As per case facts, the State appealed against the acquittal of respondents accused of offenses under the Indian Penal Code and Bombay Police Act, following a fatal knife assault on ...
R/CR.A/1040/2002 JUDGMENT DATED: 22/10/2026
(GJHC240303002002)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1040 of 2002
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
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STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
ANILSINH DIPSINH CHAUHAN & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR ROHAN RAVAL APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR DK DESAI(278) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2
MS DARSHANA TRIVEDI(2388) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 22/10/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI)
1.Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of
acquittal dated 16/08/2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Ahmedabad Rural in Sessions Case No.57 of 2000 acquitting the
respondents- accused from the charge of offence punishable under
Sections 504, 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 135
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of the Bombay Police Act, the appellant – State has preferred the present
appeal under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(for short “the Code”).
2.The brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeals, are as
under:
2.1.The prosecution case in brief is that the complainant is residing at
village Kolvada, district: Gandhinagar with his family and he is earning
his livelihood by way of driving rickshaw. That on 21.8.2000 complainant
came to his village and at about 9 O'clock, he was in the Hanuman
Mandir situated in the same village. At that time, his uncle's son
Arvindsinh Waghela came there running and informed him that the
brother of the complainant Dilipsinh had a quarrel with the accused at
three road Kolwada and that accused Anilsinh had given knife blows to
Dilipsinh. He, further, informed the complainant that Dilipsinh is
admitted in the Civil Hospital, Gandhinagar. The complainant, therefore,
rushed to Gandhinagar, Civil Hospital, where his brother informed him
that he was traveling in the rickshaw of Vanrajsinh and that rickshaw
collided with the rickshaw of accused No.1. Anilsinh. Rickshaw of
Anilsinh had some damage and, therefore, in order to avoid quarrel
Dilipsinh told Anilsinh that he would pay the repairing charges of the
Rickshaw. However, while the deceased Dilipsinh was standing near
three road of Kolvada, the accused came to him and started quarreling.
That accused No.3 Pravinsinh Hamtuji Chauhan and the deceased
Champaksinh alias Bhurio Dipsinh Chauhan caught hold of the deceased
and Anilsinh Dipsinh Chauhan inflicted knife blows on the stomach and
hand of the deceased. Thereafter, the deceased became unconscious. He
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was then shifted to Ahmedabad Civil Hospital where he died during
treatment. The complaint was filed with Pethapur Police Station and the
Police after investigation chargesheeted the accused. However, the
original accused No.2 Champaksinh alias Bhurio Dipsinh Chauhan
expired during the pendency of the trial and, therefore, the case against
him is abated.
3.In pursuance of the complaint lodged by the complainant,
investigating agency recorded statements of the witnesses, collected
relevant evidence in form of medical evidence and drawn various
Panchnamas and other relevant evidence for the purpose of proving the
offence. After having found material against the respondent accused,
charge-sheet came to be filed in the Court of learned JMFC, as said Court
lacked jurisdiction to try the offence, it committed the case to the
Sessions Court provided under section 209 of the Code.
4.Upon committal of the case to the Sessions Court, learned Sessions
Judge framed charge against the respondent accused for the aforesaid
offence. The respondent accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be
tried
5.In order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined
various witnesses and also produced various documentary as well as oral
evidence before the learned Sessions Court, more particularly described
in para No.5 of the impugned judgment and order.
6.On conclusion of evidence on the part of the prosecution, the
Sessions Court put various incriminating circumstances appearing in the
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evidence to the respondent accused so as to obtain his explanation/answer
as provided u/s 313 of the Code. In the further statement, the respondent
accused denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him as
false and further stated that he is innocent and false case has been filed
against him. After hearing both the sides and after analysis of evidence
adduced by the prosecution, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the
respondent accused of the offences, for which he was tried, as the
prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
7.We have heard learned APP for the appellant – State and learned
Advocate Mr.D K Desai assisted with Ms. Darshana Trivedi, learned
Advocate appearing for the respondents – accused and have minutely
examined the documentary evidence provided to us by learned Advocate
during the course of hearing.
8.Learned APP appearing for the appellant – State would submit that
the learned Sessions Court has failed to appreciate the evidence of the
important witnesses who have deposed in favour of the prosecution and
nothing contrary has come on record to disbelieve their evidence. He
would further submit that though there is an eye-witness to the incident in
question in the form of deposition of PW – Vanrajsinh examined at
Exh.48; however in spite of the fact that nothing has come on record to
disbelieve his evidence, the learned Sessions Court has totally disbelieved
the case of prosecution.
8.1Learned APP would further submit that the evidence of the
witnesses examined before the Court have specifically deposed as to how
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and in what manner the entire incident took place and narrated the actual
event prior to commission of offence and described the role of each of the
accused and the manner in which the assault was made which resulted
into death of the deceased. He would submit that the learned Sessions
Court has not believed those aspect merely on the basis of some
omissions and contradictions which would not be relevant and not proved
fatal to the case of prosecution.
8.2Learned APP would further submit that though the scientific
evidence in the form report of the FSL and the blood group found on the
weapon recovered used in commission of the crime in question and the
muddamal clothes of the accused where-upon the blood was found are of
the same group and there is no reasons to disbelieve the scientific
evidence which would link the accused with the crime. However the
learned Sessions Court has not considered this piece of evidence and has
acquitted the accused while overlooking to the factum as to their
involvement.
8.3By making the above submissions, learned APP would submit to
allow the present appeal and to quash and set aside the judgment and
order of acquittal and to sentence the respondents – accused.
9.Learned Advocate appearing for the respondents-accused while
supporting the impugned judgment and order of acquittal would submit
that the learned Sessions Court after threadbare examination of the
witnesses examined before the Court has recorded the finding of
acquittal. He would further submit that the learned Sessions Court has
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found some contradictions and omission in the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses which has proved fatal to the case of prosecution
and therefore this Court may not interfere with the said finding of
acquittal.
10.Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the respective
parties and examining the facts of the case, what appears from the record
that if the evidence of the complainant – Ratansinh Rajuji Vaghela
examined at Exh.46 and the complaint produced at Exh.47 is taken into
consideration, it appears that he had no personal knowledge about the
occurrence of the incident and he was informed about the incident took
place on 21/08/2000 at about 9:00 hours in the night by Arvindsinh
Gandaji Vaghela, son of his uncle and he was not aware as to the fact of
what kind of words were used by the accused. It would be relevant to
note here that the person who informed the complainant viz., Arvindsinh
Gandaji Vaghela has not been examined before the Court and therefore
the evidence of the complainant does not get corroborated. However,
upon taking into consideration the complaint at Exhibit-47 , it appears
that when the complainant met the deceased for the first time and asked
him what had happened, the deceased replied that at about 7:00 p.m., he
was sitting in Vanrajsinh's rickshaw near the outskirts of the village when
Anilsinh Dipsinh Chauhan's rickshaw came from the opposite direction,
resulting in a collision between the two rickshaws. As a result,
Vanrajsinh’s rickshaw caused some damage. Anilsinh had an altercation
with Vanrajsinh, whereupon the deceased told Anilsinh that he should get
the rickshaw repaired and that he would bear the expenses incurred for
the repairs, thereby settling the dispute. Thereafter, while the deceased
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and Vanrajsinh were standing on the road leading to Kolvada, at about
8:30 p.m. at night accused – Anilsinh and Bhuriyo Dipsinh and
Pravinsinh Hemtuji came and quarrel was taken place. Thus, from the
facts stated in the complaint, it is established only that a verbal altercation
had taken place between the accused persons and the deceased, as well as
witness Vanrajsinh. However, it is not clearly established what abusive or
provocative words were used by the accused persons during the
altercation. Moreover, there is no clear evidence to establish whether the
words allegedly used were sufficient to provoke the deceased or
Vanrajsinh to disturb the public peace, or whether any such words were
actually uttered. The only fact established is that witness Vanrajsinh was
present at the time of the incident.
11.Now, if the deposition of prosecution witness No. 8, Vanrajsinh
Huzan Vaghela, recorded at Exhibit 48 is examined, he has deposed that
on 21/08/2000, at about 6:00 p.m., he had gone to the house of his
maternal uncle, Dilipsinh, at Kolavada, Gandhinagar, and had stayed
there for approximately one and a half hours. Thereafter, his maternal
uncle, Dilipsinh, took him in his rickshaw to Pan-masala stall near the
village outskirts. On the way, they encountered the rickshaw of Anilsinh
coming from the opposite direction. Anilsinh’s rickshaw collided with
their rickshaw, causing a minor dent. Consequently, a verbal altercation
took place, during which the deceased told Anilsinh to get the dent
repaired the following morning. He has deposed that thereafter, he and
Dilipsinh went and sat near a Pan stall on the other side of the road. At
about 8:30 p.m., Anilsinh arrived there in his rickshaw along with two
other persons. Those two persons caught hold of the deceased, while
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Anilsinh inflicted knife blows on Dilipsinh’s abdomen. When the
deceased, Dilipsinh, attempted to catch hold of the knife, he also
sustained an injury to his hand. When the witness intervened, he was
pushed forcefully, causing him to fall onto the road. He sustained minor
injuries to his right hand and leg. He has further deposed that he was
threatened with the words, “Leave this place; otherwise, I will kill you.”
Thereafter, he became frightened and went to the house. However, the
said fact has not been mentioned in his cross-examination or police
statement. It is not stated in his police statement that, when the deceased
Dilipsinh caught hold of the knife, the accused sustained an injury on his
hand, nor has it been stated in his police statement that the accused told
the deceased, “Leave this place; otherwise, I will kill you.” Further, the
witness has not stated in his police statement that, since the deceased had
sustained simple injuries, the accused threatened to kill him during his
deposition before the Court with a view to exaggerate the seriousness of
the incident, or that the deceased had sustained simple injuries and that
the deceased himself sustained an injury to his hand while attempting to
catch hold of the knife. It is thus evident that the witness appears to have
introduced this statement during his deposition before the Court.
11.1From the testimony of the aforesaid witness, it becomes clear that
the deceased, Dilipsinh , was his maternal uncle, and a close relative of
the witness. According to the testimony of this witness, when he
intervened at the time of the incident, accused Anilsinh had pushed him
forcefully, as a result of which he sustained a simple injury to his right
leg. However, upon considering the entire evidence on record, there is no
evidence to show that the said witness had undergone any medical
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treatment for the injury allegedly sustained by him or that any medical
certificate or medical record pertaining to the said injury had been
obtained. Thus, there is no corroborative evidence to establish whether
the said witness had actually sustained any injury during the incident.
Furthermore, as per the testimony of this witness, at the time of the
incident, he and the deceased, Dilipsinh, were travelling in his rickshaw
to the village outskirts to eat Pan Masala. At that time, the rickshaw
driven by accused Anilsinh collided with their rickshaw, causing damage
to the rickshaw of accused Anilsinh. Consequently, a verbal altercation
took place, during which the deceased stated that the cost of repairing for
the damage would be paid on the next morning. This indicates that the
dispute arising out of the said incident had been amicably settled between
the parties. Thus, there is reason to believe that accused Anilsinh or any
of the other accused had no motive to harbour any ill will, animosity or
grudge against the deceased.
Furthermore, at the time of the incident, the aforesaid witness,
Vanrajsinh, was driving the rickshaw. During that time, it collided with
the rickshaw of accused Anilsinh Chauhan, as a result of which the
another rickshaw got damaged. Thus, even if accused Anilsinh Chauhan
had any dispute or grievance arising out of the incident, it would naturally
have been against the said witness, Vanrajsinh. Consequently, any verbal
altercation or quarrel would also have been with the said witness. The
deceased, Dilipsinh was merely sitting in the rear portion of the rickshaw.
Thus, even if accused Anilsinh had felt any anger or harboured any ill
will, animosity, hostility or grudge on account of the damage caused to
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his rickshaw in the collision, such feelings would more naturally have
been directed towards the aforesaid witness, Vanrajsinh, who was driving
the rickshaw in which the deceased was travelling, rather than towards
the deceased, Dilipsinh, who was merely a passenger sitting in the
rickshaw. Thus, the possibility of the accused harbouring such feelings
against the deceased appears to be less probable.
12.It would be relevant to note that even if assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the deceased, Dilipsinh, had refused to pay the expenses in
the morning incurred in connection with the auto-rickshaw collision and
that, as a result, the accused had developed resentment or anger towards
him, the testimony of the aforesaid witness, Vanrajsinh Vaghela, clearly
establishes that the accused, Anilsinh, inflicted a blow on the abdomen of
the deceased, Dilipsinh, with an open knife in his hand. Thus, it clearly
emerges that accused Anilsinh inflicted more than one knife blow upon
the deceased, Dilipsinh, including a blow on his abdomen. The aforesaid
witness has further stated that when he intervened, Anilsinh pushed him,
and when he moved aside slightly, the accused again inflicted a blow
upon Dilipsinh. This testimony of witness Vanrajsinh also constitutes
evidence that accused Anilsinh inflicted more than one knife blow upon
the deceased, Dilipsinh.
13.Thus, the deceased had sustained injuries on his hands as well as an
on his abdomen. It is, therefore, apparent that the aforesaid witness,
Vanrajsinh, has attempted to make the incident more serious by deposing
that the deceased had been inflicted with more than one knife blow by
accused Anilsinh which indicates that the witness had not actually seen
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the incident and has narrated fabricated facts to support the prosecution
case. It also emerges that, although the deceased Dilipsinh was his
maternal uncle and a close relative, the witness allegedly fled from the
place of occurrence at the time of the incident. His assertion that he was
present at the place of occurrence along with the deceased and thereafter
fled from the spot appears to be unnatural and does not inspire
confidence. Even if the witness had become frightened at the time of the
incident, he would ordinarily have informed someone about the
occurrence after fleeing from the place. However, this witness did not
inform anyone about the incident. To the contrary, in his cross-
examination, the witness has clearly admitted that it is true that he
disclosed the facts of the incident to the police for the first time when the
police came to record his statement, and that he had not disclosed the
same to anyone else before that. The witness has further stated in his
cross-examination that the police recorded his statement on the next day
after the incident, i.e., on 22
nd
whereas the incident took place on
21/08/2000 at about 8:30 p.m. However, the said witness did not disclose
the facts of the incident to anyone for approximately for about 24 hours
thereafter. The conduct of the said witness appears to be unnatural,
improbable and somewhat strange. In cross-examination, the said witness
has clearly admitted that even on the next day after the incident, he did
not go to inquire about Dilipsinh. He did not make any inquiry regarding
the condition of Dilipsinh, nor did he make any attempt to inform his
relatives. He did not even make any attempt to inform the police. He has
further stated that, at the time of the incident, he did not raise any alarm
or make any attempt to call anyone. Even thereafter, he did not raise any
alarm, nor did he make any attempt to run away, etc.
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14.Thus, the conduct of the said witness also appears to be unnatural.
In such circumstances, the testimony of this witness does not appear to be
truthful or reliable. It appears that the said witness was subsequently
brought forward to support the complainant's case. Therefore, his
testimony cannot be relied upon. It would be relevant to note that
although the aforesaid witness, Vanrajsinh, claims that he was present at
the time of the incident and sustained injuries during the incident, he did
not inform anyone about the incident for nearly 24 hours. In such
circumstances, his testimony ought not to be believed.
15.PW No 2, Natuji Becharji Vaghela is examined at Exh.34. The said
witness has deposed that he resides at Kolavada and on 21/08/2000, while
he was at his house at about 9:00 p.m., the deceased’s wife, Vilasba,
called him by shouting. Upon going there, he saw the deceased,
Dilipsinh, lying in an auto-rickshaw in a blood-soaked condition. The
auto-rickshaw belonged to Jagdishsinh, who was sitting in the driver's
seat. Thereafter, the witness and Vilasba accompanied the deceased in the
said auto-rickshaw to the Civil Hospital at Gandhinagar. He has further
deposed that on the way, Vilasba asked the deceased what had happened
to him, whereupon Dilipsinh stated that, he, along with Vanrajsinh, went
in his rickshaw at the outskirts where the said rickshaw collided with Anil
Singh's rickshaw whereupon the altercation ensued. Thereafter, he went
towards the road leading to Gandhinagar and sat at the outskirts. After
some time, Anilsinh Dipsinh arrived in a rickshaw, accompanied by
Pravinsinh Haimatji, who was the brother of Anilsinh. Both of them were
known to him. They caught hold of him from both sides, and Anilsinh
stabbed him with a knife.
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15.1During cross-examination, this witness stated that he, deceased
Dilipsinh, and the complainant all resided in the same village, in the same
locality. He had known Jagdishsinh, who was associated with the
rickshaw, for a long time. During cross-examination, he stated that, at the
time of the incident, he was asleep, and when he came outside,
Jagdishsinh was standing outside the rickshaw. No conversation had
taken place between him and Jagdishsinh, nor had he asked Jagdishsinh
anything. No conversation had taken place between Jagdishsinh and
Vilasba. He had seen Dilipsinh in the rickshaw, and Dilipsinh was
bleeding profusely. His clothes had also become stained with blood.
Dilipsinh was bleeding heavily on the road as well. Before Dilipsinh was
seated in the rickshaw, Vilasba had not asked him anything, and Dilipsinh
had not told him anything at that time. Dilipsinh was telling him, “Take
me to the hospital; I will die.” His clothes had also become stained with
blood. However, neither his bloodstained clothes nor Vilasba's
bloodstained clothes had been produced before the police. He had not
informed the police about the fact that his clothes had become stained
with blood. After reaching the hospital, Vilasba and Jagdishsinh took
Dilipsinh to the doctor. He had not gone inside. He did not know whether
the doctor had asked Dilipsinh what injuries had sustained by him. In his
presence, the doctor had not asked Dilipsinh anything. Nobody had asked
him anything either, and he had not told the doctor anything. This witness
did not have any conversation whatsoever with Dilipsinh’s brother and
nor did he disclose the conversation that took place in the rickshaw to
anyone other than the police. This witness had not spoken to any other
family member. This witness was not aware that he ought to inform his
relatives about what Dilipsinh had said in the rickshaw. This witness
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returned home from the hospital at around 10:30 or 10:45 p.m. and his
wife met him at home, and the neighbours also met him . This witness
told them that the injured person had been taken away. His relatives did
not ask him anything, and no discussion regarding the incident took
place. The police came to my house to record my statement.
15.2It appears that during the cross-examination, this witness has
categorically stated that the conversation which took place in the
rickshaw was not disclosed by him to anyone except the police. In short,
the testimony of this witness does not appear to be truthful, reliable or
trustworthy. According to the testimony of this witness, the deceased, in
his presence, had narrated the incident to his wife, Vilasben, stating that,
at the time of the incident, he was sitting near the road leading towards
Gandhinagar, when Anilsinh Dipsinh, Pravinsinh and the brother of
Anilsinh arrived in a rickshaw, caught hold of him from both sides, and
Anilsinh inflicted a knife blow upon him. However, the deceased did not
disclose any such facts before Dr. K. B. Shah, who initially provided him
with medical treatment, or before Dr. Rajendra Kumar Bhagirathprasad
Joshi, who subsequently treated him at the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, or
before any other doctor who treated him during the period between his
admission to the hospital and his death. The deceased did not make even
the slightest reference before any of the doctors to the fact that accused
Anilsinh or his associates, namely, accused Pravinsinh and the brother of
Anilsinh had caused the injuries to him. On the contrary, he merely stated
that somebody had assaulted him with a knife. Thus, reasonable doubt
exists as to whether the deceased had, in fact, narrated the aforesaid facts
in the rickshaw in the presence of this witness.
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15.3Furthermore, the aforesaid witness, Natubhai Becharji Vaghela
(Exh. 34), has deposed that he was the first person to see the deceased at
the place where Jagdishsinh had stopped, in an injured and blood-soaked
condition. However, witness Natubhai Becharji Vaghela has no
knowledge whatsoever as to who brought the deceased Dilipsinh to the
said place in the rickshaw, how and for what reason Jagdishsinh brought
him there, or who inflicted the injuries upon the deceased, in what
manner, and for what reason. There is also no evidence to show that he
had discussed any of this issue with Jagdishsinh, the rickshaw driver.
Similarly, witness Natubhai Vaghela has not stated that he had any
conversation with the deceased while they were in the rickshaw. He has
deposed that the deceased spoke to his wife, Vilasba, in the rickshaw
regarding the manner in which he had sustained the injuries, and that he
had heard that conversation. However, no evidence of the deceased's
wife, Vilasba, has been adduced before the Court, nor has the rickshaw
driver, Jagdishsinh, been examined before the Court.
15.4It also appears that the deceased was taken to the Civil Hospital at
Gandhinagar and that an entry to that effect was made in the M.L.C.
Register. However, the said register mentions that the deceased had been
brought by Jagdishsinh. It does not mention that the deceased's wife,
Vilasba, or the aforesaid witness, Natubhai Becharji Vaghela, had
accompanied him. The rickshaw driver, Jagdishsinh, is neither a close
relative nor a family member of the deceased. Therefore, naturally, if the
deceased had been brought to the hospital by his wife, the M.L.C.
Register would have reflected the said fact. The witness stated that
although the deceased had sustained injuries, no bloodstained clothes,
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blood samples, or other relevant articles were collected from the place as
required. Further, no prescription or medical record was produced to
establish that witness Natuji had sustained any injury or had received
medical treatment from a doctor. This also raises a doubt as to whether,
after the incident, the deceased Dilipsinh was actually taken by the said
witness Natuji in an auto-rickshaw to the Civil Hospital at Gandhinagar,
as well as, raising a doubt as to whether witness Natuji had informed the
deceased’s wife, Vilasben, about the manner in which the incident had
occurred, or whether Natuji had heard the relevant facts from her.
16.PW No.1 – Dr. Kalpesh Bababhai Shah has been examined at
Exh.32 before whom Dilipsinh Vaghela was brought for treatment and
upon asking as to how the injury was caused, he had given the history
that injury was caused with knife. During the cross-examination, he has
deposed that patient did not mention the name of the assailant in the
history and only fact of assaulting injury with the knife has been
mentioned in the history. Thus, it would appear from the record that the
name of the assailant was not mentioned before the Doctor in the history
given by the injured.
17.Likewise, PW 14 – Dr. Rajendra Joshi has been examined before
whom the injured was referred and the same history was given by the
injured that someone had caused knife injury and did not mention the
name.
18.From the aforesaid analysis of the evidence, it clearly emerges
from the record that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond all
reasonable doubt and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses examined
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before the Court raise the doubt as to the involvement of the accused in
the commission of crime.
19.In context to consider the statement alleged to have been made by
the deceased-Dilipsinh before PW No.2-Natuji, Vilasba (wife of the
deceased) as well as Jagdishsinh, the person driving the auto-rickshaw
taking the deceased to the hospital, it would be apt to note that even at the
time when the deceased was brought before the Doctor who examined
and extended the treatment, as also the Doctor to whom the deceased was
referred for further treatment, no such statement naming the person who
inflicted a knife blow was made by the deceased before the Doctor
though the fact remains that the Doctor/s who examined and treated the
deceased cited consciousness of the deceased when brought before them;
but the deceased only stated that the injuries was caused to him with knife
and no such other fact was stated by the deceased.
20.Since as per the case of the prosecution, the deceased narrated and
described the entire set of incident before his wife – Vilasba; however to
the utter shock and surprise of this Court and for the reasons best known
to the prosecution, the wife of the deceased has not been examined by the
prosecution which otherwise speaks volume and create a shadow of doubt
on the case of the prosecution.
21.Apart from the aforesaid, even if the facts stated is considered to be
the gospel truth that the deceased made a statement to his wife – Vilasba
in presence of PW No.2 – Natuji while going to hospital in the auto-
rickshaw which belonged to Jagdishbhai, the said rickshaw driver has
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(GJHC240303002002)
also not been examined by the prosecution who can be said to be the best
witness, at least to throw the light on the case of the prosecution.
However, again the non-examination of the said auto-rickshaw driver for
the reasons bets known to the prosecution proved fatal to the genesis of
the very incident taking the deceased to the hospital as claimed by the
PW No.2 and the entries made by the Doctor in the Register showing that
the deceased was brought by Jagdish Chhatrasinh and no such reference
as to the deceased accompanied with his wife and PW No.2 – Natuji was
made in the said Register renders the entire story doubtful which has
rightly been discarded by the learned Sessions Court and therefore, the
said finding does not warrant any interference at the hands of this Court.
21.At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Manjunath v. State of Karnataka,
2023 LiveLaw (SC) 961 where the dying declaration was rendered
nugatory because the person who took it down was not examined, the
police officer had not endorsed who recorded it, and it was unclear before
which relatives it was taken and the judgment and order of acquittal was
upheld. The observations made in paragraph No.29.1 reads thus:
“29.1 The dying declaration, although undoubtedly a substantive
piece of evidence upon which reliance can be placed, in the present
facts is rendered nugatory as the person who took down such
declaration was not examined, nor did the police officer (PW19)
endorse the said document with details of who took down the
declaration. It is also not clear as to in front of which of the
relatives of deceased was the same taken down.”
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22.There is no doubt that if the dying declaration is proved to be the
last statement of the deceased, that can be the sole base for the conviction
of the accused provided that the credibility is attached with such
statement. However, weight and utility of a dying declaration depend
upon the surrounding circumstances and the credibility which the court
attaches to it, having regard to the evidence led before it. Insofar as the
case on hand is concerned, treating the history given before the Doctor by
the deceased for the first time as dying declaration, as well as, the history
given by the deceased before his wife while taking him for the treatment
in the auto-rickshaw is to be treated as dying declaration, it would be
relevant to note that the deceased had not named any person who had
caused him the knife injury before the Doctor with whom he was firstly
taken and thereafter referred to another Doctor, as also the wife of the
deceased with whom the deceased had disclosed the incident had not
been examined. Thus, the theory of treating the last statement of the
deceased as the dying declaration cannot have any legs to stand in the eye
of law.
23.At this juncture, it is apt to refer the judgment of the Supreme
Court, in the case of Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. The State of
Karnataka & Ors., 2026 INSC 67, the relevant paragraphs of which read
as under:
“29.From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said
that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal
recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view,
the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground
that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be
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(GJHC240303002002)
kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against
an order of acquittal:
(a)whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity,
(b)whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to
consider the material evidence on record,
(c)an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are
“compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is
“clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for
interference.’
(d)the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal,
after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether
the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could
have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record,
(e)if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot
overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view
was also possible, and
(f)the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if
it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be
recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt
of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no
other conclusion was possible.”
24.Thus, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of
decisions, while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning
by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be
upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal
in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial
Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands
and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial
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(GJHC240303002002)
Court, it might have taken a different view.
25.In light of the above legal position and for the reasons recorded in
the foregoing paragraphs, the present appeal fails and is accordingly
dismissed. Bail Bond, if any, shall stand discharged. Records and
Proceedings, if any, be remitted to the Court concerned forthwith.
(ILESH J. VORA,J)
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
sompura
Page 21 of 21
This significant ruling, now meticulously archived and available for in-depth analysis on CaseOn, serves as a crucial reference point for understanding the intricacies of the Gujarat High Court Criminal Appeal process and the rigorous standards applied in an Acquittal Judgment Analysis. The case, R/CR.A/1040/2002, dated 22/10/2026, concerns the State's appeal against an acquittal, highlighting fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence, particularly regarding witness credibility and the weight of dying declarations. The High Court, comprising Honourable Mr. Justice Ilesh J. Vora and Honourable Mr. Justice R. T. Vachhani, meticulously examined the prosecution's evidence, ultimately affirming the lower court's decision.
The prosecution's case revolved around an incident on August 21, 2000, in Kolvada village. The complainant, Ratansinh Rajuji Vaghela, a rickshaw driver, was informed by his uncle's son, Arvindsinh Waghela, that his brother, Dilipsinh, had been stabbed during a quarrel following a rickshaw collision. Dilipsinh was initially admitted to Gandhinagar Civil Hospital and later succumbed to his injuries at Ahmedabad Civil Hospital. The deceased reportedly told the complainant that accused Anilsinh Dipsinh Chauhan, assisted by Pravinsinh Hamtuji Chauhan and the now-deceased Champaksinh alias Bhurio Dipsinh Chauhan, inflicted knife blows after a verbal altercation over rickshaw damage.
Following the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed, leading to a trial in the Sessions Court. The accused faced charges under Sections 504, 302, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. However, after hearing both sides and analyzing the presented evidence, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad Rural, acquitted the respondents-accused on August 16, 2002, concluding that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.
The core legal question before the Gujarat High Court was whether the judgment and order of acquittal, rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad Rural, was perverse, based on misreading/omission of material evidence, or clearly unreasonable, thereby warranting intervention by the appellate court. Specifically, the appeal raised questions regarding:
The High Court's decision was guided by established legal principles concerning the review of acquittals and the admissibility of dying declarations. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. The State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 INSC 67, which reiterates that:
Regarding dying declarations, the court also referenced Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 961, which held that a dying declaration could be rendered nugatory if the person who took it down was not examined, if the police officer did not endorse its recording, or if the circumstances of its recording were unclear.
The High Court meticulously dissected the prosecution's evidence, identifying several critical flaws:
The complainant, Ratansinh Rajuji Vaghela, admittedly had no personal knowledge of the incident, relying solely on information from Arvindsinh Gandaji Vaghela, who was not examined in court. This severely weakened the foundational evidence, as the complainant's statements were uncorroborated hearsay.
Vanrajsinh, a maternal uncle of the deceased, claimed to be an eyewitness. However, his testimony was riddled with inconsistencies:
Natuji stated he saw the deceased in a blood-soaked rickshaw and heard Dilipsinh narrate the incident to his wife, Vilasba, while en route to the hospital. However:
For legal professionals seeking efficient ways to grasp such complex evidentiary analyses, CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that distill the essence of these specific rulings, making it easier to identify critical points and potential legal arguments.
Dr. Kalpesh Bababhai Shah (PW-1) and Dr. Rajendra Joshi (PW-14), who treated Dilipsinh, confirmed knife injuries. However, both doctors testified that the deceased, while conscious, did not name his assailant. He merely stated that he had sustained a knife injury, which significantly undermined the prosecution's claim of a dying declaration naming the accused.
The court noted that even if the statements made in the rickshaw were considered dying declarations, their credibility was severely compromised by the non-examination of key witnesses (Vilasba, Jagdishsinh) and the deceased's failure to name assailants to the doctors. The principles laid down in Manjunath v. State of Karnataka were applicable, rendering the purported dying declaration unreliable in the absence of proper authentication and corroboration.
Based on the extensive analysis of the evidence, the Gujarat High Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. The glaring contradictions, unnatural conduct of witnesses, lack of corroboration for crucial claims (especially the dying declaration and the alleged injuries to Vanrajsinh), and the non-examination of pivotal witnesses (Vilasba and Jagdishsinh) collectively created a significant shadow of doubt on the accused's involvement.
Applying the settled legal position from the Supreme Court, the High Court found that the trial court's decision to acquit was a 'possible view' based on the evidence on record and did not suffer from perversity or misreading of material evidence. Therefore, the appeal filed by the State was dismissed, and the acquittal of the respondents-accused was upheld.
This Gujarat High Court judgment is an important read for lawyers and students for several reasons:
All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.
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