ESA-11-2024 (O&M) & ESA-12-2024(O&M) --1--

112 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

(1) ESA No. 11 of 2024 (O&M)

State of Haryana Through SDO (Civil) Loharu ...... Appellant.

Versus

Neetu Dahiya ...... Respondent.

(2) ESA No. 12 of 2024 (O&M)

State of Haryana Through SDO (Civil) Loharu ....... Appellant.

Versus

Neetu Dahiya ...... Respondent.

1 The date when the judgment was reserved 03.07.2026

2 The date when the judgment is pronounced 10.09.2026

3 The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 10.09.2026

4 Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced 

or whether the full judgment is pronounced

Full

5 The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full judgment, 

and reasons thereof.

Not 

applicable

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH MANUJA

Present:Mr. Sharad Aggarwal, Additional Advocate General

for the appellant.

Mr. Govind Goel, Advocate for the respondent.

*****

HARKESH MANUJA J. (Oral)

[1] Vide this common order, aforementioned two Execution

Second Appeals shall stand disposed of as they involve common

question of law and fact. For the sake of brevity, the facts are being

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culled out from ESA-11 of 2024.

[2] By way of the present Execution Second Appeal, p rayer

has been made for setting aside of the orders dated 12.07.2023 and

29.09.2023 passed by the learned Courts below, whereby the

objections preferred at the instance of the appellant7State, claiming

itself to be a third party objector, to the execution of the decree dated

12.11.2005, have been dismissed.

FACTS

A. PRESENT LITIGATION

[3] Briefly stating, in the present case, plaintiffs (Decree

Holders/ Respondent’s predecessors) filed Civil Suit No. 74 of 2003

against Gram Panchayat, Loharu, seeking an injunction restraining

the Gram Panchayat from disturbing their possession of Plot No. 129,

measuring 1667 square yards, in village Loharu. Their claim rested

on a Kabala dated 04.04.1942, executed by the then Nawab of

Loharu, in favour of their predecessor, Bhikraj Jaipuria. The suit was

decreed on 12.11.2005 by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior

Division) holding that the plaintiffs' predecessor had purchased the

plot under the Kabala and that the plaintiffs, having inherited from

him, were owners in possession, the Gram Panchayat having

produced no document to support its own claim.

[3.1] The Gram Panchayat's first appeal, Civil Appeal No. 3 of

2006, was dismissed. The Gram Panchayat's further appeal, RSA

No. 1289 of 2007, was dismissed by this Court on 19.12.2007 and

the decree became final. A connected decree, over the adjoining Plot

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No. 128, was passed the same day in Civil Suit No. 76 of 2003 and

followed the same appellate course, the first appeal being dismissed

as Civil Appeal No. 1 of 2006 and the second appeal being dismissed

as RSA No. 2324 of 2007, also on 19.12.2007.

[3.2] The Decree Holders earlier initiated executio n

proceedings in 2008, which were withdrawn in 2014 as fully satisfied.

In those earlier proceedings, execution was pressed in respect of Plot

Nos. 126, 128 and 129, execution as to Plot No. 127 having been

separately withdrawn. The respondent in the present appeal7Neetu

Dahiya bought both properties relevant to the present appeal(s),

along with the other connected plots, under a registered sale deed

dated 14.03.2019 and on being substituted as Decree Holder,

continued the present Execution Petition No. 49/2017, seeking

warrants of possession.

[3.3] In support of its claim, the appellant State also relies

upon a demarcation report dated 10.04.2021, stated by it to have

been obtained pursuant to an order of the SDM, Loharu dated

05.04.2021. The Courts below found that this report was got

conducted by the SDO (Civil), Loharu on his own, through the Naib

Tehsildars, Loharu and Behal, without any order of the learned

Executing Court and without notice to the decree holder.

[3.4] The appellant State was not a party to either of the 2003

suits. It objected under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC claiming that the land

is part of Khasra No. 735, owned by the State, that a Government

primary school has stood on part of it since 1918, that the decrees

were obtained by fraud since the Decree Holders were never in

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possession, that the 2021 demarcation report supports its claim.

[3.5] By order dated 12.07.2023, the learned Executing Court

dismissed the aforementioned objections, holding that the Decree

Holder was admittedly not in possession, a finding drawn from her

separate dispute with the named objectors/judgment debtors, who

were themselves found to be occupying the land as vegetable

vendors and further holding that Order 21 Rule 32(5) CPC permits

possession to be restored to a Decree Holder dispossessed after an

injunction decree, relying on a settled line of decisions of this Court.

The appeals against this order, together with the connected

objections of the Poddar Charity Trust, were dismissed by common

judgment dated 29.09.2023, which also directed that execution over

any part of the land within the Government school premises be

carried out in the presence of the District Elementary Education

Officer and the Tehsildar. Still aggrieved, the present Execution

Second Appeals came to be filed at the instance of State through

SDO (Civil) Loharu.

PREVIOUS LITIGATION

[4] Municipal Committee, Loharu, formerly Gram Panchayat,

Loharu, which had merged into it in 2006, filed third party objections

in the earlier execution in 2008 and a separate suit, claiming that the

land was part of Khasra No. 271. A Local Commissioner was

appointed by the Court to visit the spot. On 05.09.2011, after framing

issues and considering the evidence led by both sides, the learned

Executing Court dismissed the objections, holding that the land is not

part of Khasra No. 271. This finding was upheld in appeal on

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15.11.2013. Municipal Committee, Loharu also separately pursued its

Khasra No. 271 claim through Civil Suit No. 94 of 2009, dismissed on

26.02.2010, with the first appeal dismissed on 09.11.2010; a further

second appeal, RSA No. 806 of 2012, was allowed on 06.10.2016

and the suit remanded but Municipal Committee withdrew it on

22.02.2017/04.03.2017 rather than proceeding to a fresh trial.

[5] A separate application was moved in 2012 by ano ther

set of claimants, Suresh Kumar, Vicky and others, s eeking

demarcation of Khasra Nos. 734 and 735. This was dismissed by

order dated 16.08.2013, passed by Sh. Sunil Kumar, Additional Civil

Judge (Senior Division), Loharu, in the earlier execution proceedings,

the Court holding that it was for the applicants themselves to prove

where Khasra Nos. 734 and 735 lay and declining to order a fresh

demarcation to do that work for them. The same order also held that

the objectors, having claimed possession only through Municipal

Committee, could not agitate a claim that had already been finally

decided against Municipal Committee.

[6] In the present execution itself, a fresh set of objectors,

Pyare Lal and others, describing themselves as vegetable vendors on

the disputed land, which they described as falling in Khasra Nos. 734

and 735, raised objections and also moved an application seeking

demarcation of Khasra Nos. 734 and 735. By a composite order

dated 15.05.2019, Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Loharu,

dismissed both the objections and the demarcation application,

holding that the objectors were admittedly in possession only in the

character of vegetable vendors and directed them to vacate. Their

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first appeal, CA No. 209 of 2019, was dismissed on 15.02.2021 by

the Additional District Judge, Bhiwani, who held that the objectors,

claiming through Municipal Committee's earlier allotment, were bound

by the finding of the order dated 05.09.2011 by the principle of res

judicata. Their further appeals to this Court, ESA Nos. 6 to 9 of 2021,

were dismissed on 01.12.2021, this Court holding that the objectors

had shown no right or title in the property, that finding vacant land

and occupying it to sell vegetables conferred no valuable right and

that persons with no right or title in the property had no locus standi to

seek its demarcation. The SLP (Civil) Diary No. 10057 of 2022

against that order was dismissed as withdrawn on 01.11.2022.

[7] During the pendency of the execution, a warrant of

possession issued for the decretal land came back unexecuted, the

Bailiff reporting that a portion of approximately seven feet of Plot No.

129 fell under a Government primary school.

[8] Separately, the appellant State filed suits to set aside the

2005 decrees, pleading that the decretal land formed part of Khasra

No. 735: Civil Suit No. 347 of 2013 concerning Plot No. 129 and Civil

Suit No. 342 of 2013 concerning Plot No. 128, both instituted on

24.10.2013. The suit concerning Plot No. 128 was dismissed on

10.08.2017, the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division),

Loharu holding that the State had failed to prove that the land forms

part of Khasra No. 735 and that the decree dated 12.11.2005, resting

on the 1942 Kabala, was valid. The first appeal was dismissed on

19.04.2018. The second appeal, RSA No. 373 of 2022, was

dismissed by this Court on 14.02.2022, holding that no substantial

ESA-11-2024 (O&M) & ESA-12-2024(O&M) --7--

question of law arose and further, that the appeal was liable to be

dismissed on the independent ground of an unexplained delay of 682

days in filing it. The SLP (Civil) Diary No. 24915 of 2022, was

dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 03.07.2023. The suit

concerning Plot No. 129 followed the same course.

CONTENTIONS

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

[9] Learned counsel for the State argued that a dec ree of

permanent injunction cannot be enforced through a warrant of

possession and that the learned Executing Court went beyond what

the decrees allowed. He argued that the land is part of Khasra No.

735, owned by the State, with a Government primary school standing

on part of it since 1918. He argued that the decrees were obtained by

fraud, since the Decree Holders were never actually in possession.

He argued that the State was denied a fair chance to prove its case,

since no issues were framed and no evidence was allowed and that

the demarcation report the State obtained in 2021 supports its claim

and should have been considered.

ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

[10]

Learned counsel for the respondent argued that the

question of mode of execution was already raised before and answered

by, the learned Executing Court and does not in any event help the

State, since the finding of non7possession came from a

separate

dispute to which the State was never a party. He argued that the

State itself pursued the identical claim, that the land is Khasra No.

ESA-11-2024 (O&M) & ESA-12-2024(O&M) --8-

735, in its own suits against these Decree Holders, over both plots

and lost in each, carrying the matter through every tier up to the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, so that the present objections are barred by

res judicata. He argued that the fraud plea gives no particulars as

required by law, that the 2021 demarcation report was made without

any order of the learned Executing Court and without notice to the

decree holder and that the order refusing to frame issues has long

become final, since it was never appealed.

DISCUSSION AND REASONING

[11] I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone

through the paper7book and records of the case.

[12] The following questions arise for determination in these

appeals:

(i) Whether, in the absence of any independent right, title or

possession established by the appellant7State, the correctness of

the mode of execution adopted, namely restoration of possession

under Order 21 Rule 32(5) CPC upon a decree of perm anent

injunction, gives rise to any substantial question of law requiring

determination in these appeals?

(ii) Whether the appellant7State, having litigated the identical claim

that the decretal land forms part of Khasra No. 735 in its own suits to

set aside the very decrees now sought to be executed and having

failed to discharge the burden that lies upon a third party objector

under Order 21 Rules 97 to 99 CPC, can reagitate that claim through

the present objections or whether such objections are barred and

disclose no substantial question of law warranting interference with

the concurrent findings of the Courts below?

[13] The contention raised that an injunction decree cannot

be enforced by a warrant of possession is not new here. The learned

Executing Court dealt with this exact question in its order dated

ESA-11-2024 (O&M) & ESA-12-2024(O&M) --9--

12.07.2023, relying on settled authority that allows possession to be

restored where a Decree Holder is shown to have lost possession

after the decree. This Court need not decide whether that view is

correct because the point does not help the State's case either way.

The finding of non7possession came from the Decree Holders'

dispute with their own judgment debtors, found to be occupying the

land as vegetable vendors. That dispute was decided against them

by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Loharu, by

order dated 15.05.2019 and their appeal, CA No. 209 of 2019, was

dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Bhiwani, on 15.02.2021,

holding that the objectors, claiming through a party already bound by

an earlier finding, could not take a different stand. Their further

appeals to this Court, ESA Nos. 6 to 9 of 2021, were also dismissed

on 01.12.2021, by this Court independently, holding that the objectors

had shown no right or title in the property and that occupying vacant

land to sell vegetables conferred no valuable right upon them. The

State was never one of those objectors/judgment debtors and does

not claim through them. It claims a wholly separate title, as owner in

its own right. Where such an independent claim is made by someone

who is a stranger to the decree, the real question is not the mode of

execution as between the Decree Holder and her objectors/judgment

debtors but whether the objector has itself proved a right, title or

possession strong enough to defeat the Decree Holder's claim. That

is what the second question answers.

[14] On the second question, the State's case encou nters a

difficulty that goes to substance and not merely to procedure. It is

ESA-11-2024 (O&M) & ESA-12-2024(O&M) --10-

necessary to notice that the finding dated 05.09.2011 of the learned

Executing Court, on which the Courts below have pla ced

considerable reliance, addressed a single question, namely whether

the decretal land forms part of Khasra No. 271 and answered it in the

negative. Khasra No. 735 was never in issue before that Court. That

finding cannot, therefore, be read as an affirmative determination that

the decretal land either is or is not part of Khasra No. 735. The claim

that the land instead falls within Khasra Nos. 734 and 735 has, in

fact, been raised no fewer than three times: first in 2012, resulting in

the order dated 16.08.2013 dismissing the demarcation application

for want of proof; again in 2019, resulting in the order dated

15.05.2019, upheld in CA No. 209 of 2019 decided on 15.02.2021

and in ESA Nos. 6 to 9 of 2021 decided by this Court on 01.12.2021;

and once more through the demarcation report dated 10.04.2021,

which was got conducted without any order of the learned Executing

Court authorising it. On each occasion, the claim was either rejected

for want of proof by the person asserting it or in the case of the 2021

report, never even tested. None of these attempts settles the

question either way; what they establish is only that no claimant

asserting these Khasra numbers has ever discharged the burden of

proving them.

[14.1] What the State cannot escape, however, is it s own

conduct. The State has itself pursued, through its own suits rather

than mere objections, the identical claim it now presses in respect of

both plots, that the decretal land is part of Khasra No. 735. Its suit

concerning Plot No. 128, Civil Suit No. 342 of 2013, was dismissed

ESA-11-2024 (O&M) & ESA-12-2024(O&M) --11--

on 10.08.2017, the first appeal was dismissed on 19.04.2018 and the

second appeal, RSA No. 373 of 2022, was dismissed by this Court on

14.02.2022, both on merits and independently on the ground of an

unexplained delay of 682 days. Its suit concerning Plot No. 129, Civil

Suit No. 347 of 2013, rests on the same pleadings and pressed the

same claim. Both suits were fought out on evidence, with witnesses

examined on both sides and were dismissed on a specific finding that

the State had failed to prove the connection between the decretal

land and Khasra No. 735. This is a decision on the merits in the

fullest sense and Section 11 CPC squarely bars the State from

raising that same question again, whether by suit or by objection,

against the same Decree Holders.

[14.2] A recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, though

turning on somewhat different facts, reached the same result on a

footing considerably weaker than the present one. In Sharada

Sanghi v. Asha Agarwal, 2026 INSC 292 , the party seeking to

reopen at the execution stage a question already put before a Court

was the Decree Holder rather than the objector but the principle

applied was the same. There, the appellants had, while their specific

performance suit was pending, separately sued to cancel the very

sale deeds under which the respondents claimed a rival title. Those

suits were allowed to be dismissed for default, without any decision

on the merits. When the appellants later sought to execute their

decree so as to dispossess the respondents, it was held that

dismissal for default could not attract Section 11 CPC, since that

Section requires the matter to have been “heard and finally decided.”

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Even so, the appellants were not permitted to obtain through

execution what their own abandoned suits had failed to secure,

applying the wider principle, drawn from K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi,

(1998) 3 SCC 573, that relitigating an issue already raised and lost is

an abuse of the process of the Court, whether or not the strict

requirements of res judicata are met. The nexus between an

independent suit raising a question that goes to the decree and a

later attempt to have that same question determined in execution, is

thus squarely established; and it operates with equal force whether

the party attempting it is the Decree Holder, as there or the objector,

as here. The relevant portion of Sharada’s case (supra) is

reproduced herein:7

“45. In the case of Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) 2 All ER

255] the Court had to consider different proceedings on the same

cause of action for conspiracy, but supported by different averments.

The Court held that if the plaintiff has chosen to put his case in one

way, he cannot thereafter bring the same transaction before the

Court, put his case in another way and say that he is relying on a

new cause of action. In such circumstances he can be met with the

plea of res judicata or the statement or plaint may be struck out on

the ground that the action is frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of

the process of the court.

46. In Mcllkenny v. Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Force

[(1980) 2 All ER 227] the court of appeal in England struck out the

pleading on the ground that the action was an abuse of the process

of the court since it raised an issue identical to that which had been

finally determined at the plaintiffs' earlier criminal trial. The Court

said even when it is not possible to strike out the plaint on the

ground of issue estoppel, the action can be struck out as an abuse

of the process of the court because it is an abuse for a party to re7

litigate a question or issue which has already been decided against

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him even though the other party cannot satisfy the strict rule of res

judicata or the requirement of issue estoppel. (emphasis ours)

48. In the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, this Court cannot ignore

such conduct where a party plays fast and loose with the court.

Allowing proceedings touching upon title to be dismissed for default,

while continuing to pursue relief in another proceeding concerning

the same property, raises concerns as to procedural fairness. Equity

frowns upon selective prosecution. A party cannot act recklessly with

the judicial process, invoking it as per his convenience and

abandoning it when inconvenient, only to resurrect advantage in

execution.”

[14.3] The present case stands on an even better fo oting

because the very thing missing, a hearing and a final decision on the

merits, is squarely present here. The State's suits were not dismissed

for default. They went to trial, evidence was led by both sides and a

clear finding was returned against the State. If the Hon’ble Apex

Court refused to allow relitigation even where the earlier suits had

never been tried on the merits, then the State cannot be allowed to

relitigate a claim that was actually tried, evidenced, and lost.

Sharada Sanghi’s case (supra) , therefore, only fortifies a

conclusion that Section 11 CPC compels on its own terms. The

burden of proof points the same way. In an objection of this kind, it is

for the objector to establish its right, title or possession and the State

has already had one full opportunity, with its own pleadings and its

own evidence, to discharge that burden and failed.

[15] The State's difficulty deepens further when the history of

this very execution is considered. The claim that the land is part of

Khasra Nos. 734 and 735 was pursued by a different set of objectors,

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Pyare Lal and others, under a different name, through the learned

Executing Court, by order dated 15.05.2019, the first appellate Court,

in CA No. 209 of 2019 decided on 15.02.2021 and this Court, in ESA

Nos. 6 to 9 of 2021 decided on 01.12.2021 and failed at every stage;

a Special Leave Petition against this Court's order was dismissed as

withdrawn on 01.11.2022. That outcome does not itself bind the

State, which did not claim through those objectors. But it confirms

that this specific numerical claim has already been tested to finality

once before and rejected, within this very execution.

[16] The fraud plea does not hold up either. A decr ee

obtained by fraud gives no right to the person who obtained it,

however, it is well7settled that allegations of fraud must be

substantiated with specific evidence and cannot rely solely on general

pleadings. Absence of evidence to support pleadings of fraud renders

the claim untenable. In Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, 1951

AIR Supreme Court 280  the Hon’ble Apex Court observed:7

"

 25. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have

been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better

established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue

influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth

full particulars and the case can only be decided on the

particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in

evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount

to an averment of fraud of which any Ct. ought to take notice,

however, strong the language in which they are couched may

be and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. See

Order 6, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code.”

[16.1] The present objections say no more than that the Decree

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Holders were never in possession, which falls short of a proper plea

of fraud and is harder still to accept once it is recalled that the State's

own claim on the same question has already been hea rd and

rejected, over both plots. It may also be noted that in the State's own

suits, its pleadings describe a Government Primary School as lying

on the eastern boundary of Khasra No. 735, rather than within it, a

description that sits uneasily with the present claim that a school has

stood on Khasra No. 735 itself since 1918. The 2021 demarcation

report fares no better. As already noticed, it was got conducted by the

SDO (Civil), Loharu on his own, without any order of the learned

Executing Court and without notice to the decree holder, who had no

chance to take part in the exercise or to question its findings. It

cannot be used against her, particularly against the background of

the earlier, fully contested proceedings that reached a different

conclusion.

[17] The complaint that the State was denied a chan ce to

lead evidence cannot be entertained here. The appellant State,

through the learned Government Pleader, moved its own separate

application on 13.12.2022 for framing of issues. Replies were filed on

behalf of the decree holder and the application was dismissed by the

learned Executing Court by order dated 17.01.2023, nearly six

months before the objections themselves came to be decided on

12.07.2023. That order was appealable and the State, which lost no

time in appealing the order dated 12.07.2023, chose not to assail it. It

has long attained finality, binds the parties on that question and

cannot be reopened collaterally at this stage.

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[18] Moreover, it is difficult to overlook what this Decree

Holder has had to go through merely to obtain what a Court granted

her predecessors in 2005. The Hon'ble Supreme Court , in

Satyawati v. Rajinder Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 491 , made the

following observations:7

“13. It is really agonizing to learn that the appellant 7 Decree

Holder is unable to enjoy the fruits of her success even today

i.e. in 2013 though the appellant7 plaintiff had finally

succeeded in January, 1996. As stated hereinabove, the Privy

Council in the case of The General Manager of the Raj

Durbhnga under the Court of Wards v. Maharajah Coomar

Ramaput Sing had observed that the difficulties of a litigant in

India begin when he has obtained a Decree. Even in 1925,

while quoting the aforestated judgment of the Privy Council in

the case of Kuer Jang Bahadur v. Bank of Upper India

Ltd., Lucknow, [AIR 1925 Oudh 448] , the Court was

constrained to observe that " Courts in India have to be

careful to see that process of the Court and law of procedure

are not abused by the judgment7debtors in such a way as to

make Courts of law instrumental in defrauding creditors, who

have obtained decrees in accordance with their rights. "

14. In spite of the aforestated observation made in 1925,

this Court was again constrained to observe in Babu Lal

v. M/s. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors., [(1982)1 SCC 525] in

para 29 that " Procedure is meant to advance the cause of

justice and not to retard it. The difficulty of the Decree Holder

starts in getting possession in pursuance of the decree

obtained by him. The judgment debtor tries to thwart the

execution by all possible objections... "

15. This Court, again in the case of Marshall Sons & Co. (I)

Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. & Anr., [(1999)2 SCC

325] was constrained to observe in para 4 of the said

judgment that " ..it appears to us, prima facie, that a decree in

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favour of the appellant is not being executed for some reason

or the other, we do not think it proper at this stage to direct

the respondent to deliver the possession to the appellant since

the suit filed by the respondent is still pending. It is true that

proceedings are dragged for a long time on one count or the

other and on occasion, become highly technical accompanied

by unending prolixity at every stage providing a legal trap to

the unwary. Because of the delay, unscrupulous parties to the

proceedings take undue advantage and person who is in

wrongful possession draws delight in delay in disposal of the

cases by taking undue advantage of procedural complications.

It is also a known fact that after obtaining a decree for

possession of immovable property, its execution takes long

time.. "

16. Once again in the case of Shub Karan Bubna alias

Shub Karan Prasad Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna and Ors.,

[2009(4) RCR (Civil) 303 : 2009(5) Recent Apex

Judgments (R.A.J.) 534 : (2009)9 SCC 689] at para 27 this

Court observed as under :

" In the present system, when preliminary decree for

partition is passed, there is no guarantee that the

plaintiff will see the fruits of the decree. The proverbial

observation by the Privy Council is that the difficulties of

a litigant begin when he obtains a decree. It is

necessary to remember that success in a suit means

nothing to a party unless he gets the relief. Therefore, to

be really meaningful and efficient, the scheme of the

Code should enable a party not only to get a decree

quickly, but also to get the relief quickly. This requires a

conceptual change regarding civil litigation, so that the

emphasis is not only on disposal of suits, but also on

securing relief to the litigant. "”

[18.1.] In the present case, in the twenty years since the decree

was passed in 2005, this land has been contested by Gram

ESA-11-2024 (O&M) & ESA-12-2024(O&M) --18-

Panchayat, then by Municipal Committee under its new name, then

by a fresh set of claimants asserting Khasra Nos. 734 and 735, then

by another set of claimants doing the same in this very execution and

now by the State itself, twice over, first through a suit to set aside the

decree and now through these very objections. Each challenge has

run its own course, through trial, appeal and often second appeal and

each has failed. A Decree Holder is entitled to the fruits of her decree

within a reasonable time and a repeated succession of objections,

each raising a variant of the same claim after the last one has failed,

cannot be allowed to become a substitute for a right of appeal that

was never successfully exercised. The finality of a decree would

mean little if it could be indefinitely deferred by the simple device of a

new objector appearing each time an earlier one is turned away.

[19] At this stage, it is made clear that this Court is not

inclined to order a fresh demarcation. The claim that the land falls

within Khasra Nos. 734 and 735 has already been raised three times,

in 2012, in 2019 and again through the State's own report dated

10.04.2021 and has failed on each occasion. When that claim was

last pressed, by a different set of objectors, it was rejected at every

tier up to this Court, which held that a person with no right or title in

the property has no locus standi to ask for its demarcation.

Reopening that question now would simply repeat what has already

been settled three times over. The only concrete public7interest

concern disclosed by this record is the seven7foot portion of Plot No.

129 which the Bailiff, on visiting the spot in 2021, found to fall under

the Government primary school. That is a narrow and specific matter,

ESA-11-2024 (O&M) & ESA-12-2024(O&M) --19--

quite distinct from the sweeping claim of title that has been raised and

rejected. It is already addressed by the direction contained in the

impugned judgment, that execution be carried out in the presence of

the District Elementary Education Officer and the Tehsildar, Bhiwani,

which shall continue to operate. Nothing further is required.

CONCLUSION

[20] In view of the discussion made hereinabove, no

substantial question of law arises and the impugned orders call for no

interference. Consequently, the present appeal(s), being devoid of

merits, are hereby dismissed.

[21] Since the main appeal itself stands dismissed, no order

is required to be passed on the application for condonation of delay in

either appeal. The applications for stay and any other pending

miscellaneous applications, shall stand disposed of.

[22] A copy of this order be placed on the file of the

connected appeal.

[23] Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

10.09.2026 (HARKESH MANUJA)

sonika JUDGE

(i) Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes

(ii) Whether reportable: Yes