2025 INSC 325 CA 13999/2024 Page 1 of 22

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13999 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(C) No.13875 OF 2021)

SMT. LAVANYA C & ANR. … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

VITTAL GURUDAS PAI

SINCE DESEASED BY LRS.

& ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL J.

1. This appeal arises out of judgment and order dated

23

rd

February 2021/16

th

March, 2021 passed in Miscellaneous

First Appeal No.7055/2013(CPC) by the High Court of

Karnataka at Bengaluru, whereby the respondents before the

High Court, appellants herein (defendants in Trial Court), were

held guilty of disobedience of their undertaking before the Trial

Court of not alienating the property, subject matter of the suit.

CA 13999/2024 Page 2 of 22

The original defendants in the Trial Court through their

counsel gave an undertaking which was allegedly disobeyed.

The plaintiffs aggrieved thereby filed the case, which was

dismissed, and they appealed to the High Court, ultimately

resulting in a favourable order. The original defendants now

aggrieved by being held in contempt, are appellants herein.

2. A brief resume of facts leading to the appeal are :

2.1 The respondents herein were the original plaintiffs

in Original Suit No.4191 of 2007 seeking a declaration to

the effect that agreement between the parties dated

30

th

April 2004, i.e., ‘Joint Development Agreement’

1

to be

“revoked rescinded and terminated.” The JDA was entered

into regarding the construction of residential apartments

within a period of 24 months, on a turnkey basis.

2.2 Said construction was to be completed by

31

st

October 2006. However, the same could not be done.

Legal notice intimating the cancellation of the JDA was

issued on 23

rd

March 2007, and eventually, the subject

Original Suit came to be filed.

2.3 The learned Trial Court eventually concluded vide

judgment and order dated 2

nd

January 2017 that the plaintiffs

could not prove that the construction made was in violation

of the JDA and instead, the defendants proved that the

1

‘JDA’, for short

CA 13999/2024 Page 3 of 22

construction made by them was in accordance thereof. It

was held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the

declaration and permanent injunction, as prayed for.

2.4 In the pendency of the above proceedings, record

reveals that the counsel for the defendants undertook, on

two occasions, i.e., 11

th

July 2007 and 13

th

August 2007 that

they will not alienate the subject property to any third

person. Allegedly, however, such undertaking was not

abided by, which led to the filing of Interlocutory

Application No.3 that came to be registered as Civil Misc.

Application No.38 of 2011 under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of

the Civil Procedure Code, 1908

2

.

2.5 The concerned Court framed the following issues :

“1) Whether the petitioners have made out a case of

breach or willful disobedience by the

respondents of order passed by this court in

pursuance of undertaking given by the

defendant and order of injunction dated

17.11.2007 beyond all reasonable doubts?

2) What order?”

2.6 The Court considered the jurisdiction which has

been agitated, observing that the said power is punitive in

nature and akin to imposing punishment for civil contempt

under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It was concluded

as under :

2

Hereafter ‘CPC’

CA 13999/2024 Page 4 of 22

“38. It is significant to note that advocate for

petitioners have produced 10 photos of suit property,

which depict that suit property is still vacant and

foundation is lying. But, here in this case, the

petitioners have contended that the flats were sold by

the respondents inspite of Court Order. Moreover,,

the description of the suit property is incomplete and

ambiguous. Therefore, the averment/contention of

the petitioners is not believable.

39. In view of aforesaid reasons and observations

made, I can safely conclude that the petitioners are failed

to prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt that the

respondents are knowingly and willfully disobeyed the

injunction order of this Court. : There is no sufficient and

satisfactory materials on record to come to conclusion

that the respondents have knowingly and willfully

disobeyed and committed the breach of order of this

Court. Hence, respondents are entitled for benefit of

doubt. Therefore, I answer aforesaid point No.1 in

Negative.

40. Point No.2 : For the foregoing reasons and in

view of my findings and discussions, I proceed to pas the

following :

ORDER

In the result, therefore this Civil Misc.

petition (I.A. No.3) filed by the petitioners U/o

XXXIX Rule 2A and U/s.151 of CPC against the

respondents is liable to be rejected. Accordingly,

it is dismissed.

Parties shall bear their own costs.”

2.7 Aggrieved by this order, the High Court was

approached by way of Misc. First Appeal No.7055 of 2013

(CPC) under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) read with 104(i) of CPC.

CA 13999/2024 Page 5 of 22

The question to be considered was whether the lower

Court’s order is sustainable in law.

Impugned Judgment

3. A question of maintainability of the application under

Order XXXIX Rule 2A was raised. With reference to Samee

Khan v. Bindu Khan

3

, it was held that even if the injunction

order was subsequently set aside, the disobedience thereof is not

erased. The subsequent dismissal of a suit does not absolve the

party of liability of breach of injunction order. That apart, it was

observed that an appeal against the Trial Court’s dismissal of the

Original Suit was also pending before the High Court bearing

R.F.A.No.592/2017.

3.1 The substance of the dispute is that on 11

th

July

2007, the counsel for the appellants herein filed memo as

follows :

“The undersigned counsel undertake that the

defendants have not alienate the suit schedule

property to any third person”

3.2 Subsequently, on two dates 13

th

August and 17

th

November, 2007 the proceedings of the Trial Court have

been taken note of by the Trial Court in paras 26 to 28,

which read as follows :

3

(1998) 7 SCC 59

CA 13999/2024 Page 6 of 22

“26. Then the matter was adjourned to 13.08.2007. On

13.08.2007, the advocate for the defendants filed another

memo which reads as follows :

“The undersigned counsel undertake that they

have not alienate the suit schedule property in

the above case.”

27. Then the trial Court ordered to list the matter on

17.11.2007. On 17.11.2007, the defendants’ Counsel

failed to appear before the Court. The plaintiffs’

Counsel submitted to the Court about the undertaking

given by the defendants’ Counsel. Under such

circumstances, the trial Court passed the following

order:

“Parties to the suit called out. Absent.

Learned Counsel for the plaintiff is present.

Learned Counsel for the defendant is absent.

On the last date the learned Counsel for the

defendants had undertaken that the

defendants will not alienate suit property.

Today neither defendants nor learned Counsel

for the defendants are present. I.A. I & II

cannot be heard as the defendants and learned

Counsel for defendant Nos.1 to 3 are absent.

Hence, it is hereby ordered that defendants 1

to 3 shall not alienate the suit property till

next date. For hearing of IA I & II and to call

the parties under Section 89 of CPC. Call on

08.12.2007.”

28. That order was extended from time to time.

Subsequent to 17.11.2007, the defendants executed the

sale deeds under Exs.P3 to P5, Ex.P7 to P13, the dates

of which are as follows :

Ex.P3–19.11.2007 Ex.P4-03.12.2008

Ex.P5–01.07.2008 Ex.P7-15.06.2009

Ex.P8–06.08.2008 Ex.P9-13.12.2011

Ex.P10–19.11.2007Ex.P11-01.07.2008

Ex.P12-03.12.2008 Ex.P13-15.06.2009”

CA 13999/2024 Page 7 of 22

3.3 The Court citing various judicial pronouncements

observed that there was no merit in the contention that

injunction order is invalid. The order of the lower Court was

set aside, and the appellants herein were held guilty of

disobedience of their undertaking made before the Trial

Court.

3.4 Vide order dated 16

th

March 2021 the appellants

were held guilty of contempt of Court. Contemnor No.3,

namely, Chalsani R.B. who is the second appellant herein,

was directed to be detained in a civil prison for a period of

three months and his property, subject matter of suit, to be

attached for a period of one year. Contemnor No.2, namely,

Smt. Lavanya C., the first appellant herein, qua her it was

directed that the subject matter property be attached for a

period of one year. It was further directed that both the

contemnors shall pay a sum of Rs.10 lakhs within four

weeks, as compensation for the hardship caused to the

respondents herein. The part of the order directing

attachment was stayed for a period of 60 days.

Our Consideration

4. It is this order of the High Court which is sought to be

challenged in this appeal. By way of the special leave petition, it

has been urged, inter alia :

CA 13999/2024 Page 8 of 22

a) In the prayers made in the application under Order

XXXIX Rule 1 and 2, no specific prayer, restraining the

parties from creating third party rights, has been made. The

Trial Court has observed that the description of property is

ambiguous, incomplete and that no satisfactory material has

been brought on record to show wilful disobedience on the

part of the appellants, hence, they are entitled to the benefit

of doubt.

b) There has been deliberate suppression of facts on

the part of the respondents herein regarding construction of

apartments and selling off a part thereof, even prior to filing

of the original Suit.

c) An unconditional apology has been tendered before

the Court and the appellants herein have no intent or desire

to disrespect any order passed by a competent Court.

d) The sentence imposed, in the attending facts and

circumstances, is unjustified given that the second appellant

is a person of advanced years and suffers from various

ailments.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the record. The question to be considered is whether the High

Court was correct in setting aside the order of the Court below,

holding the appellants herein not guilty of wilful disobedience of

their undertaking given to the Court.

CA 13999/2024 Page 9 of 22

6. A few dates require immediate recall. The undertaking

subject matter of controversy was given by the counsel on 11

th

July 2007 and reiterated on 13

th

August 2007. The Trial Court

made such an undertaking into an order of the Court on 17

th

November 2007. The same was extended at regular intervals.

The application for violation of the undertaking/order of the

Court under Order XXXIX Rule 2A was made in 2011. An order

was made dismissing the application on 2

nd

August 2013.

Immediately thereafter, an appeal was filed before the High

Court. In the pendency of this appeal, the Original Suit came to

be decided on 2

nd

January 2017. An appeal against such

dismissal of the Original Suit was pending before the High Court

on the date that the impugned judgment came to be passed.

7. Although of primary concern, in this appeal is the sentence

of imprisonment and compensation to be paid by the appellants

herein, it would be apposite to take note of the contours of Order

XXXIX Rule 1, Rule 2 and Rule 2A.

7.1 A Three-Judge Bench in Wander Limited & Anr. v.

Antox India Pvt. Ltd.

4

observed as follows :

“9. .....

“...is to protect the plaintiff against injury by

violation of his rights for which he could not

adequately be compensated in damages

recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were

resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for

4

1990 (Suppl) SCC 727

CA 13999/2024 Page 10 of 22

such protection must be weighed against the

corresponding need of the defendant to be

protected against injury resulting from his

having been prevented from exercising his own

legal rights for which he could not be

adequately compensated. The court must weigh

one need against another and determine where

the ‘balance of convenience’ lies.”

x x x x

14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against

the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such

appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the

exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and

substitute its own discretion except where the discretion

has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or

capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored

the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of

interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of

discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate

court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a

conclusion different from the one reached by the court

below if the one reached by that court was reasonably

possible on the material. The appellate court would

normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise

of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it

had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have

come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been

exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial

manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken

a different view may not justify interference with the

trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to

these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore)

Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [(1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR

1960 SC 1156] : (SCR 721)

“... These principles are well established, but as

has been observed by Viscount Simon

in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton [1942

AC 130] ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court

of appeal of an order made by a judge below in

the exercise of his discretion is well established,

and any difficulty that arises is due only to the

CA 13999/2024 Page 11 of 22

application of well settled principles in an

individual case’.”

The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this

principle.”

(Emphasis supplied)

7.2 A recent judgment of this Court in Ramakant

Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi

5

, referring to

Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh

6

has reiterated the

principles governing the grant of temporary injunction.

7.3 The aspect of disobedience of an order of temporary

injunction has been discussed in detail in Kanwar Singh

Saini v. High Court of Delhi

7

, in the following terms :

“17. Application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC lies

only where disobedience/breach of an injunction granted

or order complained of was one that is granted by the

court under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which is

naturally to enure during the pendency of the suit.

However, once a suit is decreed, the interim order, if any,

merges into the final order. No litigant can derive any

benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as

the interim order always merges in the final order to be

passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed,

the interim order stands nullified automatically.

(Vide A.R. Sircar v. State of U.P. [1993 Supp (2) SCC

734 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 896 : (1993) 24 ATC 832], Shiv

Shanker v. U.P. SRTC [1995 Supp (2) SCC 726 : 1995

SCC (L&S) 1018 : (1995) 30 ATC 317], Arya Nagar

Inter College v. Sree Kumar Tiwary [(1997) 4 SCC 388

: 1997 SCC (L&S) 967 : AIR 1997 SC 3071], GTC

5

2024 SCC OnLine 3538

6

(1992) 1 SCC 719

7

(2012) 4 SCC 307

CA 13999/2024 Page 12 of 22

Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [(1998) 3 SCC 376 :

AIR 1998 SC 1566] and Jaipur Municipal

Corpn. v. C.L. Mishra [(2005) 8 SCC 423] .)

18. In case there is a grievance of non-compliance with

the terms of the decree passed in the civil suit, the

remedy available to the aggrieved person is to approach

the execution court under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC which

provides for elaborate proceedings in which the parties

can adduce their evidence and can examine and cross-

examine the witnesses as opposed to the proceedings in

contempt which are summary in nature. Application

under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC is not maintainable once

the suit stood decreed. Law does not permit to skip the

remedies available under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC and

resort to the contempt proceedings for the reason that the

court has to exercise its discretion under the 1971 Act

when an effective and alternative remedy is not available

to the person concerned. Thus, when the matter relates

to the infringement of a decree or decretal order

embodies rights, as between the parties, it is not

expedient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction,

in essence, as a mode of executing the decree or merely

because other remedies may take time or are more

circumlocutory in character. Thus, the violation of

permanent injunction can be set right in executing the

proceedings and not the contempt proceedings. There is

a complete fallacy in the argument that the provisions of

Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC would also include the case of

violation or breach of permanent injunction granted at

the time of passing of the decree.”

7.4 In Samee Khan (supra), it was observed that :

“12. But the position under Rule 2-A of Order 39 is

different. Even if the injunction order was subsequently

set aside, the disobedience does not get erased. It may be

a different matter that the rigour of such disobedience

may be toned down if the order is subsequently set aside.

For what purpose is the property to be attached in the

case of disobedience of the order of injunction? Sub-rule

(2) provides that if the disobedience or breach continues

CA 13999/2024 Page 13 of 22

beyond one year from the date of attachment, the court

is empowered to sell the property under attachment and

compensate the affected party from such sale proceeds.”

8. There is no question as to the maintainability of the

application before this Court. It is also true that the order, in the

challenge against which the impugned judgment was passed, was

made in the pendency of the original suit and, therefore, it is

saved from that bar as well. No error, therefore, can be found on

the exercise of such jurisdiction.

9. The next point which needs consideration is the

relationship between an advocate and his client. The appellants

have cast certain aspersions on their counsel to the effect that he,

allegedly, gave the undertaking, germane to the instant

controversy, without express authorization. This Court has, time

and again, taken note of the fiduciary relationship between an

advocate and his client. We may notice a few decisions as

follows:

9.1 In Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi

8

, it

was held :

“12. At this stage, we may also advert to the nature of

relationship between a lawyer and his client, which is

solely founded on trust and confidence. A lawyer cannot

pass on the confidential information to anyone else. This

is so because he is a fiduciary of his client, who reposes

trust and confidence in the lawyer. Therefore, he has a

duty to fulfil all his obligations towards his client with

8

(2011) 12 SCC 600

CA 13999/2024 Page 14 of 22

care and act in good faith. Since the client entrusts the

whole obligation of handling legal proceedings to an

advocate, he has to act according to the principles of

uberrima fides i.e. the utmost good faith, integrity,

fairness and loyalty.

x x x

14. An analysis of the above reproduced Rules shows

that one of the most important duties imposed upon an

advocate is to uphold the interest of the client fearlessly

by all fair and honourable means. An advocate cannot

ordinarily withdraw from engagement without sufficient

cause and without giving reasonable and sufficient

notice to the client. If he has reason to believe that he

will be a witness in the case, the advocate should not

accept a brief or appear in the case.”

9.2 The nature of the profession was highlighted by a

Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law

Officers' Assn.

9

, in the following terms :

“14. Legal profession is essentially a service-oriented

profession. The ancestor of today's lawyer was no more

than a spokesman who rendered his services to the needy

members of the society by articulating their case before

the authorities that be. The services were rendered

without regard to the remuneration received or to be

received. With the growth of litigation, lawyering

became a full-time occupation and most of the lawyers

came to depend upon it as the sole source of livelihood.

The nature of the service rendered by the lawyers was

private till the Government and the public bodies started

engaging them to conduct cases on their behalf. The

Government and the public bodies engaged the services

of the lawyers purely on a contractual basis either for a

specified case or for a specified or an unspecified period.

Although the contract in some cases prohibited the

lawyers from accepting private briefs, the nature of the

contract did not alter from one of professional

engagement to that of employment. The lawyer of the

9

1994 (2) SCC 204

CA 13999/2024 Page 15 of 22

Government or a public body was not its employee but

was a professional practitioner engaged to do the

specified work. This is so even today, though the lawyers

on the full-time rolls of the Government and the public

bodies are described as their law officers. It is precisely

for this reason that in the case of such law officers, the

saving clause of Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India

Rules waives the prohibition imposed by the said rule

against the acceptance by a lawyer of a full-time

employment.

15. The relationship between the lawyer and his client is

one of trust and confidence. The client engages a lawyer

for personal reasons and is at liberty to leave him also,

for the same reasons. He is under no obligation to give

reasons for withdrawing his brief from his lawyer. The

lawyer in turn is not an agent of his client but his

dignified, responsible spokesman. He is not bound to tell

the court every fact or urge every proposition of law

which his client wants him to do, however irrelevant it

may be. He is essentially an adviser to his client and is

rightly called a counsel in some jurisdictions. Once

acquainted with the facts of the case, it is the lawyer's

discretion to choose the facts and the points of law which

he would advance. Being a responsible officer of the

court and an important adjunct of the administration of

justice, the lawyer also owes a duty to the court as well

as to the opposite side. He has to be fair to ensure that

justice is done. He demeans himself if he acts merely as

a mouthpiece of his client. This relationship between the

lawyer and the private client is equally valid between

him and the public bodies.”

9.3 Observations made in Himalayan Coop. Group

Housing Society v. Balwan Singh

10

, by a Bench of three

Judges are also instructive for our purposes presently :

“22. Apart from the above, in our view lawyers are

perceived to be their client's agents. The law of agency

10

(2015) 7 SCC 373

CA 13999/2024 Page 16 of 22

may not strictly apply to the client-lawyer's relationship

as lawyers or agents, lawyers have certain authority and

certain duties. Because lawyers are also fiduciaries, their

duties will sometimes be more demanding than those

imposed on other agents. The authority-agency status

affords the lawyers to act for the client on the subject-

matter of the retainer. One of the most basic principles

of the lawyer-client relationship is that lawyers owe

fiduciary duties to their clients. As part of those duties,

lawyers assume all the traditional duties that agents owe

to their principals and, thus, have to respect the client's

autonomy to make decisions at a minimum, as to the

objectives of the representation. Thus, according to

generally accepted notions of professional

responsibility, lawyers should follow the client's

instructions rather than substitute their judgment for that

of the client. The law is now well settled that a lawyer

must be specifically authorised to settle and compromise

a claim, that merely on the basis of his employment he

has no implied or ostensible authority to bind his client

to a compromise/settlement. To put it alternatively that a

lawyer by virtue of retention, has the authority to choose

the means for achieving the client's legal goal, while the

client has the right to decide on what the goal will be. If

the decision in question falls within those that clearly

belong to the client, the lawyer's conduct in failing to

consult the client or in making the decision for the client,

is more likely to constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel.

x x x

30. The Privy Council in Sourendra Nath

Mitra v. Tarubala Dasi [(1929-30) 57 IA 133 : (1930) 31

LW 803 : AIR 1930 PC 158] , has made the following

two observations which hold relevance to the present

discussion : (IA pp. 140-41)

“Two observations may be added. First, the

implied authority of counsel is not an

appendage of office, a dignity added by the

courts to the status of barrister or advocate at

law. It is implied in the interests of the client,

to give the fullest beneficial effect to his

CA 13999/2024 Page 17 of 22

employment of the advocate. Secondly, the

implied authority can always be

countermanded by the express directions of

the client. No advocate has actual authority

to settle a case against the express

instructions of his client. If he considers such

express instructions contrary to the interests

of his client, his remedy is to return his

brief.”

(See: Jamilabai Abdul Kadar v. Shankarlal

Gulabchand [(1975) 2 SCC 609] and Svenska

Handelsbanken v. Indian Charge Chrome Ltd. [(1994) 2

SCC 155] )

31. Therefore, it is the solemn duty of an advocate not

to transgress the authority conferred on him by the client.

It is always better to seek appropriate instructions from

the client or his authorised agent before making any

concession which may, directly or remotely, affect the

rightful legal right of the client. The advocate represents

the client before the court and conducts proceedings on

behalf of the client. He is the only link between the court

and the client. Therefore his responsibility is onerous. He

is expected to follow the instructions of his client rather

than substitute his judgment.

32. Generally, admissions of fact made by a counsel are

binding upon their principals as long as they are

unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to a

purported admission, the court should be wary to accept

such admissions until and unless the counsel or the

advocate is authorised by his principal to make such

admissions. Furthermore, a client is not bound by a

statement or admission which he or his lawyer was not

authorised to make. A lawyer generally has no implied

or apparent authority to make an admission or statement

which would directly surrender or conclude the

substantial legal rights of the client unless such an

admission or statement is clearly a proper step in

accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer was

employed. We hasten to add neither the client nor the

court is bound by the lawyer's statements or admissions

as to matters of law or legal conclusions. Thus, according

CA 13999/2024 Page 18 of 22

to generally accepted notions of professional

responsibility, lawyers should follow the client's

instructions rather than substitute their judgment for that

of the client. We may add that in some cases, lawyers can

make decisions without consulting the client. While in

others, the decision is reserved for the client. It is often

said that the lawyer can make decisions as to tactics

without consulting the client, while the client has a right

to make decisions that can affect his rights.”

(Emphasis supplied)

9.4 Recently, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Bar of

Indian Lawyers v. National Institute of Communicable

Diseases

11

, which also comprised one of us (Mithal J.)

speaking through Trivedi J., observed :

“51. When we examine the relationship between an

advocate and his client from this point of view, the

following unique attributes become clear:

51.1. Advocates are generally perceived to be their

client's agents and owe fiduciary duties to their clients.

51.2. Advocates are fastened with all the traditional

duties that agents owe to their principals. For example,

advocates have to respect the client's autonomy to make

decisions at a minimum, as to the objectives of the

representation.

51.3. Advocates are not entitled to make concessions or

give any undertaking to the court without express

instructions from the client.

51.4. It is the solemn duty of an advocate not to

transgress the authority conferred on him by his client.

51.5. An advocate is bound to seek appropriate

instructions from the client or his authorised agent before

taking any action or making any statement or concession

11

(2024) 8 SCC 430

CA 13999/2024 Page 19 of 22

which may, directly or remotely, affect the legal rights of

the client.

51.6. The Advocate represents the client before the court

and conducts proceedings on behalf of the client. He is

the only link between the court and the client. Therefore,

his responsibility is onerous. He is expected to follow the

instructions of his client rather than substitute his

judgment.”

(Emphasis supplied)

10. The above judgments make clear that a lawyer-client

relationship is fiduciary in nature and the former is cast in terms

of agency of the latter. It is also clear that the lawyer is to respect

the decision-making right of the client. It flows from this that any

undertaking given to a Court cannot be without requisite

authority from the client.

11. The appellants herein would have us believe that the

undertaking to not alienate the subject matter property, which,

undoubtedly, has far-reaching implications, extending over a

large period of time. We find such a situation difficult to accept.

The undertaking, subject matter of controversy, was given in July

2007 and the miscellaneous application was filed in the year

2011, i.e., after a period of four and a half years. Had the situation

been that the said undertaking was without requisite authority, the

clients were perfectly within their rights to seek discharge of that

order, however, no such step was taken.

CA 13999/2024 Page 20 of 22

12. The same undertaking was re-emphasized a month later,

on 13

th

August 2007 and was later made into an order of the Court

which, as already observed supra, was extended from time to

time. Alienation of the subject matter property despite express

orders of the Court, in our view, entirely justify the stand taken

by the High Court in punishing the appellants for contempt of

Court.

13. The powers of contempt of Court have been provided for

the purposes of ensuring that the dignity and majesty of law is

always maintained. Such purpose is aptly captured in the words

of the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union

of India

12

, as follows:

“42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be

exercised sparingly and with caution whenever an act

adversely affects the administration of justice or which

tends to impede its course or tends to shake public

confidence in the judicial institutions. This jurisdiction

may also be exercised when the act complained of

adversely affects the majesty of law or dignity of the

courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold

the majesty and dignity of the courts of law. It is an

unusual type of jurisdiction combining “the jury, the

judge and the hangman” and it is so because the court is

not adjudicating upon any claim between litigating

parties. This jurisdiction is not exercised to protect the

dignity of an individual judge but to protect the

administration of justice from being maligned. In the

general interest of the community it is imperative that the

authority of courts should not be imperilled and there

should be no unjustifiable interference in the

12

(1998) 4 SCC 409

CA 13999/2024 Page 21 of 22

administration of justice. It is a matter between the court

and the contemner and third parties cannot intervene. It

is exercised in a summary manner in aid of the

administration of justice, the majesty of law and the

dignity of the courts. No such act can be permitted which

may have the tendency to shake the public confidence in

the fairness and impartiality of the administration of

justice.”

When there has been an express violation of an order of a Court,

as is in the present case, the exercise of contempt jurisdiction

cannot be faulted with. The judgment of the High Court is,

therefore, confirmed.

14. In the attending facts and circumstances, keeping in view

the fact that at the time of filing of this appeal, the appellant No.1

herein, who was the contemnor No.3 before the High Court, was

63 years of age and today must approximately be of 68 years of

age, we modify the impugned order to the extent that the three

months confinement in civil prison shall stand deleted. The rest

of the order regarding attachment of property remains

undisturbed. Additionally, the amount of compensation payable

by the appellants herein shall stand enhanced from a sum of Rs.10

lakhs to Rs.13 lakhs.

15. The appeal is partly allowed and disposed of with the

above modification to the impugned order. The amount of

compensation shall also carry simple interest @6% from the date

of the judgment of the lower Court, i.e., 2

nd

August 2013.

CA 13999/2024 Page 22 of 22

Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.

..................................J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

.................................J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

New Delhi;

March 5, 2025.