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CGHC010320502026 2026:CGHC:36995-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRMP No. 2173 of 2026

1 - Smt. Rita Singh W/o Ramesh Chand Singh Rajput Aged About 50

Years R/o House No. L I G-7 Vaishali Nagar, Supela, Bhilai, Tehsil And

District- Durg, Chhattisgarh,

2 - Ramesh Chand Singh Rajput S/o Anand Prasad Singh Aged About

54 Years R/o House No. L I G-7 Vaishali Nagar, Supela, Bhilai, Tehsil

And District- Durg, Chhattisgarh,

3 - Manav Chand Singh S/o Ramesh Chand Singh Rajput Aged About

31 Years R/o House No. L I G-7 Vaishali Nagar, Supela, Bhilai, Tehsil

And District- Durg, Chhattisgarh,

... Petitioners

versus

1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through- S H O. Police Station Utai, District-

Durg, Chhattisgarh,

2 - B.B. Singh S/o Late S.B. Singh Aged About 58 Years Partner A B B

S Stone Crasher, R/o Beside Maharana Pratap Homeopathy Medical

College, New Rajendar, Nagar, Raipur, Tehsil And District- Raipur,

Chhattisgarh,

... Respondents

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioners :Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate

assisted by Mr. Shikhar Bakhtiyar,

Advocate

For Respondent No.1/State:Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government

Advocate

For Respondent No.2 :Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge

Order on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice

19.08.2026

1.Heard Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, learned Senior Counsel assisted by

Mr. Shikhar Bakhtiyar, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard

Mr. Sangharsah Pandey, learned Government Advocate, appearing for

the State/respondent No.1 as well as Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan,

learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.

2.The present petition has been filed by the petitioners under

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short,

‘B.N.S.S.’) with the following relief:-

“A) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly quash and

set-a-side the FIR No.411/2026,

Dated:02/08/2026, registered with P.S. Utai,

District Durg for the offence punishable under

section 318(2), 318(3), 318(4), 336(3), 338, and

340 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)

registered with P.S. Utai, District Durg,

Chhattisgarh, in the interest of Justice.

B) That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased

to quash the order dated 31.07.2026 passed by

the Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC),

Patan, District Durg (C.G.) in unregistered

Criminal Case under Section 175(3) of the

BNSS, 2023 directing the registration of an FIR

against the Petitioners for offenses punishable

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under Sections 318(2), 318(3), 318(4), 336(3),

338, and 340 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,

2023 (BNS)., in the interest of justice.

C) That the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased

to quash the complaint dated 24/06/2026

pending before the Judicial Magistrate First

Class, Patan, District Durg, Chhattisgarh, filed by

the respondent no. 2 (ANNEXURE P/15) against

the petitioners and also the further proceedings

be quashed in unregistered criminal case

pending before the Ld. Judicial Magistrate First

Class, Patan, District Durg, Chhattisgarh.

D) That any other relief Hon'ble Court deems feet

may also be granted.”

3.The facts of the case, in nutshell, are that Petitioner No.1 acquired

15 parcels of land from the original owner on 11.03.2008, out of which 9

parcels were transferred through registered sale deeds, while

possession of the remaining 6 parcels was obtained under an

Agreement to Sell. The petitioners remained in peaceful and

uninterrupted possession of the entire land from 2008. Subsequently,

owing to financial necessity, the petitioners entered into an Agreement

to Sell dated 29.02.2024 with Respondent No.2 in respect of the land,

machinery and crusher plant, and handed over possession thereof to

him. Respondent No.2 thereafter commenced and continued mining

operations and also independently entered into agreements with the

original titleholders in respect of certain parcels of land.

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4.During the course of the transaction, Respondent No.2 allegedly

failed to discharge electricity dues and statutory mining liabilities, which

were being demanded from the petitioners as the relevant permissions

continued to stand in their names. The petitioners accordingly lodged

complaints before the concerned authorities. Thereafter, Respondent

No.2 lodged a complaint dated 05.02.2026 before the police alleging

cheating, whereupon notices were issued to the petitioners and their

statements were recorded. During the police inquiry, the parties entered

into a Settlement Deed dated 03.05.2026, under which Respondent

No.2 was required to pay certain outstanding amounts to the petitioners.

According to the petitioners, however, due to an inadvertent

typographical error in the settlement deed, the financial liability of

Rs.20,00,000/- was incorrectly shown as payable by Petitioner No.1 to

Respondent No.2, which the latter subsequently sought to take

advantage of.

5.As Respondent No.2 allegedly failed to honour his contractual

obligations, the petitioners issued legal notices dated 16.05.2026 and

23.05.2026. Thereafter, Petitioner No.1 instituted a civil suit before the

Civil Judge Class-I, Patan, seeking declaration regarding the Agreement

to Sell dated 29.02.2024 and also sought temporary injunction under

Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. The application for temporary

injunction was entertained by the Civil Court vide order dated

03.06.2026. Aggrieved by the institution of the civil suit, Respondent

No.2 thereafter approached the Judicial Magistrate First Class under

Section 175(4) of the BNSS, 2023, seeking registration of an FIR

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against the petitioners. Pursuant thereto, the police conducted an

inquiry and submitted its report dated 21.07.2026 before the learned

JMFC, specifically recording that the dispute essentially related to the

registration of the land at Village Chanta and non-payment of the

complete consideration under the agreement and that the dispute

between the parties was civil in nature. Despite the aforesaid report, the

criminal proceedings have been initiated/continued against the

petitioners, which they contend to be an abuse of the process of law,

arising out of a purely civil and contractual dispute. The petitioners

have, therefore, approached this Court seeking appropriate relief

against the impugned criminal proceedings.

6.Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr.

Shikhar Bakhtiyar, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the

entire criminal proceeding initiated against the petitioners is nothing but

an abuse of the process of law, arising out of a purely civil and

commercial dispute between the parties. It is submitted that the

principal Agreement to Sell dated 29.02.2024 was executed exclusively

by Petitioner No.1, whereas there is no privity of contract whatsoever

between Respondent No.2 and Petitioners No.2 and 3. Petitioner No.3

had only executed a Power of Attorney in favour of his father in respect

of one parcel of land. Therefore, merely because Petitioners No.2 and 3

are the husband and son of Petitioner No.1, they cannot be implicated

in a criminal case in the absence of any specific overt act or allegation

constituting the ingredients of the alleged offence.

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7.Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the very subject

matter of the alleged criminal dispute is already pending consideration

before the competent Civil Court in Civil Suit No.49-A/2026, wherein the

Civil Judge Class-I, Patan, vide order dated 03.06.2026, has

entertained the dispute and granted interim protection under Order

XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. It is contended that the subsequent

initiation of criminal proceedings in respect of the same transaction,

during the subsistence of the civil court's order, amounts to an

impermissible interference with the civil proceedings and constitutes a

clear abuse of the criminal process. It is further submitted that the

police, after examining the relevant transaction records, statements and

accounting material, submitted its report dated 21.07.2026 categorically

recording that the dispute essentially concerns non-payment of

consideration and registration of land and is civil in nature.

8.It is next submitted that the learned JMFC committed a serious

error in directing registration of the FIR without properly considering the

aforesaid police inquiry report and without examining compliance with

the mandatory safeguards governing applications seeking registration of

an FIR. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the order directing

registration was passed in a routine and mechanical manner, without

due consideration of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 and

Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 regarding the

necessity of adherence to the prescribed procedural safeguards and

preliminary scrutiny. Thus, the criminal machinery has been set in

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motion without satisfying the requisite legal parameters.

9.Learned Senior Counsel also submits that there was no dishonest

or fraudulent intention on the part of the petitioners at the inception of

the transaction, which is an essential ingredient of the offence of

cheating. The petitioners had remained in settled possession of the land

since 2008 and had fully disclosed the nature of their title and

possession to Respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 was himself aware

of the status of the concerned parcels and, in fact, independently

entered into transactions with the original recorded owners. It is

therefore argued that the subsequent dispute regarding consideration,

registration and performance of contractual obligations cannot, in the

absence of fraudulent intention at the inception, be converted into an

allegation of cheating under Section 318 of the BNS.

10.It is further contended that Respondent No.2 had himself initially

invoked the civil remedies by issuing a notice seeking specific

performance of the commercial agreement and thereafter resorted to

criminal proceedings only when the petitioners demanded payment of

the outstanding consideration and clearance of electricity dues and

mining liabilities. The subsequent criminal complaint is therefore an

afterthought and has been instituted with the ulterior object of exerting

pressure upon the petitioners. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the

unexplained delay in raising allegations concerning transactions which

were within the knowledge of Respondent No.2 for nearly two years,

coupled with his own independent transactions concerning the subject

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land, further demonstrates the mala fide nature of the prosecution.

Placing reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp. (1) SCC

335; Ramesh Chandra Gupta & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2022

INSC 1233; Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC

330; Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.,

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand

& Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 673; and Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai

Bhimsinhbhai Karmur & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2017) 9

SCC 641, learned Senior Counsel submits that the present case

squarely falls within the recognised categories warranting exercise of

the extraordinary/inherent jurisdiction of this Court to prevent abuse of

the process of law. It is argued that the uncontroverted police inquiry

report, the order of the Civil Court and the registered documentary

material constitute unimpeachable material demonstrating the civil

nature of the dispute and absence of the requisite mens rea.

Accordingly, continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve no

legitimate purpose and would amount to permitting the criminal process

to be used as a mechanism for recovery of disputed contractual dues.

The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, prays that the impugned FIR

and all consequential criminal proceedings be quashed in the interest of

justice.

11.Per contra, Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government

Advocate, opposing the submissions advanced by learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submits that the present petition

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is devoid of merit, inasmuch as the impugned FIR has been registered

pursuant to a specific order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate

First Class, Patan, District Durg, upon consideration of the complaint

preferred by respondent No.2 under Section 175(4) of the BNSS. It is

submitted that the learned Magistrate, after examining the allegations

contained in the complaint, the documents placed on record and the

investigation report submitted by Police Station Utai, found sufficient

material warranting registration of a criminal case against the petitioners

for the offences punishable under Sections 318(2), 318(3), 318(4), 338,

336(3) and 340 of the BNS. Pursuant thereto, the FIR has been

registered and the matter is presently under investigation.

12.It is further submitted that the allegations made by respondent

No.2 are not merely in the nature of a simple civil or contractual dispute.

The complaint specifically alleges that the petitioners represented

themselves as having authority and title over several parcels of land

and movable properties and, on the basis of such representations,

entered into an agreement dated 29.01.2024 and received a substantial

amount of approximately 4,39,50,000/- out of the agreed consideration

₹

of 4,50,00,000/-. It is alleged that several properties mentioned in the

₹

agreement were either owned by third parties, were government

leasehold properties, or were lands over which the petitioners had no

transferable title. The complainant has also alleged that certain

agreements were subsequently prepared or executed without his

consent and that false signatures were used. Thus, the allegations,

taken at their face value, disclose elements of deception, dishonest

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inducement, fraudulent execution and use of documents, which require

proper investigation.

13.Learned State counsel further submits that the question as to

whether the allegations ultimately stand proved, whether the petitioners

possessed any lawful authority to deal with the properties, whether the

documents relied upon by the complainant are genuine, and whether

the amount received by the petitioners was pursuant to a lawful

transaction or by way of fraudulent inducement are all matters which

can be determined only after investigation and examination of the

relevant revenue records, agreements, bank transactions, registration

records and statements of the persons concerned. At the stage of

considering a challenge to the FIR, the Court is not required to conduct

a meticulous examination of the defence of the accused or undertake

an appreciation of disputed questions of fact. Since the FIR has been

registered pursuant to the order of the competent Magistrate and the

allegations prima facie disclose cognizable offences, no interference at

the threshold is warranted.

14.It is lastly submitted that the investigation is at its nascent stage

and the petitioners cannot seek quashing of the FIR merely by

projecting the dispute as a civil transaction. The existence of a civil

remedy or a contractual element does not, by itself, obliterate criminality

where the allegations disclose dishonest or fraudulent conduct. The

investigating agency must be permitted to collect the relevant evidence

and ascertain the true nature of the transaction. Consequently, learned

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State counsel prays for dismissal of the petition and submits that no

exceptional circumstance has been made out for exercise of the

extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for quashing the FIR at this stage.

15.Mr. Pravin Kumar Tulsyan, learned counsel appearing for

respondent No.2, adopts the submissions advanced by learned

Government Advocate and submits that the complaint preferred by

respondent No.2 contains specific and detailed allegations against the

petitioners regarding the manner in which they represented themselves

to be competent to sell and transfer various properties and movable

assets despite the alleged absence of lawful title or authority in respect

thereof. It is submitted that pursuant to the agreement executed

between the parties, respondent No.2 paid an amount of approximately

4,39,50,000/- towards the agreed consideration, but subsequently

₹

discovered that several properties forming part of the transaction were

not legally transferable by the petitioners and that certain properties

belonged to third parties or were government leasehold lands. The

complainant has further alleged that despite repeated demands, the

petitioners neither completed the transaction nor returned the amount

received by them.

16.Learned counsel further submits that the allegations relating to

preparation and execution of documents, use of signatures allegedly

without the consent of respondent No.2, and the representation of the

petitioners regarding their authority over the concerned lands constitute

serious allegations requiring investigation. The FIR has not been

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registered mechanically; rather, it has been registered pursuant to the

reasoned order passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 175(4)

of the BNSS after considering the complaint, documents and the

material collected by the police. Therefore, the petitioners cannot seek

an adjudication of disputed questions of title, possession, validity of

agreements and genuineness of documents in proceedings for

quashing of the FIR. The petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be

dismissed and the investigating agency ought to be permitted to

complete the investigation in accordance with law.

17.We have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced by

learned counsel for the parties and have perused the impugned FIR, the

complaint, the order dated 31.07.2026 passed by the learned Judicial

Magistrate First Class, Patan, the police inquiry report dated

21.07.2026, the documents placed on record and the other material

forming part of the case.

18.The principal question which arises for consideration is as to

whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the

petitioners have made out such an exceptional case as would warrant

exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of

the BNSS for quashing the FIR and the consequential criminal

proceedings at the threshold.

19.Before adverting to the factual aspects of the matter, it would be

apposite to notice the settled legal position governing exercise of

inherent jurisdiction for quashing of an FIR or criminal proceedings. The

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power under Section 528 of the BNSS, which corresponds to Section

482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is undoubtedly wide in

amplitude, but the width of the power does not mean that the same can

be exercised in a routine or mechanical manner. The jurisdiction is

essentially intended to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice. At the same time, where an FIR

discloses commission of cognizable offences and the allegations

require investigation, the High Court ordinarily ought not to interdict the

investigation at its inception. The Court is required to maintain a clear

distinction between a case where the allegations, even if accepted in

their entirety, do not constitute an offence and a case where the

allegations prima facie disclose the ingredients of an offence but the

accused seek to explain or controvert the same by relying upon their

own version of facts or documents.

20.The principles governing such exercise of jurisdiction were

authoritatively laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal

(supra), wherein the Supreme Court illustrated the categories of cases

in which the extraordinary jurisdiction may be exercised for quashing

criminal proceedings.

21.At the same time, the said judgment also makes it clear that the

power has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that

the Court should not embark upon an enquiry into the reliability or

genuineness of the allegations at the stage of considering a prayer for

quashing. The principles enunciated in Bhajan Lal (supra) continue to

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constitute the foundational parameters for determining whether

interference with criminal proceedings at the threshold is justified.

22.Likewise, in Ramesh Chandra Gupta (supra), Rajiv Thapar

(supra), Paramjeet Batra (supra), and Parbatbhai Aahir @

Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme

Court has reiterated the circumstances and limitations governing

exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The consistent

thread running through these decisions is that the Court must examine

the allegations in their entirety and determine whether they disclose the

commission of an offence; however, it cannot ordinarily undertake an

appreciation of disputed facts, test the defence of the accused, or

conduct an enquiry into the evidentiary value of the material which is yet

to be tested in accordance with law.

23.In this context, the distinction between a mere breach of contract

and an offence of cheating is also required to be borne in mind. It is

undoubtedly correct that every breach of contractual obligation does not

constitute the offence of cheating and that dishonest or fraudulent

intention at the inception of the transaction is an essential element for

constituting the offence of cheating. However, merely because a

transaction has a contractual or commercial complexion, the criminality

arising from the same cannot be ruled out if the allegations disclose that

the accused, from the very inception, made false representations or

concealed material facts with the dishonest intention of inducing the

complainant to part with his property or money. Whether the requisite

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dishonest intention existed at the inception of the transaction is

ordinarily a matter to be determined on the basis of the evidence

collected during investigation and, where necessary, at trial. Such

disputed questions cannot ordinarily be conclusively determined in

proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS.

24.The decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), relied upon by learned

Senior Counsel, no doubt recognizes that a purely civil dispute,

particularly one relating to enforcement of contractual obligations,

should not ordinarily be given a criminal colour. However, the principle

cannot be applied in isolation from the allegations contained in the FIR.

The mere presence of a civil remedy or pendency of civil proceedings

does not constitute an absolute bar against criminal prosecution. The

decisive consideration is whether the factual allegations, taken at their

face value, disclose the ingredients of a cognizable offence. If they do,

the mere fact that the complainant may simultaneously pursue a civil

remedy would not, by itself, justify quashing of the criminal proceedings.

25.The legal position on the issue of quashing of criminal

proceedings is well-settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint,

FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in

exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the

investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations

made in the FIR or the complaint even if taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or

make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may

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be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.).

26.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Rupan Deol Bajaj

v. K.P.S. Gill reported in (1995) SCC (Cri) 1059, Rajesh Bajaj v. State

of NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and Medchl Chemicals

& Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E Ltd. & Ors reported in 2000 SCC

(Cri) 615, the Supreme Court clearly held that if a prima facie case is

made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence, Court should not

quash the complaint. However, it was held that if the allegations do not

constitute any offence as alleged and appear to be patently absurd and

improbable, Court should not hesitate to quash the complaint. The note

of caution was reiterated that while considering such petitions the

Courts should be very circumspect, conscious and careful. Thus, there

is no controversy about the legal proposition that in case a prima facie

case is made out, the FIR or the proceedings in consequence thereof

cannot be quashed.

27.In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra,

2021 SCC OnLine SC 315 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

authoritatively settled the scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High

Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now

Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023). The

Apex Court has held that the power to quash criminal proceedings is

required to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in the

rarest of rare cases. It has been categorically observed that while

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considering a prayer for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings, the

High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry into the reliability,

genuineness or otherwise of the allegations contained in the FIR, nor

can it appreciate the evidence or conduct a mini trial. The Court is only

required to examine whether the allegations, if taken at their face value,

disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The Supreme Court

further emphasized that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at

the threshold, that investigation into cognizable offences should

ordinarily be permitted to proceed unhindered, and that the

extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised

with great caution and self-restraint, save in exceptional cases where

non-interference would result in manifest miscarriage of justice.

28.Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar

Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on

02.09.2025), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid

principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court

cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary

worth of the material collected during investigation. Unless all these

parameters are cumulatively satisfied, High Court ought not to interfere

in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish

their respective cases before trial Court in accordance with law.

29.Applying the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Pradeep Kumar

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Kesharwani (supra), we find that the allegations contained in the

complaint and the FIR cannot, at this stage, be characterized as

allegations relating to a mere non-performance of a contractual

obligation. The complaint contains specific allegations regarding the

manner in which the petitioners allegedly dealt with various parcels of

land and movable properties and represented their authority to transfer

the same. It is specifically alleged that an agreement was executed in

respect of several parcels of land, machinery and other assets and that

a substantial amount of approximately 4,39,50,000/- was paid by

₹

respondent No.2 against the agreed consideration of 4,50,00,000/-. It

₹

has further been alleged that some of the properties forming part of the

transaction were recorded in the names of third persons, certain

properties were government leasehold properties and certain other

properties were allegedly not legally transferable by the petitioners.

There are also allegations regarding preparation and execution of

documents and use of signatures which are disputed by the

complainant. These allegations, taken at their face value, cannot be

said to be so absurd, inherently improbable or devoid of substance that

the criminal proceedings can be terminated at the threshold.

30.Significantly, the allegations are not confined to a simple assertion

that the petitioners failed to execute a sale deed after receiving

consideration. The complainant has alleged that representations were

made regarding ownership, authority and transferability of several

properties and that, acting upon such representations, he parted with a

very substantial amount. He has also alleged that after payment of the

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consideration, he came to know about the alleged absence of title or

authority in respect of various properties and that certain documents

were prepared or executed without his consent. Whether these

allegations are true or false, whether the petitioners had actual authority

over the properties, whether respondent No.2 was aware of the true

status of the land at the time of entering into the transaction, and

whether there was dishonest intention at the inception are all matters

requiring factual determination.

31.We are conscious of the submission of learned Senior Counsel

that the petitioners had been in possession of the land since 2008 and

that substantial documentary material exists in their favour. We are also

conscious of the fact that a civil suit concerning the agreement is

pending before the competent Civil Court and that interim relief has

been granted therein. However, these circumstances, by themselves,

cannot lead to the conclusion that the criminal case is necessarily an

abuse of process. The existence of civil proceedings and criminal

proceedings arising out of the same transaction is not, in itself, sufficient

to quash the criminal proceedings. The Court is required to examine

whether the allegations in the criminal case independently disclose the

ingredients of a criminal offence. In the present case, they cannot, at

this preliminary stage, be held to be incapable of constituting such

offences.

32.The submission that the dispute is essentially civil in nature also

cannot be accepted in absolute terms at this stage. A transaction may

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simultaneously give rise to civil consequences and criminal liability. The

availability of a civil remedy for specific performance, declaration,

injunction or recovery of money does not confer immunity from criminal

law where the allegations disclose the commission of a cognizable

offence. The nature of the remedy depends upon the facts established

during investigation and trial. Therefore, the pendency of Civil Suit

No.49-A/2026 cannot operate as an automatic bar to the investigation

pursuant to the impugned FIR.

33.Equally, the existence of the police inquiry report dated 21.07.2026

does not justify quashing of the subsequent FIR. The said report, at the

highest, records the opinion of the police on the basis of the material

available to it at that particular stage. Such an opinion cannot foreclose

the power of the competent Magistrate to consider the complaint and

the material placed before him in accordance with Section 175 of the

BNSS. More importantly, the petitioners seek to rely upon the said

report as an unimpeachable piece of material conclusively establishing

the civil nature of the dispute. Such an approach would necessarily

require this Court to assess the correctness and evidentiary value of the

police report vis-à-vis the allegations made by respondent No.2, which

would amount to entering into disputed questions of fact and

undertaking an enquiry impermissible in exercise of jurisdiction under

Section 528 of the BNSS.

34.The contention regarding the alleged absence of dishonest

intention at the inception of the transaction also cannot be conclusively

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accepted in these proceedings. The petitioners have placed their own

version regarding the transaction, their possession since 2008, the

alleged disclosure made to respondent No.2, the subsequent settlement

and the conduct of respondent No.2. On the other hand, respondent

No.2 has alleged that material facts relating to ownership and

transferability of the properties were concealed and that he was induced

to part with a substantial amount on the basis of false representations.

These competing versions cannot be adjudicated merely on the basis of

the pleadings and documents produced by the accused. The question

whether the ingredients of cheating are ultimately established is a

matter for investigation and, if the material so warrants, trial.

35.The argument founded upon the alleged absence of privity of

contract between respondent No.2 and petitioners No.2 and 3 also does

not, at this stage, furnish sufficient ground for quashing the FIR qua

those petitioners. The FIR and the complaint contain allegations

concerning the participation and role attributed to the respective

accused persons. Whether such allegations are supported by

independent material, whether the petitioners acted in furtherance of a

common design, whether any document was executed by or through

them, and what was the precise nature of their involvement are

questions which require investigation. The mere assertion by the

petitioners that they had no role in the transaction cannot be accepted

as conclusive at the stage of quashing. We also find no merit in the

submission that the initiation of criminal proceedings after institution of

the civil suit necessarily establishes mala fide intention. The chronology

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relied upon by the petitioners is itself a matter requiring examination.

Respondent No.2 claims to have discovered subsequent facts

concerning the properties and documents and thereafter approached

the Magistrate when, according to him, the police did not take effective

action on his complaint. Whether the criminal complaint was a bona fide

attempt to seek investigation or was motivated by an ulterior purpose

cannot be determined merely from the sequence of dates. The

allegation of mala fide, particularly when disputed by the complainant,

cannot be accepted merely on the basis of the defence version.

36.As regards the reliance placed upon Priyanka Srivastava (supra)

and Lalita Kumari (supra), the said decisions undoubtedly lay down

important safeguards concerning the manner in which applications

seeking directions for registration/investigation are to be dealt with.

However, in the present case, the learned Magistrate has considered

the complaint and the material available before passing the order dated

31.07.2026. The petitioners essentially seek a reappraisal of the

material considered by the learned Magistrate and invite this Court to

substitute its own assessment of the factual dispute for that of the

Magistrate and investigating agency. Such an exercise is not warranted

in the present proceedings, particularly when the allegations in the FIR

themselves disclose cognizable offences requiring investigation.

37.It is also relevant to note that the petitioners have sought quashing

not only of the FIR but also of the complaint, the order of the learned

JMFC and all consequential proceedings. Granting such a relief at this

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stage would effectively bring the investigation to an end before the

investigating agency has had an opportunity to collect and verify the

relevant documentary and oral evidence. The allegations concern

numerous parcels of land, ownership and revenue records, agreements,

alleged powers of attorney, bank transactions, mining permissions,

government leasehold rights, machinery and other movable assets. The

truth or otherwise of these allegations can be ascertained only after

examination of the relevant records and persons connected with the

transactions.

38.The present case, therefore, is not one where the allegations,

even if accepted in their entirety, fail to disclose any cognizable offence.

Nor is it a case where the allegations are so patently absurd, inherently

improbable or legally impossible that no prudent person could ever

reach a conclusion that an offence had been committed. On the

contrary, the allegations disclose a factual foundation which, if

established by investigation, may constitute the offences for which the

FIR has been registered. Whether the prosecution will ultimately be able

to establish the allegations beyond the applicable standard is a matter

which cannot be determined at this stage.

39.It is equally important to emphasize that this Court, while

exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, is not required to

determine the ultimate truthfulness of the allegations. The Court is also

not required to decide which of the competing versions is correct. The

petitioners' case rests substantially upon their defence that they were in

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possession of the land, that the transaction was entered into bona fide,

that respondent No.2 was aware of the nature of the title, that a civil

dispute is pending and that the police had earlier described the dispute

as civil. These are matters which may constitute a defence before the

investigating agency or the competent Court, but they do not, in the

facts of the present case, furnish a legally sustainable basis for

terminating the criminal investigation at its inception.

40.The principle that criminal law cannot be permitted to be used as a

substitute for recovery of money or enforcement of contractual

obligations is undoubtedly well settled. Equally settled, however, is the

principle that a dispute does not cease to be criminal merely because it

also involves a contractual or commercial transaction. The Court must

therefore look to the substance of the allegations rather than merely to

the form of the underlying transaction. In the present case, the

allegations regarding alleged misrepresentation of title and authority,

receipt of substantial consideration, dealing with properties allegedly

belonging to third parties or subject to restrictions, and the alleged

manipulation or use of documents, cannot at this stage be reduced to a

mere claim for recovery of contractual dues.

41.Upon a cumulative consideration of the complaint, the FIR, the

order passed by the learned Magistrate, the material placed on record

and the rival submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the

petitioners have failed to demonstrate that continuation of the

investigation would amount to an abuse of the process of law or that

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interference by this Court is necessary to secure the ends of justice.

The case does not fall within any of the exceptional categories

warranting exercise of inherent jurisdiction as contemplated in Bhajan

Lal (supra). The judgments relied upon by learned Senior Counsel lay

down the settled parameters for exercise of such jurisdiction, but those

parameters, when applied to the facts of the present case, do not

support quashing of the impugned FIR.

42.We may clarify that nothing contained in this order shall be

construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the allegations or

the defence of the petitioners. We have deliberately refrained from

recording any final finding regarding the ownership of the properties,

validity or enforceability of the agreements, entitlement of the parties to

consideration, genuineness of the disputed documents, existence or

otherwise of fraudulent intention, or the ultimate culpability of any of the

accused persons. All such questions are expressly left open to be

considered by the investigating agency and, if the investigation results

in filing of a charge-sheet, by the competent Court in accordance with

law.

43.The investigating agency shall, therefore, be at liberty to conduct a

fair, impartial and comprehensive investigation in accordance with law

and shall examine all relevant materials, including the agreements

relied upon by both sides, revenue and registration records relating to

the concerned khasra numbers, records concerning government

leasehold land, documents relating to mining permissions, powers of

26

attorney, bank/payment transactions, disputed signatures and all other

material relevant for determining the actual role of the respective

accused persons. The investigation shall not be influenced by any

observation contained in this order except to the extent expressly

decided herein.

44.In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered

opinion that no ground for interference under Section 528 of the BNSS,

2023 is made out. The allegations contained in the impugned FIR, if

taken at their face value, prima facie disclose the commission of

cognizable offences and warrant investigation. The existence of a civil

suit, the alleged contractual nature of the transaction, the police inquiry

report dated 21.07.2026, and the defence raised by the petitioners do

not, either individually or cumulatively, constitute sufficient grounds for

quashing the criminal proceedings at this stage.

45.Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. The prayer for

quashing of FIR No.411/2026 dated 02.08.2026 registered at Police

Station Utai, District Durg, for offences punishable under Sections

318(2), 318(3), 318(4), 336(3), 338 and 340 of the Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023, the order dated 31.07.2026 passed by the learned

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patan, and the consequential criminal

proceedings is hereby declined.

46.Needless to observe, the dismissal of the present petition shall not

preclude the petitioners from availing any remedy available to them

under law at an appropriate stage of the proceedings. The investigating

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agency shall complete the investigation expeditiously and strictly in

accordance with law, uninfluenced by the observations made herein,

which are confined solely to the question of whether the criminal

proceedings warrant quashing at the present stage.

47.The petition, accordingly, stands dismissed. All pending

interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Anu