

stated that, he is desirous of taking the detenue out

of   the   country.   It   was   precisely   the   said

apprehension that was expressed by her father in

the   proceedings   before   this   Court   on   the   earlier

occasion.   This   Court   has   on   the   said   occasion

recorded the fact that since she was not possessed

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of a Passport, there was no likelihood of her being

taken to Syria. The question that crops up now is

whether   the   marriage   that   has   been   allegedly

performed is not a device to transport her out of this

country. We are not aware of the identity of the

person who is alleged to have got married to the

detenue. We are not aware of the antecedents of the

said person or his family background. The address

mentioned   in   the   marriage   certificate   produced

shows that he is from Kollam. In what manner he

has come into contact with detenue and under what

circumstances,   the   detenue   has   agreed   to   get

married to a  stranger like him are matters that

require   to   be   probed   thoroughly.   The   marriage

certificate shows that the marriage was performed

by the Khazi at the house of the 7th respondent,

Srambikal House, Puthur. Why the marriage was

conducted at her house is not clear. Unless the

above   questions   are   answered,   it   cannot   be

accepted that the detenue is in safe hands. This

Court exercising Parens Patriae jurisdiction has a

duty to ensure that young girls like the detenue are

not   exploited   or   transported   out   of   the   country.

Though the learned Senior Counsel has vociferously

contended that the detenue is a person who has

attained majority, it is necessary to bear in mind

the fact that the detenue who is a female in her

twenties   is   at   a   vulnerable   age.   As   per   Indian

tradition, the custody of an unmarried daughter is

with the parents, until she is properly married. We

consider it the duty of this Court to ensure that a

person under such a vulnerable state is not exposed

to further danger, especially in the circumstances

noticed above where even her marriage is stated to

have   been   performed   with   another   person,   in

accordance with Islamic religious rites. That too,

with   the   connivance   of   the   7th   respondent   with

whom she was permitted to reside, by this Court. 8.

We place on record our absolute dissatisfaction at

the manner in which the marriage if at all one has

been   performed,   has   been   conducted.   The   7

th

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respondent   having   been   a   party   to   these

proceedings had a duty to at least inform this Court

of the same, in advance. This Court had relying on

her   credentials   and   assurance,   permitted   the

detenue to accompany her and to live with her. We

would have expected a reasonable litigant, which

includes the detenue also who as we have noticed

earlier, is represented through an eminent Senior

Counsel of this Court, to have informed this Court

and   obtained   permission   from   this   Court   before

such a drastic course was undertaken. Considering

the   manner   in   which   the   marriage   has   been

conducted,   the   secrecy   surrounding   the   said

transaction and also the hurried manner in which

the   whole   exercise   was   completed,   the   entire

episode   is   shrouded   in   suspicion.   Unless   the

suspicion   is   cleared   the   detenue   cannot   be

permitted to go with the person who is seen to be

accompanying her now. In view of the above, the

following directions are issued. 

1)   The   first   respondent   is   directed   to  escort   the

detenue   and   to   have   her   accommodated   at   the

S.N.V.Sadanam Hostel, Chittoor Road, Ernakulam,

until   further   orders.   The   first   respondent   shall

ensure   that   she   is   not   provided   the   facility   of

possessing or using a mobile phone. The petitioner

and   the   mother   shall   be   at   liberty   to   meet   her

according to the rules and regulations of the hostel.

No other person is permitted to meet her.

2) The first respondent shall cause an investigation

to   be   conducted   into   the   education,   family

background, antecedents and other relevant details

of   Sri.   Shafin   Jahan   who   is   stated   to   be   the

bridegroom of the alleged marriage that is stated to

have been conducted on 19.12.2016 as evidenced

by the certificate dated 20.12.2016 produced before

us. The first respondent shall also enquire into the

circumstances   surrounding   the   conduct   of   such

marriage,   the   persons   who   were   involved   in   the

15

conduct   of   the   same   the   organization   that   has

issued   the   marriage   certificate,   as   well   as   their

antecedents. A report of such investigation shall be

placed before us before the next posting date of this

case.   The   4th   respondent   shall   oversee   the

investigation and see that all relevant details are

unearthed and placed before us including any links

with extremist organizations, of which allegations

are made in the Writ Petition. 

3) The Secretary, Othukkungal Grama Panchayat is

directed not to issue the marriage certificate sought

for by the applicants Shafine Jahan and Hadiya as

per receipt dated 20.12.2016, without further orders

from   this   Court.   The   petitioner   shall   bear   the

expenses for the accommodation of the detenue at

the hostel. 

4)Post on 6.1.2017.”

14.Thereafter, the matter was taken up on various dates by the

High Court and eventually, by the impugned judgment and order,

it opined that a girl aged 24 years is weak and vulnerable and

capable of being exploited in many ways and thereafter, the

Court, exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction, observed that it

was concerned with the welfare of the girl of her age.  It has been

further observed by the High Court that the duty is cast on it to

ensure the safety of at least the girls who are brought before it

and the said duty can only be discharged by ensuring that the

16

custody of Akhila alias Hadiya should be given to her parents.

The High Court further directed to the following effect:­

“She shall be cared for, permitted to complete her

House Surgeoncy Course and made professionally

qualified so that she would be in a position to stand

independently on her own two legs. Her marriage

being the most important decision in her life, can

also be taken only with the active involvement of her

parents. The marriage which is alleged to have been

performed is a sham and is of no consequence in

the eye of law. The 7

th

 respondent and her husband

had   no   authority   or   competence   to   act   as   the

guardian of Ms. Akhila and to give her in marriage.

Therefore, the alleged marriage is null and void. It is

declared to be so.”

15.The High Court also directed that a police officer of the rank

of   Sub­Inspector   should   escort   Akhila   alias   Hadiya   from   the

hostel to her father’s house and the Superintendent of Police,

Respondent No.2 therein, should maintain surveillance over them

to ensure their continued safety.   That apart, the High Court

issued the following directions:­

“iii)   The   4th   respondent   shall   take   over   the

investigation   of   Crime   No.   21   of   2016   of

Perinthalmanna   Police   Station   and   shall   have   a

comprehensive   investigation   conducted   co­

ordinating the investigation in Crime No.510 of 2016

of   Cherpulassery   Police   Station   which   has   been

registered into the forcible conversion of Ms.Athira

which is the subject matter of W.P.(Crl.) No. 235 of

2016 of this Court. The 4th respondent shall also

investigate the activities of the organizations that

17

are involved in this case of which reference has been

made   by   us   above.   Such   investigation   shall   be

completed   as   expeditiously   as   possible   and   the

persons who are found to be guilty shall be brought

to the book. 

iv) The 4th respondent shall conduct a full­fledged

enquiry   into   the   lapses   on   the   part   of   the

Investigating   Officer   in   this   case   and   shall,   if

necessary, pursue departmental proceedings against

the Officer concerned.”

16.Against the aforesaid order, the present appeal, by special

leave, was filed by Shafin Jahan seeking permission to file the

special leave which is granted by this Court.

17.This Court, vide order dated 4.8.2017, asked Mr. Maninder

Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General, to accept notice on

behalf of the Respondent No.6, the National Investigating Agency

(NIA).  Thereafter, various orders were passed by this Court with

regard to investigation which are not necessary to narrate.  It is

worthy to mention that on 30.10.2017, this Court directed the 1

st

respondent   to   produce   his   daughter   before   this   Court   on

27.11.2017.  On the date fixed, Hadiya was produced before this

Court and a prayer was made to interact with Hadiya in camera

and not in open Court but repelling the said submission, the

following order was passed:­

18

  “After   due   deliberation,   we   thought   it

appropriate to interact with Akhila @ Hadiya and we

have accordingly interacted with her in Court. We

were   told   that   though   she   can   communicate   in

English, she may not be able to effectively articulate

in that language. Hence, we requested Mr. V. Giri,

learned   senior   counsel,   who   also   represents   the

State of Kerala to assist in translating the questions

posed to her in Court and the answers given by her. 

  The range of questions that we posed basically

pertained to her qualifications, interest in studies,

perception of life and what she intends to do in

future. In response to our queries, she responded by

stating that she has passed Class X from Higher

Secondary   School   in   K.V.   Puram,   Vaikom   in

Kottayam   District   and   thereafter   she   was

prosecuting   her   BHMS   course   in   Shivaraj

Homeopathy Medical College in Salem in the State

of Tamil Nadu. She has also stated that she intends

to continue her internship/ housemanship which

she had left because of certain reasons and her

ambition is to become a full­fledged homeopathic

doctor. She has expressed her desire to stay in the

hostel and complete the course in the said college, if

a seat is made available.

  In the above view, we direct, as desired by her,

that she be taken to Salem so as to enable her to

pursue   her   internship/housemanship.   We   also

direct the college to admit her and to allow the

facility of a room or a shared room in the hostel as

per   practice   to   enable   her   to   continue   her

internship/housemanship afresh. Be it stated, she

herself   has   stated   that   the   duration   of   the

internship/housemanship   is   likely   to   be   for   11

months. If any formality is to be complied with, the

college shall communicate with the university and

the   university   shall   accede   to   the   same.   Our

directions are to be followed in letter and spirit by

all concerned. Needless to say, when she stays in

the hostel, she will be treated like any other student

19

and will be guided by the hostel rules. If necessary,

the expenses for pursuing the course and for the

hostel shall be borne by the State of Kerala. The

Dean of the College shall approach this Court if

there is any problem with regard to any aspect. 'Any

problem' does not mean, admission in the hostel or

continuance in the course.

  We   direct   the   State   of   Kerala   to   make   all

necessary arrangements so that she can travel to

Salem at the earliest. She has made a request that

she   should   be   accompanied   by   policewomen   in

plainclothes. The State shall attend to the prayer

appropriately. If any security problem arises, the

State of Tamil Nadu shall make local arrangements

for   the   same.   We   have   been   told   that   she   is

presently staying in Kerala Bhawan at New Delhi.

Mr.   V.   Giri,   learned   senior   counsel   assures   this

Court that she shall be permitted to stay in Kerala

Bhawan till she moves to Salem. 

  We make it clear that the NIA investigation

shall continue in accordance with law.”

18.The aforesaid adumbration calls for restatement of the law

pertaining   to   writ   of   habeas   corpus   which   has   always   been

considered as ‘a great constitutional privilege’ or ‘the first security

of civil liberty’.  The writ is meant to provide an expeditious and

effective   remedy   against   illegal   detention,   for   such   detention

affects   the   liberty   and   freedom   of   the   person   who   is   in

confinement.

20

19.In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon  (1997 Edn.), while

defining “habeas corpus”, apart from other aspects, the following

has been stated:­

“The ancient prerogative writ of habeas corpus takes

its  name from  the two  mandatory  words habeas

corpus, which it contained at the time when it, in

common with all forms of legal process, was framed

in Latin. The general purpose of these writs, as their

name indicates, was to obtain the production of an

individual.”

20.In Cox v. Hakes

1

, Lord Halsbury observed as under: ­

"For a period extending as far back as our legal

history, the writ of habeas corpus has been regarded

as   one   of   the   most   important   safeguards   of   the

liberty of the subject. If upon the return to that writ

it was adjudged that no legal ground was made to

appear justifying detention, the consequence was

immediate   release   from   custody.   If   release   was

refused,   a   person   detained   might   make   a   fresh

application to every judge or every court in turn,

and each court or judge was bound to consider the

question independently and not to be influenced by

the   previous   decisions   refusing   discharge.   If

discharge   followed,   the   legality   of   that   discharge

could never be brought in question. No writ of error

or demurrer was allowed."

21.In Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O’Brien

2

, it has

been observed that:­

“… It is perhaps the most important writ known to

the constitutional law of England, affording as it

does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of

1 (1890) 15 AC 506

2 [1923] AC 603 : [1923] ALL E.R. Rep. 442 (HL)

21

illegal restraint or confinement. It is of immemorial

antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the

thirty­third year of Edward I. It has through the

ages been jealously maintained by the courts of law

as a check upon the illegal usurpation of power by

the executive at the cost of the liege.”

22.In  Ranjit Singh v. State of Pepsu (now Punjab)

3

, after

referring to Greene v. Secy. of States for Home Affairs

4

, this

Court ruled:­

“4. … the whole object of proceedings for a writ of

habeas corpus is to make them expeditious, to keep

them as free from technicality as possible and to

keep them as simple as possible.”

The Bench quoted Lord Wright who, in Greene’s case, had

stated:­ 

“… The incalculable value of habeas corpus is that it

enables the immediate determination of the right to

the applicant’s freedom.”

23.In Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling and

Others

5

, a Constitution Bench, after adverting to the brief history

of  the   writ  of  habeas  corpus,  opined  that   it  is essentially  a

procedural writ that deals with the machinery of justice and  not

a substantive law.  The object of the writ is to secure release of a

3 AIR 1959 SC 843

4 [1942] AC 284 : [1941] 3 All ER 388 (HL)

5 (1973) 2 SCC 674

22

person who is illegally restrained of his liberty.  The Court further

elaborated:­

“… The writ of habeas corpus is one of the most

ancient writs known to the common law of England.

It is a writ of immemorial antiquity and the first

threads of its origin are woven deeply within the

“seamless web of history” and they are concealed

and perhaps untraceable among countless incidents

that constituted the total historical pattern.”

24.Tracing the history, the Court proceeded to explicate:­ 

“The writ of habeas corpus cum causa made its

appearance   in   the   early   years   of   the   fourteenth

century. It not merely commanded the Sheriff to

“have the body” of the person therein mentioned like

its predecessor but added the words “with the cause

of the arrest and detention”. The person who had

the custody of a prisoner was required by this writ

to produce him before the Court together with the

ground for the detention. The writ thus became a

means of testing the legality of the detention and in

this   form   it   may   be   regarded   as   the   immediate

ancestor of the modern writ of habeas corpus. The

writ of habeas corpus cum causa was utilised by the

common law courts during the fifteenth century as

an  accompaniment   of  the  writs  of  certiorari  and

privilege to assert their jurisdiction against the local

and franchise courts.”

25.In Ware v. Sanders

6

, a reference was made to the Law of

Habeas Corpus  by James A Scott and Charles C. Roe of the

Chicago   Bar   (T.H.   Flood   &   Company,   Publishers,   Chicago,

6 146 Iowa 233 : 124 NW 1081 (1910)

23

Illinois, 1923) where the authors have dealt with the aspect of

Habeas Corpus.  It reads as under:­

“A writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right of very

ancient origin, and the preservation of its benefit is

a matter of the highest importance to the people,

and   the   regulations   provided   for   its   employment

against an alleged unlawful restraint are not to be

construed or applied with over technical nicety, and

when ambiguous or doubtful, should be interpreted

liberally   to   promote   the   effectiveness   of   the

proceeding.”

(See  Ummu   Sabeena   v.   State   of   Kerala   and

Others

7

)

26.In  Ummu   Sabeena,   the   Court   further   ruled   that   the

principle   of   habeas   corpus   has   been   incorporated   in   our

constitutional law and in a democratic republic like India where

judges function under a written Constitution and which has a

chapter of fundamental rights to protect individual liberty, the

judges owe a duty to safeguard the liberty not only of the citizens

but also of all persons within the territory of India; and the same

exercise of power can be done in the most effective manner by

issuing a writ of habeas corpus.

27.Thus, the pivotal purpose of the said writ is to see that no

one is deprived of his/her liberty without sanction of law. It is the

7 (2011) 10 SCC 781

24

primary duty of the State to see that the said right is not sullied

in any manner whatsoever and its sanctity is not affected by any

kind of subterfuge.   The role of the Court is to see that the

detenue   is   produced   before   it,   find   out   about   his/her

independent choice and see to it that the person is released from

illegal   restraint.   The   issue   will   be   a   different   one   when   the

detention is not illegal. What is seminal is to remember that the

song   of   liberty   is   sung   with   sincerity   and   the   choice   of   an

individual   is  appositely  respected  and   conferred  its   esteemed

status as the Constitution guarantees.  It is so as the expression

of choice is a fundamental right under Articles 19 and 21 of the

Constitution, if the said choice does not transgress any valid legal

framework.   Once   that   aspect   is   clear,   the   enquiry   and

determination have to come to an end. 

28.In the instant case, the High Court, as is noticeable from

the impugned verdict, has been erroneously guided by some kind

of social phenomenon that was frescoed before it. The writ court

has taken exception to the marriage of the respondent No. 9

herein with the appellant. It felt perturbed. As we see, there was

nothing to be taken exception to. Initially, Hadiya had declined to

25

go with her father and expressed her desire to stay with the

respondent No.7 before the High Court and in the first writ it had

so   directed.   The   adamantine   attitude   of   the   father,   possibly

impelled by obsessive parental love, compelled him to knock at

the doors of the High Court in another Habeas Corpus petition

whereupon the High Court directed the production of Hadiya who

appeared on the given date along with the appellant herein whom

the High Court calls a stranger. But Hadiya would insist that she

had entered into marriage with him. True it is, she had gone with

the respondent No.7 before the High Court but that does not

mean and can never mean that she, as a major, could not enter

into a marital relationship. But, the High Court unwarrantably

took   exception   to   the   same   forgetting   that   parental   love   or

concern cannot be allowed to fluster the right of choice of an

adult in choosing a man to whom she gets married. And, that is

where the error has crept in. The High Court should have, after

an interaction as regards her choice, directed that she was free to

go where she wished to. 

29.The High Court further erred by reflecting upon the social

radicalization  and certain  other aspects. In a  writ of  habeas

corpus,   especially   in   the   instant   case,   it   was   absolutely

26

unnecessary. If there was any criminality in any sphere, it is for

the law enforcing agency to do the needful but as long as the

detenue has not been booked under law to justify the detention

which   is   under   challenge,   the   obligation   of   the   Court   is   to

exercise   the   celebrated   writ   that   breathes   life   into   our

constitutional guarantee of freedom. The approach of the High

Court on the said score is wholly fallacious. 

30.The High Court has been swayed away by the strategy, as it

thought, adopted by the respondent No.7 before it in connivance

with the present appellant and others to move Hadiya out of the

country. That is not within the ambit of the writ of Habeas

Corpus. The future activity, if any, is required to be governed and

controlled by the State in accordance with law. The apprehension

was not within the arena of jurisdiction regard being had to the

lis before it.

31.Another aspect which calls for invalidating the order of the

High Court is the situation in which it has invoked the parens

patriae  doctrine.   Parens Patriae  in Latin means “parent of the

nation”.  In law, it refers to the power of the State to intervene

against an abusive or negligent parent, legal guardian or informal

27

caretaker, and to act as the parent of any child or individual who

is in need of  protection.    “The  parens patriae  jurisdiction is

sometimes spoken of as ‘supervisory’”

8

.

32.The doctrine of Parens Patriae has its origin in the United

Kingdom in the 13

th

  century.   It implies that the King as the

guardian   of   the   nation   is   under   obligation   to   look   after   the

interest of those who are unable to look after themselves. Lindley

L.J.   in  Thomasset   v.   Thomasset

9

  pointed   out   that   in   the

exercise of the Parens Patriae jurisdiction, “the rights of fathers

and legal guardians were always respected, but controlled to an

extent unknown at common law by considering the real welfare.”

The duty of the King in feudal times to act as Parens Patriae has

been taken over in modern times by the State.

33.Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘Parens Patriae’ as:­

“1.The State regarded as a sovereign; the state in

its capacity as provider of protection to those unable

to care for themselves.

2.A   doctrine   by   which   a   government   has

standing   to   prosecute   a   lawsuit   on   behalf   of   a

citizen,   especially   on   behalf   of   someone   who   is

under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.  The

State ordinarily has no standing to sue on behalf of

8 P.W. Yong, C Croft and ML Smit, On Equity.

9 [1894] P 295

28

its citizens, unless a separate, sovereign interest will

be served by the suit.”

34. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India

10

, the Constitution 

Bench, while delving upon the concept of parens patriae, stated:­

“35. … In the “Words and Phrases” Permanent Edition,

Vol. 33 at page 99, it is stated that parens patriae is

the inherent power and authority of a legislature to

provide   protection   to   the   person   and   property   of

persons  non   sui   juris,   such   as   minor,   insane,   and

incompetent  persons, but  the words  parens patriae

meaning   thereby   ‘the   father   of   the   country’,   were

applied originally to the King and are used to designate

the   State   referring   to   its   sovereign   power   of

guardinaship over persons under disability. (emphasis

supplied)  Parens   patriae  jurisdiction,   it   has   been

explained, is the right of the sovereign and imposes a

duty   on   sovereign,   in   public   interest,   to   protect

persons   under   disability   who   have   no   rightful

protector. The connotation of the term parens patriae

differs   from   country   to   country,   for   instance,   in

England it is the King, in America it is the people, etc.

The Government is within its duty to protect and to

control   persons   under   disability.   Conceptually,   the

parens patriae theory is the obligation of the State to

protect   and   takes   into   custody   the   rights   and   the

privileges of its citizens for dischargings its obligations.

Our Constitution makes it imperative for the State to

secure to all its citizens the rights guaranteed by the

Constitution   and   where   the   citizens   are   not   in   a

position to assert and secure their rights, the State

must come into picture and protect and fight for the

rights of the citizens. …” 

10 (1990) 1 SCC 613

29

35.In Anuj Garg and Others v. Hotel Association of India

and   others

11

,   a   two­Judge   Bench,   while   dealing   with   the

constitutional validity of Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act,

1914 prohibiting employment of “any man under the age of 25

years” or “any woman” in any part of such premises in which

liquor or intoxicating drug is consumed by the public, opined

thus in the context of the parens patriae power of the State:­

“29. One important justification to Section 30 of the Act

is parens patriae power of State. It is a considered fact

that use of parens patriae power is not entirely beyond

the pale of judicial scrutiny.

30. Parens patriae power has only been able to gain

definitive   legalist   orientation   as   it   shifted   its

underpinning from being merely  moralist  to a more

objective grounding i.e.  utility. The subject­matter of

the   parens   patriae   power   can   be   adjudged   on   two

counts:

(i) in terms of its necessity, and

(ii) assessment of any trade­off or adverse impact, if

any.

This inquiry gives the doctrine an objective orientation

and   therefore   prevents   it   from   falling   foul   of   due

process challenge. (See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne

Living Center

12

)”

11 (2008) 3 SCC 1

12 473 US 432, 439-41: 105 S Ct 3249 : 87 L Ed 2d 313 (1985)

30

36.Analysing further, the Court ruled that the parens patriae

power is  subject  to constitutional  challenge  on  the  ground of

right to privacy also. It took note of the fact that young men and

women know what would be the best offer for them in the service

sector and in the age of internet, they would know all pros and

cons of a profession.  The Court proceeded to state:­

“31.   …   It   is   their   life;   subject   to   constitutional,

statutory   and   social   interdicts—a   citizen   of   India

should be allowed to live her life on her own terms.”

37.Emphasizing on the right of self­determination, the Court

held:­

“34. The fundamental tension between autonomy and

security   is   difficult   to   resolve.   It   is   also   a   tricky

jurisprudential issue. Right to self­determination is an

important offshoot of gender justice discourse. At the

same time,  security and protection  to carry out such

choice or option specifically, and state of violence­free

being generally is another tenet of the same movement.

In fact, the latter is apparently a more basic value in

comparison to right to options in the feminist matrix.”

38.In  Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India

13

,

the Court, after dealing with the decision  in State of Kerala v.

N.M. Thomas

14

  wherein it has been stated by Mathew, J. that

13 (2011) 4 SCC 454

14 (1976) 2 SCC 310

31

“the Court also is ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 (of the

Constitution)  ...”, opined:­

“130. In our opinion, in the case of an incompetent

person who is unable to take a decision whether to

withdraw life support or not, it is the Court alone, as

parens   patriae,   which   ultimately   must   take   this

decision,   though,   no   doubt,   the   views   of   the   near

relatives, next friend and doctors must be given due

weight.”

39. Constitutional   Courts   in   this   country   exercise  parens

patriae  jurisdiction   in   matters   of   child   custody   treating   the

welfare   of   the   child   as   the   paramount   concern.     There   are

situations when the Court can invoke the parens patriae principle

and   the   same   is   required   to   be   invoked   only   in   exceptional

situations.  We may like to give some examples.   For example,

where a person is mentally ill and is produced before the court in

a writ of habeas corpus, the court may invoke the aforesaid

doctrine.  On certain other occasions, when a girl who is not a

major has eloped with a person and she is produced at the

behest of habeas corpus filed by her parents and she expresses

fear of life in the custody of her parents, the court may exercise

the jurisdiction to send her to an appropriate home meant to give

32

shelter to women where her interest can be best taken care of till

she becomes a major.

40.In Heller v. Doe

15

, Justice Kennedy, speaking for the U.S.

Supreme Court, observed:­

“The State has a legitimate interest under its Parens Patriae

powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable to

care for themselves.”

41.The Supreme Court of Canada in E. (Mrs.) v. Eve

16

 observed

thus with regard to the doctrine of Parens Patriae:­

“The  Parens Patriae  jurisdiction for the care of the

mentally   incompetent   is   vested   in   the   provincial

superior   courts.     Its   exercise   is   founded   on

necessity.   The need to act for the protection of

those   who   cannot   care   for   themselves.     The

jurisdiction is broad.  Its scope cannot be defined.

It applies to many and varied situations, and a court

can act not only if injury has occurred but also if it

is   apprehended.     The   jurisdiction   is   carefully

guarded and the courts will not assume that it has

been removed by legislation.

While the scope of the parens partiae jurisdiction is

unlimited,   the   jurisdiction   must   nonetheless   be

exercised   in   accordance   with   its   underlying

principle.     The   discretion   given   under   this

jurisdiction is to be exercised for the benefit of the

person in need of protection and not for the benefit

of others.   It must at all times be exercised with

great caution, a caution that must increase with the

seriousness of the matter.  This is particularly so in

cases   where   a   court   might   be   tempted   to   act

15 509 US 312 (1993)

16 [1986] 2 SCR 388

33

because   failure   to   act   would   risk   imposing   an

obviously heavy burden on another person.”

42.The High Court of Australia in Secretary, Department of

Health   and   Community   Service   v.   J.W.B.   and   S.M.B.

17

,

speaking through Mason C.J., Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ.,

has made the following observations with regard to the doctrine:­

“71.No doubt the jurisdiction over infants is for the

most part supervisory in the sense that the courts

are supervising the exercise of care and control of

infants by parents and guardians.  However, to say

this   is   not   to   assert   that   the   jurisdiction   is

essentially supervisory or that the courts are merely

supervising or reviewing parental or guardian care

and   control.     As   already   explained,   the  Parens

Patriae  jurisdiction   springs   from   the   direct

responsibility of the Crown for those who cannot

look after themselves; it includes infants as well as

those of unsound mind.”

43.Deane J. in the same case stated the following:­

“4… Indeed, in a modern context, it is preferable to refer to

the traditional  Parens Patriae  jurisdiction as “the welfare

jurisdiction” and to the “first and paramount consideration”

which underlies its exercise as “the welfare principle”.”

44.Recently, the Supreme Court of New South Wales, in the

case of AC v. OC (a minor)

18

, has observed:­

17 [1992] HCA 15 (MARION’S Case) : (1992) 175 CLR 218

18 [2014] NSWSC 53

34

“36.That jurisdiction, protective of those who are

not able to take care of themselves, embraces (via

different historical routes) minors, the mentally ill

and those who, though not mentally ill, are unable

to manage their own affairs:  Re Eve  [1986] 2 SCR

388 at 407­417; Court of Australia in  Secretary,

Department of Health and Community Services v.

JWB and SMB (Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218 at

258; PB v. BB [2013] NSWSC 1223 at [7]­[8], [40]­

[42], [57]­[58] and [64]­[65].

37.A   key   concept   in   the   exercise   of   that

jurisdiction is that it must be exercised, both in

what   is   done   and   what   is   left   undone,   for   the

benefit, and in the best interest, of the person (such

as a minor) in need of protection.”

45.Thus, the Constitutional Courts may also act as  Parens

Patriae so as to meet the ends of justice.  But the said exercise of

power is not without limitation.  The courts cannot in every and

any case invoke the Parens Patriae doctrine.  The said doctrine

has to be invoked only in exceptional cases where the parties

before it are either mentally incompetent or have not come of age

and it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the said

parties have either no parent/legal guardian or have an abusive

or negligent parent/legal guardian.

46.Mr.   Shyam   Divan,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the   first

respondent,   has   submitted   that   the   said   doctrine   has   been

35

expanded by the England and Wales Court of Appeal in a case DL

v. A Local Authority and others

19

. The case was in the context

of "elder abuse" wherein a man in his 50s behaved aggressively

towards his parents, physically and verbally, controlling access to

visitors and seeking to coerce his father into moving into a care

home against his wishes. While it was assumed that the elderly

parents did have capacity within the meaning  of the  Mental

Capacity Act, 2005 in that neither was subject to "an impairment

of, or a disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain", it

was found that the interference with the process of their decision

making arose from undue influence and duress inflicted by their

son. The Court of Appeal referred to the judgment  in  Re: SA

(Vulnerable Adult with Capacity : Marriage )

20

 to find that the

parens patriae jurisdiction of the High Court existed in relation to

"vulnerable   if   'capacitous'   adults".   The   cited   decision   of   the

England and Wales High Court (Family Division) affirmed the

existence of a "great safety net" of the inherent jurisdiction in

relation to all vulnerable adults. The term "great safety net" was

coined by Lord Donaldson in the Court of Appeal judgment which

19 [2012] 3 All ER 1064

20 [2005] EWHC 2942 (FAM)

36

was later quoted with approval by the House of Lords in In Re F

(Mental Patient: Sterilisation

21

. In paragraph 79 of Re: SA

(Vulnerable Adult with Capacity : Marriage ),  Justice Munby

observes:­

“The inherent jurisdiction can be invoked wherever

a vulnerable adult is, or is reasonably believed to be,

for some reason deprived of the capacity to make

the relevant decision, or disabled from making a free

choice, or incapacitated or disabled from giving or

expressing a real and genuine consent. The cause

may   be,   but   is   not   for   this   purpose   limited   to,

mental   disorder   or   mental   illness.   A   vulnerable

adult who does not suffer from any kind of mental

incapacity   may   nonetheless   be   entitled   to   the

protection of the inherent jurisdiction if he is, or is

reasonably   believed   to   be,   incapacitated   from

making   the   relevant   decision   by   reason   of   such

things as constraint, coercion, undue influence or

other vitiating factors.”

47.In relation to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human

Rights (ECHR), Justice Munby observes in paragraph 66:­

“In   terms   of   the   ECHR,   the   use   of   the   inherent

jurisdiction in this context is compatible with Article 8

in   just   the   same   manner   as   the   MCA   2005   is

compatible. Any interference with the right to respect

for an individual's private or family life is justified to

protect his health and or to protect his right to enjoy

his Article 8 rights as he may choose without the undue

influence   (or   other   adverse   intervention)   of   a   third

party. Any orders made by the court in a particular

case   must   be   only   those   which   are   necessary   and

21 [1990] 2 AC 1

37

proportionate to the facts of that case, again in like

manner to the approach under the MCA 2005.”

48.However, in paragraph 76, he qualifies the above principle

with the following comment:­

“It  is, of  course,  of  the  essence  of  humanity  that

adults   are   entitled   to   be   eccentric,   entitled   to   be

unorthodox, entitled to be obstinate, entitled to be

irrational. Many are.”

49.The   judgment   of Re:   SA   (Vulnerable   Adult   with

Capacity : Marriage) (supra) authored by Justice Munby and

cited in the above Court of Appeal case was in the context of the

exercise of parens patriae to protect an eighteen year old girl from

the risk of an unsuitable arranged marriage on the ground that

although the girl did not lack capacity, yet she was undoubtedly

a "vulnerable adult".

50.Interestingly, in another case, namely, A Local Authority

v.  HB, MB, ML and BL (By their Children's Guardian)

22

,  the

High Court's inherent jurisdiction was invoked to protect children

who were allegedly going to be taken by their mother to Syria

where they were at a risk of radicalization. Although the High

22 [2017] EWHC 1437 (Fam)

38

Court dismissed the applications on facts for want of evidence,

yet   it   made   certain   observations   regarding   extremism   and

radicalization.

51.Mr. Divan has drawn our attention to the authority in A

Local Authority v. Y

23

 wherein the High Court (Family Division)

invoked its inherent jurisdiction to protect a young person, the

defendant Y, from radicalization. 

52.Relying upon the aforesaid decisions, he emphasized on the

concept that when the major is a vulnerable adult, the High

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can exercise

the  parens patriae  doctrine which has been exercised in this

case. The aforesaid judgments, in our considered opinion, are not

applicable to the facts of the present case. We say so without any

hesitation as we have interacted with the respondent No. 9 and

there is nothing to suggest that she suffers from any kind of

mental incapacity or vulnerability. She was absolutely categorical

in her submissions and unequivocal in the expression of her

choice. 

23 [2017] EWHC 968 (Fam)

39

53.It is obligatory to state here that expression of choice in

accord with law is acceptance of individual identity. Curtailment

of that expression and the ultimate action emanating therefrom

on the conceptual structuralism of obeisance to the societal will

destroy the individualistic entity of a person.  The social values

and   morals   have   their   space   but   they   are   not   above   the

constitutionally guaranteed freedom.  The said freedom is both a

constitutional and a human right.  Deprivation of that freedom

which is ingrained in choice on the plea of faith is impermissible.

Faith of a person is intrinsic to his/her meaningful existence.  To

have the freedom of faith is essential to his/her autonomy; and it

strengthens the core norms of the Constitution.  Choosing a faith

is the substratum of individuality and sans it, the right of choice

becomes a shadow.  It has to be remembered that the realization

of a right is more important than the conferment of the right.

Such   actualization   indeed   ostracises   any   kind   of   societal

notoriety and keeps at bay the patriarchal supremacy.  It is so

because the individualistic faith and expression of choice are

fundamental for the fructification of the right.  Thus, we would

like to call it indispensable preliminary condition. 

40

54.Non­acceptance of her choice would simply mean creating

discomfort to the constitutional right by a Constitutional Court

which is meant to be the protector of fundamental rights. Such a

situation cannot remotely be conceived. The duty of the Court  is

to uphold the right and not to  abridge the sphere of the right

unless there is a valid authority of law. Sans lawful sanction, the

centripodal value of liberty should allow an individual to write

his/her script. The individual signature is the insignia of the

concept.

55.In   the   case   at   hand,   the   father   in   his   own   stand   and

perception may feel that there has been enormous transgression

of his right to protect the interest of his daughter but his view

point or position cannot be allowed to curtail the fundamental

rights of his daughter who, out of her own volition, married the

appellant.   Therefore, the High Court has completely erred by

taking upon itself the burden of annulling the marriage between

the   appellant   and   the   respondent   no.9   when   both   stood

embedded to their vow of matrimony.

56.Resultantly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned

order. However, as stated in the order dated 08.03.2018, the

41

investigation by the NIA in respect of any matter of criminality

may continue in accordance with law.  The investigation should

not encroach upon their marital status.

………………………………CJI

(Dipak Misra)

……………………………….J.

(A.M. Khanwilkar)

New Delhi;

09 April, 2018. 

42

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No 366 OF 2018

[Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.5777 of 2017]

SHAFIN JAHAN APPELLANT

Versus

ASOKAN K M AND OTHERS .....RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

1 While re-affirming the conclusions set out in the operative order, I agree

with the erudite judgment of the learned Chief Justice. I have added my own

thoughts on the judicial parchment to express my anguish with the grievous

miscarriage of justice which took place in the present case and to formulate

principles in the expectation that such an injustice shall not again be visited

either on Hadiya or any other citizen. The High Court of Kerala has committed

an error of jurisdiction. But what to my mind, is disconcerting, is the manner in

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which the liberty and dignity of a citizen have been subjected to judicial affront.

The months which Hadiya lost, placed in the custody of her father and against

her will cannot be brought back. The reason for this concurring judgment is

that it is the duty of this Court, in the exercise of its constitutional functions to

formulate principles in order to ensure that the valued rights of citizens are not

subjugated at the altar of a paternalistic social structure.

2 Asokan, the father of Akhila alias Hadiya moved a habeas corpus

petition before the High Court of Kerala. His apprehension was that his

daughter was likely to be transported out of the country. The Kerala High

Court was informed during the course of the hearing that she had married

Shafin Jahan. The High Court allowed the petition for habeas corpus and

directed that Hadiya shall be escorted from a hostel in which she resided in

Ernakulam to the house of her father holding that:

“A girl aged 24 years is weak and vulnerable, capable of

being exploited in many ways. This Court exercising parens

patriae jurisdiction is concerned with the welfare of a girl of

her age. The duty cast on this Court to ensure the safety of at

least the girls who are brought before it can be discharged

only by ensuring that Ms. Akhila is in safe hands.”

3 With these directions, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court

declared that the marriage between Hadiya and Shafin Jahan is null and void

and ordered “a comprehensive investigation” by the police. Hadiya continued

to remain, against her will, in compulsive confinement at the home of her

father in pursuance of the directions of the Kerala High Court. On 27

44

November 2017, this Court interacted with Hadiya and noted that she desires

to pursue and complete her studies as a student of Homeopathy at a college

where she was a student, in Salem. Accepting her request, this Court directed

the authorities of the State to permit her to travel to Salem in order to enable

her to pursue her studies.

4 The appeal filed by Shafin Jahan has been heard finally. Hadiya is a

party to these proceedings.

5 This Bench of three judges pronounced the operative part of its order on

8 March 2018 and allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment of the

High Court annulling the marriage between Shafin Jahan and Hadiya. The

Court has underscored that Hadiya is at liberty to pursue her endeavours in

accordance with her desires.

6 Hadiya is a major. Twenty four years old, she is pursuing a course of

studies leading up to a degree in Homoeopathic medicine and surgery at a

college in Salem in Tamil Nadu. She was born to parents from the Ezhava

Community. In January 2016, Asokan instituted a habeas corpus petition,

stating that Hadiya was missing. During the course of the proceedings, Hadiya

appeared before the Kerala High Court and asserted that she had accepted

Islam as a faith of choice. From 7 January 2016, she resided at the

establishment of Sathyasarani Education Charitable Trust at Malappuram. On

45

19 January 2016, the Kerala High Court categorically observed that Hadiya

was not under illegal confinement after interacting with her and permitted her

to reside at the Sathyasarani Trust premises. Nearly seven months later,

Asokan filed another petition in the nature of habeas corpus alleging that

Hadiya had been subjected to forced conversion and was likely to be

transported out of India.

7 During the course of the proceedings, the High Court interacted with

Hadiya. She appeared in the proceedings represented by an advocate.

Hadiya, as the High Court records, declined to accompany her parents and

expressed a desire to continue to reside at Sathyasarani. The High Court

initially issued a direction that she should be “accommodated in a ladies’

hostel at the expense of her father”. On 27 September 2016, Hadiya made a

serious grievance of being in the custody of the court for thirty five days

without being able to interact with anyone. She stated that she had no

passport and the allegation that she was likely to go to Syria was incorrect.

Based on her request, the High Court directed her to reside at the

Sathyasarani establishment. The High Court heard the case on 24 October

2016, 14 November 2016 and 19 December 2016. On 21 December 2016, the

High Court was informed that Hadiya had entered into a marriage on 19

December 2016. The High Court recorded its “absolute dissatisfaction at the

manner in which the marriage if at all one has been performed has been

conducted”.

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Confronted with the undisputed fact that Hadiya is a major, the High Court still

observed:

“This Court exercising Parens Patriae jurisdiction has a duty

to ensure that young girls like the detenue are not exploited or

transported out of the country. Though the learned Senior

Counsel has vociferously contended that the detenue is a

person who has attained majority, it is necessary to bear in

mind the fact that the detenue who is a female in her twenties

is at a vulnerable age. As per Indian tradition, the custody of

an unmarried daughter is with the parents, until she is

properly married. We consider it the duty of this Court to

ensure that a person under such a vulnerable state is not

exposed to further danger, especially in the circumstances

noticed above where even her marriage is stated to have

been performed with another person, in accordance with

Islamic religious rites. That too, with the connivance of the 7

th

respondent with whom she was permitted to reside, by this

Court.”

Hadiya was under judicial order transported to a hostel at Ernakulam, with a

direction that:

“she is not provided the facility of possessing or using a

mobile phone.”

Save and except for her parents no one was allowed to meet her. An

investigation was ordered into the “education, family background, antecedents

and other relevant details” of Shafin Jahan together with others involved in the

‘conduct’ of the marriage. The High Court continued to monitor the case on 6

January 2017, 31 January 2017, 7 February 2017 and 22 February 2017.

Eventually, by its judgment and order dated 24 May 2017, the High Court

allowed the petition for habeas corpus and issued the directions noted above.

47

8 The principal findings which have been recorded by the High Court

need to be visited and are summarised below:

(i)This was “not a case of a girl falling in love with a boy of a different

religion and wanting to get married to him” but an “arranged marriage”

where Hadiya had no previous acquaintance with Shafin Jahan;

(ii)Hadiya met Shafin Jahan on an online portal called “Way to Nikah”;

(iii)During the course of the proceedings, Hadiya had stated before the

court that she desired to complete her studies as a student of

Homeopathy and “nobody had a case at that time that she wanted to

get married”;

(iv)Though on 19 December 2016, the High Court adjourned the hearing to

21 December 2016 to enable her to proceed to her college, the

marriage took place on the same day;

(v)The marriage was “only a make-believe intended to take the detenue

out of reach of the hands of this court”;

(vi)The conduct of the parties in conducting the marriage without informing

the court was unacceptable;

(vii)There is no document evidencing the conversion of Hadiya to Islam; the

antecedents of Shafin Jahan and his Facebook posts show a radical

inclination; and

(viii)No prudent parent would decide to get his daughter married to a person

accused in a criminal case.

The High Court concluded that the marriage “is only a sham and is of no

consequence”, a charade to force the hands of the court.

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9 During the course of the present proceedings, this Court by its order

dated 30 October 2017 directed the First respondent to ensure the presence

of his daughter on 27 November 2017. On 27 November 2017, Hadiya stated

before this Court, in the course of the hearing, that she intends to pursue

further studies towards the BHMS degree course at Salem, where she was

admitted. Directions were issued by the Court to ensure that Hadiya can

pursue her course of studies without obstruction. We clarified that while she

could stay in the hostel of the college as she desired, she would be “treated

like any other student”.

10Hadiya has filed an affidavit expressly affirming her conversion to Islam

and her marriage to Shafin Jahan.

11There are two serious concerns which emerge from the judgment of the

Kerala High Court. The first is that the High Court transgressed the limits of its

jurisdiction in issuing a declaration annulling the marriage of Shafin Jahan and

Hadiya in the course of the hearing of a habeas corpus petition.

12Undoubtedly, the powers of a constitutional court are wide, to enable it

to reach out to injustice. Mr Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel appearing

on behalf of First respondent emphasised the plenitude of the inherent powers

of the High Court. The width of the domain which is entrusted to the High

49

Court as a constitutional court cannot be disputed. Halsbury’s Laws of

England postulates:

“In the ordinary way the Supreme Court, as a superior court

of record, exercise the full plenitude of judicial power in all

matters concerning the general administration of justice within

its territorial limits, and enjoys unrestricted and unlimited

powers in all matters of substantive law, both civil and

criminal, except insofar as that has been taken away in

unequivocal terms by statutory enactment. The term “inherent

jurisdiction” is not used in contradistinction to the jurisdiction

of the court exercisable at common law or conferred on it by

statute or rules of court, for the court may exercise its

inherent jurisdiction even in respect of matters which are

regulated by statute or rule of court. The jurisdiction of the

court which is comprised within the term “inherent” is that

which enables it to fulfil itself, properly and effectively, as a

court of law.”

Dealing with the ambit of the powers under Article 226, Gajendragadkar, CJ in

State of Orissa v Ram Chandra Dev and Mohan Prasad Singh Deo

24

observed thus:

“Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the

High Court is undoubtedly very wide. Appropriate writs can be

issued by the High Court under the said Article even for

purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental

rights and in that sense, a party who invokes the special

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not confined

to case of illegal invasion of this fundamental right alone. But

though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is

wide in that sense, the concluding words of that Article clearly

indicate that before a writ or an appropriate order can be

issued in favour of a party, it must be established that the

party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or

threatened. The existence of a right is thus the foundation of

a petition under Article 226.”

While dealing with the powers and privileges of the state legislatures, in

Keshav Singh

25

, a Bench of seven learned judges held thus:

24 AIR (1964) SC 685

25 (1965) 1 SCR 413

50

“136…in the case of a superior Court of Record, it is for the

court to consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction

or not. Unlike a Court of limited jurisdiction, the superior Court

is entitled to determine for itself questions about its own

jurisdiction. “Prima facie”, says Halsbury, “no matter is

deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court

unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within

the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown

on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is

within the cognizance of the particular court [Halsbury's Law

of England, Vol. 9, p. 349] ”.

The High Court is vested with an extra-ordinary jurisdiction in order to meet

unprecedented situations (T K Rangarajan v Government of T.N.

26

). Several

decisions have noted the inherent and plenary powers of the High Court. Their

purpose is to advance substantial justice. (i) Roshan Deen v Preeti Lal

27

; (ii)

Dwarka Nath v ITO, Special Circle D-ward, Kanpur

28

; (iii) Naresh Shridhar

Nirajkar v State of Maharashtra

29

; and (iv) M V Elisabeth v Harwan

Investment and Trading (P) Ltd.

30

13These principles which emerge from the precedent are well-settled.

Equally the exercise of all powers by a constitutional court must ensure justice

under and in accordance with law.

14The principles which underlie the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court in

a habeas corpus petition have been reiterated in several decisions of the

Court. In Gian Devi v Superintendent, Nari Niketan, Delhi

31

, a three-judge

26 (2003) 6 SCC 581

27 (2002) 1 SCC 100

28 (1965) 3 SCR 536

29 (1966) 3 SCR 744

30 1993 Suppl. (2) SCC 433

31 (1976) 3 SCC 234

51

Bench observed that where an individual is over eighteen years of age, no

fetters could be placed on her choice on where to reside or about the person

with whom she could stay:

“…Whatever may be the date of birth of the petitioner, the fact

remains that she is at present more than 18 years of age. As

the petitioner is sui juris no fetters can be placed upon her

choice of the person with whom she is to stay, nor can any

restriction be imposed regarding the place where she should

stay. The court or the relatives of the petitioner can also not

substitute their opinion or preference for that of the petitioner

in such a matter.”

The ambit of a habeas corpus petition is to trace an individual who is stated to

be missing. Once the individual appears before the court and asserts that as a

major, she or he is not under illegal confinement, which the court finds to be a

free expression of will, that would conclude the exercise of the jurisdiction. In

Girish v Radhamony K

32

a two judge Bench of this Court observed thus:

“3…In a habeas corpus petition, all that is required is to find

out and produce in court the person who is stated to be

missing. Once the person appeared and she stated that she

had gone of her own free will, the High Court had no further

jurisdiction to pass the impugned order in exercise of its writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

In Lata Singh v State of U P

33

, Bench of two judges took judicial notice of the

harassment, threat and violence meted out to young women and men who

marry outside their caste or faith. The court observed that our society is

32 (2009) 16 SCC 360

33 (2006) 5 SCC 475

52

emerging through a crucial transformational period and the court cannot

remain silent upon such matters of grave concern. In the view of the court:

“17…This is a free and democratic country, and once a

person becomes a major he or she can marry whosoever

he/she likes. If the parents of the boy or girl do not approve of

such inter-caste or inter-religious marriage the maximum they

can do is that they can cut-off social relations with the son or

the daughter, but they cannot give threats or commit or

instigate acts of violence and cannot harass the person who

undergoes such inter-caste or inter-religious marriage. We,

therefore, direct that the administration/police authorities

throughout the country will see to it that if any boy or girl who

is a major undergoes inter-caste or inter-religious marriage

with a woman or man who is a major, the couple is not

harassed by anyone nor subjected to threats or acts of

violence, and anyone who gives such threats or harasses or

commits acts of violence either himself or at his instigation, is

taken to task by instituting criminal proceedings by the police

against such persons and further stern action is taken against

such persons as provided by law.”

Reiterating these principles in Bhagwan Dass v State (NCT OF DELHI)

34

, this

Court adverted to the social evil of honour killings as being but a reflection of a

feudal mindset which is a slur on the nation.

In a more recent decision of a three judge Bench in Soni Gerry v Gerry

Douglas

35

, this Court dealt with a case where the daughter of the appellant

and respondent, who was a major had expressed a desire to reside in Kuwait,

where she was pursuing her education, with her father. This Court observed

thus:

“9…She has, without any hesitation, clearly stated that she

intends to go back to Kuwait to pursue her career. In such a

situation, we are of the considered opinion that as a major,

she is entitled to exercise her choice and freedom and the

34 (2011) 6 SCC 396

35 (2018) 2 SCC 197

53

Court cannot get into the aspect whether she has been forced

by the father or not. There may be ample reasons on her

behalf to go back to her father in Kuwait, but we are not

concerned with her reasons. What she has stated before the

Court, that alone matters and that is the heart of the

reasoning for this Court, which keeps all controversies at bay.

10. It needs no special emphasis to state that attaining the

age of majority in an individual's life has its own significance.

She/He is entitled to make her/his choice. The courts cannot,

as long as the choice remains, assume the role of parens

patriae. The daughter is entitled to enjoy her freedom as the

law permits and the court should not assume the role of a

super guardian being moved by any kind of sentiment of the

mother or the egotism of the father. We say so without any

reservation.”

These principles emerge from a succession of judicial decisions. Fundamental

to them is the judgment of a Constitution bench of this Court in Kanu Sanyal v

District Magistrate, Darjeeling

36

.

15The High Court was seized of the grievance of Asokan that his daughter

was under illegal confinement and was likely to be transported out of the

country. In the course of the hearing of an earlier petition for habeas corpus,

the High Court by its order dated 19 January 2016 expressly noticed that

Hadiya was not willing to return to her parental home. Taking note of the

desire of Hadiya to reside at Sathyasarani, the High Court observed that “the

alleged detenue needs to be given liberty to take her own decision with

respect to her future life.”

36 (1973) 2 SCC 674

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With the passing of that order the writ petition was withdrawn on 25 January

2016. Yet, again, when a second petition was filed, it was evident before the

High Court that Hadiya had no desire to stay with her parents. She is a major.

The Division Bench on this occasion paid scant regard to the earlier outcome

and to the decision of a coordinate Bench. The High Court inexplicably

sought to deviate from the course adopted in the earlier proceeding.

16The schism between Hadiya and her father may be unfortunate. But it

was no part of the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide what it considered to

be a ‘just’ way of life or ‘correct’ course of living for Hadiya. She has absolute

autonomy over her person. Hadiya appeared before the High Court and stated

that she was not under illegal confinement. There was no warrant for the High

Court to proceed further in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226.

The purpose of the habeas corpus petition ended. It had to be closed as the

earlier Bench had done. The High Court has entered into a domain which is

alien to its jurisdiction in a habeas corpus petition. The High Court did not take

kindly to the conduct of Hadiya, noting that when it had adjourned the

proceedings to issue directions to enable her to pursue her studies, it was at

that stage that she appeared with Shafin Jahan only to inform the court of their

marriage. How Hadiya chooses to lead her life is entirely a matter of her

choice. The High Court’s view of her lack of candour with the court has no

bearing on the legality of her marriage or her right to decide for herself, whom

she desires to live with or marry.

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17The exercise of the jurisdiction to declare the marriage null and void,

while entertaining a petition for habeas corpus, is plainly in excess of judicial

power. The High Court has transgressed the limits on its jurisdiction in a

habeas corpus petition. In the process, there has been a serious

transgression of constitutional rights. That is the second facet to which we

now turn.

18Hadiya and Shafin Jahan are adults. Under Muslim law, marriage or

Nikah is a contract. Muslim law recognises the right of adults to marry by their

own free will. The conditions for a valid Muslim marriage are:

(i)Both the individuals must profess Islam;

(ii)Both should be of the age of puberty;

(iii)There has to be an offer and acceptance and two witnesses must be

present;

(iv)Dower and Mehar; and

(v)Absence of a prohibited degree of relationship.

19A marriage can be dissolved at the behest of parties to it, by a

competent court of law. Marital status is conferred through legislation or, as

the case may be, custom. Deprivation of marital status is a matter of serious

import and must be strictly in accordance with law. The High Court in the

exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 ought not to have embarked on the

course of annulling the marriage. The Constitution recognises the liberty and

autonomy which inheres in each individual. This includes the ability to take

decisions on aspects which define one’s personhood and identity. The choice

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of a partner whether within or outside marriage lies within the exclusive

domain of each individual. Intimacies of marriage lie within a core zone of

privacy, which is inviolable. The absolute right of an individual to choose a life

partner is not in the least affected by matters of faith. The Constitution

guarantees to each individual the right freely to practise, profess and

propagate religion. Choices of faith and belief as indeed choices in matters of

marriage lie within an area where individual autonomy is supreme. The law

prescribes conditions for a valid marriage. It provides remedies when

relationships run aground. Neither the state nor the law can dictate a choice of

partners or limit the free ability of every person to decide on these matters.

They form the essence of personal liberty under the Constitution. In deciding

whether Shafin Jahan is a fit person for Hadiya to marry, the High Court has

entered into prohibited terrain. Our choices are respected because they are

ours. Social approval for intimate personal decisions is not the basis for

recognising them. Indeed, the Constitution protects personal liberty from

disapproving audiences.

20Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights underscores the

fundamental importance of marriage as an incident of human liberty:

“Article 16. (1) Men and women of full age, without any

limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to

marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights

as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full

consent of the intending spouses.

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(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of

society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”

21The right to marry a person of one’s choice is integral to Article 21 of the

Constitution. The Constitution guarantees the right to life. This right cannot be

taken away except through a law which is substantively and procedurally fair,

just and reasonable. Intrinsic to the liberty which the Constitution guarantees

as a fundamental right is the ability of each individual to take decisions on

matters central to the pursuit of happiness. Matters of belief and faith,

including whether to believe are at the core of constitutional liberty. The

Constitution exists for believers as well as for agnostics. The Constitution

protects the ability of each individual to pursue a way of life or faith to which

she or he seeks to adhere. Matters of dress and of food, of ideas and

ideologies, of love and partnership are within the central aspects of identity.

The law may regulate (subject to constitutional compliance) the conditions of a

valid marriage, as it may regulate the situations in which a marital tie can be

ended or annulled. These remedies are available to parties to a marriage for it

is they who decide best on whether they should accept each other into a

marital tie or continue in that relationship. Society has no role to play in

determining our choice of partners.

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22In Justice K S Puttaswamy v Union of India

37

, this Court in a decision

of nine judges held that the ability to make decisions on matters close to one’s

life is an inviolable aspect of the human personality:

“The autonomy of the individual is the ability to make

decisions on vital matters of concern to life… The intersection

between one’s mental integrity and privacy entitles the

individual to freedom of thought, the freedom to believe in

what is right, and the freedom of self-determination… The

family, marriage, procreation and sexual orientation are all

integral to the dignity of the individual.”

A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v

Union of India

38

, held:

“Our autonomy as persons is founded on the ability to decide:

on what to wear and how to dress, on what to eat and on the

food that we share, on when to speak and what we speak, on

the right to believe or not to believe, on whom to love and

whom to partner, and to freely decide on innumerable matters

of consequence and detail to our daily lives.”

The strength of the Constitution, therefore, lies in the guarantee which it

affords that each individual will have a protected entitlement in determining a

choice of partner to share intimacies within or outside marriage.

23The High Court, in the present case, has treaded on an area which

must be out of bounds for a constitutional court. The views of the High Court

have encroached into a private space reserved for women and men in which

neither law nor the judges can intrude. The High Court was of the view that at

37 2017 (10) SCC 1

38 Writ Petition(Civil) No. 215 of 2005

59

twenty four, Hadiya “is weak and vulnerable, capable of being exploited in

many ways”. The High Court has lost sight of the fact that she is a major,

capable of taking her own decisions and is entitled to the right recognised by

the Constitution to lead her life exactly as she pleases. The concern of this

Court in intervening in this matter is as much about the miscarriage of justice

that has resulted in the High Court as much as about the paternalism which

underlies the approach to constitutional interpretation reflected in the

judgment in appeal. The superior courts, when they exercise their jurisdiction

parens patriae do so in the case of persons who are incapable of asserting a

free will such as minors or persons of unsound mind. The exercise of that

jurisdiction should not transgress into the area of determining the suitability of

partners to a marital tie. That decision rests exclusively with the individuals

themselves. Neither the state nor society can intrude into that domain. The

strength of our Constitution lies in its acceptance of the plurality and diversity

of our culture. Intimacies of marriage, including the choices which individuals

make on whether or not to marry and on whom to marry, lie outside the control

of the state. Courts as upholders of constitutional freedoms must safeguard

these freedoms. The cohesion and stability of our society depend on our

syncretic culture. The Constitution protects it. Courts are duty bound not to

swerve from the path of upholding our pluralism and diversity as a nation.

24Interference by the State in such matters has a seriously chilling effect

on the exercise of freedoms. Others are dissuaded to exercise their liberties

60

for fear of the reprisals which may result upon the free exercise of choice. The

chilling effect on others has a pernicious tendency to prevent them from

asserting their liberty. Public spectacles involving a harsh exercise of State

power prevent the exercise of freedom, by others in the same milieu. Nothing

can be as destructive of freedom and liberty. Fear silences freedom.

25We have not been impressed with the submission of Mr Shyam Divan,

learned senior counsel that it was necessary for the High Court to nullify, what

he describes as a fraud on the Court, as an incident of dealing with conduct

obstructing the administration of the justice. Whether or not Hadiya chose to

marry Shafin Jahan was irrelevant to the outcome of the habeas corpus

petition. Even if she were not to be married to him, all that she was required to

clarify was whether she was in illegal confinement. If she was not, and desired

to pursue her own endeavours, that was the end of the matter in a habeas

corpus petition. The fact that she decided to get married during the pendency

of the proceedings had no bearing on the outcome of the habeas corpus

petition. Constitutionally it could have no bearing on the outcome.

26During the course of the proceedings, this Court by its interim order had

allowed the National Investigation Agency to assist the Court. Subsequently,

NIA was permitted to carry out an investigation. We clarify that NIA may

exercise its authority in accordance with the law within the bounds of the

authority conferred upon it by statute. However, the validity of the marriage

61

between Shafin Jahan and Hadiya shall not form the subject matter of the

investigation. Moreover, nothing contained in the interim order of this Court will

be construed as empowering the investigating agency to interfere in the lives

which the young couple seeks to lead as law abiding citizens.

27The appeal stands allowed in terms of our order dated 8 March 2018.

The judgment of the High Court is set aside.

...…............................................J

[Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]

New Delhi;

April 09, 2018.