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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 3951 of 2006

PETITIONER:

SOM DEV & ORS.

RESPONDENT:

RATI RAM & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/09/2006

BENCH:

H.K. SEMA & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.3353 OF 2006)

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

Leave granted.

1. This Appeal is by the contesting defendants in a suit

filed by Respondent No.1 herein for recovery of possession of

the suit property in enforcement of a right of pre-emption

claimed by him. The plaintiff claimed that a half share in the

suit property had been relinquished in favour of himself and

his brother by Sheoram a co-owner with the assignor of the

contesting defendants and the said relinquishment had been

recognised by the court by decreeing the claim made by the

present plaintiff and his brother in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980.

Thus, having become a co-owner with the assignor of the

contesting defendants, the plaintiff was entitled to enforce a

right of pre-emption and recover possession of the property

from the assignee of the other co-owner. The contesting

defendants resisted the suit. The contention germane to this

appeal that was raised by the contesting defendants was that

a right was created in the present plaintiff by the decree in

Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 which was one based on a

compromise and since the decree purported to create a right in

the plaintiff in a property in which he had no pre-existing

right, the compromise decree required registration in terms of

Section 17(1) of the Registration Act and the decree not having

been registered, the plaintiff was not entitled to enforce the

alleged right of pre-emption as against the contesting

defendants or their assignor, the other co-owner.

2. The trial court held that the decree in Civil Suit

No.398 of 1980 was enforceable even without registration as it

was not hit by Section 17(1) of the Registration Act; that the

said decree had recognised the right claimed by the plaintiff

and in the circumstances the plaintiff was entitled to a decree

for possession from the assignee of the other co-owner in

enforcement of his right of pre-emption. On appeal, the lower

appellate court affirmed this view of the trial court. The lower

appellate court also held that what was involved in Civil Suit

No.398 of 1980 was a family arrangement and since a bona

fide family arrangement among the members of a family in the

larger sense of the term, did not require registration, no

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objection could be raised by the contesting defendants to the

enforceability of the title claimed by the plaintiff. Thus, the

decree of the trial court was affirmed. The contesting

defendants filed a second appeal. They raised the substantial

question of law that the decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980

created rights in favour of the plaintiff in a property in which

he had no pre-existing right and such a decree, to become

enforceable, required registration. Reliance was placed on the

decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major

and others [(1995) Supp. 3 S.C.R. 466) in support. The High

Court held that the decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 was

based on a family settlement which did not require registration

and that the decree itself did not require registration in view of

Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act. Thus, the substantial

question of law formulated was answered in favour of the

plaintiff, the judgments and decrees of the courts below were

confirmed and the second appeal filed by the contesting

defendants was dismissed. It is challenging this decision of

the High Court that this appeal by special leave is filed by the

contesting defendants.

3. Before proceeding to consider the question argued

before us, we think that it is proper to notice that the case

arises from the State of Haryana which was originally a part of

the State of Punjab and that the Transfer of Property Act as

such did not apply to the State. But, Sections 54, 107 and

123 of the Transfer of Property Act were made applicable to

the State of Punjab with effect from 01.04.1955 vide

notification dated 23.03.1955. As is clear, Section 54 of the

Transfer of Property Act relates to a sale of immovable

property of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards, Section 107

deals with leases of immovable property and Section 123

indicates how the transfer of immovable property by way of gift

is to be effected. It insists that for making a gift of immovable

property, the transfer must be effected by a registered

instrument singed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by

at least two witnesses. One other aspect to be noted is the

introduction of sub-section (1A) of Section 17 of the

Registration Act made prospective from the date of coming into

force of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment)

Act, 2001 insisting that documents containing contracts to

transfer for consideration any immovable property for the

purpose of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, shall be

registered if they have been created after the commencement

of sub-section (1A) of Section 17 of the Transfer of Property

Act.

4. The decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 was really a

decree on admission. It was not a compromise decree. In the

plaint in that suit the present plaintiff and his brother had

asserted that Sheo Ram the son of the sister of the assignor of

the contesting defendants had relinquished his half share in

the properties in their favour and on the death of Phusa Ram

the grandfather of Sheo Ram, the plaintiffs therein had

become the absolute owners of that half share and the

defendant Sheo Ram did not have any right in the property.

This case set up by the plaintiffs in that suit was admitted in

his written statement by Sheo Ram as also in his evidence.

Based on these admissions, the court decreed the suit as

prayed for by the plaintiffs therein. The decree thus upheld

the right of the present plaintiff and his brother to one half of

the present suit property on the basis of the arrangement

between themselves and Sheo Ram. This decree is relied on

by the present plaintiff as affirming his right that entitles him

to exercise a right of pre-emption in respect of the other half

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that belonged to the assignor of the contesting defendants. It

is in that context that the contesting defendants have raised

the contention that the decree created fresh rights in the

property in favour of the plaintiff wherein he had no pre-

existing right and hence that decree required registration. It

is also attempted to be argued that the decree is one on

compromise and going by the ratio of Bhoop Singh (supra), it

required registration.

5. On an advertence to the circumstances leading to

that decree, in the context of the pleadings in that suit, we are

not in a position to agree with counsel for the contesting

defendants that the decree was a compromise decree. It was

really a decree on admission and the admission was of the

pre-existing right set up by the plaintiffs as created by Sheo

Ram. The decree by itself did not create any right in

immovable property. It only recognised the right set up by the

plaintiffs in that suit in respect of the property involved in that

suit. It is one thing to say that that decree is vitiated by

collusion or by fraud or some such vitiating element. But it is

quite another thing to say that such a decree could be

excluded from consideration on the ground of want of

registration.

6. We shall now advert to Section 17 of the

Registration Act, 1908. Sub-section (1) specifies what are the

documents that are to be registered. An instrument of gift of

immovable property, an instrument which purports to create,

declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in

future any right, title or interest in immovable property, the

value of which exceeds Rs.100/-, any instrument which

acknowledges the receipt or payment of consideration on

account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or

extinction of any right title or interest, leases of immovable

property from year to year or for a term exceeding one year

and instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order

of court or any award where such decree or order or award

operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any

right, title or interest in immovable property, the value of

which exceeds Rs.100/-. Sub-section (1A) provides that

agreements for sale to be used to claim protection of Section

53A of the Transfer of Property Act entered into after

24.09.2001 require registration. Sub-section (2) excludes

from the operation of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of

Section 17, the various transactions described therein under

various clauses. We are concerned with clause (vi) therein.

We shall set down that provision for convenience:

"Any decree or order of a Court except a

decree or order expressed to be made on a

compromise and comprising immovable

property other than which is subject matter of

the suit or proceeding". (emphasis supplied)

It may be noted that going by clause (vi), a decree or order of

court need not be registered on the basis that it comes within

the purview of Section 17(1)(b) or 17(1)(c) of the Act as an

instrument purporting to or operating to create, declare,

assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in

immovable property. It may further be seen that a

compromise decree also does not require registration in terms

of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the

Registration Act unless that decree takes in immovable

property valued above Rs.100/-, that is not a subject matter of

the suit or the proceeding giving rise to the compromise

decree. In other words, only if the compromise also takes in

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any property that is not the subject matter of the suit, it would

require registration. If the compromise is confined to the

subject matter of the suit, it would not. It may be noted that

Section 43 of the Registration Act of 1864 and Section 41 of

the Registration Act of 1866 provided that when any civil court

should by a decree or order, declare any document relating to

immovable property, which should have been registered, to be

invalid or when any civil court should pass a decree or order

affecting any such document and the decree or order should

create, declare, transfer, limit or extinguish any right, title or

interest under such document to or in the immovable property

to which it relates, the court should cause a memorandum of

the decree or order to be sent to the Registrar within whose

district the document was originally registered. But these

sections were omitted while enacting the Registration Act of

1871. But in the Specific Relief Act, 1877, Section 39 was

introduced providing that where an instrument is adjudged

void or viodable under that section and ordered to be delivered

up and cancelled, the court should send a copy of its decree, if

the instrument has been registered under the Registration Act,

to the officer in whose office the instrument had been so

registered and such officer should note on the copy of the

instrument contained in his books the effect of its

cancellation. But under the 1887 Act, decrees and orders of

courts and awards were exempted from registration. They

were also not mentioned in Section 18 which related to

documents of which registration was optional. Sargent, CJ in

Purmananddas vs. Vallabdas ( ILR 11 Bombay 506) explained

the position as follows:

"The application (for execution) was refused on

the ground that the decree was an instrument,

which created an interest in immovable

property, and could not be given in evidence

for want of registration. Provision was made

for the registration of such a decree by Section

42 of Act XX of 1886, but that section was not

re-enacted in Act VIII of 1871. If, therefore, it

required registration under the Act, it could

only be as an 'executed instrument' under

Section 17, a description which is scarcely

applicable to a decree. Moreover, it is to be

remarked that Section 32 deals only with the

presentation of a 'copy' of a decree, the

optional registration of which is expressly

provided for by section 18 of the Act. Upon a

true construction of the Act of 1871, read with

reference to Act XX of 1866, such a decree, we

are strongly inclined to think, did not fall

within Section 17. However, Act III of 1877,

which is now in force, expressly excludes such

decrees, whether passed before or after the

Act, from the operation of compulsory

registration, and the decree is, therefore, now

admissible in evidence."

In Pranal Anni Vs. Lakshmi Anni & Ors. [I.L.R. 22 MADRAS

508], the Privy Council held:

"The razinamah was not registered in

accordance with the Act of 1877; but the

objection founded upon its non-registration

does not, in their Lordships' opinion, apply to

its stipulations and provisions in so far as

these were incorporated with, and given effect

to by, the order made upon it by the

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Subordinate Judge in the suit of 1885. The

razinamah, in so far as it was submitted to

and was acted upon judicially by the learned

Judge, was in itself a step of judicial procedure

not requiring registration; and any order

pronounced in terms of it constituted res

judicata, binding upon both the parties to this

appeal who gave their consent to it."

In Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi vs. Midnapur Zamindari

Company Limited (46 Indian Appeals 240) the Privy Council

again held that a consent decree did not require registration

even if it compromised immovable property other than that

which was the subject matter of the suit and that the

consequences provided for by Section 49 of the Act would not

follow. It was in the light of this decision of the Privy Council,

that by virtue of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property

(Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929, which came into force

on 01.04.1930, clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration

Act was amended and re-enacted in the present form, thus,

excluding decrees and orders of courts including compromise

decrees from registration because of Section 17(1)(b) and (c), if

they related only to the subject matter of the suit or if the

compromise did not take in any property outside the subject

matter of the suit. (See Mulla on Registration Act, Tenth

Edition)

7. On a plain reading of Section 17 of the Registration

Act, with particular reference to clause (vi) of sub-section (2) it

is clear that a decree or order of a court and a compromise

decree that relates only to the subject matter of the suit need

not be registered on the ground that it is a non-testamentary

instrument which purports to or operates to create, declare,

assign, limit or extinguish any right to or in immovable

property or which acknowledges receipt or payment of any

consideration on account of a transaction which brings about

the above results. But if a suit is decreed on the basis of a

compromise and that compromise takes in property that is not

the subject matter of the suit, such a compromise decree

would require registration. Of course, we are not unmindful

of the line of authorities that say that even if there is inclusion

of property that is not the subject matter of the suit, if it

constitutes the consideration for the compromise, such a

compromise decree would be considered to be a compromise

relating to the subject matter of the suit and such a decree

would also not require registration in view of clause (vi) of

Section 17(2) of the Registration Act. Since we are not

concerned with that aspect here, it is not necessary to further

deal with that question. Suffice it to say that on a plain

reading of clause (vi) of Section 17(2) all decrees and orders of

Court including a compromise decree subject to the exception

as regards properties that are outside the subject matter of the

suit, do not require registration on the ground that they are

hit by Section 17(1)(b) and (c) of the Act. But at the same

time, there is no exemption or exclusion, in respect of the

clauses (a), (d) and (e) of Section 17(1) so that if a decree

brings about a gift of immovable property, or lease of

immovable property from year to year or for a term exceeding

one year or reserving an early rent or a transfer of a decree or

order of a Court or any award creating, declaring, assigning,

limiting or extinguishing rights to and in immovable property,

that requires to be registered.

8. After the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure

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by Act 104 of 1976, a compromise of a suit can be effected and

the imprimatur of the Court obtained thereon leading to a

decree, only if the agreement or compromise presented in

court is in writing and signed by the parties and also by their

counsel as per practice. In a case where one party sets up a

compromise and the other denies it, the Court can decide the

question whether, as a matter of fact, there has been a

compromise. But, when a compromise is to be recorded and a

decree is to be passed, Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code

insists that the terms to the compromise should be reduced to

writing and signed by the parties. Therefore, after 1.2.1977, a

compromise decree can be passed only on compliance with the

requirements of Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code and unless a

decree is passed in terms thereof, it may not be possible to

recognise the same as a compromise decree. In the case on

hand, a decree was passed on 10.10.1980 after the

amendment of the Code and it was not in terms of Order XXIII

Rule 3 of the Code. On the other hand, as the decree itself

indicates, it was one on admission of a pre-existing

arrangement.

9. We shall now advert to the position in the present

case. The plaintiffs in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 were the

descendants of Jeeta @ Chet Ram. Sheo Ram, the defendant

in that suit, was the descendant of Deepa. Deepa and Jeeta

were children of Mauji. The property descended from Mauji

and one half of the entire property came to the present

plaintiff and his brother, the descendants of Jeeta and the

other half descended to Phusa and through him to the

assignor of the contesting defendants and to Sheo Ram the

defendant in the earlier suit, through his mother. It was in

this property that a half share was surrendered or

relinquished by Sheo Ram in favour of the present plaintiff

and his brother. The present plaintiff and his brother could

not take possession of the property since Phusa Ram was alive

at the relevant time. After the death of Phusa Ram the

present plaintiff and his brother filed the earlier suit for

establishment of their right on the basis of the arrangement

came to with Sheo Ram even during the life time of Phusa

Ram. It was that arrangement or relinquishment of right by

Sheo Ram that was admitted by him in his written statement

in the earlier suit and it was based on that admission that a

decree was given to plaintiff and his brother. It was pleaded

that the relinquishment or surrender by Sheo Ram was by way

of a family arrangement in view of the close relationship

enjoyed by the present plaintiff and his brother, the uncles

(not direct) on the one hand and Sheo Ram on the other, who

was actually their nephew one step removed, but who was

treated by them as their own real nephew. There was no case

that his share was gifted by Sheo Ram in favour of the present

plaintiff and his brother so as to attract clause (a) of Section

17(1) of the Registration Act. It was really a case of clause (b)

of Section 17(1) being attracted, if at all. All the courts have

found that the relinquishment was part of a family settlement

and hence its validity cannot be questioned on the ground of

want of registration in the light of the decisions of this Court.

Apart from that strand of reasoning, it appears to us that the

decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 did not create, declare,

assign, limit or extinguish any right in the suit property. It

merely recognised the right put forward by the plaintiffs in

that suit based on an earlier family arrangement or

relinquishment by the defendant in that suit and on the basis

that the defendant in that suit had admitted such an

arrangement or relinquishment. Therefore, on principle, it

appears to us that the decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980

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cannot be held to be not admissible or cannot be treated as

evidencing the recognition of the rights of the present plaintiff

and his brother as co-owners, for want of registration. Nor

can we ignore the relief obtained therein by the plaintiff and

his brother.

10. Almost the whole of the argument on behalf of the

appellants here, is based on the ratio of the decision of this

Court in Bhoop Singh (supra). It was held in that case that

exception under clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Act is meant

to cover that decree or order of a Court including the decree or

order expressed to be made on a compromise which declares

the pre-existing right and does not by itself create new right,

title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value

of Rs.100/- or upwards. Any other view would find the

mischief of avoidance of registration which requires payment

of stamp duty embedded in the decree or order. It would,

therefore, be the duty of the Court to examine in each case

whether the parties had pre-existing right to the immovable

property or whether under the order or decree of the Court one

party having right, title or interest therein agreed or suffered to

extinguish the same and created a right in praesenti in

immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or upwards in

favour of the other party for the first time either by

compromise or pretended consent. If latter be the position,

the document is compulsorily registrable. Their Lordships

referred to the decisions of this Court in regard to the family

arrangements and whether such family arrangements require

to be compulsorily registered and also the decision relating to

an award. With respect, we may point out that an award does

not come within the exception contained in clause (vi) of

Section 17(2) of the Registration act and the exception therein

is confined to decrees or orders of a Court. Understood in the

context of the decision in Hemanta Kumari Debi (supra) and

the subsequent amendment brought about in the provision,

the position that emerges is that a decree or order of a court is

exempted from registration even if clauses (b)and (c) of Section

17(1) of the Registration Act are attracted, and even a

compromise decree comes under the exception, unless, of

course, it takes in any immovable property that is not the

subject matter of the suit.

11. In Mangan Lal Deoshi Vs. Mohammad Moinul

Haque & Others [(1950) SCR 833], this Court considered a

case where the effect of a decree was to create a perpetual

under-lease and considered the case whether under such

circumstances that decree required registration in the context

of Section 17(1)(b) of the Act. This Court stated:

"What the compromise really did was, as

stated already, to bring the Singhs and the

Deoshis into a new legal relationship as under-

lessor and under-lessee in respect of 500

bighas which were the subject matter of the

title suit; in other words, its legal effect was to

create a perpetual under-lease between the

Singhs and the Deoshis which would clearly

fall under clause (d) but for the circumstance

that it was to take effect only on condition that

the Singhs paid Rs. 8,000 to Kumar within 2

months thereafter. As pointed out by the

Judicial Committee in Hemanta Kumari's case

[47 Calcutta 485] "An agreement for a lease,

which a lease is by the statute declared to

include, must, in their Lordships' opinion, be a

document which effects an actual demise and

operates as a lease\005\005. The phrase which in

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the context where it occurs and in the statute

in which it is found, must in their opinion

relate to some document which creates a

present and immediate interest in the land."

The compromise decree expressly provides that

unless the sum of Rs.8,000 was paid within

the stipulated time the Singhs were not to

execute the decree or to take possession of the

disputed property. Until the payment was

made it was impossible to determine whether

there would be any under-lease or not. Such a

contingent agreement is not within clause (d)

and although it is covered by clause (b), is

excepted by clause (vi) of sub-section (2)."

(Emphasis supplied)

12. We shall now examine the decision in Bhoop Singh

(supra). What was involved therein was a decree based on

admission. It is to be noted that in that case it was a decree

that created the right. The decree that is quoted in paragraph

2 of that judgment was to the effect:

"It is ordered that a declaratory decree in

respect of the property in suit fully detailed in

the heading of the plaint to the effect that the

plaintiff will be the owner in possession from

today in lieu of the defendant after his death

and the plaintiff deserves his name to be

incorporated as such in the revenue papers, is

granted in favour of the plaintiff against the

defendant,\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005."

Therefore, it was a case of the right being created by the

decree for the first time unlike in the present case. In

paragraph 13 of that Judgment it is stated that the Court

must enquire whether a document has recorded unqualified

and unconditional words of present demise of right, title and

interest in the property and if the document extinguishes that

right of one and seeks to confer it on the other, it requires

registration. But with respect, it must be pointed out that a

decree or order of a Court does not require registration if it is

not based on a compromise on the ground that clauses (b) and

(c) of Section 17 of the Registration Act are attracted. Even a

decree on a compromise does not require registration if it does

not take in property that is not the subject matter of the suit.

A decree or order of a Court is normally binding on those who

are parties to it unless it is shown by resort to Section 44 of

the Evidence Act that the same is one without jurisdiction or

is vitiated by fraud or collusion or that it is avoidable on any

ground known to law. But otherwise that decree is operative

and going by the plain language of Section 17 of the

Registration Act, particularly, in the context of sub-clause (vi)

of sub-section (2) in the background of the legislative history,

it cannot be said that a decree based on admission requires

registration. On the facts of that case, it is seen that their

Lordships proceeded on the basis that it was the decree on

admission that created the title for the first time. It is obvious

that it was treated as a case coming under Section 17(1)(a) of

the Act, though the scope of Section 17(2)(vi) of the Act was

discussed in detail. But on the facts of this case, as we have

indicated and as found by the courts, it is not a case of a

decree creating for the first time a right, title or interest in the

present plaintiff and his brother. The present is a case where

they were putting forward in the suit a right based on an

earlier transaction of relinquishment or family arrangement by

which they had acquired interest in the property scheduled to

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that plaint. Clearly, Section 17(1)(a) is not attracted. It is

interesting to note that their Lordships who rendered the

judgment in Bhoop Singh themselves distinguished the

decision therein in S. Noordeen Vs. V.S. Thiru Venkita

Reddiar and Ors. [(1996) 2 S.C.R. 261] on the basis that in

the case of Bhoop Singh there was no pre-existing right to the

properties between the parties, but a right was sought to be

created for the first time under the compromise. Their

Lordships proceeded to hold that in a case where the plaintiff

had obtained an attachment before judgment on certain

properties, the said properties would become subject matter of

the suit and a compromise decree relating to those properties

came within the exception in Section 17(2)(vi) of the Act and

such a compromise decree did not require registration.

Merely because the defendant in that suit in the written

statement admitted the arrangement pleaded by the plaintiff it

could not be held that by that pleading a right was being

created in the plaintiffs and a decree based on such an

admission in pleading would require registration. We are

satisfied that the decision in Bhoop Singh (supra) is clearly

distinguishable on facts. We may notice once again that all

the courts have found that it was as a part of a family

arrangement that the defendant in the earlier suit

relinquished his interest in favour of the present plaintiff and

his brother and such a family arrangement has been held even

in Bhoop Singh (supra) not to require registration.

13. When a cause of action is put in suit and it

fructifies into a decree, the cause of action gets merged in the

decree. Thereafter, the cause of action cannot be resurrected

to examine whether that cause of action was enforceable or

the right claimed therein could be enforced. To borrow the

words of Spencer-Bower and Turner on 'Res judicata', every

judicial decision:

"is of such exalted nature that it extinguishes

the original cause of action, and consequently

bars the successful party from afterwards

attempting to resuscitate what has been so

extinguished and stir the dust which has

received such honourable sepulture;"

(See Introduction to the Second Edition)

In the face of the decree in Civil Suit No. 398 of 1980, it is not

permissible to search in the cause of action put in suit therein

for any infirmity based on want of registration. The title

acquired earlier had been pleaded by the plaintiff and his

brother and upheld by the decree. It is only permissible to

look at the evidentiary value of that decree at least as a case of

assertion and recognition of the right by the court. In the case

on hand, the family arrangement set up, which suffered no

defect on the ground of want of registration, had been

accepted by the Court in Civil Suit No. 398 of 1980 and relief

granted. That grant of relief cannot be ignored as not

admissible.

14. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-contesting

respondent raised a contention that the ratio of the decision in

Bhoop Singh (supra) requires reconsideration since the said

decision has not properly understood the scope of clause (vi) of

Section 17(2) of the Registration Act. For the purposes of this

case we do not think that it is necessary to examine this

argument. We are satisfied that the said decision is

distinguishable.

15. We also feel that the tendency, if any, to defeat the

law of registration has to be curtailed by the legislature by

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appropriate legislation. In this instance, we wonder why the

Transfer of Property Act is not being extended to the

concerned states even now. Its extension would ensure that

no transfer is effected without satisfying the requirements of

that Act and of the Stamp and Registration Acts.

16. Going by the history of the legislation, the decisions

of the Privy Council and of the High Courts earlier rendered we

are satisfied that the decree in Civil Suit No.398 of 1980 is

admissible in evidence to establish that there had been a

relinquishment of his interest by Sheo Ram in favour of the

present plaintiff and his brother and that they were entitled to

possession of half share in the property. Firstly, the decree

did not create any title for the first time in the present plaintiff

and his brother. Secondly, as a decree it did not require

registration in view of clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the

Registration Act, though it was a decree based on admission.

We have noticed that there is no challenge to that decree

either on the ground that it was fraudulent or vitiated by

collusion or that it was passed by a court which had no

jurisdiction to pass it. It is not as if a litigant cannot admit a

true claim and he has necessarily to controvert whatever has

been stated in a plaint or deny a transaction set up in the

plaint even if, as a matter of fact, such a transaction had gone

through. Therefore, merely because a decree is based on

admission, it would not mean that the decree is vitiated by

collusion. Though, generally there is reluctance on the part of

the litigants to come forward with the truth in a Court of law,

we cannot accede to the argument that they are not entitled to

admit something that is true while they enter their plea. We

are, therefore, satisfied that there is no merit in the challenge

of counsel for the contesting defendants to the decree in Civil

Suit No.398 of 1980.

17. The courts below have held that as a family

arrangement the relinquishment had followed and on that

basis the decree in the earlier suit recognising that

arrangement did not require registration. In the face of that,

the High Court was justified in answering the substantial

question of law formulated by it in favour of the plaintiff and

against the contesting defendants.

18. We, thus find no merit in this appeal. We confirm

the judgments and decrees under appeal and dismiss this

appeal. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.