2024 INSC 262 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 21096 of 2019)

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

JAHANGIR BYRAMJI JEEJEEBHOY …RESPONDENT(S)

(D) THROUGH HIS LR

J U D G M E N T

J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :

Leave granted.

2.This appeal arises from an order passed by a

learned single Judge of the High Court of Judicature

at Bombay dated 09.07.2019 in Civil Application No.

1494 of 2019 filed in Writ Petition No. 2307 of 1993 by

which the High Court declined to condone the delay of

12 years and 158 days in filing the application for

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restoration of the Writ Petition No. 2307 of 1993

referred to above which came to be dismissed for

non-prosecution vide order dated 10.10.2006.

3.The facts giving rise to this appeal may be

summarized as under.

4.The suit property bearing S. No. 402, Bungalow

No. 15A, situated at Staveley Road, Pune Cantonment,

Pune–1 was leased by the respondent in favour of the

appellants on 09.03.1951.

5.As the appellants committed breach of the terms of

the lease deed, the respondent herein instituted civil

suit bearing No. 2599 of 1981 before the Court of the

4

th

Additional Small Causes Judge, Pune for the

recovery of the possession of the suit property &

arrears towards the rent.

6.On 02.05.1987, the suit came to be allowed and

the final decree came to be passed in the following

terms:

2

“ORDER

1) The plaintiffs are entitled to possession of

the suit premises.

2) The defendant shall deliver vacant and

peaceful possession of the suit premises to

the plaintiffs or before 30.6.1987.

3) The defendants do pay by way of

damages and mesne profits and notice

charges Rs. 17,383/- to the plaintiffs.

4) The defendant shall also pay future

mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 316/- per

month from the date of filing of the suit till

recovery of possession of the suit premises

under order 20 rule 12(1) of CPC.

5) The defendant shall pay costs of this suit

to the plaintiffs and shall bear their own.”

7.The appellants herein challenged the judgment

and decree referred to above by preferring Civil Appeal

bearing No. 850 of 1987 in the Court of the District

Judge, Pune. The appeal filed by the appellants herein

came to be dismissed vide the judgment and order

dated 29.08.1992 passed by the 8

th

Additional District

Judge, Pune.

8.The judgment and order passed by the first

appellate court dismissing the appeal referred to above

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came to be challenged by the appellants herein by filing

the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 before the High Court of

Bombay invoking its supervisory jurisdiction under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

9.On 10.10.2006, the Petition No. 2307 of 1993

referred to above came to be dismissed for non-

prosecution. The order reads thus:

“Coram : D.G. Deshpande – J.) on 10.10.06

AND UPON hearing Shri. D.S. Mhaispurkar

for Respondent Nos. 1A to 1C and 2 this

Court has passed the following order:-

"None for the Petitioners. Mr. D.S.

Mhaispurkar for the Respondents 1A to C

and 2.

Petition is dismissed. Rule discharged.

Interim order is vacated.

IT IS ACCORDINGLY ordered that this writ

petition is disposed of as per the

accompanying court's order. The directions

given in the court's order hereinabove shall

be carried out and complied with

scrupulously.

It is accordingly ordered that this order be

punctually observed and carried into

execution by concerned.”

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10.On 26.11.2013 the respondent herein filed

Execution Petition bearing No. 16 of 2014. The

appellants herein were served with the notice in the

execution proceedings on 18.03.2016 by the Executing

Court.

11.On 20.08.2018, the appellants herein filed an

application seeking to set aside the order passed by the

Executing Court. On 30.10.2018 the Executing Court

set aside the said order referred to above.

12.On 12.04.2019, the appellants herein filed Civil

Application No. 1294 of 2019 seeking restoration of the

Petition No. 2307 of 1993 referred to above and for

condonation of delay of 12 years and 158 days in

preferring such restoration application.

13.On 09.07.2019, a learned single Judge of the High

Court vide the impugned order declined to condone the

delay of 12 years and 158 days in filing the restoration

application.

14.In view of the aforesaid, the appellants are here

before this Court with the present appeal.

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Submissions on behalf of the appellants

15.Mr. R. Venkataramani, the learned Attorney

General for India appearing for the appellants

vehemently submitted that he has a very good case on

merits and considering the merits alone, the delay of

12 years and 158 days deserves to be condoned. The

learned Attorney General laid much emphasis on the

fact that the suit property is situated within the Pune

cantonment which is under the ownership of the Union

of India and the same was held by the respondent

herein on old grant lease and in such circumstances,

according to the learned Attorney General, the

respondent in his capacity as a private party should

not be permitted to deprive the Government of its land

after having admitted that the super structure alone

belongs to him and that the land belongs to the

Government.

16.On the aspect of delay of 12 years and 158 days in

filing the restoration application before the High Court,

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the learned Attorney General has no explanation worth

to offer.

Submissions on behalf of the respondent

17.Mr. Sudhanshu Chaudhari, the learned senior

counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other

hand, vehemently opposed the present appeal and

submitted that no error not to speak of any error of law

could be said to have been committed by the High

Court in passing the impugned order.

18.He submitted that no sufficient case worth the

name has been assigned by the appellants for the

purpose of getting such a long and inordinate delay of

more than 12 years condoned for filing the restoration

application.

19.In such circumstances referred to above, the

learned counsel prayed that there being no merit worth

the name in the present appeal, the same may be

dismissed.

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Analysis

20.Having heard the learned counsel appearing for

the parties and having gone through the materials on

record, the only question that falls for our

consideration is whether the High Court committed

any error in passing the impugned order?

21. When this matter was heard for the first time by

this Bench, we brought to the notice of the learned

Attorney General something very relevant as observed

by the High Court in para 18 of its impugned order.

Para 18 of the impugned order reads thus:

“18. During the course of hearing, I

suggested Mr. Singh that in case the

defendants are ready and willing to

handover possession of the suit property to

the respondents, the Court will consider

restoring the Petition to its original position.

The respondents in turn will give

undertaking to the effect that in case the

defendants succeed in the Petition, before

approaching the Apex Court, they will

handover possession of the suit property to

the defendants. Upon taking instructions,

Mr. Singh submitted that defendants are not

ready and willing to handover possession of

the suit property. In view of the aforesaid

discussion, no case is made out for

condoning the delay.”

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22.Thus, it appears that the High Court made a

reasonable suggestion to the appellants that if the

possession of the suit property is handed over to the

respondent, then probably the Court may consider

restoring the Petition No. 2307 of 1993 which came to

be dismissed for default on 10.10.2006. The High

Court noted as above that the learned counsel

appearing for the appellants declined to hand over the

possession of the suit property to the respondent

herein. We reiterated the very same suggestion before

the learned Attorney General that if the appellants are

ready and willing to hand over the suit property to the

respondent, then, despite there being a long and

inordinate delay, we may consider condoning the same

and remanding the matter back to the High Court so

that the High Court may be in a position to hear the

matter on its own merits. However, the learned

Attorney General, after taking instructions from his

clients, regretted his inability to persuade the

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appellants to hand over the possession of the suit

property to the respondent.

23.In such circumstances referred to above, we were

left with no other option but to call upon the learned

Attorney General to make submissions as to why we

should look into only the merits of the matter and

condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days.

24.In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very

clear that we are not going to look into the merits of

the matter as long as we are not convinced that

sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of

such a long and inordinate delay.

25.It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private

party or a State or Union of India when it comes to

condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the

litigant chooses to approach the court long after the

lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant

provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and

say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by

the delay being condoned. This litigation between the

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parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.

Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the

respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his

decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone

the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask

the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal

proceedings.

26.The length of the delay is a relevant matter which

the court must take into consideration while

considering whether the delay should be condoned or

not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants,

it appears that they want to fix their own period of

limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law

has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held

that a party has lost his right to have the matter

considered on merits because of his own inaction for a

long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay

and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be

heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to

be preferred as against the technical considerations.

While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the

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court must not start with the merits of the main

matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the

bona fides of the explanation offered by the party

seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause

assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other

side is equally balanced that the court may bring into

aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of

condoning the delay.

27.We are of the view that the question of limitation is

not merely a technical consideration. The rules of

limitation are based on the principles of sound public

policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the

‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the

respondent for indefinite period of time to be

determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

28.At this stage, we would like to quote few

observations made by the High Court in its impugned

order pointing towards lack of bona fides on the part

of the appellants. The observations are as under:-

“9. A perusal of paragraph 4 extracted

hereinabove shows that on oath, solemn

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statement is made that notice of Darkhast

No.16 of 2014 for execution of the decree

issued by the executing Court was received

by the Department on 25.02.2019. As

against this, in paragraph 3 of the

additional affidavit dated 04.07.2019 made

by Rajendra Rajaram Pawar, it is stated

that the averments made in paragraph 4 as

regards service of Darkhast on 25.02.2019

is factually incorrect. Notice of Darkhast No.

16 of 2014 was received by the defendants

on 18.03.2016. The error in the application

is out of inadvertence for which he tendered

unconditional apology. It is further stated

that inadvertent mistake on facts as to

knowledge of execution proceedings was

purely because of oversight in the light of

possibilities of issuance of possession

warrant by the executing court and

requirement of expeditious urgency of

moving before this Court to save the

proceeding in litigation since 1981 which

otherwise would have got frustrated. He

stated that the same is nothing beyond

human error.

x x x x

12. The assertions made in paragraph 4 are

bereft of any particulars and are totally

vague. In fact the solemn statement made in

paragraph 4 that notice of Darkhast for

execution of the decree issued by the

executing Court was received by the

Department on 25.02.2019, to put it mildly,

is incorrect statement. In view of paragraph

3 of the additional affidavit dated

04.07.2019 made by Rajendra Rajaram

Pawar, it is evident that notice of Darkhast

was received by the defendants on

18.03.2016. It is material to note that no

particulars are given as to when the

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Department sought legal opinion. There is

also no explanation as to why Department

did not instruct lawyer in the High Court to

apply for restoration of the Petition and why

the Department defended execution

proceedings. It is worthwhile to note that

execution proceedings were filed by the

respondents only because Writ Petition was

dismissed. If the Writ Petition was restored,

automatically the execution proceedings

would have been stayed by the executing

Court. Instead of adopting appropriate

proceedings, the defendants unnecessarily

went on defending the execution

proceedings. In paragraph 4(b) though it is

stated that Department was regularly

following up with its panel lawyer till 2003,

this statement is also not substantiated by

producing any document. Even if I accept

that the Department was regularly following

up with its panel lawyer till 2003, there is

no explanation worth the name as to why

the Department did not follow up the matter

between 2003 and 2006 when the Petition

was dismissed in default. That apart,

equally, there is no explanation as to why

no follow up action was taken by the

officers between 2006 and 2016 when

Department acquired knowledge about

dismissal of Writ Petition on 18.03.2016.

13. It is no doubt true that while

considering the application for condonation

of delay, the expression ‘sufficient cause’

has to be liberally construed. It, however,

does not mean that without making any

sufficient cause, the Court will condone the

delay regardless of the length of the delay.

In the present case, the delay is of 12 years

and 158 days. A perusal of the application

as also the additional affidavit hardly

indicates any sufficient cause for condoning

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the unpardonable delay of 12 years and

158 days.”

29. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited

v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation ,

(2010) 5 SCC 459, this Court rejected the application

for condonation of delay of 4 years in filing an

application to set aside an exparte decree on the

ground that the explanation offered for condonation of

delay is found to be not satisfied.

30. In Postmaster General and others v. Living

Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, this Court,

while dismissing the application for condonation of

delay of 427 days in filing the Special Leave Petition,

held that condonation of delay is not an exception and

it should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the

government departments. In that case, this Court held

that unless the Department has reasonable and

acceptable reason for the delay and there was bona

fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual

explanation that the file was kept pending for several

months/years due to considerable degree of procedural

15

red tape in the process cannot be accepted. In Para

Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29 respectively, this Court

dealt with the scope of ‘sufficient cause’ and held as

follows:

“25. We have already extracted the reasons

as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn

by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air

Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is

relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the

Department has itself mentioned and is

aware of the date of the judgment of the

Division Bench of the High Court in Office of

the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India

Ltd. [(2009) 8 AD 201 (Del)] as 11-9-2009.

Even according to the deponent, their

counsel had applied for the certified copy of

the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the

same was received by the Department on

the very same day. There is no explanation

for not applying for the certified copy of the

impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at

least within a reasonable time. The fact

remains that the certified copy was applied

for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of

nearly four months.

26. In spite of affording another opportunity

to file better affidavit by placing adequate

material, neither the Department nor the

person-in-charge has filed any explanation

for not applying the certified copy within the

prescribed period. The other dates

mentioned in the affidavit which we have

already extracted, clearly show that there

was delay at every stage and except

mentioning the dates of receipt of the file

and the decision taken, there is no

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explanation as to why such delay had

occasioned. Though it was stated by the

Department that the delay was due to

unavoidable circumstances and genuine

difficulties, the fact remains that from day

one the Department or the person/persons

concerned have not evinced diligence in

prosecuting the matter to this Court by

taking appropriate steps.

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)

concerned were well aware or conversant

with the issues involved including the

prescribed period of limitation for taking up

the matter by way of filing a special leave

petition in this Court. They cannot claim

that they have a separate period of

limitation when the Department was

possessed with competent persons familiar

with court proceedings. In the absence of

plausible and acceptable explanation, we

are posing a question why the delay is to be

condoned mechanically merely because the

Government or a wing of the Government is

a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that

in a matter of condonation of delay when

there was no gross negligence or deliberate

inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal

concession has to be adopted to advance

substantial justice, we are of the view that

in the facts and circumstances, the

Department cannot take advantage of

various earlier decisions. The claim on

account of impersonal machinery and

inherited bureaucratic methodology of

making several notes cannot be accepted in

view of the modern technologies being used

and available. The law of limitation

undoubtedly binds everybody, including the

Government.

17

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform

all the government bodies, their agencies

and instrumentalities that unless they have

reasonable and acceptable explanation for

the delay and there was bona fide effort,

there is no need to accept the usual

explanation that the file was kept pending

for several months/years due to

considerable degree of procedural red tape

in the process. The government departments

are under a special obligation to ensure that

they perform their duties with diligence and

commitment. Condonation of delay is an

exception and should not be used as an

anticipated benefit for the government

departments. The law shelters everyone

under the same light and should not be

swirled for the benefit of a few.”

31.In the case of Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs v.

State of Andhra Pradesh & others , (2011) 4 SCC

363, this Court made the following observations:

“20. In N. Balakrishnan, [(1998) 7 SCC 123]

this Court again reiterated the principle

that: (SCC p. 127, para 11)

“11. Rules of limitation are not

meant to destroy the rights of

parties. They are meant to see that

[the] parties do not resort to dilatory

tactics, but seek their remedy

promptly.”

21 to 27.........

18

28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or

rationale, which could have impelled the

High Court to condone the delay after

holding the same to be unjustifiable. The

concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice

oriented approach”, “substantial justice”

cannot be employed to jettison the

substantial law of limitation. Especially, in

cases where the court concludes that there

is no justification for the delay. In our

opinion, the approach adopted by the High

Court tends to show the absence of judicial

balance and restraint, which a Judge is

required to maintain whilst adjudicating

any lis between the parties. We are rather

pained to notice that in this case, not being

satisfied with the use of mere intemperate

language, the High Court resorted to blatant

sarcasms.

29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or

extravagant language in a judgment has

been repeatedly disapproved by this Court

in a number of cases. Whilst considering

applications for condonation of delay under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do

not enjoy unlimited and unbridled

discretionary powers. All discretionary

powers, especially judicial powers, have to

be exercised within reasonable bounds,

known to the law. The discretion has to be

exercised in a systematic manner informed

by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or

predilections cannot and should not form

the basis of exercising discretionary

powers.”

19

32. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by LRs. v.

Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project &

others, (2008) 17 SCC 448, this Court held as follows:

“19. In Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of

Gujarat [(1981) 1 SCC 495 : 1981 SCC (Cri)

184] this Court observed: (SCC p. 497, para

6)

“6. … it is true that a party is

entitled to wait until the last day of

limitation for filing an appeal. But

when it allows limitation to expire

and pleads sufficient cause for not

filing the appeal earlier, the

sufficient cause must establish that

because of some event or

circumstance arising before

limitation expired it was not

possible to file the appeal within

time. No event or circumstance

arising after the expiry of limitation

can constitute sufficient cause.”

(emphasis supplied)

This judgment squarely applies to the facts

in hand.

x x x x

21. Shri Mohta, learned Senior Counsel

relying on the decision of this Court in N.

Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998)

7 SCC 123] submitted that length of delay is

no matter and acceptability of explanation

is the only criterion. It was submitted that if

the explanation offered does not smack of

mala fides or it is not put forth as a part of

dilatory tactics, the court must show utmost

consideration to the suitor. The very said

20

decision upon which reliance has been

placed holds that the law of limitation fixes

a lifespan for every legal remedy for the

redress of the legal injury suffered.

Unending period for launching the remedy

may lead to unending uncertainty and

consequential anarchy. The law of limitation

is thus founded on public policy. The

decision does not lay down that a lethargic

litigant can leisurely choose his own time in

preferring appeal or application as the case

may be. On the other hand, in the said

judgment it is said that court should not

forget the opposite party altogether. It was

observed: (SCC p. 128, para 11)

“11. … It is enshrined in the

maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis

litium (it is for the general welfare

that a period be put to litigation).

Rules of limitation are not meant to

destroy the rights of the parties.

They are meant to see that parties

do not resort to dilatory tactics but

seek their remedy promptly. The

idea is that every legal remedy must

be kept alive for a legislatively fixed

period of time.”

22. In Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR

1962 SC 361] this Court held that: (AIR pp.

363-65)

“In construing Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, it is relevant to bear in

mind two important considerations.

The first consideration is that the

expiration of period of limitation

prescribed for making an appeal

gives rise to right in favour of the

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decree-holder to treat the decree as

binding between the parties and this

legal right which has accrued to the

decree-holder by lapse of time should

not be light-heartedly disturbed. The

other consideration which cannot be

ignored is that if sufficient cause of

excusing delay is shown discretion is

given to the court to condone the

delay and admit the appeal. It is

further necessary to emphasise that

even if the sufficient cause has been

shown a party is not entitled to the

condonation of delay in question as a

matter of right. The proof of a

sufficient cause is a condition

precedent for the exercise of the

discretionary jurisdiction vested in

the court by Section 5. This aspect of

the matter naturally introduces the

consideration of all relevant facts and

it is at this stage the diligence of the

party or its bona fides may fall for

consideration.” (emphasis supplied)

23. On the facts and in the circumstances,

we are of the opinion that the respondent

beneficiary was not diligent in availing the

remedy of appeal. The averments made in

the application seeking condonation of

delay in filing appeals do not show any

acceptable cause much less sufficient cause

to exercise courts' discretion in its favour.”

33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing

Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy &

Others, (2013) 12 SCC 649, this Court made the

following observations:

22

“21. From the aforesaid authorities the

principles that can broadly be culled out

are:

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal,

pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic

approach while dealing with an application

for condonation of delay, for the courts are

not supposed to legalise injustice but are

obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should

be understood in their proper spirit,

philosophy and purpose regard being had to

the fact that these terms are basically

elastic and are to be applied in proper

perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being

paramount and pivotal the technical

considerations should not be given undue

and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to

deliberate causation of delay but, gross

negligence on the part of the counsel or

litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a

party seeking condonation of delay is a

significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that

adherence to strict proof should not affect

public justice and cause public mischief

because the courts are required to be

vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate

there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach

has to encapsulate the conception of

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reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a

totally unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between

inordinate delay and a delay of short

duration or few days, for to the former

doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to

the latter it may not be attracted. That

apart, the first one warrants strict approach

whereas the second calls for a liberal

delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and

attitude of a party relating to its inaction or

negligence are relevant factors to be taken

into consideration. It is so as the

fundamental principle is that the courts are

required to weigh the scale of balance of

justice in respect of both parties and the

said principle cannot be given a total go by

in the name of liberal approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is

concocted or the grounds urged in the

application are fanciful, the courts should

be vigilant not to expose the other side

unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no

one gets away with fraud,

misrepresentation or interpolation by taking

recourse to the technicalities of law of

limitation.

21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to

be carefully scrutinised and the approach

should be based on the paradigm of judicial

discretion which is founded on objective

reasoning and not on individual perception.

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21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an

entity representing a collective cause should

be given some acceptable latitude.

22. To the aforesaid principles we may add

some more guidelines taking note of the

present day scenario. They are:

22.1. (a) An application for condonation of

delay should be drafted with careful

concern and not in a haphazard manner

harbouring the notion that the courts are

required to condone delay on the bedrock of

the principle that adjudication of a lis on

merits is seminal to justice dispensation

system.

22.2. (b) An application for condonation of

delay should not be dealt with in a routine

manner on the base of individual

philosophy which is basically subjective.

22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be

laid down regard being had to the concept

of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort

for achieving consistency and collegiality of

the adjudicatory system should be made as

that is the ultimate institutional motto.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to

perceive delay as a non-serious matter and,

hence, lackadaisical propensity can be

exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires

to be curbed, of course, within legal

parameters.”

34.In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the

conclusion that the High Court committed no error much

25

less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even

otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory

jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

35.In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been

said that delay should not be excused as a matter of

generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause

prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed

to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting

the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not

satisfied in this case.

36.For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is

hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

37.Pending application, if any, shall also stand disposed

of accordingly.

………………………………..J.

( ANIRUDDHA BOSE )

NEW DELHI; ………………………………..J.

APRIL 03, 2024 ( J.B. PARDIWALA )

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