Criminal Appeal, Acquittal, Murder, Indian Penal Code, Bombay Police Act, Gujarat High Court, Evidence, Witness Testimony, Dying Declaration, Reasonable Doubt
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State Of Gujarat Vs. Anilsinh Dipsinh Chauhan & Anr.

  Gujarat High Court R/CR.A/1040/2002
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Case Background

As per case facts, the State appealed against the acquittal of respondents accused of offenses under the Indian Penal Code and Bombay Police Act, following a fatal knife assault on ...

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Document Text Version

R/CR.A/1040/2002 JUDGMENT DATED: 22/10/2026

(GJHC240303002002)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1040 of 2002

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA

and

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI

==========================================================

Approved for Reporting Yes No

✔

==========================================================

STATE OF GUJARAT

Versus

ANILSINH DIPSINH CHAUHAN & ANR.

==========================================================

Appearance:

MR ROHAN RAVAL APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1

MR DK DESAI(278) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2

MS DARSHANA TRIVEDI(2388) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2

==========================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA

and

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI

Date : 22/10/2026

ORAL JUDGMENT

(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI)

1.Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of

acquittal dated 16/08/2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions

Judge, Ahmedabad Rural in Sessions Case No.57 of 2000 acquitting the

respondents- accused from the charge of offence punishable under

Sections 504, 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 135

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of the Bombay Police Act, the appellant – State has preferred the present

appeal under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(for short “the Code”).

2.The brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeals, are as

under:

2.1.The prosecution case in brief is that the complainant is residing at

village Kolvada, district: Gandhinagar with his family and he is earning

his livelihood by way of driving rickshaw. That on 21.8.2000 complainant

came to his village and at about 9 O'clock, he was in the Hanuman

Mandir situated in the same village. At that time, his uncle's son

Arvindsinh Waghela came there running and informed him that the

brother of the complainant Dilipsinh had a quarrel with the accused at

three road Kolwada and that accused Anilsinh had given knife blows to

Dilipsinh. He, further, informed the complainant that Dilipsinh is

admitted in the Civil Hospital, Gandhinagar. The complainant, therefore,

rushed to Gandhinagar, Civil Hospital, where his brother informed him

that he was traveling in the rickshaw of Vanrajsinh and that rickshaw

collided with the rickshaw of accused No.1. Anilsinh. Rickshaw of

Anilsinh had some damage and, therefore, in order to avoid quarrel

Dilipsinh told Anilsinh that he would pay the repairing charges of the

Rickshaw. However, while the deceased Dilipsinh was standing near

three road of Kolvada, the accused came to him and started quarreling.

That accused No.3 Pravinsinh Hamtuji Chauhan and the deceased

Champaksinh alias Bhurio Dipsinh Chauhan caught hold of the deceased

and Anilsinh Dipsinh Chauhan inflicted knife blows on the stomach and

hand of the deceased. Thereafter, the deceased became unconscious. He

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was then shifted to Ahmedabad Civil Hospital where he died during

treatment. The complaint was filed with Pethapur Police Station and the

Police after investigation chargesheeted the accused. However, the

original accused No.2 Champaksinh alias Bhurio Dipsinh Chauhan

expired during the pendency of the trial and, therefore, the case against

him is abated.

3.In pursuance of the complaint lodged by the complainant,

investigating agency recorded statements of the witnesses, collected

relevant evidence in form of medical evidence and drawn various

Panchnamas and other relevant evidence for the purpose of proving the

offence. After having found material against the respondent accused,

charge-sheet came to be filed in the Court of learned JMFC, as said Court

lacked jurisdiction to try the offence, it committed the case to the

Sessions Court provided under section 209 of the Code.

4.Upon committal of the case to the Sessions Court, learned Sessions

Judge framed charge against the respondent accused for the aforesaid

offence. The respondent accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be

tried

5.In order to bring home charge, the prosecution has examined

various witnesses and also produced various documentary as well as oral

evidence before the learned Sessions Court, more particularly described

in para No.5 of the impugned judgment and order.

6.On conclusion of evidence on the part of the prosecution, the

Sessions Court put various incriminating circumstances appearing in the

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evidence to the respondent accused so as to obtain his explanation/answer

as provided u/s 313 of the Code. In the further statement, the respondent

accused denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him as

false and further stated that he is innocent and false case has been filed

against him. After hearing both the sides and after analysis of evidence

adduced by the prosecution, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the

respondent accused of the offences, for which he was tried, as the

prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

7.We have heard learned APP for the appellant – State and learned

Advocate Mr.D K Desai assisted with Ms. Darshana Trivedi, learned

Advocate appearing for the respondents – accused and have minutely

examined the documentary evidence provided to us by learned Advocate

during the course of hearing.

8.Learned APP appearing for the appellant – State would submit that

the learned Sessions Court has failed to appreciate the evidence of the

important witnesses who have deposed in favour of the prosecution and

nothing contrary has come on record to disbelieve their evidence. He

would further submit that though there is an eye-witness to the incident in

question in the form of deposition of PW – Vanrajsinh examined at

Exh.48; however in spite of the fact that nothing has come on record to

disbelieve his evidence, the learned Sessions Court has totally disbelieved

the case of prosecution.

8.1Learned APP would further submit that the evidence of the

witnesses examined before the Court have specifically deposed as to how

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and in what manner the entire incident took place and narrated the actual

event prior to commission of offence and described the role of each of the

accused and the manner in which the assault was made which resulted

into death of the deceased. He would submit that the learned Sessions

Court has not believed those aspect merely on the basis of some

omissions and contradictions which would not be relevant and not proved

fatal to the case of prosecution.

8.2Learned APP would further submit that though the scientific

evidence in the form report of the FSL and the blood group found on the

weapon recovered used in commission of the crime in question and the

muddamal clothes of the accused where-upon the blood was found are of

the same group and there is no reasons to disbelieve the scientific

evidence which would link the accused with the crime. However the

learned Sessions Court has not considered this piece of evidence and has

acquitted the accused while overlooking to the factum as to their

involvement.

8.3By making the above submissions, learned APP would submit to

allow the present appeal and to quash and set aside the judgment and

order of acquittal and to sentence the respondents – accused.

9.Learned Advocate appearing for the respondents-accused while

supporting the impugned judgment and order of acquittal would submit

that the learned Sessions Court after threadbare examination of the

witnesses examined before the Court has recorded the finding of

acquittal. He would further submit that the learned Sessions Court has

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found some contradictions and omission in the evidence of the

prosecution witnesses which has proved fatal to the case of prosecution

and therefore this Court may not interfere with the said finding of

acquittal.

10.Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the respective

parties and examining the facts of the case, what appears from the record

that if the evidence of the complainant – Ratansinh Rajuji Vaghela

examined at Exh.46 and the complaint produced at Exh.47 is taken into

consideration, it appears that he had no personal knowledge about the

occurrence of the incident and he was informed about the incident took

place on 21/08/2000 at about 9:00 hours in the night by Arvindsinh

Gandaji Vaghela, son of his uncle and he was not aware as to the fact of

what kind of words were used by the accused. It would be relevant to

note here that the person who informed the complainant viz., Arvindsinh

Gandaji Vaghela has not been examined before the Court and therefore

the evidence of the complainant does not get corroborated. However,

upon taking into consideration the complaint at Exhibit-47 , it appears

that when the complainant met the deceased for the first time and asked

him what had happened, the deceased replied that at about 7:00 p.m., he

was sitting in Vanrajsinh's rickshaw near the outskirts of the village when

Anilsinh Dipsinh Chauhan's rickshaw came from the opposite direction,

resulting in a collision between the two rickshaws. As a result,

Vanrajsinh’s rickshaw caused some damage. Anilsinh had an altercation

with Vanrajsinh, whereupon the deceased told Anilsinh that he should get

the rickshaw repaired and that he would bear the expenses incurred for

the repairs, thereby settling the dispute. Thereafter, while the deceased

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and Vanrajsinh were standing on the road leading to Kolvada, at about

8:30 p.m. at night accused – Anilsinh and Bhuriyo Dipsinh and

Pravinsinh Hemtuji came and quarrel was taken place. Thus, from the

facts stated in the complaint, it is established only that a verbal altercation

had taken place between the accused persons and the deceased, as well as

witness Vanrajsinh. However, it is not clearly established what abusive or

provocative words were used by the accused persons during the

altercation. Moreover, there is no clear evidence to establish whether the

words allegedly used were sufficient to provoke the deceased or

Vanrajsinh to disturb the public peace, or whether any such words were

actually uttered. The only fact established is that witness Vanrajsinh was

present at the time of the incident.

11.Now, if the deposition of prosecution witness No. 8, Vanrajsinh

Huzan Vaghela, recorded at Exhibit 48 is examined, he has deposed that

on 21/08/2000, at about 6:00 p.m., he had gone to the house of his

maternal uncle, Dilipsinh, at Kolavada, Gandhinagar, and had stayed

there for approximately one and a half hours. Thereafter, his maternal

uncle, Dilipsinh, took him in his rickshaw to Pan-masala stall near the

village outskirts. On the way, they encountered the rickshaw of Anilsinh

coming from the opposite direction. Anilsinh’s rickshaw collided with

their rickshaw, causing a minor dent. Consequently, a verbal altercation

took place, during which the deceased told Anilsinh to get the dent

repaired the following morning. He has deposed that thereafter, he and

Dilipsinh went and sat near a Pan stall on the other side of the road. At

about 8:30 p.m., Anilsinh arrived there in his rickshaw along with two

other persons. Those two persons caught hold of the deceased, while

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Anilsinh inflicted knife blows on Dilipsinh’s abdomen. When the

deceased, Dilipsinh, attempted to catch hold of the knife, he also

sustained an injury to his hand. When the witness intervened, he was

pushed forcefully, causing him to fall onto the road. He sustained minor

injuries to his right hand and leg. He has further deposed that he was

threatened with the words, “Leave this place; otherwise, I will kill you.”

Thereafter, he became frightened and went to the house. However, the

said fact has not been mentioned in his cross-examination or police

statement. It is not stated in his police statement that, when the deceased

Dilipsinh caught hold of the knife, the accused sustained an injury on his

hand, nor has it been stated in his police statement that the accused told

the deceased, “Leave this place; otherwise, I will kill you.” Further, the

witness has not stated in his police statement that, since the deceased had

sustained simple injuries, the accused threatened to kill him during his

deposition before the Court with a view to exaggerate the seriousness of

the incident, or that the deceased had sustained simple injuries and that

the deceased himself sustained an injury to his hand while attempting to

catch hold of the knife. It is thus evident that the witness appears to have

introduced this statement during his deposition before the Court.

11.1From the testimony of the aforesaid witness, it becomes clear that

the deceased, Dilipsinh , was his maternal uncle, and a close relative of

the witness. According to the testimony of this witness, when he

intervened at the time of the incident, accused Anilsinh had pushed him

forcefully, as a result of which he sustained a simple injury to his right

leg. However, upon considering the entire evidence on record, there is no

evidence to show that the said witness had undergone any medical

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treatment for the injury allegedly sustained by him or that any medical

certificate or medical record pertaining to the said injury had been

obtained. Thus, there is no corroborative evidence to establish whether

the said witness had actually sustained any injury during the incident.

Furthermore, as per the testimony of this witness, at the time of the

incident, he and the deceased, Dilipsinh, were travelling in his rickshaw

to the village outskirts to eat Pan Masala. At that time, the rickshaw

driven by accused Anilsinh collided with their rickshaw, causing damage

to the rickshaw of accused Anilsinh. Consequently, a verbal altercation

took place, during which the deceased stated that the cost of repairing for

the damage would be paid on the next morning. This indicates that the

dispute arising out of the said incident had been amicably settled between

the parties. Thus, there is reason to believe that accused Anilsinh or any

of the other accused had no motive to harbour any ill will, animosity or

grudge against the deceased.

Furthermore, at the time of the incident, the aforesaid witness,

Vanrajsinh, was driving the rickshaw. During that time, it collided with

the rickshaw of accused Anilsinh Chauhan, as a result of which the

another rickshaw got damaged. Thus, even if accused Anilsinh Chauhan

had any dispute or grievance arising out of the incident, it would naturally

have been against the said witness, Vanrajsinh. Consequently, any verbal

altercation or quarrel would also have been with the said witness. The

deceased, Dilipsinh was merely sitting in the rear portion of the rickshaw.

Thus, even if accused Anilsinh had felt any anger or harboured any ill

will, animosity, hostility or grudge on account of the damage caused to

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his rickshaw in the collision, such feelings would more naturally have

been directed towards the aforesaid witness, Vanrajsinh, who was driving

the rickshaw in which the deceased was travelling, rather than towards

the deceased, Dilipsinh, who was merely a passenger sitting in the

rickshaw. Thus, the possibility of the accused harbouring such feelings

against the deceased appears to be less probable.

12.It would be relevant to note that even if assuming, for the sake of

argument, that the deceased, Dilipsinh, had refused to pay the expenses in

the morning incurred in connection with the auto-rickshaw collision and

that, as a result, the accused had developed resentment or anger towards

him, the testimony of the aforesaid witness, Vanrajsinh Vaghela, clearly

establishes that the accused, Anilsinh, inflicted a blow on the abdomen of

the deceased, Dilipsinh, with an open knife in his hand. Thus, it clearly

emerges that accused Anilsinh inflicted more than one knife blow upon

the deceased, Dilipsinh, including a blow on his abdomen. The aforesaid

witness has further stated that when he intervened, Anilsinh pushed him,

and when he moved aside slightly, the accused again inflicted a blow

upon Dilipsinh. This testimony of witness Vanrajsinh also constitutes

evidence that accused Anilsinh inflicted more than one knife blow upon

the deceased, Dilipsinh.

13.Thus, the deceased had sustained injuries on his hands as well as an

on his abdomen. It is, therefore, apparent that the aforesaid witness,

Vanrajsinh, has attempted to make the incident more serious by deposing

that the deceased had been inflicted with more than one knife blow by

accused Anilsinh which indicates that the witness had not actually seen

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the incident and has narrated fabricated facts to support the prosecution

case. It also emerges that, although the deceased Dilipsinh was his

maternal uncle and a close relative, the witness allegedly fled from the

place of occurrence at the time of the incident. His assertion that he was

present at the place of occurrence along with the deceased and thereafter

fled from the spot appears to be unnatural and does not inspire

confidence. Even if the witness had become frightened at the time of the

incident, he would ordinarily have informed someone about the

occurrence after fleeing from the place. However, this witness did not

inform anyone about the incident. To the contrary, in his cross-

examination, the witness has clearly admitted that it is true that he

disclosed the facts of the incident to the police for the first time when the

police came to record his statement, and that he had not disclosed the

same to anyone else before that. The witness has further stated in his

cross-examination that the police recorded his statement on the next day

after the incident, i.e., on 22

nd

whereas the incident took place on

21/08/2000 at about 8:30 p.m. However, the said witness did not disclose

the facts of the incident to anyone for approximately for about 24 hours

thereafter. The conduct of the said witness appears to be unnatural,

improbable and somewhat strange. In cross-examination, the said witness

has clearly admitted that even on the next day after the incident, he did

not go to inquire about Dilipsinh. He did not make any inquiry regarding

the condition of Dilipsinh, nor did he make any attempt to inform his

relatives. He did not even make any attempt to inform the police. He has

further stated that, at the time of the incident, he did not raise any alarm

or make any attempt to call anyone. Even thereafter, he did not raise any

alarm, nor did he make any attempt to run away, etc.

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14.Thus, the conduct of the said witness also appears to be unnatural.

In such circumstances, the testimony of this witness does not appear to be

truthful or reliable. It appears that the said witness was subsequently

brought forward to support the complainant's case. Therefore, his

testimony cannot be relied upon. It would be relevant to note that

although the aforesaid witness, Vanrajsinh, claims that he was present at

the time of the incident and sustained injuries during the incident, he did

not inform anyone about the incident for nearly 24 hours. In such

circumstances, his testimony ought not to be believed.

15.PW No 2, Natuji Becharji Vaghela is examined at Exh.34. The said

witness has deposed that he resides at Kolavada and on 21/08/2000, while

he was at his house at about 9:00 p.m., the deceased’s wife, Vilasba,

called him by shouting. Upon going there, he saw the deceased,

Dilipsinh, lying in an auto-rickshaw in a blood-soaked condition. The

auto-rickshaw belonged to Jagdishsinh, who was sitting in the driver's

seat. Thereafter, the witness and Vilasba accompanied the deceased in the

said auto-rickshaw to the Civil Hospital at Gandhinagar. He has further

deposed that on the way, Vilasba asked the deceased what had happened

to him, whereupon Dilipsinh stated that, he, along with Vanrajsinh, went

in his rickshaw at the outskirts where the said rickshaw collided with Anil

Singh's rickshaw whereupon the altercation ensued. Thereafter, he went

towards the road leading to Gandhinagar and sat at the outskirts. After

some time, Anilsinh Dipsinh arrived in a rickshaw, accompanied by

Pravinsinh Haimatji, who was the brother of Anilsinh. Both of them were

known to him. They caught hold of him from both sides, and Anilsinh

stabbed him with a knife.

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15.1During cross-examination, this witness stated that he, deceased

Dilipsinh, and the complainant all resided in the same village, in the same

locality. He had known Jagdishsinh, who was associated with the

rickshaw, for a long time. During cross-examination, he stated that, at the

time of the incident, he was asleep, and when he came outside,

Jagdishsinh was standing outside the rickshaw. No conversation had

taken place between him and Jagdishsinh, nor had he asked Jagdishsinh

anything. No conversation had taken place between Jagdishsinh and

Vilasba. He had seen Dilipsinh in the rickshaw, and Dilipsinh was

bleeding profusely. His clothes had also become stained with blood.

Dilipsinh was bleeding heavily on the road as well. Before Dilipsinh was

seated in the rickshaw, Vilasba had not asked him anything, and Dilipsinh

had not told him anything at that time. Dilipsinh was telling him, “Take

me to the hospital; I will die.” His clothes had also become stained with

blood. However, neither his bloodstained clothes nor Vilasba's

bloodstained clothes had been produced before the police. He had not

informed the police about the fact that his clothes had become stained

with blood. After reaching the hospital, Vilasba and Jagdishsinh took

Dilipsinh to the doctor. He had not gone inside. He did not know whether

the doctor had asked Dilipsinh what injuries had sustained by him. In his

presence, the doctor had not asked Dilipsinh anything. Nobody had asked

him anything either, and he had not told the doctor anything. This witness

did not have any conversation whatsoever with Dilipsinh’s brother and

nor did he disclose the conversation that took place in the rickshaw to

anyone other than the police. This witness had not spoken to any other

family member. This witness was not aware that he ought to inform his

relatives about what Dilipsinh had said in the rickshaw. This witness

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returned home from the hospital at around 10:30 or 10:45 p.m. and his

wife met him at home, and the neighbours also met him . This witness

told them that the injured person had been taken away. His relatives did

not ask him anything, and no discussion regarding the incident took

place. The police came to my house to record my statement.

15.2It appears that during the cross-examination, this witness has

categorically stated that the conversation which took place in the

rickshaw was not disclosed by him to anyone except the police. In short,

the testimony of this witness does not appear to be truthful, reliable or

trustworthy. According to the testimony of this witness, the deceased, in

his presence, had narrated the incident to his wife, Vilasben, stating that,

at the time of the incident, he was sitting near the road leading towards

Gandhinagar, when Anilsinh Dipsinh, Pravinsinh and the brother of

Anilsinh arrived in a rickshaw, caught hold of him from both sides, and

Anilsinh inflicted a knife blow upon him. However, the deceased did not

disclose any such facts before Dr. K. B. Shah, who initially provided him

with medical treatment, or before Dr. Rajendra Kumar Bhagirathprasad

Joshi, who subsequently treated him at the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, or

before any other doctor who treated him during the period between his

admission to the hospital and his death. The deceased did not make even

the slightest reference before any of the doctors to the fact that accused

Anilsinh or his associates, namely, accused Pravinsinh and the brother of

Anilsinh had caused the injuries to him. On the contrary, he merely stated

that somebody had assaulted him with a knife. Thus, reasonable doubt

exists as to whether the deceased had, in fact, narrated the aforesaid facts

in the rickshaw in the presence of this witness.

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15.3Furthermore, the aforesaid witness, Natubhai Becharji Vaghela

(Exh. 34), has deposed that he was the first person to see the deceased at

the place where Jagdishsinh had stopped, in an injured and blood-soaked

condition. However, witness Natubhai Becharji Vaghela has no

knowledge whatsoever as to who brought the deceased Dilipsinh to the

said place in the rickshaw, how and for what reason Jagdishsinh brought

him there, or who inflicted the injuries upon the deceased, in what

manner, and for what reason. There is also no evidence to show that he

had discussed any of this issue with Jagdishsinh, the rickshaw driver.

Similarly, witness Natubhai Vaghela has not stated that he had any

conversation with the deceased while they were in the rickshaw. He has

deposed that the deceased spoke to his wife, Vilasba, in the rickshaw

regarding the manner in which he had sustained the injuries, and that he

had heard that conversation. However, no evidence of the deceased's

wife, Vilasba, has been adduced before the Court, nor has the rickshaw

driver, Jagdishsinh, been examined before the Court.

15.4It also appears that the deceased was taken to the Civil Hospital at

Gandhinagar and that an entry to that effect was made in the M.L.C.

Register. However, the said register mentions that the deceased had been

brought by Jagdishsinh. It does not mention that the deceased's wife,

Vilasba, or the aforesaid witness, Natubhai Becharji Vaghela, had

accompanied him. The rickshaw driver, Jagdishsinh, is neither a close

relative nor a family member of the deceased. Therefore, naturally, if the

deceased had been brought to the hospital by his wife, the M.L.C.

Register would have reflected the said fact. The witness stated that

although the deceased had sustained injuries, no bloodstained clothes,

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blood samples, or other relevant articles were collected from the place as

required. Further, no prescription or medical record was produced to

establish that witness Natuji had sustained any injury or had received

medical treatment from a doctor. This also raises a doubt as to whether,

after the incident, the deceased Dilipsinh was actually taken by the said

witness Natuji in an auto-rickshaw to the Civil Hospital at Gandhinagar,

as well as, raising a doubt as to whether witness Natuji had informed the

deceased’s wife, Vilasben, about the manner in which the incident had

occurred, or whether Natuji had heard the relevant facts from her.

16.PW No.1 – Dr. Kalpesh Bababhai Shah has been examined at

Exh.32 before whom Dilipsinh Vaghela was brought for treatment and

upon asking as to how the injury was caused, he had given the history

that injury was caused with knife. During the cross-examination, he has

deposed that patient did not mention the name of the assailant in the

history and only fact of assaulting injury with the knife has been

mentioned in the history. Thus, it would appear from the record that the

name of the assailant was not mentioned before the Doctor in the history

given by the injured.

17.Likewise, PW 14 – Dr. Rajendra Joshi has been examined before

whom the injured was referred and the same history was given by the

injured that someone had caused knife injury and did not mention the

name.

18.From the aforesaid analysis of the evidence, it clearly emerges

from the record that the prosecution has not proved the case beyond all

reasonable doubt and the evidence of the prosecution witnesses examined

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before the Court raise the doubt as to the involvement of the accused in

the commission of crime.

19.In context to consider the statement alleged to have been made by

the deceased-Dilipsinh before PW No.2-Natuji, Vilasba (wife of the

deceased) as well as Jagdishsinh, the person driving the auto-rickshaw

taking the deceased to the hospital, it would be apt to note that even at the

time when the deceased was brought before the Doctor who examined

and extended the treatment, as also the Doctor to whom the deceased was

referred for further treatment, no such statement naming the person who

inflicted a knife blow was made by the deceased before the Doctor

though the fact remains that the Doctor/s who examined and treated the

deceased cited consciousness of the deceased when brought before them;

but the deceased only stated that the injuries was caused to him with knife

and no such other fact was stated by the deceased.

20.Since as per the case of the prosecution, the deceased narrated and

described the entire set of incident before his wife – Vilasba; however to

the utter shock and surprise of this Court and for the reasons best known

to the prosecution, the wife of the deceased has not been examined by the

prosecution which otherwise speaks volume and create a shadow of doubt

on the case of the prosecution.

21.Apart from the aforesaid, even if the facts stated is considered to be

the gospel truth that the deceased made a statement to his wife – Vilasba

in presence of PW No.2 – Natuji while going to hospital in the auto-

rickshaw which belonged to Jagdishbhai, the said rickshaw driver has

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(GJHC240303002002)

also not been examined by the prosecution who can be said to be the best

witness, at least to throw the light on the case of the prosecution.

However, again the non-examination of the said auto-rickshaw driver for

the reasons bets known to the prosecution proved fatal to the genesis of

the very incident taking the deceased to the hospital as claimed by the

PW No.2 and the entries made by the Doctor in the Register showing that

the deceased was brought by Jagdish Chhatrasinh and no such reference

as to the deceased accompanied with his wife and PW No.2 – Natuji was

made in the said Register renders the entire story doubtful which has

rightly been discarded by the learned Sessions Court and therefore, the

said finding does not warrant any interference at the hands of this Court.

21.At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the decision of the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Manjunath v. State of Karnataka,

2023 LiveLaw (SC) 961 where the dying declaration was rendered

nugatory because the person who took it down was not examined, the

police officer had not endorsed who recorded it, and it was unclear before

which relatives it was taken and the judgment and order of acquittal was

upheld. The observations made in paragraph No.29.1 reads thus:

“29.1 The dying declaration, although undoubtedly a substantive

piece of evidence upon which reliance can be placed, in the present

facts is rendered nugatory as the person who took down such

declaration was not examined, nor did the police officer (PW19)

endorse the said document with details of who took down the

declaration. It is also not clear as to in front of which of the

relatives of deceased was the same taken down.”

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(GJHC240303002002)

22.There is no doubt that if the dying declaration is proved to be the

last statement of the deceased, that can be the sole base for the conviction

of the accused provided that the credibility is attached with such

statement. However, weight and utility of a dying declaration depend

upon the surrounding circumstances and the credibility which the court

attaches to it, having regard to the evidence led before it. Insofar as the

case on hand is concerned, treating the history given before the Doctor by

the deceased for the first time as dying declaration, as well as, the history

given by the deceased before his wife while taking him for the treatment

in the auto-rickshaw is to be treated as dying declaration, it would be

relevant to note that the deceased had not named any person who had

caused him the knife injury before the Doctor with whom he was firstly

taken and thereafter referred to another Doctor, as also the wife of the

deceased with whom the deceased had disclosed the incident had not

been examined. Thus, the theory of treating the last statement of the

deceased as the dying declaration cannot have any legs to stand in the eye

of law.

23.At this juncture, it is apt to refer the judgment of the Supreme

Court, in the case of Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. The State of

Karnataka & Ors., 2026 INSC 67, the relevant paragraphs of which read

as under:

“29.From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said

that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence

on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal

recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view,

the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground

that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be

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(GJHC240303002002)

kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against

an order of acquittal:

(a)whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity,

(b)whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to

consider the material evidence on record,

(c)an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are

“compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is

“clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for

interference.’

(d)the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal,

after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether

the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could

have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record,

(e)if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot

overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view

was also possible, and

(f)the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if

it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be

recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt

of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no

other conclusion was possible.”

24.Thus, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of

decisions, while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning

by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be

upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal

in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial

Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands

and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial

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(GJHC240303002002)

Court, it might have taken a different view.

25.In light of the above legal position and for the reasons recorded in

the foregoing paragraphs, the present appeal fails and is accordingly

dismissed. Bail Bond, if any, shall stand discharged. Records and

Proceedings, if any, be remitted to the Court concerned forthwith.

(ILESH J. VORA,J)

(R. T. VACHHANI, J)

sompura

Page 21 of 21

Description

Gujarat High Court Upholds Acquittal in Criminal Appeal: A Deep Dive into Evidentiary Standards

This significant ruling, now meticulously archived and available for in-depth analysis on CaseOn, serves as a crucial reference point for understanding the intricacies of the Gujarat High Court Criminal Appeal process and the rigorous standards applied in an Acquittal Judgment Analysis. The case, R/CR.A/1040/2002, dated 22/10/2026, concerns the State's appeal against an acquittal, highlighting fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence, particularly regarding witness credibility and the weight of dying declarations. The High Court, comprising Honourable Mr. Justice Ilesh J. Vora and Honourable Mr. Justice R. T. Vachhani, meticulously examined the prosecution's evidence, ultimately affirming the lower court's decision.

Case Background: The Incident and the Trial

The prosecution's case revolved around an incident on August 21, 2000, in Kolvada village. The complainant, Ratansinh Rajuji Vaghela, a rickshaw driver, was informed by his uncle's son, Arvindsinh Waghela, that his brother, Dilipsinh, had been stabbed during a quarrel following a rickshaw collision. Dilipsinh was initially admitted to Gandhinagar Civil Hospital and later succumbed to his injuries at Ahmedabad Civil Hospital. The deceased reportedly told the complainant that accused Anilsinh Dipsinh Chauhan, assisted by Pravinsinh Hamtuji Chauhan and the now-deceased Champaksinh alias Bhurio Dipsinh Chauhan, inflicted knife blows after a verbal altercation over rickshaw damage.

Following the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed, leading to a trial in the Sessions Court. The accused faced charges under Sections 504, 302, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. However, after hearing both sides and analyzing the presented evidence, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad Rural, acquitted the respondents-accused on August 16, 2002, concluding that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Legal Issues at Hand (IRAC - Issue)

The core legal question before the Gujarat High Court was whether the judgment and order of acquittal, rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad Rural, was perverse, based on misreading/omission of material evidence, or clearly unreasonable, thereby warranting intervention by the appellate court. Specifically, the appeal raised questions regarding:

  • The reliability and corroboration required for an eyewitness testimony, especially when contradicted by previous statements and exhibiting unnatural conduct.
  • The evidentiary value of a dying declaration, particularly when the declarant failed to name the assailant to medical professionals and key witnesses to the declaration were not examined.
  • The general standard for an appellate court to overturn an acquittal when the trial court's view is a 'possible view' based on the evidence.

Understanding the Legal Principles (IRAC - Rule)

The High Court's decision was guided by established legal principles concerning the review of acquittals and the admissibility of dying declarations. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. The State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 INSC 67, which reiterates that:

  • If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal.
  • An acquittal order is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so, or if the order is “clearly unreasonable.”
  • If the trial court’s view is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible.
  • Interference is only permissible if the appellate court finds that the only conclusion possible was the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Regarding dying declarations, the court also referenced Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 961, which held that a dying declaration could be rendered nugatory if the person who took it down was not examined, if the police officer did not endorse its recording, or if the circumstances of its recording were unclear.

Detailed Case Analysis (IRAC - Analysis)

The High Court meticulously dissected the prosecution's evidence, identifying several critical flaws:

Complainant's Testimony (Exh. 46, Exh. 47)

The complainant, Ratansinh Rajuji Vaghela, admittedly had no personal knowledge of the incident, relying solely on information from Arvindsinh Gandaji Vaghela, who was not examined in court. This severely weakened the foundational evidence, as the complainant's statements were uncorroborated hearsay.

Eyewitness Testimony (PW-8, Vanrajsinh Huzan Vaghela)

Vanrajsinh, a maternal uncle of the deceased, claimed to be an eyewitness. However, his testimony was riddled with inconsistencies:

  • **Motive:** The initial rickshaw collision dispute was reportedly settled with an agreement to pay for repairs, diminishing the motive for a fatal assault later.
  • **Contradictions:** Vanrajsinh claimed multiple knife blows, his own intervention, and sustaining minor injuries. Crucially, these details were absent from his police statement and cross-examination. There was also no medical record to corroborate his alleged injuries.
  • **Unnatural Conduct:** Despite being a close relative and an alleged eyewitness, Vanrajsinh fled the scene and did not inform anyone about the incident for approximately 24 hours. He did not inquire about Dilipsinh's condition or inform other relatives or the police. This delay and silence cast serious doubt on his presence and the veracity of his account.
  • **Exaggeration:** The court observed that Vanrajsinh appeared to have introduced new, more serious details during his court deposition, suggesting an attempt to exaggerate the incident's gravity.

Circumstantial Witness Testimony (PW-2, Natuji Becharji Vaghela)

Natuji stated he saw the deceased in a blood-soaked rickshaw and heard Dilipsinh narrate the incident to his wife, Vilasba, while en route to the hospital. However:

  • **Lack of Corroboration:** Natuji admitted he was asleep at the time of the incident and did not disclose the conversation in the rickshaw to anyone except the police, implying an undue delay and selective disclosure.
  • **Missing Witnesses:** Crucially, neither the deceased's wife, Vilasba (who allegedly heard the dying declaration), nor the rickshaw driver, Jagdishsinh (who transported Dilipsinh), were examined by the prosecution. The hospital's MLC Register noted Jagdishsinh brought the deceased, but made no mention of Vilasba or Natuji. This omission proved fatal to the prosecution's claim of a dying declaration to Vilasba.

For legal professionals seeking efficient ways to grasp such complex evidentiary analyses, CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that distill the essence of these specific rulings, making it easier to identify critical points and potential legal arguments.

Medical Evidence

Dr. Kalpesh Bababhai Shah (PW-1) and Dr. Rajendra Joshi (PW-14), who treated Dilipsinh, confirmed knife injuries. However, both doctors testified that the deceased, while conscious, did not name his assailant. He merely stated that he had sustained a knife injury, which significantly undermined the prosecution's claim of a dying declaration naming the accused.

Dying Declaration Credibility

The court noted that even if the statements made in the rickshaw were considered dying declarations, their credibility was severely compromised by the non-examination of key witnesses (Vilasba, Jagdishsinh) and the deceased's failure to name assailants to the doctors. The principles laid down in Manjunath v. State of Karnataka were applicable, rendering the purported dying declaration unreliable in the absence of proper authentication and corroboration.

The Court's Final Ruling (IRAC - Conclusion)

Based on the extensive analysis of the evidence, the Gujarat High Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. The glaring contradictions, unnatural conduct of witnesses, lack of corroboration for crucial claims (especially the dying declaration and the alleged injuries to Vanrajsinh), and the non-examination of pivotal witnesses (Vilasba and Jagdishsinh) collectively created a significant shadow of doubt on the accused's involvement.

Applying the settled legal position from the Supreme Court, the High Court found that the trial court's decision to acquit was a 'possible view' based on the evidence on record and did not suffer from perversity or misreading of material evidence. Therefore, the appeal filed by the State was dismissed, and the acquittal of the respondents-accused was upheld.

Why This Judgment Matters for Legal Professionals and Students

This Gujarat High Court judgment is an important read for lawyers and students for several reasons:

  • **Appellate Review of Acquittals:** It serves as a prime example of the cautious approach appellate courts take when reviewing acquittals, emphasizing that interference is warranted only under exceptional circumstances of perversity or unreasonableness.
  • **Witness Credibility:** The case highlights the critical importance of witness credibility, demonstrating how inconsistencies, delays in reporting, unnatural conduct, and lack of corroboration can undermine even an eyewitness's testimony.
  • **Dying Declarations:** It offers valuable insights into the stringent requirements for relying on dying declarations, particularly the need for corroboration, proper recording, and the examination of all persons involved in its taking. The non-examination of key witnesses to a purported dying declaration can be fatal to the prosecution's case.
  • **Prosecution's Burden:** The judgment underscores the heavy burden on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, emphasizing that gaps in evidence, such as missing key witnesses, can lead to acquittals.
  • **IRAC Application:** For students, this case provides an excellent opportunity to apply the IRAC method to understand how legal issues, rules, analysis, and conclusions are systematically developed in judicial decisions.

Disclaimer

All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.

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