CMI 18/2026 Page 1 of 33

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment reserved on: 20.08.2026

Judgment pronounced on: 07.09.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010390312026

+ CMI 18/2026, CM APPL. 56322/2026 (For permission to

file regular first appeal by the appellant being an

indigent person), CM APPL. 56323/2026 (Ex. From filing

certified copy of the annexures) & CM APPL. 56324/2026

(Delay of 25 days in filing the petition)

S.P. TANTI .....Appellant

Through: Appellant in person.

versus

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR .....Respondents

Through: Ms. Kangan Roda, SPC and

Mr. Nipun Jain, GP along with

Ms. Apoorva Sharma,

Advocate for Respondent

No. 1/UOI.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VA IDYANATHAN

SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

1. The present Regular First Appeal

1

has been filed under

Section 96 read with Order XLIV Rule 1 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908

2

, assailing the Judgment and Decree dated

27.04.2026

3

passed by the learned District Judge-06, South District,

1

Appeal

2

CPC

3

Impugned Judgment

CMI 18/2026 Page 2 of 33

Saket Courts, New Delhi

4

in CS DJ No. 59/2019

5

, titled “S.P. Tanti

v. Union of India & Anr.”, whereby the Recovery Suit filed by the

Appellant seeking recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,99,00,000/- towards

damages on account of alleged malicious prosecution, loss of

reputation, mental agony and other consequential losses came to be

dismissed.

2. For the sake of convenience and to avoid any ambiguity, the

parties shall hereinafter be referred to by their nomenclature before

this Court, i.e. as the Appellant and the Respondent, respectively.

3. The present Appeal, being a fresh institution, came up for its

initial hearing and, with the consent of the Appellant, appearing in

person and learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent,

was taken up for final disposal.

BRIEF FACTS:

4. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present Appeal

are set out hereinbelow:

a) The Appellant had applied for appointment to the post of Public

Prosecutor in the Central Bureau of Investigation

6

against a vacancy

reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste category. In support of

his claim to the said category, the Appellant relied upon Caste

Certificate No. 216 dated 25.02.1992

7

stated to have been issued by

the competent authority at Anumandal Padadhikari Office, Sadar,

Bhagalpur, Bihar, certifying him to belong to the “Pan” community.

b) The Appellant was thereafter recommended by the Union

Public Service Commission for appointment to the post of Public

4

learned Trial Court

5

Recovery Suit

6

CBI

7

Caste Certificate

CMI 18/2026 Page 3 of 33

Prosecutor vide letter dated 28.11.1995. Following the requisite

verification and completion of the prescribed formalities, an

appointment memorandum dated 09.12.1996 came to be issued,

pursuant to which the Appellant joined the CBI as Public Prosecutor

on 20.12.1996.

c) The dispute which subsequently arose concerned the

genuineness and validity of the caste certificate relied upon by the

Appellant. According to the Appellant, despite his appointment and

completion of the probationary period, the then Administrative Officer

of the CBI initiated action against him in respect of the caste

certificate.

d) The Appellant alleges that the action was actuated by mala fides

and was undertaken without obtaining an opinion from a handwriting

expert regarding the signatures appearing on the certificate. It is his

case that the ensuing criminal proceedings were instituted with the

intention of causing injury to his reputation, career and personal life.

e) The Respondent, on the other hand, disputed the aforesaid

allegations. Their case was that, upon verification of the certificate,

the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, had reported that the Appellant

belonged to the Other Backward Class

8

category and that the caste

certificate relied upon by him was not genuine.

f) In particular, reliance was placed upon the Report dated

10.12.1998 of the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur

9

, wherein it was

stated that no certificate in the name of the Appellant had been issued

from the concerned office and that the signature of the purported

8

OBC

9

Report

CMI 18/2026 Page 4 of 33

issuing authority appearing on the certificate was doubtful and did not

tally with the signature of the then Anumandal Padadhikari.

g) On the basis of the aforesaid verification, and with the approval

of the competent authority, a communication dated 20.01.1999 was

addressed to the concerned police authorities, pursuant to which FIR

No. 45/1999

10

came to be registered at Police Station Lodhi Colony,

New Delhi, under Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860

11

.

h) The criminal proceedings thereafter continued for several years.

The Appellant's case was that the allegation concerning the caste

certificate was false and that the criminal prosecution had caused him

prolonged mental agony, loss of reputation and financial hardship.

i) The Appellant has pleaded that the registration and publication

of the allegations concerning the criminal case adversely affected his

reputation and standing in society and caused hardship to his family as

well. He has also attributed the loss of his employment and other

consequential financial difficulties to the actions of the Respondent.

j) The criminal case ultimately culminated in the Appellant's

acquittal vide Judgment dated 01.02.2018

12

passed by the learned

Metropolitan Magistrate

13

in the proceedings arising out of the FIR.

k) The Appellant relied upon the said acquittal as the principal

foundation for his subsequent claim that the criminal proceedings had

been maliciously instituted against him. The Respondent, however,

disputed that the acquittal could, by itself, establish either malice or

10

FIR

11

IPC

12

Acquittal Judgment

13

learned Magistrate

CMI 18/2026 Page 5 of 33

absence of reasonable and probable cause in instituting the criminal

proceedings.

l) It is also relevant that, in the interregnum, the Appellant's

services as Public Prosecutor had come to be terminated on

15.04.2002. The Appellant attributed the termination to the criminal

proceedings and the alleged acts of the Respondents. The

Respondents, however, specifically disputed this assertion and

pleaded that the Appellant had concealed the subsequent litigation

concerning his termination.

m) They pointed out that the Appellant had challenged the

termination before the Central Administrative Tribunal

14

in OA No.

902/2003 and that, although the Tribunal had initially directed his

reinstatement vide Order dated 28.04.2004, the said decision was

subsequently interfered with by this Court in W.P.(C) No.12998/2004

vide Judgment dated 31.05.2007, whereby the order of termination

stood restored.

n) Following his acquittal, the Appellant issued legal notices

dated 14.09.2018 and 26.09.2018

15

to the Respondents claiming

compensation of Rs.1,99,00,000/-. The claim comprised, inter alia,

Rs.1 crore towards injury and loss to his reputation arising from the

loss of his Group-A gazetted service, Rs.50 lakhs towards mental

torture and physical agony allegedly suffered over a period of

approximately 19 years, Rs.40 lakhs towards loss of family honour

and Rs.9 lakhs towards legal assistance and other expenses. The

Appellant's case was that the Respondents failed to respond to the said

notices, resulting in the institution of the suit.

14

Tribunal

15

Legal Notices

CMI 18/2026 Page 6 of 33

o) Accordingly, the Appellant instituted a Recovery Suit before

the learned Trial Court, seeking recovery of Rs.1,99,00,000/- towards

damages on account of alleged malicious prosecution, defamation,

loss of reputation, mental agony, financial loss and other injuries.

p) The Appellant also sought permission to prosecute the suit as an

indigent person under Order XXXIII Rules 2 and 3 read with Section

151 CPC. Upon consideration of the report of the SDM concerning his

assets, properties, cash and bank balances, the said application came

to be allowed vide Order dated 02.08.2024.

q) The Respondents contested the suit by filing their written

statement. Apart from raising objections concerning the valuation of

the suit, court fees and maintainability, the Respondents denied the

allegations of malicious prosecution and defamation. It was

specifically pleaded that the criminal proceedings had not been

initiated without basis, but had followed the verification Report

received from the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, concerning the caste

certificate relied upon by the Appellant. The Respondents further

disputed the alleged loss of reputation, goodwill and other damages

and contended that the claim was unsupported by any substantial

material.

r) On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed

the following issues vide Order dated 17.04.2025, namely, whether the

suit was properly valued and the requisite court fee had been paid;

whether the suit was bad for misjoinder of parties; whether the

Appellant was entitled to recover Rs.1,99,00,000/- from the

Respondents on account of damages and loss of reputation; and relief.

s) In support of his case, the Appellant entered the witness box as

PW-1 and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit. He relied, inter

CMI 18/2026 Page 7 of 33

alia, upon the certified copy of the Acquittal Judgment passed in the

criminal proceedings arising out of the FIR, copies of the Legal

Notices issued to the Respondents and the corresponding postal

receipts and tracking reports, besides other documents. The Appellant

was cross-examined and discharged, following which his evidence

was closed on 30.07.2025. The Respondents did not lead evidence,

and their evidence was closed, after which the matter proceeded to

final arguments.

t) Upon hearing the parties and considering the material placed on

record, the learned Trial Court proceeded to examine the claim for

damages principally in the context of the ingredients required to

sustain an action for malicious prosecution, as well as the Appellant's

separate claim on account of alleged defamation and loss of

reputation.

u) The Recovery Suit ultimately came to be dismissed vide the

Impugned Judgment, giving rise to the present Appeal.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:

5. The Appellant, appearing in person, would assail the Impugned

Judgment and submit that the learned Trial Court has failed to

appreciate the case of the Appellant in its proper perspective. He

would submit that he had instituted the Recovery Suit seeking

damages on account of the malicious and tortious acts of the

Respondents, which had resulted in prolonged criminal proceedings,

loss of reputation, mental agony and financial hardship.

6. He would submit that the criminal proceedings initiated against

the Appellant ultimately culminated in his acquittal vide Acquittal

Judgment and that the circumstances in which the FIR came to be

CMI 18/2026 Page 8 of 33

registered demonstrate that the proceedings were initiated with a mala

fide intention and without any proper basis. He would submit that he

was subjected to criminal prosecution for several years despite there

being no sufficient material to sustain the allegations against him.

7. He would further submit that the learned Trial Court has failed

to appreciate the distinction between general and special damages

recognised under the law of torts. He would submit that the claim

raised by him included damages towards mental agony, injury to

reputation and consequential losses suffered by him and his family,

which arose from the acts complained of and were liable to be

considered by the learned Trial Court.

8. He would further submit that the Respondents did not lead any

evidence in support of the defence taken in the written statement. In

particular, that Respondent No. 2 did not enter the witness box or

tender any evidence by way of affidavit. He would, therefore, submit

that the averments contained in the written statement, in the absence

of supporting evidence, could not have been relied upon to defeat his

claim.

9. He would also submit that the learned Trial Court has failed to

appreciate the effect of his acquittal in the criminal proceedings and

the prolonged period during which he was required to face the

prosecution. He would submit that the acquittal, coupled with the

circumstances in which the criminal proceedings were initiated and

continued, constituted material which ought to have been duly

considered while examining his claim for damages.

10. He would, therefore, submit that the Impugned Judgment

suffers from material errors in appreciation of the pleadings and

evidence on record and that the learned Trial Court has failed to

CMI 18/2026 Page 9 of 33

properly consider the principles governing a claim for damages arising

from malicious prosecution and tortious conduct. He would

accordingly seek setting aside of the Impugned Judgment and grant of

the reliefs sought by him in the Appeal.

11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Respondent would support the Impugned Judgment and submit that

the learned Trial Court has duly considered all the aspects arising for

consideration and, upon appreciation of the material placed on record,

has rightly dismissed the Recovery Suit filed by the Appellant.

12. Learned counsel would submit that the Impugned Judgment is a

well-reasoned and considered judgment, wherein the learned Trial

Court has dealt with the respective pleadings and contentions of the

parties and has thereafter returned findings on the issues arising for

determination. He would submit that no error or infirmity has been

demonstrated in the reasoning adopted by the learned Trial Court

which would warrant interference by this Court.

13. Learned counsel would further submit that the mere acquittal of

the Appellant in the criminal proceedings cannot, by itself, establish

that the prosecution was malicious or that the Respondents acted with

any mala fide intention. He would submit that the criminal

proceedings were initiated pursuant to the circumstances and material

available at the relevant time and there was no intention on the part of

the Respondents to cause injury to the Appellant.

14. It would further be submitted that the Appellant has failed to

establish the essential ingredients necessary to sustain a claim for

damages on account of malicious prosecution or any other tortious

conduct. The findings returned by the learned Trial Court, therefore,

CMI 18/2026 Page 10 of 33

call for no interference and the present Appeal, being devoid of merit,

is liable to be dismissed.

ANALYSIS:

15. This Court has heard the Appellant, appearing in person, and

the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent and carefully

perused the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and the entire

record.

16. As noticed hereinabove, the controversy in the present Appeal

arises out of the Appellant's claim for damages founded principally

upon the alleged malicious and tortious acts of the Respondents in

initiating and pursuing the criminal proceedings against him. The

Appellant has sought to assail the findings returned by the learned

Trial Court rejecting his claim, inter alia, on the ground that the

criminal proceedings had culminated in his acquittal, that the

Respondents had acted with mala fide intention and that the Appellant

had suffered loss of reputation, mental agony and other consequential

damages. Consequently, the principal question which falls for

consideration before this Court is whether the finding so recorded

suffers from any perversity, illegality, or material misappreciation of

the oral and documentary evidence on record so as to warrant

interference in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 96

of the CPC.

17. Before adverting to the rival submissions and examining the

evidence on record, it would be apposite to briefly recapitulate the

nature and scope of the jurisdiction exercised by a First Appellate

Court under Section 96 of the CPC.

CMI 18/2026 Page 11 of 33

18. It is well settled that a first appeal is a valuable statutory right.

Unless expressly curtailed by statute, the entire case, both on facts and

law, is open for reconsideration before the First Appellate Court. The

appellate court is not confined to examining errors of law alone but is

under a duty to independently assess the pleadings, appreciate the oral

and documentary evidence, consider the submissions advanced by the

parties, and arrive at its own findings supported by cogent reasons.

19. At the same time, it is equally well settled that where the

findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based upon a proper

appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, particularly after

evaluating the credibility and demeanour of witnesses who have

deposed before it, such findings ordinarily deserve due weight and

deference. Interference with such findings is justified only where they

are shown to be perverse, contrary to the evidence on record, based on

an erroneous application of law, or are such that no reasonable judicial

mind could have arrived at the conclusions reached by the Trial Court.

20. The aforesaid principles have been consistently reiterated by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari

16

,

Madhukar v. Sangram

17

, H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith

18

; and

several other decisions. These principles were comprehensively

restated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malluru Mallappa v.

Kuruvathappa

19

, wherein the Court succinctly explained the scope

and ambit of a first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, the obligation

of the appellate court to independently evaluate the evidence and

record reasons in compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC,

16

(2001) 3 SCC 179

17

(2001) 4 SCC 756

18

(2005) 10 SCC 243

19

(2020) 4 SCC 313

CMI 18/2026 Page 12 of 33

while simultaneously recognizing that where the appellate court

concurs with the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court, it need

not unnecessarily restate the entire evidence or reiterate every reason

recorded by the Trial Court. The relevant observations as made in the

said Judgement read as under:

“10. Section 96CPC provides for filing of an appeal from the

decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the

court authorised to hear the appeals from the decisions of such

courts. In the instant case, the appeal from the decree passed by the

trial court lies to the High Court. The expression “appeal” has not

been defined in CPC. Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edn.) defines an

appeal as “a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered

by bringing it to a higher authority”. It is a judicial examination of

the decision by a higher court of the decision of a subordinate court

to rectify any possible error in the order under appeal. The law

provides the remedy of an appeal because of the recognition that

those manning the judicial tiers too commit errors.

11. In Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963

SC 698 it was held that a right of appeal carries with it a right of

rehearing on law as well as on fact, unless the statute conferring a

right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way as has been done

in second appeal arising under CPC.

12. In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya

Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74 it was held thus: (SCC pp. 77-78, para 5)

“5. … In the well -known work of Story on

Constitution (of United States), Vol. 2, Article 1761, it is

stated that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is

that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause

already instituted and does not create that cause. The

appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of

forms and, indeed, in any form in which the legislature

may choose to prescribe. According to Article 1762, the

most usual modes of exercising appellate jurisdiction, at

least those which are most known in the United States, are

by a writ of error, or by an appeal, or by some process of

removal of a suit from an inferior tribunal. An appeal is a

process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely

subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and a

retrial.”

13. It is a settled position of law that an appeal is a continuation of

the proceedings of the original court. Ordinarily, the appellate

jurisdiction involves a rehearing on law as well as on fact and is

invoked by an aggrieved person. The first appeal is a valuable right

of the appellant and therein all questions of fact and law decided by

the trial court are open for reconsideration. Therefore, the first

CMI 18/2026 Page 13 of 33

appellate court is required to address itself to all the issues and

decide the case by giving reasons. The court of first appeal must

record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law as well

as fact and with the evidence, oral as well as documentary, led by

the parties. The judgment of the first appellate court must display

conscious application of mind and record findings supported by

reasons on all issues and contentions [see: Santosh

Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179,

Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756, B.M. Narayana

Gowda v. Shanthamma, (2011) 15 SCC 476, H.K.N.

Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 and Sri Raja

Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC

259.

14. A first appeal under Section 96 CPC is entirely different from a

second appeal under Section 100. Section 100 expressly bars

second appeal unless a question of law is involved in a case and the

question of law so involved is substantial in nature.

15. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC provides the guidelines for the appellate

court to decide the matter. For ready reference Order 41 Rule 31

CPC is as under:

“31. Contents, date and signature of judgment. - The

judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and

shall state-

(a) the points for determination;

(b) the decision thereon;

(c) the reasons for the decision; and

(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied,

the relief to which the appellant is entitled;

and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and

dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.”

16. In Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar, (2015) 1 SCC 391 this Court

has reiterated the principles to be borne in mind while disposing of

a first appeal, as under: (SCC p. 395, para 15)

“15. Again in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy,

(2010) 13 SCC 530, this Court taking note of all the

earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the

aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp. 530-

31, paras 3-4)

„3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed

of by the appellate court/High Court has been

considered by this Court in various decisions.

Order 41CPC deals with appeals from original

decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31

mandates that the judgment of the appellate court

shall state:

(a) the points for determination;

(b) the decision thereon;

(c) the reasons for the decision; and

CMI 18/2026 Page 14 of 33

(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or

varied, the relief to which the appellant is

entitled.

4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse

or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first

appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless

restricted by law, the whole case is therein open

for rehearing both on questions of fact and law.

The judgment of the appellate court must,

therefore, reflect its conscious application of

mind and record findings supported by reasons,

on all the issues arising along with the

contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties

for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a

court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High

Court [H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy v. B.V.

Nagesha, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 837] to deal

with all the issues and the evidence led by the

parties before recording its findings. The first

appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a

right to be heard both on questions of law and on

facts and the judgment in the first appeal must

address itself to all the issues of law and fact and

decide it by giving reasons in support of the

findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam

Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179, SCC p. 188, para 15

and Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756,

SCC p. 758, para 5.)‟”

17. In Shasidhar v. Ashwini Uma Mathad, (2015) 11 SCC 269, it

was held as under: (SCC p. 277, para 21)

“21. Being the first appellate court, it was, therefore, the

duty of the High Court [Shasidhar v. Ashwini Uma

Mathad, 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 8774] to decide the first

appeal keeping in view the scope and powers conferred on

it under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 of the

Code mentioned above. It was unfortunately not done,

thereby, causing prejudice to the appellants whose

valuable right to prosecute the first appeal on facts and law

was adversely affected which, in turn, deprived them of a

hearing in the appeal in accordance with law.”

18. It is clear from the above provisions and the decisions of this

Court that the judgment of the first appellate court has to set out

points for determination, record the decision thereon and give its

own reasons. Even when the first appellate court affirms the

judgment of the trial court, it is required to comply with the

requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 and non-observance of this

requirement leads to infirmity in the judgment of the first appellate

court. No doubt, when the appellate court agrees with the views of

CMI 18/2026 Page 15 of 33

the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or

reiterate reasons given by the trial court. Expression of a general

agreement with the reasons given by the trial court would

ordinarily suffice.”

21. Having noticed the nature and scope of the controversy arising

in the present Appeal, this Court now proceeds to examine the

challenge laid by the Appellant to the findings returned by the learned

Trial Court on the claim for damages. Before undertaking such

examination, it would be apposite to first advert to the reasoning

which persuaded the learned Trial Court to reject the Appellant's

claim. The relevant findings recorded in the Impugned Judgment are

reproduced hereunder:

“ISSUE NO. 3

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of recovery of an

amount of Rs. 1,99,00,000/- (Rupees one crore Ninety Nine

Lacs) against the defendants on account of damages and loss of

reputation, as prayed for? OPP

24. The burden of proving this issue was upon plaintiff. In order to

prove his case to this effect, the plaintiff placed reliance upon his

testimony and the documents Ex.PW1/2 to Ex.PW1/11.

25. It is argued by plaintiff that he is entitled for compensation due

to malicious act or tortious act committed by complainant

Dr.Tarsem Chand of CBI without obtaining the expert opinion in

reference of alleged caste certificate dated 21.11.1994 from

handwriting expert of Central Government or State Government;

plaintiff suffered 19 years under the wheel of justice and

everything lost i.e. reputation, monetary loss as well as suffered

mental and physical injury and pain. He further argued that it is

mandatory to seek an explanation from the employee before

lodging a criminal case against him, which was not done by

Defendant No. 2 in the present case, hence, the defendant is liable

to pay compensatory damages. He also contended that if a person

knowingly lodges a false complaint with the police, naming, the

plaintiff as the accused, and supports the same with false evidence

before the police as well as in court, such person would be deemed

to be the prosecutor in a suit for malicious prosecution even if the

court takes cognizance of the case on a police challan, as held in

Balbhaddar v. Badrisah, AIR 1926 PC46.

26. On the other hand, it is argued by Ld. Counsel for defendant

that plaintiff is not entitled to decree for recovery of any amount on

account of damages and loss of reputation for want of any

CMI 18/2026 Page 16 of 33

document in support of claim, and that in absence of any

supporting document alleged claims are unreliable, inadmissible in

evidence and cannot be considered by this Court. It is further

argued that the plaintiff has neither annexed any documents with

the plaint nor exhibited any documents during his testimony, and

that, in the absence of any evidence of publication no claim for

defamation can be sustained against any person.

27. The present suit has been instituted by plaintiff for recovery on

account of damages and defamation for malicious prosecution. In

order to succeed in a suit for damages on account of malicious

prosecution, the following conditions must be fulfilled:

(i) that criminal proceedings must have been instituted by

the defendant;

(ii) that in doing so the defendant had acted without any

reasonable and probable cause;

(iii) that the defendant acted maliciously:

(iv) that the criminal proceedings terminated in favour of

plaintiff i.e. in his acquittal or discharge and the

defendant was unsuccessful.

28. A bare perusal of the judgment passed in case FIR No.45/1999.

P.S. Lodhi Colony, State vs. Shankar Prasad Tanti shows that

condition no. 1 and 4 are fulfilled. However, plaintiff has failed to

either plead or prove the malice on the part of defendant in

prosecution of aforesaid case. As per rules of pleadings, the

plaintiff was required to give detailed particulars of the alleged

malice on the part of defendant in prosecution of criminal case in

the plaint and the said particulars should have been proved by the

plaintiff by leading reliable evidence. However, in my considered

opinion, a bare perusal of plaint shows that entire plaint is

conspicuously silent about alleged malice on the part of defendant

in prosecution of the aforesaid case.

29. On a bare perusal of judgment passed by Ld. M.M-01,South

East. Saket Courts, New Delhi further shows that the defendant

cannot be said to be acting without any reasonable or probable

cause in as much as it has been recorded by Ld. MM that the

present FIR was registered by complainant / PW1 on the basis of

report of District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, Bihar which was sent vide

letter dated 10.12.1998. However, plaintiff was acquitted as no

evidence was produced by the prosecution by which it may be

established that accused had cheated the public authorities by

producing fake scheduled caste certificate for obtaining the service

as public prosecutor in CBI. However, it does not mean that in

filing the complaint, the defendant had acted without any

reasonable or probable cause.

30. Thus, in my considered opinion, in the absence of detailed

particulars as to the malice on the part of defendant in his criminal

case, the plaint does not disclose any cause of action for claim of

damage on account of malice prosecution.

CMI 18/2026 Page 17 of 33

31. The averment of the plaintiff that the said criminal prosecution

was a malicious prosecution has to be viewed in the light of the law

laid by the Hon'ble Apex Court and Hon'ble High Courts in various

judgments. Pertinently, the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court

in its judgment "Tarwinder Kumar Bedi v. Jit Parkash (2014

SCC Online P&H 20259), the Court has held that:

“6. In order to succeed in a suit for damages for malicious

prosecution, plaintiff has to prove:-

(a) that the plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendant;

(b) that the prosecution ended in favour of plaintiff;

(c) that the defendant acted without reasonable and

probable cause;

(d) that the defendant was actuated by malice."

Further, the Hon'ble High Court in para no. 9 of its judgment has

observed as follows –

"…The onus to prove that the proceedings were initiated

without any reasonable cause is always on the person who

asserts in affirmative i.e. the plaintiff in the present case

who seeks damages on account of alleged false accusation.

The conditions precedent for filing the suit for malicious

prosecutions are the aforesaid conditions which should

coexist before the defendant in a suit for malicious

prosecution can be burdened with liability. No doubt it is

true that the acquittal of a person in a criminal case

sometimes gives presumption that there was no reasonable

cause for his prosecution, but this presumption is

rebuttable in nature and there cannot be any universally

accepted phenomenon that in case prosecution fails then

the accused would be entitled for damages. Otherwise in

all those cases where prosecution fails, would give rise to

damages in favour of the accused. In view of this, it would

be more in consonance with justice and equity to weigh

the lodging of accusation on the threshold of principles as

enumerated above. The question which has been posed for

consideration before the court is whether the prosecution

lodged against the person before a criminal court of law, if

found having been instituted falsely or maliciously can lay

the foundation for filing suit for damages for malicious

prosecution. The proposition has been seen in the context

of complicity whether simply, setting the criminal law in

motion on account of presentation of complaint (whether

the same is found false subsequently) gives arise to any

cause of action. If the action is dismissed by the court in

the very inception as the same does not disclose any

complicity, then in such eventuality, the finding of the

criminal court cannot be presumed to be conclusive in

nature. The second situation arises, where acquittal is

recorded by the Court or a complaint is dismissed on the

CMI 18/2026 Page 18 of 33

ground that it does not disclose any cognizable offence.

The findings recorded in such process may or may not

have contained a finding that the prosecution case is based

on falsehood and is thus frivolous.

Recording of such findings are only for the purpose of

dismissal of the complaint or criminal prosecution. A

sharp distinction has to be drawn between the aforesaid

course and the course which is required for an action for a

malicious prosecution. In an action for malicious

prosecution if the ingredients as mentioned above are not

satisfied, then the courts are not obliged to connect the lis

simply on the basis of alleged accusation based on filing

of the complaint simpliciter. The court is required to

record finding in an action for malicious prosecution on all

the aforesaid ingredients with reference to evidence on

record..."

32. The meaning of malice and malicious prosecution has been

explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "West Bengal State

Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar Ray (2007) 14 SCC 568 as

follows-

"Malicious Prosecution Malice. Malice means an improper

or indirect motive other than a desire to vindicate public

justice or a private right. It need not necessarily be a

feeling of enmity, spite or ill-will. It may be due to a

desire to obtain a collateral advantage. The principles to

be borne in mind in the case of actions for malicious

prosecutions are these: Malice is not merely the doing a

wrongful act intentionally but it must be established that

the defendant was actuated by mains animus, that is to

say, by spite of ill- will or any indirect or improper

motive. But if the defendant had reasonable or probable

cause of launching the criminal prosecution no amount of

malice will make him liable for damages. Reasonable and

probable cause must be such as would operate on the mind

of a discreet and reasonable man;' malice and want of

reasonable and probable cause.' have reference to the state

of the defendant's mind at the date of the initiation of

criminal proceedings and the onus rests on the plaintiff to

prove them.

33. In view of the above, it is evident that the defendant acted with

reasonable and probable cause, subsequently, criminal prosecution

against the plaintiff was lodged.

34. Further, in the present case, the plaintiff has pleaded that he

was defamed due to the acts of the defendants. In this regard, it is

observed that there is no statutory law of civil defamation in our

country, although its criminal aspect is covered under the

provisions of Indian Penal code. The essential ingredients that must

be established in a suit for civil defamation are that the alleged

CMI 18/2026 Page 19 of 33

statement is: (i) false, (ii) defamatory, and (iii) published .In civil

proceedings, the emphasis is on restoring the aggrieved person to

the position he or she occupied prior to the commission of the

wrong. In a case of defamation, this is done through reimbursing

the person for the harm caused to him by imposing damages on the

wrongdoer. Thus, it has to be proved that the alleged defamatory

contents damaged the reputation of the person (damages must be

proved and not merely alleged or claimed). In a civil suit for

defamation, the only ingredients which need to be proved are that

the statement was false, caused harm to reputation and was

published. Intention or motive does not need to be attributed to the

offender.

35. In Halsbury's laws of England, defamatory statement i.e. libel is

defined in the following terms:

"The defamatory statement is a statement which tends to

lower a person in the estimation of right thinking members

of society generally or to cause him to be shunned or

avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule or

to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to

him in his office, profession, calling Trade or business."

36. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Trilok Chand Bansalv.

Bharat Bhushan Bansal (decided on 23.03.2017) has observed as

follows:

“22. In my view all prosecutions ending in an acquittal

cannot be said to be malicious. I have in Sannam Bharti vs

D.T.C (2013 SCC online DEL 3104) and in Akbar Ali vs

State 2014 SCC Online DEL 1547) held so. There is no

presumption in law of a prosecution ending in an acquittal

being malicious. Thus a plaint in a suit for compensation

for malicious prosecution merely stating that the plaintiff

was prosecuted by or at the instance of the defendant and

was acquitted, would not disclose a cause of action.

23. There can be manifold reasons for acquittal. Every

acquittal is not a consequence of the prosecution being

malicious. It cannot be lost sight of that the remedy of

compensation has been provided for "malicious

prosecution" and not for "wrongful or uncalled for or

failed prosecution".

37. In Deepak Rathaur & anr v. Shashi Bhushan Lal Dass (2016

SCC Online Del 5319) the Hon'ble Delhi High Court on this point

has observed that:

“8. The issue therefore is as to whether on account of the

appellants/plaintiffs being acquitted in the criminal case

this by itself can show that there is malicious prosecution

of the appellants/plaintiffs by the respondent/defendant. In

my opinion, the answer to that has to be in the negative

because mere fact that there has been acquittal in the

criminal case will not automatically prove malicious

CMI 18/2026 Page 20 of 33

prosecution in as much as what is relevant to succeed in a

civil suit for seeking damages for malicious prosecution is

that it must be found that a criminal complaint case or an

FIR was initiated without reasonable and probable cause.

10. …the Supreme Court has categorically held in the

judgment in the case of Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya

Sapra (Smt.) (2009) 13 SCC 729 that judgment in a

criminal case between the parties which has resulted in

acquittal is not binding on the civil court and any finding

in the criminal proceedings by no stretch of imagination

would be binding between civil proceedings. Therefore, I

reject the argument urged on behalf of the

appellants/plaintiffs that this Court should hold the

respondent/defendant guilty on the basis of reasoning and

conclusions contained in the Judgment dated 6.8.2007 of

the Additional Sessions Judge. The relevant para of the

judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vishnu Dutt

Sharma (supra) is para 23 and the same reads as under:

"23. It brings us to the question as to whether previous

judgment of a criminal proceeding would be relevant in a

suit. Section 40 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

"Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or rial--

The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by

law prevents any Courts from taking Cognizance of a suit

or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is

whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit

or to hold such trial." This principle would, therefore, be

applicable, inter alia, if the suit is found to be barred by

the principle of res judicata or by reason of the provisions

of any other statute. It does not lay down that a judgment

of the criminal court would be admissible in the civil court

for is relevance is limited. (See Seth Ramdayal Jat v.

Laxmi Prasad). The judgment of a criminal court in a civil

proceeding will only have limited application, viz., inter

alia, for the purpose as to who was the accused and what

was the result of the criminal proceedings. Any finding in

a criminal proceeding by no stretch of imagination would

be binding in a civil proceeding."

38. Precisely, in case Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Daya Sapra2009)

13 SCC 729 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:

“There cannot be any doubt or dispute that a creditor can

maintain a civil and criminal proceeding at the same time.

Both the proceedings, thus, can run parallel. The fact

required to be proved for obtaining a decree in the civil

suit and a judgment of conviction in the criminal

proceedings may be overlapping but the standard of proof

in a criminal case vis-à- vis a civil suit, indisputably is

different. Whereas in a criminal case the prosecution is

CMI 18/2026 Page 21 of 33

bound to prove the commission of the offence on the part

of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt, in a civil

suit" preponderance of probability" would serve the

purpose for obtaining a decree."

39. It brings us to the question as to whether previous judgment of

a criminal proceeding would be relevant in a suit. Section 40 of the

Evidence Act reads as under:

"40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or

trial. --The existence of any judgment, order or decree

which by law prevents any court from taking cognizance

of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the

question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of

such suit or to hold such trial." This principle would,

therefore, be applicable, inter alia, if the suit is found to be

barred by the principle of res judicata or by reason of the

provisions of any other statute. It does not lay down that a

judgment of the criminal court would be admissible in the

civil court for its relevance is limited. (See Seth Ramdayal

Jat v. Laxmi Prasad I(2009) |1 SCC 545 : (2009) 5 Scale

527.) The judgment of a criminal court in a civil

proceeding will only have limited application viz. inter

win the result of the criminal proceedings. Any finding in

a criminal proceeding by no stretch of imagination would

be binding in a civil proceeding."

40.The grounds of the plaintiff on which the plaintiff has brought a

suit for malicious prosecution against the defendants is the acquittal

of plaintiff by the Ld. MM-01, and it is on the basis of his acquittal

only that the plaintiff asserts that prosecution is false and

malicious, is not sustainable on the reasons as discussed in the

foregoing paras. The present suit has been instituted by the plaintiff

against the defendant seeking damages for defamation and

malicious prosecution, on account of losses allegedly suffered in

terms of money and reputation due to a false and frivolous criminal

complaint. However, the said claim is not tenable in view of the

judgment in Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Daya Sapra (supra). This

Court observes that the prosecution was initiated against the

plaintiff on the basis of complaint and there is no material on

record to show that a malicious/mischievous complaint was filed

against the plaintiff. This court further observes that the officials of

defendant no. 2 were only doing their job by carrying out

investigation and prosecution thereof and their actions were all in

good faith and due process of law was followed. From careful

perusal of the record, it is relevant to state that it is not the case of

plaintiff that there was any enmity between the plaintiff and

defendant as enumerated in West Bengal State Electricity Board

(supra).

41. As far as the quantum of damage is concerned, the plaintiff has

mentioned in his written submissions that he suffered special and

CMI 18/2026 Page 22 of 33

general damages (Rs.1,00,00,000/- as injury/loss of reputation

being a gazetted post of service in Group A, Rs.50,00.000/ as

mental torture and physical agony for the period of 19 years and

Rs.40,00,000/- as loss of family honour). Plaintiff has further

claimed a sum of Rs. 9,00,000/- towards legal assistant and

general. However, no calculation has been provided by the plaintiff

in the plaint regarding the amount sought is damages. The plaintiff

has adduced the legal notice dated 26.09.2018 Ex.PW1/3 regarding

the damage and compensation of Rs 1,99,00,000/- but no breakup

of the amount was provided in the said legal notice also.

42. Further, the plaintiff has not examined any other witness to

show that his reputation has been lowered or his image tarnished

amongst his social circle, friends and relatives etc. The plaintiff

herein has thus not been able to prove that he suffered damages due

to filing of criminal case by defendant and defamation was caused

to him as alleged. Damage and compensation as pleaded by

plaintiff have not been substantiated by requisite evidence.

43. The plaintiff has not been able to prove "malicious prosecution

or the aspect of damages on the basis of the judgment of acquittal

and other evidence adduced. Thus, this issued is decided against

plaintiff and in favour of the defendant.

(emphasis supplied)

22. A perusal of the aforesaid findings would reveal that the learned

Trial Court proceeded to examine the Appellant‟s claim primarily

with reference to the essential ingredients of an action for malicious

prosecution and, upon such examination, found that while the

institution of the criminal proceedings and their eventual termination

in favour of the Appellant stood established, the Appellant had failed

to plead and prove the remaining essential ingredients, namely, that

the proceedings had been initiated without reasonable and probable

cause and that the Respondents were actuated by malice.

23. In arriving at this conclusion, the learned Trial Court took note

of the material which had preceded the registration of the FIR,

particularly the report of the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, Bihar and

held that the criminal proceedings could not be said to have been

initiated without reasonable or probable cause merely because they

subsequently culminated in an acquittal.

CMI 18/2026 Page 23 of 33

24. The learned Trial Court further found that the Appellant had

failed to establish the alleged malice or any improper motive on the

part of the Respondents and, insofar as the claim for defamation and

damages was concerned, also found the evidence insufficient to

substantiate either the alleged injury to reputation or the quantum of

damages claimed.

25. The reasoning adopted by the learned Trial Court having been

set out hereinabove, it would now be apposite for this Court, in

exercise of its first appellate jurisdiction, to independently examine

the pleadings, evidence and material on record and determine whether

the conclusions so arrived at can be sustained.

26. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the

Appellant has established the essential ingredients of an action for

malicious prosecution. The settled requirements are that the criminal

proceedings must have been instituted by the Respondents, that the

proceedings must have terminated in favour of the Appellant, that the

Respondents acted without reasonable and probable cause, and that

the Respondents were actuated by malice.

27. The learned Trial Court, while examining the aforesaid

requirements, has already taken note of the decisions in Tarwinder

Kumar Bedi v. Jit Parkash

20

, West Bengal State Electricity Board v.

Dilip Kumar Ray

21

and the other authorities noticed in the Impugned

Judgment, and has applied the principles emerging therefrom to the

claim set up by the Appellant.

28. This Court, therefore, does not consider it necessary to reiterate

the principles already noticed by the learned Trial Court and proceeds

20

2014 SCC Online P&H 20259

21

(2007) 14 SCC 568

CMI 18/2026 Page 24 of 33

to independently examine whether, on the evidence and material

available on record, the findings so returned are sustainable.

29. Therefore, the burden of establishing these ingredients rests

upon the person seeking damages on the ground of malicious

prosecution. The mere fact that the criminal proceedings have

terminated in favour of the accused does not, by itself, establish that

the prosecution was malicious or that it had been initiated without

reasonable and probable cause.

30. In the present case, there is no dispute that the criminal

proceedings arising out of the FIR were instituted against the

Appellant and that the same ultimately terminated in his favour by

way of acquittal. These two ingredients, therefore, stand satisfied.

31. The controversy, however, lies in determining whether the

Appellant has established that the Respondents had initiated the

proceedings without reasonable and probable cause and were actuated

by malice.

32. On an independent examination of the material placed on

record, this Court is unable to find that the institution of the criminal

proceedings was without any reasonable or probable basis.

33. The circumstances preceding the institution of the criminal

proceedings assume considerable significance in examining whether

the Respondents had reasonable and probable cause for setting the

criminal law in motion. The prosecution case itself proceeded on the

basis that the Caste Certificate furnished by the Appellant was sent for

verification and that the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, by its

communication dated 10.12.1998, reported that, as per the report of

the Anumandal Padadhikari dated 24.11.1994, no certificate in the

name of the Appellant had been issued and that the signature of the

CMI 18/2026 Page 25 of 33

issuing authority appeared doubtful. It was on the basis of the

aforesaid material that the complaint dated 20.01.1999 came to be

lodged, and the criminal proceedings were initiated.

34. However, the nature and quality of the material which preceded

the registration of the FIR cannot be divorced from the manner in

which the same was subsequently tested in the criminal proceedings.

35. It is in the aforesaid context that the findings recorded in the

Acquittal Judgment assume significance. Before examining its bearing

on the question of reasonable and probable cause, it would be

appropriate to notice the relevant observations recorded therein. The

relevant portions are extracted hereinbelow:

“*****

The present FIR was registered by complainant/PW1 on the basis

of report of District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, Bihar which was sent

vide his letter dated 10.12.1998 in which he reported that as per the

report of the Anumandal Padadhikari dated 24.11.1994, no

certificate in the name of Shankar Prasad Tanti S/o Sh. Deep

Narayan Tanti was issued from his office. The said report of

District Magistrate, District Bhagalpur dated 10.12.1998 is not

proved by the prosecution, either by primary evidence or by

secondary evidence. Nor the content of the report was corroborated

by the prosecution by producing any other evidence. On perusal of

the copy of report of District Magistrate dated 10.12.1998, it is

found that District Magistrate had raised the doubt in regard to the

genuineness of the caste certificate on the ground that signature

was found to be not matching with the the then Anumandal

Padadhikari. However, during investigation, it is not established

that whether the signature of the said Anumandal Padadhikari was

genuine or not. IO himself admitted during his cross examination

that the signature in question was never compared with admitted

signature of issuing authority and IO had explained the reason for

the same that the admitted signature of the issuing authority were

not available and due to the same reason, the same were not sent

for its examination or comparison with the documents in question

in the CSFL Lab, Kolkatta.

The second basis of the prosecution case was that the caste

certificate issuing register was not having any endorsement of the

issuing authority. However, the said the cast certificate issuing

register was neither proved by prosecution by primary evidence or

by secondary evidence.

CMI 18/2026 Page 26 of 33

*****

Further, entry at serial No.216 in the name of Shankar Prasad Tanti

in the caste certificate register is not in dispute and said register

was in the possession and custody of the issuing authority and

accused was not having any opportunity to see whether issuing

authority of the caste certificate had performed his duty by making

his proper endorsement and signature in the register and accused

cannot be held liable for the wrong, if any, done by the custodian of

caste certificate issuing authority register.

*****

No evidence is produced by the prosecution by which it may be

established that accused had cheated the public authorities by

producing fake scheduled caste certificate for obtaining the

services as Public Prosecutor in CBI or accused used forged

certificate forgetting appointment as a Public Prosecutor in CBI.

The Court is of the considered view that case of the prosecution

regarding charge of offence punishable u/s 420/471 IPC against

accused Shankar Prasad Tanti S/o Sh. Deep Narayanm Tanti is not

proved, hence, accused is acquitted from the present case.

……..”

(emphasis supplied)

36. The learned Magistrate, while acquitting the Appellant,

specifically recorded that the Report of the District Magistrate, which

constituted the basis of the complaint, had not itself been proved either

by primary or secondary evidence, nor had its contents been

corroborated by any other evidence. The Court further noticed that,

although the report had raised a doubt regarding the genuineness of

the signature appearing on the caste certificate, the prosecution had

failed to establish whether the signature of the concerned Anumandal

Padadhikari was in fact genuine or otherwise. Significantly, the

Investigating Officer

22

himself admitted that the questioned signature

was never compared with any admitted signature of the issuing

authority, the stated reason being that such an admitted signature was

not available.

22

IO

CMI 18/2026 Page 27 of 33

37. The learned Magistrate also examined the second circumstance

relied upon by the prosecution, namely, the absence of the

endorsement or signature of the issuing authority in the caste

certificate register. It was found that the register itself had not been

proved by primary or secondary evidence and, even otherwise, the

relevant page contained other entries which also did not bear the

signature of the issuing authority. The entry relating to the Appellant

was, however, present in the register. The learned Magistrate further

noticed that the register remained in the custody of the issuing

authority and that the Appellant could not be held responsible for any

omission on the part of the custodian in making an endorsement in

that register.

38. Ultimately, it was concluded by the learned Magistrate that

there was no evidence, either primary, secondary or scientific in

nature, establishing that the Appellant was not a member of the PAN

community or Scheduled Caste, or that he had cheated the authorities

by producing a fake Scheduled Caste certificate for obtaining his

appointment as Public Prosecutor. It was in the aforesaid

circumstances that the Appellant came to be acquitted of the offences

under Sections 420 and 471 of the IPC.

39. The aforesaid findings are relevant to the present proceedings,

although the acquittal itself cannot be treated as conclusive proof of

malicious prosecution.

40. Accordingly, the question before this Court is a distinct one,

namely, whether the Respondents, at the time of setting the criminal

law in motion, possessed reasonable and probable cause to do so and

whether the proceedings were actuated by malice. The fact that the

prosecution ultimately failed to prove its case is undoubtedly not

CMI 18/2026 Page 28 of 33

sufficient, by itself, to establish these ingredients; however, the nature

of the material which was available to the Respondents at the time of

initiation of the proceedings and the circumstances in which that

material came to be acted upon are required to be examined.

41. In this regard, the fact that a verification of the caste certificate

had been undertaken and that a report was thereafter received from the

District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, cannot be ignored. At the same time,

the contents of the said report and the circumstances in which it came

to be acted upon have to be examined in the context of the material

which was actually available to the Respondents and not merely by

reference to the fact that such a report existed.

42. The Report, as noticed from the criminal record, proceeded on

the basis that no caste certificate in the name of the Appellant had

been issued from the concerned office and that the signature of the

issuing authority appeared doubtful. However, the criminal

proceedings revealed that the Appellant‟s name was reflected in the

caste certificate register against the PAN community, while other

entries in the register also did not bear the signature of the issuing

authority. The learned Magistrate further noticed that the questioned

signature was never compared with any admitted signature of the

issuing authority, the certificate contained no manipulation, cutting,

overwriting or addition, and the relevant register remained in the

custody of the issuing authority.

43. These circumstances, however, have to be assessed with

reference to the point of time when the complaint was instituted. The

question is whether the material then available to the Respondents

furnished reasonable and probable cause for setting the criminal law in

motion, and not whether such material ultimately proved sufficient to

CMI 18/2026 Page 29 of 33

secure a conviction. The subsequent failure of the prosecution, though

relevant, cannot by itself retrospectively establish absence of

reasonable and probable cause.

44. In the facts of the present case, the Respondents did not initiate

the criminal proceedings in the absence of any preceding verification.

The complaint was preceded by an official verification process and the

Report of the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, Bihar. Whether the

material forming the basis of that Report was ultimately sufficient to

sustain the prosecution is a different question from whether it

provided a reasonable basis, at the relevant time, for seeking

investigation into the authenticity of the caste certificate.

45. The distinction assumes significance because the Appellant

seeks to derive absence of reasonable and probable cause principally

from the deficiencies subsequently noticed in the criminal

proceedings. Those deficiencies may explain why the prosecution

failed, but they do not, without further evidence, establish what the

Respondents knew or ought reasonably to have known when the

complaint was lodged.

46. The next and distinct question is whether the Appellant has

established that the proceedings were instituted with malice. The

pleadings in this regard assume significance. The Appellant has

alleged that the complaint was made with an intention to cause

damage to his career, reputation and personal life. However, the

allegation of malice must be supported by circumstances from which

an improper motive can reasonably be inferred. Mere use of the

criminal process, even where the prosecution ultimately fails, does not

by itself establish malice.

CMI 18/2026 Page 30 of 33

47. On an independent consideration of the material placed on

record, this Court does not find any specific evidence demonstrating

that Respondent No.2 had a personal animosity against the Appellant

or that the complaint was initiated for a collateral purpose unrelated to

the verification of the caste certificate. The material does establish that

the issue concerning the Appellant's caste certificate was taken up for

verification and that, thereafter, action was initiated. There is,

however, no evidence establishing that Respondent No.2 knew the

allegations to be false and nevertheless proceeded to set the criminal

law in motion with the object of causing injury to the Appellant.

48. The Acquittal Judgment, while recording serious deficiencies in

the prosecution evidence, does not contain any finding that the

complainant or the Respondents had fabricated the allegation or had

knowingly initiated a false prosecution. The learned Magistrate

concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the offences

under Sections 420 and 471 IPC by the evidence led before it. That

finding is undoubtedly relevant to the Appellant's case, but it cannot,

without more, substitute for proof of the distinct ingredient of malice

required in an action for malicious prosecution.

49. The submission that Respondent No.2 did not enter the witness

box also requires consideration. The absence of evidence from the

Respondents cannot be treated as automatically establishing the

Appellant's case. The Appellant, being the person asserting a cause of

action for malicious prosecution, was required to establish the

necessary ingredients of that cause of action. The burden did not shift

merely because the Respondents chose not to lead affirmative

evidence. The material which the Appellant himself relies upon must,

CMI 18/2026 Page 31 of 33

therefore, establish the absence of reasonable and probable cause as

well as malice.

50. In the present case, while the material brought on record casts

doubt upon the manner in which the authenticity of the Caste

Certificate was investigated and ultimately resulted in the prosecution,

this Court is unable to find sufficient evidence to establish that the

proceedings were instituted with an improper or malicious motive.

The distinction between absence of sufficient evidence to sustain a

criminal conviction and absence of reasonable and probable cause at

the time of institution of the prosecution has to be maintained.

51. The claim for damages must consequently be examined in the

backdrop of the aforesaid findings. The Appellant has claimed

substantial amounts towards general and special damages, including

loss of reputation, mental agony, loss of family honour and legal

expenses. However, the claim for damages cannot be sustained merely

upon the factum of the criminal prosecution or its termination in

favour of the Appellant. The actionable wrong and the injury said to

have resulted therefrom must first be established.

52. Insofar as the allegation of loss of reputation is concerned, the

Appellant has relied principally upon the fact that he was subjected to

criminal proceedings and was required to face the prosecution for a

considerable period. While the pendency of criminal proceedings may

undoubtedly cause hardship and distress, the claim for damages for

injury to reputation requires the Appellant to establish the actionable

basis for such injury and the consequent loss. The record does not

disclose evidence sufficient to establish the extent of any diminution

of reputation or to substantiate the substantial amount claimed under

this head.

CMI 18/2026 Page 32 of 33

53. Similarly, the amounts claimed towards mental agony, physical

suffering, loss of family honour and legal expenses have not been

established by evidence commensurate with the quantum claimed. The

Appellant's own testimony may establish that he underwent the ordeal

of criminal proceedings, but the Court cannot award damages of the

magnitude claimed merely on the basis of an assertion of hardship,

particularly where the foundational tort of malicious prosecution has

itself not been established.

54. The contention that certain heads of general damages may, by

their very nature, not be capable of precise mathematical proof does

not dispense with the requirement of establishing the underlying cause

of action and the factum of injury. The question is not whether every

element of damages must necessarily be established by mathematical

precision, but whether the Appellant has placed sufficient material

before the Court to enable it to hold that the Respondents are legally

liable for the injury claimed and, thereafter, to assess reasonable

compensation.

55. Thus, upon an independent examination of the pleadings, the

evidence led before the learned Trial Court, the material preceding the

criminal proceedings and the judgment of acquittal, this Court finds

that the Appellant has established that criminal proceedings were

instituted against him and that the same ultimately terminated in his

favour.

56. However, the evidence does not sufficiently establish the

remaining essential ingredients of malicious prosecution, particularly

the requisite malice. The subsequent acquittal, notwithstanding the

deficiencies noticed in the criminal prosecution, cannot by itself

furnish a complete basis for an award of damages.

CMI 18/2026 Page 33 of 33

CONCLUSION:

57. Consequently, this Court, upon an independent examination of

the pleadings, evidence and material on record, finds that the

Appellant has failed to establish the foundational ingredients of

malicious prosecution. The acquittal of the Appellant, though relevant

to establish that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favour,

cannot by itself establish the absence of reasonable and probable cause

or malice. Nor has the Appellant established the alleged defamation,

consequential injury or the quantum of damages claimed.

58. The findings returned by the learned Trial Court, therefore,

withstand independent scrutiny. The conclusion that the Appellant

was not entitled to recover the amount claimed towards damages and

loss of reputation does not suffer from any error warranting

interference in the present Appeal.

59. Accordingly, the present Appeal, being devoid of any merit,

stands dismissed

60. Pending Applications, if any, also stand dismissed.

61. No Order as to costs.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.

SEPTEMBER 07, 2026/jk