criminal law, evidence law
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State Of Chhattisgarh Vs. Sanjay Kumar Singh Rathore

  Chhattisgarh High Court WA No. 2 of 2026
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2026:CGHC:1863-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WA No. 2 of 2026

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Fisheries,

Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

2 - The Director Fisheries Indrawati Bhawan, 4th Floor (B Block), Naya Raipur, Distt.

Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

3 - The Dy. Director Fisheries Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, Distt. Bastar, Chhattisgarh.

... appellant (s)

versus

1 - Sanjay Kumar Singh Rathore S/o Late Shri Jagatpal Singh Rathore Aged About

48 Years R/o Danteshwari Ward No. 20, Besides Pump House, Jagdalpur, Distt.

Bastar, Chhattisgarh, 494001.

... Respondent(s)

For appellant (s)/ State : Mr. Prasun Bhadhuri, Dy. Advocate General

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

Order on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

13/01/2026

1.Heard Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhadhuri, learned Deputy Advocate

General for the appellant/State on I.A. No.02 of 2026, which is

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an application for condonation of delay of 284 days in preferring

the appeal.

2.Learned Dy. Advocate General appearing for the

State/appellants submits that the present writ appeal has been

preferred by the appellant/ State against the judgment dated

09.01.2025 passed in WPS No. 3212 of 2018 (Sanjay Kumar

Singh Rathore Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others) by the

Hon’ble Single Bench of this Court, whereby the Hon’ble Court

was pleased to quash the termination orders dated 01.12.1997

and 03.01.1998 as well as the appellate order dated 27.11.2017

and directed reinstatement of the respondent with consequential

benefits. It is submitted that after passing of the impugned order,

for filing of the present appeal, a permission has been granted

by the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Mantralaya,

Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Dist- Raipur, vide dated

08.10.2025 and OIC has been appointed by the Department

concerned in the matter for filing of the instant writ appeal on

behalf of the appellant/ State vide order dated 10.10.2025.

Thereafter, the case was placed before the Hon’ble Advocate

General on 24.11.2025 and on the same day the case was

marked to the Government Advocate for drafting writ appeal

against the impugned judgment dated 09.01.2025 and

thereafter, the writ appeal has been prepared and filed before

this court.

3.It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary

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documents and information with respect to the case, however,

some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various

departmental formalities and working of the Government

machinery because the State Government is a multi functioning

body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities

takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State

is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of

limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The instant

appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 284 days from

the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed

upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others,

(1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the

learned State counsel prays that the delay of 284 days in

preferring the petition may be condoned.

4.The question for determination before this Court is whether the

provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of

1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for

condonation of delay.

5.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster

General and others v. Living Media India Limited and

another, (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue

and held as under:-

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)

concerned were well aware or conversant

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with the issues involved including the

prescribed period of limitation for taking up

the matter by way of filing a special leave

petition in this Court. They cannot claim that

they have a separate period of limitation

when the Department was possessed with

competent persons familiar with court

proceedings. In the absence of plausible

and acceptable explanation, we are posing

a question why the delay is to be

condoned mechanically merely because

the Government or a wing of the

Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that

in a matter of condonation of delay when

there was no gross negligence or deliberate

inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal

concession has to be adopted to advance

substantial justice, we are of the view that in

the facts and circumstances, the Department

cannot take advantage of various earlier

decisions. The claim on account of

impersonal machinery and inherited

bureaucratic methodology of making

several notes cannot be accepted in view

of the modern technologies being used

and available. The law of limitation

undoubtedly binds everybody including

the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all

the government bodies, their agencies and

instrumentalities that unless they have

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reasonable and acceptable explanation for

the delay and there was bonafide effort, there

is no need to accept the usual explanation

that the file was kept pending for several

months/years due to considerable degree of

procedural red-tape in the process. The

government departments are under a special

obligation to ensure that they perform their

duties with diligence and commitment.

Condonation of delay is an exception and

should not be used as an anticipated benefit

for government departments. The law

shelters everyone under the same light and

should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no

proper explanation offered by the Department

for the delay except mentioning of various

dates, according to us, the Department has

miserably failed to give any acceptable and

cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a

huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are

liable to be dismissed on the ground of

delay.”

6.Recently, a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary,

2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some

directions and observed as follows:-

“5. The legal position is that where a

case has been presented in the Court

beyond limitation, the petitioner has to

explain the Court as to what was the

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"sufficient cause" which means an

adequate and enough reason which

prevented him to approach the Court

within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.

Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC

1260, it was held by this Court that

even though limitation may harshly

affect the rights of a party, it has to be

applied with all its rigour when

prescribed by statute. A reference was

also made to the decision of this Court

in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023

SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as

follows:

"13. This Court in the case of

Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition

Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while

rejecting an application for

condonation of delay for lack of

sufficient cause has concluded in

Paragraph 15 as follows:

“15. The law on the issue can be

summarised to the effect that where a

case has been presented in the court

beyond limitation, the applicant has to

explain the court as to what was the

“sufficient cause” which means an

adequate and enough reason which

prevented him to approach the court

within limitation. In case a party is

found to be negligent, or for want of

bona fide on his part in the facts and

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circumstances of the case, or found to

have not acted diligently or remained

inactive, there cannot be a justified

ground to condone the delay. No court

could be justified in condoning such an

inordinate delay by imposing any

condition whatsoever. The application

is to be decided only within the

parameters laid down by this Court in

regard to the condonation of delay. In

case there was no sufficient cause to

prevent a litigant to approach the court

on time condoning the delay without

any justification, putting any condition

whatsoever, amounts to passing an

order in violation of the statutory

provisions and it tantamounts to

showing utter disregard to the

legislature.”

14. Therefore, we are of the

considered opinion that the High Court

did not commit any mistake in

dismissing the delay condonation

application of the present appellant."

Thus, it is crystal clear that the

discretion to condone the delay has to

be exercised judiciously based on facts

and circumstances of each case and

that, the expression 'sufficient cause'

cannot be liberally interpreted, if

negligence, inaction or lack of bona

fides is attributed to the party.

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5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir

Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his

legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein,

one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a

member, after referring to various

decisions on the issue, it was in

unequivocal terms observed by this

Court that delay should not be excused

as a matter of generosity and

rendering substantial justice is not to

cause prejudice to the opposite party.

The relevant passage of the same is

profitably extracted below:

“24. In the aforesaid circumstances,

we made it very clear that we are not

going to look into the merits of the

matter as long as we are not

convinced that sufficient cause has

been made out for condonation of such

a long and inordinate delay.

25. It hardly matters whether a litigant

is a private party or a State or Union of

India when it comes to condoning the

gross delay of more than 12 years. If

the litigant chooses to approach the

court long after the lapse of the time

prescribed under the relevant

provisions of the law, then he cannot

turn around and say that no prejudice

would be caused to either side by the

delay being condoned. This litigation

between the parties started sometime

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in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43

years have elapsed. However, till date

the respondent has not been able to

reap the fruits of his decree. It would

be a mockery of justice if we condone

the delay of 12 years and 158 days

and once again ask the respondent to

undergo the rigmarole of the legal

proceedings.

26. The length of the delay is a

relevant matter which the court must

take into consideration while

considering whether the delay should

be condoned or not. From the tenor of

the approach of the appellants, it

appears that they want to fix their own

period of limitation for instituting the

proceedings for which law has

prescribed a period of limitation. Once

it is held that a party has lost his right

to have the matter considered on

merits because of his own inaction for

a long, it cannot be presumed to be

non-deliberate delay and in such

circumstances of the case, he cannot

be heard to plead that the substantial

justice deserves to be preferred as

against the technical considerations.

While considering the plea for

condonation of delay, the court must

not start with the merits of the main

matter. The court owes a duty to first

ascertain the bona fides of the

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explanation offered by the party

seeking condonation. It is only if the

sufficient cause assigned by the litigant

and the opposition of the other side is

equally balanced that the court may

bring into aid the merits of the matter

for the purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the

question of limitation is not merely a

technical consideration. The rules of

limitation are based on the principles of

sound public policy and principles of

equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword

of Damocles’ hanging over the head of

the respondent for indefinite period of

time to be determined at the whims

and fancies of the appellants.

xxx xxx xxx

34. In view of the aforesaid, we have

reached to the conclusion that the High

Court committed no error much less

any error of law in passing the

impugned order. Even otherwise, the

High Court was exercising its

supervisory jurisdiction under Article

227 of the Constitution of India.

35. In a plethora of decisions of this

Court, it has been said that delay

should not be excused as a matter of

generosity. Rendering substantial

justice is not to cause prejudice to the

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opposite party. The appellants have

failed to prove that they were

reasonably diligent in prosecuting the

matter and this vital test for condoning

the delay is not satisfied in this case.

36. For all the foregoing reasons, this

appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs.”

Applying the above legal proposition to

the facts of the present case, we are of

the opinion that the High Court

correctly refused to condone the delay

and dismissed the appeal by observing

that such inordinate delay was not

explained satisfactorily, no sufficient

cause was shown for the same, and no

plausible reason was put forth by the

State. Therefore, we are inclined to

reject this petition at the threshold.

6. At the same time, we cannot

simply brush aside the delay

occurred in preferring the second

appeal, due to callous and

lackadaisical attitude on the part of

the officials functioning in the State

machinery. Though the Government

adopts systematic approach in

handling the legal issues and

preferring the

petitions/applications/appeals well

within the time, due to the fault on

the part of the officials in merely

communicating the information on

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time, huge revenue loss will be

caused to the Government

exchequer. The present case is one

such case, wherein, enormous

delay of 1788 days occasioned in

preferring the second appeal due to

the lapses on the part of the officials

functioning under the State, though

valuable Government lands were

involved. Therefore, we direct the

State to streamline the machinery

touching the legal issues, offering

legal opinion, filing of cases before

the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the

responsibility on the officer(s)

concerned, and penalize the

officer(s), who is/are responsible for

delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any,

to the value of the loss caused to

the Government. Such direction will

have to be followed by all the States

scrupulously.

7. There is one another aspect of the

matter which we must not ignore or

overlook. Over a period of time, we

have noticed that whenever there is a

plea for condonation of delay be it at

the instance of a private litigant or

State the delay is sought to be

explained right from the time, the

limitation starts and if there is a delay

of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till

the end of the same. For example if

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the period of limitation is 90 days then

the party seeking condonation has to

explain why it was unable to institute

the proceedings within that period of

limitation. What events occurred after

the 91st day till the last is of no

consequence. The court is required to

consider what came in the way of the

party that it was unable to file it

between the 1st day and the 90th day.

It is true that a party is entitled to wait

until the last day of limitation for filing

an appeal. But when it allows the

limitation to expire and pleads

sufficient cause for not filing the appeal

earlier, the sufficient cause must

establish that because of some event

or circumstance arising before the

limitation expired it was not possible to

file the appeal within time. No event or

circumstance arising after the expiry of

limitation can constitute such sufficient

cause. There may be events or

circumstances subsequent to the

expiry of limitation which may further

delay the filing of the appeal. But that

the limitation has been allowed to

expire without the appeal being filed

must be traced to a cause arising

within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit

Singh Thakur Singh and Another v.

State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).”

7.Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present

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case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)

and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that

Government departments are under a special obligation to

discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.

Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot

be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by

Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon

all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage

upon a select few.

8.Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of

Shivamma (dead) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &

Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts

ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of

State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra

cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-

authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity

and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of

the apathy and pangs of a private litigant.

9.Upon considering the matter in its entirety and also applying the

well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case, we

find that the State has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory

explanation for the delay in filing the present appeal. The only

reason cited is that the Law & Legislative Affairs Department,

Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had

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forwarded a proposal to the Office of the Advocate General for

initiating an appeal against the impugned order dated

09.01.2025. Thereafter, the case was processed, and the

present appeal was ultimately filed. However, this sequence of

events, lacking in specificity or justifiable cause, does not

amount to a cogent or acceptable explanation. Thus, the State

has miserably failed to demonstrate sufficient cause warranting

the condonation of an inordinate delay of 284 days.

10.Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our

discretionary power under the law to condone such extraordinary

delay. The learned counsel for the State has not been able to

establish any convincing or bona fide reason for the delay.

Therefore, there is no justification for condoning the delay of 284

days in filing the writ appeal.

11.In view of the above, the writ appeal is hereby rejected on

the ground of delay and laches.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

sagrika

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