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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA

AGARTALA

BA NO.166 OF 2026

SRI PARIMAL RUDRA PAL ,

S/O- late Dengu Rudra Pal, aged about 45 years, resident of Shyamapalli,

Chowrangee Para School, P.S. Amtali, District- West Tripura.

The accused persons being lodged in judicial custody, the present petition is

preferred and presented by the father of accused person No.2, and relative of

accused person no.1, named above:

1. SRI JAYANTA SARKAR ,

S/O- late Chandan Sarkar, aged about 26 years, resident of Madhuban, P.S.

Amtali, District- West Tripura.

2. SRI RAONE RUDRA PAL ,

S/O- late Sri Parimal Rudra Pal, aged about 22 years, resident of

Panchamukh, Shyamapalli, Chowrangee Para School, P.S. Amtali, District-

West Tripura

……ACCUSED PERSONS

Versus

The State of Tripura

....... Respondent(s)

For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Pijush Kanti Biswas, Sr. Advocate.

Mr. R. Nath, Advocate.

Mr. P. Biswas, Advocate.

Mr. J. Rahaman, Advocate.

Mr. A. Das, Advocate.

Mr. P. Pal, Advocate.

Mr. S. Tripura, Advocate.

For the Respondent(s) : Mr. R. Datta, P.P.

Date of hearing : 09.09.2026

TRHC010015982026

2026:THC:1267

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Date of delivery of

Judgment & Order : 14/09/2026

Whether fit for reporting : YES

HON’BLE JUSTICE DR. T. AMARNATH GOUD

J U D G M E N T & O R D E R

1. This present bail application has been filed in connection

with Khowai P.S. case No.2020 KHW 007 dated 13.02.2026 registered under

Section 20(b)(ii)(C), 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act.

2. The brief fact of this case is that on 13.02.2026 at about

14:40 hours, Sub-Inspector Francis Halam of Khowai Police Station,

accompanied by police and TSR personnel, departed for routine vehicular

checking. While conducting surveillance at Barabil on NH-208 at around 15:05

hours, the police team intercepted a white vehicle bearing registration number

TR01L3923 proceeding at high speed from Kamalpur towards Khowai. The

vehicle was occupied by two persons, identified through their respective

documents as driver Jayanta Sarkar and co-driver Sri Raone Rudra Paul. After

seeing their suspicious behaviour and upon sensing strong smell of ganja

emanating from the vehicle, a preliminary inspection revealed suspected dry

ganja wrapped in khaki coloured adhesive tape concealed inside the back seat

and inside the trunk/dicky of the aforesaid vehicle.

3. The police thereafter immediately detained the occupants

and the vehicle and informed the matter the O/C Khowai P.S. and requested

him to come to the spot with NDPS related equipment’s/articles and also make

necessary communication with SDM Khowai and arrange to depute one

Executive Magistrate. At approximately 15:55 hours, Inspector Krishnadhan

Sarkar (O/C Khowai PS) arrived with NDPS related equipments, alongside

Deputy Collector and Magistrate (DCM) Sri Sanjay Chowdhury, TCS Gr-II and

the Inspector of Food. The SDPO Khowai also arrived at the spot. Following a

search of the raiding team witnessed by an independent witness, a formal search

of the intercepted vehicle was executed under the supervision of the DCM

Khowai and other witnesses. During search they recovered total 45 packets of

suspected dry cannabis wrapped with Khaki colour adhesive tape from the back

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seat and trunk of the aforesaid vehicle. The said contraband item were tested

with drug detection kit and total 121 kgs of dry Ganga was seized. A seizure

list was prepared at 17:20 hours seizing the contraband, the offending vehicle,

and other related documents and entire procedure of the search and seizure was

video-graphed and photographed and also taken with eSakshya application.

4. Both accused persons were arrested at the spot at about

17:25 hours. Following their return to the police station, SI Francis Halam

lodged a suo moto complaint, culminating in the registration of Khowai PS

Case No. 2020 KHW 007 dated 13.02.2026 under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 25, and

29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The accused

persons were produced before the learned Special Judge, Khowai, on

14.02.2026, and were subsequently remanded to police custody for four days,

after which they were remanded to judicial custody. Upon completion of

investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted the charge-sheet on

03.08.2026 under the charged sections.

5. During the course of the proceedings, the applicants filed

several bail applications under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita (BNSS) before the learned Special Judge, Khowai. These prayers were

consistently turned down by the trial court, with the learned Special Judge (In-

charge), Khowai, lastly rejecting the bail application vide Order dated

18.08.2026.

6. Aggrieved by the said rejection, the applicants have

approached this Hon'ble High Court by way of the instant bail application

seeking regular bail.

7. Heard Mr. Pijush Kanti Biswas, learned Sr. counsel assisted

by Mr. Pujan Biswas, learned counsel, Mr. A. Das, learned counsel and Mr. J.

Rahaman, learned counsel appearing for the applicants as well as Mr. R. Datta,

learned. P.P., appearing for the State-respondent.

8. Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

accused-person, submitted that the very arrest and subsequent detention of the

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accused stand wholly vitiated due to non-compliance with the mandatory

constitutional guarantee under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and the

statutory commands of Section 47 of the BNSS (Section 50 Cr.P.C.). The core

submission of the learned Senior Counsel is that the copy of the grounds of

arrest was not served upon the accused persons as per mandated law. It is

submitted that although the accused persons are conversant only with Bengali,

the grounds of arrest was prepared in English and were not understood by them.

Learned Sr. counsel also urged that the arrest memo was prepared in the

English language, but the same was not prepared in the language the accused

persons are acquainted with. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that the

specific grounds forming the very ground of the arrest mentioned in the seizure

list were not furnished to the accused. Further, learned Sr. counsel submitted

that no copy of the grounds of arrest or intimation was not supplied or

communicated to the relatives of the accused-persons as mandated under

Section 48 of the BNSS.

9. To support his argument on the point of ground of arrest,

learned Sr. counsel relied upon the following paragraphs of the Judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court reported reported in 2025 INSC 1288 bearing No.

Criminal Appeal No.2195 of 2025 titled as Mihir Rajesh Shah Vs. The State

of Maharastha on 6

th

November, 2025. [The same are as under:-

“25……. 29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating

that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of

detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person

placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the

Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation.

Non-compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would

lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be.”

26. Subsequently, in Vihaan Kumar (supra), this Court underscored that a failure

to comply with the requirement of informing the grounds of arrest soon after the

arrest would render the arrest illegal. The Court referred to the above-mentioned

decisions of this Court and observed that although the ideal mode of

communication of grounds of arrest is to provide such grounds in writing, there is

no such statutory requirement to provide such grounds in writing. The Court noted

that it may not be practical to communicate grounds of arrest in writing in every

situation, but if such a course is followed, the controversy about non-compliance

will not arise at all.]

……………………………………

16. ……………………….

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2. The issue on the requirement of communication of grounds of arrest to the

person arrested, as mandated under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India,

which has also been incorporated in the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,

2002 under Section 19 thereof has been succinctly reiterated in this judgment. The

constitutional mandate of informing the grounds of arrest to the person arrested in

writing has been explained in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India [(2024) 7 SCC 576 :

(2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] so as to be meaningful to serve the intended purpose which

has been reiterated in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2024) 8 SCC

254 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 573]. The said constitutional mandate has been

incorporated in the statute under Section 50CrPC (Section 47 of the BNSS). It may

also be noted that the aforesaid provision of requirement for communicating the

grounds of arrest, to be purposeful, is also required to be communicated to the

friends, relatives or such other persons of the accused as may be disclosed or

nominated by the arrested person for the purpose of giving such information as

provided under Section 50-ACrPC. As may be noted, this is in the addition of the

requirement as provided under Section 50(1)CrPC.

42. As mentioned above, it has been held while dealing with the mode of

communicating the grounds of arrest so as to serve the intended purpose of the

constitutional mandate that the language used in Article 22(1) and 22(5) regarding

communication of the grounds is identical and therefore the interpretation

of Article 22(5) shall ipso facto apply to Article 22(1). The grounds of arrest must

be furnished in writing, in order to attend the true intended purpose of Article

22(1). Reference at this stage may be made to the Constitution Bench Judgment of

this Court in Harikisan (supra) wherein while dealing with the Article 22(5) of the

Constitution of India in the context of the right of a detainee to be made aware of

the grounds of arrest, it has been held that the same should be furnished in a

language which he can understand and in a script which he can read, if he is a

literate person. The relevant portion thereof reads thus:

“7. It has not been found by the High Court that the appellant knew enough

English to understand the grounds of his detention. The High Court has only stated

that „he has studied up to 7th Hindi standard, which is equivalent to 3rd English

standard‟. The High Court negatived the contention raised on behalf of the

appellant not on the ground that the appellant knew enough English, to understand

the case against him, but on the ground, as already indicated, that the service upon

him of the Order and grounds of detention in English was enough communication

to him to enable him to make his representation. We must, therefore, proceed on

the assumption that the appellant did not know enough English to understand the

grounds, contained in many paragraphs, as indicated above, in order to be able

effectively to make his representation against the Order of Detention. The learned

Attorney-General has tried to answer this contention in several ways. He has first

contended that when the Constitution speaks of communicating the grounds of

detention to the detenue, it means communication in the official language, which

continues to be English; secondly, the communication need not be in writing and

the translation and explanation in Hindi offered by the Inspector of Police, while

serving the Order of Detention and the grounds would be enough compliance with

the requirements of the law and the Constitution; and thirdly, that it was not

necessary in the circumstances of the case to supply the grounds in Hindi. In our

opinion, this was not sufficient compliance in this case with the requirements of the

Constitution, as laid down in clause (5) of Article 22. To a person, who is not

conversant with the English language, service of the Order and the grounds of

detention in English, with their oral translation or explanation by the police officer

serving them does not fulfil the requirements of the law. As has been explained by

this Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951 SCC

43 : (1951) SCR 167] clause (5) of Article 22 requires that the grounds of his

detention should be made available to the detenue as soon as may be, and that the

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earliest opportunity of making a representation against the Order should also be

afforded to him. In order that the detenue should have that opportunity, it is not

sufficient that he has been physically delivered the means of knowledge with which

to make his representation. In order that the detenue should be in a position

effectively to make his representation against the Order, he should have knowledge

of the grounds of detention, which are in the nature of the charge against him

setting out the kinds of prejudicial acts which the authorities attribute to him.

Communication, in this context, must, therefore, mean imparting to the detenue

sufficient knowledge of all the grounds on which the Order of Detention is based.

In this case the grounds are several, and are based on numerous speeches said to

have been made by the appellant himself on different occasions and different dates.

Naturally, therefore, any oral translation or explanation given by the police officer

serving those on the detenue would not amount to communicating the grounds.

Communication, in this context, must mean bringing home to the detenue effective

knowledge of the facts and circumstances on which the Order of Detention is

based.

8. We do not agree with the High Court in its conclusion that in every case

communication of the grounds of detention in English, so long as it continues to be

the official language of the State, is enough compliance with the requirements of

the Constitution. If the detained person is conversant with the English language, he

will naturally be in a position to understand the gravamen of the charge against

him and the facts and circumstances on which the order of detention is based. But

to a person who is not so conversant with the English language, in order to satisfy

the requirements of the Constitution, the detenue must be given the grounds in a

language which he can understand, and in a script which he can read, if he is a

literate person.

46. This Court is of the opinion that to achieve the intended objective of the

constitutional mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, the grounds of

arrest must be informed to the arrested person in each and every case without

exception and the mode of the communication of such grounds must be in writing

in the language he understands.

53. The above indicated lower limit of two hours minimum interval before the

production is grounded in the functional necessity so that the right as provided to

an arrestee under the Constitution and the statute is safeguarded effectively. This

period would ensure that the counsel has adequate time to scrutinize the basis of

arrest and gather relevant material to defend the arrestee proficiently and capably

while opposing the remand. Any shorter interval may render such preparation

illusory, thereby resulting in non-compliance of the constitutional and statutory

mandate. The two-hour threshold before production for remand thus strikes a

judicious balance between safeguarding the arrestee‟s constitutional rights

under Article 22(1) and preserving the operational continuity of criminal

investigations.

56. In conclusion, it is held that:

i) The constitutional mandate of informing the arrestee the grounds of arrest is

mandatory in all offences under all statutes including offences under IPC 1860

(now BNS 2023);

ii) The grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the arrestee in the

language he/she understands;

iii) In case(s) where, the arresting officer/person is unable to communicate the

grounds of arrest in writing on or soon after arrest, it be so done orally.

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10. On the point of difference between reasons of arrest and

ground of arrest and also on ground of arrest, learned Sr. counsel appearing for

the applicants referred to paras-26, 38 and 49 of the Judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court reported in AIR 2024 SUPREME COURT 2967 titled as

Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State(NCT of Delhi) bearing No.Criminal Appeal

No.2577 of 2024. The same is produced here-in-under:-

“26.. Further, this Court in the case of Lallubhai Jogibhai

Patel v. Union of India and Ors.5, laid down that the grounds of detention must be

communicated to the detenue in writing in a language which he understands and if

the grounds are only verbally explained, the constitutional mandate of Article

22(5) is infringed. The relevant para is extracted hereunder: -

“20. …. “Communicate” is a strong word. It means that

sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the “grounds” should be

imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he

understands. The whole purpose of communicating the “ground” to the detenu is to

enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the “grounds” are

only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a

language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the

constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed…..” (emphasis supplied)

38. The interpretation given by the learned Single Judge that

the grounds of arrest were conveyed to the accused in writing vide the arrest memo

is unacceptable on the face of the record because the arrest memo does not indicate

the grounds of arrest being incorporated in the said document. Column No. 9 of the

arrest memo(Annexure P-7) which is being reproduced hereinbelow simply sets out

the „reasons for arrest‟ which are formal in nature and can be generally attributed

to any person arrested on accusation of an offence whereas the „grounds of arrest‟

would be personal in nature and specific to the person arrested.

“9. Reason for arrest a. Prevent accused person from committing any further

offence.

b. For proper investigation of the offence.

c. To prevent the accused person from causing the evidence of the offence to

disappear or tempering with such evidence in any manner.

d. To prevent such person from making any inducement threat or promise to any

person acquainted the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such

facts to the Court or to the Police officer.

e. As unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required

cannot be ensured.

49. It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a

significant difference in the phrase „reasons for arrest‟ and „grounds of arrest‟.

The „reasons for arrest‟ as indicated in the arrest memo are purely formal

parameters, viz., to prevent the accused person from committing any further

offence; for proper investigation of the offence; to prevent the accused person from

causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tempering with such evidence in

any manner; to prevent the arrested person for making inducement, threat or

promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him

from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the Investigating Officer. These

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reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on charge of a crime

whereas the „grounds of arrest‟ would be required to contain all such details in

hand of the Investigating Officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused.

Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in writing must convey to the

arrested accused all basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to provide him

an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail.

Thus, the „grounds of arrest‟ would invariably be personal to the accused and

cannot be equated with the „reasons of arrest‟ which are general in nature.”

11. Learned Sr. counsel further to prove his point referred to the

relevant paras of the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in

Vihaan Kumar Vs. The State of Haryana dated 7

th

February, 2025 reported in

2025 INSC 162. The same is produced here-in-under:-

“10. As far as Article 22(1) is concerned, the legal position is

well settled. In the case of Pankaj Bansal1, this Court dealt with Section 19 of the

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short, „the PMLA‟). Section

19 reads thus:

“19. Power to arrest.—(1) If the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or

any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government by general or

special order, has on the basis of material in his possession, reason to believe (the

reason for such belief to be recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of

an offence punishable under this Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as soon

as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. (2) The Director, Deputy

Director, Assistant Director or any other officer shall, immediately after arrest of

such person under sub-section (1), forward a copy of the order along with the

material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating

Authority, in a sealed envelope, in the manner as may be prescribed and such

Adjudicating Authority shall keep such order and material for such period, as may

be prescribed. (3) Every person arrested under sub-section (1) shall, within twenty-

four hours, be taken to a [Special Court or] Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan

Magistrate, as the case may be, having jurisdiction:

Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the time necessary for

the journey from the place of arrest to the [Special Court or] Magistrate's Court.”

(emphasis added) There are two parts of Section 19(1). The first part is the

requirement of recording in writing the reason to believe that any person has been

guilty of an offence punishable under the PMLA. No such requirement of

recording in writing the reason to believe is found in clause (ba) of Section 41(1).

The second requirement incorporated in Section 19(1) is that the person arrested

shall be informed of the grounds of such arrest as soon as may be. The second part

is the requirementincorporated in Article 22(1). Therefore, even under Section

19(1) of PMLA, there is a requirement to inform the arrestee of the grounds of

arrest. This decision deals with and interprets Article 22(1). In paragraph 38 of the

decision, this Court held thus:

“38. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1) of the Constitution provides,

inter alia, that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being

informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. This being the

fundamental right guaranteed to the arrested person, the mode of conveying

information of the grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve

the intended purpose. It may be noted that Section 45 PMLA enables the person

arrested under Section 19 thereof to seek release on bail but it postulates that

unless the twin conditions prescribed thereunder are satisfied, such a person would

not be entitled to grant of bail. The twin conditions set out in the provision are that,

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firstly, the court must be satisfied, after giving an opportunity to the Public

Prosecutor to oppose the application for release, that there are reasonable grounds

to believe that the arrested person is not guilty of the offence and, secondly, that he

is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. To meet this requirement, it would

be essential for the arrested person to be aware of the grounds on which the

authorised officer arrested him/her under Section 19 and the basis for the officer's

“reason to believe” that he/she is guilty of an offence punishable under the 2002

Act. It is only if the arrested person has knowledge of these facts that he/she would

be in a position to plead and prove before the Special Court that there are grounds

to believe that he/she is not guilty of such offence, so as to avail the relief of bail.

Therefore, communication of the grounds of arrest, as mandated by Article 22(1) of

the Constitution and Section 19 PMLA, is meant to serve this higher purpose and

must be given due importance.” (emphasis added) In the said decision, this Court

in paragraphs 42 and 43 observed thus:

“42. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why a copy of such written

grounds of arrest should not be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of

course and without exception. There are two primary reasons as to why this would

be the advisable course of action to be followed as a matter of principle. Firstly, in

the event such grounds of arrest are orally read out to the arrested person or read

by such person with nothing further and this fact is disputed in a given case, it may

boil down to the word of the arrested person against the word of the authorised

officer as to whether or not there is due and proper compliance in this regard. In

the case on hand, that is the situation insofar as Basant Bansal is concerned.

Though ED claims that witnesses were present and certified that the grounds of

arrest were read out and explained to him in Hindi, that is neither here nor there as

he did not sign the document. Non- compliance in this regard would entail release

of the arrested person straightaway, as held in V. Senthil Balaji [V. Senthil Balaji v.

State, (2024) 3 SCC 51 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] . Such a precarious situation is

easily avoided and the consequence thereof can be obviated very simply by

furnishing the written grounds of arrest, as recorded by the authorised officer in

terms of Section 19(1) PMLA, to the arrested person under due acknowledgment,

instead of leaving it to the debatable ipse dixit of the authorised officer.

43. The second reason as to why this would be the proper course to adopt is the

constitutional objective underlying such information being given to the arrested

person. Conveyance of this information is not only to apprise the arrested person of

why he/she is being arrested but also to enable such person to seek legal counsel

and, thereafter, present a case before the court under Section 45 to seek release on

bail, if he/she so chooses. In this regard, the grounds of arrest in V. Senthil Balaji

[V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] are placed on

record and we find that the same run into as many as six pages. The grounds of

arrest recorded in the case on hand in relation to Pankaj Bansal and Basant

Bansal have not been produced before this Court, but it was contended that they

were produced at the time of remand. However, as already noted earlier, this did

not serve the intended purpose.

Further, in the event their grounds of arrest were equally voluminous, it would be

well-nigh impossible for either Pankaj Bansal or Basant Bansal to record and

remember all that they had read or heard being read out for future recall so as to

avail legal remedies. More so, as a person who has just been arrested would not be

in a calm and collected frame of mind and may be utterly incapable of

remembering the contents of the grounds of arrest read by or read out to him/her.

The very purpose of this constitutional and statutory protection would be rendered

nugatory by permitting the authorities concerned to merely read out or permit

reading of the grounds of arrest, irrespective of their length and detail, and claim

due compliance with the constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) and the

statutory mandate under Section 19(1) PMLA.” (emphasis added)

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13. 13. In the case of Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India4, in paragraph 20,

this Court held thus:

“20. It is an admitted position that the detenu does not know English. The grounds

of detention, which were served on the detenu, have been drawn up in English. It is

true that Shri C.L. Antali, Police Inspector, who served the grounds of detention on

the detenu, has filed an affidavit stating that he had fully explained the grounds of

detention in Gujarati to the detenu. But, that is not a sufficient compliance with the

mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which requires that the grounds of

detention must be “communicated” to the detenu. “Communicate” is a strong

word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the

“grounds” should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a

language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the

“ground” to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective

representation. If the “grounds” are only verbally explained to the detenu and

nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that

purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed.

If any authority is needed on this point, which is so obvious from Article 22(5),

reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Harikisan v. State of

Maharashtra [1962 Supp 2 SCR 918 : AIR 1962 SC 911 : (1962) 1 4 (1981) 2 SCC

427 Cri LJ 797] and Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate [(1969) 1 SCR 227 :

AIR 1969 SC 43 :

1969 Cri LJ 274] .” (emphasis added) Therefore, as far as Article 22(1) is

concerned, compliance can be made by communicating sufficient knowledge of the

basic facts constituting the grounds of arrest to the person arrested. The grounds

should be effectively and fully communicated to the arrestee in the manner in

which he will fully understand the same. Therefore, it follows that the grounds of

arrest must be informed in a language which the arrestee understands. That is how,

in the case of Pankaj Bansal1, this Court held that the mode of conveying the

grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve the intended

purpose. However, under Article 22(1), there is no requirement of communicating

the grounds of arrest in writing. Article 22(1) also incorporates the right of every

person arrested to consult an advocate of his choice and the right to be defended by

an advocate. If the grounds of arrest are not communicated to the arrestee, as soon

as may be, he will not be able to effectively exercise the right to consult an

advocate. This requirement incorporated in Article 22(1) also ensures that the

grounds for arresting the person without a warrant exist. Once a person is arrested,

his right to liberty under Article 21 is curtailed. When such an important

fundamental right is curtailed, it is necessary that the person concerned must

understand on what grounds he has been arrested. That is why the mode of

conveying information of the grounds must be meaningful so as to serve the objects

stated above.

14. Thus, the requirement of informing the person arrested of the grounds of arrest

is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional requirement. Article 22 is

included in Part III of the Constitution under the heading of Fundamental Rights.

Thus, it is the fundamental right of every person arrested and detained in custody

to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as possible. If the grounds of arrest

are not informed as soon as may be after the arrest, it would amount to a violation

of the fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1). It will also

amount to depriving the arrestee of his liberty. The reason is that, as provided

in Article 21, no person can be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with the

procedure established by law. The procedure established by law also includes what

is provided in Article 22(1). Therefore, when a person is arrested without a warrant,

and the grounds of arrest are not informed to him, as soon as may be, after the

arrest, it will amount to a violation of his fundamental right guaranteed

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under Article 21 as well. In a given case, if the mandate of Article 22 is not followed

while arresting a person or after arresting a person, it will also violate fundamental

right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21, and the arrest will be rendered illegal.

On the failure to comply with the requirementof informing grounds of arrest as

soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest is vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be

vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.”

12. On the other hand Mr. R. Datta, learned P.P. appearing for

the respondent argued that issue to ground of arrest and other issues as raised by

the learned Sr. counsel appearing for the appellant cannot be raised at this point

as this present case is a bail application and for such ground, separate writ

petition(criminal) needs to be filed. Learned P.P., submitted that in Annexure-5

of this present application, is the memo of Ground of Arrest, it is mentioned in

the said copy that ground of arrest has been supplied. The said annexure-5 also

contains the signature of the accused persons. The proceeding proves that the

ground of arrest was communicated to the accused immediately after the arrest

and without any delay accused was represented by their Advocates before the

Court and moved bail applications. They were served required case papers. At

the time of arrest they were informed about the same.

To strengthen his argument, learned P.P., relied upon the

principle laid by the Subordinate Bench of this Court in Judgment dated

15.07.2026 bearing No.Crl. Petn. No.16 of 2026 titled as The State of Tripura

Vs. Sri Sumanta Das and ors and also Judgment of this Court passed in

20.08.2025 bearing No.W.P.(Crl.) No.6 of 2025 titled as Sima Aktar on Behalf

of Ikbal Hossain Vs. the State of Tripura and anr. Similarly, learned P.P., also

relied upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2025 SCC

Online SC 1702 titled as State of Karnataka Vs. Sri Darshan Etc bearing No.

Criminal Appeal Nos. 3528-3534 of 2025( Arising from SLP(Crl.) Nos.516-

522 of 2025) decided on August 14

th

2025. [The relevant paras are as follows:-

“20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr.P.C is mandatory, the consistent

judicial approach has been to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining

alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does not ipso facto

render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable prejudice or denial of a

fair opportunity to defend.

20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly

reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were

legally (2024) 7 SCC 576 represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly

after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the

Page 12 of 19

]accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice

was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable

prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself,

warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a

determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section

302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal and

Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially different

facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the

settled principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent

prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail. 20.2.

Courts are not expected to render findings on the merits of the case at the bail stage.

13. Learned P.P., further to prove his point relied upon the

Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC

1392 dated 23

rd

July, 2026 titled as State of Meghalaya Vs Sonam

Raghuvanshi, the same is produced here-in-under:-

“11. We find that the respondent is not entitled for bail, both on

merits and on the grounds discussed by both the Courts. There is a fundamental

difference between non-service of grounds of arrest and non-furnishing of adequate

reasons thereunder. While the first category might vitiate the arrest, in the second

category, one has to see the prejudice caused to the accused. In the facts of the

instant case, it is not as if the respondent was not served with the grounds of arrest.

Hence, the case of the respondent falls within the second category discussed above.

The respondent has also not taken the said plea at the earliest point of time, having

done so only in her 4th Bail Application before the trial court.

12. With respect to the contention of the learned Senior Counsel

for the respondent that there is no waiver of the right guaranteed under Article

22(1) of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the stage at which a plea touching

upon fundamental rights is raised would not matter, we would only clarify that when

an accused person files a bail application, the stage might become irrelevant.

However, when the accused person warranted a finding on merits on the earlier

occasions, it is not open for him/her to go back and raise the plea on the issue

pertaining to the grounds of arrest thereafter.”

14. Learned P.P., subsequently submitted that in the Court

below the accused persons never raised the plea that the ground arrest has not

been properly communicated or about the language used in the memo of arrest

or other argument as raised herein. In fact, on perusal of the order of the Special

Judge dated, 16.02.2026, 18.03.2026 and 18.08.2026 it is evident that no such

plea has been recorded. So now, it is now not open for the accused persons to

raise this issue now before the High Court for the first time. Learned P.P.,

submitted that in terms of the Hon’ble Supreme Court Judgment as indicted

above, as the plea has not be taken up in the inception, the same cannot be taken

at this stage. Learned P.P., submitted that further in the present case, ground of

arrest has been properly communicated to the accused persons and the same has

Page 13 of 19

been made to understand in the Bengali language. Learned P.P., also submitted

that the custodial Trial is necessary as because the contraband item recovered

from the possession of the accused person is 121 kgs of Ganja in several

bags/packs and is a commercial quantity. In the ground of arrest, the reasons of

the arrest have been clearly mentioned. Learned P.P. submits that rights of the

accused-persons has not be breached as given under Article 22(1) of the

Constitution of India as from the inception the accused persons have been

property represented by a legal counsel as such he was not prejudice. The

accused-persons can be illiterate but his presenting counsel is not illiterate and

they are the experts of law. Learned P.P., also submit that the rights of the

accused persons given under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India has also

be complied with. Learned P.P., further submitted that when it is proved that

121 kg of Ganja has been recovered from the accused persons mere raising

technical issues on the ground of arrest is immaterial. Stating thus learned P.P.

urged this Court to dismiss this present bail application.

15. Before delving into the conclusion, for proper analysis of the

present case, let us produce Article 22 of the Constitution of India:-

“22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases

(1)No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being

informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be

denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his

choice.

(2)Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced

before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such

arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest

to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in

custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.

(3)Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply—

(a)to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or

(b)to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for

preventive detention.

(4)No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention

of a person for a longer period than three months unless—

(a)an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are

qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the

expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion

sufficient cause for such detention:Provided that nothing in this sub-clause

shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period

Page 14 of 19

prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause

(7); or

(b)such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law

made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).

(5)When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any

law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order

shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which

the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of

making a representation against the order.

(6)Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order

as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority

considers to be against the public interest to disclose.

(7)Parliament may by law prescribe—

(a)the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which,

a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any

law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an

Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause

(4);

(b)the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of

cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention; and

(c)the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under

sub-clause (a) of clause (4).”

16. Further in terms of the arguments advance by the learned

counsel appearing for the parties, it is relevant for this Court produce the overall

meaning and definition of the term ‘Arrest’, ‘Judicial remand’ and ‘detention’;-

Parameter Arrest Detention Judicial Custody

Definition

Formal deprivation of

liberty by legal

authority upon

suspicion or charge of

an offence.

Temporary restraint on

physical movement for

inquiry, prevention, or

preventive detention laws.

Custodial supervision of the

Court/Magistrate following the

remand of an accused.

Primary

Authority

Police Officer,

Magistrate, or Private

Person (under specific

statutory power).

Police/Investigating Officer

or Executive Magistrate.

Judicial Magistrate / Sessions

Court.

Place of

Confinement

Police station lockup

or temporary police

custody.

Police station lockup,

custom house, or designated

detention center.

Central or District Jail (under jail

authority, governed by Prison

Manuals).

Interrogation Police have direct, Police/investigating agency Police cannot interrogate without

Page 15 of 19

Statutory Legal Framework

1. Arrest

Article 22(1) & 22(2), Constitution of India: Guarantees the right to know grounds of arrest,

consult a legal practitioner, and be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours.

Sections 35 to 49, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)(formerly Sec. 41–60

CrPC): Governs when police may arrest without a warrant, procedures for arrest, mandatory

preparation of arrest memos, and duties of arresting officers.

2. Detention

Preventive Action under BNSS:Sections 168 to 173 BNSS(formerly Sec. 149–152 CrPC)

empower police officers to intercede and detain individuals to prevent cognizable offences.

Preventive Detention Laws:Article 22(3) to 22(7) of the Constitution permits executive

detention without formal charge under specific statutes (e.g., NSA, PIT-NDPS) for state

security and public order, subject to Advisory Board review.

3. Judicial Custody

Section 187 BNSS(formerly Sec. 167 CrPC): Outlines procedure when investigation cannot

be completed in 24 hours. The Magistrate may authorize detention in police custody (up to 15

days in tranches across initial investigation) or remand the accused to judicial custody for up

to 60 days (offences punishable under 10 years) or 90 days (heinous offences).

17. In the present case, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon

the case of Prabir Purkayastha (supra), the said case pertained to the UAPA

and also electronic conspiracies. But in the sharp contrast, the present case

comes under the NDPS Act, involving an on the spot physical interception and

recovery of 121 Kilograms of Ganja a contraband item. In the present case, the

accused were intercepted with a vehicle loaded with commercial quantities of

narcotics, the foundational facts constituting the offence are concrete, physical,

and immediately manifest. The seizure list explicitly mentioned the recovered

contraband and its weight. Here in the present case, knowledge of the grounds

of arrest in such circumstances is self-evident. The accused-persons were not

arrested on abstract conspiracy theories, they were apprehended with

continuous access for

interrogation.

has direct control for

questioning.

explicit prior permission/order from

the Magistrate.

Max Duration

Without Court

Order

24 hours (excluding

travel time) before

compulsory judicial

production.

24 hours under general law;

up to 3 months under

Preventive Detention

statutes (Art. 22(4)).

Up to 60 or 90 days total during

investigation (Sec 187 BNSS / Sec

167 CrPC), extendable during trial.

Page 16 of 19

contraband in their direct physical custody the same cannot be equated with

Prabir Purkayastha(surpa).

18. The principle emerging from Vihaan Kumar v. State of

Haryana(surpa) is that the grounds of arrest must be effectively and

meaningfully communicated to the arrested person so that he obtains sufficient

knowledge of the basic facts constituting such grounds. The communication

must be in a language understood by the arrestee. At the same time, as noticed

in the said decision and subsequently referred to in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State

of Maharashtra(supra), though written communication is the ideal mode and

avoids a later dispute regarding compliance, Article 22(1) of the Constitution

and do not expressly prescribe that the grounds must invariably be furnished in

writing.

19. Thus, the decisive question in the present matter is not

merely whether the arrest memo was prepared in English, but whether the basic

facts constituting the grounds of arrest were effectively communicated to the

accused-persons in a language understood by them. The State relies upon the

seizure proceedings, the signatures of the accused-persons on the seizure list

and arrest memo, and the endorsement that the grounds of arrest were read over

and explained to them in the vernacular language. The accused-persons, on the

other hand, dispute such effective communication. This Court must therefore

examine the records rather than proceed solely on the language in which the

formal arrest memo was drawn up.

20. Upon verification of the Lower Court Records, it is found

that the accused-persons were produced before the learned Special Judge within

twenty-four hours of their arrest. Accordingly, the mandate under Article 22(2)

of the Constitution, namely production before the nearest Magistrate within

twenty-four hours, appears to have been complied with. Article 22(3) to Article

22(7) concern persons arrested or detained under laws of preventive detention.

Since the present case is a regular criminal prosecution under the NDPS Act

and not a case of preventive detention, those clauses have no application.

Page 17 of 19

21. The accused-persons cannot be presumed to have

understood the English contents of the arrest memo merely because they signed

it in English. However, if the record genuinely contains a contemporaneous

endorsement that the relevant grounds were explained in Bengali, and if such

explanation covered the basic facts, namely, the interception, alleged

possession, recovery and seizure of 121 kg of ganja, the requirement of

meaningful communication may stand satisfied. The burden to establish

compliance with Article 22(1) is not agitated at the threshold before the

Magistrate/concerned Court when produced, it is not open at this juncture to

raise a fresh argument as the record is against the accused.

22. On the materials presently considered, the accused-persons

have not demonstrated that they were unaware of the factual basis of their arrest

or that their right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner was

defeated as because it is not disputed that 121 kg of Ganja were intercepted and

recovered from their possession and their own signature is also evident in the

seizure list. Further as argued by the learned P.P. is it evident from the record

that the accused herein were duly represented by a legal counsel in the Court

below. This case is distinguishable from one where the arrest memo contains

only printed or generic reasons, without disclosure of the actual factual grounds

for arrest.

23. The allegation herein is of recovery of 121 kg of ganja,

which is of a commercial quantity. Therefore, Section 37 of the NDPS Act is

attracted. For reference let us produced Section 37 of the NDPS Act:-

„37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.—

(1)Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—

(a)every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;

(b)no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under

section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences

involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on his

own bond unless—

(i)the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose

the application for such release, and

Page 18 of 19

(ii)where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court

is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he

is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any

offence while on bail.

(2)The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-

section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time

being in force, on granting of bail‟

24. Unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable

grounds for believing that the accused-persons are not guilty of the alleged

offence and are not likely to commit any offence while on bail, bail cannot

ordinarily be granted. On the materials presently available, including the

alleged recovery and seizure from the accused-persons, this Court is unable to

record the satisfaction required by Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

25. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that

Article 22(3) to Article 22(7) of the Constitution, being provisions concerning

preventive detention, are not applicable to the present case. The requirement

under Article 22(2) appears to have been complied with, as the accused-persons

were produced before the learned Special Judge within twenty-four hours of

arrest. Regarding Article 22(1), the issue has to be examined on the basis of

whether the factual grounds of arrest were effectively communicated to the

accused-persons in a language understood by them. Upon consideration of the

contemporaneous seizure list, arrest memo, the signatures attributed to the

accused-persons, and the prosecution assertion that the grounds were explained

in Bengali, no case of established violation of Article 22(1) or Section 47 of the

BNSS is made out at this stage. Furthermore, in view of the alleged recovery of

121 kg of ganja from the vehicle which was driver by the accused and

contraband being commercial quantity, the conditions prescribed under Section

37 of the NDPS Act remain unsatisfied to consider the arguments advanced by

applicants counsel is liable to be dismissed. Further it is not the case of the

accused that they were away from scene of offence and suddenly to their

surprise they were arrested on different date, different place without being

informed or supplied with ground of arrest. Accordingly, in view of the above

discussion, this present bail application stand dismissed.

Page 19 of 19

26. Accordingly, the present bail application stands dismissed.

Any observation made herein is confined to the adjudication of the present bail

application and shall not influence the trial on merits.

DR. T. AMARNATH GOUD, J

Suhanjit