1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8003  OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.24726/2019

    D.NO.25495 OF 2019)

SHIV KUMAR & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T 

ARUN MISHRA, J.

1.The question involved in the matter is whether a purchaser of

the property after issuance of notification under section 4 of the Land

Acquisition   Act,   1894   (for   short,   “the   1894   Act”),   can   invoke   the

provisions contained in section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation

and   Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and

Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, "the Act of 2013").

2.Notification No.F.10(29)/96/L&B/LA/11394, dated 27.10.1999,

was issued for the acquisition of the land situated in the revenue

estate of Village Pansali, Delhi, for the public purpose of the Rohini

Residential   Scheme   under   planned   development   of   Delhi.     It   was

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followed   by   the   declaration   under   section   6   issued   on   3.4.2000.

Possession was taken on 12.5.2000.   Subsequently, the petitioners

purchased the land           on 5.7.2001 by way of Registered Sale Deed

executed by one Satya Narain, the Power of Attorney holder of original

owners.  The purchasers then participated in the proceedings for the

determination of compensation under sections 9 and 10 of the 1894

Act.     The   award   was   passed   on   3.4.2002.   In   the   meanwhile,   an

unauthorized colony came up with the name of Deep Vihar, Pansali,

Pooth Kalan, Delhi.  The petitioners claimed that they continued in the

actual physical possession of the land even after passing of the award

on 17.09.2008 and the same formed part of the unauthorized colony.

The Government of NCT of Delhi provisionally regularised the colony.

The Act of 2013 came in force from 1.1.2014.  The respondents never

took   the   actual   physical   possession   of   the   land;   as   such,   the

acquisition   has   lapsed.     The   purchasers/   petitioners   filed   a   writ

petition at the High Court of Delhi.   A Division Bench of the High

Court has dismissed the writ application.

3.Learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   purchasers

submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   erred   in   rejecting   the   writ

application   on   the   ground   that   the   purchasers   after   issuance   of

notification under section 4 of the 1894 Act cannot question the land

acquisition.  The decision runs contrary to the dictum laid down by

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this Court in Government (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust & Anr.

(2017) 6 SCC 751.  Learned counsel further submitted that the High

Court has also erred in dismissing the writ application on the ground

that   petitioners   have   admitted   that   the   property   is   part   of   the

unauthorized colony of Deep Vihar.

4.Shri   K.M.   Natraj   learned   Additional   Solicitor   General   has

supported the impugned judgment and order and submitted that the

purchase made after the notification issued under section 4 of the

1894 Act and declaration under section 6 is void.  The purchasers had

acquired no right, and they cannot question the land acquisition, nor

they can invoke the provisions contained in section 24 of the Act of

2013.  It was further submitted that decision in Manav Dharam Trust

(supra) is per incuriam because of a large number of decisions of this

Court  holding   that   sale   made   after   issuance   of   notification  under

section 4 is void.

5.It is crystal clear that for seeking the relief under section 24, the

proceedings for taking possession under Act of 1894 have been put

into   question   as   illusory   one,   and   possession   continues   with

appellants. The decision in  Manav Dharam Trust  (supra) has been

mainly relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

purchasers/   petitioners   in   which   a   Division   Bench   opined   that

subsequent purchasers are affected by the acquisition. Therefore, they

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are entitled to seek a declaration of the lapse of acquisition under the

Act of 2013. It has further opined that since declaration is sought, the

challenge   is   not   to   the   acquisition   proceedings.     Because   of   the

operation of section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the ratio of the various

cases decided by this Court under the Act of 1894, has no application

to such situations.  It has observed thus:

“21. All the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing

for the appellants, no doubt, have categorically held that the

subsequent purchasers do not have locus standi to challenge the

acquisition proceedings. However, in the present case, the challenge is

not to the acquisition proceedings; it is only for a declaration that the

acquisition proceedings have lapsed because of the operation of

Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, and therefore, the ratio in those cases

has no application to these cases.

22. It is one thing to say that there is a challenge to the legality or

propriety or validity of the acquisition proceedings and yet another

thing to say that by virtue of the operation of subsequent legislation,

the acquisition proceedings have lapsed.

23. In all the decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the

appellants, which we have referred to above, this Court has protected

the rights of the subsequent purchaser to claim compensation, being a

person interested in the compensation, despite holding that they have

no locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings.

28. Thus, the subsequent purchaser, the assignee, the successor in

interest, the power-of-attorney holder, etc., are all persons who are

interested in compensation/landowners/affected persons in terms of

the 2013 Act and such persons are entitled to file a case for a

declaration that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue

of operation of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. It is a declaration qua

the land wherein indisputably they have an interest, and they are

affected by such acquisition. For such a declaration, it cannot be said

that the respondent-writ petitioners do not have any locus standi."

6.First, we advert to the legal position concerning the purchases

made on 5.7.2001, made after notification under Section 4 had been

issued under the Act of 1894. Law is well settled in this regard by a

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catena   of   decisions   of   this   Court   that   an   incumbent,   who   has

purchased   the   land   after   section   4   notification,   has   no   right   to

question the acquisition. 

6(a).In U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman & Anr. v. Kalra

Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 124 it was observed :

“3. …...That apart, since M/s. Kalra Properties, the respondent

had purchased the land after the notification under Section 4(1)

was published, its sale is void against the State, and it acquired

no right, title, or interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled

law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification or

the regularity in taking possession of the land before the

publication of the declaration under Section 6 was published."

6(b).In Sneh Prabha (Smt.) & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1996) 7 SCC

426 it has been laid down that subsequent purchaser cannot take

advantage of land policy.  It was observed:

"5. Though at first blush, we were inclined to agree with the

appellant but on a deeper probe, we find that the appellant is

not entitled to the benefit of the Land Policy. It is settled law

that any person who purchases land after the publication of the

notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/her peril. The

object of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is

notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be

needed for a public purpose, and the acquisition proceedings

point out an impediment to anyone to encumber the land

acquired thereunder. It authorizes the designated officer to enter

upon the land to do preliminaries, etc. Therefore, any alienation

of land after the publication of the notification under Section

4(1) does not bind the Government or the beneficiary under the

acquisition. On taking possession of the land, all rights, titles,

and interests in land stand vested in the State, under Section 16

of the Act, free from all encumbrances, and thereby, absolute

title in the land is acquired thereunder. If any subsequent

purchaser acquires land, his/her only right would be subject to

the provisions of the Act and/ or to receive compensation for

the land. In a recent judgment, this Court in Union of India v.

Shri Shivkumar Bhargava and Ors. [1995] 1 SCR 354

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considered the controversy and held that a person who

purchases land subsequent to the notification is not entitled to

an alternative site. It is seen that the Land Policy expressly

conferred that right only on that person whose land was

acquired. In other words, the person must be the owner of the

land on the date on which notification under Section 4(1) was

published. By necessary implication, the subsequent purchaser

was elbowed out from the policy and became disentitled to the

benefit of the Land Policy."

6(c).In Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors. (2008) 9

SCC 177, the Court had relied upon the decision described above and

observed thus: 

"21. In view of the aforesaid decisions, it is by now well-settled

law that under the Land Acquisition Act, the subsequent

purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings and that

he would be only entitled to get the compensation."

6(d).In  V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer & Ors.

(2012) 12 SCC 133, the Court has considered various decisions and

opined   that   the   purchaser   after   Section   4   notification   could   not

challenge land acquisition on any ground whatsoever.   The Court

observed:

"15. The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the

person who purchases the land subsequent to a notification

being issued under Section 4 of the Act has been considered by

this Court time and again. In Leela Ram v. Union of India AIR

1975 SC 2112, this Court held that anyone who deals with the

land subsequent to a Section 4 notification being issued, does

so, at his own peril. In Sneh Prabha v. State of Uttar Pradesh

AIR 1996 SC 540, this Court held that a Section 4 notification

gives a notice to the public at large that the land in respect to

which it has been issued, is needed for a public purpose, and it

further points out that there will be "an impediment to anyone

to encumber the land acquired thereunder." The alienation after

that does not bind the State or the beneficiary under the

acquisition. The purchaser is entitled only to receive

compensation. While deciding the said case, reliance was

placed on an earlier judgment of this Court in Union of India v.

Shiv Kumar Bhargava and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 427.

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18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be

summarized to the effect that a person who purchases land

subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification with

respect to it, is not competent to challenge the validity of the

acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the

reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does not confer

upon him, any title and at the most he can claim compensation

on the basis of his vendor's title.”

(emphasis supplied)

6(e).In Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corpn.

v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur & Ors. (2013) 5

SCC 427, it is laid down:

“13. There can be no quarrel with respect to the settled legal

proposition that a purchaser, subsequent to the issuance of a

Section 4 Notification in respect of the land, cannot challenge

the acquisition proceedings, and can only claim compensation

as the sale transaction in such a situation is Void qua the

Government. Any such encumbrance created by the owner, or

any transfer of the land in question that is made after the

issuance of such a notification would be deemed to be void and

would not be binding on the Government. (Vide: Gian Chand v.

Gopala and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 528; Yadu Nandan Garg v. State

of Rajasthan and Ors. AIR 1996 SC 520; Jaipur Development

Authority v. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society, Jaipur, and Ors.

(1996) 11 SCC 229; Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority,

Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and Ors. (1997) 1 SCC 35; Meera

Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. (2008) 9 SCC

177; Har Narain (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Mam Chand (Dead) by

L.Rs. and Ors. (2010) 13 SCC 128; and V. Chandrasekaran and

Anr. v. The Administrative Officer and Ors. JT 2012 (9) SC

260)."

(emphasis supplied)

6(f).A Three­Judge Bench in Rajasthan Housing Board v. New Pink

City Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. & Anr., (2015) 7 SCC 601, in the

context of section 4 as well as section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act

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which also prohibited the transactions from being entered into with

SC/ST persons, has observed:

“33. The other decision relied upon by the Society is V.

Chandrasekaran and Anr. v. Administrative Officer and Ors.

2012 (12) SCC 133] wherein this Court laid down thus:

17. In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India: AIR 1996

SC 2677; Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati

and Anr. (1995) 5 SCC 335; Gian Chand v. Gopala and

Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 528; and Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant

Governor of Delhi and Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 177, this

Court categorically held that a person who purchases

land after the publication of a Section 4 notification

with respect to it, is not entitled to challenge the

proceedings for the reason, that his title is void and he

can at best claim compensation on the basis of vendor's

title. In view of this, the sale of land after issuance of a

Section 4 notification is void, and the purchaser cannot

challenge the acquisition proceedings. (See also: Tika

Ram v. the State of U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689).

18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be

summarized to the effect that a person who purchases

land subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4

notification with respect to it, is not competent to

challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on

any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed

executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any

title and at the most he can claim compensation on the

basis of his vendor's title.

34. Reliance has been placed on Dossibai Nanabhoy

Jeejeebhoy v. P.M. Bharucha 1958 (60) Bom.LR 1208] so as to

contend that the 'person interested' in the land under Section 9

of the Land Acquisition Act would include a person who claims

interest in compensation to be paid on account of acquisition of

land ad the interest contemplated Under Section 9 is not

restricted to legal or proprietary estate or interest in the land but

such interest as will sustain a claim to apportionment, is the

owner of the land. In our opinion, the decision is of no avail.

The instant transaction being void as per Section 42 of the

Rajasthan Tenancy Act, and the property was inalienable to

non-SC. Obviously, the logical corollary has to be taken that no

right in apportionment to compensation can be claimed by the

Society."

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6(g).In M. Venkatesh & Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development

Authority, etc. (2015) 17 SCC 1, a three­Judge Bench has opined:

“16. That brings us to the question of whether Prabhaudas Patel

and other respondents in SLP (C) No. 12016 of 2013 were

entitled to any relief from the Court. These respondents claim

to have purchased the suit property in terms of a sale deed

dated 22-8-1990, i.e., long after the issuance of the preliminary

Notification published in July 1984. The legal position about

the validity of any such sale, post-issuance of preliminary

notification, is fairly well settled by a long line of the decisions

of this Court. The sale in such cases is void and non-est in the

eye of the law giving to the vendee the limited right to claim

compensation and no more. Reference may in this regard be

made to the decision of this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra

Properties (P) Ltd, wherein this Court said: (SCC pp. 126-27,

para 3)

“3. … It is settled law that after the notification under

Section 4(1) is published in the gazette, any

encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the

Government, and the purchaser does not acquire any

title to the property. In this case, Notification under

Section 4(1) was published on 24-3-1973; possession of

the land admittedly was taken on 5-7-1973, and the

pumping station house was constructed. No doubt,

declaration under Section 6 was published later on 8-7-

1973. Admittedly power under Section 17(4) was

exercised dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A

and on service of the notice under Section 9 possession

was taken, since urgency was acute viz. pumping station

house was to be constructed to drain out floodwater.

Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under

Section 17(2) free from all encumbrances. It is further

settled law that once possession is taken, by operation

of Section 17(2), the land vests in the State free from all

encumbrances unless a notification under Section 48(1)

is published in the gazette withdrawing from the

acquisition. Section 11-A, as amended by Act 68 of

1984, therefore, does not apply, and the acquisition does

not lapse. The notification under Section 4(1) and the

declaration under Section 6, therefore, remain valid.

There is no other provision under the Act to have the

acquired land divested, unless, as stated earlier,

notification under Section 48(1) was published, and the

possession is surrendered pursuant thereto. That apart,

since M/s Kalra Properties, the respondent had

purchased the land after the notification under Section

4(1) was published, its sale is void against the State, and

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it acquired no right, title, or interest in the land.

Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot challenge

the validity of the notification or the regularity in taking

possession of the land before the publication of the

declaration under Section 6 was published.

(emphasis supplied)"

7.It   has   been   laid   down   that   the   purchasers   on   any   ground

whatsoever cannot question proceedings for taking possession.   A

purchaser after Section 4 notification does not acquire any right in

the land as the sale is ab initio void and has no right to claim land

under the Policy. 

8.When we ponder as to beneficial provisions of the Act of 2013,

they also intend to benefit landowners mentioned in the notification

under Section 4, not for the benefit of such purchasers who purchase

the land after it has been vested in the State. 

9.Sub­section 4 of Section 11 of the Act of 2013, which is akin to

section 4 of the Act of 1894, contains a prohibition that no person

shall make any transaction or cause any transaction of land or create

any   encumbrance   on   land   from   the   date   of   publication   of   such

notification. Section 11(4) is extracted hereunder: 

“11. Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers

thereupon.–

x x x x x

(4) No person shall make any transaction or cause any transaction of

land specified in the preliminary notification or create any

encumbrances on such land from the date of publication of such

notification till such time as the proceedings under this Chapter are

completed:

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Provided that the Collector may, on the application made by the

owner of the land so notified, exempt in special circumstances to be

recorded in writing, such owner from the operation of this subsection:

Provided further that any loss or injury suffered by any person due

to his wilful violation of this provision shall not be made up by the

Collector.”

Without seeking exemption from the Collector, there is a total

prohibition on any transaction of land. Whereas the legal position

under the Act of 1894 was that a transaction effected after section 4

notification was illegal and void. 

10.When we consider other provisions, the ‘affected family' has been

defined under section 3(c) of the 2013 Act. The definition reads as

under:  

“3. Definitions.–In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(c) “affected family” includes—

(i) a family whose land or other immovable property has been acquired;

(ii) a family which does not own any land but a member or members of

such family may be agricultural labourers, tenants including any form

of tenancy or holding of usufruct right, share-croppers or artisans or

who may be working in the affected area for three years prior to the

acquisition of the land, whose primary source of livelihood stand

affected by the acquisition of land;

(iii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who have

lost any of their forest rights recognized under the Scheduled Tribes and

Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act,

2006 (2 of 2007) due to acquisition of land;

(iv) family whose primary source of livelihood for three years prior to

the acquisition of the land is dependent on forests or water bodies and

includes gatherers of forest produce, hunters, fisherfolk and boatmen,

and such livelihood is affected due to acquisition of land;

(v) a member of the family who has been assigned land by the State

Government or the Central Government under any of its schemes and

such land is under acquisition;

(vi) a family residing on any land in the urban areas for preceding three

years or more prior to the acquisition of the land or whose primary

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source of livelihood for three years prior to the acquisition of the land is

affected by the acquisition of such land;”

The affected family includeslandowners for whose benefit land is

held before the acquisition.  A person acquiring interest after section

11 notification cannot be said to be included in the “affected family” at

all.

11.Definition of ‘family' is in section 3(m), it is extracted hereunder:

“3. Definition.–In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

…..

(m) "family" includes a person, his or her spouse, minor children,

minor brothers and minor sisters dependent on him: Provided that

widows, divorcees, and women deserted by families shall be

considered separate families;

Explanation.—An adult of either gender with or without spouse or

children or dependents shall be considered as a separate family for the

purposes of this Act.”

12.The   definition   of   ‘landowner'   is   in   section   3(r),   the   same   is

extracted hereunder: 

“3. Definition.–In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

…..

(r) "landowner" includes any person,— (i) whose name is recorded as

the owner of the land or building or part thereof, in the records of the

authority concerned; or

(ii) any person who is granted forest rights under the Scheduled Tribes

and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights)

Act, 2006 (2 of 2007) or under any other law for the time being in

force; or

(iii) who is entitled to be granted Patta rights on the land under any law

of the State including assigned lands; or (iv) any person who has been

declared as such by an order of the court or Authority;”

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Landowner is a person who is recoded as the owner of land or

building.   The record of date of issuance of preliminary notification

under section 11 is relevant. A purchaser after section 11 cannot be

said to be a landowner within the purview of section 3(r).

13.Person interested is defined in section 3(x) thus :

“3. Definition.–In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(x) “person interested” means—

(i) all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on

account of the acquisition of land under this Act;

(ii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers, who have

lost any forest rights recognized under the Scheduled Tribes and Other

Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2

of 2007);

(iii) a person interested in an easement affecting the land;

(iv) persons having tenancy rights under the relevant State laws

including share-croppers by whatever name they may be called; and

(v) any person whose primary source of livelihood is likely to be

adversely affected;”

14.A rehabilitation and resettlement scheme has to be prepared

under Section 16. Section 17 deals with the review of such a scheme.

An approved scheme to be made public under Section 18. Section 19

deals   with   the   publication   of   declaration   and   summary   of

rehabilitation   and   resettlement   scheme.     After   inquiry,   Award   is

passed by the Collector under Section 23. The Collector is required to

consider, among other things, the interest of the person claiming the

compensation,   rehabilitation,   and   resettlement   while   making   an

award.

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15.Section 24 of the Act of 2013, which deals with land acquisition

made under the Act of 1894, is also relevant.  The same is extracted

hereunder:

“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be

deemed to have lapsed in certain cases – (1) Notwithstanding

anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition

proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,—

(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition

Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the

determination of compensation shall apply; or

(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then

such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said

Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of

land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been

made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the

physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation

has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed

and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the

proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the

provisions of this Act:

Provided that where an award has been made, and compensation in

respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the

account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the

notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition

Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions

of this Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

16.Section 24 (2) provides that in case the award has been passed

five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act, but the

physical   possession   of   the   land   has   not   been   taken,   or   the

compensation   has   not   been   paid,   the   said   proceedings   shall   be

deemed to have lapsed.  It is not the case set up that compensation

15

had not been paid to purchasers/owners.  The only case set up is that

physical possession has not been taken and proceedings of taking over

possession   have   been   questioned   to   take   advantage   of   provisions

under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Whereas, averment in the writ

petition itself indicates that possession had been taken over in the

year 2000 and that unauthorized colonies have come up in the area.

Thus, it is clear that possession, if any, is illegal, and in fact, the

actual   physical   possession   had   been   taken,   and   re­entering   in

possession in an unauthorized manner can confer no right.  There is

nothing to doubt that actual physical possession had been taken in

2000.  Thus, Section 24(2) is not attracted in the case.

17.Even otherwise, proviso to Section 24(2) does not recognize a

purchaser after Section 4 notification inasmuch as it provides that

where an award has been made, and the compensation in respect of a

majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the

beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for

acquisition   issued   under   the   Act   of   1894,   shall   be   entitled   to

compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013.   The proviso

makes it clear that in case of compensation concerning the majority of

landholding has not been deposited, then recorded owner(s) at the

time of issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall

have the right to receive the compensation.  Purchasers after section 4

16

notification   have   not   been   given   the   right   to   receive   the   higher

compensation under the provisions contained in the act of 2013

18.The Act of 2013 presupposes that a person is required to be

rehabilitated and resettled. Such a person who has purchased after

section 4 notification as sale deed is void under the Act of 1894,

cannot claim rehabilitation and resettlement as per policy envisaged

under the Act of 2013, as his land has not been acquired, but he has

purchased a property which has already been acquired by the State

Government,   he   cannot   claim   even   higher   compensation,   as   per

proviso to section 24(2) under the Act of 2013.  An original landowner

cannot be deprived of higher value under the Act of 2013, which

higher   compensation   was   not   so   contemplated   when   the   void

transaction of sale had been entered, and right is conferred under

proviso to Section 24(2) on recorded owners under Act of 1894. We

have come across instances in which after notifications under section

4 were issued and, the property was purchased at throwaway prices

by the builders and unscrupulous persons, such purchases are void

and confer no right even to claim higher compensation under Section

24(2) of the Act of 2013 as it is to be given to the owner as mentioned

in the notification.

19.Given   that,   the   transaction   of   sale,   effected   after   section   4

notification,   is   void,   is   ineffective   to   transfer   the   land,   such

17

incumbents cannot invoke the provisions of section 24. As the sale

transaction did not clothe them with the title when the purchase was

made; they cannot claim ‘possession' and challenge the acquisition as

having   lapsed   under   section   24   by   questioning   the   legality   or

regularity of proceedings of taking over of possession under the Act of

1894.  It would be unfair and profoundly unjust and against the policy

of the law to permit such a person to claim resettlement or claim the

land back as envisaged under the Act of 2013. When he has not been

deprived of his livelihood but is a purchaser under a void transaction,

the outcome of exploitative tactics played upon poor farmers who were

unable to defend themselves.

20.Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013,

challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over of possession

under the Act of 1894 cannot be made, based on a void transaction

nor   declaration   can   be   sought   under   section   24(2)   by   such

incumbents to obtain the land. The declaration that acquisition has

lapsed under the Act of 2013 is to get the property back whereas, the

transaction once void, is always a void transaction, as no title can be a

+cquired in the land as such no such declaration can be sought.  It

would   not   be   legal,   just   and   equitable   to   give   the   land   back   to

purchaser as land was not capable of being sold which was in process

of acquisition under the Act of 1894. The Act of 2013 does not confer

18

any   right   on   purchaser   whose   sale   is  ab   initio  void.     Such   void

transactions are not validated under the Act of 2013.  No rights are

conferred by the provisions contained in the 2013 Act on such a

purchaser as against the State.

21.‘Void is,  ab initio,' a nullity, is inoperative, and a person cannot

claim the land or declaration once no title has been conferred upon

him to claim that the land should be given back to him. A person

cannot enforce and ripe fruits based on a void transaction to start

claiming title and possession of the land by seeking a declaration

under Section 24 of the Act of 2013; it will amount to conferment of

benefit never contemplated by the law. The question is, who can claim

declaration/ rights under section 24(2) for the restoration of land or

lapse of acquisition. It cannot be by a person with no title in the land.

The provision of the Act of 2013 cannot be said to be enabling or

authorizing a purchaser after Section 4 to question proceeding taken

under the Act of 1894 of taking possession as held in U.P. Jal Nigam

(supra) which is followed in M. Venkatesh (supra) and other decisions

and consequently claim declaration under Section 24 of the Act of

2013.     What   cannot   be   done   directly   cannot   be   permitted   in   an

indirect method. 

19

22.The provisions of the Act of 2013 aimed at the acquisition of land

with least disturbance to the landowners and other affected families

and to provide just and fair compensation to affected families whose

land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected  and

to   make   adequate   provisions   for   such   affected   persons   for   their

rehabilitation and resettlement. The provisions of Act of 2013 aim at

ousting all inter­meddlers from the fray by ensuring payment in the

bank account of landholders under section 77 of the Act.

23.The   intendment   of   Act   of   2013   is   to   benefit   farmers   etc.

Subsequent purchasers cannot be said to be landowners entitled to

restoration of land and cannot be termed to be affected persons within

the provisions of Act of 2013. It is not open to them to claim that the

proceedings have lapsed under Section 24(2). 

24.Apart from that the claims have been made on transactions

based on the power of attorneys, agreements, etc.; as such also they

are not entitled to any indulgence and cannot invoke provisions of

section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.  The Court has considered the question

of the validity of transactions in the form of power of attorney in Suraj

Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. through Director v. State of Haryana &

Anr. (2012) 1 SCC 656, and has held that no rights could be accrued

20

on such transactions as this is not a legal mode of transfer. This Court

has observed :

"20. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in

regard to any right, title, or interest in an immovable property.

The Power of Attorney is a creation of an agency whereby the

grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein,

on behalf of the grantor, which when executed will be binding

on the grantor as if done by him (see Section 1A and Section 2

of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or

terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner

known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the

effect of transferring title to the grantee.

21. In-State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nehata 2005 (12) SCC 77

this Court held:

"13. A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by

Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of

attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal

in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the

affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority

upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed

by the principal in favor of the agent. The agent derives a right

to use his name and all acts, deeds, and things are done by him

and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the

same shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney

is, as is well known, a document of convenience.

Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the provisions of

the Contract Act as also the Powers-of-Attorney Act is valid. A

power of attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is executed by

the donor so as to enable the done to act on his behalf. Except

in cases where power of attorney is coupled with an interest, it

is revocable. The done in exercise of his power under such

power of attorney only acts in place of the donor subject, of

course, to the powers granted to him by reason thereof. He

cannot use the power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in

a fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a

matter between the donor and the done.

An attorney holder may, however, execute a deed of

conveyance in the exercise of the power granted under a power

of attorney and convey title on behalf of the grantor.

Scope of Will

14. A will is the testament of the testator. It is a posthumous

disposition of the estate of the testator directing the distribution

21

of his estate upon his death. It is not a transfer inter vivo. The

two essential characteristics of a will are that it is intended to

come into effect only after the death of the testator and is

revocable at any time during the lifetime of the testator. It is

said that so long as the testator is alive, a will is not be worth

the paper on which it is written, as the testator can at any time

revoke it. If the testator, who is not married, marries after

making the will, by operation of law, the will stands revoked.

(see Sections 69 and 70 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925).

Registration of a will does not make it any more effective.

Conclusion

15. Therefore, a SA/GPA/WILL transaction does not convey

any title nor create any interest in an immovable property. The

observations by the Delhi High Court, in Asha M. Jain v.

Canara Bank 94 (2001) DLT 841 that the "concept of power of

attorney sales have been recognized as a mode of transaction"

when dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/WILL are

unwarranted and not justified, unintended misleading the

general public into thinking that SA/GPA/WILL transactions

are some kind of a recognized or accepted mode of transfer and

that it can be a valid substitute for a sale deed. Such decisions

to the extent they recognize or accept SA/GPA/WILL

transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted from an

agreement to transfer, are not good law.

16. We, therefore, reiterate that immovable property can be

legally and lawfully transferred/ conveyed only by a registered

deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of 'GPA sales'

or 'SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not

amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of

transfer of immovable property. The courts will not treat such

transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as

conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest

in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds

of title, except to the limited extent of Section 53A of the

Transfer of Property Act. Such transactions cannot be relied

upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue

Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of

conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of

leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only

under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is

put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions

known as GPA sales.

17. It has been submitted that making declaration that GPA

sales and SA/GPA/WILL transfers are not legally valid modes

of transfer is likely to create hardship to a large number of

persons who have entered into such transactions, and they

22

should be given sufficient time to regularize the transactions by

obtaining deeds of conveyance. It is also submitted that this

decision should be made applicable prospectively to avoid

hardship.”

No right can be claimed based on a transfer made by way of

execution of Power of Attorney, Will, etc., as it does not create any

interest in immovable property.

25.In Manav Dharam Trust (supra), even the provisions of the Act of

2013 have not been taken into consideration, which prohibits such

transactions   in   particular   provisions   of   section   11,   including   the

proviso to section 24(2).  Apart from that, it was not legally permissible

to   a   Division   Bench   to   ignore   the   decisions   of   the   larger   Bench

comprising of three Judges and of Co­ordinate Bench. They were not

per   incuriam  and   were   relevant   for   deciding   the   issue   of   taking

possession under Act of 1894, at the instance of purchaser. In case it

wanted to depart from the view taken earlier, it ought to have referred

the   matter   to   a   larger   bench.   It   has   been   ignored   that   when   a

purchase is void, then no declaration can be sought on the ground

that the land acquisition under the Act of 2013 has lapsed due to

illegality/irregularity of proceedings of taking possession under the Act

of 1894.  No declaration can be sought by a purchaser under Section

24 that acquisition has lapsed, effect of which would be to get back

the land.  They cannot seek declaration that acquisition made under

23

the Act of 1894 has lapsed by the challenge to the proceedings of

taking possession under the Act of 1894.  Such right was not available

after the purchase in 2000 and no such right has been provided to the

purchasers under the Act of 2013 also. Granting a right to question

acquisition would be against the public policy and the law which

prohibits such transactions; it cannot be given effect to under the

guise   of   subsequent   legislation   containing   similar   provisions.

Subsequent legislation does not confer any new right to a person

based   on   such   void   transaction;   instead,   it   includes   a   provision

prohibiting such transactions  without permission of the Collector  as

provided in Section 11(4).

26.Thus, we have to follow the decisions including that of larger

Bench mentioned above, laying down the law on the subject, which

still holds the field and were wrongly distinguished.  The binding value

of the decision of larger and coordinate Benches have been ignored

while deciding the Manav Dharam Trust case (supra), it was not open

to it to take a different view.   The decision in  Manav Dharam Trust

(supra)   is   per   incuriam   in   light   of   this   decision   of   this   Court   in

Mamleshwar   Prasad   v.   Kanahaiya   Lal,   (1975)   2   SCC   232,  A.R.

Anutulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, State of Uttar Pradesh v.

Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139, State of B. Shama

Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry,  AIR 1967 SC 1480,  Municipal

24

Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101,  Narmada

Bachao Andolan (III) v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 1989,

Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Odisha, (2015) 2 SCC 189 and

Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Societies Ltd. 2010 13 SCC 336.

27.We hold that Division Bench in  Manav Dharam Trust  (supra)

does   not   lay   down   the   law   correctly.   Given   the   several   binding

precedents which are available and the provisions of the Act of 2013,

we cannot follow the decision in  Manav Dharam Trust  (supra) and

overrule it.  Shri S.N. Bhatt, learned counsel submitted that in case

this Court does not agree with the Manav Dharam Trust (supra), the

case may be referred to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India under the

provisions of Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.  He

has relied upon the decision of this court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh

Sharma (2019) 6 SCC 162 in which, in view of the conflict of opinion of

two Division Bench judgments of this Court as to the interpretation of

section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 the matter was referred to

the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, for constituting an appropriate

Bench. However, in the instant case, the issue is different, whether we

have to follow the decision in  Manav Dharam Trust  (supra) or the

earlier decisions of this Court mentioned above.   It is apparent that

the decisions of the Three Judges Bench are binding on us, and in

view of other consistent decisions of this Court, we have to follow

25

them. It is not appropriate to refer the case to larger Bench under

Order VI Rule 2 of Supreme Court Rules.   We find no fault in the

Judgments laying down the law that the purchase after section 4 is

void as against the State.  We are not impressed with the submission

raised   on   behalf   of   the   purchasers   to   refer   the   matter   for   the

constitution of a Larger Bench to the Hon’ble Chief Justice. When

decisions of Larger Bench and other Division Bench are available, the

case cannot be referred to a Larger Bench.

28.Concerning the illegal colony, averments have been made that

the colony is an unauthorized and provisional order was passed to

regularise it.  The plea taken is contradictory and shows the falsity of

the claim raised by the purchasers. That, apart predecessors of the

purchaser obtained the land­based on Power of Attorney, Agreement

to Sell, and Will on 9.12.1982.   As per averments made in the writ

application, Bijender Singh, who was owning 

½ share, sold the share

to Satya Narain by the documents like Agreement to Sell, Power of

Attorney, or Will.  It has also been averred that Om Prakash sold the

remaining 

½ share to Satya Narain on 11.3.1984 by way of Agreement

to Sale, Power of Attorney, or Will.    The  purchase  made through

Agreement to Sale, Power of Attorney, or Will by Satya Narain did not

confer a title upon him to transfer it to the purchasers apart from the

fact that it was void in view of purchase after Section 4.   Based on

26

purchase   made   from   such   owners   whose   title   was   not   perfect,

purchasers had no derivative title in the eye of law. There was no

legally recognized title deed in favor of Satya Narain.

29.Resultantly, we hold that no interference is called for in the

judgment   and   order  passed   by   the   High   Court.     Accordingly,   the

appeal is dismissed. 

…………………………. J.

   (ARUN MISHRA)

…………………………. J.

   (M.R. SHAH)

…………………………. J.

           (B.R. GAVAI)

NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 14, 2019.