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Special Reference No. I of 1998 Vs. -----

  Supreme Court Of India Ref. U/S 143 /1/1998
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SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998

OCTOBER 28, 1998

[S.P. BHARUCHA, M.K. MUKHERJEE, S.B. MAJMUDAR,

SUJATA V. MANOHAR, G.T. NANAVATI, S. SAGHIRAHMAD,

K. VENKATASWAMI, B.N. KIRPAL AND

G. B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Constitution of India,

1950-Articles 143 and 124 (2), 217 (1) and

222(1)-Presidential reference re-consultation between the Chief Justice of

India and his brother judges regarding appointments of Supreme Court and

C High Court judges and transfer of latter-Answering the reference held, Chief

Justice

of India must make a recommendation to appoint a judge of the Supreme Court and to transfer a Chief Justice or puisne Judge of a High

Court

in consultation with the four senior most puisne Judges of the

Supreme

Court-In so far as an appointment to the High Court is concerned, the

D recommendation must be made in consultation with the two senior most

puisne Judges

of the

Supreme Court.

Article 222(1)-Judicial review

of transfer of judges-Held, permissible

only to the extent that the recommendation by the Chief Justice

of India has

E not been made in consultation with the four senior most puisne Judges of the

Supreme Court and/or that the views of the Chief Justice of the High Court

from which the transfer is

to be effected and of the Chief Justice of the High

Court to which the transfer

is to be effected have not been obtained.

Articles 217

(1) and 222(1)-Expression "consultation with the Chief

F Justice of

lndia"-Held, requires consultation with a plurality of judges in

the formation of the opinion-Consultation is not to be confined to those

Judges who have that High Court

as a parent High Court but also Judges

who have occupied the office

of a judge or Chief Justice of that High Court

on transfer-Words and

Phrases.

G

H

Article 124(/)-Relevance of seniority in making appointments to the

Supreme Court-Held, "strong cogent reasons" do not have to be recorded

as justification for a departure from the order

of seniority, in respect of each

senior Judge who has been passed

over-What has to be recorded is the

positive reason for the recommendation.

400

...

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 401

Articles 124 (2), 217 (1) and 222(1)-Appointments of Judges of the A

Supreme Court and the High Courts and transfer of judges of High Court­

Held, Chief Justice of India obliged to comply with the norms and the

requirements

of the consultation process, in making his recommendations to

the Government of India-Recommendations made by the Chief Justice of

India without complying with the norms and requirements of the consultation B

process, as aforesaid, are not binding upon the Government of India.

In its decision in Supreme Court Advocates-On-Record Association v. Union of India (1993) Supp 2 SCR 659 ("the second Judges case') this court

laid down principles and prescribed procedural norms

in regard to the

appointment

of Judges of this Court and the Chief Justices and Judges of C

the High Court and transfer of Judges from one High Court to another.

Doubts having arisen about the interpretation of the law laid down by this

Court in the aforesaid decision, the President of India, on July 23, 1998, in

exercise of his powers under Article 143 (1) of the Constitution of India,

referred nice questions to this

court for its consideration and opinion.

The questions

in the Presidential reference related broadly, to three

aspects:

D

(1) Consultation between the Chief Justice of India and his brothers

Judges in

the matter of appointments of Supreme Court and High Court

Judges and transfers of the latter [questions No. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9]; E

(2) Judicial review of transfers of Judges [question No. 2); and

(3) the relevance ofseniority in making appointments to the Supreme

Court [question No. 6).

The Court recorded at the outset the statements of the Attorney General

for India

that-(1) the

Union of India is not seeking a review or reconsideration

of the Judgment in the second Judges case, and (2) that the Union oflndia

shall accept and treat as binding the answers of the Court to the questions

set out in the Reference.

Rendering its Opinion, this

Court

HELD : 1.1. The Chief Justice oflndia must make a recommendation

F

G

to appoint a judge of the Supreme Court and to transfer a Chief Justice or

puisne Judge of a High Court in consultation with the four senior most

puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. In

so far as an appointment to the High H

402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Court is concerned, the recommendation must be made in consultation with

the two senior most puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. [434-C-DI

1.2. The expression "consultation with the Chief Justice of India" in

Articles 217 (1) and 222 (1) of the Constitution oflndia requires consultation

with a plurality

of Judges in the formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice

B oflndia. The sole, individual opinion of the Chief Justice oflndia does not

constitute "consultation" within the meaning

of the said Articles. [434-A)

1.3. The Chief Justice

of India is not entitled to act solely in his

individual capacity, without consultation with other Judges

of the

Supreme

C Court, in respect of materials and information conveyed by the Government

of India for non-appointment of a Judge recommended for appointment.

[434-D-E)

1.4. The requirement of consultation by the Chief Justice of India with

his colleagues who are likely to be conversant with the affairs of the concerned

D High Court does not refer only to those Judges who have that High Court

as a parent High Court. It does not exclude Judges who have occupied the

office

of a judge or Chief Justice of that High Court on transfer.[434-E-F)

1.5. The views

of the other Judges consulted should be in writing and

should be conveyed to the Government

of India by the Chief Justice of India

E along with his views to the extent set out in the body of this opinion.

[434-GJ

F

1.6. The Chief Justice oflndia is obliged to comply with the norms and

the requirement

of the consultation process, as aforesaid, in making his

recommendations to the Government

oflndia. [434-H; 435-A]

1.7. Recommendations made by the Chief Justice

of India without

complying with

the norms and requirements of the consultation process, as

aforesaid, are not binding upon the Government

oflndia. [435-A-B)

Supreme Court Advocates -on Record Association v.

Union of India,

G (1993) Supp. 2 SCR 659, followed and explained.

S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, [1982) 2 SCR 365, referred to.

2. The transfer of puisne Judges is judicially reviewable only to this

extent;

that the recommendation that has been made by the Chief Justice of

H India in this behalf has not been made in consultation with the four seniormost

-.

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 (S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 403

puisne Judges of the Supreme Court and/or that the views of the Chief A

Justice of the High Court from which the transfer is to be effected and of

the Chief Justice of the High Court to which the transfer is to be effected

have

not been obtained. [434-B-C]

K. Ashok Reddy v. Government of India, [1994) 2 SCC

303, referred

3. "Strong congent reasons" do not have to be recorded, as justification

for a departure from the order of seniority, in respect of each senior Judge

who has been passed over. What has to be recorded is the positive reason for

the recommendation. (434-F-G)

B

c

CIVIL ADVISORY JURISDICTION : Special Reference No. 1 of

1998.

Under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India.

Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, N. Santosh Hegde, Solicitor General,

C.S. Vaidyanathan, Additional Solicitor General, R.K. Jain, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, D

Arun Jaitley, B.R. Bhattacharya, P.S. Poti, Harish N.Salve, K.K. Venugopal,

Anil B.Divan, Hardev Singh Gopal Subrarnanium, K. Parasaran, M.C. Bhandare,

T.R. Andhyarujina, R.P. Bhat, Sr. Advs., A. Subba Rao, Ms. Devika Bezboruah,

Sanjay Hegde, Manoj Goel, Surya Kant, Ms. H. Wahi, Ms. Neithona Rhetso,

R.P. Goyal, R.B. Misra, Kamlendra Misra, R.C. Verma, Ajay Kumar Aggarwal,

E

K. Venkatapathy, A. Mariarputham, Ms. Aruna Mathur, T. Nandakumar Singh,

K.H. Nobin Singh, Gopal Singh, Anis Ahmed, Ms. Radha Rangaswamy, V.N.

Dwivedi,

S.L. Saxena, Sakesh Kumar, S.K. Agnihotri, A.R. Barthakur, Kailash

Vasdev, R.S. Sodhi, Lokesh Kumar, Rajiv Mehta, S. Vijaya Shankar, K. R.

Nagaraja, Y.K. Tyagi, Ms. Madhu Sweta, Ms. Shardha, Ramanna, K. Ramkumar,

Ms.

Asha Nair,

Y. Subba Rao, Ms. Bina Prakash, Govind Das, R.K. Mehta, F

A.K. Gupta , Ms. A. Subhashini, B.A. Ranganadhan, Sanjay Kasol, N.K.

Sharma, Ajay Siwach, Prem Malhotra, P.H. Parekh, Amit Dhingra, Ms. Bina

Madhavan, Mrs. Madhu Moolchandani, G. Prakash,

M. K. Damodaran, Naveen

Kr. Singh,

Uma Nath Singh, V. G. Pragasam, Sunil Kumar Jain, Vijay Hansaria,

A.S. Pundir, Viswajit Singh, D.K. Garg, R.K. Singh, P.G. Baruah, Mahabir G

Singh, M.L. Sarin, Manoj Swarup, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Shashi Anugrah Narain,

Saket Singh, B.B. Singh, Ranjan Mukherjee, D.M. Nargolkar, Vimal Dave, N.

Ganpathy, V. Krishna Murthy and Aruneshwar Gupta for the appearing parties.

The opinion

of the Court was delivered by : S.P. BHARUCHA, J. Article 143 of the Constitution of India confers H

404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A upon the President of India the power to refer to this Court for its opinion

questions

of law or fact which have arisen or are likely to arise and which

are of

such a nature and of such public importance that is expedient to obtain

such opinion.

In exercise of this power, the

President of India has on 23rd

July,

1998 made the present reference, which is quoted in extenso:

B

· "WHEREAS the Supreme Court of India has laid down principles and

prescribed procedural

norms in regard to the appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court [article 124(2) of the Constitution oflndia], Chief Justices and

Judges of the High Court [article 217(1)], and transfer of Judges from one

High Court to another [article 222(1)], in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-

C on-Record Association andAnr. v. Union of India, reported in AIR (1994) SC

268;

D

AND WHEREAS doubts have arisen about the interpretation of the law

laid down by the Supreme Court and it is in public interest that the said

doubts relating

to the appointment and transfer of Judges be resolved;

AND

WHEREAS, in view of what is hereinbefore stated, it appears to

me that the following questions of law have arisen and are of such a nature

and

of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of

the

Supreme Court of India thereon;

E NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by

clause (!) of article 143 if the Constitution of India, I, K.R. Narayanan,

President

of India, hereby refer the following questions to the

Supreme Court

of India

for consideration and to report its opinion thereon, namely,:-

(I) whether the expression

"consultation with the Chief Justice of

F India" in articles 217(1) and 222(1) requires consultation with a plurality

of Judges in the formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India

or does the sole individual opinion of the Chief Justice of India

constitute consultation

within the meaning of the said articles;

(2) whether

the transfer of judges is judicially reviewable in the

G light of the observation of the

Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment

that "such transfer is not justiciable on any ground" and its further

observation that limited judicial review is available in matters of transfer,

and the extent and scope of judicial review;

(3) whether article

124(2) as interpreted in the said judgment

H requires the Chief Justice of India to consult only the two seniormost

'

...

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF I 998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 405

Judges or whether there should be wider consultation according to A

past practice;

( 4) whether the Chief Justice

of India is entitled to act solely in

his individual capacity, without consultation with other Judges of the

Supreme Court

in respect of all materials and information conveyed by

the Government

of India for non-appointment of a judge recommended B

for appointment;

( 5) whether the requirement

of consultation by the Chief Justice

of India with his colleagues, who are likely to be conversant with the

affairs

of the concerned High Court refers to only those Judges who

have that High Court

as a parent High Court and excludes Judges who C

had occupied the office of a Judge or Chief Justice of that Court on

transfer from their parent

or any other Court;

( 6) whether

in light of the legitimate expectations of senior Judges

of the High Court in regard to their appointment to the Supreme Court

referred

to in the said judgment, the 'strong cogent reason' required D

to justify the departure from the order of the seniority has to be

recorded

in respect of each such senior Judge, who is overlooked,

while making recommendation

of a Judge junior to him or her;

(7) whether the government is not entitled to require that the

opinions

of the other consulted Judges be in writing in accordance E

with the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment and that the same be

transmitted

to the Government of India by the Chief Justice of India

along with his views;

(8) whether the Chief Justice

of India is not obliged to comply

with the norms and the requirement

of the consultation process in F

making his recommendation to the Government of India;

(9) whether any recommendations made by the Chief Justice

of

India without complying with the norms and consultation process are

binding upon the Government

of India?

New Delhi

Dated:

23.7.1998

Narayanan K.R.

President of India".

G

The decision mentioned in the Reference, in Supreme Court Advocates­

on-Record Association

and Anr. v.

Union of India, [1993] Supp 2 SCR 659,

(now referred to as "the second Judges Case") was rendered by a Bench of H

406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A nine learned Judges. It examined these issues :

B

"( 1) Primacy of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India in regard

to the appointments

of Judges to the Supreme Court and the High

Court, and

in regard to the transfers of High Court Judges/Chief

Justices; and

(2) Justiciability

of these matters, including the matter of fixation

of the Judge-strength in the High

Courts." (Page 739)

The issues were required to be examined because a smaller Bench was of the

opinion that the correctness

of the majority view in the case of S.P. Gupta &

C Ors. v.

Union of India & Ors., (1982] 2 SCR 365, ("the Judges case") required

reconsideration by a larger Bench.

Five judgments were delivered in the second Judges case. Verma,

J.

spoke for himself and four learned Judges.

Pandian, J. and Kuldip Singh, J.

wrote individual judgments supporting the majority view. Ahmadi, J. dissented,

D adopting, broadly, the reasoning that had found favour in the Judges' case.

Punchhi,

.J. took the view that the

Chief Justice of India had primacy and that

he was entitled "to consult any number of Judges on the particular proposal.

It is equally within his right not to consult anyone".

The questions in the Presidential reference relate, broadly, to three

E aspects:

(

1) consultation between the Chief Justice of India and his brothers Judges

.in the matter of appointments of Supreme

Court and High Court Judges and

transfers

of the latter; question nos. 1,3,4,5, 7,8 & 9;

F (2) judicial review of transfers of Judges : question no.2; and

(3) the relevance

of seniority in making appointments to the Supreme

Court:

question no.6.

Before quoting what was said

in the majority judgment in the second

G Judges case on these aspects, it is necessary to set out the provisions of

Articles 124, 216, 217 and 222 of the

Constitution, dealing, respectively, with

the establishment and constitution

of the Supreme Court, the constitution of

the High Courts, the appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of

a High

Court and the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another.

H "124. Establishment and Constitution of Supreme Court.-{!)

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 407

There shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice A

of India and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, of not

more than seven other Judges.

(2) Every Judge

of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the

President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with

such

of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in B

the

States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose and

shall hold office until he attains the age

of sixty five years:

Provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than

the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice

of India shall always be consulted:

Provided further that-

(a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President,

resign his office;

c

(b) a Judge may be removed from his office in the manner provided in D

clause (4).

[(2A) The age

of a Judge of the Supreme Court shall be determined by

such authority and

in such manner as

Parliament may by law provide.]

(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment

as a Judge of the E

Supreme Court unless he is a citizen of India and

(a) has been for at least five years a Judge

of a High Court or of two

or more such Comts

in succession; or

(b) has been for at least ten years an advocate

of a High Court or of

p

two or more such Courts in succession; or

(c)

is, in the opinion of the

President, a distinguished jurist.

Explanation/. -

In this clause 'High Court' means a High Court which

exercises, or which at any time before the commencement of this Constitution G

exercised, jurisdiction in any part of the territory of India.

Explanation II. -In computing for the purpose of this clause the period

during which a person has been an advocate any period during which a

person has held judicial office not inferior to that

of a district judge after he

became an advocate shall be included. H

408

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

SUPRF.ME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

(4) A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his

office except

by an order of the President passed after an address by

each House

of Parliament supported by a majority of the total

membership

of that House and by a majority of not less than two

thirds

of the members of that House present and voting has been

presented

to the President in the same session for such removal on

the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.

(5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the

presentation

of an address and for the investigation and proof of the

misbehavior or incapacity

of a Judge under clause (4).

(6) Every person appointed to be a Judge

of the Supreme

Court

shall, before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the

President, or some person appointed

in that behalf by him, an oath

or affirmation according to the form set out for the purpose

in the

Third Schedule.

(7)

No person who has held office as a Judge of the Supreme

Court shall plead or act in any court or before any authority within

the territory

of India.

216.

Constitution of High Courts.-Every High

Court shall consist

of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from

time to time deem it necessary to appoint.

217.

Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a

High Court.-(!) Every Judge of a High

Court shall be appointed by

the President by warrant under

his hand and seal after consultation

with the

Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and, in the

case

of appointment of a Judge other than the

Chief Justice, the Chief

Justice of the High Court and shall hold office, in the case of an

additional or acting Judge, as provided

in article 224, and in any other

case, until

he attains the age of sixty-two years.

Provided that -

(a) a Judge may, by writing under his hand addressed to the

President, resign his office;

(b) a Judge may be removed from his office by the President

in

the manner provided in clause (4) of article 124 for the removal of a

H Judge of the Supreme

Court.

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 409

( c) the office of a Judge shall be vacated by his being appointed A

by the President to be a Judge of the Supreme Court or by his being

transferred by the President to any other High Court within the territory

of India.

(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge

of

a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and - B

(a) has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the territory

of India; or

(b) has for at least ten years been an advocate

of a High Court

or

of two or more such courts in succession;

Explanation - For the purposes of this clause -

(a) in computing the period during which a person has held

judicial office

in the territory of India, there shall be included any

period, after he has held any judicial office, during which the person

c

has been an advocate of a High Court or has held the office of a D

member of a tribunal or any

µost, under the Union or a State, requiring

special knowledge

of law;

(aa)

in computing the period during which a person has been an

advocate

of a High Court, there shall be included any period during

which the person has held judicial

offic~ or the office of a member of E

a tribunal or any post, under the Union or a State, requiring special

knowledge

of law after he became an advocate;

(b)

in computing the period during which a person has held

judicial office

in the territory of India or been an advocate of a High

Court, there shall

be included any period before the commencement F

of this Constitution during which he has held judicial office in any

area which was comprised before the fifteenth day

of August, 1947,

within India as defined

by the Government of India Act, 1935, or has

been an advocate

of any High Court in any such area, as the case may

be.

(3)

If any question arises as to the age of a Judge of a High Court,

the question shall be decided by the

President after consultation with

the Chief Justice

of India and the decision of the

President shall be

final.

G

222. Transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another.(!) The H

410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A president may, after consultation with the Chief Justice oflndia, transfer

a Judge from one High Court to any other High Court.

(2) When a Judge has been or is so transferred, he shall, during

the period he serves, after the commencement

of the

Constitution

(Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, as a Judge of the other High Court,

B be entitled to receive in addition to his salary such compensatory

allowance as may be determined

by Parliament by law and, until so

determined, such compensatory allowance as

the President may by

order fix."

C The following are extracts of what was said in the majority judgment in

the second Judges case about tbe primacy of the Chief Justice of India in the

matter

of appointments of Judges to the Supreme

Court and the High Courts

and the need in this behalf of the desirability of consultation between the

Chief Justice of India and his brother Judges:

D ................... "A further check in that limited sphere is provided by the

conferment

of the discretionary authority not to one individual but to

a body of men, requiring the final decision to be taken after full

interaction and effective consultation between them, to ensure

projection

of all likely points of view and procuring the

t,Jement of

plurality in the final decision with the benefit of the collective wisdom

E of all those involved in the process. The conferment of this

discretionary authority in the highest functionaries is a further check

in the same direction. The constitutional scheme excludes the scope

of absolute power in any one individual. Such a construction of the

provisions also, therefor, matches the constitutional scheme and the

p constitutional purpose for which these provisions were

enacted." .....

(Page 745 F

to 746 A)

...........

"Attention has to be focussed on the purpose, to enable better

appreciation

of the significance of the role of each participant with the

consciousness that each

of them has some inherent limitation, and it

G is only collectively that they constitute the selector.

The discharge

of the assigned role by each functionary, viewed

in the context

of the obligation of each to achieve the common

constitutional purpose

in the joint venture will help to transcend the

concept

of primacy between them. However, ifthere be any disagreement

H even then between them which cannot be ironed out by joint effort,

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. l OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 411

the question of primacy would arise to avoid stalemate."........... A

(Page 753 B to 753 C)

.............. "It is obvious, that the provision for consultation with the

Chief Justice

of India and, in the case of the High Courts, with the

Chief Justice

of the High Court, was introduced because of the

realisation that the Chief Justice

is best equipped to know and assess B

the worth of the candidate, and his suitability for appointment as a

superior judge; and

it was also necessary to eliminate political influence

even at the stage

of the initial appointment of a judge, since the

provisions for securing

his independence after appointment were alone

not sufficient for an independent judiciary. At the same time, the

C

phraseology used indicated that giving absolute discretion or the

power

of veto to the Chief Justice of India as an individual in the

matter

of appointments was not considered desirable, so that there

should remain some power with the executive to

be exercised as a

check, whenever necessary. The indication

is, that in the choice of a

candidate suitable for appointment, the opinion

of the Chief Justice D

of India should have the greatest weight; the selection should be

made as a result

of a participatory consultative process in which the

executive should have power

to act as a mere check on the exercise

of power by the Chief Justice of India, to achieve the constitutional

purpose. Thus, the executive element

in the appointment process is

reduced to the minimum and any political influence is eliminated. It E

was for this reason that the word 'consultation' instead of

'concurrence' was used, but that was done merely to indicate that

absolute discretion was not given to any one, not even to the Chief

Justice

of India as individual, much less to the executive,

whi~h earlier

had absolute discretion under the Government

of India Act. F

The primary aim must be to reach an agreed decision taking into

account the views

of all the consultees, giving the greatest weight to

the opinion

of the Chief Justice of India who, as earlier stated, is best

suited to know the worth of the appointee. No question

of primacy

would arise when the decision

is reached in this manner by consensus, G

without any difference of

opinion." ............... .

(Pages 757 A to 758 C)

"The primacy must, therefore, lie in the final opinion of the Chief

Justice

of India, unless for very good reasons known to the executive

and disclosed to the Chief Justice

of India, that appointment is not H

412

A

B

c

D

E

F

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

considered to be suitable." ................. .

(Page 758 E)

................... "On the other hand, in actual practice, the Chief Justice of

India and the Chief Justice of the High Court, being responsible for

the functioning

of the courts, have to face the consequence of any

unsuitable appointment which gives rise

to criticism levelled by the

ever vigilant Bar. That controversy

is raised primarily in the courts.

Similarly, the Judges

of the Supreme

Court and High Courts, whose

participation

is involved with the

Chief Justice in the functioning of

the courts, and whose opinion is taken into account in the selection

process, bear the consequen.ces and become accountable. Thus,

in

actual practice, the real accountability in the matter of appointments

of Superior Judges is of the

Chief Justice of India and the Chief

Justices of the High Courts, and not of the executive which has

always held out, as

it did even at the hearing before us that, except

for rare instances, the executive

is guided in the matter of appointments

by the opinion

of the

Chief Justice of India." (Page 759 G to 760 A)

.................... "If that is the position in actual practice of the constitutional

provisions relating to the appointments

of the superior Judges, wherein

the executive itself holds out that it gives primacy to the opinion

of

the

Chief Justice of India, and in the matter of accountability also it

indicates the primary responsibility of the Chief Justice of India, it

stands to reason that the actual practice being

in conformity with the

constitutional scheme, should also

be accorded legal sanction by

permissible constitutional interpretation. This reason given by the

majority

in

S.P. GUPTA for its view, that the executive has primacy,

does not withstand scrutiny, and

is also not in accord with the

existing practice and perception even

of the executive.

However,

it need hardly be stressed that the primacy of the opinion

of the Chief Justice of India in this context

is, in effect, primacy of

the opinion of the Chief Justice of India formed collectively, that is

G to say, after taking into account the views of his senior colleagues

who are required to be consulted by him for the formation of his

opinion." ....... ..

(Page 760 B to 760 E)

................ "Providing for the role of the judiciary as well as the executive

H in the integrated process of appointment merely indicated that it is a

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 413

participatory consultative process, and the purpose is best served if A

at the end of an effective consultative process between all the

consultees the decision

is reached by consensus, and no question

arises

of giving primacy to any consultee.

Primarily, it is this indication

which

is given by the constitutional provisions, and the constitutional

purpose would be best served

if the decision is made by consensus B

without the need of giving primacy to any one of the consultees on

account of any difference remaining between them. The question of

primacy of the opinion of any. one of the constitutional functionaries

qua the others would arise only

if the resultant of the consultative

process

is not one opinion reached by consensus.

The constitutional

puri. JSe to be served by these provisions is C

to select the best from amongst those available for appointment as

Judges

of the superior judiciary, after consultation with those

functionaries who are best suited to make the

selection." ............. ..

(Pages 761 G to 762 B)

.................. "Even the personal traits of the members of the Bar and the

Judges are quite often fully known to the Chief Justice

of India and

the Chief Justice

of the High Court who get such information from

various sources. There may however, be some personal trait

of an

individual lawyer or Judge, which may be better known

to the executive

D

and may be unknown to the Chief Justice of India and the Chief E

justice of the High Court, and which may be relevant for assessing

his potentiality to become a good Judge.

It is for this reason, that the

executive

is also one of the consultees in the process of appointment.

The object

of selecting the best men to constitute the superior judiciary

is achieved by requiring consultation with not only the judiciary but F

also the executive to ensure that every relevant particular about the

candidate

is known and duly weighed as a result of effective

consultation between all the consultees, before the appointment

is

made." ........... .

(Page 762 F to 762 H)

................... "It has to be borne in mind that the principle of non­

arbitrariness which

is an essential attribute of the rule of law is all

pervasive throughout the Constitution; and an adjunct

of this principle

of the absence of absolute power in one individual in any sphere of

constitutional activity. The possibility of intrusion of arbitrariness has

G

to be kept in view, and eschewed, in constitutional interpretation and, H

414

A

B

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

therefore, the meaning of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, in

the context of primacy, must be ascertained. A homogenous mixture,

which accords with the constitutional purpose and its ethos, indicates

that

it is

the opinion of the judiciary 'symbolised by the view of the

Chief Justice of India' which is given greater significance or primacy

in the matter

of appointments. Jn other words, the view of the Chief

Justice of India is to be expressed in the consultative process as truly

reflective

of the opinion of the judiciary, which means that

ii must

necessarily have the element

of plurality in its formation. Jn actual

practice, this

is how the Chief Justice of India does, and is expected

to function, so that the final opinion expressed by him is not merely

C his individual opinion, but the collective opinion formed after taking

into account the view

of some other judges who are traditionally

associated with this function.

In view of the primacy of judiciary in this process, the question next,

is of the modality for achieving this purpose. The indication in the

D constitutional provisions is found from the reference to the office of

the Chief Justice of India, which has been named for achieving this

object

in a pragmatic manner. The opinion of the judiciary 'symbolised

by the view

of the Chief Justice of

India', and it is this opinion which

has primacy.

E

F

G

H

The rule of law envisages the area of discretion to be the minimum

requiring only the application

of known principles or guidelines to

ensure non-arbitrariness, but to that limited extent, discretion

is a

pragmatic need. Conferring discretion upon high functionaries and,

whenever feasible, introducing the element

of plurality by requiring

collective decision, are further checks against arbitrariness. This

is

how idealism and pragmatism are reconciled and integrated, to make

the system workable

in a satisfactory manner. Entrustment of the task

of appointment of superior Judges to high constitutional functionaries;

the greatest significance attached to the view

of the Chief Justice of

India, who is best equipped to assess the true worth of the candidates

for adjudging their suitability;

the opinion of the Chief Justice of

India being the collective opinion formed after laking into account

the views

of some of his colleagues; and the executive being permitted

to prevent an appointment considered to be unsuitable, for strong

reasons disclosed to the Chief Justice

of India, provide the best

method,

in the constitutional scheme, to achieve the constitutional

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 415

purpose without conferring absolute discretion or veto upon either A

the judiciary or the executive, much less in any individual, be he the

Chief Justice

of India or the

Prime Minister.

The norms developed in actual practice, which have crystallised into

conventions

in this behalf, as visualised in the speech of the

President

of the Constituent Assembly, are mentioned later." B

(Pages 765 D to 765 E)

"Norms

The absence of specific guidelines in the enacted provisions

appears to

be deliberate, since the power is vested in high constitutional C

functionaries and it was expected of them to develop requisite norms

by convention in actual working

as envisaged in the concluding

speech

of the

President of the Constituent Assembly. The hereinafter

mentioned norms emerging from the actual practice and crystallised

into conventions -not exhaustive -are expected to be observed by

the functionaries to regulate the exercise

of their discretionary power D

in the matters of appointments and

transfers."

(Page 767 F to H)

............... "Appointments

(1) What is the meaning of the opinion of the judiciary 'symbolised E

by the view of the Chief Justice of India?

The opinion has to be formed in a pragmatic manner and past

practice based

on convention is a safe guide. Jn matters relating to

appointments

in the

Supreme Court, the opinion given by the Chief

Justice

of India in the consultative process has to be formed taking F

into account the views of the two seniormost Judges of the

Supreme

Court. The Chief Justice of India is also expected to ascertain the

views

of the seniormost Judge of the

Supreme Court whose opinion

is likely to be significant in adjudging the suitability of the candidate,

by reason

of the fact that he has come from the same High Court or G

otherwise. Article 124(2) is an indication that ascertainment of the

view

of some other Judges of the

Supreme Court is requisite. The

object underlying Article 124(2)

is achieved in this manner as the

Chief Justice

of India consults them for the formation of his opinion.

This provision

in Article 124(2) is the basis for the existing convention

which requires the Chief Justice

of India to consult some Judges of H

416

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

the Supreme Court before making his recommendation. This ensures

that the opinion

of the Chief Justice of India is not merely his

individual opinion, but

an opinion formed collectively by a body of

men at the apex level in the judiciary.

In matters relating to appointments in the High Courts the Chief

Justice

of India is expected to take into account the views of his

colleagues

in the Supreme Court who are likely to be conversant

with the affairs

of the concerned High Court. The Chief Justice of

India may also ascertain the views of one or more senior Judges of

that High Court whose opinion according to the Chief Justice of

India, is likely to be significant in the formation of his opinion. The

opinion

of the Chief Justice of the High Court would be entitled to

the greatest weight, and the opinion

of the other functionaries involved

must be given due weight,

in the formation of the opinion of the Chief

Justice

of India. The opinion of the Chief Justice of the High Court

must be formed after ascertaining the views

of at least the two

seniormost Judges

of the High Court.

The Chief Justice of India, for the formation of his opinion, has to

adopt a course which would enable him to discharge duty objectively

to select the best available persons as Judges

of the

Supreme Court

and the High Courts.

The ascertainment of the opinion of the other

Judges by the Chief Justice

of India and the Chief Justice of the High

Court, and the expression

of their opinion, must be in writing to

avoid any

ambiguity." ............. ..

(Pages 768 A to 769 A)

............... "(5) The opinion of the Chief Justice of lndia,for the purpose

of Articles 124(2) and 217(1), so given has primacy in the matter

of all appointments; and no appointment can be made by the President

under these provisions

to the Supreme Court and the High Courts,

unless it

is in conformity with the final opinion of the Chief Justice

of India, formed in the manner indicated.

(6) The distinction between making an appointment in conformity

with the opinion

of the Chief Justice

of India, and not making an

appointment recommended

by the Chief Justice of India to be borne

in mind. Even though no appointment can be made unless it is in

conformity with the opinion

of the Chief Justice of India, yet in an

exceptional case, where the facts justify, a recommendee

of the Chief

=

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 417

Justice of India, if considered unsuitable on the basis of pos!tive A

material available on record and placed before the Chief Justice of

India, may not be appointed except in the situation indicated later.

Primacy is in making an appointment; and, when the appointment is

not made, the ·question of primacy does not arise. There may be a

certain area, relating to suitability

of the candidate, such as his

antecedents and personal character, which, at times, consultees, other

B

than the Chief Justice of India, may be in a better position to know.

In that area, the opinion of the other consultees is entitled to due

weight, and pennits non-appointment

of the candidate recommended

by the Chief Justice oflndia, except in the situation indicated hereafter.

It is only to this limited extent of non-appointment of a

recommendee

of the Chief Justice of India, on the basis of positive

material indicating his appointment to be otherwise unsuitable, that

c

the Chief Justice of India does not have the primacy to persist for

appointment

of that recommendee except in the situation indicated

later. This will ensure composition

of the courts by appointment of D

only those who are approved of by the Chief Justice of India, which

is the real object of the primacy of his opinion and intended to secure

the independence

of the judiciary and the appointment of the best

men available with undoubted

credentials." ............. ..

(Page 770 B to 770 H) E

............... "(7) Non-appointment of anyone recommended, on the ground

of unsuitability must be for good reasons, disclosed to the Chief

Justice of India to enable him to reconsider and withdraw his

recommendation

on those considerations. If the Chief Justice of

India does not find it necessary to withdraw his recommendation F

even thereafter, but the other Justice of the

Supreme Court who have

been consulted

in the matter are of the view that it ought to be

withdrawn,

the non-appointment of that person for reasons to be

recorded, may be permissible in the public interest.

If the non­

appointment

in a rare case, on this ground, turns out to be a mistake, G

that mistake in the ultimate public interest is less harmful than a wrong

appointment.

However, if after due consideration of the reasons

disclosed to the Chief Justice

of India, that recommendation is

reiterated by the Chief Justice of India with the unanimous agreement

of the Judges of the

Supreme Court consulted in the matter, with

reasons

for not withdrawing the recommendation, then that H

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A appointment as a matter of healthy convention ought to be made.

B

c

D

E

F

(8)

Some instances when non-appointment is permitted and

justified may be given. Suppose the final opinion

of the Chief Justice

of India is contrary to the opinion of the senior. Judges consulted by

the Chief Justice

of India and the senior Judges are of the view that

the recommendee

is unsuitable for stated reasons, which are accepted

by the

President, then the non-appointment of the candidate

recommended by the Chief Justice of India would be

permissible." ............. ..

(Page 771 A to 771 E)

"(9) In order to ensure effective consultation between all the

constitutional functionaries involved

in the process, the reasons for

disagreement,

if any, must be disclosed to all others, to enable

reconsideration on that basis.

All consultations with everyone

involved, including all the Judges consulted, must be

in writing and

the Chief Justice of the High Court, in the case of appointment to

a High Court, and the Chief Justice

of India, in all cases, must

transmit with his opinion the opinion

of all Judges consulted by him,

as a part of the record.

Expression

of opinion in writing is an inbuilt check on exercise of

the power, and ensures due circumspection. Exclusion of justiciability,

as indicated hereafter, in this sphere should prevent any inhibition

against the expression

of a free and frank opinion. The final opinion

of the Chief Justice of India, given after such effective consultation

between the constitutional functionaries, has primacy

in the manner

indicated.

(Pages 771 G to 772 C)

On the aspect of transfers of Judges and the judicial review thereof,

the majority judgment stated :

G .............

"Transfers

(1) In the formation of his opinion, the Chief Justice of India, in the

case

of transfer of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, is expected

to take into account the views

of the Chief Justice of the High Court

from which the Judge

is to be transferred, any Judge of the Supreme

H Court whose opinion may be of significance in that case, as well as

·-

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 419

the views of at least one other senior Chief Justice of a High Court, A

or any other person whose views are considered relevant by the Chief

Justice

of India. The personal factors relating to the concerned Judge,

and his response

to the proposal, including his preference of places

of transfer, should be taken into account by the Chief Justice of India

before fonning his final opinion objectively,

on the available material, B

in the public interest for better administration of

justice." ............ .

(Page 774 A to 774 C)

............... "Justiciability

Appointments and Transfers

The primacy

of the judiciary in the matter of appointments and its

detenninative nature

in transfers introduces the judicial element in

the process, and is itself a sufficient justification for the absence of

c

the need for further judiciary review of those decisions, which is

ordinarily needed as check against possible executive excess or D

arbitrariness. Plurality of Judges in the formation of the opinion of

the Chief Justice of India, as indicated, is another inbuilt check against

the likelihood

of arbitrariness or bias, even subconsciously, of any

individual.

The judicial element being predominant in the case of

appointments, and decisive in transfers, as indicated, the need for E

further judicial review, as in other executive actions, is eliminated.

The reduction of the area of discretion to the minimum, the element

of plurality of Judges in formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice

of

India, effective consultation in writing, and prevailing nonns to

regulate the area

of discretion are sufficient checks against arbitrariness.

These guidelines in the form of norms are not to be construed as

conferring any justiciable right in the transferred

Judge. Apart from

the constitutional requirement

of a transfer being made only on the

recommendation

of the Chief Justice of India, the issue of transfer is

F

not justiciable on any other ground, including the reasons for the G

transfer or their sufficiency. The opinion of the Chief Justice of India

fonned in the manner indicated

is sufficient safeguard and protection

against any arbitrariness

or bias, as well as

any erosion of the

independence

of the judiciary.

This

is

abi in accord with the public interest of excluding these H

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A appointments and transfers from litigative debate, to avoid any erosion

in the credibility of the decisions, and to ensure a free and frank

expression

of honest opinion by all the constitutional functionaries,

which

is essential for effective consultation and for taking the right

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

decision." ................. .

(Page 775 B

to 775 G)

............

"It is therefore, necessary to spell out clearly the limited scope

of judicial review in such matters, to avoid similar situations in future.

Except on the ground of want of consultation with the named

constitutional functionaries or lack

of any condition of eligibility in

the case of an appointment, or of a transfer being made without the

recommendation

of the Chief Justice of India, these matters are not

justiciable on any other ground, including that

of bias, which in any

case

is excluded by the element of plurality in the process of decision

making." .............. .

(Page 776 B

to 776 C)

On the aspect of the relevance of seniority in the matter of Supreme

Court appointments, this was stated :

(3) Inter se seniority amongst Judges in their High Court and

their combined seniority on all India basis

is of admitted significance

in the matter of future prospects. Inter se seniority amongst Judges in

the Supreme Court, based on the date of appointment, is of similar

significance.

It is, therefore, reasonable that this aspect is kept in

view and given due weight while making appointments from amongst

High Court Judges to the

Supreme Court. Unless there be any strong

cogent reason to justify a departure, that order

of

seniority must be

maintained between them while making their appointment to the

Supreme Court.

Apart from recognising the legitimate expectation of

the High Court Judges to be considered for appointment to the Supreme

Court according to their seniority, this would also lend greater credence

to the process

of appointment and would avoid any distortion in the

seniority between the appointees drawn even from the same High

Court. The likelihood

of the Supreme Court being deprived of the

benefit

of the services of some who are considered suitable for

appointment, but decline a belated offer, would also be prevented.

(4) Due consideration of every legitimate expectation in the

decision making process

is requirement of the rule of non arbitrariness

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 421

and, therefore, this also

is a norm to be observed by the Chief Justice A

of India in recommending appointments to the Supreme Court.

Obviously, this factor applies only

to those considered suitable and

at least equally meritorious by the

Chief Justice of India, for

appointment

to the Supreme Court. Just as a High Court Judge at the

time

of his initial appointment has the legitimate expectation to become B

Chief Justice of a High Court in his turn in the ordinary course, he

has the legitimate expectation to be considered for appointment to the

Supreme Court

in his turn, according to his seniority.

This legitimate expectation has relevance on the ground

of longer

experience on the Bench, and

is a factor material for determining the C

suitability of the appointee. Along with other factors, such as, proper

representation

of all sections of the people from all parts of the

country, legitimate expectation

of the suitable and equally meritorious

Judges

to be considered in their tum is a relevant factor for due

consideration while making the choice

of the most suitable and

D

meritorious amongst them, the outweighing consideration being merit,

to select the best available for the apex

court." ............. .

(Pages 769 B to 770 B)

The majority judgment ends with a summary

of its conclusions.

Conclusion nos.l,2,3,4,5,7,9,10,11and14 are relevant for our purposes. They

E

read thus :

"( 1) The process of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court

and the High Courts

is an integrated 'participatory consultative process'

for selecting the best and most suitable persons available for

appointment; and all the constitutional functionaries must perform

F

this duty collectively with a view primarily to reach an agreed decision,

subserving the constitutional purpose, so that the occasion

of primacy

does not arise.

(2) Initiation

of the proposal for appointment in the case of the G

Supreme Court must be by the Chief Justice of India, and in the case

of a High Court by the Chief Justice of that High Court; and for

transfer

of Judge/Chief Justice of a High Court, the proposal had to

be initiated by the Chief Justice of India. This is the manner in which

proposals for appointments to the Supreme Court and the High Courts

as well as for the transfers of Judges/Chief Justices of the High Courts H

422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A must invariably be made.

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

(3) In the event of conflicting opm1ons by the constitutional

functionaries,

the opinion of the judiciary 'symbolised by the view of

the Chief Justice of India' and formed in the manner indicated, has

primacy.

(4) No appointment of any Judge to the

Supreme Court or any

High Court can be made, unless it

is in conformity with the opinion

of the Chief Justice of India.

( 5) In exceptional cases alone, for stated strong cogent reasons,

disclosed to the

Chief Justice of India, indicating that the recommendee

is not suitable for appointment, that appointment recommended by

the Chief Justice of India may not be made. However, if the stated

reasons are not accepted by the Chief Justice of India and the other

Judges

of the Supreme

Court who have been consulted in the matter,

on reiteration

of the recommendation by the

Chief Justice of India,

the appointment should be made

as a healthy convention.

(7) The opinion

of the

Chief Justice oflndia has not mere primacy,

but

is determinative in the matter of transfers of High

Court Judges/

Chief Justices.

(9) Any transfer made on the recommendation

of the

Chief Justice

of India is not to be deemed to be punitive, and such transfer is not

justiciable on any ground.

( 10) In making all appointments and transfers, the norms indicated

must

be followed. However, the same do not confer any justiciable

right

in any one.

( 11)

Only limited judicial review on the grounds specified earlier

is available in matters of appointments and transfers.

(14) The majority opinion

in

S.P Gupta v. Union of India, [1982]

2 S.C.R. 365, in so far as it takes the contrary view relating to primacy

of the role of the Chief Justice of India in matters of appointments

and transfers, and the justiciability

of these matters as well as in

relation to Judge strength, does not commend itself to us as being the

correct view. The relevant provisions

of the Constitution including

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 423

the constitutional scheme must now be understood and implemented

A

in the manner indicated herein by

us."

(Pages 778 to 779)

(Emphasis supplied)

We have heard the learned Attorney General , learned counsel for the B

interveners and some of the High

Courts and the Advocates General of some

States.

We record at the outset the statements of the Attorney General that -

(

l) the

Union of India is not seking a review or re-consideration of the

judgment

in the second Judges case, and (2) that the

Union of India shall C

accept and treat as binding the answers of this Court to the questions set out

in the Reference.

The majority view

in the second Judges case is that in the matter of

appointments to the

Supreme Court and the High Court the opinion of the

Chief Justice of India has primacy. The opinion of the Chief Justice of India D

is "reflective of the opinion of the judiciary, which means that it must

necessarily have the element

of plurality in its

formation". It is to be formed

"after taking into account the view of some other Judges who are traditionally

associated with this function". The opinion of the Chief Justice of India "so

given has primacy in the matter of all appointments". For an appointment to E

be made, it has to be "in conformity with the final opinion of the Chief

Justice of India formed in the manner indicated". It must follow that an

opinion formed by the Chief Justice of India in any manner other than that

indicated has

no primacy in the matter of appointments to the

Supreme Court

and the High Courts and the Government is not obliged to act thereon.

In so far as appointments to the Supreme Court of India are concerned, F

the majority view in the second Judges case is that the opinion given by the

Chief Justice of India in this behalf "has to be formed taking into account the

views

of the two seniormost Judges of the

Supreme Court. The Chief Justice

oflndia is also expected to ascertain the views of the seniormost Judge of the

Supreme Court whose opinion is likely to be significant in adjudging the G

suitability of the candidate, by reason of the fact that he has come from the

same High Court, or otherwise. Article 124(2) is an indication that

ascertainment

of the views of some other Judges of the

Supreme Court is

requisite".

It was urged by the learned Attorney General as also by learned counsel H

424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A that the Chief Justice of India needs to consult a larger number of Judges of

the Supreme Court before he recommends an appointment to the Supreme

Court. Attention was drawn to the fact that at the time of the latest selection

of Judges appointed to the Supreme Court, the then Chief Justice of India had

constituted a panel

of himself and five of the then senionnost puisne Judges.

B It was submitted that this precedent should be treated as convention and

institutionalised.

We think it necessary to make clear at the outset the distinction that

follows. The opinion

of the Chief Justice of India which has primacy in the

matter

of recommendations for appointment to the

Supreme Court has to be

C fonned in consultation with a collegium of Judges. Presently, and for a long

time now, that collegium consists

of the two senionnost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. In making a decision as to whom that collegium should

recommend,

it takes into account the view that are elicited by the Chief

Justice

of India from the senionnost Judge of the

Supreme Court who comes

from the same High Court as the person proposed

to be recommended. It also

D takes into account the views of other Judges of the

Supreme Court or the

Chief Justices or Judges

of the High Court or, indeed, members of the Bar

who may also have been asked by the Chief Justice

of India or on his behalf.

The principal objective

of the collegium is to ensure that the best available

talent

is brought to the

Supreme .Court bench. The Chief Justice of India and

E the senionnost puisne Judges, by reason of their long tenures on the Supreme

Court, are best fitted to achieve this objective. They can assess the comparative

worth

of possible appointees by reason of the fact that their judgments would

have been the subject matter

of petitions for special leave to appeal and

appeals. Even where the person under consideration

is a member of the Bar,

he would have frequently appeared before them.

In assessing comparative

F worth as aforestated, the collegium would have the benefit of the inputs

provided by those whose views have been sought. The distinction, therefore,

is between the Judges of the

Supreme Court who decide, along with the Chief

Justice oflndia, who should

be recommended for appointment to the

Supreme

Court and the judges of the Supreme Court and others who are asked to

G express their views about the suitability of a possible nominee for such

appointment.

With

th is in mind, what has to be considered is whether the size of the

collegium that makes the recommendation should

be increased. Having regard

to the tenns of Article 124(2), as analysed in the majority judgment in the

H second Judges case, as also the precedent set by the then Chief Justice of

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.) 425

India, as set out earlier, and having regard to the objective aforestated, we A

think it is desirable that the collegium should consist of the Chief Justice

of India and the four seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court.

Ordinarily, one

of the four seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme

Court would succeed the

Chief Justice of India, but if the situation should be

such that the successor

Chief Justice is not one of the four seniormost puisne B

Judges, he must invariably be made part of the collegium. The Judges to be

appointed will function during his term and it is but right that he should have

a hand

in their selection.

It is not practicable to include in the colegilum the seniormost Judge of

the Supreme

Court who comes from the same High Court as the person to C

be recommended, unless, of course he is a part of the collegium by virtue of

being one of the four seniormost puisne Judges, because, as experience shows,

it is normally not one vacancy that has to be filled up but a number thereof.

The prospective candidates to fill such multiple vacancies would come from

a number ot High Courts. It would, therefore, be necessary to consult the D

seniormost Judges frqm all those High Courts. All these judges cannot

conveniently be included in the collegium. Secondly, the composition

of the

collegium cannot vary depending upon where the prospective appointees hail

from.

To put it differeutly, for a particular set of vacancies the seniormost

Judges

from the High Courts at, let us say, Allahabad and Bombay may have

to be consulted.

It would neither be proper nor desirable, if they have been E

part of the collegium for that particular selection, to leave them out of the

next collegium

altho1Jgh no prospective appointee at that time hails from the

High Courts at Allahabad or Bombay. Thirdly,

it would not be proper to

exclude from the collegium such Judges

of the Supreme Court, if

any, as are

senior

to the Judges required to be consulted. Lastly, the seniormost Judge of F

the Supreme Court who comes from the same High Court as the person to

be recommended may be, in terms

of over all seniority in the Supreme

Court,

very junior, with little experience of work in the Supreme Court, and, therefore,

unable

to assess the comparative merit of a number of possible appointees.

Necessarily, the opinion

of all

members of the collegium in respect of G

each recommendation should be in writing. The ascertainment of the views

of the seniormost Supreme Court Judges who hail from the High Courts from

where the persons to be recommended come must also be

in writing. These

must

be conveyed by the Chief Justice of India to the Government of India

along with the recommendation. The other views that the

Chief Justice of

India or the other members of the collegium may elicit, particularly if they H

426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A are from non-Judges, need not be in writing, but it seems to us advisable that

he who elicits the opinion should make a memorandum thereof, and the

substance thereof,

in general terms, should be conveyed to the Government

of India.

The seniormost Judge in the Supreme

Court from the High Court from

B which a prospective candidate comes would ordinarily know his merits and

demerits, but if per chance he does not, the next seniormost Judge

in the

Supreme Court from that High Court should

be consulted and his views

obtained

in writing.

We should add that the

obje~tive being to procure the best information

C that can be obtained about a prospective appointee, it is of no consequence

that a Judge in the Supreme Court from the prospective appointee's High

Court had been transferred to that High Court either

as a puisne Judge or as

its Chief Justice.

D It is, we think, reasonable to expect that the collegium would make its

recommendations based on a consensus.

Should that not happen, it must be

remembered that

no one can be appointed to the Supreme Court unless his

appointment

is in conformity with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India.

The question that remains

is: what is the position when the Chief Justice of

India is in a minority and the majority of the collegium disfavour the

E appointment of a particular person? The majority judgment in the second

Judges case has said that

if

"the final opinion of the Chief Justice of India

is contrary to the opinion of the senior Judges consulted by the Chief Justice

of India and the senior Judges are of the view that the recommendee is

unsuitable for stated reason, which are accepted by the President, then the

non-appointment

of the candidate recommended by the Chief Justice of India

F would be

permissible". This is delicately put, having regard to the high status

of the President, and implies that if the majority of the collegium is against

the appointment

of a particular person, that person shall not be appointed,

and we think that this

is what must invariably happen. We hasten to

ac.!d that

we cannot easily visualise a contingency of this nature; we have little doubt

G that if even two of the Judges forming the collegium express strong views,

for good reasons, that are adverse to the appointment

of a particular person

the Chief Justice

of India would not press for such appointment.

The majority judgment

in the second Judges case contemplates the

non-appointment

of a person recommended on the ground of unsuitability. It

H says that such non-appointment

"must be for good reasons, disclosed to the

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF I 998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.) 427

Chief Justice of India to enable him to reconsider and withdraw his A

recommendation on those considerations. If the Chief Justice of India does

not find

it necessary to withdraw his recommendation even thereafter, but the

other Judges

of the Supreme Court who have been consulted in the matter are

of the view that it ought to be withdrawn, the non-appointment of that person

for reasons

to be recorded, may be permissible in the public interest.......... B

However, if after due consideration of the reasons disclosed to the Chief

Justice

of India, that recommendation is reiterated by the Chief Justice of

India with the unanimous agreement of the Judges of the Supreme Court

consulted

in the matter, with reasons for not withdrawing the recommendation,

then that appointment

as a matter of healthy convention ought to be

made".

It may be that one or more members of the collegium that made a particular C

recommendation have retired or are otherwise unavailable when reasons are

disclosed to the Chief Justice

oflndia for the non-appointment of that person.

In such a situation the reasons must be placed before the remaining members

of the original collegium plus another Judge or Judges who have reached the

required seniority and become one

of the first four puisne Judges. It is for D

this collegium, so re-constituted, to consider whether the recommendation

should be withdrawn or reiterated.

It is only if it is unanimously reiterated

that the appointment must be made. Having regard to the objective

of securing

the best available men for the Supreme Court,

it is imperative that the number

of Judges of the

Supreme Court who consider the reasons for non-appointment

should be

as large as the number that had made the particular recommendation. E

The Chief Justice oflndia may, in his discretion, bring to the knowledge

of the person recommended the reasons disclosed by the Government of

India for his non-appointment and ask for his response thereto. The response,

if asked for and made, should be considered by the collegium before it

withdraws or reiterates the recommendation. F

The majority judgment in the second Judges case said that

"inter se,

seniority amongst Judges in their High Court and their combined seniority on

all India basis" should be "kept in view and given due weight while making

appointments from amongst High Court Judges to the Supreme Court. Unless

G

there be any strong cogent reason to justify a departure, that order of seniority

must be maintained between them while making their appointment

to the

Supreme

Court". It also said that "the legitimate expectation of the High

Court Judges to be considered for appointment to the Supreme Court, according

to their seniority" must be duly considered. The statement made thereafter is

very important; it is : "Obviously, this factor applies only to those considered H

428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A suitable and at least equally meritorious by the Chief Justice of India for

appointment to the Supreme Court."

Merit, therefore, as we have already noted, is the predominant

consideration for the purposes

of appointment to the supreme

Court.

Where, therefore, there is outstanding merit the possessor thereof

B deserves to be appointed regardless of the fact that he may not stand high in

the all India seniority list or in his own High Court. All that then needs to

be recorded when recommending him for appointment is that he has

outstanding merit. When the contenders for appointment

to the Supreme

Court do not possess such outstanding merit but have, nevertheless, the required

C merit in more or less equal degree, there may be reason to recomniend one

among them because, for example, the particular region

of the country in

which his parent High

Court is situated is not represented on the Supreme

Court bench. All that then needs to be recorded when making the

recommendation for appointment

is this factor. The

"strong cogent reasons"

that the majority judgment in the second Judges case speaks of are good

D reasons for appointing to the Supreme Court a particular High Court Judge,

not for not appointing other High Court Judges senior to him. It is not

unusual that a Judge who has once been passed over for appointment to the

Supreme Court might still find favour on the occasion of another selection

and there

is no reason to blot his copybook by recording what might be

E construed to be an adverse comment about him. It is only when, for very

strong reasons, a collegium finds that, whatever his seniority, some High Court Judge should never be appointed to the Supreme Court that it should

so record. This would then be justified and would afford guidance on

subsequent occasions

of considering who to recommend.

p Mr.

Parasaran, learned counsel for the intervener, the Advocates-on-

Record Association, submitted that the words 'legitimate expectation' were

not apposite when the reference was

to High

Court Judges. We make it clear

that no disparagement

of High

Court Judges was meant; all that was intended

to be conveyed was that it was very natural that senior High Court Judges

should entertain hopes

of elevation to the Supreme

Court and that the Chief

G Justice of India and the collegium should bear this in mind.

The majority judgment

in the second Judges case requires the

Chief

Justice of a High Court to consult his two seniormost puisne Judges before

recommending a name for appointment to the High Court. In forming his

opinion

in relation to such appointment the

Chief Justice of India is expected

H "to take into account the views of his colleagues in the Supreme Court who

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 429

are likely to be conversant with the affairs of the concerned High Court. The A

Chief Justice of India may also ascertain the views of one or more senior

Judges

of that High Court ......

". The Chief Justice of India should, therefore,

form his opinion

in regard to a person to be recommended for appointment

to a High Court in the same

manner as he forms it in regard to a

recommendation for appointment to the Supreme Court, that

is to say, in

consultation with his seniormost puisne Judges. They would in making their B

decision take into account the opinion of the Chief Justice of the High Court,

which

"would be entitled to the greatest weight'', the views of other Judges

of the High Court who may have been consulted and the views of colleagues

on the Supreme Court bench "who are conversant with the affairs of the

concerned High Court". Into that last category would fall Judges of the C

Supreme Court who were puisne Judges of that High Court or Chief Justices

thereof, and it

is of no consequence that the High Court is not their parent

High Court and they were transferred there. The objective being to gain

reliable information about the proposed appointee, such Supreme Court Judge

as may be in a position to give it should be asked

to do so. All these views

should be expressed

in writing and conveyed to the Government of India D

along with the recommendation.

Having regard to the fact that information about a proposed appointee

to a High Court would best come from the Chief Justice and Judges

of that

High Court and from Supreme Court Judges conversant with it, we are not

E

persuaded to alter the strength of the decision making collegium's size; where

appointments to the High Courts are concerned, it should remain as it

is

constituted of the Chief Justice of India and the two seniormost puisne Judges

of the Supreme Court.

In the context

of the judicial review of appointments, the majority F

judgment in the second Judges' case said,

"Plurality of Judges in the formation

of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, as indicated, is another in-built

check against the likelihood

of arbitrariness or bias ...... The judicial element

being predominant

in the case of appointments ...... ., as indicated, the need

for further judicial review, as in other executive actions,

is

eliminated." The G

judgment added, "Except on the ground of want of consultation with the

named constitutional functionaries or lack

of any condition of eligibility in

the case of an appointment, these matters are not justiciable on any other

ground ....

".

Judicial review m the case of an appointment, or a recommended H

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A appointment, to the Supreme Court or a High Court is, therefore, available

if the recommendation concerned

is not a decision of the

Chief Justice of

India and his seniormost colleagues, which is constitutionally requisite. They

number four in the case

of a recommendation for appointment to the

Supreme

Court and two in the case of a recommendation for appointment to a High

B Court. Judicial review is also available if, in making the decision, the views

of the seniormost Supreme Court Judge who comes from the High Court of

the proposed appointee to the Supreme Court have not been taken into account.

Similarly, if, in connection with an appointment, or a recommended

appointment, to a High Court, the views of the Chief Justice and senior

Judges

of the High

Court, as aforestated, and of Supreme Court Judges

C knowledgeable about that High Court have not been sought or considered by

the Chief Justice of India and his two seniormost puisne Judges, judicial

review

is available. Judicial review is also available when the appointee is

found to lack eligibility.

The majority judgment

in the second Judges case dealt with the question

D of the transfer of a puisne Judge of one High

Court as a puisne Judge of

another High Court. It said, "In the formation of his opinion, the Chief

Justice of India, in the case of transfer of a Judge other than the Chief Justice,

is expected to take into account the views of the Chief Justice of the High

Court from which the Judge is to be transferred, any Judge of the Supreme

E Court whose opinion may be of significance in that case, as well as the views

of at least one other senior Chief Justice of a High Court, or any other person

whose views are considered relevant

by the

Chief justice of India." In regard

to the justiciability

of such transfers, it said,

"Plurality of Judges in the

formation

of the opinion of the

Chief Justice of India, as indicated, is another

inbuilt check against the likelihood

of arbitrariness or bias ...... The judicial

F element being ........ decisive in transfers, as indicated, the need for further

judicial review, as

in other executive actions, is

eliminated." In the same

context there was reference to "the element of plurality of Judges in formation

of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India." It was then said that "apart from

the constitutional requirement

of a transfer being made only on the

G recommendation of the

Chief Justice of India, the issue of transfer is not

justiciable on any other ground, including the reasons for the transfer or their

sufficiency. The opinion

of the

Chief Justice of India formed in the manner

indicated

is sufficient safeguard and protection against any arbitrariness or

bias, as well as any erosion

of the independence of the

judiciary." Again, it

was said "Except on the ground ........ of a transfer being made without the

H recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, these matters are not justiciable

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.) 431

on any other ground, including that of bias, which in any case is excluded A

by the element of plurality in the process of decision making."

The same thoughts were expressed in the concurring judgment of Kuldip

Singh, J., thus :

"We are, therefore, of the view that the opinion of the Chief Justice B

of India in the process of consultation for appointments to the superior

courts must be formed in consultation with two

of his seniormost

colleagues. Apart from that the Chief Justice

oflndia must also consult

the seniormost Judge who comes from the same State (the

State from

where the candidate

is being considered). This process of consultation

shall also be followed while transferring any Judge/Chief Justice

C

from one

State to another. "

The judgment in the case of K. Ashok Reddy v. Government of India

and

Ors., [1994] 2

SCC 303, dealt with the justiciability of transfers of High

Court Judges from one High Court to another. The judgment, rendered by a

Bench

of three learned Judges, records that ;t was a

"sequel to the decision" D

in the second Judges case. It refers \o th<:: fact that after the second Judges

case the then Chief Justice

of

India had constituted a Peer Committee

comprised

of the then two seniormost puisne Judges of

Supreme Court and

two Chief Justices

of High Courts to make suggestions for transfers and the

Chief Justice

of India was to make his recommendations on that basis and in E

accordance with the broad guidelines indicated in the second Judges case.

There was, therefore, the judgment said, no room left for any apprehension

of arbitrariness or bias in the transfer of any Judge or Chief Justice of a High

Court. There was no doubt that the Chief Justice

of India, acting on the

institutional advice available to him, was the surest and safest bet for

preservation

of the independence of judiciary. The second Judges case did F

not exclude judicial review but limited the area of justiciability to the

constitutional requirement

of the recommendation of the Chief Justice of

India for exercise of power under Article 222 by the

President of India. The

power

of transfer was to be exercised by the highest constitutional functionaries

in the country in the manner indicated, which provided several inbuilt checks G

against the likelihood of arbitrariness or bias. The need for restricting the

standing to sue

in such a matter to the affected Judge alone had been reiterated

in the second Judges case. The transfer of a High Court Judge was justiciable

only on the ground indicated in the second Judges case and only at the

instance

of the transferred Judge himself and no one else. This was necessary

to prevent any transferred Judge being exposed to any litigation involving H

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A him except when he chose to resort to it himself in the available limited area

of justiciability. When it was said in the second Judges case that the ground

of bias was not available for challenging a transfer, it was to emphasis that

the decision by the collective exercise

of several Judges at the highest level

on objective criteria, on which the recommendation

of the Chief Justice of

B India was based, was an inbuilt check against arbitrariness and bias indicating

the absence

of need for judicial review on those grounds. If any court other

than the Supreme Court was called upon to decide a matter relating to the

transfer

of a High Court Judge, it should promptly consider the option of

requesting the Supreme Court to withdraw the case to itself for decision to

avoid any embarrassment.

c

What emerges from the aforesaid is this: before recommending the

transfer

of a puisne Judge of one High Court to another High Court, also as

a puisne Judge, the Chief Justice

of India must consult a plurality of Judges.

He must take into account the views

of the Chief Justice of the High Court

from which the Judge

is to be transferred, any Judge of the Supreme Court

D whose opinion may have significance in the case and atleast one other senior

Chief Justice

of a High Court or any other person whose views he considers

relevant. The then Chief Justice

of India had constituted, as was noted in

Ashok Reddy 's case, a

Peer Committee of the two seniormost puisne Judges

of the Supreme Court and two Chief Justices of High Courts to advise him

in the matter

of transfers of High Court Judges. That Committee is no longer

E

in position.

It is to our mind imperative, given the gravity involved in transferring

High Courts Judges, that the Chief Justice

of India should obtain the views

of the Chief Justice of the High Court from which the proposed transfer is

to be effected as also the Chief Justice of the High Court to which the

F transfer is to be effected. This is in accord with the majority judgment in the

second Judges case which postulates consultation with the Chief Justice

of

another High Court. The Chief Justice of India should also take into account

the views

of one or more Supreme Court Judges who are in a position to

provide material which would assist

in the process of deciding whether or not

G a proposed transfer should take place. These views should be expressed in

writing and should be considered by the Chief Justice of India and

the four

seniormost puisne Judges

of the Supreme Court. These views and those of

each of the four seniormost puisne Judges should be conveyed to the

Government

of India along with the proposal of transfer. Unless the decision

to transfer has been taken in the manner aforestated, it is not decisive and

H does not bind the Government of India.

-

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 [S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 433

Wide based decision making such as this eliminates the possibility of A

bias or arbitrariness. By reason of such elimination the remedy of judicial

review can legitimately

be confined to a case where the transfer has been

made or recommended without obtaining views and reaching the decision

in

the manner aforestated.

What applies to the transfer

of a puisne Judge of a High Court applies B

a well to the transfer of the Chief Justice of a High

Court as Chief Justice of

another High Court except that, in this case, only the views of one or more

knowledgable Supreme Court Judges need to be taken into account.

The majority judgment

in the second Judges case requires that

"the

personal factors relating to the concerned Judge, and his response to the C

proposal, including his preference of places of transfer, should be taken into

account by the Chief Justice

of India before forming his final opinion

objectively, on the available material, in the public interest for better

administration

of

justice" (page 774). These factors, including the response

of the High Court Chief Justice or puisne Judge proposed to be transferred D

to the proposal to transfer him, should now be placed before the collegium

of the Chief Justice of India and his first four puisne Judges to be taken into

account by them before reaching a final conclusion on the proposal.

We have heard with some dismay the dire apprehensions expressed by

some

of the counsel appearing before us. We do not share them. We take the E

optimistic view that successive Chief Justices of India shall henceforth act in

accordance with the second Judges case and this opinion.

We have not dealt with any aspect placed before us at the Bar that falls

outside the scope

of the questions posed in the Reference.

p

It remains only to express our gratitude to the Attorney General, Mr.

K. Parasaran, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Mr. R.K. Jain, Mr. A.B. Divan, Mr.

Murlidhar Bhandare,

Mr. Arun Jaitley, Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Mr. H.N.

Salve,

Mr. V.A.Mohta, Mr.

R.P. Goel, Mr. P.S Poti, Mr. Sarin, Mr. B.R.

Bhattacharya, Mr. A.R. Barthakur, Mr. P.G. Baruah, Mr. Govind Das and G

Ms. Radha Rangaswamy. Their submissions and insights have much assisted

us. We should note that there was no great divergence in what they advocated.

The questions posed

by the Reference are now answered, but we should

emphasise that the answers should

be read in conjunction with the body of

this opinion: H

434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A I. The expression "consultation with the Chief justice of India" in

Articles 217(1) and 222 (I) of the Constitution of India requires consultation

with a plurality

of Judges in the formation of the opinion of the

Chief Justice

of India. The sole, individual opinion of the Chief Justice of India does not

constitute "consultation" within the meaning of the said Articles.

B 2. The transfer of puisne Judges is judicially reviewable only to this

extent: that the recommendation that has been made by the Chief Justice of

India in this behalf has not been made in consultation with the four seniormost

puisne Judges

of the Supreme

Court and/or that the views of the Chief Justice

of the High Court from which the transfer is to be effected and of the Chief

C Justice of the High Court to which the transfer is to be effected have not been

obtained.

3. The

Chief Justice of India must make a recommendation to appoint

a Judge

of the Supreme

Court and to transfer a Chief Justice or puisne Judge

of a High Court in consultation with the four seniormost puisne Judges of the

D Supreme Court. Insofar as an appointment to the High Court is concerned,

the recommendation must be made

in consul'tation with the two seniormost

puisne Judges

of the Supreme

Court.

4. The Chief Justice of India is not entitled to act solely in his individual

capacity, without consultation with other Judges

of the Supreme

Court, in

E respect of materials and information conveyed by the Government of India

for non-appointment

of a judge recommended for appointment.

5. The requirement of consultation by the

Chief Justice of India with

his colleagues who are likely to

be conversant with the affairs of the concerned

High

Court does not refer only to those Judges who have that High Court as

F a parent High Court. It does not exclude Judges who have occupied the office

of a Judge or Chief Justice of that High Court on transfer.

6. "Strong cogent reasons" do not have to be recorded as justification

for a departure from the order

of seniority, in respect of each senior Judge

who has been passed over. What has to

be recorded is the positive reason for

G the recommendation.

7. The views of the Judges consulted should be in writing and should

be conveyed to the Government

of India by the

Chief Justice of India along

with his views to the extent set out

in the body of this opinion.

H 8. The

Chief Justice of India is obliged to comply with the norms and

...

"

SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. I OF 1998 (S.P. BHARUCHA, J.] 435

the requirement of the consultation process, as aforestated, in making his A

recommendations to the Government of India.

9. Recommendations made by the Chief Justice of India without

complying with the norms and requirements

of the consultation process, as

aforestated, are not binding upon the Government of India.

S.M. Opinion rendered.

B

Reference cases

Description

Decoding Special Reference No. 1 of 1998: The Supreme Court's Final Word on the Collegium System

The landmark opinion in Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, famously known as the Third Judges Case, remains a cornerstone of Indian constitutional law, providing a definitive framework for Judicial Appointments and solidifying the operational mechanics of the Collegium System. This pivotal ruling, available for in-depth study on CaseOn, arose from a Presidential Reference seeking clarity on the principles established in the Second Judges Case. The Supreme Court’s nine-judge bench meticulously answered critical questions, institutionalizing the process of appointing and transferring judges to the higher judiciary, thereby shaping the contours of judicial independence in India for decades to come.

The Core Issue: Seeking Clarity on Judicial Primacy and Consultation

Following the Second Judges Case (1993), which established the primacy of the Chief Justice of India's (CJI) opinion in judicial appointments, several procedural and interpretative doubts emerged. To resolve these ambiguities, the President of India, exercising powers under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, referred nine questions to the Supreme Court for its opinion. The central issues revolved around:

  • The meaning of “consultation with the Chief Justice of India.” Did it imply the CJI's individual opinion or a collective decision-making process involving other senior judges?
  • The composition and functioning of the consulting body for appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts.
  • The extent of judicial review available in matters of judicial appointments and transfers.
  • The relevance of seniority versus merit in appointments to the Supreme Court.
  • The binding nature of recommendations made by the CJI if the prescribed consultation process was not followed.

The Legal Rule: Constitutional Mandates and Judicial Precedent

Constitutional Framework for Appointments and Transfers

The legal basis for the reference is rooted in the following constitutional provisions:

  • Article 124(2): Governs the appointment of Supreme Court Judges, requiring the President to consult with the CJI and other judges as deemed necessary.
  • Article 217(1): Pertains to the appointment of High Court Judges, mandating consultation with the CJI, the Governor of the State, and the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court.
  • Article 222(1): Deals with the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another, requiring consultation with the CJI.

The Second Judges Case had previously interpreted "consultation" to mean "concurrence," giving primacy to the CJI’s opinion. However, it also stressed that this opinion must be formed collectively, representing the judiciary as an institution.

Analysis: The Supreme Court's Landmark Opinion

The Supreme Court, in its advisory opinion, provided a comprehensive and structured framework, transforming the abstract principle of collective consultation into a concrete, workable mechanism.

The 'Collegium' is Institutionalized: Defining "Consultation"

The Court's most significant finding was that the expression “consultation with the Chief Justice of India” requires consultation with a plurality of judges. The sole, individual opinion of the CJI does not constitute valid consultation. This holding formally institutionalized the Collegium System by defining its composition:

  • For Supreme Court Appointments/Transfers: The Collegium must consist of the Chief Justice of India and the four senior-most puisne Judges of the Supreme Court.
  • For High Court Appointments: The Collegium for recommending appointments to High Courts would comprise the Chief Justice of India and the two senior-most puisne Judges of the Supreme Court.

This structure was designed to ensure that the CJI's recommendation is a collective, institutional opinion, thereby promoting transparency and minimizing arbitrariness.

The Role of Seniority and Merit in Appointments

The Court addressed the sensitive issue of superseding senior judges. It clarified that while seniority is a significant factor and legitimate expectation, merit is the predominant consideration. The judgment explained that the “strong cogent reasons” mentioned in the Second Judges Case need not be a negative reflection on the superseded judges. Instead, the focus should be on recording the positive reasons for the recommendation, such as the outstanding merit of the chosen candidate, which would justify the departure from the seniority rule.

Navigating the complex interplay of seniority, merit, and collegium opinions in rulings like the Third Judges Case can be challenging. For legal professionals pressed for time, CaseOn.in offers a powerful tool: 2-minute audio briefs that summarize key judgments. This feature allows lawyers and students to quickly grasp the essential holdings and analysis of this specific ruling, ensuring they stay informed without disrupting their workflow.

Judicial Review: A Limited but Crucial Check

The judgment affirmed that while the merits of a particular candidate are not subject to judicial review, the appointment process itself is. Judicial review is permissible on the limited ground that the mandatory consultation process was not followed. For instance, a recommendation would be challengeable if:

  • The CJI did not consult the prescribed number of senior-most judges (the collegium).
  • The views of judges conversant with the affairs of the relevant High Court were not obtained and considered.
  • The recommendation was the CJI's individual opinion rather than the collective view of the collegium.

This provides a crucial check on the procedural integrity of the appointment and transfer process.

Binding Nature of Recommendations

Crucially, the Court held that any recommendation made by the Chief Justice of India without complying with the norms and requirements of the consultation process is not binding on the Government of India. This reinforces the idea that the primacy granted to the CJI is not personal but institutional, and its legitimacy is derived from a fair, collective, and transparent procedure.

Conclusion of the Court

The nine-judge bench provided clear, numbered answers to the President's questions, effectively creating a guidebook for judicial appointments and transfers. The Court concluded that the process must be participatory and consultative, with the CJI’s opinion being formed collectively with the collegium. This opinion, when formed correctly, has primacy. Any deviation from this established procedure renders the recommendation non-binding and opens the door to limited judicial review.

Final Summary and Why This Judgment Matters

Quick Summary of the Ruling

The Third Judges Case institutionalized the Collegium System by specifying its composition and mandating a collective, written decision-making process for judicial appointments and transfers. It balanced seniority with merit, clarified the non-binding nature of procedurally flawed recommendations, and established that the consultation process is subject to limited judicial review, thereby strengthening the independence and accountability of the higher judiciary.

Why This Judgment Is an Important Read for Lawyers and Students

  • Foundational Text on Judicial Independence: It is essential for understanding the separation of powers and the mechanisms designed to protect the judiciary from executive interference in India.
  • The Blueprint of the Collegium System: As the Collegium System remains the governing mechanism for judicial appointments, this case provides the definitive procedural framework that every law student and practitioner must know.
  • Insight into Constitutional Interpretation: The judgment is a masterclass in how the judiciary can interpret constitutional silences to create workable and robust procedures that uphold the spirit of the Constitution.
  • Relevance in Current Debates: It remains highly relevant in contemporary discussions surrounding judicial reforms, transparency, and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) case.

Disclaimer: This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal issues, please consult with a qualified legal professional.

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