2026 INSC 290 Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 1 of 19

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1275 OF 2015

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH ... APPELLANT(S)

Versus

HUKUM CHAND ALIAS MONU ... RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

1. The State of Himachal Pradesh, aggrieved by final judgment

and order dated 3

rd

June 2014 in Criminal Appeal No 721 of 2008

1

whereby the learned Division Bench set aside the findings of guilt

and consequent sentence returned by the District and Sessions

1

Impugned judgment

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 2 of 19

Judge, Mandi

2

in Sessions Case No. 12 of 2008 in terms of the

judgment dated 12

th

September 2008 and instead, entered a finding

of acquittal against the respondent-accused, has preferred this

appeal.

2. A nine-year-old girl was sent by her mother to fetch

buttermilk bright and early in the morning of 27

th

August 2007,

however, the brightness was soon extinguished. She was taken into

a cowshed by the neighbour’s son and sexually assaulted. Upon

returning home, she described the horrifying incident to her mother

and later in the day to her father, who was a mason by profession

and worked elsewhere. He made a couple of phone calls, including

one to the little girl’s maternal uncle, who visited their home

subsequently and they went and filed the First Information Report

3

with the police. The victim was medically examined, and her

bloodstained clothes were handed over to the authorities. Upon

conclusion of the investigation, the police filed a charge sheet under

Sections 376, 201 of the Indian Penal Code,1860

4

and Section 3(xii)

2

Trial Court

3

FIR No. 355 of 2007 registered at PS Sunder Nagar

4

IPC

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 3 of 19

of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989

5

.

3. The Trial Court, having appreciated the testimony of sixteen

witnesses for the prosecution and three for the defense, convicted

the accused under Section 376 IPC and the offence under the SC/ST

Act, and acquitted him under Section 201 IPC. The sentence

awarded was rigorous imprisonment for ten years and a fine of Rs.

10,000/- for the former offence, with a further rigorous

imprisonment of one year in default of payment of fine. For the

latter offence, imprisonment of the same description for five years

and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with a further rigorous imprisonment of

one year in default of payment of fine. To arrive at this conclusion,

reliance was placed on the testimony of the victim, and its

corroboration by subsequent witnesses such as her parents, the

medical witnesses and also the person from whom she was sent to

fetch buttermilk, altogether forming a web of factors pointing to the

guilt of the accused-respondent.

5

SC/ST Act

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 4 of 19

4. The impugned judgment reverses these findings. The sum and

substance of the High Court’s reasoning is that major contradictions

in the witness testimonies have been ignored by the Trial Court. It

was found that the prosecution version suffered from serious

improbabilities. The prosecutrix had apparently gone to fetch lassi

from a house that was about 8 kilometers away. This meant she

would have had to travel approximately 16 kilometers to go and

return within two hours, which appeared to the Court to be highly

improbable. Next considered was the aspect of the acrimonious

relationship between the two families in so far as alleged theft of

grass and fuelwood from the accused’s land. Importantly, a quarrel

had taken place between the families on the very same day as the

alleged incident. The prosecutrix herself admitted that her parents

had cut grass from the accused’s land that day and that tensions

already existed. Further, the Court found material contradictions and

inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecutrix, her mother, her

father, and her maternal uncle. There were differences regarding

how and when the incident was reported, who went where before

lodging the FIR, and whether the maternal uncle came to the house

or met them on the road. These inconsistencies were considered

significant.

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 5 of 19

Still further, the Court also questioned the conduct of the

prosecutrix’s mother. She stated that she had become aware of the

incident in the morning when she noticed bloodstains, yet no

immediate report was made. Instead, the matter was disclosed only

after the father returned home at night, and the FIR was lodged the

next morning. The Court found this delay relevant in the overall

evaluation of the case. With respect to the SC/ST Act charges, the

Court noted that these provisions were not included in the original

FIR. They were added later by the supervising officer. Similarly,

Section 201 IPC was added later, even though the Investigating

Officer did not find grounds for it during the initial investigation.

Although the medical evidence indicated that the

prosecutrix had been exposed to a sexual act, the Court held that

medical opinion alone could not be treated as substantive evidence.

In view of the inconsistencies and surrounding circumstances, the

medical evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction.

5. The State challenges the said judgment in these proceedings.

At the outset, a disturbing fact must be acknowledged. The

Legislature had as far back as 1983 introduced a provision into IPC

seeking to protect the identity of the victim of the offence under

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 6 of 19

Section 376 IPC, in the aftermath of the State of Maharashtra v.

Tukaram

6

. The amendment was made apparently to address a

specific mischief that emerged starkly from the way sexual offence

cases were handled: the public disclosure of a survivor’s identity.

Before 1983, there was no statutory bar on publishing the name or

particulars of a woman against whom a sexual offence was alleged;

Court reporting and media coverage could expose survivors to social

stigma, ostracism, and lifelong reputational harm. This perspective

is reflected in academic discussions on the evolution of the law on

sexual assault

7

, which identify the 1983 amendments as marking the

beginning of a victim-centred orientation in Indian criminal law;

protections such as in-camera trials, evidentiary presumptions, and

anonymity were designed to reduce the barriers and fears that

previously discouraged reporting and effective prosecution of

sexual offences. Clearly, the intent of this Section has been given a

miss in these proceedings. The name of the victim is treated like that

of any other witness and is freely used throughout the record. This

must be deprecated in the strongest terms. In fact, this Court has

6

(1979) 2 SCC 143

7

Shruti Bedi, The Indian Rape Law: Vocabulary of Protest, Reactionary Legislations and

Quality of Equality Culture, Udayana Journal of law and Culture, Vol 7 No.1, (2023)

https://doi.org/10.24843/UJLC.2023.v07.i01.p01

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 7 of 19

noticed earlier also that the mandate of this provision is not being

followed.

6. Moving further, it is important to note that this is a case of

differing views from the Trial Court and the High Court. The effect

of this Court interfering in this appeal would be that an acquittal

would be set aside despite the well-established position that this

Court is loath to interfere in acquittals unless the said conclusion has

been arrived at in disregard of principles of law or on an entirely

misdirected analysis of evidence leading to injustice. This Court

recently in State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg

8

, observed as follows:

“15. Having appreciated the provisions and the judgments as

aforesaid, let us now proceed to consider whether, in view of the

evidence, the High Court was justified in setting aside the

findings of the Trial Court. However, prior to that we will

undertake the task of examining the scope of this Court's power

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in criminal

matters.

15.1 In Surajdeo Mahto v. State of Bihar, it was held:

“25. It may be highlighted at the outset that although the powers

vested in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are

wide, this Court in a criminal appeal by special leave will

ordinarily loath to enter into a fresh reappraisement of evidence

and question the credibility of witnesses when there is a

concurrent finding of fact, save for certain exceptional

circumstances. While it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal

application, it has been affirmed time and again that except

8

2025 SCC OnLine SC 2801

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 8 of 19

where the assessment of the High Court is vitiated by an error

of law or procedure, or is based on misreading of evidence, or

is inconsistent with the evidence and thus has led to a perverse

finding, this Court will refrain from interfering with the findings

of the courts below.”

15.2 On a reading of various judgements, viz., Ramaniklal

Gokaldas v. State of Gujarat, Nadodi Jayaraman v. State of

T.N., Banwari Ram v. State of U.P., the generally accepted

standard - which it ought to be stated, is not a rule - is that when

the Courts below concurred, this Court does not enter into the

reappreciation of the evidence, in a criminal case. In the present

case, the Courts below have, in fact, arrived at opposite findings

and as such, to set the matter to rest either by conviction or

acquittal, this Court must analyse the evidence on record.”

The above observations were followed and referred in State of H.P.

v. Chaman Lal

9

.

7. Before proceeding further, however, it is important to also

take note of principles qua appreciation of the testimony of child

witnesses. In State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

10

this Court through one

of us, (Sanjay Karol J.,) formulated the following principles for the

appreciation of the testimony of child witnesses:

“22. Recently, a coordinate Bench of this Court in State of

M.P. v. Balveer Singh [State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh, (2025) 8

SCC 545] speaking through J.B. Pardiwala, J., considered a

large number of prior decisions of this Court to lay down

guidelines for the appreciation of the evidence of a child witness.

9

2026 SCC OnLine SC 85

10

(2025) 8 SCC 613

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 9 of 19

We have perused through the same. Reference can also be made

to other judgments in State of M.P. v. Ramesh [State of

M.P. v. Ramesh, (2011) 4 SCC 786 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 493]

; Panchhi v. State of U.P. [Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7

SCC 177 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1561] ; and State of U.P. v. Ashok

Dixit [State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit, (2000) 3 SCC 70 : 2000 SCC

(Cri) 579] , etc.

23. The principles that can be adduced from an overview of the

aforesaid decisions, are:

23.1. No hard and fast rule can be laid down qua testing the

competency of a child witness to testify at trial.

23.2. Whether or not a given child witness will testify is a matter

of the trial Judge being satisfied as to the ability and competence

of the said witness. To determine the same the Judge is to look

to the manner of the witness, intelligence, or lack thereof, as may

be apparent; an understanding of the distinction between truth

and falsehood, etc.

23.3. The non-administration of oath to a child witness will not

render their testimony doubtful or unusable.

23.4. The trial Judge must be alive to the possibility of the child

witness being swayed, influenced and tutored, for in their

innocence, such matters are of ease for those who may wish to

influence the outcome of the trial, in one direction or another.

23.5. Seeking corroboration, therefore, of the testimony of a

child witness, is well-placed practical wisdom.

23.6. There is no bar to cross-examination of a child witness. If

the said witness has withstood the cross-examination, the

prosecution would be entirely within their rights to seek

conviction even solely relying thereon.”

(emphasis supplied)

An earlier instance in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Manga Singh

11

is also noteworthy. It was held:

11

(2019) 16 SCC 759

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 10 of 19

“10. The conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of

the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence. The conviction can be

based solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no

corroboration be required unless there are compelling reasons

which necessitate the courts to insist for corroboration of her

statement. Corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix is

not a requirement of law, but a guidance of prudence under the

given facts and circumstances. Minor contractions or small

discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing the evidence

of the prosecutrix.

11. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme

Court that corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in

a rape case. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from

any basic infirmity and the “probabilities factor” does not

render it unworthy of credence. As a general rule, there is no

reason to insist on corroboration except from medical evidence.

However, having regard to the circumstances of the case,

medical evidence may not be available. In such cases, solitary

testimony of the prosecutrix would be sufficient to base the

conviction, if it inspires the confidence of the court.

8. When it comes to inconsistencies and omissions in

testimonies, which is one of the primary grounds on which the

reasoning of the High Court rests, it is well recognised that human

perception, memory and narration are imperfect. As such, the Court

has consistently held that minor inconsistencies or trivial

discrepancies in the testimony of witnesses do not by themselves

make the evidence unreliable. In State of U.P. v. M. K. Anthony

12

,

this Court explained that while appreciating evidence, courts must

12

(1985) 1 SCC 505

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 11 of 19

not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. Variations in

trivial matters that do not affect the core of the case should not lead

to rejection of credible testimony in its entirety. The evidence must

be assessed as a whole to determine whether it carries the ring of

truth. Similarly, in Appabhai v. State of Gujarat

13

, the Court

cautioned against placing undue weight on minor contradictions or

omissions. Truthful witnesses may differ in detail due to normal

lapses of memory or differences in perception. The essential

question is whether the inconsistencies materially compromise the

backbone of the prosecution narrative. In State of Rajasthan v.

Kalki

14

, the Court distinguished between normal discrepancies

arising from errors of observation or memory and material

discrepancies that go to the core of the case. Only the latter

undermine the prosecution in a substantial manner. [See also:

Rakesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh

15

]

In conclusion, it may be said that a truthful witness may make

honest mistakes or omit immaterial details, and such normal

variation should not result in wholesale rejection of evidence.

However, when omissions or contradictions relate to material facts

13

1988 Supp SCC 241

14

(1981) 2 SCC 752

15

(2021) 7 SCC 188

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 12 of 19

that form the foundation of the prosecution’s version, they assume

significance and may create reasonable doubt.

9. Keeping the aforesaid principles in view, we now move to the

appreciation of evidence. We have perused all the testimonies. The

following is a snapshot of the main witnesses:

PW-1, who is aged 9-10 years, is the victim/prosecutrix. In her

examination-in-chief she has positively identified the accused-

respondent as being present in Court, and he being the one who took

her to the cow-shed and committed sexual assault on her. She

described informing her mother and later father of the incident, and

also the subsequent actions of the father leading to the registration

of the FIR. Certain facts elicited in the cross-examination are that

the parents of the victim and the accused respondent had quarreled

several times over the alleged theft of grass. She has categorically

denied the suggestion that she was not sexually assaulted and the

injury to her private parts was a result of her mother’s insertion of

her finger, therein, in order to frame the accused. The one

significant departure from the testimony of other witnesses, that can

be noticed here is that she has specifically deposed qua the factum

of the respondent accused’s mother coming to PW-2, the mother of

the prosecutrix and requesting her not to disclose this incident to the

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 13 of 19

villagers. However, this position has been specifically denied by

DW-2, Phula Devi. Nothing has been discussed about the same in

cross-examination.

PW-2, namely Roshani Devi, testified that the prosecutrix

informed her about the acts of the respondent accused, which she

relayed to DW-2 too, and the latter asked her to refrain from

disclosure as it would bring disrepute to both families. She

categorically said that she disclosed the incident to her husband,

PW-3, namely Jia Lal, upon his return home at 9:30 pm in the

evening, and was scolded for not having done so earlier. Jia Lal

called up Hemraj PW-15 who apparently called them to the road,

whereafter all of them, together, went to the police station to lodge

the FIR. In her cross-examination she has denied that the incident

is fabricated in order to teach the family of the respondent-accused,

a lesson. She further denied injuring PW-1 on purpose to that end.

PW-5 was Suresh Kumar, who was the person from whom

the prosecutrix was sent to secure buttermilk. It is while coming

back from having bought buttermilk that the alleged incident took

place. PW-5 positively states that the prosecutrix did take

buttermilk from him.

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 14 of 19

PW-7, namely Dr. Sushma Dutta, Medical Officer, Civil

Hospital, Sundar Nagar, deposed that although the medical

examination of the prosecutrix had taken place one day after the

alleged incident, i.e., on 28

th

July 2007, the victim was wearing the

same clothes that she allegedly had on, at the time of the incident.

The injuries reported were as follows:

“Local examination:

Mens pubis not well developed public hairs absent. There

was lacerated wound on right paraurethral region of size 1 x

1/2 c.m. red looking with slight bleeding on touch.

2. There was lacerated wound on left paraurethral region of

size 2x2x1/2 c.m. which also bleed on touch.

Vagina could admit little finger easily. Hymen was torn

at position 9’ clock. There was no injury seen around anus.

Vaginal swabs and smear were taken. Clothes were

preserve, sealed and handed over to the police. Public hair

were not available for examination. There was no history of any

disease or any drug in take.

Vide chemical analysis report reported by Chemical

Examiner vide Ext. PH, human blood was present on the salwar

of the victim, but no semen was present. This report was shown

to me by the police on 13.02.2007.

In my opinion, she has been exposed to sexual act and

my opinion remained the same after the report of Chemical

Examiner. The probable duration of injuries was within 48

hours. I issued the MLC Ext. PJ which bears my signatures and

is in my hand. The victim was referred to Z.H. Mandi for age

verification vide X-ray from Ext. PK by me, shirt Ext. P1 and

salwar Ext. P2 are the same.”

Nothing in the cross-examination substantially dislodges the

testimony in the examination-in-chief.

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 15 of 19

PW-10 was Dr. S.K. Fotedar, Medical Officer, CHC, Ratti.

He is the one who examined the respondent accused. He deposed

that the accused was capable of sexual intercourse. The injury that

he suffered was testified to be possible in the course of agricultural

work. The description of the injury is as follows:

One superficial abrasion 0.5 cm x 0.75 cm on right ear, medially

on pinna opposite right mastoid with blood stains on mastoid

area. No fresh bleedings was present. The wound was 24 to 36

hours old.

But at the same time, it was further submitted that an injury is not

necessary on the commission of rape.

10. We may observe that the approach adopted by the High Court

is one of attempting to pick holes in a case that otherwise has

withstood the test of cross-examination. The prosecutrix has

positively identified the respondent-accused and has unequivocally

stated that it was he who forced himself upon her. Not even a shred

of doubt could be created by cross-examination on these two most

essential points. Neither the testimony of the mother nor the father,

that supported the version of the prosecutrix could be credibly

questioned. The discrepancy that does appear pertains to the alleged

quarrel between the families of the prosecutrix and the accused-

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 16 of 19

respondent. The prosecutrix and PW-2 state that repeated quarrels

between the two families were a regular feature but PW-3 submits

otherwise. That apart, one major improbability noticed by the High

Court was that the prosecutrix had travelled 16 kms to and fro from

the house of PW-5 within two hours. This has been observed to be

almost impossible.

11. Be that as it may. Even if it is the case that to travel 16

kilometres was not possible in two hours, it still is an uncontroverted

reality that the factum of sexual assault has not been disturbed. In

proving the occurrence of an offence within a particular time frame,

the Court does not look for mathematical precision. For the purposes

of argument, even if the alleged time frame is extended by an hour,

the possibility of the occurrence of the offence is still not shaken.

12. At this stage, let us deal with the rejection of the medical

evidence of PW-7 on account of 16 kilometre distance being

improbable and the apparent site map which is a part of record. In

the considered view of the High Court, these two combined falsify

the medical evidence. It is well-established that medical evidence is

in the nature of expert opinion and is corroborative in nature. It is

equally well established that medical evidence when it contravenes

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 17 of 19

other credible evidence particularly ocular evidence, then in such a

situation, it can be kept aside or ignored. That is not the case here.

It cannot be lost sight of that the expert evidence squarely

corroborates the evidence of the prosecutrix, that she was sexually

assaulted. In her evidence, at the cost of repetition, it may be stated

positively that she identified him and attributed the act to him. The

same has not been challenged or questioned by the process of law.

Then the question is, on the basis of some alleged improbability of

time, can we ignore other credible evidence? We think not. That

would be a stand entirely in contravention of law.

13. As already referred above, the evidence of the prosecutrix

alone, in matters such as these is sufficient to convict the accused.

As such, on PW-1’s evidence alone the offence stands established.

The evidence of others only adds further credence to the statement

of the victim. We may add that animosity is a double-edged sword

and if given undue weight, may lead to injustice, in view of the

uncontroverted testimony of the victim.

14. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment acquitting

the respondent- accused cannot stand and is required to be set aside.

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 18 of 19

Appeal is accordingly allowed. He is directed to surrender forthwith

and serve the remainder of the sentence.

15. In the end, we direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to

all the Registrars General of the High Courts to ensure that in all

matters dated prior to the passing of this Court’s judgment in Nipun

Saxena v. Union of India

16

which has mandated the non-disclosure

of the victim’s identity, and still pending, the proscription in Section

228-A IPC is followed strictly. This has been the long-standing

position in law but, it has not been followed. The primary reason

thereamongst, one supposes, is the general indifference of the

Courts below and possibly even the lack of awareness of the deep

stigma that follows such offences. Immediate reference can be made

to State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh

17

which touched upon this issue

in connection with Section 327 CrPC, and also Bhupinder Sharma

v. State of HP

18

. Suffice it to say that both these judgments were

pronounced by this Court much prior to the incident in question.

16

(2019) 2 SCC 703

17

(1996) 2 SCC 384

18

(2003) 8 SCC 551

Cr.A..@SLP (Crl) NO. 9574 of 2018 Page 19 of 19

Pending applications, if any, shall be disposed of.

......................................................................J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

........................................................................J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

New Delhi;

March 24, 2026