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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

W.P.(C). No. 33465 of 2025

(An application under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of

India)

Siba Prasad Singh ....... Petitioner

- Versus-

District Sub- Registrar,

Khurdha & Anr. ....... Opposite Parties

_______________________________________________________

For Petitioners : Mr. B. Baug, Sr. Advocate

with M/s. M.R. Baug, G.R. Sahoo,

& H. Sahu, Advocates

For Opp. Parties : Mr. S.N Patnaik,

Addl. Government Advocate

_______________________________________________________

CORAM:

JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA

JUDGMENT

22

nd

May, 2026

SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J. The petitioner seeks to challenge the

order dated 15.01.2025 passed by the District Sub-Registrar,

Khordha at Bhubaneswar under Section 71 of the Registration

Act, 1908 refusing registration of the deed of cancellation of

General Power of Attorney and the appellate order dated

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09.09.2025 passed by the Addl. District Magistrate-cum-

District Registrar, Khordha in Registration Appeal No.4 of 2025

affirming the order of refusal and directing the petitioner to

approach the competent Civil Court in respect of cancellation of

the General Power of Attorney.

2. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that the

petitioner is the owner in possession of the land appertaining to

Plot No.17 under Khata No.2692 of Mouza-Nayapalli measuring

Ac.0.320 decimals classified as Gharabari land. In order to

develop the land, he executed a registered General Power of

Attorney dated 20.12.2021 in favour of Akruti City Centre

Properties Private Limited represented through its Director Smt.

Kadambini Sahoo authorizing the attorney holder to undertake

development activities over the property. Development

agreement was also executed between the parties in respect of

same land.

It is stated that despite execution of the

documents, the attorney holder failed to undertake any

developmental activity over the land and remained inactive for a

considerable period. The petitioner therefore, issued a legal

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notice dated 06.05.2023 intimating the attorney holder of

cancellation of the Power of Attorney and called upon the

attorney holder to cooperate for cancellation. Since the attorney

holder did not respond to the notice, the petitioner executed a

deed of cancellation of the General Power of Attorney and

presented the same before the District Sub-Registrar, Khordha

at Bhubaneswar for registration. However, the registering

authority refused registration of deed of cancellation of the

General Power of Attorney.

Being aggrieved by the refusal, the petitioner

approached this Court in W.P.(C) No.25287 of 2023 and this

Court directed the registering authority either to register the

document or to pass an order under Section 71 of the

Registration Act assigning reasons for refusal. Pursuant thereto,

the District Sub-Registrar passed order dated 12.09.2023

refusing registration on the ground that the Power of Attorney

was governed by Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act and

could not be unilaterally cancelled. The petitioner thereafter

preferred appeal under Section 72 of the Registration Act before

the ADM-cum-District Registrar, Khordha being Registration

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Appeal No.06 of 2023. The appellate authority, by order dated

30.11.2024 set aside the order of refusal and remitted the

matter to the District Sub-Registrar for fresh consideration.

Upon remand, the District Sub-Registrar again

refused registration by order dated 15.01.2025 holding inter

alia that the Power of Attorney was executed by both parties in

connection with development of the property and contained

clauses relating to construction and sale of super built-up area

and, therefore, unilateral cancellation is not permissible.

Challenging the said order, the petitioner preferred Registration

Appeal No.4 of 2025 before the Addl. District Magistrate-cum-

District Registrar, Khordha, who, by order dated 09.09.2025

dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of refusal observing

that the petitioner may approach the competent Civil Court for

appropriate relief. Said orders are impugned in the present writ

petition.

3. Heard Mr. B. Baug, learned Senior Counsel with

Mr. G.R. Sahoo, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S.N.

Patnaik, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State-

Opposite Parties.

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4. Mr. Baug would argue that the District Registrar

have illegally refused to register the deed of cancellation on the

ground that the General Power of Attorney was irrevocable and

coupled with interest under Section 202 of the Indian Contract

Act, 1872. According to him, the Power of Attorney is only a

General Power of Attorney and not an irrevocable Power of

Attorney. He argues that the attorney holder had no

independent interest over the land and, therefore, the Power of

Attorney cannot be said to be one coupled with interest so as to

attract Section 202 of the Contract Act. He also submits that

the provision is not mandatory in nature and, in any event, has

no application to the facts of the present case.

Mr. Baug also argues that the attorney holder had

not exercised any power conferred under the General Power of

Attorney and no developmental activity whatsoever had been

undertaken pursuant thereto. The petitioner, being the

principal, had issued notice dated 06.05.2023 intimating

revocation of the Power of Attorney in compliance with Section

206 of the Contract Act. Referring to Sections 205, 207 and 208

of the Contract Act, he submits that the authority of a principal

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to revoke a Power of Attorney is recognized in law and such

revocation may either be express or implied. According to him, if

by such revocation the agent suffers any loss, the remedy

available to the agent is only to claim compensation under

Section 205 of the Contract Act.

He also contends that Section 22-A of the

Registration Act (Odisha Amendment) does not prohibit

unilateral cancellation of a Power of Attorney and that the

registering authority, having no adjudicatory power, cannot

examine the validity or enforceability of the underlying

transaction while considering registration of the deed of

cancellation.

On the question of maintainability of the writ

application on the face of availability of alternative remedy, Mr.

Baug submits that the remedy under Section 77 of the

Registration Act is only optional and does not bar exercise of

writ jurisdiction.

To buttress his argument Mr. Baug has relied on

the following judgments:

 K. Gopi v. Sub- Registrar and Ors.,(2026) 2 SCC

696

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 Thankamma George v. Lily Thomas and Anr.,

2024 (7) SCALE 406

 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. ,

(1997) 3 SCC 261

 State of U.P and Ors. V. M/s Indian Hume Pipe

Co. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 724

 M/s Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. V. The excise and

Taxation Officer- Cum- Assessing Authority & Ors.,

(2023 (2) SCALE 361

 Santosh Kumar Routray (dead) after him

Prasana Kumar Routray v. State of Orissa &

Ors.,2014 (II) OLR 305

5. Per contra, Mr. Patnaik would submit that the

General Power of Attorney in question was not just a mere

agency simpliciter, but was executed in connection with a

development agreement conferring certain rights upon the

developer in respect of construction and sale of super built-up

area over the property. According to him, the recitals of the

document clearly show that the Power of Attorney was coupled

with interest and, therefore, attracted Section 202 of the Indian

Contract Act, 1872, which prohibits unilateral revocation of

documents to the prejudice of the agent’s interest. He further

submits that the District Sub-Registrar, while exercising power

under Section 71 of the Registration Act was justified in

refusing registration of the deed of cancellation inasmuch as

registration of a unilateral cancellation deed affecting vested

contractual rights would itself be contrary to law.

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Mr. Patnaik also argues that disputed questions

relating to validity, termination and enforceability of the

development agreement and the Power of Attorney involve

adjudication of civil rights, which can be decided only by the

competent Civil Court. The appellate authority, therefore,

rightly relegated the petitioner to seek redressal before the Civil

Court

He also submits that in view of availability of

alternative remedy under Section 77 of Act, the writ petition

may not be entertained.

6. Having regard to the contentions raised, it is

evident that the first point that arises for consideration is

maintainability of the writ application on the ground of

availability of alternative remedy. It has been argued by Mr.

Patnaik that Section 77 provides remedy to a person aggrieved

by the order passed under Section 72 of the Act to file a suit

before the competent Civil Court and therefore, challenging the

said order before this Court invoking its writ jurisdiction is not

permissible.

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7. For immediate reference, Section 77 is reproduced

below:-

“77. Suit in case of order of refusal by Registrar.—(1)

Where the Registrar refuses to order the document to be

registered, under section 72 or a decree section 76, any

person claiming under such document, or his

representative, assign or agent, may, within thirty days

after the making of the order of refusal, institute in the

Civil Court, within the local limits of whose original

jurisdiction is situate the office in which the document is

sought to be registered, a suit for a decree directing the

document to be registered in such office if it be duly

presented for registration within thirty days after the

passing of such decree.

(2) The provisions contained in sub-sections (2) and (3) of

section 75 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to all documents

presented for registration in accordance with any such

decree, and, notwithstanding anything contained in this

Act, the documents shall be receivable in evidence in such

suit.”

8. Undoubtedly, the petitioner is aggrieved by order

passed by the District Registrar passed under Section 72 of the

Act confirming the order passed by the Registering Officer

under Section 71 of the Act. So, ordinarily further challenge to

such order can only be by way of a suit before the civil Court. It

is well settled that availability of alternative remedy cannot

always be a bar to entertaining the writ application. In this

context, the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the

case of M/s Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (Supra) can be referred to.

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On the question of exercise of writ powers conferred

by Article 226 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court inter alia

held as follows:-

“4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to

say a few words on the exercise of writ powers

conferred by article 226 of the Constitution having come

across certain orders passed by the High Courts holding

writ petitions as "not maintainable" merely because the

alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes

has not been pursued by the parties desirous of

invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue

prerogative writs under article 226 is plenary in nature.

Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be

traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference

in this regard may be made to article 329 and

ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the

Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any

limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue

writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers

despite availability of a remedy under the very statute

which has been invoked and has given rise to the action

impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a

routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner

before the High Court, in a given case, has not pursued

the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot

mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal.

It is axiomatic that the High Courts (bearing in mind the

facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether

to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-

imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under

article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents

is that the High Courts should normally not entertain a

writ petition, where an effective and efficacious

alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it

must be remembered that mere availability of an

alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the

party invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under

article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the

jurisdiction of the High Court and render a writ petition

"not maintainable". In a long line of decisions, this court

has made it clear that availability of an alternative

remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the

"maintainability" of a writ petition and that the rule,

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which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy

provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience

and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though

elementary, it needs to be restated that

"entertainability" and "maintainability" of a writ petition

are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction

between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The

objection as to "maintainability" goes to the root of the

matter and if such objection were found to be of

substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of

even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other

hand, the question of "entertainability" is entirely within

the realm of discretion of the High Courts, writ remedy

being discretionary. A writ petition despite being

maintainable may not be entertained by a High Court

for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to

the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if

grant of the claimed relief would not further public

interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a High

Court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed

the alternative remedy without, however, examining

whether an exceptional case has been made out for

such entertainment would not be proper.”

[Emphasis added]

9. It has been further held that if the controversy

involved is purely legal in nature without involving disputed

questions of fact, the writ Court can interfere. The following

observations in Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. (Supra) are noteworthy:

“8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the

decisions of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724

(State of U. P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.)** and

(2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of India v. State of Haryana).

What appears on a plain reading of the former decision

is that whether a certain item falls within an entry in a

sales tax statute, raises a pure question of law and if

investigation into facts is unnecessary, the High Court

could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even

though the alternative remedy was not availed of ; and,

unless exercise of discretion is shown to be

unreasonable or perverse, this Court would not

interfere. In the latter decision, this court found the

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issue raised by the appellant to be pristinely legal

requiring determination by the High Court without

putting the appellant through the mill of statutory

appeals in the hierarchy. What follows from the said

decisions is that where the controversy is a purely legal

one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact

but only questions of law, then it should be decided by

the High Court instead of dismissing the writ petition on

the ground of an alternative remedy being available.”

[Emphasis added]

10. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this point.

Having held so, it is now required to be examined whether the

present writ petition involves a pure question of law or disputed

questions of fact.

11. The petitioner’s request for registration of the deed of

cancellation of the General Power of Attorney was refused by

the Registering Officer referring to the provisions contained

under Section 202 of the Contract Act. It has been argued that

the said provision is not applicable as the instrument in

question is merely a General Power of Attorney and no interest

in the property was ever created in favour of the agent. It has

also been contended that the Registering Officer does not

possess powers akin to an adjudicating authority to decide the

validity, enforceability or legal effect of the Power of Attorney or

the development agreement.

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12. As already stated, the registering authority refused

registration of the deed of cancellation firstly, on the ground

that the same was unilateral and secondly, on the ground that

the instrument created interest in favour of the agent within the

meaning of Section 202 of the Contract Act. The appellate

authority also reiterated the same grounds besides referring to

the clarification issued by the Inspector General of Registration

vide letter dated 29.03.2022 and the provisions of the Specific

Relief Act.

13. It would be apt to first refer to the relevant provisions of

the Indian Contract Act. Chapter X deals with agency. Section

186 provides that the authority of an agent may be expressed

or implied. In the present case, the petitioner executed the

registered General Power of Attorney in favour of the agent.

Revocation of the authority so granted is governed by Section

201, which is reproduced below:-

“ 201. Termination of agency.—An agency is terminated

by the principal revoking his authority; or by the agent

renouncing the business of the agency; or by the

business of the agency being completed; or by either the

principal or agent dying or becoming of unsound mind;

or by the principal being adjudicated an insolvent under

the provisions of any Act for the time being in force for

the relief of insolvent debtors.”

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14. Section 205 provides for compensation for revocation and

Section 206 provides for notice of revocation. Section 207

provides that revocation can either be express or implied. For

immediate reference the relevant provisions are reproduced

below:-

“205.Compensation for revocation by principal, or

renunciation by agent.—Where there is an express or

implied contract that the agency should be continued for

any period of time, the principal must make

compensation to the agent, or the agent to the principal,

as the case may be, for any previous revocation or

renunciation of the agency without sufficient cause.

206. Notice of revocation or renunciation.—Reasonable

notice must be given of such revocation or renunciation,

otherwise the damage thereby resulting to the principal

or the agent, as the case may be, must be made good to

the one by the other.

207.Revocation and renunciation may be expressed or

implied.—Revocation and renunciation may be

expressed or may be implied in the conduct of the

principal or agent respectively.”

15. Mr. Baug has referred to the notice dated 06.05.2023

issued by the petitioner to argue that the agency stood revoked

in terms of Sections 205, 206 and 207 of the Contract Act.

However, except making a statement that notice was issued,

there is actually no averment in the pleadings or material

before this Court to show as to when such notice was served

upon the attorney holder, if at all. Section 206 of the Contract

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Act provides a statutory mandate requiring reasonable notice

before revocation of agency. Therefore, whether reasonable

notice was in fact given to the attorney holder prior to unilateral

cancellation of the Power of Attorney itself becomes a disputed

question of fact requiring adjudication.

16. Further, the petitioner has stated in the deed of

cancellation as well as in the writ petition that no

developmental activity had been undertaken by the attorney

holder pursuant to execution of the development agreement

and the General Power of Attorney. Such statements are

unilateral in nature. This Court cannot proceed merely on the

basis of such averments and on the presumption that no work

had in fact been undertaken pursuant to the agreement

without affording opportunity to the attorney holder to place its

stand on record. Whether possession had been delivered,

whether preparatory steps for development had been

undertaken, whether rights had crystallized in favour of the

developer and whether the developer had acted upon the

authority granted are all matters which require factual

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determination upon consideration of rival pleadings and

appreciation of evidence.

17. This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that the

attorney holder in whose favour the General Power of Attorney

and the development agreement were executed has not been

heard in the present case. Wholesome acceptance of the

petitioner’s submissions at this stage would necessarily amount

to recording findings touching upon the rights of the attorney

holder without adjudicating the disputed factual issues after

hearing the other party.

18. For the foregoing reasons therefore, this Court is of the

considered view that the dispute involved in the present writ

petition cannot be treated as one involving a pure question of

law alone. The issues raised by the petitioner as regards

applicability of Section 202 of the Contract Act, validity of

unilateral revocation, service of notice upon the attorney holder

and the effect of the development agreement involves disputed

questions of fact requiring detailed adjudication upon

appreciation of evidence. Such disputed issues cannot be

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decided by this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction. These are

matters falling within the domain of the competent Civil Court.

19. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed leaving it open

to the petitioner to avail the remedy available under Section 77

of the Registration Act before the competent Civil Court. It is

however, made clear that this Court has not expressed any

opinion on the merits of the rival claims of the parties and all

issues are left open to be adjudicated independently.

……..………………….

(Sashikanta Mishra),

Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack

22

nd

May, 2026 Puspanjali Ghadai, Jr. Stenographer