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Serial No. 01

Supplementary List

HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA

AT SHILLONG

WP(C) No. 462 of 2021

Date of Decision: 27.03.2026

Shri. Nathaniel John Dexter Shadap

S/o (L) John Booth

R/o Laitumkhrah, Nongkynrih, Shillong

793003, East Khasi Hills District,

Meghalaya.

…….. Petitioner

-Versus-

1. The State of Meghalaya, through the

Chief Secretary to the Government of

Meghalaya, Shillong.

2. The Principal Secretary to the

Government of Meghalaya, Agriculture

Department, Shillong.

3. The Secretary to the

Government of Meghalaya, Agriculture

Department, Shillong.

4. The Joint Secretary to the

Government of Meghalaya, Agriculture

Department, Shillong.

5. The Director of Agriculture,

Meghalaya, Shillong.

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6. Smti. Purnima K. Sangma,

District Agriculture Officer,

West Garo Hills, Tura.

7. Smti. Batrity Mylliem Umlong,

District Agriculture Officer,

East Khasi Hills District, Shillong.

8. Shri. Kiang Bai Lakiang,

District Horticulture Officer,

East Khasi Hills District, Shillong.

9. Shri. Ollan Singh Suin,

Asstt. Director of Agriculture,

Mawkyrwat. (Since retired)

10. Smti Bidalyne Laso

Deputy Director, MAMETI,

Upper Shillong, East Khasi Hills District.

11. Smti. Diwly Mukhim,

Distrcit Horticulture Officer,

South West Khasi Hills, Mawkyrwat.

12. Smti. Vallariancy Mary Skhemlond,

Deputy Director of Horticulture

(Planning), H.Q.

13. Smti.Annie Winda M. Sangma,

District Agriculture Officer,

Resubelpara.

14. Shri. Uchon Rangza Marak,

Asstt. Director of Horticulture,

Ampati. (Since retired).

15. Smti. Queen Mary Lyngdoh,

Asstt. Director of Horticulture,

Khliehriat. (Since retired)

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16. Shri. Wanorlang Syiemlieh,

District Horticulture Officer,

Nongstoin.

17. Shri. Lennie Donald Wahlang,

Asstt. Director of Horticulture,

Williamnagar. (Since Expired)

18. Smti. Banella B Wanshnong,

Asstt. Director of Horitculture (Mktg),

Mawkyrwat. (Since retired).

19. Shri. List Joint Niang,

District Agriculture Officer,

Nongstoin.

20. Smti. Syrpailynore Dkhar,

Deputy Director of Agriculture

(Agronomy), HQ.

21. Smti. Angela Mary Dohling,

Asstt. Director of Agriculture (Soil),

Shillong. (Since expired).

22. Shri. Bibhash Chardra Hajong,

District Agriculture Officer,

Mawkyrwat.

23. Shri. Jitendra Prasad Verma,

District Horticulture Officer,

Williamnagar.

24. Smti. Merginia Dkhar,

Asstt. Director of Horticulture (Mktg),

Shillong. (Since retired).

25. Shri. Baphin Kerlang Sohliya,

Meghalaya Agricultural Service Grade- II,

Meghalaya Basin Development Authority. (Since retired).

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26. Shri. Darius Syiemiong,

District Horticulture Officer,

Resubelpara.

27. Smti. Desina Lyngdoh,

District Agriculture Officer, Nongpoh.

28. Mrs. Babli. N. Sangma,

Principal, Basic Agriculture Training Centre,

Upper Shillong.

29. Smti. Damayansha Nongkhlaw,

Meghalaya Agricultural Service Grade- II,

Asstt. Director of Agriculture (SSF),

Sambrak.

30. Shri. Bomfield G. Momin,

Sub-Division Agriculture Officer,

South Garo Hills, Baghmara.

31. Shri. Shanbha Rani,

Research Officer, DLRSL, Sangsangre Tura,

West Garo Hills District.

32. Smti. Delmanita G. Kharkongor

Senior Instructor BATC, Upper Shillong.

East Khasi Hills District.

33. Smti. Bansara Mylliemngap,

Sub. Division Agriculture Officer,

East Jaintia Hills District, Khliehriat.

34. Shri. Hironya Gasumatary,

Sub Division Agriculture Officer, Dadenggri,

West Garo Hills.

35. Shri. Eddie Murphy Harlada Passah,

Sub Division Agriculture Officer,

East Khasi Hills District, Shillong.

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(Respondents No. 9, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21,

24, 25 & 28 deleted from the array of parties

Vide Court’s order dated 27.04.2022 passed in

MC[WP(C)] No. 66 of 2022).

(Respondent Nos. 6-8, 11-13, 16, 19, 22-23,

26-27, 29-31 and 33-35 struck off from the

array of parties vide Hon’ble Court’s order

Dated 09.07.2025 passed in WP(C) No. 462 of 2021).

…….. Respondents

Coram:

Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge

Appearance:

For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. Philemon Nongbri, Adv. with

Mr. R. Pahsyntiew, Adv.

For the Respondent(s) : Mr. S. Sen, GA.

Ms. R. Colney, GA.

i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No

Law journals etc.:

ii) Whether approved for publication

in press: Yes/No

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

1. Said to have been denied promotion to the post of Meghalaya

Agricultural Service, (MAS) Grade-II during the years 2013 and 2015, the

respondent authorities preferring and promoting his juniors without assigning

any reasons, the petitioner has now approached this Court with relevant prayer

for restoration of his seniority as on 2013. 2026:MLHC:284

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2. Heard Mr. Philemon Nongbri, learned counsel for the petitioner

who, at the outset, has detailed the factual background of the petitioner’s case to

say that the petitioner was initially appointed to the Meghalaya Agricultural

Subordinate Service, Grade-I (Old Rules), vide notification dated 06.01.1990

upon the recommendation of the Meghalaya Public Service Commission

(MPSC). Such appointment being made under Regulation 3(f) of the Meghalaya

Public Service Commission (LOF) Regulation 1972. He has then joined in the

post of Agriculture Extension Officer (Horticulture) Samanda Development

Block, East Garo Hills.

3. The petitioner was also called to appear for an interview conducted

by the MPSC to the available post under the Meghalaya Agricultural Subordinate

Service, Grade-I, on being declared successful and placed at Serial No. 11, on

06.01.1990, he was posted as Research Assistant in the Tura office of the

Research Office, District and Local Research Station & Laboratories, Tura.

4. In the meantime, the Government of Meghalaya has formulated and

notified “the Meghalaya Agricultural Service Rules 1996” for regulating the

recruitment and condition of service of persons appointed to the agriculture

service. As a consequent thereof, the post held by the petitioner was redesignated

as a post under the Meghalaya Agriculture Service (MAS), Grade-III, under the

1996 Rules. 2026:MLHC:284

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5. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that pursuance to

the formulation of the said rules, the State respondent has prepared an inter se

Seniority list of the members of the Meghalaya Agriculture Service (MAS),

Grade-III, the petitioner being placed at Serial No. 102 in the Seniority list,

whereas, the respondent Nos. 6 to 35 has been placed at Serial Nos. 103 to 122

respectively and Serial Nos. 136 to 138.

6. That vide notification dated 10.01.2013, 23 (Twenty-three)

individuals from various post of Meghalaya Agricultural Service (MAS), Grade-

III, were promoted to the post of Meghalaya Agricultural Service (MAS), Grade-

II. Some of these are junior in service to the petitioner, while the name of the

petitioner was not considered, thereby, he was then superseded by his juniors.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that again,

the Government of Meghalaya in the Agricultural Department vide notification

dated 01.06.2015 has promoted 11 (Eleven) officers from various posts of the

Meghalaya Agricultural Service (MAS), Grade-III, all of whom are junior to the

petitioner. Once, again the petitioner was denied promotion by such arbitrary

and discriminatory action of the respondent authorities resulting in his juniors to

supersede him.

8. In this regard, the learned counsel has submitted that Rule 9 of the

said Meghalaya Agricultural Service Rules 1996, provides that the basis and 2026:MLHC:284

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criteria for consideration of promotion of a member of the cadre is seniority, and,

if a junior member is selected for promotion in preference to his seniors, the

committee shall record in writing, the reasons for doing so.

9. Being aggrieved by the action of the respondent authorities, the

petitioner has made several requests to the department to consider his case for

seniority. However, no response was forthcoming in this regard. Instead, the

State respondent has prepared and notified a new seniority list of the Meghalaya

Agricultural Service Officers in 2016, wherein the respondent Nos. 6 to 35 have

been placed in a separate inter-se seniority list of Grade-II officers, while the

petitioner was placed in a separate list of Grade-III officers, albeit, at Serial No.

1 in the said list, submits the learned counsel.

10. It is a fact that though, subsequently the petitioner was promoted

from Grade-III to Grade-II vide notification dated 05.01.2017, but the situation

remains the same as far as his seniority, vis-à-vis, his juniors is concerned, since

they have also been promoted and has reached the level of Grade-I, whereas the

petitioner is still lingering at Grade-II level, which has prompted the petitioner

to make several representations dated 02.03.2021 and 09.08.2021 to the

authorities to consider his promotion to the level of his actual seniority as on

2013, submits the learned counsel.

11. The learned counsel went on to submit that, inspite of such 2026:MLHC:284

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representation, no action was taken by the respondent authorities, and instead,

had promoted the petitioner to Grade-I (below Deputy Director level post) while

some of his juniors have been promoted to the level of senior Grade and Grade-

I, (Deputy Director level post). This has once again compelled the petitioner to

file representation dated 25.11.2021, but no action was taken by the competent

authority. Hence this petition.

12. The learned counsel has submitted that the action or rather the

inaction of respondent authorities as far as the case of the petitioner is concerned,

is a violation of the statutory rules, viz; Meghalaya Agricultural Service Rules

1996, particularly Rule 9 (3) where in a case of juniors being preferred over

seniors, the committee shall record in writing the reasons for doing so. The word

‘shall’ making it a mandatory requirement. In this regard, the case of A.R.

Antulay v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak and Anr, (1984) 2 SCC 500, para 22 has been

referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner, who has submitted that in the

said judgment, the legal principle that where a statute requires to do a certain

thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all was

emphasized.

13. That the fundamental rights of the petitioner were also violated is the

contention of the learned counsel who, in this connection has relied in the case

of Ajit Singh and Ors. (II) v. State of Punjab and Ors, (1999) 7 SCC 209, para 2026:MLHC:284

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21 to 27.

14. There being no negative remarks against the petitioner in his service

career, that is no disciplinary proceedings was ever initiated not was any adverse

entry found in his ACR, therefore, the petitioner has a right to be considered for

promotion as enshrined under Article 16 (1) of the Constitution of India.

15. The learned counsel has however submitted that in course of these

proceedings, almost all the private respondents herein have since retired from

service, as such, the petitioner has made necessary prayer for such respondents

to be dropped from the array of respondents which was done so, vide relevant

orders of this Court. The petitioner himself has since retired. Under such

circumstances at this juncture, the petitioner has limited his prayers to notional

promotion for the purpose of seniority and pensionary benefits, that is for

restoration of his seniority to the position be held in the 1997 Seniority list (Serial

No.102) as against his juniors who has subsequently superseded him. The case

of State of Mysore v. C.R. Sheshadri and Ors, (1974) 4 SCC 308, para 5 to 8 was

referred to in this regard.

16. The learned counsel has fairly submitted that, if the case of the

petitioner succeeds and his seniority is restored notionally, there will however

be no demand for payment of arrears of salary for the relevant period. The case

of State of Haryana & Ors. v. O.P. Gupta and Ors, (1996) 7 SCC 533, para 7 has 2026:MLHC:284

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been cited in this regard.

17. It is therefore prayed that the petitioner may be allowed and the

petitioner may be given his actual due.

18. In reply, Mr. S. Sen, learned GA appearing for the State respondent

has submitted that this is a clear case where the petitioner by his own conduct,

has forfeited any right to being considered for promotion retrospectively, his

main grievance was that he was overlooked for promotion, firstly, in the year

2013 and secondly, in another round of promotion affected in the year 2015 in

the Meghalaya Agricultural Service (MAS), but he has approached this Court

only in the year 2021, that is, about 8(eight) years or so after the first promotion

which has allegedly affected his rights.

19. The learned GA has further submitted that though, the petitioner at

para 12 of this petition, has stated that he has made several requests to the

department to look into the matter as regard his actual seniority as on 2013, yet

there is nothing on record to substantiate this claim. Instead, the petitioner has

referred to two of such representations made to the authorities on 02.03.2021 and

09.08.2021 (Annexure -13 and 14 of this petition), which, as has been submitted,

has come at a very belated stage.

20. The learned GA has also submitted that the Director of Agriculture

vide communication dated 14.04.2016, has circulated a draft inter se Seniority 2026:MLHC:284

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list of MAS Officers to all Drawing and D isbursing Officers,

Agriculture/Horticulture, with a request to circulate the same to all Officers

under their control, which the petitioner being one such officer, is also presumed

to have received the circular. However, even at that particular point of time, there

was no objection or complaint raised by the petitioner as regard his seniority.

This can only point out to the fact that there has been acquiescence on his part.

21. In support of this contention, the learned GA has relied upon the

following decisions:

i) P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tami Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC

152, para 2; and

ii) Shiba Shankar Mohapatra & Ors v. State of Orissa and Ors.,

(2010) 12 SCC 471, para 18, 19, 20, 21 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,

28, 29, 30, 31.

22. On the point of latches and acquiescence, the learned GA has referred

to the case of Bichitrananda Behera v. State of Orrisa & Ors, (2023) 18 SCC

420, para 29, 30.

23. From the stand taken by the respective parties herein, what is

understood is that the main grievance of the petitioner is that, inspite of being

senior in service, his promotion to the higher grade(s) at the relevant point of

time, has been arbitrarily and unjustly ignored, even though, there is an express

provision in the Service Rules(MAS), particularly Rule 9 (3) of the said MAS 2026:MLHC:284

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Rules of 1996 which provides that the authorities was required to cite reasons

for promoting those who are junior as against those who are senior in the grade,

which was not done so to the detriment of the petitioner’s case.

24. The petitioner has laid emphasis on this aspect of the matter by

referring to relevant judicial authorities in this regard, the case of A.R. Antulay

(supra) where at para 22 of the same, is found that observation of the Supreme

Court pointing to the legal principle that “…Where a statute requires to do a

certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all…”,

the fallout of the same in the context of the case of the petitioner herein, is that

his right to be considered for promotion which is a Fundamental Right under

Article 16(1) of the Constitution has been violated, the case of Ajit Singh (supra),

para 21, 22, 23, 24 & 27 being cited to support this contention.

25. The fact remained that the respondent authorities have not been able

to produce any record to explain why those junior Officers were considered for

promotion ahead of the petitioner at the relevant point of time, that is, in the year

2013 as well as 2015.

26. That the petitioner has eventually been promoted to Grade-II in 2017

and to Grade-I in 2021 has also been admitted. The question as was asked by the

State respondent is, what has the petitioner done to air his grievance to the

concerned authorities at the relevant point of time? Since the conduct of the 2026:MLHC:284

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petitioner in this respect, would have a bearing on the outcome of this instant lis.

27. The learned GA in his argument, has maintained that the petitioner

by not raising any objection to such alleged supersession by his juniors at the

first point of time, that is, when he has alleged that he was overlooked for

promotion to Grade-II from Grade-III in the year 2013 while those Officers who

were junior to him in service and even in the gradation list have been promoted

to Grade-II, and then the second time around, when he was again superseded by

another batch of his juniors who were promoted to Grade –II in the exercise

carried out to affect promotion in the year 2015, whereas he was lingering at

Grade-III, his seniority again being overlooked, he has forfeited his right to raise

this issue at this stage, the question of delay, laches and acquiescence coming

into play.

28. As has been observed hereinabove, the grievance of the petitioner is

that he has been overlooked for promotion, vis-à-vis, his juniors in the year 2013.

The cause of action has therefore accrued to him since that year. Records do not

bear witness to the fact that the petitioner has raised any objection or has filed

any representation before the authorities in this regard in the year 2013 or near

about. Even in the year 2015, here too, no representation or objection has been

filed by the petitioner. Again, in the year 2017 when the said circular was issued,

calling for any objection as far as the gradation list is concerned, the petitioner 2026:MLHC:284

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is also found wanting as far as his comment or objection to the gradation list

(which is said to have upset his seniority) is concerned. It was only in 2021 that

the petitioner has raised the issue of his seniority by filing representations before

the authorities.

29. In this regard, the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of

Shiba Shankar Mahapatra (supra) at para 18, would answer this question, the

same being reproduced herein as:

“18. The question of entertaining the petition disputing the long-

standing seniority filed at a belated stage is no more res integra. A

Constitution Bench of this Court, in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar

v. State of Maharashtra,

(1974) 1 SCC 317, considered the effect of

delay in challenging the promotion and seniority list and held that

any claim for seniority at a belated stage should be rejected inasmuch

as it seeks to disturb the vested rights of other persons regarding

seniority, rank and promotion which have accrued to them during the

intervening period. A party should approach the court just after

accrual of the cause of complaint. While deciding the said case, this

Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments, particularly in

Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi,

(1969) 1 SCC 110, wherein it

has been observed that the principle on which the court proceeds in

refusing relief to the petitioner on the ground of laches or delay, is

that the rights, which have accrued to others by reason of delay in

filing the writ petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless

there is a reasonable explanation for delay. The Court further

observed as under: (Tilokchand case,

(1969) 1 SCC 110, SCC p. 115,

para 7)

"7. … The party claiming fundamental rights must move the

Court before other rights come into existence. The action of

courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by

reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court."

30. In the same manner as has been put forth by the learned GA, the 2026:MLHC:284

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petitioner has indeed passively accepted his situation. The proposition set out in

the case of Bichitrananda Behera (supra) at para 29, can also be applied to the

case of the petitioner herein, the same read as follows:

29. Union of India v. N. Murugesans,

(2022) 2 SCC 25, (SCC pp.

37-38, paras 20-25)

"Delay, laches and acquiescence

20. The principles governing delay, laches, and

acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many

occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct

elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and

acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus

to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case

where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles

are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that

these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the

period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation

in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of

practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application

of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be

one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue

to be taken note of by the court.

Laches

21. The word "laches" is derived from the French

language meaning *"remissness and slackness"*. It thus involves

unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an

equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is

neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while

asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party

getting relief or remedy.

22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the

delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it

would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party

approaching the court apart from the change in position in the

interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of 2026:MLHC:284

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Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his

acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has

put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would

be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a

man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be

allowed to avail a remedy.

23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is

no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear

case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of

fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have

any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved

by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept

of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches,

the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are

available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the

various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned

alone would be amenable to acquiescence.

Acquiescence

24. We have already discussed the relationship between

acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other.

25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive

acceptance. It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other

words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when

acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a

particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance,

therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to

perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its

terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously

ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does

take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied

agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is

not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the

compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the

conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving

a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it

may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the

concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis."

(emphasis supplied) 2026:MLHC:284

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31. Granted, the petitioner has by this time retired from service, however,

according to him, at the time of his superannuation, he was serving in Grade-I in

the service, therefore, it cannot be said that since, his alleged supersession when

he was placed in Grade-III, he has not been eventually promoted in the ranks.

He would therefore be entitled to pensionary benefits commensurate with that of

an Officer of Grade-I.

32. In view of the above, this Court finds that the petitioner has not been

able to make out a case for himself under the circumstances. This petition being

devoid of merits, is hereby rejected.

33. Petition disposed of. No costs.

Judge

2026:MLHC:284