2026:HHC:36668

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Appeal No. 321 of 2015

Reserved on: 19.08.2026

Date of Decision: 27.08.2028

State of Himachal Pradesh ....Appellant

Versus

Bhuri Singh & Anr. ....Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the appellant/State : Mr Jitender Sharma,

Additional Advocate General.

For the Respondents : Mr Naresh Kaul, Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeal is directed against the

judgment dated 24.12.2014 , passed by Learned Judicial

Magistrate First Class Court No. 2, Nurpur, District Kangra,

H.P. (learned trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused

before Learned trial Court) were acquitted of the commission

1

. Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

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of offences punishable under Sections 324 and 325 read with

Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC). (The parties shall

hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were

arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

appeal are that the police presented a challan before the

learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable

under Sections 324 and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It

was asserted that the informant, Ved Parkash (PW-1), went to

his field on 09.05.2007. He found that a branch of a Dreak tree

had fallen during the previous night, and accused Bhuri Singh

was cutting it. The informant objected, and the accused

retorted by saying that the tree belonged to him. The

informant tried to prevent the accused from cutting the tree.

However, the accused inflicted a blow with the sickle on the

informant’s left hand. Accused Sheela Devi also came to the

spot. She inflicted blows on the informant's back and the right

arm. The accused Bhuri Singh inflicted a blow on the

informant's face, and his tooth was broken. The matter was

reported to the police, and an entry (Ext. PW-10/A) was

recorded in the Police Station. An application was filed for the

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informant’s medical examination. Dr Dilwar Singh (PW-3)

examined the informant/victim and found that he had

sustained multiple injuries. He referred the informant to an

orthopaedic and dental surgeon for expert opinion. Dr Raman

Vaid (PW-4) found that the informant’s tooth was dislocated;

hence, the injury was grievous in nature. Dr Dilwar Singh

(PW-3) issued the final opinion (Ext. PW-3/E) stating that the

injuries were grievous, which could have been caused by

means of a sickle (Ext.P-1). An entry (Ext.PW-10/B) was

recorded in the police station, and an FIR (Ext. PW-8/A) was

registered. ASI Sher Singh (PW-9) investigated the matter. He

visited the spot and prepared the spot map (Ext.PW-9/A). The

accused produced a sickle (Ext.P-1), which was seized vide

memo (Ext.PW-1/C). Statements of witnesses were recorded

as per their version, and after the completion of investigation,

the challan was prepared and presented before the learned

trial Court.

3. The learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were

charged with the commission of offences punishable under

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Sections 324 and 325 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which

they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove

its case. Ved Parkash (PW-1) is the informant. Shilpa (PW-2),

Milkhi Ram (PW-5) and Subhash Chand (PW -6) are the

eyewitnesses. Dr Dilwar Singh (PW-3) medically examined

the informant. Dr Raman Vaid (PW-4) is the dental surgeon,

who examined the informant and found that the nature of the

injury was grievous. Nathu Ram (PW-7) prepared the Challan.

ASI Ashok Kumar (PW -8) signed the F.I.R. ASI Sher Singh

(PW-9) investigated the matter. HHC Rashpal Singh (PW-10)

proved the entries.

5. The accused, in his statement recorded under

Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), denied

the prosecution case. They asserted that they had never given

any blow to the informant, the police had falsely implicated

them, and the witnesses deposed falsely in connivance with

the informant and the police. They did not produce any

evidence in their defence.

6. Learned trial Court held that the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses were not reliable. Dr Raman Vaid (PW-

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4) stated that the informant was suffering from periodontitis

and the tooth had come out because of the disease. No

corresponding injury was found on the face. There were

discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses. Dr Dilwar

stated that the possibility of sustaining the injuries while

doing the agricultural work could not be ruled out. The

relationship between the parties was strained , and the

prosecution case required careful consideration. The

circumstances on record made the prosecution case doubtful.

Hence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the

learned trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal

asserting that the learned trial Court erred in appreciating the

material placed before it. The informant narrated the incident

on oath in the Court. His testimony was corroborated by

Shilpa (PW-2), Milkhi Ram (PW-5) and Subhash Chand (PW-

6). There was no reason to show that the witnesses had

deposed falsely. Their testimonies were corroborated by the

medical evidence. The learned Trial Court held that the

informant and Shilpa were related to each other, but mere

relationship is not sufficient to discard the prosecution case.

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Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed

and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set

aside.

8. I have heard Mr Jitender Sharma, learned

Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr

Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for the respondent.

9. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate

General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned

Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of

prosecution witnesses corroborated each other on material

particulars. The medical evidence also corroborated their

testimonies. The learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the

statements of the witnesses without any cogent reasons.

Therefore, h e prayed that the present appeal be allowed and

the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

10. Mr Naresh Kaul, learned counsel for the

respondent/accused, submitted that Dr Raman Vaid (PW-4)

proved that the tooth had come out because of the disease.

This falsified the informant's version that the accused had

caused injuries to him. The names of the prosecution

witnesses were not mentioned in the earliest complaint made

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to the police, and their presence on the spot is highly doubtful.

The learned trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this

Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the

learned trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal

be dismissed.

11. I have given considerable thought to the

submissions made at the bar and have gone through the

records carefully.

12. The present appeal has been filed against a

judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2026 SCC

OnLine SC 1373, that the Court can interfere with a judgment of

acquittal only if it is impossible, perverse, wholly

unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. It was observed:

Scope of interference with an acquittal:

26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves

of the settled principles governing interference with an

order of acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent

until proven guilty. When a court of competent

jurisdiction acquits the accused, the presumption of

innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where such

acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to

be exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even

greater.

27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2

SCC 808: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1048, this Court explained the

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golden thread running through criminal jurisprudence

in the following words:

“25. Another golden thread which runs through the

web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is

that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced

in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and

the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable

to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a

special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the

accused is sought to be established by circumstantial

evidence. A rule has accordingly been laid down that

unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent

only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and

is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court

should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the

accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court

entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the

accused, the accused must have the benefit of that

doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the

accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a

mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable

of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that it is

hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural

consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt

also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by resort

to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As

mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab

v. Jagir Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale

wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination

and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to

whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of

the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event

in real life and is the product of the interplay of

different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion

about the guilt of the accused charged with the

commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the

evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, intrinsic

worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the

final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts.

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Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should

be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the

same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy

on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of

conjectures.”

28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further

cautions that wrongful acquittal and wrongful

conviction do not stand on the same footing, for

conviction of an innocent person causes grave injustice

and shakes public confidence in the administration of

criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore,

is not a technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard

flowing from the presumption of innocence.

29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10

SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the

limited scope of interference with acquittals. This

Court observed:

“75. The Trial Court has the advantage of

watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have

given evidence; therefore, the appellate court

should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the

Trial Court. An acquittal by the Trial Court should

not be interfered with unless it is totally perverse or

wholly unsustainable.”

30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also

crystallised certain propositions: first, there is a double

presumption of innocence in favour of an acquitted

accused; secondly, if two views are possible, the view

favourable to the accused must prevail; thirdly, though

the appellate court has the power to reappreciate

evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal is

manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of

justice; and fourthly, due weight must be given to the

Trial Court's findings, particularly because the trial

judge had the advantage of observing the demeanour

of witnesses.

31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC

415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court held that though

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the appellate court has full power to review and

reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of

innocence is strengthened by an order of acquittal. It

was held that when two reasonable conclusions are

possible on the basis of evidence on record, the

appellate court should not disturb the finding of

acquittal.

32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v.

State of Tripura (2011) 9 SCC 479, wherein this Court

held that an order of acquittal is to be interfered with

only when there are compelling and substantial

reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are

possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the

appellate court should not disturb the finding of

acquittal.

33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether

another view on the evidence is possible. The question

is whether the view taken by the Trial Court and

affirmed by the High Court is impossible, perverse,

wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal. Having

examined the record, we are unable to hold so.

13. The entry (Ext. PW-10/A) does not mention that

any person had witnessed the incident. Ther efore, the

statements of Shilpa (PW -2), Milkhi Ram (PW-5) and

Subhash Chand (PW-6) are required to be seen with due care

and caution.

14. The informant stated that accused Bhuri Singh was

cutting a Dreak tree at about 07.30 a.m., and when he

objected, accused Bhuri Singh inflicted an injury by means of

a sickle. Subhash Chand (PW-6), on the other hand, stated

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that the wife of Bhuri Singh was cutting a Dreak tree, which

led to the incident. Therefore, the statements of these two

witnesses are contradictory regarding the genesis of the

incident.

15. The informant Ved Parkash (PW-1) stated that the

accused had pushed him and inflicted blows with fists. Sheela

Devi inflicted blows by means of a stick, and thereafter Bhuri

Singh inflicted a blow by means of Darat. He tried to avoid the

blow, and he sustained injury on his arm. This is contrary to

the earliest version wherein it was stated that the injury was

caused to the thumb. Dr Dilwar Singh (PW-3) found injury No.

1 over the left hand and the base of the little finger, 3 cm long,

3 mm deep and 2 mm wide, with regular margins, which could

have been caused by means of a sickle. He noticed an injury on

the left forearm, but that was not stated to have been caused

by means of a sickle. Therefore, the medical evidence does not

corroborate the informant's version on oath.

16. The informant stated that his tooth was dislocated

because of the fist blows given by the accused. Dr Raman Vaid

(PW-4) examined the informant and found that the

informant was suffering from periodontitis. There was no

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corresponding injury, swelling or bleeding to the adjacent

tissues. He admitted in his cross -examination that the

informant had lost a tooth because of periodontitis. The tooth

in question had caries, and the possibility of coming out of the

tooth because of the caries could not be ruled out. There was

no corresponding injury in the face and oral cavity. The

statement of this witness shows that the tooth could have

been dislocated by periodontitis and caries, and the absence of

the corresponding injuries makes the informant's version

doubtful that the tooth was dislocated because of the fist

below inflicted by the accused.

17. Shilpa (PW-2) stated that the informant went to

the spot and objected to the cutting of the tree by the accused.

The accused gave two or three fist blows. Accused Sheela Devi

also reached the spot and inflicted a blow by means of a stick.

The accused inflicted a blow with a sickle when the informant

tried to pick up the branch, and the informant sustained

injuries on his hand. She stated in her cross-examination that

she was studying in school. Her school was functioning on the

date of the incident, but she had stayed at home. She admitted

that there was a dispute between the informant and the

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accused related to the land. She admitted that both the parties

claimed the tree to be owned by them.

18. She has not assigned any reason as to why she

should have stayed at home on the date of the incident. She is

related to the informant, and her name was not mentioned in

the entry in the daily diary recorded at the first instance.

Therefore, the learned trial Court was justified in looking for

corroboration to her testimony.

19. Milkhi Ram (PW-5) stated that accused Bhuri

Singh started cutting the branch of the tree. The informant

came to the spot and objected to the cutting of the branch.

Both the parties had a scuffle and grappled with each other.

Sheela Devi also came to the spot with two other women. They

surrounded the informant. Bhuri Singh inflicted a fist blow on

the informant’s face. He could not witness the incident

because the woman had obstructed his view. The statement of

this witness is contrary to the prosecution version, and the

informant did not state that the accused and the informant

had a scuffle with each other or that accused Sheela Devi came

to the spot with two other women who had surrounded him.

The name of this witness was also not mentioned in the entry

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in the daily diary, and the learned trial Court was justified in

discarding his version.

19. Subhash Chand (PW-6) has changed the genesis of

the incident by saying that accused Sheela Devi was cutting

the branch of the tree, which is nobody's case.

20. The learned Trial Court had rightly observed that

the relationship between the parties was strained and the

testimonies of the witnesses were required to be seen with due

care and caution. The statements of the witnesses

contradicted each other on material aspects, and the medical

evidence also did not corroborate the testimonies of the

witnesses. Hence, the learned Trial Court had taken a

reasonable view that could have been taken based on the

evidence led before the learned Trial Court, and no

interference is required with a reasonable view of the learned

Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

21. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it

is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.

22. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the

Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to

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furnish personal bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- each with

one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the

learned trial Court, which shall be effective for six months

with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition

being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the

respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before

the Hon'ble Supreme Court

23. The present appeal stands disposed of, so also the

pending miscellaneous application(s), if any

24. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the

learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

27

th

August, 2026.

(Ravinder)