2025 INSC 619 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5245 OF 2024

SHANMUGAM @ LAKSHMINARAYANAN …. APPELLANT

VERSUS

HIGH COURT OF MADR AS .... RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4219 OF 2024

M. MURUGANANDAM …. APPELLANT

VERSUS

HIGH COURT OF MADR AS

THROUGH THE REGISTRAR GENERAL .... RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ______ OF 2025

(@ Crl. A. Diary No. 45480 of 2024)

S. AMAL RAJ …. APPELLANT

2

VERSUS

HIGH COURT OF MADR AS ...RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

Appeal arising out of Criminal Appeal Diary No. 45480 of

2024 is admitted.

2. The three appellants before us namely, Shanmugam @

Lakshminarayanan in Criminal Appeal N o. 5245 of 2024

(Contemnor No. 4 before the High Court), M. Muruganandam in

Criminal Appeal No. 4219 of 2024 (Contemnor No. 3 before the

High Court) and S. Amal Raj in Criminal Appeal arising out of

Criminal Appeal Diary No. 45480 of 20 24 (Contemnor No. 7

before the High Court) stand convicted by the High Court for

committing contempt of Court and have been sentenced to

undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. The

appellants have called in question the legality and validity of

the judgment and order of the High Court in the present

appeals.

3

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The District Munsiff Court, Tiruchengode passed a decree

dated 17.11.2004 in O.S. No. 212 of 2000 in favour of J.K.K.

Rangammal Charitable Trust

1

ordering recovery of possession

and arrears of rent from the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3 . The

Contemnors preferred appeal suits which were dismissed. The

Decree Holder preferred Execution Petition and when the Court

Amin went to execute the decree to effect delivery of

possession on 17.04.2018 the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3 produced

interim orders passed by the High Court of Madras in C.R.P.

Nos. 1467 – 1469 of 2018 staying the decree.

3.1. The Decree Holder applied and obtained the copies of

the said orders produced by the Contemnors in Execution

Petition Nos. 14, 17 and 18 of 2014 and also entered caveat

before the High Court. On verification, it was found, the said

orders produced before the Execution Court were fraudulently

created by committing forgery and impersonation in the name

of the Judge of the High Court of Madras.

1

“Decree Holder”

4

3.2. The Decree Holder submitted a complaint to the High

Court and Superintendent of Police, Namakkal District on

03.05.2018 and 15.05.2018 respectively. The Registrar

General, High Court, forwarded the complaint to the

Superintendent of Police, Namakkal on 18.07.2018.

The Decree Holder then preferred W.P. No. 22410 of 2018

before the High Court to direct the Superintendent of Police,

Namakkal to take action on the complaint dated 15.05.2018. In

the meanwhile, First Information Report in Crime No. 8 of 2018

was registered by the District Crime Branch, Namakkal for

offences under Sections 466, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860

2

against the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 3 /Judgment

Debtors. The writ petition was disposed of on 05.09.2018

directing the registry to place the matter before the Division

Bench, dealing with the criminal contempt matters, after

obtaining necessary orders from the Hon’ble Chief Justice, for

the Division Bench to proceed with the matter in terms of

Section 15 (1) read with Section 18 (1) of the Contempt of

Courts Act, 1971. The Superintendent of Police, Namakkal

2

‘IPC’

5

District, was also directed to monitor the investigation in DCB

Crime No. 8 of 2018.

3.3. On 10.09.2018, the Contemnor No. 4/Shanmugam @

Lakshminarayanan

3

was arrested by the District Crime Branch,

Namakkal and he made a statement about the manner in which

the fake order copies were prepared with the help of

Contemnor No. 6/P. Meiyappan

4

in a Digital Net Centre at

Bhavani.

3.4. On 11.09.2018, Contemnor No. 3/M. Muruganandam

5

was arrested. He disclosed the manner in which the fraudulent

order copies were obtained by the C ontemnor No. 4 and

Contemnor No. 7 . The District Crime Br anch, Namkkal

completed the investigation and submitted a report on

14.08.2019 in C.C. No. 537 of 2020 before the Judicial

Magistrate, Komarapalayam against the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 5.

3.5. On account of the case bundle relating to W.P. No.

22410 of 2018 missing in the Registry, the criminal contempt

was not numbered from 2018 to 2022 . On the Division Bench

being informed regularly, the bundle was traced, and the

3

‘C4’

4

‘C6’

5

‘C3’

6

contempt petition was numbered as 2493 of 2022 . Initially,

statutory notice was issued to the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 5 and

thereafter to the Contemnor No. 6 and Contemnor No. 7 when

they were also found to be involved in the process of

preparation of the fake order of the High Court. Since the

Contemnor nos. 1 and 2 died during proceedings, the same

stood abated against them.

3.6. The Division Bench framed charges against

Contemnor Nos. 1, 3, 4 & 5 on 19.12.2022 to the following

effect:

“Since S. Sundaram (2nd contemnor) has died, no

charge could be framed against him.

2.That, you, Angamuthu (1

st

contemnor),

Muruganandam (3

rd

contemnor), Shanmugam @

Lakshminarayanan (4th contemnor) and

Thangamani (5th contemnor) along with the

deceased Sundaram submitted the photocopies of

the following three fake orders of this Court, all

dated 12.03.2018 to the bailiff, when he came for

executing the decree as set out above.

i.C.R.P.No.1467 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2038 of 2018

ii.C.R.P.No.1468 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2039 of

2018 and

iii.C.R.P.No.1469 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2040 of

2018

The above three orders appear to have been

passed by Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa

Sathyanarayana on 12.03.2018, whereas, the

records of the Registry show that no such Civil

7

Revision Petitions were even filed, and the said

Hon'ble Judge was not holding the C.R.P. roster on

12.03.2018 and therefore, it is evident that these

three orders have been fabricated.”

3.7. Basing the affidavits filed by the Contemnor Nos. 1

and 3 to 5, during pendency of the contempt proceedings, the

High Court suo motu impleaded Contemnor Nos. 6 & 7 on the

ground that the material available on record including the police

report revealed that these two contemnors are also involved in

the preparation and handing over of the fake High Court’s

orders to the litigants, Contemnor Nos. 3 and 5. Accordingly,

charges were framed by the High Court on 16.04.2024 against

the Contemnor Nos. 6 & 7 as under:

“That, you, P. Meiyappan (6th contemnor) and S.

Amal Raj (7th contemnor) along with Contemnor

Nos.3 to 5, including the deceased, P. Angamuthu

and S. Sundaram, created fake orders of this

Court, all dated 12.03.2018 and aided in producing

it to the bailiff, when he came for executing the

decree as set out in the order dated 19.12.2022:

i. C.R.P.No. 1467 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2038 of

2018

ii.C.R.P.No.1468 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2039 of

2018 and

iii.C.R.P.No.1469 of 2018 and C.M.P.No.2040 of

2018

The above three orders appear to have been

passed by Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Pushpa

Sathyanarayana on 12.03.2018, whereas, the

records of the Registry show that no such Civil

8

Revision Petitions were even filed and the said

Hon'ble Judge was not holding the C.R.P. roster on

12.03.2018 and therefore, it is evident that these

three orders have been fabricated.

The above act of yours prima facie attracts Section

2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which

is punishable under Section 12, ibid., in that, by

submitting the aforesaid three photocopies of the

orders of this Court, you have interfered with the

administration of justice, in the execution of

proceedings before the District Munsif,

Tiruchengode”

3.8. The Contemnor Nos. 3 and 5 preferred Crl. O.P. No.

17492 of 2023 for reinvestigation/fresh investigation of the

crime registered against them. The Division Bench passed an

order on 21.09.2023 directing the DGP to form a Special Team

whereupon the DGP transferred the investigation to CBCID

(OCU) and renumbered as Crime No. 2 of 2023. A detailed

investigation was carried out by CBCID, and voluminous

incriminating materials were collected against the Contemnor

Nos. 4 to 6.

3.9. P. Meiyappan/Contemnor No. 6

6

and S. Amal

Raj/Contemnor No. 7

7

were also arrested by the CBCID. The

statement of two witnesses namely, Thangaraj and Shanthi was

recorded under Section 164(5) of Cr. P. C. before the Judicial

6

‘C6’

7

‘C7’

9

Magistrate No. II, Namakkal. Sample voices of C3 and C4 were

also recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Namakkal for

comparison with the cell phone conversation held between

them. CBCID filed first status report in the contempt petition on

18.10.2023 and also verified the record relating to C.R.P. Nos.

1467 – 1469 of 2018. The material objects were recovered

from the Digital Net Centre, Bhavani and sent to the Tamil

Nadu Forensic Science Laboratory

8

. The CBCID filed second

status report in the contempt petition on 19.12.2023 and

thereafter third status report was filed on 12.02.2024. Basing

above status reports, C6 & C7 were impleaded .

3.10. In his affidavit in response to the contempt notice,

the C3 admitted that in the Execution case he and other

tenants were guided by C4 to prefer revision before the High

Court. According to him, the Judgment Debtor , in three suits,

paid a sum of Rs. 15,000/- for preferring revision. On the

relevant date his wife handed over the copy of bogus interim

order to the Court Amin which was given to him by C4 through

one Mr. P. Meiyappan. He categorically states that since C4 was

handling his case for the last two decades , there was no

8

‘FSL’

10

occasion to doubt the genuineness of the High Court order.

When he contacted C4, he stated that one Mr. Thangapandian,

advocate had given the said order to him. This conversation

was recorded in the automated Samsung android phone . He

had given transcript of the conversation between him and C4 to

the police along with the certificate under Section 65-B (4) of

the Evidence Act, 1872.

3.11. The High Court after considering the materials and

the submissions made by the appellants found that the three

appellants are responsible in preparation of the bogus High

Court interim orders and have accordingly sentenced them to

undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The High Court

found that the Contemnor Nos. 1 and 2 are also involved but

since they have died, the case stood abated against them.

Insofar as C6 is concerned, the High Court has given him the

benefit of doubt.

SUBMISSIONS

4. Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned senior counsel and Mr. S.

Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellants/contemnors would submit that the initiation of

11

contempt against the appellant/contemnors is barred by

limitation in view of the provisions contained in Section 20 of

Contempt of Court Acts, 1971. It is also argued that formal

charges are not framed against the appellants/contemnors

without which contempt cannot proceed . It is vehemently

argued that standard of proof in a criminal contempt is the

same as required in a criminal case, therefore, the High Court

has erred in holding that standard of strict proof is not required

for conviction in a contempt matter. It is lastly submitted that

the High Court having given benefit of doubt to C6 and has

acquitted Contemnor No. 5, wife of the C3, the same yardstick

should have been applied against the appellant/C3 and thus, he

deserves to be acquitted.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/High Court

and Intervenor/Decree Holder have supported the impugned

order. According to them, the present appellants have been

found involved in creation of forged High Court order which

have rightly been dealt with by the High Court by punishing

them for committing contempt of Court. It is submitted that

when the contempt proceedings are drawn suo motu by the

High Court the law of limitation is not attracted. There being

12

sufficient material against the appellants/contemnors, it is not

a case where they have been found guilty and sentenced on

the basis of probabilities, but it is a case of cogent material

available against them.

ANALYSIS

6. The High Court has recorded the finding of guilt

against the appellants/contemnors on the basis of the report

filed by CBCID and the affidavits filed by the appellants in

response to the statutory notice issued against them. The

report of the CBCID was in turn founded on the statement of

witnesses as well as telephonic conversations held between C3

and C4 as also between C6 and C4. It has also come on record

that C4 has forwarded the format for the preparation of fake

stay order copies received from the advocate Thangapandian

through P. Meiyappan’s email. Thereafter, C4 prepared the fake

stay order copies and handed over the same to the accused,

Thangamani, Sundaram and Angamuthu through P. M eiyappan.

C4 further stated in his confession statement to the CBCID that

Contemnor No. 7/S. Amal Raj

9

is the person who floated the

9

‘C7’

13

idea of preparing the forged High Court stay orders. The

properties were seized from the Digital Net Centre, Bhavani

where the fake stay orders were prepared and the same were

sent to the FSL. The High Court has extracted the report of the

FSL in para 30 of the impugned order. Moreover, C3 in his

affidavit has alleged that C4 was the person who guided them

throughout in the litigation and it was he (C4) who handed over

fake orders through P. Meiyappan. Paragraph Nos. 12, 13, 15 &

16 of his affidavit have been reproduced by the High Court

which clearly supports the finding recorded by the High Court.

Thus, the case against the appellants/ C3, C4 & C7 for

committing contempt has been found proved by the High Court

on the basis of cogent and reliable material available on record

and the same is recorded after considering their stand taken in

the affidavit.

7. Having deeply scrutinised the material, we are satisfied

that the finding recorded by the High Court does not suffer

from any illegality or perversity. The present is not a case

where it is not known as to who produced the fake interim

orders of the High Court or who prepared the same. The chain

14

of events emerging from 18.04.2018 onwards, when the fake

orders were presented at the time when the bailiff tried to

effect delivery of possession, have been found established. As a

matter of fact, C3 admits that he submitted the fake orders

before the Court Amin. From the conversation recorded

between C3 and C4 as produced before the CBCID and as

mentioned in the affidavits, clearly accuses that it was C4 who

was responsible for handing over the orders through P

Meiyappan. It was C7 who floated the idea of preparing the

forged orders. Thus, all three appellants/contemnors have

rightly been convicted.

8. The sole object of the Court wielding its power to punish

for contempt is always for maintaining the purity of

administration of justice. Nothing is more incumbent upon the

courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being

misrepresented, nor is there anything more pernicious when

the order of the court is forged and produced to gain undue

advantage. A misleading or a wrong statement deliberately and

wilfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a

favourable order would undoubtedly tantamount to interference

with the due course of judicial proceedings. When a person is

15

found to have utilised an order of a court which he or she

knows to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons who are

not entitled to the same, the very utilisation of the fabricated

order by the person concerned would be sufficient to hold

him/her guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact whether he

or she himself or herself is the author of fabrication. [See: In

Re: Bineet Kumar Singh

10

). Thus, C3, who is the beneficiary

of the fake interim orders is rightly held guilty of contempt.

9. In re: “Vinay Chandra Mishra”

11

, this Court has

held that the Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law and the

duty to protect the same is apart from the function of

adjudicating the disputes between the parties and it is for this

purpose that the courts are entrusted with the extraordinary

power of punishing those who indulge in acts whether inside or

outside the courts, which tend to undermine their authority and

bring them in disrepute and disrespect by scandalising them

and obstructing them from discharging their duties without fear

or favour.

10

(2001) 5 SCC 501

11

(1995) 2 SCC 584

16

10. It has been argued by learned senior counsel for the

appellants that they were not given proper opportunity to

defend, inasmuch as, the charges were not framed against

them in a formal manner nor explained to them. This argument

deserves to be rejected at the outset in view of the settled

proposition in “Vinay Chandra Mishra”(supra) in the

following words:

“26.……….The criminal contempt of court

undoubtedly amounts to an offence but it is an

offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the

procedure adopted both under the common law

and the statute law even in this country has always

been summary. However, the fact that the process

is summary does not mean that the procedural

requirement, viz., that an opportunity of meeting

the charge, is denied to the contemner. The degree

of precision with which the charge may be stated

depends upon the circumstances. So long as the

gist of the specific allegations is made clear or

otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific

allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate

the charge in a specific allegation. The consensus

of opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike

is that despite the objection that the Judge deals

with the contempt himself and the contemner has

little opportunity to defend himself, there is a

residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to

punish on the spot, but it is the only realistic way

of dealing with certain offenders. This procedure

does not offend against the principle of natural

justice, viz., nemo judex in sua causa since the

prosecution is not aimed at protecting the Judge

personally but protecting the administration of

17

justice. The threat of immediate punishment is the

most effective deterrent against misconduct. The

Judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of

the case and he must be able to take steps to

restore order as early and quickly as possible. The

time factor is crucial. Dragging out the contempt

proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the

main proceedings which paralyses the court for a

time and indirectly impedes the speed and

efficiency with which justice is administered.

Instant justice can never be completely

satisfactory, yet it does provide the simplest, most

effective and least unsatisfactory method of dealing

with disruptive conduct in court. So long as the

contemner's interests are adequately safeguarded

by giving him an opportunity of being heard in his

defence, even summary procedure in the case of

contempt in the face of the court is commended

and not faulted.”

11. Much emphasis was laid by the appellants taking

shelter under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

12

to raise the plea of limitation. It was submitted that the

contempt proceedings should have been initiated within one

year from the date of production of the fake interim orders i.e.

18.04.2018. However, the notice was issued after four years in

the year 2022 and as such entire proceeding is barred by

12

“1971 Act”

18

limitation. Reliance is placed on “Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian

& Ors.”

13

12. In “Pritam Pal vs. High Court of Madhya

Pradesh, Jabalpur, through Registrar ”

14

the following is

held:

“15. Prior to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,

it was held that the High Court has inherent power

to deal with a contempt of itself summarily and to

adopt its own procedure, provided that it gives a

fair and reasonable opportunity to the contemnor

to defend himself. But the procedure has now been

prescribed by Section 15 of the Act in exercise of

the powers conferred by Entry 14, List III of the

Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Though the

contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the

High Court can be regulated by legislation by

appropriate legislature under Entry 77 of List I and

Entry 14 of List III in exercise of which the

Parliament has enacted the Act of 1971, the

contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the

High Court is given a constitutional foundation by

declaring to be ‘Courts of Record’ under Articles

129 and 215 of the Constitution and, therefore, the

inherent power of the Supreme Court and the High

Court cannot be taken away by any legislation

short of constitutional amendment. In fact, Section

22 of the Act lays down that the provisions of this

Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of

the provisions of any other law relating to

contempt of courts. It necessarily follows that the

constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and

the High Court under Articles 129 and 215 cannot

be curtailed by anything in the Act of 1971. The

above position of law has been well settled by this

13

(2001) 7 SCC 549

14

(1993) Supp (1) SCC 529

19

Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and

Judges of the PEPSU High Court [(1953) 2 SCC

571]holding thus:

“In any case, so far as contempt of a High

Court itself is concerned, as distinct from one of a

subordinate court, the Constitution vests these

rights in every High Court, so no Act of a

legislature could take away that jurisdiction and

confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority.”

24. From the above judicial pronouncements of

this Court, it is manifestly clear that the power of

the Supreme Court and the High Court being the

Courts of Record as embodied under Articles 129

and 215 respectively cannot be restricted and

trammelled by any ordinary legislation including

the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and

their inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not

subjected to any limit. It would be appropriate, in

this connection, to refer certain English authorities

dealing with the power of the superior court as

Courts of Record.

37. The power under Articles 129 and 215 is a

summary power as held in the cases of Sukhdev

Singh Sodhi, C.K. Daphtary and in Hira Lal

Dixit v. State of U.P.

38. Peacock, C.J. laid down the rule quite

broadly in the following words in Abdool, Re:

[(1867) 8 WR Cr 32, 33)

“[T]here can be no doubt that every court of

record has the power of summarily punishing for

contempt.”

42. If we examine the facts of the present

case in the backdrop of the proposition of law,

the contentions raised by the appellant

challenging the procedure followed by the

High Court do not merit any consideration

since the appellant has been served with a

notice of contempt and thereafter permitted

to go through the records and finally has been

afforded a fair opportunity of putting forth his

explanation for the charge levelled against

20

him. Incidentally, we may say that the

submission of the contemnor that the

impugned order is vitiated on the ground of

procedural irregularities and that Article 215

of the Constitution of India is to be read in

conjunction with the provisions of Sections 15

and 17 of the Act of 1971, cannot be

countenanced and it has to be summarily

rejected as being devoid of any merit. ”

(Emphasis supplied)

13. A three Judge Bench of this Court in “Pallav Sheth”

(supra) has held thus:

“30. There can be no doubt that both this Court

and High Courts are courts of record, and the

Constitution has given them the powers to punish

for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly

show that this power cannot be abrogated or

stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and

Article 215 is absolute, can thereby any legislation

indicating the manner and to the extent that the

power can be exercised? If there is any provision

of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power

under Article 129 and/or Article 215, there can be

little doubt that such law would not be regarded

as having been validly enacted. It, however,

appears to us that providing for the quantum of

punishment or what may or may not be regarded

as acts of contempt or even providing for a period

of limitation for initiating proceedings for

contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which

abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction

under Article 129 or Article 215 of the

Constitution.

33. The question which squarely arises is as to

what is the meaning to be given to the expression

“no court shall initiate any proceedings for

21

contempt …” occurring in Section 20 of the 1971

Act. Section 20 deals not only with criminal

contempt but also with civil contempt. It applies

not only to the contempt committed in the face of

the High Court or the Supreme Court but would

also be applicable in the case of contempt of the

subordinate court. The procedure which is to be

followed in each of these cases is different.

41. One of the principles underlying the law of

limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and

not sleep over its rights. In this background such

an interpretation should be placed on Section 20

of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous

result causing hardship to the party who may

have acted with utmost diligence and because of

the inaction on the part of the court, a contemner

cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the

section in the manner canvassed by Mr

Venugopal would mean that the court wo uld

be rendered powerless to punish even

though it may be fully convinced of the

blatant nature of the contempt having been

committed and the same having been

brought to the notice of the court soon after

the committal of the contempt and within the

period of one year of the same. Section 20,

therefore, has to be construed in a manner

which would avoid such an anomaly and

hardship both as regards the litigants as also

by placing a pointless fetter on the part of

the court to punish for its contempt. An

interpretation of Section 20, like the one

canvassed by the appellant, which would

render the constitutional power of the courts

nugatory in taking action for contempt even

in cases of gross contempt, successfully

hidden for a period of one year by practising

fraud by the contemner would render Section

20 as liable to be regarded as being in

conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215.

22

Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be

avoided.

(Emphasis supplied)

42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal case to

the effect that initiation of proceedings under

Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when

the court formed the prima facie opinion that

contempt has been committed and issued notice to

the contemner to show cause why it should not be

punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20

which does not seem to be warranted and is not

only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate

injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be

interpreted having regard to the realities of

the situation. (Emphasis supplied) For

instance, in a case where a contempt of a

subordinate court is committed, a report is

prepared whether on an application to court or

otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate

court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a

High Court can take further action under Section

15. In the process, more often than not, a period of

one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20

put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would

mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate

court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied

that contempt has been committed the High Court

would become powerless to take any action. On

the other hand, if the filing of an application

before the subordinate court or the High

Court, making of a reference by a subordinate

court on its own motion or the filing of an

application before an Advocate -General for

permission to initiate contempt proceedings is

regarded as initiation by the court for the

purposes of Section 20, then such an

interpretation would not impinge on or

stultify the power of the High Court to punish

for contempt which power, dehors the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in

Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an

interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise

23

that section with the powers of the courts to

punish for contempt which is recognised by

the Constitution.

(Emphasis supplied)

44. Action for contempt is divisible into two

categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the

court and that instituted otherwise than on the

court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each

case would necessarily be different. While in the

case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself

which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the

other cases initiation can only be by a party filing

an application. In our opinion, therefore, the

proper construction to be placed on Section

20 must be that actio n must be initiated,

either by filing of an application or by the

court issuing notice suo motu, within a

period of one year from the date on which

the contempt is alleged to have been

committed.

(Emphasis supplied)

46. The record discloses that the Custodian

received information of the appellant having

committed contempt by taking over benami

concerns, transferring funds to these concerns

and operating their accounts clandestinely only

from a letter dated 5-5-1998 from the Income Tax

Authorities. It is soon thereafter that on 18-6-

1998, a petition was filed for initiating action in

contempt and notice issued by the Special Court

on 9-4-1999. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,

1963 provides that where any special or local law

prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a

period of limitation different from the period

prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of

Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the

period prescribed by the Schedule and for the

purpose of determining any period of limitation

prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by

24

any special or local law, the provisions contained

in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar

as, and to the extent to which, they are not

expressly excluded by such special or local law.

This Court in the case of Kartick Chandra Das has

held that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with

Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands

prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of

the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in

consequence thereof the provisions of Sections 4

to 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted.

47. Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia,

provides that where, in the case of any suit or

application for which a period of limitation is

prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right

or title on which a suit or application is founded is

concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his

agent [Section 17(1)(b)] or where any document

necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or

the applicant has been fraudulently concealed

from him [Section 17(1)(d)], the period of

limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff

or the applicant has discovered the fraud or the

mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have

discovered it; or in the case of a concealed

document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first

had the means of producing the concealed

document or compelling its production. These

provisions embody fundamental principles of

justice and equity viz. that a party should not be

penalised for failing to adopt legal proceedings

when the facts or material necessary for him to do

so have been wilfully concealed from him and also

that a party who has acted fraudulently should not

gain the benefit of limitation running in his favour

by virtue of such fraud.

48. The provisions of Section 17 of the

Limitation Act are applicable in the present case.

The fraud perpetuated by the appellant was

unearthed only on the Custodian receiving

25

information from the Income Tax Department,

vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming

aware of the fraud, application for initiating

contempt proceedings was filed on 18 -6-

1998, well within the period of limitation

prescribed by Section 20. It is on this

application that the Special Court by its order

of 9-4-1999 directed the application to be

treated as a show -cause notice to the

appellant to punish him for contempt.

(Emphasis supplied) In view of the abovestated

facts and in the light of the discussion regarding

the correct interpretation of Section 20 of the

Contempt of Courts Act, it follows that the action

taken by the Special Court to punish the appellant

for contempt was valid. The Special Court has only

faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the

sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under

the circumstances, to examine the finding of the

Special Court that this was a continuing wrong or

contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was

not barred by Section 20.”

14. While the appellants have referred to para 44 of

“Pallav Sheth”(supra), the respondent has relied upon

paragraph nos. 30, 41 & 42. Upon reading of the entire

judgment in the matter of “Pallav Sheth” (supra), it is clearly

depicted that the contempt action must be initiated either by

filing of an application or by the Court issuing notice suo motu

within a period of one year from the date on which the

contempt is alleged to have been committed. The originating

point for calculating the period of limitation has been

26

interpreted in para 42 of Pallav Sheth which is reproduced

again at the cost of repetition.

“ 42………………..On the other hand, if the filing of

an application before the subordinate court or the

High Court, making of a reference by a

subordinate court on its own motion or the filing

of an application before an Advocate-General for

permission to initiate contempt proceedings is

regarded as initiation by the court for the

purposes of Section 20, then such an

interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the

power of the High Court to punish for contempt

which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act,

1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the

Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20

would harmonise that section with the powers of

the courts to punish for contempt which is

recognised by the Constitution.”

Thus, in view of the law laid down by this Court in paras

42 and 44 of “Pallav Sheth” (supra), it is to be seen as to

when the application was preferred by the respondent/Decree

Holder for initiation of action against the appellants. The

present contempt proceeding has its root in WP No. 22410 of

2018 preferred by the Trust/Decree Holder. This writ petition

was preferred on 20.08.2018 i.e. immediately after four months

from 17.04.2018 when the fake orders were produced before

the Court Amin. In this writ petition, prayer was made to

initiate action against the respondents for committing act of

27

forgery and fraudulent creation of bogus orders in the name of

the High Court. When the matter was posted before the learned

Single Judge it was informed by the Registry that the matter

was placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice on the

administrative side and the Hon’ble Chief Justice has directed

police investigation in this case. Accordingly, the Deputy

Registrar, High Court of Madras gave a complaint to the

Superintendent of Police, Namakkal Division for investigation

and eventually Crime No. 8 of 2018 was registered in District

Crime Branch, Namakkal Division on 04.09.2018. When the

matter was placed before the learned Single Judge on

05.09.2018, the Court was of the prima facie opinion that

despite registration of FIR further action needs to be taken for

initiation of contempt proceedings under the Act, 1971, as

there is prima facie material to show that criminal contempt

has been committed. The jurisdiction to proceed for criminal

contempt being with the Division Bench, the learned Single

Judge of the High Court directed the Registry to place th e

matter before the Division Bench dealing with the criminal

contempt matters, after obtaining necessary orders from

Hon’ble the Chief Justice, for the Division Bench to proceed with

28

the matter in terms of Section 15(1) read with Section 18(1) of

the Act, 1971. Thus, it is this date i.e. 05.09.2018 when the

contempt proceedings were drawn by the High Court though

actual notice was issued later on by the Division Bench in the

year 2022. Significantly, it requires special reference that for

about 4 years the case bundle of WP No. 22410 of 2018 was

missing in the Registry of the High Court. On repeated

information/request by the Decree Holder the bundle was

traced, and the contempt case was registered in 2022.

However, it does not mean that the contempt was initiated in

the year 2022.

15. It is significant to notice that the case bundle of writ

petition in the High Court was misplaced in the registry of the

High Court so as to render the High Court powerless to punish

for contempt even though it may be fully convinced of the

blatant nature of the contempt and the same having been

brought to the notice of the Court within one year from the

date of commission of contempt. Such situation was clearly

foresighted by this Court in “ Pallav Sheth”(supra), by

observing in para 41 that Section 20 of the Act, 1971 ,

29

therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid

such an anomaly and eventually concluded that the date of

initiation of suo motu contempt action is regarded as the

initiation by the Court for the purpose of Section 20. Therefore,

in the case in hand, initiation of contempt action shall be

treated to have been taken on 05.09.2018 when the learned

Single Judge dealing with the writ petition so directed and this

date being within one year from 17.04.2018 when the fake

orders were presented before the Court Amin , we are of the

considered view that the present contempt action was not

barred by limitation.

16. Another submission of learned senior counsel for the

appellants is that the High Court has proceeded on an

assumption that the standard of strict proof required to convict

a person under the penal law need not be considered whereas

in Khushi Ram vs. Sheo Vati & Anr.

15

, it is held that the

charge of contempt of court partakes of the nature of a criminal

charge and it must be established beyond all reasonable doubt.

Basing above, it is argued that the charge having not proved

beyond all reasonable doubt, the appellants cannot be

15

(1953) 1 SCC 726

30

punished. However, the present is a case where the High Court

has initiated suo motu contempt on proved and admitted facts

that C3 produced fake interim orders of the High Court and the

same were prepared by C4 & C7. Despite observation by the

High Court, we are of the view that present is a case where it is

established beyond all reasonable doubt that the present

appellants/contemnors have either used or created fake High

Court interim orders. It is not a case of mere probability of

commission of offence rather it is a proved case of commission

of offence. Creating fake orders of the Court is one of the most

dreaded acts of contempt of court. It not only thwarts the

administration of justice, but it has inbuilt intention by

committing forgery of record. Therefore, the charge of

contempt is fully proved against the appellants beyond all

reasonable doubt.

17. For the foregoing, we have no hesitation in affirming

the finding of guilt of commission of contempt by the

appellants, as recorded by the High Court. The appeals are,

accordingly, dismissed.

31

However, insofar as imposition of sentence of simple

imprisonment for six months is concerned, the same appears to

be harsh, therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of

the case, we are of the view that ends of justice would be

served if the appellants are sentenced to undergo simple

imprisonment for one month.

Accordingly, we confirm the conviction and modify the

sentence from simple imprisonment for six months to simple

imprisonment for one month. It is ordered accordingly.

The appellants shall surrender before the Registrar of the

High Court of Madras within 15 days from today to undergo the

sentence. Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to

communicate this order to the concerned High Court for

compliance.

….…….………………………………………J.

(SUDHANSHU DHULIA )

…....….………………………………………J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 02, 2025.