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2026:CGHC:11781-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WA No. 212 of 2026

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Social

Welfare, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Police Staiton Rakhi, Naya

Raipur Chhattsigarh,

2 - Director, Directorate Of Social Welfare, Government Of

Chhattisgarh, D.K.S. Bhawan, Compound Raipur Chhattsigarh,

3 - Superintendent, Sankalp, Special Govt. School For Mentally ,ill/

Retarded Boys And Girls Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh,

... Appellants

versus

Sandeep Mishra S/o Shri D.N. Sharma, Aged About 28 Years R/o

Badadeep Singh, Nagar, Plot No. 139, Street Pole No. 257, Bhilai,

Police Station Supela, District Durg Chhattsigarh,

... Respondent(s)

For Appellants :Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General

For Respondent :Mr.Sharad Mishra, Advocate

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

12/03/2026

1.Heard Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General for the

appellants/State as well as Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned counsel

appearing for the respondent on I.A. No.02 of 2026, which is an

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application for condonation of delay.

2.Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/

appellants submits that the instant writ appeal is being preferred

by the appellants/State against the order dated 19.06.2025

passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.

4812 of 2015 (Sandeep Mishra vs. State of Chhattisgarh and

others), whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed and set-

aside the order dated 21.07.2015. He further submits that 45

days time is allowed under the law to file an appeal before the

Division Bench against the order passed by learned Single

Judge. It is submitted that the order impugned was passed on

19.06.2025. Thereafter, the Director, Social Welfare,

Chhattisgarh, Raipur sought an opinion from the office of

Advocate General on 13.08.2025. After receiving the order, an

opinion was sought from the office of the Advocate General,

which was given on 10.09.2025. Thereafter, the file was sent to

the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of

Chhattisgarh for obtaining sanction with regard to filing of writ

appeal. The Law & Legislative Affairs Department accorded

sanction on 01.12.2025, which was received by the Department

on 08.12.2025 and thereafter, Officer-in-Charge has been

appointed and he approached the office of the Advocate General

for filing the instant writ appeal. Thereafter, the writ appeal has

been prepared and is being filed before the Hon'ble Court. The

instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 178 days

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from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been

placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court

in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others,

(1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the

learned State counsel prays that the delay of 464 days in

preferring the appeal may be condoned.

3.Learned counsel for the respondent opposes the submissions

made by learned Deputy Advocate General for the

appellants/State.

4.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

documents annexed herewith.

5.The question for determination before this Court is whether the

provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of

1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to file an appeal

against the order passed by the writ Court.

6.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster

General and others v. Living Media India Limited and

another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue

and held as under:-

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)

concerned were well aware or conversant

with the issues involved including the

prescribed period of limitation for taking up

the matter by way of filing a special leave

petition in this Court. They cannot claim

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that they have a separate period of

limitation when the Department was

possessed with competent persons

familiar with court proceedings. In the

absence of plausible and acceptable

explanation, we are posing a question

why the delay is to be condoned

mechanically merely because the

Government or a wing of the

Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact

that in a matter of condonation of delay

when there was no gross negligence or

deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a

liberal concession has to be adopted to

advance substantial justice, we are of the

view that in the facts and circumstances,

the Department cannot take advantage

of various earlier decisions. The claim

on account of impersonal machinery

and inherited bureaucratic

methodology of making several notes

cannot be accepted in view of the

modern technologies being used and

available. The law of limitation

undoubtedly binds everybody including

the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform

all the government bodies, their agencies

and instrumentalities that unless they have

reasonable and acceptable explanation for

the delay and there was bonafide effort,

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there is no need to accept the usual

explanation that the file was kept pending

for several months/years due to

considerable degree of procedural red-

tape in the process. The government

departments are under a special obligation

to ensure that they perform their duties

with diligence and commitment.

Condonation of delay is an exception and

should not be used as an anticipated

benefit for government departments. The

law shelters everyone under the same

light and should not be swirled for the

benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no

proper explanation offered by the

Department for the delay except

mentioning of various dates, according to

us, the Department has miserably failed to

give any acceptable and cogent reasons

sufficient to condone such a huge delay.

Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be

dismissed on the ground of delay.”

7.Recently, a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary,

2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some

directions and observed as follows:-

“5. The legal position is that where a

case has been presented in the Court

beyond limitation, the petitioner has to

explain the Court as to what was the

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"sufficient cause" which means an

adequate and enough reason which

prevented him to approach the Court

within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.

Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC

1260, it was held by this Court that

even though limitation may harshly

affect the rights of a party, it has to be

applied with all its rigour when

prescribed by statute. A reference was

also made to the decision of this Court

in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023

SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as

follows:

"13. This Court in the case of

Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition

Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while

rejecting an application for

condonation of delay for lack of

sufficient cause has concluded in

Paragraph 15 as follows:

“15. The law on the issue can be

summarised to the effect that where a

case has been presented in the court

beyond limitation, the applicant has to

explain the court as to what was the

“sufficient cause” which means an

adequate and enough reason which

prevented him to approach the court

within limitation. In case a party is

found to be negligent, or for want of

bona fide on his part in the facts and

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circumstances of the case, or found to

have not acted diligently or remained

inactive, there cannot be a justified

ground to condone the delay. No court

could be justified in condoning such an

inordinate delay by imposing any

condition whatsoever. The application

is to be decided only within the

parameters laid down by this Court in

regard to the condonation of delay. In

case there was no sufficient cause to

prevent a litigant to approach the court

on time condoning the delay without

any justification, putting any condition

whatsoever, amounts to passing an

order in violation of the statutory

provisions and it tantamounts to

showing utter disregard to the

legislature.”

14. Therefore, we are of the

considered opinion that the High Court

did not commit any mistake in

dismissing the delay condonation

application of the present appellant."

Thus, it is crystal clear that the

discretion to condone the delay has to

be exercised judiciously based on facts

and circumstances of each case and

that, the expression 'sufficient cause'

cannot be liberally interpreted, if

negligence, inaction or lack of bona

fides is attributed to the party.

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5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir

Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his

legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein,

one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a

member, after referring to various

decisions on the issue, it was in

unequivocal terms observed by this

Court that delay should not be excused

as a matter of generosity and

rendering substantial justice is not to

cause prejudice to the opposite party.

The relevant passage of the same is

profitably extracted below:

“24. In the aforesaid circumstances,

we made it very clear that we are not

going to look into the merits of the

matter as long as we are not

convinced that sufficient cause has

been made out for condonation of such

a long and inordinate delay.

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant

is a private party or a State or Union of

India when it comes to condoning the

gross delay of more than 12 years. If

the litigant chooses to approach the

court long after the lapse of the time

prescribed under the relevant

provisions of the law, then he cannot

turn around and say that no prejudice

would be caused to either side by the

delay being condoned. This litigation

between the parties started sometime

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in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43

years have elapsed. However, till date

the respondent has not been able to

reap the fruits of his decree. It would

be a mockery of justice if we condone

the delay of 12 years and 158 days

and once again ask the respondent to

undergo the rigmarole of the legal

proceedings.

26. The length of the delay is a

relevant matter which the court must

take into consideration while

considering whether the delay should

be condoned or not. From the tenor of

the approach of the appellants, it

appears that they want to fix their own

period of limitation for instituting the

proceedings for which law has

prescribed a period of limitation. Once

it is held that a party has lost his right

to have the matter considered on

merits because of his own inaction for

a long, it cannot be presumed to be

non-deliberate delay and in such

circumstances of the case, he cannot

be heard to plead that the substantial

justice deserves to be preferred as

against the technical considerations.

While considering the plea for

condonation of delay, the court must

not start with the merits of the main

matter. The court owes a duty to first

ascertain the bona fides of the

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explanation offered by the party

seeking condonation. It is only if the

sufficient cause assigned by the litigant

and the opposition of the other side is

equally balanced that the court may

bring into aid the merits of the matter

for the purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the

question of limitation is not merely a

technical consideration. The rules of

limitation are based on the principles of

sound public policy and principles of

equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword

of Damocles’ hanging over the head of

the respondent for indefinite period of

time to be determined at the whims

and fancies of the appellants.

xxx xxx xxx

34. In view of the aforesaid, we have

reached to the conclusion that the High

Court committed no error much less

any error of law in passing the

impugned order. Even otherwise, the

High Court was exercising its

supervisory jurisdiction under Article

227 of the Constitution of India.

35. In a plethora of decisions of this

Court, it has been said that delay

should not be excused as a matter of

generosity. Rendering substantial

justice is not to cause prejudice to the

opposite party. The appellants have

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failed to prove that they were

reasonably diligent in prosecuting the

matter and this vital test for condoning

the delay is not satisfied in this case.

36. For all the foregoing reasons, this

appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs.”

Applying the above legal proposition to

the facts of the present case, we are of

the opinion that the High Court

correctly refused to condone the delay

and dismissed the appeal by observing

that such inordinate delay was not

explained satisfactorily, no sufficient

cause was shown for the same, and no

plausible reason was put forth by the

State. Therefore, we are inclined to

reject this petition at the threshold.

6. At the same time, we cannot

simply brush aside the delay

occurred in preferring the second

appeal, due to callous and

lackadaisical attitude on the part of

the officials functioning in the State

machinery. Though the Government

adopts systematic approach in

handling the legal issues and

preferring the petitions/

applications/ appeals well within the

time, due to the fault on the part of

the officials in merely

communicating the information on

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time, huge revenue loss will be

caused to the Government

exchequer. The present case is one

such case, wherein, enormous

delay of 1788 days occasioned in

preferring the second appeal due to

the lapses on the part of the officials

functioning under the State, though

valuable Government lands were

involved. Therefore, we direct the

State to streamline the machinery

touching the legal issues, offering

legal opinion, filing of cases before

the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the

responsibility on the officer(s)

concerned, and penalize the

officer(s), who is/are responsible for

delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any,

to the value of the loss caused to

the Government. Such direction will

have to be followed by all the States

scrupulously.

7. There is one another aspect of the

matter which we must not ignore or

overlook. Over a period of time, we have

noticed that whenever there is a plea for

condonation of delay be it at the instance

of a private litigant or State the delay is

sought to be explained right from the time,

the limitation starts and if there is a delay

of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the

end of the same. For example if the period

of limitation is 90 days then the party

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seeking condonation has to explain why it

was unable to institute the proceedings

within that period of limitation. What

events occurred after the 91st day till the

last is of no consequence. The court is

required to consider what came in the way

of the party that it was unable to file it

between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is

true that a party is entitled to wait until the

last day of limitation for filing an appeal.

But when it allows the limitation to expire

and pleads sufficient cause for not filing

the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause

must establish that because of some event

or circumstance arising before the

limitation expired it was not possible to file

the appeal within time. No event or

circumstance arising after the expiry of

limitation can constitute such sufficient

cause. There may be events or

circumstances subsequent to the expiry of

limitation which may further delay the filing

of the appeal. But that the limitation has

been allowed to expire without the appeal

being filed must be traced to a cause

arising within the period of limitation. (See:

Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v.

State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”

8.Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present

case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)

and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that

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Government departments are under a special obligation to

discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.

Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot

be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by

Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon

all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage

upon a select few.

9. Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of

Shivamma (dead) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &

Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts

ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of

State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra

cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-

authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity

and lethargy. The constitutional Courts ought to be cognizant of

the apathy and pangs of a private litigant.

10. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State

has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for

the delay in filing the present appeal. The only reason cited is

that the Director, Social Welfare, Chhattisgarh, Raipur sought an

opinion from the office of Advocate General on 13.08.2025. After

receiving the order, an opinion was sought from the office of the

Advocate General, which was given on 10.09.2025. Thereafter,

the file was sent to the Law & Legislative Affairs Department,

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Government of Chhattisgarh for obtaining sanction with regard to

filing of writ appeal. The Law & Legislative Affairs Department

accorded sanction on 01.12.2025, which was received by the

Department on 08.12.2025 and thereafter, Officer-in-Charge has

been appointed and he approached the office of the Advocate

General for filing the instant writ appeal. Thereafter, the writ

appeal has been prepared and is being filed before the Hon'ble

Court. However, this sequence of events, lacking in specificity or

justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or acceptable

explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to demonstrate

sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an inordinate

delay of 178 days.

11. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary

power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The

learned counsel for the State has not been able to establish any

convincing or bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is

no justification for condoning the delay of 178 days in filing the

present appeal.

12. In view of the above, the instant writ appeal is dismissed on the

ground of delay and laches.

Sd/- Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Bablu