IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

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AT GWALIOR

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BEFORE

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HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI

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ON THE 24

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th

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OF FEBRUARY, 2026

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WRIT PETITION No. 18632 of 2021

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SMT. CHHOTI DEVI TOMAR

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Versus

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS

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Appearance:

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Shri Anil Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.

Shri Sohit Mishra -GA for the respondents/State.

ORDER

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Petitioner has filed this writ petition praying for a direction to

respondents to pay her full pay and allowances for the period of suspension

from 1/9/1999 to 30/8/2016. She has also prayed for interest on the aforesaid

amount.

2. Facts necessary for decision of this case are that the petitioner was

working as ANM and was posted at Sub-Health Centre, Badapura under

Community Health Centre, Porsa, District Morena. A criminal case was

registered against the petitioner at Police Station Mahua, District Morena for

offence punishable under Section 307, 294, 341 & 34 of IPC. In connection

with the said criminal case, she was arrested by the Police. Resultantly, she

was placed under suspension by the respondents on 1/9/1999.

3. After investigation, the challan was filed and the petitioner was tried

for the aforesaid offences. Trial concluded with judgment dated 18/11/2005,

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whereby, the petitioner was convicted under Section 307 & 34 of IPC and

was directed to undergo imprisonment for five years with fine. Petitioner

challenged the said judgment of conviction and sentence before this Court by

filing Cr.A. No.810/2005. Criminal Appeal was allowed vide judgment dated

23/3/2017 (Annexure P/2) and the petitioner stood acquitted.

4. While the criminal appeal was pending before this Court, the

petitioner attained the age of superannuation and stood retired from service

w.e.f. 31/8/2016. After acquittal in the criminal case, she approached

respondents for regularization of period of her suspension. Accordingly, vide

impugned order dated 25/1/2019 (Annexure P/1), the period of suspension

has been treated as on duty for all purposes except for pay and allowances

for the said period. The petitioner is thus aggrieved by the denial of monetary

benefit of full pay & allowances for the suspension period and is therefore,

filed the present writ petition.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the impugned order on

the ground that once the petitioner is acquitted in the criminal case, the very

foundation of placing her under suspension vanished. He accordingly

submitted that petitioner's suspension was unjustified and she is entitled to

get full pay and allowances for the said period. Learned counsel also

submitted that even though no charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner,

however, an enquiry was conducted by the enquiry officer and he gave a

verdict vide his report (filed at page no.13 of the reply) that the petitioner is

not entitled for pay and allowances for the period of suspension. It is his

submission that by denying the monetary benefits, petitioner has been

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punished for the offence in which she has been acquitted by the Court.

Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of Apex

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Court in the case of Brahma Chandra Gupta Vs. Union of India,

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reported in

AIR 1984 SC 380

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and the order passed by this Court in the case of Brijesh

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Singh Kushwaha Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.

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passed in W.P. No.22404/2021 to

submit that once the petitioner is acquitted in the criminal case, the reason

on account of which she was placed under suspension vanished. The learned

counsel therefore, submitted that the petitioner's suspension was unjustified

and therefore, he should be paid full pay and allowances for the said period.

6. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents supported the

impugned action of the respondents and submitted that the petitioner got

involved in the criminal case because of her own acts and the respondents

were not instrumental in her prosecution. He further submitted that the

petitioner was arrested by the police, she was required to be placed under

suspension. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner's suspension was

unjustified. He further submitted that the respondents have treated the

suspension period of the petitioner as on duty for all purposes except the

benefit of full pay & allowances. He referred to provisions of FR 54-B in

support of his submissions. It is his submission that the competent authority

since did not find the suspension of petitioner as wholly unjustified, she is

rightly denied full pay & allowances for the period of suspension. He relied

upon Division Bench judgment in the case of Ramesh Singh Vs. M.P. State

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Electricity Board

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reported in 2011(1) MPLJ 466

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as also in the case of Pratap

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Singh vs. State of M.P. & ors. passed in W.A. No.2397/2025

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. The learned

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counsel thus prayed for dismissal of writ petition.

7. Considered the arguments and perused the record.

8. In relation to his prosecution in the criminal case, the petitioner

remained under suspension from 1/9/1999 till 31/8/2016 i.e. the date of her

retirement. It is not in dispute that criminal prosecution of the petitioner was

not at the instance of the respondents. Further, since the petitioner was

arrested by police, it was incumbent on the part of respondents to place her

under suspension by virtue of Rule 9(2)(a) of M.P. Civil Services

(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966. Thus, it cannot be said that

the action of the respondents in placing the petitioner under suspension was

unjustified.

9. The regularization/treatment of period of suspension of a Govt.

servant is governed by the provisions of FR 54-B. Sub-rule (3) of FR 54-B is

relevant for consideration of the controversy involved in this case and is thus

extracted below:

"(3) Where the authority competent to order reinstatement is of the

opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the

Government servant shall subject to the provisions of sub-rule (8)

be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been

entitled had he not been suspended:

Provided that where such authority is of the opinion that the

termination of the proceedings instituted against the Government

servant had been delayed due to reason directly attributable to the

Government servant it may, after giving him an opportunity to

make his representation [within 60 days from the date on which

the communication in this regard is served in him] and after

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considering the representation if any, submitted by him direct, for

reasons to be recorded in writing that the Government servant

shall be paid for the period of such delay only such [amount (not

being the whole) of such pay and allowances as it may determine."

Thus, from reading FR 54-B(3), it is evident that full pay &

allowances are payable to the employee only when the competent authority

forms an opinion that the suspension of the employee was wholly

unjustified. In other words, it is only when the authority comes to the

conclusion that suspension was wholly unjustified, the pay and allowances

for the period of suspension are liable to be paid to the employee. In this

Case, there is no such finding recorded by the competent authority nor the

petitioner could establish that his suspension was wholly unjustified.

10. The issue involved in this case was considered by the Division

Bench of this Court in the case of Ramesh Singh (supra)

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, wherein, the

Division Bench held in para 7 as under:-

" 7.Thus, from perusal of F.R. 54-B(3) of the Fundamental Rules it

is apparent that the authority who is competent to pass order of

reinstatement is required to form an opinion as to whether

suspension was wholly unjustified. If the authority comes to the

conclusion that suspension was wholly unjustified, then the

incumbent would be entitled to full pay and allowances under sub-

rule (8) of Rule 54-B. In the instant case, the competent authority

vide order dated 31.3.2010 which was assailed in the writ petition

by the appellant, has found that suspension of the appellant was

mandatory as challan against him was filed in the Court for a

criminal case. The appellant was acquitted by the court only by

giving benefit of doubt, therefore, it cannot be said to be wholly

unjustified. Accordingly, the period of suspension from 25.3.2000

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to 22.9.2002 was directed to be treated as on duty and his pay and

allowances for the said period were restricted to the subsistence

allowance already paid to him. Thus, cogent reasons have been

assigned by the competent authority while passing the order in

terms of Rule 54-B(3) of the Fundamental Rules. The discretion

conferred by the rule has rightly been exercised by the competent

authority."

11. Similar view was taken by this Court in the case of Pratap Singh

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vs. State of M.P. & ors. In W.P. No.165 of 2024

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. The order passed in writ

petition has been

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affirmed by Division Bench in W.A. No.2397/2025

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holding

as under:

"10. As in the present appeal, appellant was arrested on

22.07.2017 in pursuance to the criminal case and he was remained

in custody up to 26.07.2017 which is more than 48 hours,

therefore, he was placed under suspension w.e.f. 22.07.2017. The

said suspension on account of arrest in a criminal case which was

under Rule 9(2)(a) (deeming clause) of Rules 1966 on account of

custody for more than 48 hrs., the authority had no other option

but to place employee under suspension under the deeming clause

of Rule 9(2)(a) of Rules 1966. Therefore, the said suspension

cannot be treated as unjustified even in case of acquittal also,

because at the time of suspension it was justified under deeming

clause of Rule 9(2) of Rules 1966.

11. Once it is held that suspension of employee was not wholly

unjustified, he cannot be held entitled to pay allowances for the

period of suspension. As at the time of suspension, there was no

other option but to suspend the appellant on account of his custody

in a criminal case. Merely because he was acquitted, the said

suspension of petitioner which was under the statutory rules

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cannot be treated as wholly unjustified."

12.The issue regarding payment of back-wages to an employee who

was dismissed from service on account of conviction in criminal case and

was later reinstated on his acquittal, has been dealt with by Apex Court at

more than one occasion. In the case of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore vs.

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Gujarat Electricity Board

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reported in (1996)11 SCC 603

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, the Court was

dealing with an issue regarding payment of back wages to an employee who

was dismissed from service on account of his conviction in the criminal case.

The Court held thus:

"2. This case does not warrant interference for the reason that,

admittedly, the petitioner was charged for an offence under

Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for his involvement in a

crime committed on 1-10-1986. The Sessions Judge had convicted

the petitioner under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and

sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. On that basis, the

respondents had taken action to have him dismissed from service

since he was working as a Junior Clerk in the respondent-

Electricity Board. The petitioner challenged the validity of the

dismissal order by way of a special civil application filed under

Article 226 of the Constitution. Pending disposal, the Division

Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated 14-10-1992

acquitted him of the offence. Consequently, while disposing of the

writ petition, the learned Single Judge directed the respondent to

reinstate him into the service with continuity of the service, but

denied back wages. The petitioner then filed Letters Patent Appeal

No. 319 of 1993 which was dismissed by the impugned order

dated 26-8-1993. Thus, this special leave petition.

3.The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already

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been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he

is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself

in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in

service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is

entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was

terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso

to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of

back wages would be considered only if the respondents have

taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was

found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented

from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes

relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop.

In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime,

though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from

rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in

jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to

payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge and the

Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting

interference."

13. The similar view was taken by Apex Court in the case of Union of

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India vs. Jaipal Singh

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reported in (2004)1 SCC 121

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, wherein the Court held

thus:

" 4.On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on

record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice,

we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a

special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons

therefor does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or

constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon

by the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically

recorded therefor it operates as a binding precedent as well. On

going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the

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view taken in Ranchhodji [(1996) 11 SCC 603 : 1997 SCC (L&S)

491] . If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the

person concerned was at the behest of or by the department itself,

perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as

a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a

criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial court, he

gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in

any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service,

since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so

kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the

reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are

not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as

well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing

reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be

reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was

on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the

appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the

respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants

cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could

not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our

view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also,

without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations.

Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar as it directed

payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside."

14. The aforesaid legal proposition is reiterated by Apex Court in the

case of Crop. Mithilesh Kumar Vs. Union of India and Ors.,

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reported in

(2020)12 SCC 423

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.

15.The aforesaid judgments by Apex Court held that a Govt. Servant is

not entitled to back wages if he got involved in a criminal case for his own

acts and the department is not responsible for his prosecution and resultant

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conviction. This is because, the department could not avail his services while

he was out of service because of his conviction. The matter is held to be

different if the prosecution was at the instance of department.

16. Similar is the case with an employee who is suspended because of

his involvement in criminal case, lodged not at the instance of department

but at the instance of a third person with which department is not concerned.

In such case also, under the service rules, the department is obliged to place

the employee under suspension and is thus not in a position to avail services

of the Govt. servant. As is held by Apex Court in aforementioned cases, the

employer cannot be burdened with payment of back wages in such cases.

Similarly, as has been held by Division Benches of this Court in the case of

Ramesh Singh and Pratap Singh (supra)

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, the suspension in these

circumstances would not be wholly unjustified and the concerned Govt.

servant would not be entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of

suspension even when he is acquitted in the criminal case. This is because,

on his arrest, the suspension is inevitable.

17. The issue was also considered by Apex Court in the case of

Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan

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reported in (2012)13

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SCC 94

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. It was a case where a Judicial Magistrate was prosecuted for charge

of murder. On account of his arrest, he was placed under suspension by

Rajasthan High Court on 22.12.1985. He remained under suspension till his

acquittal by Trial Court and thereafter the appeal against acquittal was

decided by High Court. His suspension still continued since the High Court

initiated disciplinary proceedings thereafter wherein also the employee was

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exonerated. At this stage his suspension was revoked by High Court on

26.03.2008. He thus remained under suspension for a long period of time

from 22.12.1985 to 26.03.2008. While deciding the issue as to whether the

petitioner is entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of suspension

or not, the Apex Court divided the entire period into different stages. The

extract of the Apex Court judgment is reproduced hereunder-

" 29.The only issue that needs to be resolved at this stage is as to

whether the petitioner would be entitled only to the subsistence

allowance as already paid to him or full salary and allowances, in

view of his acquittal in the criminal case and the exoneration in

departmental proceedings. Related to the aforesaid issue would be

a consequential issue of notional promotion from the date an

officer junior to him was promoted in the Rajasthan Judicial

Service and the consequential entitlement to the emoluments on

the promotional post, which in turn would determine the amount

of suspension allowance and the other retiral benefits.

xxx xxx xxx

35.We have examined the entire issue keeping the aforesaid

principles in mind. In order to determine the issue relating to the

entitlement of the petitioner to the salary and other allowance(s)

upon reinstatement, the matter needs to be examined at the

different stages/point of time. The first stage commenced at the

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time when the petitioner was initially suspended on 22-12-1985

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w.e.f. 20-12-1985. The petitioner, in our opinion, cannot

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legitimately protest against his suspension, at the initial stage,

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when he had remained in police custody for more than forty-eight

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hours, though unfortunately for circumstances for which he was

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not responsible. This suspension was naturally continued when he

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was facing the trial for murder

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.

xxx xxx xxx

39. As noticed above, Mr Calla has submitted that the suspension

of the petitioner should have been revoked at this stage. It will not

be possible to accept the proposition that as soon as the trial court

had acquitted the petitioner, the Rajasthan High Court was

required to forthwith revoke the order of suspension.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner could have been given a non-sensitive

posting, not involving judicial functions. But, it was not

imperative for the High Court to revoke the suspension, at that

stage. It is a matter of record, that the prosecuting agency decided

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to file an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the trial

court, acquitting the petitioner. The appeal filed by CBI was

admitted by the Delhi High Court and remained pending till it was

decided on 27-9-2005 [State v. Gurpal Singh, (2005) 124 DLT

282] . Therefore, the conclusions recorded by the trial court, were

not final. They were liable to be reversed in appeal by the High

Court. Thus, during the said period/stage, it cannot be said that the

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continuance of the suspension of the petitioner was wholly

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unjustified. Merely because the High Court could have revoked

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the suspension, would not render the decision to continue the

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suspension, wholly unjustified

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.

xxx xxx xxx

52. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition. We reject the

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submissions of Mr Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was

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rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by the trial court. We

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also reject the submissions of Mr Calla that the suspension of the

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petitioner was wholly unjustified during the pendency of the

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appeal before the High Court

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. We, however, hold that the

continued suspension of the petitioner during the pendency of the

departmental proceedings was wholly unjustified. The petitioner

is, therefore, held entitled to full pay and allowances from 27-9-

2005 i.e. the date of the judgment [State v. Gurpal Singh, (2005)

124 DLT 282] rendered by the Delhi High Court onwards. We

further hold that the petitioner was entitled to be considered for

promotion notionally from the date when an officer junior to him

was promoted. We, therefore, direct the High Court to consider

the case of the petitioner for promotion (if he otherwise satisfies

the requirements as per the Rules) from the date when a person

junior to him was considered and promoted to the next higher post.

Let such a decision be taken by the High Court within a period of

three months from the date of receipt of this order."

It is thus evident that, even though the petitioner therein was found to

be fully innocent, the period of suspension during the trial was held to be

justified inasmuch as it was inevitable to suspend the petitioner on account

of his arrest in criminal case. He was thus held not entitled to pay &

allowances for this period and was granted the same for the period thereafter.

The issue thus stood conclusively decided by Apex Court in the case of

Gurpal Singh (supra)

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.

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(ASHISH SHROTI)

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JUDGE

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18. This Court has also considered the similar issue in the case of

Vijay Kumar Sharma Vs. MPMKVVCom. Ltd. & Ors.

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, passed in W.P.

No.6869/2023, which has been confirmed by the Division Bench in W.A.

No.184/2026.

19. In view of the aforesaid discussion made above, petitioner is not

entitled for the full pay and allowances for the period of suspension.

Impugned order is therefore found to be just and proper, same is accordingly

upheld. Petition fails and is hereby dismissed

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.

JPS/-

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