2025 INSC 598 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5622 OF 2025

[Arising from SLP (C) No. 2549 OF 2021]

P. KUMARAKURUBARAN … APPELLANT

VERSUS

P. NARAYANAN & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Leave granted.

2.This Civil Appeal arises out of the final judgment and order dated

03.09.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras

1

in CRP(NPD) No.

131 of 2018, whereby the High Court allowed the Civil Revision Petition filed by

Respondent No.1 and rejected the plaint filed by the appellant under Order VII

Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

2

on the ground that the suit was

barred by limitation.

1

For short, “the High Court”

2

For short, “CPC”

1

3.Originally, the appellant / plaintiff instituted a suit bearing O.S. No. 310 of

2014 before the Principal District Court, Chengalpet, against the respondents /

defendants and the Government authorities for the following reliefs:

(i) Declaring that the appellant is the legal owner of the suit schedule property,

(ii) Issuing a permanent injunction against Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 restraining them

from causing any interruption on the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit

schedule property by the appellant,

(iii) Declaring the sale deed bearing No. 303/1993 dated 10.10.1988 registered

in Pudukottai Sub Registration Office, Tuticorin District, in favour of Defendant

No. 1 with respect to the suit schedule property as null and void,

(iv) Declaring the Settlement Deed bearing No. 1493/2012 dated 16.04.2012

registered in Alandur Sub Registration Office executed by Defendant No.1 in

favour of Defendant No. 2 with respect to the suit schedule property as null and

void,

(v) Declaring the General Power of Attorney Deed bearing No. 3725/2012 dated

31.12.2012 registered in Alandur Sub Registration Office executed by Defendant

No. 2 in favour of Defendant No. 3 with respect to the suit schedule property as

null and void,

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(vi) Issuing a permanent injunction that Defendant No. 5 should not register any

document created by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 with respect to the suit schedule

property except the appellant,

(vii) Issuing a permanent injunction directing Defendant No. 5 not to issue building

plan permit to Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 except the appellant for the construction of

new building in the suit schedule property, and

(viii) Cost of the suit to be paid by the Defendants to the appellant.

4.It was alleged in the plaint that the appellant was assigned a vacant site by

the Special Tahsildar, Saidapet, Tamil Nadu, on 05.05.1974. He constructed a roof

house and was in possession and enjoyment of the said property by paying tax and

other charges. While so, he executed a Power of Attorney in favour of his father,

K. Pothikannu Pillai, which was registered on 06.01.1978 as Document No. 04-11-

101-102-3/1978 in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Thallakulam, Madurai, for the

purposes of putting up construction, entering into agreement, and performing other

relevant activities. Contrary to the same, the father of the appellant executed a sale

deed on 10.10.1988, in favour of the second respondent / Defendant No.1 /

granddaughter vide Document No. 303/1993 on the file of the Sub-Registrar,

Pudukottai, which according to the appellant, was illegal, as the Power of Attorney

did not authorize his father to alienate the property. After coming to know about

the same, the appellant approached the Additional Commissioner of Police,

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Chennai and gave a complaint on 09.12.2011 under Land Grabbing Cell against

the family of Defendant No. 1. Subsequently, the appellant applied for the

individual patta to the Special Tahsildar, Alandur, on 24.02.2012 and also made a

representation to Defendant No. 4 not to register any document with respect to the

suit schedule property. In the meanwhile, the father of the appellant had died.

Following the same, the second respondent / Defendant No.1 executed a settlement

deed in favour of the third respondent / Defendant No.2 vide Document No.

1198/2012 on 16.04.2012. Subsequently, the third respondent / Defendant No.2

executed a General Power of attorney deed in favour of the first respondent /

Defendant No.3 on 31.12.2012. Thereafter, the defendants made application for

building permission on 05.07.2013, to which, the appellant filed his objection. In

the said circumstances, the appellant came forward with the suit for the reliefs

stated supra.

5.During the pendency of the aforesaid suit, the respondents / defendants filed

an interlocutory application bearing I.A. No. 151 of 2015 in O.S. No. 310 of 2014

under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint, on the ground that

the suit was undervalued and was barred by limitation.

4

6.After hearing both sides, the Additional District and Sessions Judge,

Kancheepuram District at Chengalpet, by order dated 04.10.2017, dismissed the

aforesaid application, observing that the grounds raised by the defendants can only

be addressed after conducting a detailed trial based on the material facts, records,

and other related issues, and therefore, the plaint cannot be rejected at the

threshold. Challenging the same, the appellant / plaintiff preferred a Civil Revision

Petition bearing No. 131 of 2018 before the High Court.

7.By order dated 03.09.2020, the High Court allowed the aforesaid Civil

Revision Petition after having held that the suit was barred by limitation.

Aggrieved by the same, the appellant / plaintiff is before us with the present

appeal.

8.The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court erred in

allowing the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and in rejecting the

plaint on the ground of limitation, particularly while exercising its revisional

jurisdiction. Adding further, it is submitted that the question of limitation -

especially in matters involving the knowledge or notice of the impugned

transaction- is a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be conclusively

determined without a full-fledged trial. The Additional District Judge, upon a

careful consideration of the pleadings, rightly held that the suit raised triable issues

5

requiring evidence, and therefore, correctly declined to reject the plaint at the

preliminary stage. It is also submitted that the plaint contains specific averments

challenging the alienation of the suit property by the appellant’s father, who had no

authority to do so; and that, the appellant, being a third party to the document, has

duly and correctly valued the suit in accordance with the provisions of the Tamil

Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955; and hence, the rejection of the

plaint either on the ground of limitation or valuation, without affording the

appellant an opportunity to adduce evidence, is contrary to the settled principles of

law.

8.1.It is also submitted that a suit seeking a declaration along with a

consequential relief of injunction cannot be construed as a suit for declaration

simpliciter. Such a suit is one for declaration with further relief as contemplated

under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Therefore, it cannot be dismissed

solely on the basis that one of the prayers may not be maintainable or barred.

The dismissal of the entire suit on the strength of a single prayer without

examining the merit and maintainability of the consequential relief is legally

untenable. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this court in

N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board

3

in which, it was

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2024 INSC 817

6

held that the suit for a declaration of a right cannot be held to be barred so long as

right to property subsist.

8.2.The learned counsel submitted that the power of attorney relied upon is

specific in nature and is confined solely to matters relating to construction and

obtaining necessary approvals. It did not confer any authority upon the appellant’s

father to execute a sale deed or enter into a sale agreement. In the absence of such

authority, the execution of the sale deed and the settlement deed by the respondents

is wholly without jurisdiction and stands vitiated by fraud.

8.3.The learned counsel further pointed out that the appellant has sought the

relief of declaration of title and permanent injunction by expressly disputing the

right, title, and possession claimed by the respondents. The plaint contains specific

allegations regarding fraudulent alienation, subsequent encumbrance, and the

absence of authority on the part of the appellant’s father to effect the transfer of the

suit property. These are serious and contested issues that necessitate a detailed

adjudication based on oral and documentary evidence. At the threshold stage, it is

impermissible for the Court to assess the truth or falsity of these averments or to

summarily reject the suit on the ground of limitation. Furthermore, the Additional

District Judge, in declining the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC

committed no jurisdictional error, as the plaint disclosed triable issues requiring

7

full-fledged trial. However, the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction,

has erroneously interfered with the order of the trial Court and proceeded to reject

the suit at the preliminary stage.

8.4.Stating so, the learned counsel prayed to allow this appeal by setting aside

the order passed by the High Court.

9.Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent No.1, at the outset, submitted

that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed as per the judgment of the High

Court, which rightly held that the suit filed by the appellant was hopelessly barred

by limitation. Continuing further, it is submitted that in the plaint, the appellant

failed to establish the date of knowledge of the alleged transaction, which was a

significant and material fact necessary to corroborate the cause of action for filing

the suit. On the other hand, the certified copy of the sale deed dated 10.10.1978

executed by the power of attorney holder, namely, the father of the appellant, was

alleged to have been received by the appellant on 28.07.2011. If the said date is

construed as the date of knowledge, the suit ought to have been instituted within a

period of three years therefrom i.e., on or before 27.07.2014, in accordance with

Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the plaint came to be filed only

on 03.12.2014. Consequently, the High Court upheld the maintainability of the

8

interlocutory application filed by the respondents under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for

rejection of the plaint.

9.1.It is also submitted that the appellant and the respondents are closely related,

as the power of attorney holder was the father of the appellant, and the respondents

are the appellant’s sister, nephew, and niece. Therefore, the appellant’s contention

that he remained unaware of the alleged transaction for a period of 26 years is

untenable in law.

9.2.Further, the learned counsel referred to the power of attorney and submitted

that the terms ‘signing and filing of all applications and agreement and Indemnity

Bonds’ clearly indicate that the appellant’s father, acting as the power of attorney

holder, was duly authorized to execute lawful agreements. Accordingly, he

executed the sale deed dated 10.10.1988 in favour of the second respondent /

Defendant No.1 under the authority of the said document.

9.3.The learned counsel also submitted that a bare perusal of the averments in

the plaint reveals that the suit is barred by limitation. In this regard, reliance was

placed on the decisions of this Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali

4

and Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh(Dead) by LRs

5

wherein, it

was held that when the foundational facts, as pleaded, squarely attract the bar of

4

(2020) 7 SCC 366

5

(2020) 16 SCC 601

9

limitation, no trial is warranted and the suit is liable to be dismissed at the

threshold. That apart, the learned counsel referred to the decision of this Court in

Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje

Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another

6

, wherein, it was clearly held that the

spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is only for the courts to nip at its

bud when any litigation ex-facie appears to be a clear abuse of process.

9.4.Thus, according to the learned counsel, the respondents / defendants being

the absolute owners of the property, have been in peaceful possession and

enjoyment thereof. However, the appellant, having suppressed material facts,

deliberately instituted the suit after an inordinate delay of 26 years. Therefore, the

impugned order passed by the High Court rejecting the plaint does not warrant any

interference by this Court.

10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon careful perusal of

the pleadings, the material on record, and the impugned judgment, we find it

necessary to examine whether the rejection of the plaint under Order VII

Rule 11(d) CPC was justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

It is to be pointed out at this juncture that though the respondents / defendants

sought to reject the plaint on two grounds - valuation of the suit and limitation - the

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2024 SCC OnLine SC 3844

10

High Court rejected the plaint solely on the ground that it was time-barred.

Accordingly, we shall confine our consideration in this appeal to the issue of

limitation.

11.It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, governs suits

seeking cancellation of an instrument and prescribes a period of limitation of three

years from the date when the plaintiff first had knowledge of the facts entitling him

to such relief. The emphasis under Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction

per se, but on the accrual of the cause of action, which, in cases involving

allegations of fraud or unauthorized execution of documents, hinges upon the date

on which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of such facts.

12.In the present case, the appellant has specifically averred in the plaint that

upon becoming aware of registration of documents allegedly carried out among the

defendants in relation to the suit property, he immediately approached the

Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai and lodged a land grabbing complaint

on 09.12.2011 against the family of Defendant No.1. Subsequently, he applied for

patta in his favour on 24.02.2012, and raised objections on 05.03.2012 to

Defendant No. 4 stating that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff and that no

registration concerning the same should be carried out. He has also submitted an

objection petition to Defendant No. 5 requesting that no planning permit be granted

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to anybody except the appellant in respect of the suit property. Thereafter, the

appellant instituted the suit on 03.12.2014 seeking a declaration and consequential

reliefs. On the other hand, the respondents / defendants stated in their application

filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the appellant had knowledge of the

execution of the sale deed by his father in favour of Defendant No.1 at the earliest

point of time and hence, the suit instituted by the appellant was barred by

limitation. While the trial Court rejected the said application holding that the issue

of limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact, the High Court in revision,

took a contrary view and allowed the application filed under Order VII

Rule 11 CPC and rejected the plaint solely on the ground that the suit was barred

by limitation.

12.1.However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the

appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier

point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are

matters that necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary stage,

the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to

be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of

the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily.

It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the

threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on

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the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally

unsustainable.

12.2.In this regard, we may usefully refer to the following decisions of this Court,

which have consistently held that when the question of limitation involves disputed

facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the stage

of Order VII Rule 11 CPC:

(i) Daliben Valjibhai & Others v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai & Another

7

“10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants made an

application for correcting the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the

said application the Deputy Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in March 2017

and that was the time when the plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the

sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit was instituted in the year

2017. While the High Court came to the correct conclusion that under Article 59 of

the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it

proceeded to return a finding that in cases where the document is registered, the

knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration.

11.

12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar where again a suit

for cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an application under Order 7

Rule 11, on ground of limitation, this Court specifically held that limitation in all

such cases will arise from date of knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows:

“15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the

application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the

plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence available to the

defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or any application

filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule

11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is common ground that the

registered sale deed is dated 18-10-1996. The limitation to challenge the registered

sale deed ordinarily would start running from the date on which the sale deed was

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2024 SCC OnLine SC 4105

13

registered. However, the specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013

they had no knowledge whatsoever regarding execution of such sale deed by their

brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of Jaikrishnabhai Prabhudas

Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and

immediately took steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale deed and on

receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on them by their brothers concerning

the ancestral property and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had approached

their brothers (original Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering

with their possession and to partition the property and provide exclusive possession

of half (½) portion of the land so designated towards their share. However, when

they realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any heed to their

request, they had no other option but to approach the court of law and filed the

subject suit within two days therefrom. According to the appellants, the suit has

been filed within time after acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the

registered sale deed. In this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue

and declined to accept the application filed by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for

rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view commends to us.

…

19. In the present case, we find that the appellant-plaintiffs have asserted that the

suit was filed immediately after getting knowledge about the fraudulent sale deed

executed by original Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the dark about such

execution and within two days from the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2

to refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of use and possession of the

ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the view taken by the trial court that

the issue regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the facts of the present

case, is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint cannot be rejected at the

threshold in exercise of the power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. In view of the above, there was no justification for the High Court in allowing

the application under Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were not evident from the

plaint averments itself. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the

limitation period commences from the date of registration itself. In this view of the

matter the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.”

(ii) Salim D. Agboatwala & Others v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar & Others

8

8

(2021) 17 SCC 100

14

“11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy

[(2015) 8 SCC 331: (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100], the rejection of plaint under Order 7

Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action at the

threshold. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power are

stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint is sought on the ground of

limitation. When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts

giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the same has to

be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11.

12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v.

Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar [(2018) 6 SCC 422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524],

the plea regarding the date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge of the

essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by

limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out

at the threshold.

13…

14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a few sentences here and there from the

plaint and contend that the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the proceedings and

that therefore limitation started running from the date of constructive notice. In

fact, the plea of constructive notice is raised by the respondents, after asserting

positively that the plaintiffs had real knowledge as well as actual notice of the

proceedings. In any case, the plea of constructive notice appears to be a

subsequent invention.”

(iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Another

9

“6. The central question is: whether the plaint as filed by the appellant could have

been rejected by invoking Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC?

7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample power to the court to reject the plaint,

if from the averments in the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by any law

including the law of limitation. This position is no more res integra. We may

usefully refer to the decision of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar

Gupta [(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to 20, the Court observed as follows: (SCC

pp. 65-66)

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(2020) 17 SCC 260

15

“13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be rejected in the following

cases:

‘(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by

the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do

so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper

insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply

the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9;’

14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra,

[(2003) 1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code that:

‘9. … the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application

thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power

… at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons

to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of

deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the

averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written

statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.…’ (SCC p. 560, para 9).

15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery

Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be

decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code

is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely

illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.

16. “The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful—not formal—reading

of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a

clear right to sue, it should exercise its power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking

care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has

created the illusion of a cause of action, [it has to be nipped] in the bud at the first

hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC.” (See T.

Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467] , SCC p. 468.)

17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole

plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v.

Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487], only a part of the plaint cannot be

16

rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be

rejected.

18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was

observed that the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out

whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 was applicable.

19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. [(2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held

thus: (SCC pp. 146-47, para 15)

‘15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and

inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is

adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to

which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not

permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in

isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked

into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction

or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party

concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings

taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic

approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.’

20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes it clear that if the plaint does

not contain necessary averments relating to limitation, the same is liable to be

rejected. For the said purpose, it is the duty of the person who files such an

application to satisfy the court that the plaint does not disclose how the same is in

time. In order to answer the said question, it is incumbent on the part of the court

to verify the entire plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is rejected, the

court has to record the order to that effect with the reasons for such order.”

8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust &

Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [(2012) 8 SCC

706: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows: (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12)

“10. … It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of

action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed

by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the

court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails

to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to

reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power

under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either

before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or

at any time before the conclusion of the trial.

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11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of

Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557], in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of

the Code, it was held as under: (SCC p. 560, para 9)

‘9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which

need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in

the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at

any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the

defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of

deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the

averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written

statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the

written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC

cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the

trial court.’

It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the

averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any

stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are

immaterial and it is the duty of the court to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the

plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application

are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in

the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on

the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett &

Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel

M.V. Fortune Express [(2006) 3 SCC 100].

12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal

[(1977) 4 SCC 467], wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order

7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, this Court

has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation: (SCC p. 470, para 5)

‘5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal —

reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not

disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11

CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever

drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first

hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge

is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively

on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot

down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such

men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.’

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It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a

clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his

power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause

of action as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in the abovereferred decision [T.

Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], it should be nipped in the bud

at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code.”

14. All these events have been reiterated in Para 28 of the plaint, dealing with the

cause of action for filing of the suit. Indeed, the said para opens with the expression

“the cause of action to file the suit accrued in favour of the plaintiff and against the

defendants when the illegal recoveries were noticed and letter dated 21-7-2000

was sent to the defendants to clarify as to how the interest was being calculated”.

This averment cannot be read in isolation.

….

22. It is well-established position that the cause of action for filing a suit would

consist of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of the suit being barred by limitation,

ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason,

invoking Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the assertion in the

plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its claim was being processed by the

regional office and the regional office would be taking appropriate decision at the

earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the Senior Manager of

the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the effect

that the action taken by the Bank was in accordance with the rules and the

appellant need not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This firm

response from the respondent Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue

the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had eventually sent a

legal notice on 28-11-2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2-

2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken by

the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law,

depending on the response of the respondents.”

13.In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well-

reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly

held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication upon evidence,

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particularly in view of the appellant’s assertion that the Power of Attorney

executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit

property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much

later point in time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved

disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit

of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a prima

facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without undertaking any

examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was

demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion

of this Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a

misapplication of the well-established principles governing the exercise of power

under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the decisions relied upon by

the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually

distinguishable.

14.It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint

that he executed the registered power of attorney in favour of his father solely for

the limited purpose of constructing a house and carrying out related activities.

There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any

person without the appellant’s consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant’s father

executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the

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power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and

potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order

VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause

of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted

within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the matter

ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional

jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of

any jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court’s order. Rejecting the plaint

where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of

authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable.

15.In light of the foregoing, the judgment and order dated 03.09.2020 passed by

the High Court in CRP (NPD) No. 131 of 2018 is set aside and the order dated

04.10.2017 passed by the Additional District Judge, Chengalpattu in I.A. No. 151

of 2015 in O.S. No. 310 of 2014 is affirmed. As a sequel, the suit is restored for

trial on its merits. It is, however, made clear that the trial Court shall proceed

without being influenced by any of the observations made by the High Court.

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16.This appeal stands allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order as to

costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, shall stand

closed.

…………………………J.

[J.B. Pardiwala]

………………………… J.

[R. Mahadevan]

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 29, 2025.

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