1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1497/2023

[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 4149/2016]

SHAH NEWAZ KHAN & ORS. APPELLANTS

VS.

STATE OF NAGALAND & ORS. RESPONDENTS

WITH

TRANSFER PETITION (C) NO. 307/2016

SHAH NEWAZ KHAN & ORS. PETITIONERS

VS.

STATE OF NAGALAND & ORS. RESPONDENTS

2

JUDGMENT

Dipankar Datta, J.

1.Leave granted.

THE ISSUE

2.An issue, pristinely legal and novel, emerges for decision.

It is novel in the sense that although three different High Courts

of the country have taken views which are entirely consistent,

except the view taken in the judgment and order under

challenge of the Gauhati High Court which impliedly stands

overruled by a larger Bench of the same High Court, this Court

hitherto might not have had the occasion to deal with such an

issue and decide either way.

3.Shortly put, the issue is:

Is the Supreme Court the sole repository of power in terms

of section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity

‘the CPC’) to direct transfer of a suit, appeal or other

proceeding from a Civil Court in one State to a Civil Court

in another State? Or, is it open for a High Court, if it is the

common High Court for two or more States, to entertain

3

an application for transfer under section 24 of the CPC and

transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding from a Civil

Court to another Civil Court, both of which are subordinate

to such High Court but situate in different States in

relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, for consideration

and decision?

FACTS AND THE ORDER UNDER CHALLENGE

4.The facts leading to presentation of this appeal reveal that

the appellants having instituted a suit for declaration of right,

title and interest as well as for perpetual injunction and

damages in the court of the District Judge at Dimapur,

Nagaland sometime in 2007, failed to prosecute it in the right

earnest allegedly due to hostile circumstances created by the

private defendants in the suit resulting in dismissal and

restoration thereof on three occasions. Pleading why it is

impossible for them to continue with prosecution of the suit at

Dimapur, the appellants moved an application under section 24

of the CPC before the Gauhati High Court for an order to

transfer the suit to the court of the District Judge at Guwahati,

4

Assam. A learned Judge of the Gauhati High Court, which

presently happens to be the common High Court for the States

of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, presiding

over the Bench at the principal seat at Guwahati, rejected the

application for transfer by a judgment and order dated 10

th

December, 2015. While so rejecting, the learned Judge followed

His Lordship’s previous decision in Pomi Sengupta vs.

Biswajit Sengupta

1

which, in turn, had entirely relied on the

decision of this Court in Durgesh Sharma vs. Jayshree

2

. The

judgment and order of rejection of the application under section

24 of the CPC is under challenge in this appeal.

5.The appellants, by way of abundant caution, have also

applied before this Court under section 25 of the CPC seeking

the same relief that was disallowed by the learned Judge.

APPELLANTS’ CONTENTIONS

1 (2015) 6 GLR 396

2 (2008) 9 SCC 648

5

6.Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Goswami, learned

senior counsel contended that:

a.Article 214 of the Constitution of India ordains that there

shall be a High-Court for each State. Article 231 of the

Constitution of India provides for the establishment of a

common High Court for two or more States.

b.The relevant provisions of the CPC for the purpose of a

decision on the present dispute are sections 22 to 25 read with

section 3 thereof dealing with subordination of courts.

c.The power of the High Court and the District Courts to

direct transfer of proceedings is provided in section 24 of the

CPC.

d.The facts of the instant case clearly satisfy all the

ingredients of section 24 CPC, more particularly, sub-clause (ii)

of clause (b) of sub-section (1) thereof. A bare perusal of such

provision 24 would indicate that the High Court may, at any

stage, direct transfer of proceedings pending before it to any

court subordinate to it, or transfer proceedings pending in any

court subordinate to it to itself or to any other court

subordinate to it. Thus, the emphasis under the said provision

is on the expression "court subordinate to it". Section 3 of the

6

CPC, inter alia, defines the courts subordinate to the High

Court. Thus, on a plain reading of section 24 of the CPC, it is

evident that the common High Court, i.e., the Gauhati High

Court, has the power and jurisdiction to direct inter-State

transfer of proceedings, provided both the transferor and

transferee courts are subordinate to it, and fall within its

territorial jurisdiction, which is the case here.

e.On a harmonious construction of section 24 and section 25

of the CPC, it is clear that the latter will apply only to inter-State

transfer of proceedings between two States where the two

States in question have different High Courts, whereas, in a

case involving inter-State transfer of proceedings within the

territorial jurisdiction of a common High Court, the common

High Court would have the power and jurisdiction to direct

inter-State transfer of proceedings of the nature stated above,

in exercise of its power under section 24 of the CPC.

f. It is a settled proposition of law that in construing a provision,

the consequences that befall on a particular interpretation of a

provision is a relevant consideration. Justice G.P. Singh in his

treatise

3

has observed thus:

4. REGARD TO CONSEQUENCES

3 12

th

Edition of 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' at page 131

7

If the language used is capable of hearing more than one

construction, in selecting the true meaning, regard. Must be had to

the consequences resulting from adopting the alternative

constructions. A construction that results in hardship, serious

inconvenience, injustice, absurdity, or anomaly or which leads to

inconsistency or uncertainty and friction in the system which the

statute purports to regulate has to be rejected and preference

should be given to that construction which avoids such results.

g.This observation was quoted with approval by the

Supreme Court in paragraph 17 of its decision in D. Saibaba v

Bar Council of India & Anr.

4

.

h.Therefore, the aforementioned observation would also

lend support to the submission of the appellants in as much as

it would be more convenient for litigants within the territory of

the common High Court to approach the Gauhati High Court for

seeking transfer.

7.Mr. Goswami also cited three other decisions. The first is a

decision of the larger bench of the Gauhati High Court in

Megha Jain vs. Kartik Jain

5

. This decision has overruled

Pomi Sengupta (supra), on which the impugned judgment and

order is premised. The second is a decision of the (undivided)

Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chalasani Deepthi vs.

Chalasani Krishna Chaitanya

6

and the last a decision of the

4 (2003) 6 SCC 186

5 (2019) 6 GLR 379

6 2015 SCC OnLine Hyd 978

8

Bombay High Court in Irene Blanch Khera vs. Glenn John

Vijay

7

.

8.Based on his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Goswami urged us

to set aside the order under challenge and to remit the matter

to the Gauhati High Court for fresh consideration of the

application of the appellants under section 24 of the CPC. In the

alternative, he submitted that the application under section 25

may be considered by us on its own merits.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS 1 TO 3

9.Opposing the appeal, Mr. Balgopal, learned senior counsel

for the State of Nagaland and its officers, contended as follows:

a.A brief issue with regard to the scope and ambit of section

24 vis-à-vis section 25 of the CPC has arisen before this Court in

the instant case in view of the peculiar circumstances wherein

two States share a common High Court as provided under

Article 231 of the Constitution of India.

b.Section 24(1)(b), CPC gives power to the High Court to

withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any

7 2018 (6) Mh. L.J. 199

9

court subordinate to it and to transfer the same for trial or

disposal to any Court subordinate to it which is competent to

try or dispose of the same. As the State of Nagaland does not

have a separate High Court, consequently all courts functioning

in the State of Nagaland are subordinate to the Gauhati High

Court, being the common High Court for the States of Assam,

Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh.

c.However, in order to appreciate whether the common High

Court has the power to withdraw any suit, appeal or other

proceeding pending before any Court subordinate to it from one

State and to transfer the same to any Court subordinate to it, in

another State, the provisions of both sections 24 and 25 of the

Code will have to be examined as it involves an inter-State

transfer and not an intra-State transfer simplicitor.

d.To appreciate the true import and meaning of the

provisions of section 25(1), the said provision will have to be

read in two parts as it contains two-fold power to direct any

suit, appeal or other proceeding to be transferred:

i.From one High Court to another High Court; or

ii.From one Civil Court in one State to another Civil Court

in any other State.

10

This interpretation is substantiated by the observation made by

this Court in Durgesh Sharma (supra).

e. Section 25 is the only provision in the CPC, which refers to

transfer of a case from a Civil Court in one State to a Civil Court

in another State. Incidentally, the appellants themselves are

asking for this relief.

f.Report of the Joint Committee, Lok Sabha of the Code of

Civil Procedure (Amendment) Bill 1974 which was passed on 1

st

April, 1976 shows that this issue was raised by one of the

North-Eastern States, i.e., State of Meghalaya with regard to

conflict between sections 24 and 25 insofar as the North-East

area is concerned and reading of the minutes suggests that the

Committee assured to look into the issue.

g.In view of the specific provision in section 25(1) of the

CPC, it is only the Supreme Court and no other court which has

the power to direct transfer of the suit instituted by the

appellants from the Civil Court in Dimapur, Nagaland to the

Civil Court in Guwahati, Assam, if at all any ground is set up

therefor.

11

10.In view of the aforesaid contentions, it was submitted by

Mr. Balgopal that the impugned judgement needs no

interference and deserves to be upheld.

ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS 4 AND 5

11.Mr. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the

respondents 4 and 5, advanced the following arguments:

a.Power to effect inter-State transfer of any suit, appeal or

other proceeding is not available to be exercised by a High

Court in terms of section 24 of the CPC since such power is

expressly and exclusively provided in section 25 thereof, to be

exercised only by the Supreme Court.

b.Reliance placed by the learned senior counsel for the

appellants on Durgesh Sharma (supra) is misplaced since

that case is distinguishable. The observations in paragraph 47

were made by this Court to decide the issue captured in

paragraph 3 and this Court had no occasion to examine the

issue in the light as it has occurred in the present case. It is

trite to submit that such an observation could at best be

treated as obiter dicta (defined as an incidental remark of a

Judge's expression of opinion uttered in court or in a written

12

judgment, but not essential to the decision and therefore not

legally binding as a precedent).

c.Be that as it may, what has been held by this Court in

paragraph 57 of Durgesh Sharma (supra) nullifies the point

sought to be urged on the behalf of the appellants.

d.In Megha Jain (supra), the Division Bench of the Gauhati

High Court has held that it has jurisdiction to exercise powers

under section 24 of the CPC read with section 23(1) and/or

section 23(2) thereof to transfer a suit, appeal or any other

proceeding from one of the four States under its jurisdiction to

any other State under its jurisdiction for trial. In paragraph 9 of

Megha Jain (supra), reference has been made to section 24(1)

(a) of the CPC to arrive at the conclusion that the High Court or

the District Court may, at any stage, transfer any suit etc.

pending before it to any court subordinate to it and that a

transfer petition seeking transfer from one State to any of the

four States shall be maintainable thereunder. The abovesaid

conclusion is not the correct exposition of law. Sections 22 to 24

of the CPC and section 25 thereof are two different codes within

the CPC and there is no overlapping in relation to the domain

where these two sets of codes operate.

13

e.A plain reading of section 22 of the CPC would show that

the words “several Courts” occurring in its last has been

continued in section 23, while no such co-relation exists either

between sections 22 and 25 or sections 23 and 25. Therefore,

application of section 23 together with section 25 appears

completely faulty. Also, in relation to the exercise of power

under section 24, the said power has been made available to

even a District Court, which makes it amply clear that the

power under section 24 is a continuation of sections 22 and 23

only.

f.Further, the power of transfer of suits under section 22

can be exercised, “(W)here a suit may be instituted in any one

of two or more courts and is instituted in one of such courts”.

And this power under section 22 is explained in section 23 for

the purposes as to which court an application for transfer may

lie. Further, after the application is made, under section 24,

such power is explained as to how the same can be exercised.

Therefore, section 22 provides which of the suits, section 23

provides which of the courts and section 24 provides how such

transfers can be effected.

14

g.In contrast to the above, the power under section 25 has

been clearly defined and the same does not have any mention

in sections 22 to 24 in the same manner as it occurs in section

25, categoric and precise. Therefore, the legislative intent is

clear that only under section 25 of the CPC a direction that any

suit, appeal or other proceeding may be transferred from a Civil

Court in one State to a Civil Court in any other State and that

can only be made by this Court.

12.Resting on the aforesaid arguments, Mr. Sharma too urged

that no case for interference had been made out by the

appellants and the appeal deserves dismissal.

THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF LAW

13.Sections 24 and 25 of the CPC being at the heart of the

debate, the same need to read carefully. To the extent relevant,

the said provisions read as follows:

“24. General power of transfer and withdrawal.—(1)

On the application of any of the parties and after

notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as

desire to be heard, or of its own motion, without such

notice, the High Court or the District Court may, at any

stage—

(a) transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding

pending before it for trial or disposal to any court

15

subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of

the same, or

(b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding

pending in any court subordinate to it, and

(i) try or dispose of the same; or

(ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any

court subordinate to it and competent to try or

dispose of the same; or

(iii) retransfer the same for trial or disposal to the

court from which it was withdrawn.

(2) Where any suit or proceeding has been transferred

or withdrawn under sub-section (1), the court which

thereafter tries such suit may, subject to any special

directions in the case of an order of transfer, either

retry it or proceed from the point at which it was

transferred or withdrawn.

***”

“25. Power of Supreme Court to transfer suits, etc.—

(1) On the application of a party, and after notice to

the parties, and after hearing such of them as desire

to be heard, the Supreme Court may, at any stage, if

satisfied that an order under this section is expedient

for the ends of justice, direct that any suit, appeal or

other proceeding be transferred from a High Court or

other Civil Court in one State to a High Court or other

Civil Court in any other State.

***”

14.Prior to its amendment in 1976, section 25 of the Code

read as follows:

“25. Power of State Government to transfer suits.—(1)

Where any party to a suit, appeal or other proceeding

pending in a High Court presided over by a Single

Judge objects to its being heard by him and the Judge

is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the

objection, he shall make a report to the State

Government, which may, by notification in the Official

Gazette, transfer such suit, appeal or proceeding to

any other High Court.

16

Provided that no suit, appeal or proceeding shall be

transferred to a High Court without the consent of the

State Government of the State in which that High

Court has its principal seat.”

15.Since acceptance of the arguments of Mr. Balgopal and Mr.

Sharma would result in denuding a common High Court of the

jurisdiction to even entertain an application under section 24 of

the CPC for transfer of a suit from a Civil Court in one State to a

Civil Court of another State, notwithstanding that exercise of

jurisdiction by such High Court extends to both such States, it is

absolutely necessary to consider Chapter V of the Constitution

of India titled “(T)he High Courts in the States” and more

particularly the terms of Articles 214, 231, 227, 235 and 228

which, to our mind, are of utmost relevance for deciding the

legal issue. At the same time, having regard to the terms of

pre-amended section 25 of the CPC, a peep into the pages of

history as to how the Gauhati High Court became the common

High Court for the State of Assam and the other States seems

to be imperative.

16. Article 214 is clear that there shall be a High Court for

each State. Article 231, inserted in the Constitution by the

Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, is an ordainment

17

that notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding

provisions of Chapter V, Parliament may by law establish a

common High Court for two or more States or for two or more

States and a Union territory. Article 227 is the recognition of the

power of superintendence of every High Court over all courts

and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it

exercises jurisdiction. The control over all District Courts and

courts subordinate thereto, in terms of Article 235, vests in the

High Court. One other important provision is Article 228. Article

228 empowers the High Court, subject to its satisfaction that a

case pending in a court subordinate to it involves a substantial

question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and

the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the

case, to withdraw the case and (a) either dispose of the case

itself, or (b) determine the said question of law and return the

case to the court from which the case has been so withdrawn

together with a copy of its judgment on such question,

whereupon the said court shall proceed to dispose of the case

in conformity with such judgment.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON HIGH COURT

18

17.We now move on to note the origin and evolution of the

common High Court, i.e., the Gauhati High Court and the

trajectory that it has been ordained to follow in relation to the

territories over which it exercises jurisdiction.

18.The precursor of the Gauhati High Court was the High

Court of Assam, which was established on 5

th

April, 1948 in

terms of the Assam High Court Order, 1948 (for brevity ‘the

1948 Order’) made by the Governor General in exercise of

power conferred by section 229 of the Government of India Act,

1935 and as adopted by the India Provincial Constitution

(Amendment) Order, 1948. In terms of paragraph 4 thereof, the

High Court of Assam was conferred, in respect of the territories

for the time being included in the province of Assam, all such

original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in

force immediately before the prescribed day, was exercisable in

respect of the said territories or any part thereof, by the High

Court in Calcutta or by the Governor of Assam exercising the

functions of a high court.

19.In 1962, by an Act of Parliament titled the State of

Nagaland Act, 1962 (for brevity ‘the 1962 Act’), the State of

Nagaland was formed. While sub-section (1) of section 13 of the

19

1962 Act ordained that there shall be a common high court

called the High Court of Assam and Nagaland, sub-section (3)

thereof provided that expenditure in respect of the salaries and

allowances of the Judges of the common High Court shall be

allocated between the States of Assam and Nagaland in such

proportion as the President may by order determine.

20.The 1962 Act was followed by the North-Eastern Areas

(Reorganisation) Act, 1971 (for brevity ‘the 1971 Act’). This

enactment contained provisions for the establishment of the

States of Manipur and Tripura and for the formation of the State

of Meghalaya, and the Union territories of Mizoram and

Arunachal Pradesh, by reorganizing the existing State of Assam.

Part IV of the 1971 Act titled “High Court” contained sections 28

to 43. Sections 28 and 29, being relevant are quoted below:

“28. Common High Court for Assam, Nagaland,

Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura.—(1) On and from the

appointed day,—

(a) the High Court of Assam and Nagaland shall cease to

function and is hereby abolished;

(b) there shall be a common High Court for the States of

Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura to

be called the Gauhati High Court (the High Court of

Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur and Tripura);

(c) the Judges of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland

holding office immediately before that day shall,

unless they have elected otherwise, become on that

day the Judges of the common High Court:

20

(2) Nothing in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall

prejudice or affect the continued operation of any notice

served, injunction issued, direction given or proceedings

taken before the appointed day by the High Court of

Assam and Nagaland under the powers then conferred

upon that Court.”

“29. Jurisdiction of the common High Court.—On and

from the appointed day, the common High Court shall

have, in respect of the territories comprised in the States

of Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura, all

such jurisdiction, powers and authority as under the law

in force immediately before the appointed day, are

exercisable in respect of those territories by the High

Court of Assam and Nagaland or the Court of the Judicial

Commissioner for Manipur, or the Court of the Judicial

Commissioner for Tripura, as the case may be.”

21.With the enactment of the State of Arunachal Pradesh Act,

1986 and the State of Mizoram Act, 1986, two new States were

born. Section 18 of the former and section 15 of the latter

legislation, more or less commonly worded, when read together

would evince that a common High Court for the States of

Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram and

Arunachal Pradesh to be called the Gauhati High Court (the

High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura,

Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh) came into existence. The

common thread that runs through the developments of 1962,

1971 and 1986, noted above, is that as and when the

jurisdiction of the High Court of Assam and thereafter the

Gauhati High Court came to be enlarged and extended to

21

States other than Assam, all seven sister States in the North-

Eastern part of the country agreed to bear the expenditure in

respect of the salaries and allowances of the Judges of the

common High Court as shall be allocated amongst the States in

such proportion by an order of the President.

22.In view of the provisions of the 1971 Act, till little over a

decade back, the Gauhati High Court was the common High

Court for the seven sister states. The jurisdiction of the said

High Court extended throughout the territories of Assam,

Nagaland, Tripura, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal

Pradesh.

23.However, the 1971 Act came to be amended by the North-

Eastern Areas (Re-organisation) and Other Related Laws

(Amendment) Act, 2012 (for brevity ‘the Amendment Act’). It

established separate High Courts for the States of Meghalaya,

Manipur and Tripura. Accordingly, the definition of “common

High Court” in section 2(d) of the 1971 Act was amended. Apart

from insertion of sections 28A to 28K between sections 28 and

29, the Amendment Act, inter alia, also introduced a proviso in

sub-section (1) of section 28, reading as follows:

22

“

Provided that on and from the commencement of the

North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) and Other

Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2012, the common

High Court shall be the High Court for the States of

Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Nagaland

and shall cease to have its jurisdiction, powers and

authority for the States of Meghalaya, Manipur and

Tripura.”

24.Hence, today, the Gauhati High Court is the common High

Court exercising jurisdiction throughout Assam, Nagaland,

Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh; a fortiori, all Civil Courts in

these four States are subordinate to the same High Court, i.e.,

the Gauhati High Court. Thus, it is a High Court which earlier

exercised its jurisdiction over seven different States and is

presently exercising jurisdiction over four different States. This,

by itself, is a unique feature which stands unmatched in the

judicial annals of the country post-independence.

25.We can take judicial notice that Judges of the Gauhati High

Court in the past have been elevated from amongst advocates

and judicial officers hailing from the aforesaid States.

26. Therefore, so far as judicial administration is concerned, in

terms of Article 231 of the Constitution, the Gauhati High Court

is the High Court, inter alia, for the State of Assam as well as

for the State of Nagaland.

23

PRE-AMENDED SECTION 25, CPC

27.Before proceeding further, we may now refer to the pre-

amended section 25 of the Code for the purpose of

understanding what was the mischief that the Parliament

intended to address by radically altering its relevant terms

resulting in its substantial substitution. Bare perusal of the pre-

amended provision clearly reflects that its scope and

applicability were rather limited. Unless the State Governments

were ad idem, a transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding

from a Civil Court in one State to a Civil Court in another State

was not a permissible option. That apart, such transfer of a suit,

appeal or other proceeding instead of being effected by a

judicial act was left to an administrative act and, that too, only

if the two State Governments were in agreement. The Law

Commission having recommended an amendment, section 25

of the CPC came to be amended by the Amendment Act 104 of

1976. A contrast of the pre-amended and present version of

section 25 is clearly suggestive of the distinctive variance qua

the authority to exercise the power of transfer. At this juncture,

the Statement of Objects and Reasons (for brevity ‘the SOR’)

for amending section 25 may also be noted:

24

“Clause 12.—Section 25 of the Code empowers the

State Government to transfer suits, etc. in certain

circumstances from the High Court exercising

jurisdiction in the State to another High Court. This

section is very narrow in scope as it provides only for

the transfer of suit, appeal or other proceeding

pending in a High Court presided over by a Single

Judge. Besides, the State Government, does not seem

to be an appropriate agency for exercising the power

of transfer. Section 25 is, therefore, being substituted

by a new section which provides for the transfer to the

Supreme Court the existing power vested with the

State Government and to confer on the Supreme Court

such wide powers of transfer as it has in criminal

cases under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973. Further, the new section covers

transfer of cases from or to the Original Side of a High

Court to or from any other civil court. The new section

is thus wider in scope than Section 406 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973.”

28.Thus, with the amendment of section 25, a serious

impediment in administration of justice by the courts of law was

remedied by conferment of power on this Court to decide on

inter-State transfer of any suit, appeal or other proceeding

pending in a Civil Court of one State to a Civil Court of another

State. Since under the pre-amended section 25, such a transfer

could be made by the transferor State only if the transferee

State were to consent to it, it was rightly observed in the SOR

that it was not the function of the States to decide on such

transfer. Though advisedly, we presume, that there is absence

of any reference in the SOR about the uncertainty centering

around cooperation or the lack of it between the relevant

25

States prior to a transfer of the nature referred to in section 25

being effected, it does not take too long to comprehend that

Parliament did proceed in the right direction and sought to

address the mischief that could ensue if the two States were

not on the same page resulting in depriving a litigant of having

his cause vindicated. Be that as it may.

CONSIDERATION OF THE DECISIONS

29.Having surveyed the provisions of the Constitution relating

to the High Courts in general and how the Gauhati High Court

has taken shape as the common High Court for, inter alia, the

States of Assam and Nagaland, it is time to look into the

decision in Durgesh Sharma (supra), cited by Mr. Balgopal

and by Mr. Goswami as well as the other decisions cited by him

for the appellants.

30.In Durgesh Sharma (supra), this Court was seized of the

question as to whether the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was

justified, on an application under section 23 of the Code, in

ordering transfer of a petition under section 13 of the Hindu

Marriage Act, 1955, instituted by the appellant-husband in a

court in Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh, to a court in Malegaon, District

26

Nashik, Maharashtra to be tried along with a petition under

section 9 of the said Act instituted by the respondent-wife.

Considering the provisions of law, this Court held as follows:

“46. Having considered the scheme of the Code as

amended from time to time, in our judgment, the law

relating to transfer of cases (suits, appeals and other

proceedings) is well settled. It is found in Sections 22 to

25 of the Code and those provisions are exhaustive in

nature. Whereas Sections 22, 24 and 25 deal with power

of transfer, Section 23 merely provides forum and

specifies the court in which an application for transfer

may be made. Section 23 is not a substantive provision

vesting power in a particular court to order transfer.

47. In our considered opinion, where several courts

having jurisdiction are subordinate to one appellate

court, an application for transfer may be made to such

appellate court and the court may transfer a case from

one court subordinate to it to another court subordinate

to it. Likewise, where such courts are subordinate to the

same High Court, an application may be made and

action may be taken by the High Court transferring a

case from one court subordinate to it to any other court

subordinate to that High Court. But where such courts

are subordinate to different High Courts, it is only the

Supreme Court (this Court) which may pass an order of

transfer. In other words, if two courts are subordinate to

different High Courts, one High Court has no power,

jurisdiction or authority to transfer a case pending in any

court subordinate to that High Court to a court

subordinate to other High Court. It is only the Supreme

Court (this Court) which may order the transfer.

48. Section 25, as originally enacted in the Code of 1908

and the decisions prior to the Amendment Act of 1976,

have no application after substitution of Section 25 as it

stands today. To us, Section 23 has no application to

such cases and the only provision attracted is Section

25.

49. The language of Section 25 also supports the view

which we are inclined to take. Sub-section (1) of Section

25 of the Code enacts that ‘On the application of a

party’, this Court may pass an appropriate order of

transfer. Thus, Section 25 is ‘self-contained code’ and

27

comprises substantive as well as procedural law on the

point. It allows a party to move the Court by making an

application as also it empowers the Court to make an

order of transfer.

50. The matter can be examined from another angle

also. Every court has its own local or territorial limits

beyond which it cannot exercise the jurisdiction. So far

as this Court is concerned, its jurisdiction is not

circumscribed by any territorial limitation and it extends

over any person or authority within the territory of India.

But, it has no jurisdiction outside the country. So far as a

High Court is concerned, its jurisdiction is limited to

territory within which it exercises jurisdiction and not

beyond it. On that analogy also, a High Court cannot

pass an order transferring a case pending in a court

subordinate to it to a court subordinate to another High

Court. It would be inconsistent with the limitation as to

territorial jurisdiction of the Court.

***

54. After the commencement of the Constitution and

establishment of the Supreme Court (this Court),

Parliament thought it proper to amend Section 25 of the

Code and accordingly, it was substituted by empowering

this Court to order transfer from one High Court to

another High Court or to one civil court in one State to

another civil court in any other State.

55. It is no doubt true that even when Section 25 in the

present form was substituted by the Amendment Act of

1976, sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Code has

neither been deleted nor amended. That, however, is not

relevant. Since in our considered view, Section 23 is

merely a procedural provision, no order of transfer can

be made under the said provision. If the case is covered

by Section 25 of the Code, it is only that section which

will apply for both the purposes, namely, for the purpose

of making application and also for the purpose of

effecting transfer. ***”

31.Durgesh Sharma (supra) is an authority having the

effect of a binding precedent for deciding cases where the High

Court for a State seeks to transfer a suit, appeal or proceeding

28

from a court subordinate to it to a court subordinate to the High

Court for another State. We share the views expressed therein.

However, having regard to the fundamental factual

dissimilarities present in this case, the ratio decidendi of

Durgesh Sharma (supra) while answering the core issue may

not apply here.

32.The decision in Megha Jain (supra) was rendered on a

reference being made to a larger Bench by another single Judge

of the Gauhati High Court, who was not persuaded to agree

with the view taken by the coordinate bench in Pomi

Sengupta (supra). A matrimonial proceeding instituted by the

respondent, pending in a court in Aizawl, Mizoram was sought

to be transferred to a court in Kamrup, Guwahati, Assam by the

petitioner by pursuing the remedy provided by section 24 of the

CPC. This is what the Division Bench, speaking through the

Chief Justice, held:

“9. The constitution of the High Court with its Principal Seat

and the Permanent Benches in the manner, as taken note

supra, would indicate that all the courts in all the said four

States are subordinate to the Gauhati High Court and since

no separate High Courts are established in respect of

Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, a provision

under the Notification dated 22.6.1990 is made for the

establishment of the Permanent Bench at Aizawl. Similar

Notifications had been issued in respect of other two States.

These aspects would leave no room for doubt that the

29

Gauhati High Court can exercise its power and jurisdiction

over all Courts in all the four States. If in that light, the

provision as contained in section 24 of the CPC, extracted

above, is taken note, sub-section (1)(a) would indicate that

the High Court or the District Court may, at any stage,

transfer any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before

it for trial or disposal to any court subordinate to it and

competent to try or dispose of the same. If the said provision

is kept in view and the above noted discussion relating to the

establishment of the High Court and the Permanent Bench is

taken note and in that circumstance, when the subordinate

court in the State of Mizoram as also the subordinate court in

the State of Assam is subordinate to the Gauhati High Court,

a transfer petition filed under section 24 of the CPC before

this court, namely, the Gauhati High Court, even for transfer

of a case from the subordinate court in any of the four

States, as indicated above, to the other State would be

maintainable from the very provision as contained in section

24 itself. In such circumstance, the question of filing a

petition under section 25 of the CPC would not arise since

there are no separate High Courts exercising jurisdiction over

the States referred to above. If in that background, the

observation, as contained in Smt. Pomi Sengupta (supra) is

taken note, the learned Single Judge was not justified in

arriving at the conclusion that if a petition under section 24

of the CPC is entertained, it would amount to adding words

to the provision.”

33.Chalasani Deepthi (supra) arose out of an application

filed by the petitioner-wife seeking withdrawal and transfer of a

suit for restitution of conjugal rights, instituted by the

respondent-husband in the Family Court, Ranga Reddy District,

Telengana to the court of the Judge, Family Court, Vijaywada,

Andhra Pradesh. A learned Judge of the (undivided) Andhra

Pradesh High Court having heard the parties and the Advocates

General of the States of Telengana and Andhra Pradesh and

30

upon consideration of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh

Reorganisation Act, more particularly sections 30 and 31

thereof, together with sections 24 and 25 of the CPC as well as

the decision in Durgesh Sharma (supra), held that both the

courts being subordinate to the Andhra Pradesh High Court,

which was till then the common High Court for the States of

Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, the application for transfer

under section 24 was maintainable.

34.A learned Judge of the Bombay High Court, while following

the decision in Chalasani Deepthi (supra) allowed the

application under section 24 of the CPC filed by the petitioner-

wife seeking transfer of a matrimonial petition pending on the

file of the Civil Judge in the court at Mapusa, North Goa,

instituted by the respondent-husband, to the Family Court at

Bandra, Mumbai, Maharashtra. Incidentally, the Bombay High

Court is the common High Court for the States of Maharashtra

and Goa as well as the Union territories of Dadra & Nagar

Haveli and Daman & Diu. The learned Judge spurned the

objection of the respondent-husband that the transfer

application ought to have been filed in the Bombay High Court

at Goa and not at its principal seat in Mumbai, for the reasons

31

recorded in the decision. Significantly, no objection was raised

in this case that transfer ought to have been prayed by filing an

application before this Court under section 25 of the CPC.

35.There is, therefore, a host of judicial authorities at the

level of the High Courts that section 25 of the CPC would not

bar entertainment of an application under section 24 thereof by

a High Court, even for an inter-State transfer, if such High Court

is the common High Court for two or more States and transfer,

as prayed, is not to a civil court beyond the said High Court’s

jurisdiction.

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

36.As noted, the appellants as plaintiffs have instituted the

civil suit in the court of the District Judge, Dimapur, Nagaland

and now seek transfer of such suit to the court of the District

Judge, Guwahati, Assam. Such a transfer, if allowed, no doubt

would constitute an inter-State transfer. Insofar as inter-State

transfer of any suit, appeal or other proceeding is concerned, a

plain and literal reading of section 25 of the CPC does suggest

that the power to so transfer lies with the Supreme Court only.

Paragraph 54 of Durgesh Sharma (supra), heavily relied upon

32

by Mr. Balgopal, lends support to his contentions. Having regard

to the scheme of section 25 of the CPC and on its plain terms,

read with Durgesh Sharma (supra), Mr. Balgopal seems to

have a point that such an inter-State transfer of the nature

prayed by the appellants cannot be ordered under section 24.

However, something more seems to be visible when we put on

our judicial lens to resolve the issue.

37.Section 24 of the CPC is a general power of ‘transfer and

withdrawal’ capable of being invoked by the High Courts at any

stage either suo motu without notice or on the application of

any of the parties after notice, whereas section 25 confers

exclusive power on the Supreme Court, on the application of

either of the parties and after notice, to transfer suits, etc. from

the Courts stated therein. While section 24 is part of the

general law, section 25 is the special law. Clause (b) of sub-

section (1) of section 24, which is relevant for the present case,

opens up an avenue for the High Court, upon reaching a

satisfaction that a case for transfer has been made out, to

withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any

court subordinate to it and (i) to try and dispose of the same; or

(ii) to transfer the same for trial or disposal to any court

33

subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same;

or (iii) to retransfer the same for trial or disposal to the court

from which it is withdrawn; whereas, section 25 empowers the

Supreme Court on a satisfaction being recorded that an order is

expedient for the ends of justice to direct that any suit, appeal

or other proceeding be transferred (i) from one High Court to a

High Court; and (ii) from other Civil Court in one State to other

Civil Court in any other State. The text of the two sections,

therefore, makes the position clear about the powers reserved

for the High Courts and the Supreme Court to transfer suits,

appeal or other proceedings. Law is well-settled, and we may

profitably refer to the decision in Amarendra Pratap Singh

vs. Tej Bahadur Prajapati

8

, that a general law cannot defeat

the provisions of a special law to the extent to which they are in

conflict; else, an effort has to be made at reconciling the two

provisions by homogenous reading. What, therefore, needs to

be seen and appreciated is whether there is any conflict or

inconsistency between the general law (section 24) and the

special law (section 25) for the former to yield to the latter, and

ascertain whether the High Court still has the jurisdiction under

the general law to order an inter-State transfer notwithstanding

8 (2004) 10 SCC 65

34

the special law vesting the Supreme Court with such power of

transfer. There has to be an inconsistency between the two so

as to apply the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant. The

jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court pursuant to the

amendment of section 25 of the CPC in 1976 though special,

invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 24

may not come in conflict and defeat section 25, if jurisdiction is

still found available to be exercised in a given case under the

former without doing violence to the latter.

38. In our considered opinion, section 25 of the CPC would

operate as a bar in cases like the one in Durgesh Sharma

(supra); however, section 25 of the CPC ~ notwithstanding the

scheme envisaged in it ~ does not operate as a complete bar

to denude a common High Court, like the Gauhati High Court,

to entertain an application under section 24 thereof even for an

order to transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding from one

State to another State, provided the States concerned are two

of the four States in relation to which such High Court still

exercises jurisdiction. This is an opinion formed by us, for the

reasons, which we venture to assign now.

35

39.From the factual matrix vis-à-vis the Constitutional and

statutory provisions, there can be no cavil that the courts and

tribunals in the States of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and

Arunachal Pradesh are not only under the superintendence of

the Gauhati High Court in terms of Article 227, all district courts

and courts subordinate thereto in such States are subject to the

control of the Gauhati High Court under Article 235 as well as

subordinate to the same High Court in terms of section 3 of the

CPC. Section 25 has been inserted in the CPC with a definite

purpose of ensuring that no High Court transfers a suit, appeal

or other proceeding pending in a Civil Court in one State to a

Civil Court in another State. The reason for this is that the High

Court to which the application for transfer is made does have

the power in law to transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding

to a Civil Court subordinate to it but it does not have any power

in law to transfer any of the above to a Civil Court which is

subordinate to another High Court. The same situation that

Durgesh Sharma (supra) had to deal with, where the Civil

Courts subordinate to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and

the Bombay High Court were involved. This Court had the

occasion to hold that if two courts are subordinate to different

36

High Courts, one High Court has no power, jurisdiction or

authority to transfer a case pending in any court subordinate to

that High Court to a court subordinate to another High Court

and it is only the Supreme Court which may order the transfer.

The reason for such conclusion seems to be obvious that the

High Court, to which an application for transfer is made, does

neither enjoy any power of superintendence under Article 227

over the Civil Court to which the transfer is sought nor can such

Civil Court be said to be a court over which the High Court

exercises any control of the nature referred to in Article 235.

Also, in such a case, the Civil Court beyond the territory in

relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction cannot be

considered to be a court subordinate to such High Court in the

sense section 3 of the CPC is to be understood.

40.The creases that were sought to be ironed out by radically

altering section 25 of the CPC and presenting it in an altogether

new avatar have to be given due consideration in the light of

the SOR and the provisions of Chapter V of the Constitution.

Bestowing such consideration, we hold that what is of

primordial importance to attract section 25 is the involvement

of two civil courts (transferor and transferee) in the proceedings

37

for transfer, which are not only situate in two different States,

but are also subject to the power of judicial superintendence

and administrative control of the High Courts of each such

State.

41.While focusing on section 25, one cannot be completely

oblivious of the terms of section 24(1)(b)(ii). As and when it is

approached with an application under section 24 for transfer,

the High Court, subject to its satisfaction that the facts and

circumstances do warrant an order to be made, is empowered

to “transfer … to any Court subordinate to it”. These words are

of immense significance. In directing a transfer, the High Court

can transfer a suit, appeal or other proceeding to “any Court”

but bearing in mind the fetter that any such court, to which the

relevant case or matter is proposed or sought to be transferred,

must be subordinate to it and otherwise competent to deal with

the subject matter; if such court is either not subordinate or not

competent, the power is not available to be exercised.

However, there is no such fetter in section 24 that power under

sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) thereof cannot be

exercised if the transferee court, though subordinate to the

High Court, is situate in a different State. Similar is the case

38

with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 24. The power is

available so long the Civil Court continues to remain

subordinate to it under Article 227 read with Article 235 and

under section 3 of the CPC. To this extent, the High Court

enjoys a supreme power which is not even subject to the power

of the Supreme Court under section 25. The only caveat is that

this power of transfer under section 24(1)(a) and 24(1)(b)(ii),

however, cannot be exercised by the Gauhati High Court, say

for transfer of a civil suit from a court in Assam or Nagaland to

a Civil Court in Tripura or Manipur or Meghalaya because the

said States, from 2012, are no longer part of the Gauhati High

Court and are since having High Courts of their own.

42. It is time all concerned realize that a High Court ~

howsoever big or small, old or new ~ is as much a

Constitutional Court as this Court is and enjoys wide ranging

powers vested in it by law. No doubt, the power under section

25 is a special power, but the common High Courts of the

country ought not to read section 24 of the CPC in a manner as

if the power of the Supreme Court under section 25 to order an

inter-State transfer is available to be exclusively exercised by it

in all cases of inter-State transfer, thereby denuding the

39

common High Courts of the country of their jurisdiction by mere

reference to involvement of an inter-State transfer and without

anything more being looked at.

43.The States of Assam and Nagaland by reason of the

provisions of the 1962 Act, then the 1971 Act and finally the

Amendment Act have the Gauhati High Court as their common

High Court and it is the Gauhati High Court that enjoys power of

judicial superintendence over all courts within the territories of

these two States. Gauhati High Court also exercises

administrative control over all district courts and courts

subordinate to them. Although the States of Assam and

Nagaland in the political map of India have well demarcated

areas, for the purpose of administration of justice, both States

are mandatorily subject to the jurisdiction of the Gauhati High

Court. Having regard to the special nature of jurisdiction that is

vested in a common High Court like the Gauhati High Court,

there cannot be a truncation of the power available under

clauses (a) and (b) of section 24(1), which includes suo motu

power.

44.Secondly, we are inclined to the view that should the

contention advanced by Mr. Balgopal be accepted, the same is

40

bound to lead to anomalous and incongruous results. If a

common High Court, such as the Gauhati High Court, is

satisfied that a situation for withdrawing a civil suit from a

court, say in Nagaland, does exist, section 24(1)(b)(i) of the

CPC confers power on the Gauhati High Court to withdraw such

suit and dispose of the same itself. We are conscious that the

verb employed in the first part of section 24(1)(b(i) is

‘withdraw’ and not ‘transfer’; also, that clause (b) of sub-

section (1) of section 24 employs the verbs ‘withdraw’,

‘transfer’ and ‘retransfer’ in the three sub-clauses for achieving

the specified ends. However, would it mean that withdrawal of

a case does never involve a transfer? The verb ‘transfer’, inter

alia, means to move, or to make somebody/something move,

from one place to another. Once, for whatever reason, the

movement of a file from one place to another is involved, may

be by reason of withdrawal, a transfer in the broader sense

does take place. Now, the principal seat of the Gauhati High

Court being at Guwahati, in the State of Assam, were to

exercise the power conferred by section 24(1)(b(i), the effect

thereof upon such a withdrawal is that the suit would stand

transferred to the principal seat at Guwahati from the Civil

41

Court in Nagaland and, possibly, assigned a separate

registration number for the purpose of administrative

convenience, whereafter three options in terms of section 24(1)

(b) are open to the High Court for further course of action for

taking the suit to its logical conclusion. Once the suit is

withdrawn from the court in Nagaland and placed before the

High Court at its principal seat in Guwahati, Assam, would not

that be a case of an inter-State transfer? The answer cannot

possibly but be in the affirmative. The other aspect requiring

consideration in this regard is whether disposal of the civil suit

by the Gauhati High Court, if the same were withdrawn from

the subordinate court, constitute a transfer from one Civil Court

to another Civil Court. The High Courts are Constitutional

Courts and not a ‘Civil Court’ in the sense the term is

understood, so to encompass a transfer from one Civil Court to

another Civil Court. However, if at all such a suit were

withdrawn and finally disposed of by the Gauhati High Court at

its principal seat, it would necessarily be in the exercise of its

ordinary civil jurisdiction and the procedure to be followed

would undoubtedly be guided by the provisions of the CPC. In a

sense, the High Court would step into the shoes of the Civil

42

Court from which the suit has been withdrawn. Could the

provisions in section 25 of the CPC, in such circumstances, be

cited to abrogate the Constitutional and statutory power of the

Gauhati High Court to withdraw a civil suit from a Civil Court in

Nagaland and to decide the same? In course of hearing, we had

invited the attention of Mr. Balgopal to this situation and sought

his response. He could not have and rightly did not dispute that

in such a situation, the power vested in the Gauhati High Court

by the Constitution as well as the CPC cannot be abrogated.

Thus, exercise of the power that section 24(1)(b)(i) confers on

the Gauhati High Court in a given case, would ultimately entail

a transfer of the civil suit from the State of Nagaland to the

High Court, having its principal seat at Guwahati in the State of

Assam. Such a situation is not and cannot be controlled by

section 25, and on a harmonious reading of sections 24 and 25,

it has to be held that section 25 does not in all cases fetter the

power of a common High Court to order inter-State transfer of a

suit, appeal or other proceeding. Otherwise, it would be a

fallacy to believe that while an inter-State transfer would be

permissible in terms of sub-clause (i) but not sub-clause (ii) of

clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 24. We reiterate, section

43

25 would essentially have to be read as barring transfer of any

suit, appeal or other proceeding from a Civil Court in one State

to a Civil Court in another State if such States have their own

High Courts but not in the case of a common High Court like the

Gauhati High Court.

45.A similar power of withdrawal of any case involving, inter

alia, a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the

Constitution is conferred on the Gauhati High Court by Article

228 of the Constitution. If a situation of the nature

contemplated by Article 228 does exist, the principal seat of

the Gauhati High Court at Guwahati may withdraw such case

from any of the three States of Nagaland, Mizoram and

Arunachal Pradesh and decide which of the two courses of

action is to be opted. That would also constitute an inter-State

transfer. Obviously, section 25 cannot operate as a bar for the

Gauhati High Court to exercise a power conferred on it by the

Constitution.

46.Finally, in our opinion, an approach to construe section 25

of the CPC has to be fair, pragmatic, reasonable and realistic.

Any construction of section 25 which would impede “access to

justice”, considered to be a Fundamental Right, has to be

44

eschewed. A narrow interpretation of section 25 imposing a bar

for entertainment of an application under section 24 for

transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding by a common

High Court like the Gauhati High Court inter-se the four States

in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction could place a heavy

burden and might pose an insurmountable obstacle for litigants

of the far-flung areas of the North-East, if they were made to

approach this Court for such transfer on the specious ground

that the Civil Court to which the same is proposed to be

transferred is in a State other than the State in which the suit

has been instituted. An interpretation of the law that seeks to

address the mischief, that is consistent with the Constitution

and promotes constitutional objectives and that which responds

to the needs of the nation must be adopted. If “access to

justice” has to be real, it becomes the moral responsibility of

the Supreme Court, the supreme guardians/protectors of the

rights of people guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws,

not to construe the substantive part in section 25 of the Code in

a pedantic manner to bring about a situation that would thwart

the initiative of making “access to justice” real.

45

47.What remains is the contention advanced by Mr. Sharma.

We are not impressed, to say the least. Although sections 22 to

25 of the CPC deal with transfers, sections 22 and 23 can be

invoked in situations of the nature contemplated in section 22

by a defendant, and by none else, and the court which is

empowered to entertain such an application is the court

referred to in section 23. Section 22, in our view, permits

transfer on application of the doctrine of forum conveniens and

it has no applicability on facts and in the circumstances where

the application for transfer is at the instance of the plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION

48.In view of the aforesaid discussions, the issue is answered

by concluding that:

(i) a true and proper interpretation of section 25 of the

CPC leads us to the conclusion that the same applies

to inter-State transfer of a suit, appeal or other

proceeding where both States have a High Court in

terms of Article 214 of the Constitution and not to a

transfer where both States have a common High

Court under Article 231 thereof; and

46

(ii)the power under section 24 of the CPC can be

exercised by the High Court even for inter-State

transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding, if it is

the common High Court for two or more States under

Article 231 of the Constitution and both the Civil

Courts (transferor and transferee) are subordinate to

it.

The questions framed at the beginning of this judgment are

answered accordingly.

RELIEF

49.The sequitur of this discussion, with respect, is that the

Gauhati High Court while rendering the judgment and order

under challenge proceeded on an erroneous approach, and

such approach has also been found to be flawed in Megha Jain

(supra). The impugned judgment and order being unsustainable

in law has to be and is, accordingly, set aside and the civil

appeal stands allowed. The Gauhati High Court shall now

proceed to decide the application under section 24 of the CPC

afresh, on its own merits.

47

50.In view of the aforesaid order, the transfer petition under

section 25 of the CPC is rendered infructuous; hence, it stands

dismissed.

51.We request the Gauhati High Court to assign reasonable

priority to the application under section 24 of the CPC and to

dispose of the same as early as possible, subject to its

convenience.

52.Parties shall bear their own costs.

……………………………….J

(HRISHIKESH ROY)

...….…………………………J

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

NEW DELHI;

28

th

FEBRUARY, 2023.