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PETITIONER:

SHRIOMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE, AMRITSAR

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

SHRI SOM NATH DASS & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/03/2000

BENCH:

A.P.Misra, M.Jagannadha Rao

JUDGMENT:

MISRA, J.

The question raised in this appeal is of far reaching

consequences and is of great significance to one of the

major religious followers of this country. The question is:

whether the Guru Granth Sahib could be treated as a

juristic person or not? If it is, then it can hold and use

the gifted properties given to it by its followers out of

their love, in charity. This is by creation of an endowment

like others for public good, for enhancing the religious

fervour, including feeding the poor etc.. Sikhism grew

because of the vibrating divinity of Guru Nanakji and the 10

succeeding gurus, and the wealth of all their teachings is

contained in Guru Granth Sahib. The last of the living

guru was Guru Gobind Singhji who recorded the sanctity of

Guru Granth Sahib and gave it the recognition of a living

Guru. Thereafter, it remained not only a sacred book but is

reckoned as a living guru. The deep faith of every earnest

follower, when his pure conscience meets the divine

under-current emanating from their Guru, produces a feeling

of sacrifice and surrender and impels him to part with or

gift out his wealth to any charity may be for gurdwaras,

dharamshalas etc.. Such parting spiritualises such follower

for his spiritual upliftment, peace, tranquility and

enlightens him with resultant love and universalism. Such

donors in the past, raised number of Gurdwaras. They gave

their wealth in trust for its management to the trustees to

subserve their desire. They expected trustees to faithfully

implement the objectives for which the wealth was entrusted.

When selfishness invades any trustee, the core of trust

starts leaking out. To stop such leakage, legislature and

courts step in. This is what was happening in the absence

of any organised management of Gurudwaras, when trustees

were either mismanaging or attempting to usurp such trusts.

The Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Act 1922 (VI of 1922) was

enacted to meet the situation. It seems, even this failed

to satisfy the aspirations of the Sikhs. The main reason

being that it did not establish any permanent committee of

management for Sikh gurdwaras and did not provide for the

speedy confirmation by judicial sanction of changes already

introduced by the reforming party in the management of

places of worship. This was replaced by the Sikh Gurdwaras

Act, 1925 (Punjab Act No. 8 of 1925) under which the

present case arises. This Act provided a legal procedure

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through which gurdwaras and shrines regarded by Sikhs as

essential places of Sikh worship to be effectively and

permanently brought under Sikh control and management, so as

to make it consistent with the religious followings of this

community.

About 56 persons of villages Bilaspur, Ghodani,

Dhamot, Lapran and Buani situated in the Village Bilaspur,

District Patiala moved petition under Section 7(1) of the

said Act for declartion that the disputed property is a Sikh

Gurdwara. The State Government through Notification No.

1702 G.P. dated 14th September, 1962 published the

aforesaid petition in the Gazette including the boundaries

of the said gurdwaras which were to be declared as Sikh

Gurdwaras. Thereafter, a composite petition under Sections

8 and 10 of the said Act was filed by Som Dass son of Bhagat

Ram, Sant Ram son of Narain Dass and Anant Ram son of Sham

Dass of Village Bilaspur, District Patiala, challenging the

same. They claimed it to be a dharamshala and Dera of

Udasian being owned and managed by the petitioners and their

predecessors since the time of their forefathers and that

they being the holders of the same, received the said Dera

in succession, in accordance with their ancestral share.

They also claimed to be in possession of the land attached

to the said Dera. They denied it to be a Sikh Gurdwara.

This petition was forwarded by the Government to the Sikh

Gurdwara Tribunal, hereinafter referred to as the

Tribunal. In reply to the notice, the Shiromani Gurdwara

Parbandhak Committee, hereinafter referred to as the SGPC

(appellant), claimed it to be a Sikh Gurdwara, having been

established by the Sikhs for their worship, wherein Guru

Granth Sahib was the only object of worship and it was the

sole owner of the gurdwara property. It denied this

institution to be an Udasi Dera. However, appellant

Committee challenged the locus standi of the respondent to

file this objection to the notification. The appellants

case was under Section 8 and objection could only be filed

by any hereditary office-holders or by 20 or more

worshippers of the gurdwara, which they were not. The

Tribunal held that the petitioners before it (respondents

here), admitted in their cross- examination that the

disputed premises was being used by them as their

residential house that there was no object of worship in the

premises, neither they were performing any public worship

nor they were managing it. So it held they were not

hereditary office holders, as they neither managed it nor

performed any public worship. Thus, their petition under

Section 8 was rejected on 9th February, 1965 by holding that

they have no locus standi. Aggrieved by this they filed

first appeal being FAO No. 40 of 1965 which was also

dismissed by the High Court on 24th March, 1976, which

became final. Thereafter, the Tribunal took the petition

under Section 10 in which the stand of SGPC was that the

land and the buildings were the properties of Gurdwara

Sahib Dharamshala Guru Granth Sahib at Bilaspur. The

respondents and their predecessors along with their family

members had all along been its managers and they had no

personal rights in it. The Tribunal framed two issues:

(1) What right, title or interest have the

petitioners in the property in dispute?

(2) What right, title or interest has the notified

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Sikh Gurdwara in the property in dispute.

The Tribunal decided both issue No. 1 and issue No.

2 in favour of present appellants and held that the disputed

property belonged to the SGPC. Thus respondents petition

under Section 10 was also rejected on 4th September 1978.

Tribunals conclusion is reproduced hereinbelow:

The above discussion shows that the

respondent-Committee has been successful in bringing its

case rightly in Clauses 18 (1)(a) and 18(1)(d) of the Act

and has been successful in discharging its onus as regards

issue no. 2 and the issue is, iala is the owner of the

property in dispute consisting of Gurdwara building, the pla

of which is given in the Notification No. 1702 G.P.

dated 14.9.68 at page 2527 and the agricultural land

measuring 115 Bighas 12 Biswas the detail of which are given

in the copy of Jamabandi for the year 1955-56 A.D. attached

to the above-said Notification at page 2529 and is comprised

of Khasra Nos. 456 min, 457, 451, 644 and 452 bearing

Khawat No. 276 Khatauni nos. 524 to 527.

Aggrieved by this, respondents filed first appeal

being FAO No. 449 of 1978. During its pendency, the SGPC

on the basis of final order passed by the High Court in FAO

No. 40 of 1965 against the order of the Tribunal rejecting

Section 8 application, filed suit No. 94 of 1979 against

the respondents under Section 25-A of the Act for the

possession of the building and the land. The respondents

contested the suit by raising objection about

mis-description of the property in the plaint and also

raising an is

e about jurisdiction since the income from the

gurdwara was more than Rs. 3,000/- per annum for which a

committee was to be constituted before any suit could be

filed. On contest, the said suit of SGPC was decreed and

respondents objections were rejected, against which the

respondents filed FAO No. 2 of 1980. The High Court vide

its order dated 11th February, 1980 directed this FAO No. 2

of 1980 to be listed for hearing along with FAO No. 449 of

1978. It is also relevant to refer to, which was also

stated by the respondents in their petition before the

Tribunal, that a notification under Section 9 of the Act was

published declaring the disputed gurdwara to be a Sikh

Gurdwara.

It is necessary to give some more facts to appreciate

the contentions raised by the respective parties. In

jamabandi Ex. P-1 of 1961-62 BK, (which would be 1904 AD)

Mangal Dass and Sunder Dass, Bhagat Ram sons of Gopi Ram

Faqir Udasi were mentioned as owners in possession of the

land. They had also mortgaged part of this land to some

other persons. This village Bilaspur where the disputed

gurdwara exists formed part of the erstwhile Patiala Estate.

The then ruler of the Patiala Estate issued Farman-

Shahi dated 18th April, 1921. Its contents are quoted

hereunder:

In future, instructions be issued that so long the

appointment of a Mahant is not approved by Ijlas-I-khas

through Deori Mulla, until the time, the Mahant is entitled

to receive turban, shawl or Bandhan or Muafi etc. from the

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Government, no property or Muafi shall be entered in his

name in the revenue papers.

It should also be mentioned that the land which

pertains to any Dera should not be considered as the

property of any Mahant, nor the same should be shown in the

revenue papaers as the prope

y of the Mahant, but these should be entered as

belonging to the Dera under the management of the Mahant and

that the Mahants shall not be entitled to sell or mortgage

the land of the Dera. Revenue Department be also informed

about it and the order be gazetted.

On Maghar 10, 1985 BK (1920 AD) at the insta

e of Rulia Singh and others the patwari made a report

in compliance with the aforesaid Farman-e- Shahi for the

change of the entries in favour of Guru Granth Sahib

Barajman Dharamshala Deh. This was based on the enquiry

and evidence produced before him. In this mutation

proceeding which led to the mutation viz., Ex. P8, Narain

Dass, Bhagat Ram and Atma Ram Sadh appeared before the

Revenue Officer and stated that their ancestors got this

land which was gift

in charity (Punnarth) by the then proprietors of the

village. This land was given to the ancestors of the

respondent for the purpose that they should provide food and

comfort to the travellers passing through this village. In

the same proceeding Kapur Singh, Inder Singh Lambardars and

other right- holders of the said village also stated that

their fore-fathers had given this land in the name of Guru

Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh under the charge of

these persons for providing food and comfort to the

travellers. But Atma Ram and otherietors of the village.

This land was given to the ancestors of the respondent for

the purpose that they should provide food and comfort to the

travellers passing through this village. In the same

proceeding Kapur Singh, Inder Singh Lambardars and other

right-holders of the said village also stated that their

fore-fathers had given this land in the name of Guru Granth

Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh under the charge of these

persons for providing food and comfort to the travellers.

But Atma Ram and others, ancestors of respondents were not

performing their duties. This default was for a purpose,

which is revealed through the last settlement that they got

this land entered in their personal names, in the revenue

records against which a matter was pending before Deori

Mualla in the mutation proceedings. Based on the evidence,

the Revenue Officer after enquiry recorded the finding that

Atma Ram and others admitted that this land had been given

to them without any compensation for providing food and

shelter to the travellers which they were not performing.

He further held that Atma Ram and others could not

controvert the aforesaid assertion made by the villagers.

So, based on this enquiry and evidence on record, he ordered

the mutation, in the name of Guru Granth Sahib Barajman

Dharamshala Deh by deleting the name of Atma Ram and others

from the column of ownership of the land. He further

observed, so far as the question of appoinment of Manager or

Mohatmim was concerned that it was to be decided by the

Deori Mualla as the case about this was pending before the

Deori Mualla. Similarly, in the other mutation No,. 693

which is Ex. 9 in 27th Maghar 1983 (1926 AD) also, mutation

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was ordered by removal of the name of Narain Dass, Bhagat

Ram sons of Gopi Ram in favour of Guru Granth Sahib

Barajman Dharamshala Deh. Since that date till the filing

of the petitions by the respondents under Sections 8 and 10

of the Act entries in the ownership column of the land

continued in the name of "Guru Granth Sahib Barajman

Dharamshala Deh and no objection was filed either by the

ancestors of respondents or respondents themselves.

It was for the first time objection was raised by

respondents through their counsel before the High Court in

FAO No. 449 of 1978 regarding validity of Ex. P 8-9

contending that the entry in the revenue records in the name

of Guru Granth Sahib was void as Guru Granth Sahib was not a

juristic person. The case of the respondents was that the

Guru Granth Sahib was only a sacred book of the Sikhs and it

would not fall within the scope of the word, juristic

person. On the other hand, with vehemence and force

learned counsel for the appellant, SGPC submits that Guru

Granth Sahib is a juristic person and hence it can hold

property, can sue and be sued. On this question, whether

Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person, a difference arose

between the two learned judges of the Bench of the High

Court. Mr. Justice Tiwana held, it to be a juristic person

and dismissed both the FAOs, namely, FAO No. 449 of 1978

and 2 of 1980 upholding the judgment of the Tribunal. On

the other hand Mr. Justice Punchhi, (as he then was)

recorded dissent and held, the Guru Granth Sahib not to be a

juristic person, but did not decide the issue on merits.

The case was then referred to a third judge, namely, Mr.

Justice Tiwatia who agreed with the view of Mr. Justice

Punchhi and held the Guru Granth Sahib not to be a juristic

person. After recording this finding the learned judge

directed that the FAO may be placed before the Division

Bench for final disposal of the appeal on merits.

The question, whether Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic

person is the main point which is argued in the present

appeal to which we are called upon to adjudicate. It is

relevant to mention here that after adjudication of the

question whether the Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person,

the matter again went back to the same Bench which again

gave rise to another conflict between Justice Tiwana and Mr.

Justice Punchhi. Justice Tiwana held on merits that

mutations were valid and respondents had no right to this

property. But Mr. Justice Punchhi held to the contrary

that the mutation was invalid and this property was the

private property of the respondents. Thereafter, the said

FAO No. 449 of 1978 and FAO No. 2 of 1980 were placed

before the third judge, namely, Justice J.B.Gupta, who

concurred with the view taken by Mr. Justice Punchhi, as he

then was. He recorded the following conclusion:

in view of the findings that Guru Granth Sahib is

not a juristic person, and that the notification issued

under section 9 was not conclusive, in view of the Full

Bench Judgment of this Court in Mahant Lachhman Dass Chela

Mahant Moti Rams case (supra), the findings of the Tribunal

are liable to be set aside. The Tribunal mainly based its

findings on the mutations, Exhibits P.8 and P.9, which are

in the name of Guru Granth Sahib, since Guru Granth Sahib is

not a juristic person, any mutation a sanctioned in its name

in the present case was of no consequence. There is no

other cogent evidence except the said mutations relied upon

by the Tribunal in that behalf. Similar was the position as

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regards the building. In that behalf, the Tribunal relied

upon the notification issued earlier. The same being not

conclusive, there was not other reliable evidence to

conclude that the building formed part of the Sikh Gurdwara,

notified under Section. In these circumstances, I concur

with the view taken by M.M.Punchhi, J. in the order dated

December 16, 1986.

The foundation of his decision on merits is based on

the finding that Guru Granth Sahib is not a juristic person

and hence Exs. P8 and P9, the mutations in its name were

not sustainable. The present appellants preferred Special

Leave Petition No. 7803 of 1988 in this Court, which was

dismissed in default on 16th November, 1995 and its

restoration application was also dismissed on 19th August,

1996. In this petition it was specifically stated that the

present Civil Appeal No. 3968 of 1987 is pending in this

Court. However, it is significant as we have said above,

the judgment of Mr. Justice Gupta concurring the judgment

of Mr. Justice Punchhi, as he then was, was mainly on the

basis that the mutation in the name in favour of Guru

Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh was void in as much

as Guru Granth Sahib was not a juristic person. Thus the

foundation of that decision rests on the question which we

are considering.

The crux of the litigation now rests on the question,

whether Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person or not. Now,

we proceed to consider this issue.

The very words Juristic Person connote recognition

of an entity to be in law a person which otherwise it is

not. In other words, it is not an individual natural person

but an artificially created person which is to be recognised

to be in law as such. When a person is ordinarily

understood to be a natural person, it only means a human

person. Essentially, every human person is a person. If we

trace the history of a Person in the various countries we

find surprisingly it has projected differently at different

times. In some countries even human beings were not treated

to be as persons in law. Under the Roman Law a Slave was

not a person. He had no right to a family. He was treated

like an animal or chattel. In French Colonies also, before

slavery was abolished, the slaves were not treated to be

legal persons. They were later given recognition as legal

persons only through a statute. Similarly, in the U.S. the

African-Americans had no legal rights though they were not

treated as chattel.

In Roscoe Pounds Jurisprudence Part IV, 1959 Ed. at

pages 192-193, it is stated as follows:-

In civilized lands even in the modern world it has

happened that all human beings were not legal persons. In

Roman law down to the constitution of Antoninus Pius the

slave was not a person. He enjoyed neither rights of

family nor rights of patrimony. He was a thing, and as

such, like animals, could be the object of rights of

property..In the French colonies, before slavery was there

abolished, slaves were put in the class of legal persons by

the statute of April 23, 1833 and obtained a somewhat

extended juridical capacity by a statute of 1845. In the

United States down to the Civil War, the free negroes in

many of the states were free human beings with no legal

rights.

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With the development of society, where an individuals

interaction fell short, to upsurge social developments,

cooperation of a larger circle of individuals was

necessitated. Thus, institutions like corporations and

companies were created, to help the society in achieving the

desired result. The very constitution of State, municipal

corporation, company etc. are all creations of the law and

these Juristic Persons arose out of necessities in the

human development. In other words, they were dressed in a

cloak to be recognised in law to be a legal unit.

Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LXV, page 40 says:

Natural person. A natural person is a human being;

a man, woman, or child, as opposed to a corporation, which

has a certain personality impressed on it by law and is

called an artificial person. In the C.J.S. definition

Person it is stated that the word person, in its primary

sense, means natural person, but that the generally accepted

meaning of the word as used in law includes natural persons

and artificial, conventional, or juristic persons.

Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. VI, page 778 says:

Artificial persons. Such as are created and devised

by human laws for the purposes of society and government,

which are called corporations or bodies politic.

Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 305 says:

A legal person is any subject-matter other than a

human being to which the law attributes personality. This

extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the

conception of personality beyond the class of human beings

is one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal

imagination.

Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the

law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases. Those

which are actually recognised by our own system, however,

are of comparatively few types. Corporations are

undoubtedly legal persons, and the better view is that

registered trade unions and friendly societies are also

legal persons though not verbally regarded as

corporations..If, however, we take account of other systems

than our own, we find that the conception of legal

personality is not so limited in its application, and that

there are several distinct varieties, of which three may be

selected for special mention.

1. The first class of legal persons consists of

corporations, as already defined, namely, those which are

constituted by the personification of groups or series of

individuals. The dividuals who thus form the corpus of the

legal person are termed its members

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2. The second class is that in which the corpus, or

object selected for personification, is not a group or

series of persons, but an institution. The law may, if it

pleases, regard a church or a hospital, or a university, or

a library, as a person. That is to say, it may attribute

personality, not to any group of persons connected with the

institution, but to the institution itself.

3. The third kind of legal person is that in which

the corpus is some fund or estate devoted to special uses

a charitable fund, for example or a trust estate.

Jurisprudence by Paton, 3rd Edn., page 349 and 350

says:

It has already been asserted that legal personality

is an artificial creation of the law. Legal persons are all

entities capable of being right-and-duty- bearing units-all

entities recognised by the law as capable of being parties

to a legal relationship. Salmond said: So far as legal

theory is concerned, a person is any being whom the law

regards as capable of rights and duties.

Legal personality may be granted to entities other

than individual human beings, e.g. a group of human beings,

a fund, an idol. Twenty men may form a corporation which

may sue and be sued in the corporate name. An idol may be

regarded as a legal persona in itself, or a particular fund

may be incorporated. It is clear that neither the idol nor

the fund can carry out the activities incidental to

litigation or other activities incidental to the carrying on

of legal relationships, e.g., the signing of a contract;

and, of necessity, the law recognises certain human agents

as representatives of the idol or of the fund. The acts of

such agents, however (within limits set by the law and when

they are acting as such), are imputed to the legal persona

of the idol and are not the juristic acts of the human

agents themselves. This is no mere academic distinction,

for it is the legal persona of the idol that is bound to the

legal relationships created, not that of the agent. Legal

personality then refers to the particular device by which

the law creates or recognizes units to which it ascribes

certain powers and capacities.

Analytical and Historical Jurisprudence, 3rd Edn. At

page 357 describes

person:

We may, therefore, define a person for the purpose of

jurisprudence as any entity (not necessarily a human being)

to which rights or duties may be attributed.

Thus, it is well settled and confirmed by the

authorities on jurisprudence and courts of various countries

that for a bigger thrust of socio-political-scientific

development evolution of a fictional personality to be a

juristic person became inevitable. This may be any entity,

living, inanimate, objects or things. It may be a religious

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institution or any such useful unit which may impel the

courts to recognise it. This recognition is for subserving

the needs and faith of the society. A juristic person, like

any other natural person is in law also conferred with

rights and obligations and is dealt with in accordance with

law. In other words, the entity acts like a natural person

but only through a designated person, whose acts are

processed within the ambit of law. When an idol was

recognised as a juristic person, it was known it could not

act by itself. As in the case of minor a guardian is

appointed, so in the case of idol, a Shebait or manager is

appointed to act on its behalf. In that sense, relation

between an idol and Shebait is akin to that of a minor and a

guardian. As a minor cannot express himself, so the idol,

but like a guardian, the Shebait and manager have

limitations under which they have to act. Similarly, where

there is any endowment for charitable purpose it can create

institutions like a church, hospital, gurudwara etc. The

entrustment of an endowed fund for a purpose can only be

used by the person so entrusted for that purpose in as much

as he receives it for that purpose alone in trust. When the

donor endows for an idol or for a mosque or for any

institution, it necessitates the creation of a juristic

person. The law also circumscribes the rights of any person

receiving such entrustment to use it only for the purpose of

such a juristic person. The endowment may be given for

various purposes, may be for a church, idol, gurdwara or

such other things that the human faculty may conceive of,

out of faith and conscience but it gains the status of

juristic person when it is recognised by the society as

such.

In this background, we find that this Court in

Sarangadeva Periya Matam & Anr. Vs. Ramaswami Goundar

(dead) by legal representatives, AIR 1966 SC 1603, held that

a Mutt was the owner of the endowed property and that like

an idol the Mutt was a juristic person and thus could own,

acquire or possess any property. In Masjid Shahid Ganj &

Ors. Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee,

Amritsar, AIR 1938 Lahore 369, a Full Bench of that High

Court held that a mosque was a juristic person. This

decision was taken in appeal to the Privy Council which

confirmed the said judgment. Sir George Rankin observed:

In none of these cases was a mosque party to the

suit, and in none except perhaps the last is the fictitious

personality attributed to the mosque as a matter of

decision. But so far as they go these cases support the

recognition as a fictitious person of a mosque as an

institution-apparently hypostatizing an abstration. This,

as the learned Chief Justice in the present case has pointed

out, is very different from conferring personality upon a

building so as to deprive it of its character as immovable

property.

There may be an endowment for a pious or religious

purpose. It may be for an idol, mosque, church etc.. Such

endowed property has to be used for that purpose. The

installation and adoration of an idol or any image by a

Hindu denoting any god is merely a mode through which his

faith and belief is satisfied. This has led to the

recognition of an idol as a juristic person.

In Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar & Ors, AIR 1957 SC 137,

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this Court held:

In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha Vs. Ram Lal Maitra,

ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), it was held on a consideration of these

and other text that a gift to an idol was not to be judged

by the rules applicable to a transfer to a sentient being,

and that dedication of properties to an idol consisted in

the abandonment by the owner of his demoinion over them for

the purpoe of their being appropriated for the purposes

which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence

Jenkins C.J. at p. 138 that the pious purpose is still

the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the

mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected and that

the dedication to a deity may be a compendious expression

of the pious purposes for which the deciation is designed.

Vide also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at p.

155. In Hindu Relgious Endowments Board V.

Veeraraghavacharlu, AIR 1937 Mad 750 (G), Varadachariar J.

dealing with this question, referred to the decision in ILR

37 Cal 128 (F), and observed:

As explained in the case, that purpose of making a

gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to

confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by

making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in

a proper and impressive manner. This is the sense in which

a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public

trust.

In Som Prakash Rekhi Vs. Union of India & Anr., 1981

(1) SCC 449, this Court held that a legal person is any

entity other than a human being to which the law attributes

personality. It was stated: Let us be clear that the

jurisprudence bearing on corporations is not myth but

reality. What we mean is that corporate personality is a

reality and not an illusion or fictitious construction of

the law. It is a legal person. Indeed, a legal person is

any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law

attributes personality. This extension, for good and

sufficient reasons, of the conception of personalityis one

of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination.

Corporations are one species of legal persons invented by

the law and invested with a variety of attributes so as to

achieve certain purposes sanctioned by the law.

This Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner

of Income Tax, Calcutta, 1969 (1) SCC 555, held that the

consecrated idol in a Hindu temple is a juristic person and

approved the observation of West J. in the following

passage made in Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakshmiram, ILR 12 Bom

247;

The Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and those dervied

from it, recognises not only incorporate bodies with rights

of property vested in the Corporation apart from its

individual members but also juridical persons called

foundations. A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or

charitable institution may according to his law express his

purpose and endow it and the ruler will give effect to the

bounty or at least, protect it so far at any rate as is

consistent with his own Dharma or conception or morality. A

trust is not required for the purpose; the necessity of a

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trust in such a case is indeed a peculiarity and a modern

peculiarity of the English Law. In early law a gift placed

as it was expressed on the altar of God, sufficed it to

convey to the Church the lands thus dedicated. It is

consistent with the grants having been made to the juridical

person symbolised or personified in the idol. {Emphasis

supplied}

Thus, a trust is not necessary in Hindu Law though it

may be required under English Law.

In fact, there is a direct ruling of this Court on the

crucial point. In Pritam Dass Mahant Vs. Shiromani

Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1984 (2) SCC 600, with

reference to a case under Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 this Court

held that the central body of worship in a Gurdwara is Guru

Granth Sahib, the holy book, is a Juristic entity. It was

held:

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the

sine qua non for an institution being a Sikh gurdwara is

that there should be established Guru Granth Sahib and the

worship of the same by the congregation, and a Nishan Sahib

as indicated in the earlier part of the judgment. There may

be other rooms of the institution meant for other purposes

but the crucial test is the existence of Guru Granth sahib

and the worship thereof by the congregation and Nishan

Sahib.

Tracing the ten Sikh gurus it records:

They were ten in number each remaining faithful to

the teachings of Guru Nanak, the first Guru and when their

line was ended by a conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh,

the last Guru, succession was invested in a collection of

teachings which was given the title of Guru Granth Sahib.

This is now the Guru of the Sikhs.

xx xx

The holiest book of the Sikhs is Guru Granth Sahib

compiled by the Fifth Master, Guru Arjan. It is the Bible

of Sikhs. After giving his followers a central place of

worship, Hari-Mandir, he wanted to give them a holy book.

So he collected the hymns of the first four Gurus and to

these he added his own. Now this Sri Guru Granth Sahib is a

living Guru of the Sikhs. Guru means the guide. Guru

Granth Sahib gives light and shows the path to the suffering

humanity. Where a believer in Sikhism is in trouble or is

depressed he reads hymns from the Granth.

When Guru Gobind Singh felt that his wordly sojourn

was near, he made the fact known to his disciples. The

disciples asked him as to who would be their Guru in future.

The Guru immediately placed five pies and a coconut before

the holy Granth, bowed his head before it and said:

The Eternal Father Willed, and I raised the Panth.

All my Sikhs are ordained to believe the Granth as their

preceptor. Have faith in the holy Granth as your Master and

consider it The visible manifestation of the Gurus. He who

hath a pure heart will seek guidance from its holy words.

The Guru repeated these words and told the disciple

not to grieve at his departure. It was true that they would

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not see his body in its physical manifestation but he would

be ever present among the Khalsas. Whenever the Sikhs

needed guidance or counsel, they should assemble before the

Granth in all sincerity and decide their future line of

action in the light of teachings of the Master, as embodied

in the Granth. The noble ideas embodied in the Granth would

live for ever and show people the path to bliss and

happiness. (Emphasis supplied) The aforesaid conspectus

visualises how Juristic Person was coined to subserve to

the needs of the society. With the passage of time and the

changes in the socio-political scenario, collective working

instead of individualised working became inevitable for the

growth of the organised society. This gave manifestation to

the concept of Juristic Person as an unit in various forms

and for various purposes and this is now a well recognised

phenomena. This collective working, for a greater thrust

and unity gave birth to cooperative societies, for the

success and implementation of public endowment it gave rise

to public trusts and for purpose of commercial enterprises

the juristic person of companies were created, so on and so

forth. Such creations and many others were either statutory

or through recognition by the courts. Different religions

of the world have different nuclei and different

institutitonalised places for adoration, with varying

conceptual beliefs and faith but all with the same end.

Each may have differences in the perceptive conceptual

recognition of god but each religion highlights love,

compassion, tolerance, sacrifice as a hallmark for attaining

divinity. When one reaches this divine empire, he is

beholden, through a feeling of universal brotherhood and

love which impels him to sacrifice his wealth and

belongings, both for his own bliss and for its being useful

to a large section of the society. This sprouts charity,

for public endowment. It is really the religious faith that

leads to the installation of an idol in a temple. Once

installed, it is recognised as a juristic person. The idol

may be revered in homes but its juristic personality is only

when it is installed in a public temple.

Faith and belief cannot be judged through any judicial

scrutiny. It is a fact accomplished and accepted by its

followers. This faith necessitated the creation of a unit

to be recognised as a Juristic Person. All this shows

that a Juristic Person is not roped in any defined circle.

With the changing thoughts, changing needs of the society,

fresh juristic personalities were created from time to time.

It is submitted for the respondent that decisions of

courts recognised an idol to be a as juristic person but

they did not recognise a temple to be so. So, on the same

parity, a gurdwara cannot be a juristic person and Guru

Granth Sahib can only a sacred book. It cannot be equated

with an idol nor does Sikhism believe in worshiping any

idol. Hence Guru Granth Sahib cannot be treated as a

juristic person. This submission in our view is based on a

misconception. It is not necessary for Guru Granth Sahib

to be declared as a juristic person that it should be

equated with an idol. When belief and faith of two

different religions are different, there is no question of

equating one with the other. If Guru Granth Sahib by

itself could stand the test of its being declared as such,

it can be declared to be so.

An idol is a Juristic Person because it is adored

after its consecration, in a temple. The offerings are made

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to an idol. The followers recognise an idol to be symbol

for God. Without the idol, the temple is only a building of

mortar, cement and bricks which has no sacredness or

sanctity for adoration. Once recognised as a Juristic

Person, the idol can hold property and gainfully enlarge

its coffers to maintain itself and use it for the benefit of

its followers. On the other hand in the case of mosque

there can be no idol or any images of worship, yet the

mosque itself is conferred with the same sacredness as

temples with idol, based on faith and belief of its

followers. Thus the case of a temple without idol may be

only brick, mortar and cement but not the mosque. Similar

is the case with the Chruch. As we have said, each religion

have different nuclei, as per their faith and belief for

treating any entity as a unit.

Now returning to the question, whether Guru Granth

Sahib could be a Juristic Person or not, or whether it

could be placed on the same pedestal, we may first have a

glance at the Sikh religion. To comprehend any religion

fully may indeed be beyond the comprehension of any one and

also beyond any judicial scrutiny for it has its own

limitations. But its silver lining could easily be picked

up. In the Sikh religion, Guru is revered as the highest

reverential person. The first of such most revered Gurus

was Guru Nanak Dev, followed by succeeding Gurus, the Tenth

being the last living, viz., Guru Gobind Singh Ji. It is

said that Adi Granth or Guru Granth Sahib was compiled by

the Fifth Guru Arjun and it is this book that is worshiped

in all the gurudwaras. While it is being read, people go

down their knees to make reverential obeisance and place

their offerings of cash and kind on it, as it is treated and

equated to a living Guru. In the Book A History of the

Sikhs by Kushwant Singh, Vol. I, page 307:

The compositions of the gurus were always considered

sacred by their followers. Guru Nanak said that in his

hymns the true Guru manifested Himself, because they were

composed at His orders and heard by Him (Var Asa). The

fourth guru, Ram Das said: Look upon the words of the True

Guru as the supreme truth, for God and the Creator hath made

him utter the words: (Var Gauri). When Arjun formally

installed the Granth in the Harimandir, he ordered his

followers to treat it with the same reverence as they

treated their gurus. By the time of Guru Gobind Singh,

copies of the Granth had been installed in most Gurdwaras.

Quite naturally, when he declared the line of succession of

gurus ended, he asked his followers to turn to the Granth

for guidance and look upon it as the symbolic representation

of the ten gurus.

The Grant Sahib is the central object of worship in

all Gurdwaras.

It is usually draped in silks and placed on a cot. It

has an awning over it and, while it is being read, one of

the congregations stands behind and waves a flywhisk made of

Yaks hair. Worshippers go down on their knees to make

obeisance and place offerings of cash or kind before it as

they would before a king: for the Granth is to them what

the gurus were to their ancestors the Saca Padsah (the

true Emperor).

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The very first verse of the Guru Granth Sahib reveals

the infinite wisdom and wealth that it contains, as to its

legitimacy for being revered as guru:-

The First verse states: The creator of all is One,

the only One. Truth is his name. He is doer of everything.

He is without fear and without enmity. His form is

immortal. He is unborn and self-illumined. He is realized

by Gurus grace.

The last living guru, Guru Gobind Singh, expressed in

no uncertain terms that henceforth there would not be any

living guru. The Guru Granth Sahib would be the vibrating

Guru. He declared that henceforth it would be your Guru

from which you will get all your guidance and answer. It

is with this faith that it is worshiped like a living guru.

It is with this faith and conviction, when it is installed

in any gurudwara it becomes a sacred place of worship.

Sacredness of Gurudwara is only because of placement of Guru

Granth Sahib in it. This reverential recognition of Guru

Granth Sahib also opens the hearts of its followers to pour

their money and wealth for it. It is not that it needs it,

but when it is installed, it grows for its followers, who

through their obeisance to it, sanctify themselves and also

for running the langer which is an inherent part of a

Gurdwara.

In this background, and on over all considerations, we

have no hesitation to hold that Guru Granth Sahib is a

Juristic Person. It cannot be equated with an Idol as

idol worship is contrary to Sikhism. As a concept or a

visionary for obeisance, the two religions are different.

Yet, for its legal recognition as a juristic person, the

followers of both the religions give them respectively the

same reverential value. Thus the Guru Granth Sahib it has

all the qualities to be recognised as such. Holding

otherwise would mean giving too restrictive a meaning of a

juristic person, and that would erase the very

jurisprudence which gave birth to it.

Now, we proceed to examine the judgment of the High

Court which had held to the contrary. There was difference

of opinion between the two Judges and finally the third

Judge agreed with one of the differing Judges, who held Guru

Granth Sahib to be not a Juristic Person. Now, we proceed

to examine the reasonings for their holding so. They first

erred, in holding that such an endowment is void as there

could not be such a juristic person without appointment of a

Manager. In other words, they held that a juristic person

could only act through some one, a human agency and as in

the case of an Idol, the Guru Granth Sahib also could not

act without a manager. In our view, no endowment or a

juristic person depends on the appointment of a Manager. It

may be proper or advisable to appoint such a manager while

making any endowment but in its absence, it may be done

either by the trustees or courts in accordance with law.

Mere absence of a manager negative the existence of a

juristic person. As pointed out in Manohar Ganesh Vs.

Lakshmiram, ILR 12 Bom 247, (approved in Yogendra Nath

Naskars case, 1969 (1) SCC 555) referred to above, if no

manager is appointed by the founder, the ruler would give

effect to the bounty. As pointed in Vidyapurna Tirtha swami

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Vs. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami & Ors., ILR 27 Mad. 435 (at

457), by Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. (approved in Yogendra Nath

Naskars case, 1969 (1) SCC 555) the property given in trust

becomes irrevocable and is none was appointed to manage, it

will be managed by the court as representing the

sovereign. This can be done by the Court in several ways

under Section 92, CPC or by handing over management to any

specific body recognised by law. But the trust will not be

allowed by the Court to fail. Endowment is when donor parts

with his property for it being used for a public purpose and

its entrustment is to a person or group of person in trust

for carrying out the objective of such entrustment. Once

endowment is made, it is final and it is irrevocable. It is

the onerous duty of the persons entrusted with such

endowment, to carry out the objectives of this entrustment.

They may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication

in the trust or get it appointed through Court. So, if

entrustment is to any juristic person, mere absence of

manager would not negate the existence a juristic person.

We, therefore, disagree with the High Court on this crucial

aspect.

In Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, Vol. 14A,

at page 167:-

Endowment means property or pecuniary means bestowed

as a permanent fund, as endowment of a college, hospital or

library, and is understood in common acceptance as a fund

yielding income for support of an institution.

The further difficulty the learned Judges of the High

Court felt was that there could not be two Juristic

Persons in the same building. This they considered would

lead to two juristic persons in one place viz., gurudwara

and Guru Grant Sahib. This again, in our opinion, is a

misconceived notion. They are no two Juristic Persons at

all. In fact both are so interwoven that they cannot be

separated as pointed by Tiwana, J. in his separate

judgment. The installation of Guru Granth Sahib is the

nucleus or nectar of any gurudwara. If there is no Guru

Granth Sahib in a Gurdwara it cannot be termed as gurudwara.

When one refers a building to be a gurudwara, he refers it

so only because Guru Granth Sahib is installed therein.

Even if one holds a Gurdwara to be a juristic person, it is

because it holds the Guru Granth Sahib. So, there do not

exist two separate juristic persons, they are one integrated

whole. Even otherwise in Ram Jankijee Deities and Ors. Vs.

State of Bihar and Ors., 1999 [5] SCC 50, this Court while

considering two separate deities, of Ram Jankijee and Thakur

Raja they were held to be separate Juristic Persons. So,

in the same precincts, as a matter of law, existence of two

separate juristic persons were held to be valid.

Next it was the reason of the learned Judges that, if

Guru Granth Sahib is a Juristic Person then every copy of

Guru Granth Sahib would be a Juristic Person. This again

in our considered opinion is based on erroneous approach.

On this reasoning it could be argued that every idol at

private places, or carrying it with one self each would

become a Juristic Person. This is a misconception. An

idol becomes a juristic person only when it is consecrated

and installed at a public place for public at large. Every

idol is not a juristic person. So every Guru Granth Sahib

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cannot be a juristic person unless it takes juristic role

through its installation in a gurudwara or at such other

recognised public place.

Next submission for the respondent is that Guru Grant

Sahib is like any other sacred book, like Bible for

Christians, Bhagwat Geeta and Ramayana for Hindus and Quran

for Islamic followers and cannot be a Juristic Person.

This submission also has no merit. Though it is true Guru

Granth Sahib is a sacred book like others but it cannot be

equated with these other sacred books in that sense. As we

have said above, Guru Granth Sahib is revered in gurudwara,

like a Guru which projects a different perception. It is

the very heart and spirit of gurudwara. The reverence of

Guru Granth on the one hand and other sacred books on the

other hand is based on different conceptual faith, belief

and application.

One other reason given by the High Court is that Sikh

religion does not accept idolatry and hence Guru Granth

Sahib cannot be a juristic person. It is true that the Sikh

religion does not accept idolatry but, at the same time when

the tenth guru declared that after him, the Guru Granth will

be the Guru, that does not amount to idolatry. The Granth

replaces the guru henceforward, after the tenth Guru.

For all these reasons, we do not find any strength in

the reasoning of High Court in recording a finding that the

Guru Grant Sahib not a Juristic Person. The said

finding is not sustainable both on fact and law.

Thus, we unhesitantly hold Guru Granth Sahib to be a

Juristic Person.

Next challenge is that the basis for mutating of the

name of Guru Granth Sahib Birajman Dharamshala Deh, by

deleting the name of the ancestors of the respondents, based

on Faraman-I-shahi issued by the then ruler of the Patiala

State dated 18.4.1921 is liable to be set aside, as this

Faraman-i-Shahi did not direct the recording of the name of

Guru Granth Sahib. For ready reference the said

Faraman-i-Shahi is again quoted hereunder:-

In future, instructions be issued that so long the

appointment of a Mahant is not approved by Ijlas-I-Khas

through Deori Mualla, until the time, the Mahant is entitled

to receive turban, shawl or Bandhan or Muafi etc. from the

Government, no property or Muafi shall be entered in his

name in the revenue papers.

It should also be mentioned that the land which

pertains to any Dera should not be considered as the

property of any Mahant, nor the same should be shown in the

revenue papers as the property of the Mahant, but these

should be entered as belonging to the Dera under the

management of the Mahant and that the Mahants shall not be

entitled to sell or mortgage the land of the Dera. Revenue

Department be also informed about it and the order be

gazetted.

It was also submitted that it was not known whether

this Faraman-i- Shahi was administrative in nature or was

issued as a sovereign. If it was administrative it could

not have the same force of law.

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We have examined this Faraman-i-Shahi. It does not

direct the authorities to mutate the name of Guru Granth

Sahib. It merely directed, the revenue authority that till

Mahants appointment is approved by Deors Mulla, no

property or Muafi received by a Mahant should be entered in

his name, in the revenue papers. Further the land of any

Dera should not be considered to be that of Mahant. This

was only a directive which is protective in nature. In

other words it only directed that they should be done after

ascertaining the fact and if the land was of the Dera it

should not be put in the name of Mahant. In other words, it

stated - enquire, find out the facts and do the needful.

The mutation in the case before us was not on account of

this Farman-I-Shahi but was made because of the application

made by one Rulia Singh and others of village Bilaspur to

the Patwari, and mutation was done only after a detailed

enquiry, after examining witnesses and other evidence on the

record, which resulted into Ex.8 and Ex. 9. In the said

proceedings number of witnesses appeared before the Revenue

Officer and stated that their ancestors gifted this disputed

land for charity (Punnarth) for the benefit of public, who

were the proprietors and was merely entrusted to the

ancestors of the respondents for management. The claimants

had no rights over it. Admittedly they did not receive this

land for any payment nor for any service rendered by them to

such donors. Their statement was that this land was given

to them with clear direction that they should use it for

providing food and comfort to the travellers (Musafran)

passing through the village. They further gave evidence

that their forefathers gave it in the name of Guru Granth

Sahib Birajman Dharamshala Deh. In spite of this, Atma

Ram and others and their predecessors did not perform their

obligations. On the contrary, with oblique motives they got

this disputed land entered in their name in the revenue

records which was an attempt to usurp the property. The

Revenue Officer after enquiry held that Atma Ram and other

ancestors of respondents admitted that this land was given

without making any payment and was specifically meant for

providing food and shelter to the travellers which function

they were not performing. It was only after such an

enquiry, he ordered the mutation by ordering deleting of the

name of Atma Ram and others. With reference to the question

of appointment of a manager, he recorded that this had to be

decided by Deori Mualla, where such a case about this was

pending. Similar was the position in the other mutation

proceedings about which an application was also made to the

Revenue Officer, where the names of Narain Dass, Bhagat Ram

sons of Gopi Ram were deleted and aforesaid name was mutated

resulting into Ex. 9. So, the mutation of name was not

because of direction issued by the Farman-I-Shahi. So no

error could be said to have been committed, when Ex.8 and

Ex.9, viz., mutations were recorded. Faraman-I-Shahi if at

all may be said to have led to the enquiry but it was not

the basis.

This takes us to the last point for our consideration.

After the said difference of opinion between two learned

Judges, Mr. Justice M.M. Punchhi did not decide the case

on merits though the other Judge Mr. Justice Tiwana, held

on merits in favour of the appellants, i.e., that the

property belonged to Gurdwara. When the case again returned

to the same bench for decision on merits there was again

difference of opinion. It was again referred to the third

judge who concurred with Mr. Justice Punchhi. Against this

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the appellants filed special leave petition in this court

which was dismissed for default as aforesaid. However, we

find that the third Judge who concurred with Mr. Justice

Punchhi based his finding on the ground that Guru Granth

Sahib was not a juristic person hence entry Ex. 8 and 9

was invalid. But once the very foundation falls, and Guru

Granth Sahib is held to be a juristic person, the said

finding cannot stand. Thus, in our considered opinion there

would not be any useful purpose to remand the case. That

apart since this litigation stood for a long time, we think

it proper to examine it ourself.

Learned senior counsel for the respondents who argued

with ability and fairness said that in fact the only

question which arises in this case is whether Guru Granth

Sahib is a juristic person. Examining the merits we find

that the mutation in the revenue papers in the name of Guru

Granth Sahib was made as far back as in the year 1928, in

the presence of the ancestors of respondents and no

objection was raised by anybody till the filing of the

present objection by the respondents as aforesaid under

Section 8/10 of the 1925 Act. This is after a long gap of

about forty years. Further, this property was given in

trust to the ancestors of respondents for a specified

purpose but they did not perform their obligation. It is

also settled, once an endowment, it never reverts even to

the donor. Then no part of these rights could be claimed or

usurped by the respondents ancestors who in fact were

trustees. Hence for these reasons and for the reasons

recorded by Mr. Justice Tiwana, even on merits, any claim

to the disputed land by the respondents has no merit. Thus

any, claim over this disputed property by the respondents

fails and is hereby rejected. We uphold the findings and

orders passed by the Tribunal against which FAO No. 449 of

1978 and FAO No. 2 of 1980 was filed.

For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings

which we have recorded, we hold that High Court committed a

serious mistake of law in holding that the Guru Granth Sahib

was not a juristic person and in allowing the claim over

this property in favour of respondents. Accordingly, this

appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the

High Court dated 19-4-1985 and in FAO No. 449 of 1978 and

FAO No. 2 of 1980 are hereby set aside. We uphold the

orders passed by the Tribunal both under Section 10 of the

said Act in Suit No. 449 of 1978. Appeal is, accordingly,

allowed. Costs on the parties.

S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 2735-36 of 1989:

The main question raised in these special leave

petitions is the same as has been raised in Civil Appeal

No.3968 of 1987, which we have disposed of today. In view

of this, the point raised by the petitioners in this

petition is unsustainable for the same reasons and is

therefore dismissed.