As per case facts, the appellants filed a writ petition challenging the Gram Panchayat's decision to lease out 'charand' land, claiming it infringed upon grazing rights, violated Article 31A of ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 1941 of 1997
PETITIONER:
SHISH RAM & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/05/2000
BENCH:
S. Saghir Ahmad & R.P. Sethi.
JUDGMENT:
SETHI,J.
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Holding that the land described as "charand" is included
within the definition of "Shamilat-deh" as defined under
Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands
(Regulations) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Act") and relying upon its earlier Division Bench judgment
in the case of Khushi Puri v. State of Haryana [1978 Punjab
Law Journal 78], the High Court dismissed the writ petition
filed by the appellants praying for issuance of directions
prohibiting the Gram Panchayat from leasing out the charand
land and to keep land measuring 541 kanal and 2 marlas
reserved as charand for grazing up cattles. The High Court
also did not consider it proper to grant the prayer of the
appellants seeking declaration that the land reserved for
charand during consolidation could not be used for the
income of the Gram Panchayat as it stood allegedly deducted
from the lands of the proprietors. Not satisfied with the
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, the
appellants have filed the present appeal with the submission
that the reservation of charand land for the income of Gram
Panchayat violated Article 31A of the Constitution of India
as was the ratio of the this Court in Bhagat Ram & Ors. v.
State of Punjab & Ors. [1967 (2) SCR 165]. It is further
submitted that without paying any compensation at the market
value to the proprietors of the village, the land could not
vest in the Gram Panchayat. The reservation of Charand land
for the income of Gram Panchayat allegedly in breach of
Section 5 of the Act is stated to be illegal. The leasing
out has been alleged to be in contravention of the grazing
rights of the proprietors and non-proprietors of the
village. There is no doubt that the appellants are the
inhabitants of village Khajuri, Tehsil Jagadari, District
Yamuna Nagar, Haryana. It is also not disputed that the
land, the subject matter of the litigation being
shamilat-deh is vested in the Gram Panchayat. It has also
to be noticed that after the vesting of the land in the Gram
Panchayat, none of the inhabitants of the village raised any
objections regarding its vesting for a period of about 34
years. It is also on record that some land out of shamilat
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deh land was being leased out to the proprietors of the
village since the year 1976 and none of the inhabitants
raised any objection. From the counter affidavit filed on
behalf of the respondents it appears that many of the family
members of the appellants, particularly, the brother of the
appellant No.1 had themselves been taking the land in
dispute on lease without raising any objection. Learned
counsel appearing for the appellants relying upon a Full
Bench judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in
Bishamber Dayal v. State of Haryana & Ors. [1986 Punjab
Law Journal 208] submitted that the Gram Panchayat was not
entitled to lease the land or use it in the manner it like
without following the procedure and subject to the
restrictions placed on its use by the Punjab Village Common
Lands (Regulations) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as
"the Rules"). Referring to Rule 3(2), the learned counsel
submitted that the Gram Panchayat could use the land in
shamilat-deh vested in it under the Act either itself or
through another for anyone or more of the purposes specified
therein. One of the purposes referred to in clause (vi) is
'grazing of animals'. Learned counsel appearing for the
respondents drew our attention to clause (xxv) of Sub-rule
(2) of Rule 3 which authorised the Gram Panchayat to use the
land for the purposes of leasing out for cultivation. He
also drew our attention to the Division Bench judgment of
the High Court in Khushi Puri's case(supra) wherein it was
held: "It is provided by rule 3(2) of the Punjab Village
Common Lands (Regulation) Rules, 1964, that the panchayat
could make use of the land in shamilat deh vested in it
either itself or through another for the purposes related to
forestry. It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that the
plantation of trees was such a purpose for which the land
could not be utilised by the panchayat. Whatever rights the
panchayat had for the management of the land devolved upon
the Administrator and there is, therefore, no basis for this
contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioners
that the Administrator acted beyond his powers."
In Salig Ram & Ors.v. Maksudan Singh & Ors. [1965
Current Law Journal 711], the High Court had earlier held:
"...that the panchayat has a right to use the shamilat deh
vested in it under the 1954 Act either itself or through
another person in any of the manners set out in that rule.
Similar rules are stated to have been framed under the Act.
This shows that except to the extent to which the statutory
rules indicate, there is no fetter on the power of the
panchayat to use the shamilat deh which vests in it under
the Act for any of the specified purposes it likes and it is
not necessary that what was grazing land out of the shamilat
deh previous to such vesting, must continue to be such."
In Bishamber Dayal's case (supra) the Full Bench of the
Court had considered and approved the view taken by the
Division Bench in Khusi Puri's case. In that regard the
Court had held:
"The Act and the Rules empower the Gram Panchayat to
convert a portion of the street for any one or more of the
purposes given in Rule 3(2). A Division Bench of this Court
had an occasion to construe the provisions of Sections
2(g)(4), 4 and 5 of the Act and Rule 3(2) of the Rules made
thereunder in Khushi Puri's case (supra). It was held that
the Gram Panchayat could make use of the shamilat deh land
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vested in it either itself or through another for the
purposes mentioned in Rule 3(2). In that case a part of
Charand land which was used for grazing cattle had been
entrusted to the Forest Department to plant trees, which
were to be the property of the Gram Panchayat. This action
of the Gram Panchayat had been upheld by theDivision Bench.
Shri Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised
no contention before us that Khushi Puri's case(supra) does
not lay down the correct law or that the ratio thereof needs
reconsideration by a larger Bench. We are in respectful
agreement with the ratio of Khushi Ram's case (supra)."
We do not agree with the submission of the learned
counsel of the appellants that in Bishamber Dayal's case the@@
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Full Bench of the High Court had taken a different view than@@
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the one which was taken in Khushi Puri's case. The High
Court appears to have consistently held that the land
vesting in the Gram Panchayat can be used for any one or
more of the purposes specified in Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 3,
leasing out for cultivation being one of the purposes. We
find no reason to disagree with the High Court and in fact
approve the position of law settled by it in Khusi Puri's
case which was upheld by the Full Bench in Bishamber Dayal's
case. Learned counsel for the appellants then tried to make
a distinction between the charand land and the shamilat deh.
In support of his contentions he referred to Annexures I and
II wherein the land, the subject matter of the dispute has
been defined to be charand land. The definition of shamilat
deh proivdes that it shall include "lands described in the
revenue record as shamilat deh or (charand-in Haryana)
excluding abadi deh". Relying upon the Khushi Puri's case
the High Court in the impugned judgment was, therefore,
right in holding that there did not exist any distinction
between the charand and shamilat deh and the contention of
the appellants that the charand could not vest with the Gram
Panchayat under the Act was based upon wrong assumptions.
Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellants
upon the judgment in Bhagat Ram's case is misplaced besides@@
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being without any basis. Despite our insistence, the@@
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learned counsel for the appellants could not refer to any
averments in the writ petition filed in the High Court
regarding the alleged violation of Article 31A of the
Constitution. We are also of the opinion that the present
petition though filed in a representative capacity, yet was
not a bonafide action inasmuch as the appellants and their
relations having accepted the position of law and earlier at
times taking the benefit of lease-hold rights could not have
recourse to the legal proceedings after having failed to get
the lease in their favour or in favour of their relations.
The delay in approaching the court also remained
unexplained. There is no merit in this appeal which is
accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.@@
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The landmark Supreme Court judgment in Shish Ram & Ors. v. The State of Haryana & Ors. (1997) definitively addressed the scope of Shamilat-deh land and the extensive Gram Panchayat powers concerning its use and leasing. This crucial ruling, pivotal for understanding common land management in Haryana, is thoroughly analyzed on CaseOn, providing legal professionals with invaluable insights into its implications.
The case originated from a writ petition filed by the appellants in the High Court, seeking to prevent the Gram Panchayat from leasing out "charand" land, which they claimed was reserved for grazing cattle. They argued that using this land for income generation by the Gram Panchayat violated their grazing rights, constitutional provisions (specifically Article 31A), and the land should not have vested in the Gram Panchayat without compensation. They also contended that such use was contrary to Section 5 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961 (hereafter "the Act"). The High Court, relying on its previous judgments, dismissed their petition, affirming the Gram Panchayat's right to manage and lease the land. Dissatisfied, the appellants brought the matter before the Supreme Court.
The central legal question was whether "charand" land falls under the definition of "shamilat-deh" as per the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961, thereby vesting in the Gram Panchayat, and if the Gram Panchayat possessed the authority to lease out such land for income generation (specifically for cultivation), overriding traditional grazing rights and without compensation to the proprietors.
The Supreme Court primarily referred to:
The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court's findings, affirming that "charand" land unequivocally falls within the definition of "shamilat-deh" under Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act. This meant the land legally vested in the Gram Panchayat. The Court emphasized that Rule 3(2) of the 1964 Rules clearly empowers the Gram Panchayat to utilize or lease out "shamilat-deh" land for a variety of purposes, including cultivation, which generates income for the Panchayat.
The Court found no distinction between "charand" and "shamilat-deh" that would prevent vesting or subsequent leasing by the Panchayat. It specifically highlighted the consistent judicial view, reiterated in Khushi Puri, Salig Ram, and Bishamber Dayal, that the Gram Panchayat's powers over vested shamilat-deh land are broad and not restricted to its original use (like grazing). The argument regarding Article 31A and the reference to Bhagat Ram's case were deemed misplaced and without basis.
Furthermore, the Court noted several crucial contextual factors: the appellants' family members had themselves previously leased the land without objection, and a significant delay of 34 years in raising objections regarding the vesting of the land. These factors, coupled with the lack of a bona fide intent from the appellants (who reportedly failed to secure leases in their favor), weighed against their claim. The Court found no merit in the appeal, reinforcing the settled position of law.
For legal professionals seeking deeper insights into such rulings, CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that distil complex judgments like this one into easily digestible summaries. These audio briefs are an efficient way to stay updated and understand the practical implications of significant legal precedents, helping lawyers and students quickly grasp key arguments and judicial reasoning.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision. It affirmed that "charand" land is indeed "shamilat-deh" and vests in the Gram Panchayat. The Panchayat possesses the legal authority under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulations) Act, 1961, and its corresponding Rules, to lease out this land for income-generating purposes, including cultivation, regardless of its previous use for grazing. The Court found no constitutional violation or procedural infirmity in the Panchayat's actions, reinforcing the established legal framework for common land management in Haryana.
This judgment is critical for anyone involved in property law, land reforms, or local governance in states following similar common land legislation (like Punjab and Haryana). For lawyers, it clarifies the scope of Gram Panchayat powers over common lands, specifically "shamilat-deh" and "charand," and helps in advising clients on disputes related to leasing, management, and traditional rights. It underscores the importance of timely legal action and bona fide intent in litigation. For law students, it serves as an excellent case study on statutory interpretation, the application of constitutional articles (like Article 31A), and the doctrine of precedent, demonstrating how superior courts rely on and consolidate earlier rulings to settle points of law related to land vesting and management.
All information provided in this analysis is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances. CaseOn.in and its content creators are not liable for any actions taken based on the information presented herein.
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