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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA

AGARTALA

W.A. No.18 of 2024

Smt. Rekha Das, Scientist (level 10), Wife of Sri. Himanshu Periyadarshi,

resident of Manakkolil House, Illathuparambu Road, P.O.-Kochi-682041,

Kerala, India, Presently residing at: Quarter Type IV, B-I College of Fisheries,

P.O.- Lembucherra, P.S.- Lefunga, District-West Tripura.

……… Appellant(s).

V E R S U S

1. The Union of India, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Women and

Child Development, A-Wing, Shastri Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road,

New Delhi-110001.

2. The Secretary, Ministry of Women and Child Development, A-Wing,

Shastri Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road, New Delhi-110001.

3. The Director General, Indian Council of Agriculture Research, Krishi

Bhawan. Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road, New Delhi-110001.

4. The Secretary, Appellate Authority, under the Sexual Harassment of

Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition & Redressal) Act, 2013, Indian

Council of Agriculture Research, Krishi Bhawan, Dr. Rajendra Prasad Road,

New Delhi-110001.

5. The Director, ICAR Research Complex for NEH Region, Umiam, Umroi

Road, Meghalaya-793103.

6. The Joint Director, ICAR Research Complex for NEH Region, Tripura

Center, Lembucherra, P.O.-Lembucherra, Lembucherra, P.S.-Lefunga,

District-West Tripura.

7. Dr. Basant Kumar Kandpal, Principal Scientist, PIM Unit, ICAR

Headquarters, New Delhi.

………Respondent(s).

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Somik Deb, Sr. Advocate,

Mr. Subhendu Noatia, Advocate,

Mr. Jishan Samed, Advocate.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Bidyut Majumder, Deputy S.G.I.,

Mr. Dipankar Sarma, Addl. G.A.

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT

CAV reserved on : 07.04.2026.

Judgment delivered on : 07.05.2026.

Whether fit for reporting : YES.

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JUDGMENT & ORDER

(M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)

1) Heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr.

Jishan Samed, counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Bidyut Majumder,

Deputy S.G.I. appearing for the respondent-Union of India as well as Mr.

Dipankar Sarma, Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the respondents-

State.

2) This Writ Appeal is filed by the Appellant challenging the

judgment dt.20.12.2023 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.483 of

2022.

3) The Appellant had filed the said W.P.(C) No.483 of 2022

challenging the Office Memorandum dt.30.7.2021 as communicated by the

Letter dt.27.11.2021 and for a direction to the respondents to consider afresh a

statutory Appeal filed by her within 2 months.

4) The case has a chequered history.

The background facts:

5) The Appellant was appointed as a Scientist in the Indian Council

for Agricultural Research on 10.10.2014. She was then given posting at the

ICAR Research Complex for North Eastern Hills region, Tripura Centre,

Agartala which she joined on 23.2.2015.

6) Dr. Basant Kumar Kandpal (Respondent no.6) assumed duties

as Joint Director, ICAR, Tripura (Respondent no.7).

7) On 5.12.2018, the appellant filed a complaint under the Sexual

Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal)

Act,2013 (for short ‘the Act’) against respondent no.6/7 alleging certain

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inappropriate conduct allegedly amounting to sexual harassment while she

was working in her office and also in the field.

8) At that time there was no Internal Complaints Committee at

Agartala. So the matter was referred to the Internal Complaints Committee of

the ICAR Research Complex for NEH Region, Meghalaya (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘Institute Complaint Committee’).

9) The Administrative Officer, Institute Complaints Committee then

issued a Letter dt.29.12.2018 asking her to appear before the said Committee

on 18.1.2019 as an inquiry would be held at the Tripura Centre on the basis of

the said complaint.

The constitution of the Institute Complaint Committee:

10) The said Committee consisted of the following:

(i) Dr. Pankaj Kumar Sinha, Scientist (Agrl. Extension),

Member.

(ii) Ms. Nirmal Borthakur, Senior Technical Officer, Member

(iii) Malaya Kharaior, UDC, Member

(iv) S.R.Baruah, Administrative Officer (P), Member Secretary

(v) Dr. Bijoy Bhattacharjee, Principal Scientist, Chairman.

The report dt.9.4.2019 of the Institute Complaint Committee:

11) The said Committee submitted a report dt.9.4.2019 and a copy

thereof was furnished to the appellant too.

12) The Committee, in its report, found lapses on part of both

appellant and respondent no.7 and concluded that while the appellant was

argumentative and arrogant, the respondent no.7 was a short tempered person.

It concluded that both were good scientists and both needed to change their

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behaviour. No specific finding on the sexual harassment allegations was

given.

The Appeal filed by Appellant to the Respondent no.2:

13) Challenging the said report, the Appellant filed an Appeal/

representation dt.19.7.2019 under Section 18 of the Act to the Secretary

(Appellate Authority/ Disciplinary Authority), ICAR, Krishi Bhavan, New

Delhi ( Respondent no.2).

14) Inter alia, she raised the following grounds in the said appeal:

(i) that the respondent no.7 was the Head of the Office as well

as the reporting officer of Annual performance Appraisal Report

(for short ‘APAR’) for several employees; and in his presence, if

any enquiry is conducted by his subordinates, they may not speak

the truth out of fear of harm in their careers; and so the enquiry

held was not free and fair;

(ii) that under section 12 of the Act, respondent no.7 was not

transferred during the enquiry to any other workplace and he

therefore coerced the other employees;

(iii) that as per Section 11, the enquiry against the respondent

no.7 should have been conducted as per the service rules

applicable to respondent no.7 who was holding the respondent

no.6 post i.e the Central Civil Services Classification, Control and

Appeal Rules; that an enquiry into the complaint of sexual

harassment is deemed to be an enquiry under the said rules; and

the report of the committee should be deemed to be an enquiry

report for the purpose of the said rules, and this was not done;

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(iv) that she was not informed by the enquiry committee about

her right to cross examine the witnesses produced by respondent

no.7;

(v) that she was not provided with copy of the documents as

well as the copy of the depositions of witnesses to enable her to

submit written analysis of the deposition of witnesses in detail to

assist the enquiry committee;

(vi) There was non-application of mind by the enquiry

committee;

(vii) That the report is biased in favour of respondent no.7;

(viii) That the complete report was not furnished to her ;

And so, the enquiry report has to be set aside.

15) She sent representation dt.21.8.2019 to the Director General,

ICAR (Respondent no.3) stating that the respondent no.2 has not decided her

appeal against the report dt.9.4.2019. She stated that she did not receive any

communication about the status of the said Appeal and requested him to look

into the said issue.

16) She followed it up by another representation dt.9.9.2019 to the

Secretary (respondent no.2) to remove respondent no.7 from the North Eastern

region till her appeal is decided.

17) She even sent a reminder by email on 27.12.2019 reiterating the

request for early disposal of the appeal and to remove the respondent no.7 for

the North Eastern region.

18) Though she filed W.P.(C) No.307 of 2020 challenging the report

dt.9.4.2019, she withdrew the same on 24.2.2021 as her Appeal was pending

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consideration and the High court granted her liberty to file the petition afresh

on the same cause of action.

WP(C) No. 243/2021:

19) She then filed WP(C) No.243/2021 for early disposal of her

appeal by respondent no.2. But it was dismissed on 17.5.2021 as not

maintainable and she was directed approach the Central Administrative

Tribunal (for short ‘the CAT’) under the Administrative Tribunals Act,1985.

Writ Appeal No.183/2021:

20) She challenged the judgment of the learned Single Judge by filing

Writ Appeal No.183/2021 before the Division Bench of this Court which

allowed the said Appeal on 7.9.2021, set aside the judgement of the Single

Judge in the WP(C) No.243/2021 holding that her Writ Petition was

maintainable and that she need not approach the CAT. It directed the

respondent no.2 to decide the appeal in 2 months.

21) On 12.11.2021, the appellant gave a representation to respondent

no.2 to comply with the direction in the WA No.183/2021.

The impugned order dt.30.7.2021 of respondent no.2:

22) The said appeal was the dismissed by the Secretary, ICAR on

30.7.2021 rejecting all contentions raised by her. Copy of it was forwarded to

appellant on 27.11.021 by the Dy. Secretary, ICAR.

WP(C) No.483 of 2022 and the judgment dt.20.12.2023 therein:

23) Challenging the same, appellant filed WP(C) No.483 of 2022.

24) The Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition by judgment

dt.20.12.2023.

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25) The Single judge held that the inquiry conducted by the persons

referred to in para 9 was only a preliminary inquiry and it was not a regular

inquiry. He held that there is no question of permitting cross examination of

witnesses as that would happen only in a regular enquiry. He rejected the

allegations that witnesses were influenced by respondent no.7 stating that their

depositions did not indicate this.

26) He concluded that the competent committee had given its

observations after duly considering the witness led by the appellant and as

such, no fresh intervention is called for.

27) He also held that appellant had not made out any case on point of

maintainability of the Writ Petition and also on merits. He noted that she had

filed OA No.85 of 2020 before the CAT and she cannot also invoke the

jurisdiction of this Court.

28) Challenging the same, this Writ Appeal has been filed by the

Appellant.

29) Heard Sri Somik Deb, Sr. Counsel for Sri Pannalal Debbarma,

Counsel for Appellant, Sri Bidyut Majumder, Dy. Solicitor General of India

for respondent Nos.1 to 6 and Sri Dipankar Sarma, for respondent No.7. We

have also perused and considered the pleadings of the respective parties.

Consideration by the Court:

30) The following issues arise for consideration in the Writ Appeal:

(i) Was the Writ Petition filed by Appellant maintainable

and whether she ought to have sought relief against the

report dt.9.4.2019 and the appellate order dt.30.7.2021

before the CAT?

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(ii) If the issue (i) is held in appellant’s favour, is the

constitution of the Institute Complaint Committee and the

procedure followed by it valid in law?

Issue No.(i):

31) In our opinion, the Single Judge erred in holding that the issue of

sexual harassment raised by the appellant under the Act has to be adjudicated

only by the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Administrative

Tribunals Act,1985 and that the appellant could not have invoked the Writ

Jurisdiction.

32) This issue, inter partes, had already been decided in the judgment

dt.7.9.2021 by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.183/2021. This is

binding on the respondents and also the learned Single Judge.

33) The Division Bench had rejected the said plea of the respondents

as to maintainability of the Writ Petition in its judgment dt.7.9.2021 in W.A.

No.183/2021. It was held by the Division Bench as under:

“[19] Combined reading of the above noted provisions would

show that the very purpose of enabling an aggrieved woman to

make a complaint of sexual harassment and of providing a

mechanism for inquiring into and deal with such complaints is to

provide a safe workplace for all women to guard their human

rights and the right of gender parity. The prime purpose of the

Act is not to hand down departmental penalties on the

respondent against whom the allegations of sexual harassment

have been proved. It may be an ultimate outcome in some cases,

it is not the prime purpose of the enactment of the Act. The

purpose of enactment of the law is to deal with such allegations

swiftly by providing a mechanism where such complaints can be

dealt with effectively and thereby provide a redress to a woman

in distress. The possible imposition of a departmental punishment

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on the respondent is just one of the outcomes of a complaint of

sexual harassment. For example, as provided under Section 11,

upon receipt of the complaint of sexual harassment and finding

prima facie case existing, such complaint would be forwarded to

the police for registering case under Section 509 of Indian Penal

Code which pertains to word, gesture or act intended to insult

the modesty of a woman. As per Section 12, during the pendency

of the inquiry on a request by the aggrieved woman, she may be

transferred to another workplace, may be granted additional

leave up to three months or granted such other relief as may be

prescribed.

[20] Sub-section (3) of Section 13 provides that where the

Internal Committee or the Local Committee arrives at a

conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has been

probed, it would recommend to the employer (i) to take action for

sexual harassment as misconduct in accordance with the service

rules and (ii) to deduct, notwithstanding anything in the service

rules applicable to the respondent, from his salary such sum as it

may consider appropriate to be paid to the aggrieved woman or

her heirs in accordance with the provisions contained in Section

15. In turn, Section 15 lays down the circumstances which will be

taken into consideration by the Committee for determining the

sum that should be paid to the aggrieved woman.

[21] It can thus be seen that besides a possible imposition of

punishment under the service rules, the complaint of sexual

harassment at workplace has many other repercussions. If prima

facie case is found, the same would be forwarded to the police

for registration of a case under Section 509 of IPC. During the

pendency of the inquiry into the complaint, the complainant may

make a request for being transferred or being granted leave or

may be granted such some other relief as may be prescribed.

Even upon the conclusion of the inquiry which results into a

finding that the allegations are correct, punishment of imposition

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of penalty on the respondent as per the service rules is not the

only consequence. The employer may deduct from the salary or

wages of the respondent appropriate sum so as to pay the same

to the aggrieved woman which sum would be determined in terms

of Section 15 taking into account various factors such as the

mental trauma, pain and suffering that has been caused to her,

the loss in carrier opportunity due to the incident of sexual

harassment and so on.

[22] Recovery of amount to be paid to an aggrieved woman from

the salary and emoluments of an employee is not part of the

normal penal mechanism in service jurisprudence. It is a special

provision enacted under the Act of 2013 for giving swift relief to

a woman who has been harassed at the workplace and her

allegations of harassment have been found to be true and which

may have resulted into mental trauma, pain or suffering

including emotional distress, loss of carrier opportunity or

resulted into medical expenditure etc. In short, what we are

trying to project is that lodging of a complaint for sexual

harassment does not have sole correlation with the service

conditions of the respondent. It has many other repercussions

and consequences, imposition of departmental punishment being

just one of them.

[23] Viewed from this angle, the disputes pertaining to a

complaint of sexual harassment made by a women at the

workplace, cannot be included within the definition of ―service

matter‖ as defined in Section 3(q) of the Act of 1985. It may have

indirect consequences on the respondent in relation to his service

conditions, but the same is a matter of different consideration.”

(emphasis supplied)

34) It also held that what is referred to in Section 14 r/w Section 3(q)

of the Administrative Tribunals Act,1985 is a ‘service’ matter concerning the

person who approaches the court, be it the Tribunal or any other Court and not

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one concerning the respondent in such proceedings, and that there is nothing

in the language used in Section 14 or Section 3(q) which would justify this

interpretation.

35) It was held that the Writ Petition filed by appellant did not

involve a subject matter which would lie before the Central Administrative

Tribunal and her prayer was only for expeditious disposal of her Appeal.

36) We agree with the aforesaid reasoning of the Division Bench and

hold that the learned single Judge erred in holding that the Writ Petition is not

maintainable and that only the CAT can decide it.

37) Consequently we hold that the Writ petition filed by appellant is

maintainable. Issue No.(i) is decided accordingly in favour of the Appellant.

Issue No.(ii):

38) Next we shall consider the plea of the respondent Nos.1-5 that

what the Institute Complaints Committee did in its report dt.9.4.2019 is only a

preliminary enquiry and that only if there is a prima facie ‘fact finding’ of

such harassment by a person in an organisation, a regular enquiry will be done

under the Central Civil Services Classification Control and Appeal Rules,1965

(for short CCS (CCA) Rules,1965).

39) There is no dispute that the Institute Complaint Committee had

not supplied the full depositions of the respondent no.7’s witnesses to the

appellant and had not also allowed her to cross examine witnesses examined

by appellant.

40) Section 11 lays down the manner of conducting an inquiry into

the complaint of sexual harassment. It states:

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“ 11. Inquiry into complaint.—

(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 10, the Internal

Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall,

where the respondent is an employee, proceed to make inquiry

into the complaint in accordance with the provisions of the

service rules applicable to the respondent and where no such

rules exist, in such manner as may be prescribed or in case of a

domestic worker, the Local Committee shall, if prima facie case

exist, forward the complaint to the police, within a period of

seven days for registering the case under Section 509 of the

Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and any other relevant

provisions of the said Code where applicable:

… … …

Provided further that where both the parties are employees,

the parties shall, during the course of inquiry, be given an

opportunity of being heard and a copy of the findings shall be

made available to both the parties enabling them to make

representation against the findings before the Committee.

(2) …. ….

(3) For the purpose of making an inquiry under sub-section

(1), the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case

may be, shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court

under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) when trying

a suit in respect of the following matters, namely—

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person

and examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

and

(c) any other matter which may be prescribed.

(4) The inquiry under sub-section (1) shall be completed

within a period of ninety days.”

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41) The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,

Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 does not contemplate any preliminary

‘fact finding’ enquiry of the nature done by the respondents 1-5.

42) What it contemplates is an attempt at Conciliation under Section

10 first and then an inquiry into the complaint of sexual harassment in

accordance with the provisions of the service Rules applicable to the

respondent in the complaint.

43) The service rules applicable to the respondent are the Central

Civil Services Classification Control and Appeal Rules.

44) Rule 3- C thereof states:

“3-C. Prohibition of sexual harassment of working women.—

(1) No government servant shall indulge in any act of sexual

harassment of any women at any workplace.

(2) Every government servant who is incharge of a workplace

shall take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment to any

woman at the workplace.

Explanation.—(1) For the purpose of this rule—

(a) “sexual harassment” includes any one or more of the

following acts or behaviour (whether directly or by implication),

namely—

(i) physical contact and advances; or

(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or

(iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or

(iv) showing pornography; or

(v) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct

of a sexual nature.”

45) Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules stipulates the procedure for

imposing major penalties and is extracted below:

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“14. Procedure for imposing major penalties.—(1) No

order imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix)

of Rule 11 shall be made except after an inquiry held, as far as

may be, in the manner provided in this rule and Rule 15, or in the

manner provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37

of 1850), where such inquiry is held under that Act.

(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion

that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any

imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a government

servant, it may itself inquire into, or appoint under this rule or

under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850,

as the case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof.

Provided that where there is a complaint of sexual

harassment within the meaning of Rule 3-C of the Central Civil

Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, the Complaints Committee

established in each Ministry or Department or Office for

inquiring into such complaints, shall be deemed to be the

inquiring authority appointed by the disciplinary authority for

the purpose of these rules and the Complaints Committee shall

hold, if separate procedure has not been prescribed for the

Complaints Committee for holding the inquiry into the

complaints of sexual harassment, the inquiry as far as

practicable in accordance with the procedure laid down in these

rules.” ( emphasis supplied)

46) In Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa

1

, the Executive Council

of a University made a similar ‘fact finding inquiry’ through its Internal

Complaints Committee (First Committee) and after such inquiry appointed a

retd. High Court Judge to conduct inquiry under Section 14 of the Act.

47) The Supreme Court set aside the action of the University and

clarified that the Complaints Committee should itself be the inquiring

1

(2024) 1 SCC 632, at page 673

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authority under Rule 14 of the above Rules and it cannot be a mere ‘fact

finding’ committee and act ignoring natural justice and fair play. It held:

“75. The error committed on the part of the EC, is no less grave.

It is apparent that the EC continued to remain under an

impression that the First Committee to which the complaints

were forwarded, was only a “fact-finding Committee” and that a

full-fledged inquiry was still required to be conducted

subsequently, in the manner prescribed under Rule 14 of the CCS

(CCA) Rules. The result was that though the Report of the First

Committee was accepted and the EC proceeded to place the

appellant under suspension, for the very first time, it decided to

issue him Memorandum detailing the articles of charge and the

imputation of charges and further appointed a former Judge of

the High Court as an inquiry officer to conduct the inquiry in

terms of the Rules. Respondents 2 and 3 got wiser only when the

said proceedings commenced and the inquiry officer was

apprised of the directions issued in Medha Kotwal case

2

where it

had been clarified by this Court that the Complaints Committee

contemplated in Vishaka case

3

, will be deemed to be an inquiry

authority for the purposes of the CCS (Conduct) Rules and its

report shall be deemed to be a Report under the CCS (CCA)

Rules.

76. When the employer itself was oblivious to the remit of the

Committee and the Committee remained under the very same

impression having described its proceedings as fact-finding in

nature, it was all the more incumbent for the respondents to have

paused on receiving the Report of the First Committee and verify

the legal position before taking the next step. In all this back and

forth, it was the procedure prescribed under Rule 14 for

conducting an inquiry of sexual harassment at the workplace that

2

(2013) 1 SCC 312

3

(1997) 6 SCC 241

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came to be sacrificed at the altar of expeditious disposal, which

can neither be justified nor countenanced.

77. The intent and purpose of the proviso inserted in Rule 14(2)

of the CCS (CCA) Rules and Rule 3-C of the CCS (Conduct)

Rules is that the procedure required to be adopted for conducting

an inquiry into the complaint of sexual harassment that can lead

to imposition of a major penalty under the Rules, must be fair,

impartial and in line with the Rules. Pertinently, the emphasis on

adhering to the principles of natural justice during an inquiry

conducted by a Complaints Committee finds specific mention in

Rule 7(4) of the subsequently enacted Rules of 2013. But the

spirit behind the due process could never be suppressed or

ignored even in the absence of the Statute or the Rules inasmuch

as the principles of natural justice are the very essence of the

decision-making process and must be read into every judicial or

even a quasi-judicial proceeding.” ( emphasis supplied)

48) The respondents therefore could not have therefore contended

that the Institute Complaint Committee is only a ‘fact finding’ committee and

principles of natural justice such as supply of full depositions of witnesses and

permission to appellant to cross examine the witnesses examined by

respondent no.7 need not be given by it before submitting its report

dt.9.4.2019.

49) We further hold that the single Judge in his impugned judgment

dt.20.12.2023 in W.P.No.483 of 2022 erroneously upheld the inquiry report

agreeing with the contention of respondents 1-5 that what was done was only

a preliminary ‘fact finding’ inquiry and cross examination of witnesses can be

permitted only in a regular inquiry, if it happens later.

50) Thus both the appellate authority (Respondent no.2) in his order

dt.30.7.2021 and the single Judge in his impugned judgment dt.20.12.2023 in

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W.P.No.483 of 2022 thus erred in upholding the report dt.9.4.2019 of the

Institute Complaint Committee and the procedure followed by it even though

there was total non-compliance with Rule 11 of the Act r/w 14 of the Rules

apart from violation of principles of natural justice by it.

51) The said report dt.9.4.2019 and the order of the appellate

authority dt.30.6.2021 as also the judgment dt.20.12.2023 of the learned single

Judge in W.P.(C) No.483 of 2022 , cannot therefore be sustained.

Other aspects:

52) The reference in the judgment of the learned single judge to the

OA.No.85 of 2020 pending before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT)

is also not relevant because the said case related to the gradings in the Annual

Performance Appraisal Reports for 2017-18.

53) Though the CAT rejected her claim in it’s final order , the

appellant challenged it in this Court in W.P.(C) (CAT) 3 of 2024.

54) The Division Bench in the said case, on 25.6.2024, set aside the

order of the CAT and the rejection of her representation by the respondents 1-

5 as ‘cryptic’ and directed consideration of her representations dt.12.10.2018

and dt.5.12.2018 in that regard within 3 months.

55) Thus the issue in the proceeding before the CAT was different

and the pendency at that time of the said OA, was not a bar to the appellant

pursuing her remedies in this Court by filing a Writ Petition in relation to her

allegation of sexual harassment under the Act.

56) We shall now consider whether there can said to be any

predisposition in the Institute Complaint Committee to exonerate the

respondent no.7 because all its members were subordinate in rank to him.

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57) A specific allegation was raised by appellant by way of an

additional affidavit dt.2.12.2025 that all members of the Institute Complaints

Committee which gave the report dt.9.4.2019 are subordinate in rank to

respondent no.7. This allegation is not denied in the counter affidavit

dt.12.1.2027 filed by respondents.

58) The question is:

“Would the above fact in any way vitiate the preliminary inquiry

report?

And

“Can it be said that there is a predisposition to decide for or

against appellant, without proper regard to the true merits of the

dispute ?”

59) In India the “real likelihood of bias” has been consistently

applied.

60) In Badrinath v. Govt. of T. N

4

, the Supreme Court held that a real

likelihood of bias means at least substantial possibility of bias. The question

depends not upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be

done. The test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised

of all circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias. It was further

held that though the plea is not raised during the inquiry proceedings, if it is

raised in the High Court, it is sufficient as it goes to the root of the question

and is based on “admitted and uncontroverted facts” and does not require any

further investigation of facts. It held:

“75. The leading case on the question of reasonable

likelihood of bias is the one in Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing

4

(2000) 8 SCC 395

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Committee, Dr Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary

School

5

. This Court held in that case that the test was one of

“real likelihood” of bias even if such bias was not in fact the

direct cause. It was held there, a real likelihood of bias means at

least substantial possibility of bias. The question depends not

upon what actually was done but upon what might appear to be

done. The test of bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man,

fully apprised of all circumstances, would feel a serious

apprehension of bias. It was stated: (SCC p. 21, para 11)

“[T]he test is not whether in fact, a bias has affected the

judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could

reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the

tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of

the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice

must not only be done but must also appear to be done.”

The above ruling is an authority also for the view that

though the plea is not raised during the inquiry proceedings, if it

is raised in the High Court, it is sufficient as it goes to the root of

the question and is based on “admitted and uncontroverted

facts” and does not require any further investigation of facts.”

61) In Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P.

6

, the Supreme Court has

declared:

“29. Indian courts have consistently adopted the “real

likelihood” test to determine bias. In a recent decision in CORE

v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV)

7

, a Constitution Bench of this

Court speaking through D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J. (of which one of

us was a member), summarised the Indian position thus: (SCC p.

731, para 107)

“107. Although there have been vacillations about the test

in England, the Indian courts have been largely consistent in

5

(1993) 4 SCC 10

6

(2025) 7 SCC 545, at page 575

7

(2025) 4 SCC 741

Page 20 of 23 2026:THC:564-DB

their approach by applying the test of real likelihood of bias or

reasonable apprehension of bias. Recently, the court has used the

real danger of bias test. However, the above discussion shows

that there is no significant difference between the real danger of

bias test and the real possibility of bias test if the question of bias

is inferred from the perspective of a reasonable or fair-minded

person.”

62) In Govt. of T.N. v. Munuswamy Mudaliar

8

it was held that a

predisposition to decide for or against one party, without proper regard to the

true merits of the dispute is bias. There must be reasonable apprehension of

that predisposition. The reasonable apprehension must be based on cogent

materials.

63) Looked at from the perspective of a reasonable and fair minded

person, we are of the view that there is strong likelihood that the officer

accused of sexual harassment would influence the Internal Complaints

committee members who are subordinates to him in service. The inquiry by a

junior officer or a committee of juniors cannot therefore commend the

confidence which it deserves.

64) In fact Swamy’s Compilation of Central Civil Services

Classification, Control and Appeal Rules quotes “ G.I., C.S (Dept.of

Per.),O.M No.7/12/70- Ests.(A) dt.7.1.1971’ which states that Inquiry officers

should be senior in rank to the officers inquired against. It states:

“The Committee of Subordinate Legislation (fourth Lok

Sabha) had observed that inquiries should be conducted by an

officer who is sufficiently senior to the officer whose conduct is

being inquired into, as inquiry by a junior officer cannot

commend confidence which it deserves.” (emphasis supplied)

8

1988 Supp SCC 751, at page 753

Page 21 of 23 2026:THC:564-DB

65) This principle has also been reiterated in a subsequent Office

Memorandum dt.21.12.2022

9

which states:

“clause 2.9. IO senior from the CO: DoPT , vide OM

No.71/70-est.(A) dt.6.1.1971, requested all the

Ministries/Departments to note the observations of the

Committee on Subordinate Legislation (Fourth Lok Sabha) ,

which examined the question of appointment of inquiry officers to

conduct oral inquiry into charges levelled against delinquent

officer under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The Committee

observed that though they agree that it may not be possible to

entrust always inquiries against delinquent officer to gazetted

officers the inquiries should be conducted by an officer who is

sufficiently senior to the officer whose conduct is being inquired

into as inquiry by a junior officer cannot command confidence

which it deserves.”( emphasis supplied)

66) This important principle which flows from the maxim “Justice

must not only be done, but must be seen to be done” has also been violated by

the respondent Nos.1-5. This also vitiates their decision.

67) Another important point to be taken note of is that in her appeal

to the respondent no.2 challenging the report dt.9.4.2019, the appellant had

also specifically alleged as holder of office of Joint Director, the respondent

no.7 plays an important role in writing the Annual Performance Appraisal

reports (APARs) of the employees at the Tripura Centre.

68) The Appellate authority (Respondent No.2) in his order

dt.30.7.2021 does not deal with this specific allegation of appellant in her

appeal .

9

Quoted in the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Dr.Shyam behari v. Nuclear Power

Corporation of India Ltd … 2025 SCC Online Bom 4025 at para 13

Page 22 of 23 2026:THC:564-DB

69) The Single Judge rejected this allegation by saying erroneously

that it is not true because two persons deposed on her behalf too.

70) The Single Judge failed to note that both the witnesses examined

by her i.e., Dr. K.K. Barman and Dr. S.P. Das, Principal Scientists stated that

they were not aware of the case/complaint. All the witnesses examined by

respondent no.7, on the other hand, supported his version of denial of

allegations.

71) The above circumstance lends credence to her allegation that

respondent no.7 has a dominant position in the organisation, and since he is

also the person writing the APARs of the persons working under him, some of

whom were witnesses, they might not have deposed honestly out of fear.

72) It is sad that the respondent no.7 was not transferred during the

period of inquiry by the Institute complaint Committee so that the witnesses

can depose without fear though this could have been done under Section 12 of

the Act.

73) Had this been done, the witnesses would have been able to

depose honestly and freely.

Conclusion:

74) For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the report dt.9.4.2019

of the Institute Complaint Committee and the order dt.30.6.2021 of the

respondent no.2, upholding the same, are vitiated and cannot be sustained.

They are accordingly set aside.

75) Since the respondent no.7 is currently posted at Krishi Bhavan,

New Delhi and not at Agartala and the appellant is still working in the State of

Tripura, the respondent nos.1-5 are directed to constitute an Internal

Page 23 of 23 2026:THC:564-DB

Complaints Committee consisting of persons senior to the respondent no.7 in

the manner indicated in Section 4 of the Act within 4 weeks. The said

committee shall conduct the inquiry as per Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA)

Rules,1965.

76) The parties shall be permitted to lead evidence afresh before the

said committee; all documents filed by the respective parties shall be shared

with each other; they shall be permitted to cross-examine each other’s

witnesses; and then a reasoned order shall be passed by the said committee in

accordance with law within 6 months from the date of constitution of the said

Committee and communicated to the appellant.

77) The Writ Appeal is allowed as above. No costs.

78) All pending applications shall stand disposed of.

(BISWAJIT PALIT, J) (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)