IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

And

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandip Kumar De

W.P.L.R.T. No. 137 of 2026

Shalimar Wires Industries Limited

-Versus-

State of West Bengal and others

For the petitioner : Mr. Debayan Bera,

Mr. Rudradeb Chaudhuri,

Mr. Shashwat Nayak,

Ms. Saolini Bose, ... Advs.

For the State : Mr. Nilanjan Bhattacharjee, Sr. Standing Counsel,

Mr. Suman Banerjee,

Ms. Ayana Banerjee … Advs.

Heard on : 24.08.2026 & 03.09.2026

Reserved on : 03.09.2026

Judgment on : 29.09.2026

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The narrative in the present lis originates from the purchase of the subject

plots by the writ petitioner, under its previous name, by a registered Deed

dated May 3, 1962. The subject property is comprised of 4.73 acres of land

out of total 18.228 acres of Mouza – Uttarpara, Police Station – Uttarpara,

JL No. 12, District – Hooghly. The purchased land, in terms of the CS

records, was described in the Second Schedule of the deed.

2

2. On or about August 23, 2013 and December 6, 2019, copies of LR Record of

Rights (LR RoR) were issued to the petitioner in respect of various plots of

land, including the purchased property, indicating the name of Shalimar

Industries Private Limited as Raiyat against such plots.

3. Subsequently, the name of the company was changed to Shalimar Wires

Industries Limited (the present petitioner).

4. Subsequently, an application for conversion in respect of 2.092 acres out of

total 4.73 acres was made by the petitioner, which was allowed, thereby

permitting the land to be converted to commercial Bastu vide order dated

January 2, 2018 passed by the District Land & Land Reforms Officer (DL &

LRO), Hooghly.

5. On March 9, 2021, petitioner filed an application for correction of its name

in the LR RoR as well as to incorporate the change of character of the land

in terms of the conversion order. However, by a letter dated December 20,

2021, the ADM & DL & LRO, Hooghly asked the petitioner to submit a

proposal for lease in terms of the amended provision of Section 4B of the

West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 2017 in respect of the land

held by the company. The petitioner reiterated its request for correction of

the LR RoR by a subsequent letter dated April 13, 2022, upon which the LR

RoR was prepared on March 18, 2024 in respect of 4.711 acres for 32 plots,

incorporating the name of the petitioner in place of Shalimar Industries

Private Limited. However, the altered character of the land in terms of the

conversion order was not reflected in the records. In the remarks column of

the LR RoR, it was recorded “Section 6(3) of the W.B.E.A Act, 1953 is

applicable”.

3

6. The petitioner issued a letter to the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer (BL

& LRO) Serampore -Uttarpara on April 2, 2024 , requesting him to

incorporate the altered character of the plots and to issue a revised Khatian.

Upon no steps having been taken in that regard by the BL & LRO, a demand

of justice was sent to the BL & LRO on April 18, 2024, further requesting to

correct the LR RoR by deleting the endorsement in respect of Section 6(3) of

the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (in short, “the 1953 Act”).

7. In view of the alleged further inaction on the part of the BL & LRO on such

request by the petitioner, Original Application (OA) no. 1908 of 2024 (LRTT)

was moved by the petitioner before the West Bengal Land Reforms and

Tenancy Tribunal. The Tribunal disposed of the OA on March 28, 2025,

directing the BL & LRO to dispose of the representation dated February 2,

2024. The petitioner challenged the said order before this court in WPLRT

No. 107 of 2025, which was disposed of on August 18, 2025, thereby setting

aside the order of the Tribunal and directing it to decide the matter on

merits, at the same time, setting aside the proposal for lease given by the DL

& LRO, Hooghly.

8. Upon remand, the Tribunal, vide judgment dated March 18, 2026,

dismissed the OA and also quashed the conversion order. Assailing the said

judgment, the present writ petition has been filed.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner submits that both the

petitioner and its predecessor-in-interest, one Ganges Valley Bone Mill

Limited, were recorded as “Dakhalkar”, whic h is equivalent to “Non-

Agricultural Tenancy” (NA Tenancy), thus taking the writ petitioner and its

predecessor outside the purview of the 1953 Act. Learned counsel cites

4

Asrurekha Dutta vs. Diptimay Pal and Anr., reported at 1966 SCC OnLine Cal

110, in respect of the proposition that the term “Dakhalkar” means Non -

Agricultural Tenant (NA Tenant).

10. It is submitted that NA Tenancies are transferable under Section 8(4)(ii) and

Section 9(2)(ii) of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (for

short, “the 1949 Act”). NA Tenancies, it is contended, did not vest under the

1953 Act. In support of such proposition, learned counsel relies on the

definition of the term “intermediary” in Section 2(i) of the 1953 Act and cites

Section 2(a) of the 1953 Act, which defines “non-agricultural tenant”, as well

as Section 4 of the said Act, as per which, unless a person is an

“intermediary”, “raiyat” or “under-raiyat”, there is no vesting under the said

Act.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner next argues that Section 39 of the 1953

Act provides for the preparation of the RoR in terms of the said Act whereas

under Rules 25 and 26 of the corresponding Rules of 1954, the procedure

for such preparation has been laid down. Rule 26(b) mandates

ascertainment of the class to which each tenant belongs, for the purpose of

such preparation.

12. Thus, the finally published RoR under the 1953 Act, it is submitted, is the

appropriate document to ascertain whether a person is an “intermediary”,

“under raiyat”, or falls under any other class of tenants.

13. In the present case, the R.S. RoR did not record the status of the petitioner

as “intermediary”, “raiyat” or “under raiyat”, thereby ruling out the

applicability of the 1953 Act.

5

14. The petitioner purchased the property on May 31, 1962 and was recorded in

place of its vendor as “Dakhalkar”.

15. According to the endorsement in the LR RoR, the entire properties have been

retained under Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act in terms of a purported order

dated October 7, 1964 of the L & LR Department (Reference no. 17670L),

apparently in terms of a suo moto proceeding under Section 44(2a,) which

was referred to as “suo moto 44(2a/464)”. It is argued that in view of the

1953 Act not being applicable, such endorsement is palpably illegal and

contrary to the recording of the petitioner as “Dakhalkar” in most of the

subject plots in the R.S. RoR.

16. It is further contended that since the State failed to produce any order

under Section 44(2a) of the 1953 Act at any stage of the proceedings, the

very premise of such entry is vitiated.

17. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner cites the

following judgments:

(i) Shibsankar Nandy vs. Prabartak Sangha and Ors. , reported at AIR

1967 SC 940;

(ii) BRC Construction Company Private Limited and Another vs. The State

of West Bengal and Ors., reported at (2015) 3 CHN 658;

(iii) Abhijit Tie UP (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., reported at 2023 SCC OnLine Cal

3064;

(iv) Nikhil Chandra Sanyal v. Khirodabala Nag , reported at 1979 SCC

OnLine Cal 158.

18. Learned counsel next argues that Section 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act,

1885 (for short, “the BT Act”), has been wrongly applied by the learned

6

Tribunal to decide the issue of NA Tenancy. The said provision is not

applicable in the present case at all.

19. It is further contended that with the promulgation of the WBLR (Third

Amendment) Act, 1968 with retrospective effect from September 9, 1980,

rights of NA Tenants and under tenants under the 1949 Act vested in the

State on and from the said date, that is, September 9, 1980, under Section

3A of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (for short, “the 1955 Act”).

Therefore, the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest became a raiyat having

ownership rights and was entitled to retain lands up to the ceiling limit

prescribed under Section 14M of the 1955 Act. As a raiyat, the petitioner

was also entitled to apply for conversion under Section 4C of the 1955 Act.

Hence, the order of conversion dated January 2, 2018 in respect of 2.092

acres out of total 4.73 acres of land in favour of the petitioner was valid.

Thus, it is argued, the learned Tribunal erred in law in holding that the

conversion order was bad, by invoking Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act.

20. Addressing the applicability of Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act, learned counsel

contends that the petitioner’s purchased land, The total land of 18.228

acres belonging to the petitioner’s vendor at the time of sale was comprised

of lands, buildings as well as structures on the date of vesting under the

1953 Act. The State has never disclosed the quanta of land held by the

vendor under each individual category within the contemplation of Section 6

of the said Act.

21. Even if the said property is treated to be a heterogeneous one, comprised of

land, buildings etc., 18.228 acres would come under the ceiling limit for

individual categories.

7

22. In this regard, learned counsel points out that under Section 6(1), sub-

clause (b), there is no ceiling limit for buildings and structures. Under sub-

clause (a), homestead properties also have no ceiling limit. Retention of non-

agricultural land in khas possession is permissible up to 15 acres under

sub-clause (c) of Section 6(1) of the 1953 Act. The proviso thereto stipulates

that a composite land under sub-clauses (a) and (b), comprised of buildings

and structures as well as homestead is permissible to be retained up to 20

acres in total.

23. Thus, under no stretch of imagination was the total land of the vendor,

amounting to 18.228 acres, beyond the ceiling limit. As such, there arose no

question of “retention” of the said land, which never vested in the State in

the first place.

24. Learned counsel further argues that no proceeding under Section 6(5) has

been disclosed in the present case, which is mandatory in the event an

intermediary does not exercise his/her choice for retention. Thus, there was

no vesting in the eye of law under the 1953 Act at all.

25. Learned counsel cites an unreported judgment in Saregama India Limited

vs. State of West Bengal and others (WPLRT 126 of 2023) in support of the

proposition that if the land is below the ceiling limit and retention is

automatic, no further entitlement to retain is conferred by order under

Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act. Thus, in such a case, an order under the said

provision and under Section 6(1)(g) of the 1953 Act would merely be a

surplusage and irrelevant.

26. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Tribunal proceeded on

the premise that the ingredients of NA Tenancy have not been satisfied.

8

However, it was beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide whether

the land had the character of NA Tenancy. In Paragraph No. 22 of the

purchase deed of the petitioner, leases in lands have been mentioned to be

included under the First Schedule. Moreover, the only relevant document to

decide the issue of NA Tenancy was the finally published R.S. RoR prepared

under the 1953 Act in terms of the said Act, which did not disclose that the

property was retained under Section 6(3).

27. Learned counsel next submits that no appeal was required to be preferred

against the order under Section 44(2a) of the 1953 Act, even if there was

such an order, since the scope of the said provision is limited to revise the

finally published R.S. RoR and, even after revision, the last position of the

R.S. RoR reflected the status of the petitioner as “Dakhalkar”. Hence, the

endorsement indicating retention under Section 6(3) , subsequently

introduced in the L.R. RoR, was without jurisdiction and a nullity, amenable

to challenge even in a collateral proceeding.

28. Learned counsel addresses the Guide and Glossary to Survey and

Settlement Records of Bengal, 1917, relied on by the State, to submit that

the term “Dakhalkar” has not been used for a tenant according to Section 4

of the BT Act. Therefore, a “Dakhalkar” is not an intermediary under the

1953 Act.

29. Lastly, learned counsel relies on a Circular issued by the Land Department

of the State of West Bengal vide Memo No. 6/4735/C/92 dated September

14, 1994. It is submitted that although the same does not have statutory

force but is a guideline, in Paragraph No. 4 thereof, it is stipulated that all

types of “Dakhalkar” tenants are entitled to hold the quantum of land in

9

their khas possession and that no land of any “Dakhalkar” of any type

vested under the 1953 Act.

30. Learned Senior Standing Counsel (SSC), appearing for the State, argues that

the Records of Rights entry clearly reflects that the land was allowed to be

retained under Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act, in terms of the LR Department’s

Memo No. 17670L dated October 7, 1964, which was the date of disposal of

the proceeding under Section 44(2a) of the 1953 Act.

31. Neither the said order, nor the entry in the RoR, has been challenged by the

petitioner or its predecessor-in-interest, thereby attained finality. The

petitioner, it is submitted, purchased the land in the year 1962 and it is

evident from the purchase deed that on the date of vesting under the 1953

Act, the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest was running a mill/factory on

the subject land. Therefore, the land was susceptible to come under Section

6(1)(g), read with Section 6(3), of the 1953 Act.

32. Section 5(1) of the 1955 Act is to implement consequential action. However,

without challenging the basic order, consequential orders cannot be

challenged. In support of such contention, learned SSC cites WPLRT 733 of

2004 [Sakhi Chand Mali @ Sakhi Chand Ram Vs State of W.B.].

33. Learned SSC further argues that the absence of ceiling limit for lands, where

mills/factories were being run at the time of vesting, signifies that any

amount of land vested in the State as per Sections 4 and 5 of the 1953 Act

could be retained only under Section 6(3) as per the opinion of the State. In

the present case, the State had passed an order in respect of the petitioner’s

predecessor and the petitioner, claiming through such predecessor, cannot

take a contrary plea, either of the strength of the 1949 Act or the 1953 Act.

10

Section 5(1)(c) of the 1953 Act makes the land held by NA tenants subject to

Section 6(3). Thus, holding of a land directly under the State by an NA

tenant comes within the purview of Section 6(1)(g), read with Section 6(3) of

the 1953 Act.

34. Thirdly, the learned SSC argues that the term “Dakhalkar” means

“possessor”, indicating the possessory rights of the petitioner to run a

mill/factory. The said term is only illustrative and not exhaustive to NA

tenancies. In the present case, the petitioner is only a conditional retainer

with possessory rights for the specific purpose of running a mill/factory.

The jural status of the petitioner is not governed by the 1949 Act, rather

under Section 6(1)(g) and Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act. It is further pointed

out that the RS RoR shows some of the plots of the petitioner as

“Dakhalkar” and others as “Malik” and “Lakehraj”, the latter two bei ng

Chapter-II intermediaries under the 1953 Act.

35. Learned SSC contends that the claim of the petitioner to be an NA tenant is

also misplaced. Section 2(5) of the 1949 Act defines NA tenancies. Read

with Sections 7 and 8 of the 1949 Act, such a tenancy right must be created

with or without lease, the tenant being bound to pay rent.

36. Again, Sections 46 and 47 of the 1949 Act, read with Rules 16 of the NA

Tenancy Rules framed thereunder, lay down the procedure for issuance of

receipt in detail, which is also reflected in Form-4 and Form-5 under the

Rules. In the present case, no such document to show payment of rent

against receipt by the petitioner or its predecessor-in-interest has been

produced. Rather, the purchase deed of the petitioner suggests a sale and

11

not a lease. The deed also shows the existence of “mill” at the time of

transfer.

37. Section 5(1)(c) of the 1953 Act, it is reiterated, starts with “subject to Section

6(3)…”. The mere recording of a portion of the property under the head

“Dakhalkar” cannot operate as a bar to proceed under Sections 6(1)(g) and

6(3). Section 2(p) of the 1953 Act provides that expressions not defined in

the Act would have the same meaning as the BT Act in areas where it

applies and in other areas, would be similar to existing law relating to land

tenures. The Guide and Glossary of 1917, at Page No. 31 thereof, provides

that “Dakhalkar” is an occupant or possessor of an interest and not a tenant

under Section 4 of the BT Act. Therefore, neither the petitioner not its

predecessor has ever been a tenant in respect of the disputed property.

38. On the contrary, the terms “Malik” and “Lakehraj” have been defined as

“landlord” and “rent-free” respectively.

39. It is next contended that the conversion order dated January 2, 2018,

passed by the DL & LRO, Hooghly , was without jurisdiction, since the

petitioner’s predecessor, and thereafter the petitioner, were allowed to retain

the land for the specific purpose of running a mill/factory under Section 6(3)

and cannot be used for any other purpose. There cannot be any estoppel

against the law if a conversion order is passed in violation of Section 6(3).

40. Importantly, the conversion order itself, in Clause (4), gives the permission

to convert “without prejudice to Section 6(3)”. Hence, such conversion order

itself is contradictory.

41. Learned SSC next submits that none of the citations relied on by the

petitioner lay down any universal law that “Dakhalkars” are NA tenants.

12

None of the said judgments consider the NA tenancy ingredient or Sections 7

and 8 of the 1949 Act and Sections 46 and 47 thereof, read with Rule 16 of

the NA Tenancy Rules, which mandate that an NA tenancy has to be

accompanied by payment of rent, evinced by rent receipts. A “Dakhalkar”

can only be an NA tenant if he/she fulfils the primary obligation that a

tenancy right has been created and he/she has been paying rent. In the

present case, in view of none of such foundational facts being proved, the

case of exemption on the ground of NA tenancy, sought to be made out by

the petitioner, fails.

42. Learned SSC, dealing with the Circular dated September 14, 1994 relied on

by the petitioner, submits that the same is an Executive instruction and

cannot override or alter statutory provisions; in case of any conflict between

the two, the statutory provisions will prevail. Reliance is placed in this

regard on O.P. Lather and others v. Satish Kumar Kakkar and others ,

reported at (2001) 3 SCC 110, and DDA and others v. Joginder S. Monga and

others, reported at (2004) 2 SCC 297.

43. It is also submitted by the State that the said Circular, although sought to

clarify that all NA lands belonging to erstwhile intermediaries and rights

shall vest (if found an excess) to the State with effect from February 15,

1971 under Section 14S of the 1955 Act, however, in Clause (1), it has been

stated that Section 3A of the 1955 Act applies only to those NA tenants who

were outside the jurisdiction and provisions of the 1953 Act and guided by

the 1949 Act. in the present case, the lands-in-question stood vested in the

State and the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner was allowed to retain

the same in terms of Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act as per the LR department

13

Memo No. 17670L dated October 7, 1964, which has been duly recorded in

the relevant RoR and accepted by the petitioner and its predecessor.

44. Thus, the said Circular is not applicable to the present case.

45. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the Court arrives at the

following conclusions:

46. The appellant has raised two primary questions – first, whether the subject-

plots of land come within the purview of Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act, and

secondly, whether the appellant, being recorded as a “Dakhalkar”, should be

construed as a non-agricultural tenant, thus being outside the purview of

the 1953 Act.

47. In order to answer the first question, it is required to be noted that vesting

under the 1953 Act is primarily governed by three key provisions of the said

Act – Sections 4, 5 and 6 - which contain the entire matrix of vesting under

the 1953 Act. As per Section, 4, read with Section 5, vesting is automatic,

upon due publication of notification under Section 4, the effect of which is

that the estates and the rights of the intermediaries in the estates to which

the declaration applies vest in the State free from all incumbrances.

However, such vesting is circumscribed by the right of retention of certain

categories of lands by an intermediary under Section 6 of the said Act.

Section 6(1) begins with a non obstante clause, thus making the vesting

under Sections 4 and 5 subject to retention under Section 6.

48. The 1953 Act came into force on and from February 12, 1954. Sub-section

(3) of Section 6 as well as Clause (g) of Section 6(1), in there present form,

were subsequently introduced by way of amendment with retrospective

14

effect. The petitioner purchased the property on May 31, 1962, after coming

into force of the 1953 Act.

49. Section 6(1)(g) permits an intermediary to retain lands comprised in mills,

factories or workshops, subject, however, to the provisions of sub-section (3)

of Section 6.

50. Sub-section (3) stipulates that in case of land comprised in a tea garden,

mill, factory or workshop, the intermediary shall be entitled to retain only so

much of such land as, in the opinion of the State Government, is required for

the tea garden, mill, factory or workshop, as the case may be.

51. Thus, insofar as a mill, factory or workshop is concerned, only so much of

the land as is permitted to be retained as is required for the same in the

opinion of the State Government. Thus, by default, land co mprised in a

mill, factory or workshop vests in the State, excepting so much of such land

as opined by the State Government to be required for such purpose.

52. In BRC Construction Company Private Limited (supra)

1

, it was held by a

Division Bench of this Court that a land with structure cannot be resumed

under Section 6(3) if it comes within the ceiling limit under Section 6(1)(b),

in cases where the land is comprised in or appertains to buildings and

structures, even if Section 6(3) applies. Again, in Saregama India Limited

(supra)

2

, it was held that if there is an automatic retention under Section

6(1), Clauses (b) or (c), an order under Section 6(3) is a surplusage and no

further retention order is required.

1

BRC Construction Company Private Limited and Another vs. The State of West Bengal and

Ors., reported at (2015) 3 CHN 658

2

Saregama India Limited vs. State of West Bengal and others (WPLRT 126 of 2023)

15

53. On the other hand, in Sakhi Chand Mali @ Sakhi Chand Ram (supra)

3

, it was

held that a notice under Section 10(2) of the 1953 Act, pertaining to a

written order by a Collector requiring any intermediary to give up khas or

symbolic possession, cannot be challenged unless the vesting order itself is

challenged. Although Section 10(2) is not attracted in the present case, the

principle embodied in the said judgment holds true, to the effect that unless

the parent order of vesting and/or an order of retention passed under

Section 6(3) or the entry in the LR RoR recording the same is challenged,

such retention cannot be reopened in a subsequent proceedings.

54. From the purchase deed of the petitioner, produced by it, it is evident that

the description of the subject land shows the existence of a factory shed,

railway sidings, godowns and related fittings and fixtures over the land, thus

bringing the property within the purview of Section 6(1)(g) and Section 6(3)

of the 1953 Act, the land being comprised in mills, factories or workshops.

It is an admitted position that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner as

well as the petitioner, before and after the petitioner’s purchase, have been

running a mill/factory on the subject-plots.

55. In State of West Bengal & Ors.v. Star Iron Works Ltd. & Ors., reported at

2012 SCC OnLine Cal 3127, it was held that Section 6(3) applies only if a

mill is operational and functional on the date of the vesting. In the present

case, not only was the mill admittedly operational on the date of the vesting

but also subsequently, at the instance of the petitioner.

56. From the LR RoR, it is evident that the subject-land was retained under

Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act. The particulars of the proceedings and date of

3

WPLRT 733 of 2004 [Sakhi Chand Mali @ Sakhi Chand Ram Vs State of W.B.]

16

the order under Section 6(3) have also been referred to in the concerned

entry in the LR RoR, indicating further that a proceeding was initiated under

Section 44(2a) of the 1953 Act. A presumption of correctness is attached to

such entry, which is applicable to all official acts. Although an order passed

long back under Section 6(3) may not be possible to be produced by the

State, in the absence of any cogent rebuttal to the same, the presumption

attains an element of conclusiveness. In the present case, the petitioner has

not made out any case of it or its predecessor havinge ever assailed the

order under Section 6(3) before any competent forum. Mere non-reflection

of the existence of such order in the RS RoR does not necessarily vitiate the

order itself, the particulars of it having been clearly depicted in the LR RoR.

57. On a composite reading of the ratio laid down in BRC Construction Company

Private Limited (supra)

4

and Saregama India Limited (supra)

5

in the light of

the relevant provisions, that is, Section 6(1)(g) and Section 6(3) of the 1953

Act, it will be evident that if there is an overlap between Clauses (b) and (g)

of Section 6(1), the latter will prevail insofar as the land comprised

exclusively in a mill or factory is concerned. In BRC (supra)

4

, the co-

ordinate Bench was considering a case where a land is compri sed in or

appertaining to buildings and structures, coming within the purview of

Section 6(1)(b). Since the said language is wider than the expression

“comprised in” used in Section 6(1)(g), it was held that land appertaining to

buildings or structures would be automatically retained, without Section

6(3) affecting the same.

4

BRC Construction Company Private Limited and Another vs. The State of West Bengal and

Ors., reported at (2015) 3 CHN 658

5

Saregama India Limited vs. State of West Bengal and others (WPLRT 126 of 2023)

17

58. A harmonious construction of the ratio decidendi of BRC (supra)

4

and

Saregama India Limited (supra)

5

with the provisions of the statute would

clearly indicate that insofar as the property is comprised in or appertains to

buildings and structures simpliciter, the same would come within the

paradigm of Clause (b) of Section 6(1), whereas the portion thereof which is

exclusively comprised in a mill or factory would be governed by Clause (g) of

Section 6(1).

59. Any contrary interpretation would render Clause (g) nugatory as all mills,

factories and workshops are necessarily operated from buildings and

structures. Thus, if Clause (b) of Section 6(1) is deemed to override Clause

(g), the latter would be rendered redundant and completely nugatory. It is

trite law that no word used by the Legislature in a statute is to be presumed

to be meaningless or superfluous. Hence, a harmonious construction of

Clauses (b) and (g) of Section 6(1) would unerringly indicate that in the event

a large tract of land contains portions comprised of or appertaining to

buildings and structures simpliciter and a different part thereof is

comprised exclusively in mills and factories, there has to be a segregation

between the two and the portion comprised in mills and factories will come

under the ambit of Clause (g) of Section 6(1), read with Section 6(3), whereas

the portion having buildings and structures without any mill or factory

would be governed by Clause (b) of Section 6(1). On the other hand, a vacant

land, if also a part of the said property, would either come within Clause (c)

of Section 6(1), if non-agricultural in nature and in khas possession of the

intermediary, or Clause (d), if agricultural land in khas possession, the

respective ceiling limits for each of the categories being applicable.

18

60. Seen from the said perspective, the reference to an order passed under

Section 6(3) in the LR RoR in the present case necessarily implies that the

entire land purchased by the petitioner was permitted to be retained under

Section 6(3), hence raising a presumption that the entirety of the same was

comprised in mills, factories or workshops under Section 6(1)(g). In the

absence of any rebuttal, such pre-supposition attains conclusiveness. Once

an exercise is undertaken under Section 6(3) and an order is passed

permitting retention of a land as a mill/factory/workshop, the necessary

implication is that the same is entirely comprised of a mill or factory and the

issue cannot be reopened subsequently unless such order , or the

consequential recording in the RoR, is specifically challenged and set aside.

61. Hence, the entire purchased property of the petitioner cannot but be deemed

to have been retained under Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act.

62. The next question which crops up is whether the recording of the

petitioner’s name as “Dakhalkar” in respect of the subject-property would

automatically give rise to the presumption that the petitioner and its

predecessor were non-agricultural tenants, thus going outside the ambit of

vesting under the 1953 Act.

63. From the definition of “non-agricultural tenant” in Section 2(k) of the 1953

Act, we find that the term means a tenant of non -agricultural land who

“holds under a proprietor, a tenure-holder, a service tenure-holder or an

under-tenure holder”. Thus, a pre-requisite of such a tenancy is that the

land has to be held under a person superior in hierarchy of land tenure

holders. Again, from the definition of the said term in the 1949 Act, it is

seen that payment of rent is a prerequisite to establish non-agricultural

19

tenancy. Section 2(5) of the 1949 Act stipulates that a non-agricultural

tenant is a person who holds a land under another person and is liable to

pay rent.

64. Although the 1953 Act defines “non-agricultural tenant”, the definition of

“intermediary”, whose property would vest under the 1953 Act, excludes by

implication non-agricultural tenants from the purview of “intermediary”,

since an intermediary above a non-agricultural tenant would only qualify as

“intermediary” under the 1953 Act. Thus, the term “non-agricultural tenant”

in the 1953 Act has only been defined in such limited context, whereas the

genesis of the term lies in the 1949 Act, which, for the first time, recognized

such status of land holders. Hence, in order to ascertain the true purport of

the term “non-agricultural tenant”, we are to look at the definition of the

term in the 1949 Act. In fact, the writ petitioner cannot claim better title

than its vendor, which was admittedly carrying on business as owner in the

subject plots of land from prior to coming into force of the 1953 Act. Thus,

for the writ petitioner to acquire the status of “non-agricultural tenant”, its

predecessor-in-interest already had to have such status under the 1949 Act

regime in the first place.

65. As discussed above, in order to be a “non-agricultural tenant” under the

1949 Act, two foundational criteria are to be met:

(i) The land has to be held under another person; and

(ii) Rent has to payable to such person for the land.

66. The requirement to hold under another person, as stipulated in the 1949

Act, is retained in the definition of the said term even under the 1953

statute. Although the 1953 Act definition does not specifically incorporate

20

the criterion of payment of rent, such requirement was a sine qua non in the

1949 Act, during which regime the petitioner’s predecessor -in-interest

originally held the land.

67. In the present case, not a single rent receipt or any other document has

been produced by the pe titioner to show that the petitioner or its

predecessor-in-interest has held the land under a superior lessor or have

ever paid any rent in respect of the subject lands. Rather, the purchase

deed of the petitioner clearly shows that the petitioner purchased

ownership/proprietary rights from its predecessor, and not tenancy rights.

68. We also take note from the materials on record that, in respect of some of

the plots which are the subject-matter of the present lis, the terms “Malik”

and “Lakheraj” have been used to define the status of the appellant and its

predecessor-in-interest. As per the Guide and Glossary to Survey and

Settlement Records in Bengal, 1917, relied on by the State, the expression

‘Malik’, means ‘proprietor’, whereas “Lakehraj” (alternatively, “Lakhiraj”)

means “rent-free” or “revenue-free”. Thus, the use of the said expressions

also go on to indicate that the appellant and its predecessor had proprietary

rights, as opposed to non-agricultural tenancy rights, in respect of at least

some of the subject-plots.

69. Continuing with the discussion on whether a “Dakhalkar”, per se, means

“non-agricultural tenant”, the appellant has cited certain judgments in

support of such proposition. However, the said reports do not come to the

aid of the appellant.

21

70. In Asrurekha Dutta (supra)

6

, the Court observed that a “Dakhalkar” holding

on the basis of pattah and paying rent is a non-agricultural tenant. Hence,

the expression “Dakhalkar” was interpreted in the context of payment of

rent to a superior land tenure-holder to mean non-agricultural tenant.

Hence, the expression “Dakhalkar”, which literally means “occupant”, per se

need not necessarily mean “non-agricultural tenant”. Whereas all non-

agricultural tenants may potentially be recorded as “Dakhalkars” in the

RoR, the converse is not true, that is, all “Dakhalkars” are not necessarily

non-agricultural tenants. As opposed to the facts of Asrurekha Dutta

(supra)

6

, in the present case, not a scrap of document has been produced to

indicate that the appellant or its predecessor had ever paid rent or held the

subject-plots under a superior lessor. Hence, the said judgment does not

support the appellant’s contention.

71. In Shibsankar Nandy (supra)

7

as well, the concerned person was observed to

hold under a lease, thus bringing the said person within the purview of the

term ‘non-agricultural tenant’. Contrary thereto, in the present case, it has

not been proved that the appellant or its predecessor ever held the subject

plots under a lease. Rather, the purchase deed of the appellant clearly

shows that it was the ownership rights of its predecessor that was

transferred to the appellant.

72. Again, in Abhijit Tie Up (P) Ltd. (supra)

8

, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court

had merely held that non-agricultural tenants have been kept outside the

purview of the 1953 Act. There is no quarrel with such proposition at all.

6

Asrurekha Dutta vs. Diptimay Pal and Anr., reported at 1966 SCC OnLine Cal 110

7

Shibsankar Nandy vs. Prabartak Sangha and Ors., reported at AIR 1967 SC 940

8

Abhijit Tie UP (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., reported at 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 3064

22

However, the question is whether the appellant in the present case was at

all a non-agricultural tenant.

73. In Nikhil Chandra Sanyal (supra)

9

, the facts of the case, as reflected from the

judgment, were that rent was initially payable and was subsequently

redeemed by remission to pay future rent upon payment of a lump -sum

amount. It was also held that the land was in the nature of khas mahal, the

Government standing on the footing of a proprietor. In the present case,

however, no case of any rent being payable by the appellant has been made

out.

74. On the other hand, in WPLRT 26 of 2013 [Prabir Sen & Ors. v. State of WB &

Ors.], a co-ordinate Bench of this Court held that the person concerned was

a “Dakhaldar”, whereas there was nothing to show that he was a tenant

under the State. As such, the case of non -agricultural tenancy was

disbelieved by the Court, thereby lending support to the proposition that

merely by being recorded as a “Dakhaldar” / “Dakhalkar”, a person does not

become a non-agricultural tenant automatically.

75. In Kinuram Sadhukhan and anr. v. Hazi Md. Yusuf and anr. , reported at

1958 SCC OnLine Cal 138, a Division Bench of this Court was considering

whether the concerned persons were non-agricultural tenants. However, the

said judgment did not lay down any proposition of law apt in the context of

the present case. The Division Bench, in the facts of the said case, observed

that whereas, according to the definition of non-agricultural tenancy, the

land must by itself constitute an independent unit of tenancy, in the said

case, it was not proved that the plots which were held by the person were

9

Nikhil Chandra Sanyal v. Khirodabala Nag, reported at 1979 SCC OnLine Cal 158

23

exclusively related to non-agricultural land. In view of there being no

segregation between non-agricultural and agricultural lands held, the non-

agricultural land was held, by itself, not to constitute the subject-matter of a

separate tenancy and was found to be merely a fraction of lands held partly

for agricultural and partly for non-agricultural purposes, in which context it

was observed that the tenant holding such a land cannot be said to be a

non-agricultural tenant. Thus, the said judgment, cited by the State, is not

germane for the present consideration.

76. However, on a composite reading of the ratio laid down in the above

judgments as well as on an independent interpretation on the concerned

provision, as discussed above, it is clear that the foundational prerequisites

of a non-agricultural tenancy, being that the concerned person is a lessee

under a superior lessor and paid rent, have not been established at all

insofar as the present appellant and its predecessor-in-interest are

concerned. Rather, the purchase deed of the appellant shows that t he

proprietary/ownership rights were transferred to the appellant.

77. Thus, the appellant does not come within the purview of ‘non-agricultural

tenancy’, to claim exemption from the operation of vesting under the 1953

Act.

78. The appellant seeks to rely on a Circular, bearing Memo No. 6/4735/C/92

dated September 14, 1994, to argue that a “Dakhalkar” is a non-agricultural

tenant. However, as held in O.P. Lather (supra)

10

and DDA (supra)

11

, if there

is a conflict between Executive instruction and statutory provisions, the

latter will prevail. Thus, the aforesaid Government Circular, being

10

O.P. Lather and others v. Satish Kumar Kakkar and others, reported at (2001) 3 SCC 110

11

DDA and others v. Joginder S. Monga and others, reported at (2004) 2 SCC 297

24

administrative in nature, cannot override the provisions of the 1953 Act

and, thus, is irrelevant for the present consideration.

79. In the light of the above findings, we come to the conclusion that the

appellant’s argument that it is excluded from the operation of the 1953 Act,

on the ground that it is a non-agricultural tenant, cannot be accepted in

view of the essential tests of a non-agricultural tenancy not being satisfied

by the appellant.

80. As held above, since the concerned lands were retained as

mill/factory/workshop under Section 6 (1) (g), read with Section 6 (3), of the

1953 Act, the conversion order permitting user of the land for other purpose

was palpably without jurisdiction; thus, a nullity.

81. In view of the above, the learned Tribunal was justified in holding that the

order of conversion passed in favour of the appellant under Section 4(c) of

the 1955 Act was a nullity, being without jurisdiction in view of the land

having been originally retained under Section 6(3) of the 1953 Act for the

specific purpose of operating a factory/mill thereon and not being amenable

to conversion.

82. Consequentially, the prayer of the appellant to correct the LR Records of

Rights, in respect of the subject-land on the basis of the conversion order

dated January 2, 2018, was rightly dismissed by the learned Tribunal.

83. Thus, the present writ petition fails.

84. Accordingly, W.P.L.R.T. No. 137 of 2026 is dismissed on contest, thereby

affirming the impugned judgment dated March 18, 2026, passed by the

Fourth Bench, West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, in OA No.

1608 of 2024 (LRTT).

25

85. There will be no order as to costs.

86. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

87. Urgent photostat certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties

upon compliance of all formalities.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Sandip Kumar De, J.)