2024 INSC 290 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2319­2320 OF 2009     

1. SMT. NAJMUNISHA ….SOLE APPELLANT IN 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2319/2009

2. ABDUL HAMID CHANDMIYA 

ALIAS LADOO BAPU     ...SOLE APPELLANT IN 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2320/2009

VERSUS

1. THE STATE OF GUJARAT     

2.NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU  ... RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T 

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.

1.The instant criminal appeals arise out of SLP

(Criminal) No(s). 7419­7420 of 2009 assailing the

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 1 of 54   

Common Impugned Judgment dated 16.03.2009

of the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1702 of 2004 and 2097 of

2004 moved by the Original Accused No. 01 (Smt.

Najmunisha  – Appellant in Criminal Appeal No.

1702 of 2004 before the High Court) and Original

Accused No. 04 (Abdul Hamid Chandmiya alias

Ladoo Bapu  – Appellant in Criminal Appeal No.

2097 of 2004 before the High Court).

2.Smt.   Najmunisha  (hereinafter   referred   to   as

“Accused   No.   01”)   was   originally   convicted

under Sections 29 read with 20(b)(ii)(c) and 25

of   the   Narcotics   Drugs   and   Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as

“NDPS   Act   1985”).   The   Trial   Court   had

sentenced   her   to   ten   years   of   rigorous

imprisonment and fine of INR 30,000/­ (Rupees

Thirty   Thousand   only)   for   the   charge   under

Section 29 read with Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the

NDPS   Act   1985   and   in   default,   she   had   to

undergo one year of simple imprisonment. No

separate sentence was imposed under Section

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 2 of 54   

25 of the NDPS Act 1985. This sentence was

subsequently   modified   by   the   High   Court   of

Gujarat while partly allowing her appeal to the

effect   that   her   fine   was   enhanced   to   the

minimum   prescribed   fine   of   INR   1,00,000/­

(Rupees   One   Lakh   only)   and   reduced   the

sentence   in   default   of   paying   the   fine   from

simple   imprisonment   of   one­year   to   simple

imprisonment of three months.

2A.Abdul   Hamid   Chandmiya   alias   Ladoo   Bapu

(hereinafter referred to as “Accused No. 04”) is

the   husband   of   Accused   No.   01   who   was

originally convicted under Section 29 read with

20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act 1985 and sentenced

to thirteen years of rigorous imprisonment and

fine of INR 1,00,000/­ (Rupees One Lakh only).

The same was affirmed by the High Court of

Gujarat while also dismissing his appeal.

3.Accused   No.   05   (Nazir   Ahmed   alias   Nazir

Bazara) was convicted under Section 20(b)(ii)(a)

of the NDPS Act 1985 and was sentenced to six

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 3 of 54   

months   of   rigorous   imprisonment   along   with

fine of INR 5,000/­ (Rupees Five Thousand only)

which   he   completed   during   the   trial   and

therefore did not prefer any appeal before the

High Court of Gujarat.

4.The facts leading to the present set of appeals

are that on 10.12.1999  at about 06:30 PM, the

PW­02  Mrs   Krishna   Chaube  (Intelligence

Officer/Inspector)   (hereinafter   referred   to   as

“Mrs Chaube”) had received a secret information

that   the   Accused   No.   04   would   be   carrying

narcotic   substances   in   an   auto   rickshaw

bearing   registration   number   GJ­9T­2355   at

about 07:00 AM on 11.12.1999 and shall be

passing through one Shahpur Darwaja. The said

secret   information   was   recorded   by   her   and

reported to her superior officer (PW­03), namely

Mr Pawan Singh Tomar   – who was the Zonal

Officer (hereinafter referred to as “Mr Tomar”).

5.Thereby, on 11.12.1999, it is submitted by the

prosecution   that   on   directions   of   Mr   Tomar,

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 4 of 54   

they assembled at about 06:30 AM near the

raiding point and arranged for the panchas and

waited for the Accused No. 04 at different points

of the raiding route. When the Accused No. 04

showed   up   in   the   said   vehicle   as   per   the

information, they attempted to stop the auto

rickshaw, instead it sped away at a high speed.

Therefore,   the   members   of   the   raiding   party

arranged for and chased the said auto rickshaw

which was eventually, after covering a certain

distance, found abandoned near a road and the

Accused No. 04 was said to have escaped. On

conducting   the   search   of   the   said   auto

rickshaw,   the   raiding   party   found   a   driving

license of one Shri Abdulgafar Gulamali Shaikh

alias Rajubhai in addition to charas to the tune

of 1.450 Kilograms.  

6.As Accused No. 04 had run away, the raiding

party   eventually   was   led   to   the   house   of

Accused No. 04 wherein the Accused No. 01 was

already   present.   Thereinafter,   the   son   of

Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 – namely

Abdul Rajak (hereinafter referred to as “Accused

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 5 of 54   

No.   02”)   –   came   inquiring.   Eventually   the

raiding party conducted a search of the said

house wherein in the open kitchen there was a

cement bag which had yellow coloured wires

beneath which they are said to have found one

bundle   wrapped   in   newspaper   which   was

fastened   with   a   linen   thread   inside   which   a

transparent   plastic   bag   contained   2.098

Kilograms of substance of which turned out to

be charas. Thereafter, the necessary formalities

were   completed   and   Accused   No.   01   and

Accused No. 02 were arrested. Eventually, the

panchnama  was   also   recorded   with   two

independent witnesses. 

7.The statements of Accused No. 01 and Accused

No. 02 were recorded under Section 67 of the

NDPS   Act   1985   wherein   it   was   stated   that

Accused   No.   01   aids   the   business   of   drug

trafficking as conducted by Accused No. 04 –

who was absconding. Eventually, Accused No.

04   is   also   said   to   have   been   arrested   on

26.06.2000   and   per   his   statement   under

Section   67   of   the   NDPS   Act   1985   he   had

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 6 of 54   

confessed   to   be   transporting   and   selling   the

contraband which he sold regularly to Accused

No. 05.

8.Eventually, the charges were framed and a total

of   five   prosecution   witnesses   were   examined

with PW­01 being one of the  panch  witnesses,

PW­02 to PW­04 being members of the raiding

party,   and   PW­05   being   the   FSL   expert.   Per

contra,   the   defence   had   examined   a   total   of

seven witnesses in their favour. 

9.The trial of Accused No. 01 to Accused No. 05

was concluded by the Additional Sessions Judge

in Sessions Case No. 143 of 2000 and Sessions

Case   No.   295   of   2000   vide   judgment   dated

28.01.2004, whereby while the Accused No. 02

and Accused No. 03 were acquitted, Accused

No. 01, Accused No. 04 and Accused No. 05

were convicted as aforementioned. 

9A.Since both the Accused No. 01 and Accused No.

04 had moved in respective appeals before the

High   Court   of   Gujarat   their   conviction   stood

affirmed, while the fine imposed on Accused No.

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 7 of 54   

01 was enhanced as aforementioned and the

default sentence was reduced. As stated above,

Accused No. 05 did not prefer any appeal.

10.The High Court of Gujarat had observed that

the statements of the appellants herein under

Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985 were  prima

facie voluntary and without inducement, threat

or coercion and the statement of Accused No. 01

refers   to   dealing   of   narcotic   substances   by

Accused No. 04 for a long period of time in

which she aided as well. Therefore, there exists

a   presumption   in   favour   of   the   prosecution

under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act,

1872   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “IEA   1872”).

None of the accused had either retracted the

said   statements   or   they   had   moved   any

complaints   alleging   perversity.   The   defence,

despite   leading   evidence,   could   not   establish

their   version   that   the   officers   had   come

inquiring about house of Accused No. 04 and

eventually   arrested   Accused   No.   01   and

Accused   No.   02   as   against   all   legalities.

Furthermore,   there   was   consistency   in   the

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 8 of 54   

statements of prosecution witnesses and that no

specific   unreliability   was   established   in   the

panchnama by the defence. As to the necessary

compliance laid down in the provisions of the

NDPS   Act   1985,   the   procedure   established

under Section 52A of the NDPS Act 1985 was

not  to be considered  and  that  there was no

requirement of any authorization under Section

41   of  the   NDPS  Act   1985.  Since  Mr  Tomar,

being a Gazetted Officer, had accompanied the

raiding   party   pursuant   to   the   information

communicated by Mrs Chaube on 10.12.1999,

defence has also not raised any contention as to

breach of Section 36 or Section 53 of the NDPS

Act 1985.

11.The High Court of Gujarat had also observed in

paragraph number 36 of its judgment that there

is compliance of Section 57 of the NDPS Act

1985 as established from the reports (Ex. 87

and Ex. 112) submitted to the Zonal Officer.

Furthermore, it rejected the defence that the

prosecution   failed   to   prove   documentary

evidence   as   the   defence   did   not   raise   any

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 9 of 54   

objection to the exhibiting of said documents,

including arrest reports recorded in compliance

of Section 57 of the NDPS Act, arrest memo of

Accused   No.   04   and   Accused   No.   01   and

intimation given to the next kin of the accused

persons.   

12.The High Court of Gujarat was of the opinion

that except two minor inconsistencies, namely,

apropos   who   called   the  panchas  and   the

recording of statement of Accused No. 02, there

was no reason to question the veracity of the

depositions of the members of the raiding party.

Those minor fallacies in the statements of the

prosecution witnesses do not go to the root of

the matter. Thereafter, while acquitting Accused

No. 02, the High Court believed that there was

no evidence implicating him to the criminality

involved.   In   the   same   breath,   the   Court

observed that such finding of acquittal does not

throw   prosecution’s   case   as   against   other

accused persons, inter alia, Accused No. 01 and

Accused No. 04, which is established beyond

any reasonable doubts. 

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 10 of 54 

13.With   respect   to   the   objection   that   no

independent witnesses were examined to prove

joint possession of house by Accused No. 01

and Accused No. 04, the High Court of Gujarat

placed reliance on the depositions of Defence

Witness   (brother   of   Accused   No.   04),   who

testified   that   the   said   accommodation   was

occupied by the accused persons to entertain

their guests. The fact of possession of the house

by   Accused   No.   01   and   Accused   No.   04   is

bolstered by their own confessional statements

and   corroborated   by   the   testimony   of   an

independent   witness   PW­01.   Thereupon,

perusing   the   statements   of   Mrs   Chaube   and

PW­05, the High Court held that there was no

infirmity   regarding   the   receipt   of  muddamal

with seals intact on the goods being sent to the

Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. 

14.Delving   into   the   question   of   compliance   of

Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act 1985, the High

Court was inclined to accept the argument of

the   prosecution   that   the   statement   of   Mrs

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 11 of 54 

Chaube   with   respect   to     recording   of   secret

information   and   conveying   it   to  her   superior

officer   stood   established   by   consistent

testimonies of Mrs Chaube and Mr Tomar and

clarified that the testimony of the former cannot

be   thrown   on   the   premise   that   there   was

variation on the point that who called the panch

witness.   Considering   the   aforementioned,

theHigh Court of Gujarat affirmed the case of

conviction of the Accused No. 01 and Accused

No. 04. 

15.The learned Counsel for the appellants herein

contends   that   the   statement   of   the

appellants/accused in the instant case recorded

under the provision of Section 67 of the NDPS

Act 1985 was not admissible and ought not to

have been the basis of conviction of the Accused

No. 01 and Accused No. 04. It has been brought

to   our   attention   that   the   High   Court   has

critically   scrutinized   the   said   statements   of

Accused  No.  01  to  Accused  No.  04  and  has

observed   that   the   same   being   voluntary   in

nature and having been corroborated by other

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 12 of 54 

evidence can form the basis of their conviction.

For this purpose, reliance has been placed on

the decision in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil

Nadu (2021)  4 SCC  1  whereby  it  has  been

categorically   held   that   a   statement   recorded

under   Section   67   of   the   NDPS   Act   1985   is

inadmissible in evidence. The majority opinion

herein   had   held   that   power   of   recording   of

statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is

limited in nature and conferred upon subject to

the safeguards as set out in Sections 41 to 44 of

the NDPS Act 1985 for the purpose of entry,

search, seizure and arrest without warrants and

for conducting of only an enquiry and not in the

course of investigation. It is for the initiation of

an investigation or enquiry under the NDPS Act

1985 and it does not meet the threshold of a

confessional statement. 

16.It   is   submitted   that   the   secret   information

received by Mrs Chaube was only related to the

auto rickshaw wherein the Accused No. 04 was

to   be   carrying   the   contraband   –   which   was

eventually   seized.   However,   there   existed   no

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 13 of 54 

secret information apropos the house wherein

the subsequent search/raid was conducted by

the raiding party. The latter was totally out of

the   scope   of   the   information   received   and

recorded and thereby the search therein was

absolutely   illegal   and   in   violation   of   the

provisions of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985.

The   learned   Counsel   has   further   drawn   our

attention to the fallacies and inconsistencies in

the panchnama recorded by the raiding party in

addition to the depositions of the prosecution

witnesses. 

17.The learned Counsel further relies on Darshan

Singh v. State of Haryana  (2016) 14 SCC

358  which deals with scope of Sections 41(1)

and (2) of the NDPS Act 1985 and the need of

their   independent   compliance   against   each

other. This Court herein went on to hold that

mere registration of FIR at the instance of the

SHO and its subsequent communication to the

Superintendent of Police would not amount to

sufficient compliance with Section 42(2) of the

NDPS Act 1985. For this purpose, reference is

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 14 of 54 

made   to   paragraph   number   13   of   the   said

judgment at Page 364 as follows: 

“13. Having   given   our   thoughtful

consideration   to   the   submission

advanced   at   the   hands   of   the   learned

counsel for the respondent, we are of the

view   that   the   mandate   contained   in

Section 42(1) of the NDPS Act, requiring

the   recording   in   writing,   the   details

pertaining   to   the   receipt   of   secret

information, as also, the communication

of  the  same  to  the   superior  officer  are

separate and distinct from the procedure

stipulated   under   the   provisions   of   the

Criminal Procedure Code. Sub­section (1)

of Section 41 of the NDPS Act provides

that   a   Metropolitan   Magistrate   or   a

Magistrate   of   the   First   Class   or   any

Magistrate   of   Second   Class   specially

empowered   by   the   State   Government

may issue a warrant for the arrest of any

person whom he has reason to believe to

have committed any offence punishable

under   Chapter   IV.   Sub­section   (2)   of

Section   41   refers   to   issuance   of

authorisation for similar purposes by the

officers   of   the   Departments   of   Central

Excise,   Narcotics,   Customs,   Revenue

Intelligence, etc. Sub­section (1) of Section

42 of the NDPS Act lays down that the

empowered   officer   if   he   has   a   prior

information given by any person, should

necessarily take it down in writing, and

where he has reason to believe from his

personal knowledge, that offences under

Chapter IV have been committed or that

materials which may furnish evidence of

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 15 of 54 

commission   of   such   offences   are

concealed in any building, etc. he may

carry out the  arrest or search, without

warrant between sunrise and sunset and

he   may   do   so   without   recording   his

reasons   of   belie.   The   two   separate

procedures noticed above are exclusive of

one another. Compliance with one, would

not infer compliance with the other. In the

circumstances   contemplated   under

Section 42 of the NDPS Act the mandate

of   the   procedure   contemplated   therein

will  have  to  be  followed  separately, in

the   manner   interpreted   by   this   Court

in Karnail   Singh   case  [Karnail

Singh v. State of Haryana, (2009) 8 SCC

539 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 887] and the

same   will   not   be   assumed,   merely

because   the   Station   House   Officer

concerned   had   registered   a   first

information   report,   which   was   also

dispatched   to   the   Superintendent   of

Police, in compliance with the provisions

of the Criminal Procedure Code.”

18.The aforesaid reference places its reliance on a

judgment   of   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this

Court,   i.e.,  Karnail   Singh   v.   State   of

Haryana (2009) 8 SCC 539  which is also relied

upon by the learned Counsel for the appellants.

It is a well celebrated judgment on the statutory

requirement   of   writing   down   and   conveying

information to the superior officer prior to entry,

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 16 of 54 

search and seizure as per Section 42(1) and (2)

of the NDPS Act 1985, requiring a literal or

substantial   compliance.   The   learned   Counsel

has brought our attention to paragraph number

35 of the judgment at page 554 which dealt with

effect   of   the   decisions   in  Abdul   Rashid

Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat (2000) 2

SCC 513 and that in Sajan Abraham v. State

of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 692. By virtue of this,

it   was   observed   that   while   a   total   non­

compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985

would be impermissible, a delayed compliance

with   satisfactory   explanation   about   the   said

delay   could   be   an   acceptable   compliance   of

statutory   requirements   under   Sections   42(1)

and (2). For a better clarity of the judgment,

paragraph number 35 is reproduced as follows: 

“35. In conclusion, what is to be noticed

is that Abdul Rashid [(2000) 2 SCC 513 :

2000 SCC (Cri) 496] did not require literal

compliance   with   the   requirements   of

Sections   42(1)   and   42(2)   nor  did Sajan

Abraham [(2001) 6 SCC 692 : 2001 SCC

(Cri) 1217] hold that the requirements of

Sections   42(1)   and   42(2)   need   not   be

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 17 of 54 

fulfilled   at   all.   The   effect   of   the   two

decisions was as follows:

(a)The   officer   on   receiving   the

information [of the nature referred to

in sub­section (1) of Section 42] from

any   person   had   to   record   it   in

writing in the register concerned and

forthwith   send   a   copy   to   his

immediate   official   superior,   before

proceeding to take action in terms of

clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1).

(b)But if the information was received

when   the   officer   was   not   in   the

police station, but while he was on

the   move   either   on   patrol   duty   or

otherwise, either by mobile  phone,

or other means, and the information

calls for immediate action and any

delay   would   have   resulted   in   the

goods or evidence being removed or

destroyed, it would not be feasible

or practical to take down in writing

the information given to him, in such

a situation, he could take action as

per clauses (a) to (d) of Section 42(1)

and   thereafter,   as   soon   as   it   is

practical, record the information in

writing   and   forthwith   inform   the

same to the official superior.

(c)In other words, the compliance with

the   requirements   of   Sections   42(1)

and 42(2) in regard to writing down

the   information   received   and

sending   a   copy   thereof   to   the

superior   officer,   should

normally precede the   entry,   search

and   seizure   by   the   officer.   But   in

special   circumstances   involving

emergent situations, the recording of

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 18 of 54 

the   information   in   writing   and

sending a copy thereof to the official

superior   may   get   postponed   by   a

reasonable period, that is, after the

search,   entry   and   seizure.   The

question   is   one   of   urgency   and

expediency.

(d)While   total   non­compliance   with

requirements of sub­sections (1) and

(2)   of   Section   42   is   impermissible,

delayed   compliance   with

satisfactory   explanation   about   the

delay will be acceptable compliance

with Section 42. To illustrate, if any

delay   may   result   in   the   accused

escaping or the  goods or evidence

being   destroyed   or   removed,   not

recording in writing the information

received, before initiating action, or

non­sending   of   a   copy   of   such

information   to   the   official   superior

forthwith,   may   not   be   treated   as

violation   of   Section   42.   But   if   the

information was received when the

police   officer   was   in   the   police

station with sufficient time to take

action, and if the police officer fails

to record in writing the information

received,   or   fails   to   send   a   copy

thereof, to the official superior, then

it will be a suspicious circumstance

being a clear violation of Section 42

of   the   Act.   Similarly,   where   the

police   officer   does   not   record   the

information   at   all,   and   does   not

inform   the   official   superior   at   all,

then also it will be a clear violation

of   Section   42   of   the   Act.   Whether

there   is   adequate   or   substantial

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 19 of 54 

compliance with Section 42 or not is

a question of fact to be decided in

each   case.   The   above   position   got

strengthened   with   the   amendment

to Section 42 by Act 9 of 2001.”

19.Per   contra,   the   learned   Counsel   for   the

Respondent No. 02 herein contents that there is

no infirmity in the concurrent findings of the

Trial Court and the High Court. There has been

well   recorded   compliance   of   the   statutory

requirements   and   the   evidences   have   been

sufficiently   appraised   by   the   Courts   below.

Moreover,   there   has   been   no   material

contradiction   in   the   testimonies   of   the

prosecution   witnesses   and   the   same   aspires

confidence.   It   is   a   settled   law   that   the

concurrent   findings   of   the   facts   must   not

ordinarily be interfered with unless there exists

a prima facie perversity or absurdity in light of

the observation in paragraph number 26 in the

decision delivered in  Balak Ram v. State of

Uttar Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 219.

20.It is further submitted by the learned Counsel

for the Respondent No. 02 that there has been

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 20 of 54 

substantial   compliance   of   the   statutory

requirements under Section 42 of the NDPS Act

1985   as   Mrs   Chaube   recorded   the   secret

information in writing and conveyed the same to

her superior officer namely, Mr Tomar prior to

the raid conducted as against Accused No. 04

and Accused No. 01. It is contended that the

search undertaken at the residence of Accused

No.   04   whereby   Accused   No.   01   was   also

present, was in continuation of the action taken

on the basis of the said secret information. For

this, the learned Counsel has brought to our

attention the testimonies of Mrs Chaube (PW­

02) and Mr Tomar (PW­03). Alternatively, even

assuming   that   the   said   latter   part   of   the

raid/search at the house of the Accused No. 01

and Accused No. 04 was not in continuation of

the action taken towards Accused No. 04 as per

the   secret   information,   there   has   still   been

appropriate   compliance   of   Section   42   of   the

NDPS Act 1985 for the reason that the same

was  based  on  the  personal  knowledge  of  Mr

Tomar, who is a Gazetted Officer. It is further

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 21 of 54 

contended that the provision of Section 42(2) of

the NDPS Act is to be read disjunctively and

henceforth there is no requirement to take down

the information in writing where it emanates

from   the   personal   knowledge   of   the   superior

officer. To further this argument, the learned

Counsel   has   distinguished   the   facts   of   the

present   case   from   the   ratio   in   decisions   in

State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1994) 3 SCC

299  and  Karnail Singh (supra)  as they refer

only to the process to be followed upon receipt

of   information   from   any   person   and   not   to

“personal knowledge” of the officer.

21.Furthermore,   it   is   submitted   that   there   has

been a substantial compliance of Section 42(1)

of the NDPS Act 1985 as during the action being

taken   against   the   Accused   No.   04   and   his

absconding   therefrom,   an   emergent   situation

arose   which   necessitated   the   search   in   his

house – which was nearby to the place where

auto   rickshaw   was   abandoned.   There   was   a

grave possibility that if the Accused No. 04 was

at his house then he might run away and/or if

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 22 of 54 

there was any further amount of contraband at

his residence, he would have appropriated that

as   well.   Thence,   the   raiding   party   had   their

hands tied down to necessarily carry out the

said search at the house of Accused No. 04 in

light of the ratio in Karnail Singh (supra) not

necessitating   literal   compliance   rather

substantial compliance contingent on the facts

of each case.

22.The learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 02

further contends that the scope of Section 50 of

the NDPS Act 1985 is limited to the search on

the person of an individual and does not include

adherence   to   the   search   made   on   any

premise(s).   Reliance   is   placed   on  State   of

Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar (2005) 4

SCC 350 wherein it was held that presence of a

Gazetted Officer is required only at the time of

the search which is on the person and is not

applicable   during   search   of     premises.   To

bolster this argument, it is submitted that the

said   interpretation   fits   into   the   reading   of

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 23 of 54 

Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 as Section

42(1)(a)   of   the   NDPS   Act   1985   comprehends

search   of   a   building   or   conveyance   or   place

while Section 42(1)(d) of the NDPS Act 1985

contemplates for search of a person.

23.Apropos,   the   presumption   pertaining   to   the

recovery of contraband, the learned Counsel for

the Respondent No. 02, submits that once the

recovery of the contraband has been made from

the possession of an individual, there arises a

rebuttable presumption as per Section 54 of the

NDPS Act 1985 that the  said individual  has

committed an offence under the NDPS Act 1985.

To further  build  this  contention,  the  learned

Counsel   has   brought   our   attention   to   the

decision in Madan Lal v. State of Himachal

Pradesh   (2003)   7   SCC   465  whereby   at

paragraph numbers 22 to 26 of the judgment, it

was   has   been   laid   down   that   the   aforesaid

possession of contraband includes constructive

possession and it need not be only an actual

possession of the contraband. On the basis of

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 24 of 54 

these above recorded submissions, he prays for

dismissal of the instant appeals.

24.Before we delve into the factual analysis based

on   the   legal   principles   and   jurisprudence

existing in each contention, it is pertinent to

refer to the heart and soul of the Constitution of

India,   1950   (hereinafter   referred   to   as

“Constitution   of   India”)   –   Article   21   –

necessitates   a   just   and     fair   trial   to   be   a

humane and fundamental right and actions of

the   prosecution   as   well   as   the   authorities

concerned within the meaning of the NDPS Act

1985 must be towards ensuring of upholding of

the rights of the accused in order to allow to

have   a   fair   trial.   The   harmonious   balance

between the Latin maxims salus populi suprema

lex (the safety of the people is the supreme law)

and salus republicae suprema lex (safety of the

State is the supreme law) is not only crucial and

pertinent but lies at the core of the doctrine that

welfare of an individual must yield to that of the

community   subject   to   the   State   being   right,

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 25 of 54 

just, and fair as was iterated in the decision of

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 US 436 .

25.The NDPS Act 1985 being a special law with the

purpose   to   curtail   the   drug   menace   in   the

republic necessitated the comprehensive control

in favour of the authorities. The same is well

reflected in the decisions of this Court across

the last couple of decades. Accordingly, the key

provisions to be contemplated for the purpose of

appraising   the   present   factual   matrix   are

Sections 41, 42, and 67 of the NDPS Act 1985.

The same are thereby analysed herein after.

26.Having heard the learned Counsels for both the

parties, we deem it appropriate to refer to the

jurisprudence of Section 6 of the IEA 1872. It is

to be observed that it deals with relevancy of

facts   forming   part   of   same   transaction   and

therefore, it is crucial to refer the bare provision

which reads as follows:

  “6. Relevancy of facts forming part

of   same   transaction.––Facts   which,

though   not   in   issue,   are   so   connected

with a fact in issue as to form part of the

same transaction, are relevant, whether

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 26 of 54 

they occurred at the same time and place

or at different times and places.”

27.This   court   has   laid   down   the   test   for   “acts

forming part of same transaction” in  Gentela

Vijyvardhan   Rao   and   Anr.   v.   State   of

Andhra Pradesh (1996) 6 SCC 241 , wherein it

has been held that it is based on spontaneity

and   immediacy   of  such  statement  or   fact   in

relation to the fact in issue. Provided that if

there was an interval which ought to have been

sufficient   for  purpose  of   fabrication then  the

said   statement   having   been   recorded,   with

however slight delay there may be, is not part of

res   gestae.   The   same   was   adopted   by   a   3­

Judges’ Bench in the decision of  Dhal Singh

Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2016)

SCC OnLine SC 983. 

28.In the present factual matrix, having perused

the material it appears that the attempt towards

raiding/searching the residence of Accused No.

04 was not explicitly in pursuance of detaining

the   said   accused   but   the   testimonies   of   the

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 27 of 54 

members of the raiding party showcase the idea

of search of the house to be an afterthought

with an admitted time gap of 40­45 minutes

between having raided the auto rickshaw which

was alleged to be abandoned by the driver and

Accused No. 04 and subsequent search of the

house of Accused No. 04, wherein Accused No.

01 was present. Moreover, it appears from the

record that even the idea to search the house

was   for   the   purpose   of   recovery   of   more

contraband   and   not   to   apprehend   the   said

absconded   accused   at   the   first   instance.

Thence,   it   can   be   safely   concluded   that   the

search   conducted   at   the   residence   of   the

Accused No. 04 is not a continuance of action of

the raiding party towards the search of the auto

rickshaw   based   on   the   secret   information

received by Mrs Chaube. Accordingly, it does

not appropriately fulfill the requirements of the

test laid down in  Gentela Vijyvardhan Rao

(supra).

29.Having   reached   the   conclusion   that   the

searches of the abandoned auto rickshaw, and

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 28 of 54 

at   the   house   wherein   Accused   No.   01   was

present,   to   be   different   transactions,   the

subsequent consideration is apropos necessary

statutory safeguards enlisted in the NDPS Act

1985. Henceforth, we shall further delve into

the legal analysis of relevant provisions of the

NDPS Act 1985.

30.The next issue that falls for our consideration is

with respect to the compliance of Section 42 of

the NDPS Act 1985. For the said purposes, an

analysis of the bare text of Section 42 of the

NDPS   Act   1985   is   undertaken   hereinafter.

Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985 is worded as

follows: 

“42. Power of entry, search, seizure

and   arrest   without   warrant   or

authorisation.—

(l)   Any   such   officer   (being   an   officer

superior   in   rank   to   a   peon,   sepoy   or

constable) of the departments of central

excise,   narcotics,   customs,   revenue

intelligence  or any other department  of

the Central Government including para­

military   forces   or   armed   forces   as   is

empowered in this behalf by general or

special order by the Central Government,

or   any   such   officer   (being   an   officer

superior   in   rank   to   a   peon,   sepoy   or

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 29 of 54 

constable) of the revenue, drugs control,

excise, police or any other department of

a State Government as is empowered in

this behalf by general or special order of

the State Government, if he has reason to

believe   from   personal   knowledge   or

information   given   by   any   person   and

taken down in writing that any narcotic

drug,   or   psychotropic   substance,   or

controlled substance in respect of which

an offence punishable under this Act has

been committed or any document or other

article which may furnish evidence of the

commission   of   such   offence   or   any

illegally   acquired   property   or   any

document   or   other   article   which   may

furnish evidence of holding any illegally

acquired   property   which   is   liable   for

seizure   or   freezing   or   forfeiture   under

Chapter   VA   of   this   Act   is   kept   or

concealed in any building, conveyance or

enclosed   place,   may   between   sunrise

and sunset,—

(a)enter into and search any such 

building, conveyance or place;

(b)in   case   of   resistance,   break   open

any door and remove any obstacle

to such entry; 

(c)seize such drug or substance and all

materials used in the manufacture

thereof   and   any   other   article   and

any animal or conveyance which he

has reason to believe to be liable to

confiscation under this Act and any

document or other article which he

has reason to believe may furnish

evidence of the commission of any

offence punishable under this Act or

furnish   evidence   of   holding   any

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 30 of 54 

illegally acquired property which is

liable   for   seizure   or   freezing   or

forfeiture under Chapter VA of this

Act; and 

(d)detain and search, and, if he thinks

proper, arrest any person whom he

has   reason   to   believe   to   have

committed   any   offence   punishable

under this Act: 

[Provided that in respect of holder of a

licence for manufacture of manufactured

drugs   or   psychotropic   substances   or

controlled substances granted under this

Act or any rule or order made thereunder,

such   power   shall   be   exercised   by   an

officer   not   below   the   rank   of   sub­

inspector: 

Provided further that] if such officer has

reason to believe that a search warrant

or   authorisation   cannot   be   obtained

without   affording   opportunity   for   the

concealment of evidence or facility for the

escape of an offender, he may enter and

search   such   building,   conveyance   or

enclosed   place   at   any   time   between

sunset   and   sunrise   after   recording   the

grounds of his belief. 

(2)   Where   an   officer   takes   down   any

information in writing under sub­section

(1) or records grounds for his belief under

the   proviso   thereto,   he   shall   within

seventy­two hours send a copy thereof to

his immediate official superior.”

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 31 of 54 

31.From the perusal of provision of Section 42(1) of

the   NDPS   Act   1985,   it   is   evident   that   the

provision   obligates   an   officer   empowered   by

virtue of Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985 to

record the information received from any person

regarding an alleged offence under Chapter IV of

the NDPS Act 1985 or record the grounds of his

belief as per the Proviso to Section 42(1) of the

NDPS Act 1985 in case an empowered officer

proceeds on his personal knowledge. While the

same is to be conveyed to the immediate official

superior prior to the said search or raid, in case

of any inability to do so, the Section 42(2) of the

NDPS Act provides that a copy of the same shall

be   sent   to   the   concerned   immediate   official

superior along with grounds of his belief as per

the proviso hereto. This relaxation contemplated

by virtue of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act 1985

was brought about through the Amendment Act

of 2001 to the NDPS Act of 1985 wherein prior

to this position, the Section 42(2) mandated the

copy   of   the   said   writing   to   be   sent   to   the

immediate official superior “forthwith”.

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 32 of 54 

32.The   decision   in  Karnail   Singh   (supra)  has

been extensively referred by the learned Counsel

for the Appellants and at the cost of repetition,

it is observed that absolute non­compliance of

the statutory requirements under the Section

42(1) and (2) of the NDPS Act 1985 is verboten.

However, any delay in the said compliance may

be allowed considering the same is supported by

well­reasoned explanations for such delay. This

position adopted by the instant 5­Judges’ Bench

of this Court is derived from the ratio in the

decision in  Balbir Singh (supra)  which is a

decision by a 3­Judges’ Bench of this Court.

33.Another   3­Judges’   Bench   while   dealing   with

compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985

in Chhunna alias Mehtab v. State of Madhya

Pradesh (2002) 9 SCC 363  dealt with criminal

trial   wherein   there   was   an   explicit   non­

compliance of the statutory requirements under

the NDPS Act 1985. It was held that the trial of

the Petitioner­Appellant therein stood vitiated.

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 33 of 54 

For a better reference, the judgment is quoted

below as:

“1. The case of the prosecution was that

at 3.00 a.m. a police party saw opium

being prepared inside a room and they

entered the premises and apprehended

the   accused   who   was   stated   to   be

making   opium   and   mixing   it   with

chocolate.

2. It is not in dispute that the entry in

search of the premises in question took

place   between   sunset   and   sunrise   at

3.00   a.m.   This   being   the   position,   the

proviso   to   Section   42   of   the   Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act

was applicable and  it is admitted that

before the entry for effecting search of the

building neither any search warrant or

authorisation was obtained nor were the

grounds   for   possible   plea   that   if

opportunity for obtaining search warrant

or authorisation is accorded the evidence

will   escape   indicated.   In   other   words,

there   has   been   a   non­compliance   with

the provisions of the proviso to Section 42

and therefore, the trial stood vitiated.

3. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed.”

34.In  Dharamveer   Parsad   v.   State   of   Bihar

(2020)   12   SCC   492,  there   was   non­

examination of the independent witness without

any   explanation   provided   by   the   prosecution

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 34 of 54 

and even the  panchnama  or the seizure memo

were not prepared on the spot but after having

had   reached   police   station   only.   Since   the

vehicle was apprehended and contraband was

seized in non­compliance of the Section 42 of

the NDPS Act 1985 – conviction and sentence of

the appellant therein was set aside. Apart from

the said reasons there were various suspicious

circumstances that inspired the confidence of

the Court to set aside the conviction affirmed by

the High Court therein. Paragraph numbers 05

and 06 are reiterated below for reference:

“5. In the present case PW 1, who is the

investigating officer, in his deposition has

stated   that   the   information   i.e.   the

contraband was being carried from the

Indo­Nepal border identified in a vehicle,

details of which had also been provided,

had been received in the evening of 2­7­

2007. PW 1 has further stated that on

receipt of this information, he had formed

a team and had moved to Raxaul from

Patna, which place they had reached by

2.00 a.m. in the morning of 3­7­2007. The

vehicle   in   question   had   been

apprehended and the contraband seized

at   about   6.00   a.m.   of   3­7­2007.   No

explanation   has   been   offered   why   the

statement had not been recorded at any

anterior point of time and the same was

so done after the seizure was made.

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 35 of 54 

6. Even if we were to assume that the

anxiety of the investigating officer was to

reach   Raxaul   which   is   on   the

international border and therefore, he did

not   have   the   time   to   record   said

information as per requirement of Section

42 of the Act, the matter does not rest

there.   There   are   other   suspicious

circumstances affecting the credibility of

the   prosecution   case.   Though,   the

investigating   officer  has   stated   that  he

had moved to Raxaul along with a team

and two independent witnesses, the said

independent   witnesses   were   not

examined. No explanation is forthcoming

on this count also. That apart from the

materials   on   record   it   appears   that   no

memos including the seizure memo were

prepared at the spot and all the papers

were   prepared   on   reaching   the   police

station at Patna on 4­7­2007.”

35.The case presented by the prosecution appears

to   be   primarily   standing   on   the   fact   that

initially, Accused No. 04 – who was identified by

Mr Tomar to be sitting inside the auto rickshaw

which was part of the secret information – had

absconded,   leaving   behind   the   contraband

which was eventually seized by members of the

raiding party. It is furthermore admitted that a

Driving   License   was   also   recovered   from   the

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 36 of 54 

said auto rickshaw. However, it has never been

their case that neither the owner of the auto

rickshaw was attempted to be identified nor the

person whose driving license was found therein

was   searched   for   by   the   authorities   for   the

purpose   of   the   instant   case.   It   is   never

explained  by  Mr  Tomar  how   he   was  able  to

identify the face of the Accused No. 04 sitting on

the   passenger   seat   inside   the   auto   rickshaw

while it was being driven at high speed. It is also

not their case that any previous photographic

identification   for   the   Accused   No.   04   was

provided as part of the said information or as to

how did he know the face of the Accused No. 04.

36.Even further, it is an admitted fact by the PW­

01   –   the   alleged   independent   witness   of   the

recovery   –   that   the  panchnama  was   not

prepared at the time of actual recovery from the

auto   rickshaw.   Same   is   affirmed   by   the

testimonies of the members of the raiding party,

namely,   PW­02   to   PW­04.   It   is   furthermore

intriguing to note that the panchnama which is

timed   “0930”   was   prepared   and   the   PW­01

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 37 of 54 

states as part of his cross­examination that he

left for his office taking an auto rickshaw after

the   incident.   However,   the   testimony   of   Mrs

Chaube reveals that the PW­01 and the other

panch were present in the NCB Office after the

incident   and   even  deposes   to   the   effect   that

they, being present in the said office, ended up

inscribing their signatures on the statements

taken by them.

37.It does not transpire from the material on record

as to exactly how the Accused No. 04 came into

the fiasco here except for the claim by Mr Tomar

of having identified him as the auto rickshaw

per   the   secret   information   fled   the   scene.   It

creates   a   doubt   in   the   mind   of   the   Court

apropos the case presented by the prosecution.

38.Adopting the words of V. Ramasubramanian, J.,

while   speaking   for   the   Bench   in  Ramabora

alias   Ramaboraiah   &   Anr.   v.   State   of

Karnataka   (2022)   SCC   OnLine   SC   996

referred to the mythological Swan, Hamsa and

drew an analogy with the following observations

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 38 of 54 

made in the decision in  Arvind Kumar alias

Nemichand   &   Ors.   v.   State   of   Rajasthan

(2021) SCC OnLine SC 1099:

49. The principle that when a witness

deposes   falsehood,   the   evidence   in   its

entirety   has   to   be   eschewed   may   not

have   strict   application   to   the   criminal

jurisprudence   in   our   country.   The

principle governing sifting the chaff from

the   grain   has   to   be   applied.   However,

when   the   evidence   is   inseparable   and

such   an   attempt   would   either   be

impossible or would make the evidence

unacceptable,   the   natural   consequence

would   be   one   of   avoidance.   The   said

principle has not assumed the status of

law   but   continues   only   as   a   rule   of

caution.   One   has   to   see   the   nature   of

discrepancy in a given case. When the

discrepancies are very material shaking

the very credibility of the witness leading

to a conclusion in the mind of the court

that is neither possible to separate it nor

to rely upon, it is for the said court to

either accept or reject.

39.It becomes difficult to accept the case presented

against the Accused No. 04 by the prosecution

and it is not acceptable to state that the same

has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The inconsistencies in the testimonies and lack

of   observation   of   due   process   of   law   by   the

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 39 of 54 

investigating agency has severely impacted the

case of the prosecution.

40.The subsequent and alternate contention put

forth by the learned Counsel for the Respondent

No. 02 pertains to the non­requirement of the

compliance of Section 41 of the NDPS Act 1985.

To   appreciate   the   said   contention,

jurisprudential aspect ought to be dealt with.

Section 41 of the NDPS Act 1985 deals with the

power   to   issue   warrant   and   authorization   to

both a Magistrate and an Officer of Gazetted

rank as applicable and the same is reproduced

below as follows: 

“41.   Power   to   issue   warrant   and

authorisation.—

(1)   A   Metropolitan   Magistrate   or   a

Magistrate   of   the   first   class   or   any

Magistrate of the second class specially

empowered by the State Government in

this behalf, may issue a warrant for the

arrest   of   any   person   whom   he   has

reason to believe to have committed any

offence punishable under this Act, or for

the search, whether by day or by night,

of any building, conveyance or place in

which   he   has   reason   to   believe   any

narcotic drug or psychotropic substance

or   controlled   substance   in   respect   of

which an offence punishable under this

Act has been committed or any document

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 40 of 54 

or   other   article   which   may   furnish

evidence   of   the   commission   of   such

offence or any illegally acquired property

or any document or other article which

may   furnish   evidence   of   holding   any

illegally acquired property which is liable

for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under

Chapter   VA   of   this   Act   is   kept   or

concealed: 

(2) Any such officer of gazetted rank of

the   departments   of   central   excise,

narcotics,   customs,   revenue   intelligence

or any other department of the Central

Government   including   the   para­military

forces   or   the   armed   forces   as   is

empowered in this behalf by general or

special order by the Central Government,

or any such officer of the revenue, drugs

control,   excise,   police   or   any   other

department of a State Government as is

empowered in this behalf by general or

special order of the State Government if

he has reason to believe from personal

knowledge or information given by any

person   and   taken   in   writing   that   any

person   has   committed   an   offence

punishable   under   this   Act   or   that   any

narcotic drug or psychotropic substance

or   controlled   substance   in   respect   of

which   any   offence   under   this   Act   has

been committed or any document or other

article which may furnish evidence of the

commission   of   such   offence   or   any

illegally   acquired   property   or   any

document   or   other   article   which   may

furnish evidence of holding any illegally

acquired   property   which   is   liable   for

seizure   or   freezing   or   forfeiture   under

Chapter   VA   of   this   Act   is   kept   or

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 41 of 54 

concealed in any building, conveyance or

place,   may   authorise   any   officer

subordinate to him but superior in rank

to a peon, sepoy or a constable to arrest

such   a   person   or   search   a   building,

conveyance or place whether by day or

by night or himself arrest such a person

or   search   a   building,   conveyance   or

place. 

(3) The officer to whom a warrant under

sub­section   (1)   is   addressed   and   the

officer   who   authorised   the   arrest   or

search or the officer who is so authorised

under sub­section (2) shall have all the

powers of an officer acting under section

42.” 

41.In the instant case, we are primarily affected by

virtue of the jurisprudence of Section 41(2) of

the   NDPS   Act   1985,   which   begins   from   the

power of search and seizure conferred by the

State upon its executive or administrative arms

for   the   protection   of   social   security   in   any

civilized   nation.   Such   power   is   inherently

limited by the recognition of fundamental rights

by   the   Constitution   as   well   as   statutory

limitations. At the same time, it is not legitimate

to assume that Article 20(3) of the Constitution

of India would be affected by the provisions of

search and seizure. It is a settled law that the

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 42 of 54 

statutory provisions conferring authorities with

the   power   to   search   and   seize   are   a   mere

temporary   interference   with   the   right   of   the

accused   as   they   stand   well   regulated   by

reasonable   restrictions   emanating   from   the

statutory provisions itself. Thence, such a power

cannot   be   considered   as   a   violation   of   any

fundamental   rights   of   the   person   concerned.

The same is iterated in MP Sharma v. Satish

Chandra Sharma, District Magistrate, Delhi

1954 SCR 1077. 

42.In   light   of   the   aforementioned   constitutional

backdrop, provisions of general search warrants

and seizure were incorporated for the first time

in   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1882,

thereupon, in Sections 96, 97, 98, 102, 103,

105,   165   and   550   of   the   Code   of   Criminal

Procedure, 1898 and presently, in the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 under Sections 93,

94, 100, 102, 103 and 165. Upon perusal of

Section 41(1) of the NDPS Act 1985, it is evident

that the said provision empowers a Magistrate

to issue search warrant for the arrest of any

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 43 of 54 

person or for search, whom he has reason to

believe to have committed any offence under the

provisions of the NDPS Act 1985. Section 41(2)

of   the   NDPS   Act   1985   further   enables   a

Gazetted Officer, so empowered in this regard

by   the   Central   Government   or   the   State

Government, to arrest or conduct a search or

authorize an officer subordinate to him to do so,

provided   that   such   subordinate   officer   is

superior   to   the   rank   of   a   peon,   sepoy   or

constable.   It   is   pertinent   to   note   that   the

empowered Gazetted Officer must have reason

to believe that an offence has been committed

under Chapter IV of the NDPS Act 1985, which

necessitated the arrest or search. As per Section

41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985, such reason to

believe   must   arise   from   either   personal

knowledge   of   the   said   Gazetted   Officer   or

information   given   by   any   person   to   him.

Additionally, such knowledge or information is

required to be reduced into writing by virtue of

expression “and taken in writing” used therein.

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 44 of 54 

43.The learned Counsel of the Respondent No. 02

presents   an   alternate   argument   that   the

expressions   “personal   knowledge”   and   “and

taken in writing” contemplated by Section 41(2)

of   the   NDPS   Act   1985   ought   to   be   read

disjunctively,   thereby   eliminating   the

requirement   of   taking   down   information   in

writing   when   it   arises   out   of   the   personal

knowledge of the Gazetted Officer. We are not

inclined   to   accept   this   interpretation.   The

position   for   recording   the   reasons   for

conducting   search   and   seizure   are   well

established   through   the   ratio   in   paragraph

number 25 (2C) in Balbir Singh case (supra)

as mentioned below: 

“(2­C)   Under   Section   42(1)   the

empowered   officer   if   has   a   prior

information   given   by   any   person,   that

should   necessarily   be   taken   down   in

writing. But if he has reason to believe

from   personal   knowledge   that   offences

under Chapter IV have been committed or

materials which may furnish evidence of

commission   of   such   offences   are

concealed   in   any   building   etc.   he   may

carry out the arrest or search without a

warrant between sunrise and sunset and

this provision does not mandate that he

should record his reasons of belief. But

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 45 of 54 

under the proviso to Section 42(1) if such

officer   has   to   carry   out   such   search

between   sunset   and   sunrise,   he   must

record the grounds of his belief.

To   this   extent   these   provisions   are

mandatory   and   contravention   of   the

same would affect the prosecution case

and vitiate the trial.”

44.Applying   the   aforesaid   legal   position   to   the

present factual matrix, we do not find force in

the submission that the raiding party proceeded

to  conduct   search  at   the   house   on   personal

knowledge of the Gazetted Officer, Mr Tomar.

Foremost, the fact that the secret information

received   by   Mrs   Chaube   was   limited   to

anticipation   of   Accused   No.   04   carrying

contraband from a particular route in an auto

rickshaw,   remains   unchallenged.   Accordingly,

there was no prior information to the raiding

party,   including   Mr   Tomar   (Gazetted   Officer)

that   there   is   contraband   in   the   house   of

Accused No. 04, thereby necessitating search

for the same. Additionally, it is deposed by the

PW­01 that he was asked to accompany the

raiding party to the house of Accused No. 04,

which was located nearby for the purpose of

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 46 of 54 

carrying   out   a   search   thereof   and   admits   of

having   no   knowledge   about   any   written

information   with   the   raiding   party   for

conducting raid at the said house. Further, Mrs

Chaube in her examination in chief stated that

upon the directions of Mr Tomar that the house

of Accused No. 04 was nearby, they proceeded

to   conduct   raid   thereof.   Per   contra,   in   her

cross­examination, she admits that the raiding

team proceeded to the house of Accused No. 04

for  the   purpose   of   search   of   the   contraband

pursuant to the discussions carried by them

and not particularly on the personal knowledge

of Mr Tomar.

45.She   further   goes   on   to   admit   that   it   was

obligatory   for   her   to   obtain   a   written

authorization from her superior officer – which

was Mr Tomar in this case. She omitted seeking

the said authorization on the premise that there

was an emergent need to conduct search at the

house.   Such   major   inconsistency   as   to   the

‘source’   of   information   of   existence   of

contraband   at   the   house   of   Accused   No.   04

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 47 of 54 

weakens   the   case   of   the   prosecution.

Furthermore, the testimony of Mr Tomar has

some glaring irregularities apropos his personal

knowledge of having contraband at the house of

Accused No. 04. Mr Tomar, on one hand in his

testimony   admits   that   the   officers   of   raiding

party together decided to conduct raid at the

house of Accused No. 04 post recovery from the

auto   rickshaw,   however,   on   the   other   hand

admits of having knowledge of the residential

address   of   Accused   No.   04   from   the   secret

information. However, Mr Tomar nowhere in his

depositions stated that he proceeded to conduct

raid at the house on his personal knowledge. 

46.From the aforementioned, we are of the view

that the raid/search conducted at the house of

the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 was not

based on the personal knowledge of Mr Tomar,

rather it was an action on the part of raiding

party bereft of mandatory statutory compliance

of Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985. 

47.Furthermore, even if the learned Counsel for the

Respondent No. 02 would justify the raid at the

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 48 of 54 

house on account of “reason to believe from ….

information given by any person and taken down

in writing” as per Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act

1985,   still   the   prosecution   is   not   able   to

establish   its   case   beyond   reasonable   doubts.

Because the secret information, as received by

Mrs Chaube in the present facts was limited to

the apprehension that Accused No. 04 was to

carry contraband via an auto rickshaw from a

particular route. There is no reference to the

apprehension of existence of contraband in the

house   of   the   Accused   No.   04   in   the   said

recorded information. Thence, the raid at the

house of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No.

04 is in violation of the statutory mandate of

Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985 and the

ratio in the precedent of Balbir Singh (supra)

and Karnail Singh (supra). Consequently, the

conviction of Accused No. 01 premised on the

recovery of 2.098 kilograms of charas from the

house is not in consonance with the mandatory

statutory   compliance   of   Section   41(2)   of   the

NDPS Act 1985.

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 49 of 54 

48.While the facts and evidences are appreciated in

the instant case, the testimonies of the PW­01

and the members of the raiding party do not

present such a compliance of the information of

rights to the Accused No. 01 herein. While a

claim is made to this effect, nothing has come

up from the perusal of the  panchnama  or the

deposition   of   the   PW­01   to   this   effect.

Accordingly, the authorities have further failed

to protect the inherent rights granted to the

Accused   No.   01   by   virtue   of   the   statutory

safeguards.

49.Thereinafter, a significant reliance was placed

by  the High  Court  on the  statements  of  the

accused wherein a categorical admission was

substantiated by them, especially Accused No.

01 and Accused No. 04. To begin with, Section

67 of the NDPS Act 1985 reads:

“67.   Power   to   call   for   information,

etc.—

Any officer referred to in section 42 who

is authorised in this behalf by the Central

Government or a State Government may,

during   the   course   of   any   enquiry   in

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 50 of 54 

connection with the contravention of any

provision of this Act,— 

(a)call   for   information   from   any

person   for   the   purpose   of

satisfying   himself   whether  there

has been any contravention of the

provisions of this Act or any rule

or order made thereunder; 

(b) require any person to produce or

deliver   any   document   or   thing

useful or relevant to the enquiry; 

(c) examine   any   person   acquainted

with the facts and circumstances

of the case.”

50.The evidentiary value of confessional statements

recorded   under   Section   67   of   the   NDPS   Act

1985 was dealt with by this Court in the case of

Tofan   Singh   (supra).   As   per   the   majority

verdict   delivered   by   3­Judges’   Bench   in   this

case has held that the powers conferred on the

empowered officers under Section 41 and 42 of

the NDPS Act 1985 read with Section 67 of the

NDPS Act 1985 are limited in nature conferred

for the purpose of entry, search, seizure and

arrest without warrant along with safeguards

enlisted   thereof.   The   “enquiry”   undertaken

under   the   aforesaid   provisions   may   lead   to

initiation of an investigation or enquiry by the

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 51 of 54 

officers   empowered   to   do   so   either   under

Section 53 of the NDPS Act 1985 or otherwise.

Thus, the officers empowered only under the

aforesaid   provisions   neither   having   power   to

investigate nor to file a police report meet the

test of police officer for the purpose of Section

25   of   the   IEA   1872.   Consequently,   the   bar

under   Section   25   of   the   IEA   1872   is   not

applicable   against   the   admissibility   of

confessional   statement   made   to   the   officers

empowered   under   Section   41   and   42   of   the

NDPS Act 1985.

51.Furthermore, it was also held by this Court that

Section   67   is   at   an   antecedent   stage   to   the

investigation, which occurs after the empowered

officer under Section 42 of the NDPS Act 1985

has   the   reason   to   believe   upon   information

gathered in an enquiry made in that behalf that

an   offence   under   NDPS   Act   1985   has   been

committed and is thus not even in the nature of

a confessional statement.  Hence, question of its

being   admissible   in   trial   as   a   confessional

statement against the accused does not arise.

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 52 of 54 

52.The same, therefore, cannot be considered to

convict an accused person under the NDPS Act

1985. A reference at this stage may be made to

the   majority   view   in   the   3­Judges’   Bench

decision   wherein   it   was   held   as   follows   in

paragraph number 158: 

“158. We   answer   the   reference   by

stating:

158.1. That the officers who are invested

with   powers   under   Section   53   of   the

NDPS Act are “police officers” within the

meaning  of  Section 25 of  the  Evidence

Act, as a result of which any confessional

statement made to them would be barred

under the provisions of Section 25 of the

Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into

account in order to convict an accused

under the NDPS Act.

158.2. That a statement recorded under

Section   67   of   the   NDPS   Act   cannot   be

used as a confessional statement in the

trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.

53.By   virtue   of   the   decision   in  Tofan   Singh

(supra),   the   benefit   is   to   be   granted   to   the

appellants   herein   in   regard   to   the

inadmissibility   of   their   statements   under

Section 67 of the NDPS Act 1985.

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 53 of 54 

54.In   the   light   of   the   above,   these   appeals   are

allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment

of the High Court as well as that of the Trial

Court.   The   appellants   are   acquitted   of   the

charges framed against them by giving benefit of

doubt. 

55.Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

………….…………………………J.

       (ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

…………..…………………………J.

(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

APRIL 09, 2024;

NEW DELHI

Criminal Appeal No(s). 2319­20 of 2009          Page 54 of 54