1

2026:CGHC:2350

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CR No. 279 of 2025

1 - Sourabh Bodani S/o Late Ramesh H. Bodani Aged About 28 Years

R/o Hemu Colony Chowk, Sindhi Colony, Gondiya, District Gondiya

(Maharastra)

2 - Kapil Bodani S/o Late Ramesh H. Bodani Aged About 26 Years

General Power of Attorney Holder Of The Applicant No. 1, 3 to 5, R/o

Hemu Colony Chowk, Sindhi Colony, Gondiya, District Gondiya

(Maharastra)

3 - Smt. Shalini Bodani D/o Late Ramesh H. Bodani Aged About 30

Years R/o Hemu Colony Chowk, Sindhi Colony, Gondiya, District

Gondiya (Maharastra)

4 - Smt. Reshma Bodani D/o Late Ramesh H. Bodani Aged About 35

Years R/o Hemu Colony Chowk, Sindhi Colony, Gondiya, District

Gondiya (Maharastra)

5 - Smt. Seema Bodani W/o Late Ramesh H. Bodani Aged About 30

Years R/o Hemu Colony Chowk, Sindhi Colony, Gondiya, District

Gondiya (Maharastra)

... Applicant

versus

1 - Kanhaiyalal Gidwani S/o Late Bhagwandas Gidwani Aged About 59

Years R/o Behind Shiv Talkies, V I P Colony, Tahsil And District Bilaspur,

Chhattisgarh

2 - Tahsildar Bilaslpur, Tahsil Office, District- Bilaspur, C.G.

3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, Bilaspur, Tahsil And

District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh

... Non-applicants

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(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Applicants :Mr. Saurabh Sharma and Ms. Harneet

Kaur Khanuja, Advocates

For Non-applicant No.1Mr. Gaurav Singhal, Advocate

For State/Non-applicants

No.2 and 3

Mr. Hariom Rai, Panel Lawyer

Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

Order on Board

14.01.2026

1.By way of this civil revision, the applicants have prayed for

following relief:-

“It is, therefore, prayed that the Hon'ble Court may

kindly be pleased to allow the instant revision and

set aside the impugned order dated 08/10/2025

(ANNEXURE A/1) and further be pleased to dismiss

the suit filed by plaintiff by allowing the application

filed under order 7 rule 11 of the cpc, in the interest

of justice.”

2.The brief facts of the case are that respondent No.1/plaintiff has

instituted a civil suit for specific performance on the basis of an

alleged oral agreement dated 10.11.2009 and a subsequent

written agreement to sell dated 15.04.2010, purportedly executed

by the applicants’/defendants’ father/husband in respect of land

bearing Khasra Nos. 235/21 and 235/22 situated at Juna Bilaspur,

Tahsil and District Bilaspur (C.G.). It is pleaded that a sum of

₹51,000/- was paid as earnest money and the remaining amount

of ₹12,00,000/- was allegedly paid in cash at the time of execution

of the written agreement, whereafter possession of the suit land

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was handed over to the plaintiff. The executant is stated to have

expired on 06.11.2018. After a long and unexplained delay,

respondent No.1/plaintiff issued a legal notice to the

applicants/defendants on 03.05.2025 seeking execution of the

sale deed and thereafter filed the present suit on 09.05.2025, i.e.

more than fifteen years after the alleged agreement dated

15.04.2010.

3.The applicants/defendants filed an application under Order VII

Rule 11 CPC contending that no agreement for sale was ever

executed by their father/husband; that the alleged agreement is

forged and fabricated; and that, in any case, the suit is ex facie

barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963,

which prescribes a period of three years for filing a suit for specific

performance from the date fixed for performance or, in the

absence thereof, from the date when performance is refused.

Despite the plaint itself disclosing the dates of the alleged

agreement and the inordinate delay of over fifteen years, the

learned Trial Court, by order dated 08.10.2025, rejected the

application holding that the objections raised involved mixed

questions of fact and law. Hence, the present Civil Revision.

4.Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the impugned

order passed by the learned trial Court is per se illegal, arbitrary

and unsustainable in the eyes of law and, therefore, deserves to

be set aside. It is contended that while rejecting the application

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under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the

learned Trial Court has committed a clear jurisdictional error by

failing to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it in accordance with

law. It is further submitted that, primarily, the civil suit itself is

barred by limitation on the face of the plaint. As per the pleadings

of the plaintiff, the written agreement for sale was executed on

15.04.2010, whereas the suit for specific performance has been

instituted only on 14.05.2025. Thus, the suit has been filed after

more than fifteen years from the date of the alleged agreement

and is hopelessly barred by limitation under Article 54 of the

Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides a period of

only three years for filing a suit for specific performance of

contract. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the bar

of limitation was apparent from the plaint itself and, therefore, the

plaint was liable to be rejected at the threshold under Order VII

Rule 11 CPC.

5.Learned counsel further submits that under Sections 3 and 9 of

the Limitation Act, 1963, it is the bounden duty of the Court to first

examine whether the suit is barred by limitation and to dismiss the

same if it is so barred, even if no specific plea of limitation has

been taken by the defendants. The learned Trial Court has failed

to discharge this statutory obligation. It is contended that once the

period of limitation commences, the running of time cannot be

arrested. From the plaint averments, the right to sue accrued

when the plaintiff claims to have paid the entire consideration and

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the executant allegedly failed to execute the sale deed. Despite

such alleged default, the plaintiff remained completely silent for

several years, both during the lifetime of the executant and even

after his death. No contemporaneous demand, legal notice or any

overt act showing continuous readiness and willingness was

pleaded for over a decade, which itself demolishes the plaintiff’s

case.

6.Learned counsel also submits that the learned Trial Court failed to

examine the plaint to determine when the “right to sue” first

accrued to the plaintiff and whether, on the admitted pleadings,

the suit was within limitation. The expression “right to sue” means

the right to seek relief by way of legal proceedings, which accrues

only when the cause of action arises and not at a time arbitrarily

chosen by the plaintiff. Mere issuance of a legal notice in the year

2025 cannot revive or extend a cause of action which had long

since become barred by limitation. It is further submitted that apart

from being barred by limitation, the plaint does not disclose any

subsisting or legally enforceable cause of action for filing the civil

suit. The entire cause of action pleaded is illusory, stale and

based on a self-serving assertion after an unexplained delay of

more than fifteen years. In the absence of a live cause of action,

the suit is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC as

well.

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7.Lastly, it is urged that the impugned order has been passed

without due application of judicial mind and without any

meaningful discussion of the plaint averments and settled legal

principles. The learned Trial Court has mechanically observed that

the issue raised is a mixed question of fact and law, which is

wholly perverse in the facts of the present case and frustrates the

very object and purpose of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which is to

weed out hopelessly barred and vexatious litigation at the

inception. Therefore the impugned order dated 08.10.2025

(Annexure A-1) deserves to be set aside, and the present Civil

Revision be allowed in the interest of justice.

8.On the other hand, learned counsel for non-applicant No.1/plaintiff

submits that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality

or perversity and has been passed after due consideration of the

pleadings on record. It is contended that the question of limitation

in the present case involves mixed questions of fact and law,

which cannot be decided at the stage of an application under

Order VII Rule 11 CPC without leading evidence. Learned counsel

submits that, as per the averments made in the plaint, the cause

of action arose in the year 2025 when the defendants refused to

execute the sale deed, and therefore the suit is within limitation

and maintainable. It is further argued that since the plaint

discloses a cause of action, the application under Order VII Rule

11 CPC was rightly rejected and no interference is warranted.

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9.Learned counsel appearing for the State/non-applicants Nos.2

and 3 submits that the impugned order passed by the learned

Trial Court is just, legal and in accordance with law. It is

contended that no jurisdictional error or material irregularity has

been committed by the Trial Court while rejecting the application

under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Learned State counsel further

submits that, at the stage of considering an application under

Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is required to confine itself to

the averments made in the plaint, and since the plaint discloses a

cause of action, the Trial Court has rightly rejected the application.

It is, therefore, submitted that the present petition is devoid of

merits and is liable to be dismissed.

10.I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and

perused the documents along with this civil revision.

11.Scope of Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC: Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC

provides for rejection of a plaint at the threshold on certain

specific legal grounds. These grounds are purely procedural in

nature and are limited to examining the pleadings in the plaint

alone, not the defence of the defendant or disputed questions of

fact. The grounds include:

•When the plaint does not disclose a cause of action;

•When the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff fails

to correct it despite opportunity;

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•When the plaint is insufficiently stamped and the deficiency

is not rectified despite opportunity;

•When the suit appears barred by law.

12.It is well-settled that for deciding an application under Order 7

Rule 11 of CPC, only the averments made in the plaint are to be

considered, and not the defence or any disputed facts raised by

the defendant.

13.A mixed question of fact and law is one where the answer

depends not solely on the application of legal principles, but also

requires determination of disputed factual issues through

evidence. Examples include disputes about title, possession,

fraud, undue influence, valuation of property, and whether the

plaintiff is in possession or not. When such questions arise, they

cannot be conclusively decided at the threshold stage without

trial, because the Court cannot assume facts or evaluate evidence

while deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC.

14.Very recently in the matter of P. Kumarakurubaran v. P.

Narayanan and others passed in Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2549 of 2021), decided on

29.04.2025, reported as 2025 INSC 598, wherein the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has reiterated that the issue of limitation cannot

be adjudicated at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC when the

question hinges upon disputed facts or the date of knowledge.

The Court has further held that unless the averments in the plaint

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itself ex facie establish that the suit is barred by limitation, the

plaint cannot be rejected without permitting the parties to lead

evidence, as the plea of limitation ordinarily involves a mixed

question of fact and law and observed as follows :-

“11. It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation

Act, 1963, governs suits seeking cancellation of an

instrument and prescribes a period of limitation of

three years from the date when the plaintiff first had

knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief.

The emphasis under Article 59 is not on the date of

the transaction per se, but on the accrual of the

cause of action, which, in cases involving allegations

of fraud or unauthorized execution of documents,

hinges upon the date on which the plaintiff acquired

knowledge of such facts.

12. In the present case, the appellant has

specifically averred in the plaint that upon becoming

aware of registration of documents allegedly carried

out among the defendants in relation to the suit

property, he immediately approached the Additional

Commissioner of Police, Chennai and lodged a land

grabbing complaint on 09.12.2011 against the family

of Defendant No.1. Subsequently, he applied for

patta in his favour on 24.02.2012, and raised

objections on 05.03.2012 to Defendant No. 4 stating

that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff and

that no registration concerning the same should be

carried out. He has also submitted an objection

petition to Defendant No. 5 requesting that no

planning permit be granted to anybody except the

appellant in respect of the suit property. Thereafter,

the appellant instituted the suit on 03.12.2014

seeking a declaration and consequential reliefs. On

the other hand, the respondents/defendants stated

in their application filed under Order VII Rule 11

CPC that the appellant had knowledge of the

execution of the sale deed by his father in favour of

Defendant No.1 at the earliest point of time and

hence, the suit instituted by the appellant was barred

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by limitation. While the trial Court rejected the said

application holding that the issue of limitation

involved a mixed question of law and fact, the High

Court in revision took a contrary view and allowed

the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC

and rejected the plaint solely on the ground that the

suit was barred by limitation.

12.1. However, we are of the considered view that

the issue as to whether the appellant had prior

notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an

earlier point of time, or whether the plea regarding

the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that

necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this

preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint

must be taken at their face value and assumed to be

true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically

pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action,

the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily.

It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which

cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under

Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the

plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting

the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable.

12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the

following decisions of this Court, which have

consistently held that when the question of limitation

involves disputed facts or hinges on the date of

knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the

stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC:

(i) Daliben Valjibhai & Others v. Prajapati

Kodarbhai Kachrabhai & Another, 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 4105

“10. The First Appellate Court came to the

conclusion that the defendants made an application

for correcting the revenue records only in the year

2017 and on the said application the Deputy

Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in March

2017 and that was the time when the plaintiffs came

to know about the execution of the sale deed. It is

under these circumstances that the suit was

instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court

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came to the correct conclusion that under Article 59

of the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3

years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return a

finding that in cases where the document is

registered, the knowledge must be presumed from

the date of registration.

11.

12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai

Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar, where again a suit for

cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an

application under Order 7 Rule 11, on ground of

limitation, this Court specifically held that limitation in

all such cases will arise from date of knowledge. The

relevant portion is as follows:

“15. What is relevant for answering the matter in

issue in the context of the application under Order 7

Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the

plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole.

The defence available to the defendants or the plea

taken by them in the written statement or any

application filed by them, cannot be the basis to

decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d).

Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is

common ground that the registered sale deed is

dated 18-10-1996. The limitation to challenge the

registered sale deed ordinarily would start running

from the date on which the sale deed was

registered. However, the specific case of the

appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had no

knowledge whatsoever regarding execution of such

sale deed by their brothers, original Defendants 1

and 2, in favour of Jaikrishnabhai Prabhudas

Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that

knowledge on 26-12-2012 and immediately took

steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale

deed and on receipt thereof they realised the fraud

played on them by their brothers concerning the

ancestral property... According to the appellants, the

suit has been filed within time after acquiring the

knowledge about the execution of the registered

sale deed. In this context, the trial court opined that

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it was a triable issue and declined to accept the

application filed by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for

rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That

view commends to us.

…

19. In the present case, we find that the appellant-

plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed

immediately after getting knowledge about the

fraudulent sale deed... We affirm the view taken by

the trial court that the issue regarding the suit being

barred by limitation in the facts of the present case,

is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint

cannot be rejected at the threshold in exercise of the

power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. In view of the above, there was no justification

for the High Court in allowing the application under

Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were not evident

from the plaint averments itself. The High Court was

also not justified in holding that the limitation period

commences from the date of registration itself. In

this view of the matter the judgment of the High

Court is unsustainable.”

(ii) Salim D. Agboatwala & Others v. Shamalji

Oddhavji Thakkar & Others, (2021) 17 SCC 100

“11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj

Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy, the rejection of plaint

under Order 7 Rule 11 is a drastic power... When a

plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the

essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only

at a particular point of time, the same has to be

accepted at the stage of considering the application

under Order 7 Rule 11.

12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of

this Court in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai

Thakkar (supra), the plea regarding the date on

which the plaintiffs gained knowledge of the

essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question

whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It

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becomes a triable issue and hence the suit cannot

be thrown out at the threshold.

13…

14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a few

sentences here and there from the plaint and

contend that the plaintiffs had constructive notice of

the proceedings and that therefore limitation started

running from the date of constructive notice. In fact,

the plea of constructive notice is raised by the

respondents, after asserting positively that the

plaintiffs had real knowledge as well as actual notice

of the proceedings. In any case, the plea of

constructive notice appears to be a subsequent

invention.”

(iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central

Bank of India & Another, (2020) 17 SCC 260

“6. The central question is: whether the plaint as

filed by the appellant could have been rejected by

invoking Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC?

7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample power

to the court to reject the plaint, if from the averments

in the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by

any law including the law of limitation. This position

is no more res integra. We may usefully refer to the

decision of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv

Kumar Gupta [(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to 20,

the Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 65-66)

“13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be

rejected in the following cases:

‘(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the

plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the

valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails

to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but

the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently

stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the

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court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a

time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the

plaint to be barred by any law;

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the

provisions of Rule 9;’

14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem

Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, [(2003) 1 SCC 557] it

was held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of the

Code that:

‘9. … the relevant facts which need to be looked into

for deciding an application thereunder are the

averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise

the power… at any stage of the suit — before

registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the

defendant at any time before the conclusion of the

trial. For the purposes of deciding an application

under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC,

the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas

taken by the defendant in the written statement

would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.…’ (SCC p.

560, para 9).

15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal

[ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal,

(1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question

to be decided while dealing with an application filed

under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real

cause of action has been set out in the plaint or

something purely illusory has been stated with a

view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.

16. “The trial court must remember that if on a

meaningful—not formal—reading of the plaint it is

manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of

not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise

its power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to

see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If

clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of

action, [it has to be nipped] in the bud at the first

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hearing by examining the party searchingly under

Order 10 CPC.” (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V.

Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467] , SCC p. 468.)

17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to

be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read.

As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v.

Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487], only a

part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause

of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be

rejected.

18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property

[(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the

averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen

to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7

was applicable.

19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr.

[(2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held thus: (SCC pp.

146-47, para 15)

‘15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation,

dissection, segregation and inversions of the

language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such

a course is adopted it would run counter to the

cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a

pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its

true import. It is not permissible to cull out a

sentence or a passage and to read it out of the

context in isolation. Although it is the substance and

not merely the form that has to be looked into, the

pleading has to be construed as it stands without

addition or subtraction or words or change of its

apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the

party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the

tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole.

At the same time it should be borne in mind that no

pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat

justice on hair-splitting technicalities.’

20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes

it clear that if the plaint does not contain necessary

averments relating to limitation, the same is liable to

be rejected. For the said purpose, it is the duty of the

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person who files such an application to satisfy the

court that the plaint does not disclose how the same

is in time. In order to answer the said question, it is

incumbent on the part of the court to verify the entire

plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is

rejected, the court has to record the order to that

effect with the reasons for such order.”

8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ

Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v.

Ponniamman Educational Trust [(2012) 8 SCC 706:

(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows: (SCC

pp. 713-15, paras 10-12)

“10. … It is clear from the above that where the

plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief

claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the

time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and

not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred

by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and

the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of

Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject

the same. A reading of the above provision also

makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of

the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit

either before registering the plaint or after the

issuance of summons to the defendants or at any

time before the conclusion of the trial.

11. This position was explained by this Court in

Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC

557], in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of

the Code, it was held as under: (SCC p. 560, para 9)

‘9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear

that the relevant facts which need to be looked into

for deciding an application thereunder are the

averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise

the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage

of the suit — before registering the plaint or after

issuing summons to the defendant at any time

before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes

of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d)

of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint

are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in

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the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at

that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written

statement without deciding the application under

Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural

irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by

the trial court.’

It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11,

the court has to look into the averments in the plaint

and the same can be exercised by the trial court at

any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the

averments in the written statement are immaterial

and it is the duty of the court to scrutinise the

averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what

needs to be looked into in deciding such an

application are the averments in the plaint. At that

stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the

written statement are wholly irrelevant and the

matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments.

These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos

Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC

184] and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune

Express [(2006) 3 SCC 100].

12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T.

Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467],

wherein while considering the very same provision

i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in

considering such application, this Court has

reminded the trial Judges with the following

observation: (SCC p. 470, para 5)

‘5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on

a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it

is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense

of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should

exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC

taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein

is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the

illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the

first hearing by examining the party searchingly

under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the

answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts

would insist imperatively on examining the party at

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the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot

down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also

resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI)

and must be triggered against them.’

It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and

meritless and not disclosing a clear right or

material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to

exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever

drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action

as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in the abovereferred

decision [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4

SCC 467], it should be nipped in the bud at the first

hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of

the Code.”

14. All these events have been reiterated in Para 28

of the plaint, dealing with the cause of action for

filing of the suit. Indeed, the said para opens with the

expression “the cause of action to file the suit

accrued in favour of the plaintiff and against the

defendants when the illegal recoveries were noticed

and letter dated 21-7-2000 was sent to the

defendants to clarify as to how the interest was

being calculated”. This averment cannot be read in

isolation.

….

22. It is well-established position that the cause of

action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of

facts. Further, the factum of the suit being barred by

limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of

fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order 7

Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the

assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily

believed that its claim was being processed by the

regional office and the regional office would be

taking appropriate decision at the earliest. That

belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the

Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8-5-2002

followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the

effect that the action taken by the Bank was in

accordance with the rules and the appellant need

not correspond with the Bank in that regard any

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further. This firm response from the respondent

Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue

the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the

appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28-

11-2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the

suit on 23-2-2005, is also invoked as giving rise to

cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the

appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a

mixed question of fact and law, depending on the

response of the respondents.”

13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court

in reversing the well-reasoned order of the trial Court

warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly held

that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication

upon evidence, particularly in view of the appellant’s

assertion that the Power of Attorney executed by

him did not confer any authority upon his father to

alienate the suit property and that the impugned

transaction came to his knowledge only at a much

later point in time. In such circumstances, the

determination of limitation involved disputed

questions of fact that could not be summarily

decided without the benefit of trial. The High Court,

however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a

prima facie assumption that the suit was barred by

limitation, without undertaking any examination as to

whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge

was demonstrably false or inherently improbable in

light of the record. In the opinion of this Court, such

an approach amounts to an error of law and

constitutes a misapplication of the well-established

principles governing the exercise of power under

Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the

decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the

respondents are inapplicable, being factually

distinguishable.

14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has

categorically averred in the plaint that he executed

the registered power of attorney in favour of his

father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a

house and carrying out related activities. There is no

express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit

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property to any person without the appellant’s

consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant’s father

executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter,

going beyond the scope of the power of attorney,

which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority

and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be

rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11

CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint

discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out

at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its

jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in

holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The

High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction

under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered

in the absence of any jurisdictional error or

perversity in the trial court’s order. Rejecting the

plaint where substantial factual disputes exist

concerning limitation and the scope of authority

under the Power of Attorney, is legally

unsustainable.”

15.Reverting to the facts of the case in the light of the law laid down

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Kumarakurubaran (supra), it

is quite vivid that while exercising jurisdiction under Order VII Rule

11 CPC, the Court is required to confine itself strictly to the

averments made in the plaint and that the question of limitation

can be decided at the threshold only when the same is ex facie

apparent from the plaint itself. It is equally well-settled that where

determination of limitation hinges upon disputed facts or requires

appreciation of evidence, the issue partakes the character of a

mixed question of fact and law and cannot be conclusively

adjudicated without trial.

16.In the present case, it is not in dispute that, as per the plaint

averments, the so-called written agreement for sale is stated to

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have been executed on 15.04.2010, whereas the civil suit for

specific performance has been instituted on 14.05.2025, i.e. after

a lapse of more than fifteen years. At the same time, the plaintiff

has pleaded that the cause of action accrued subsequently and

has sought to justify the filing of the suit within limitation. Whether

such plea regarding accrual of cause of action is genuine,

sustainable in law, or merely an attempt to give a colour of

limitation to an otherwise stale claim, necessarily requires

adjudication upon evidence.

17.In view of the aforesaid legal position and keeping in mind the

ratio laid down in P. Kumarakurubaran (supra), this Court is of

the considered opinion that though the plaint could not have been

rejected outright under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at this stage, the

issue relating to limitation and existence of cause of action goes

to the very root of the matter. Therefore, the learned Trial Court

ought to adjudicate the same at the earliest as a preliminary

issue.

18.Accordingly, while declining to interfere with the impugned order

dated 08.10.2025 rejecting the application under Order VII Rule

11 CPC, the learned Trial Court is directed to frame an

appropriate preliminary issue with regard to limitation and cause

of action, permit the parties to lead evidence thereon, and decide

the said preliminary issue strictly in accordance with law.

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19.In case the suit is apparently barred by limitation, the concerned

Trial Court may pass an appropriate order keeping in view the

prescribed period of limitation.

20.With these observations and directions, the present Civil Revision

stands disposed of.

21.It is expected that the learned Trial Court shall make all

endeavours to decide the aforesaid preliminary issue

expeditiously.

Sd/--

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge

Yogesh