REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1678 OF 2002

State of Himachal Pradesh ...Appellant(s)

- Versus -

Narain Singh ...Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1679 OF 2002

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. These appeals are directed against the

judgment dated 17.4.2000 of the High Court of

Himachal Pradesh at Shimla whereby the Division

Bench of the High Court disposed of C.W.P.

1

No.851/96 alongwith C.W.P. No.1192/96, as common

questions of law and facts arose in those cases.

C.W.P. No. 851/96 was filed by Narain Singh while

C.W.P. No.1192/96 was filed by three persons namely

Shri Surat Singh, Shiv Singh Tegta and Murki Lal

and in both the writ petitions, the respondents

were the same

2. In both these cases, the constitutional

validity of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue

(Amendment and Validation) Act, 1996 (hereinafter

called ‘the amendment Act’) was challenged as being

in conflict with the original provisions of the

various sections of the Himachal Pradesh Land

Revenue Act, 1953 (Act No.6 of 1954) (hereinafter

called ‘the Principal Act’).

3. It was also contended in the writ petition

that the amendment is violative of the basic

structure of the Constitution.

2

4. The petitioners of C.W.P. No. 1192/96 and

six other land owners of Tehsil Rohru and Chirgaon,

District Shimla had earlier filed a C.W.P. No.206

of 1998 titled as Thakur Gyan Singh and others Vs.

State of Himachal Pradesh and others wherein the

petitioners sought the following relief:-

“(i) complete the on going land revenue

settlement operations as second

Revised Settlement strictly in

accordance with the intent of the two

notifications one pertaining to the

special revision of the existing

records of right under Section 33 of

the H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1953 and

the other for general assessment of

land revenue under Section 53 of the

said Act;

ii)withdraw Instruction Nos. 2, 4 and

supplementary instruction Nos. 2, 23 and

32 of Compendium of Instructions, issued by

the 4th respondent (Settlement Officer);

iii)bring up-to-date at re-settlement the

field map of the previous settlement without

recourse to re-measurement and preparation

of the record of rights including wazib-

ul-urs etc. strictly in, accordance with

Instructions contained in Para 222 of the

Settlement Manual read with Appendix XXI

thereunder and consequently directing the

deletion of Naksha Bartan illegally

prepared and not to convert the

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Classification of the government waste land

recorded in the revenue records as also in

occupation of the estate-right holders

into various lands and directing the

modification of the government policy with

respect to regularisation of encroachment

detected during the settlement proceedings;

and

iv)direct the respondents not to hand

over/deliver the revenue records to the

revenue mohal staff till the completion of

the settlement including assessment of land

revenue, incorporated in the jamabandies."

5. The said writ petition was disposed of by

a reasoned and detailed judgment of the Division

Bench of the High Court on 13/01/1994. While

accepting the writ petition, the Division Bench

issued the following directions:-

“1.The respondents are directed to

complete the on going land revenue

settlement operations in the area in

question as "second revised

settlement” in accordance with the

instructions contained in Paragraph

222 and Appendix XXI of the Punjab

Settlement Manual.

2.The compendium of instructions (P-

21) be amended in consonance with and

4

pertaining to the procedure

applicable to special revision of

record-of-rights. Resultantly,

instructions continuing to be

contained in P-21, contrary to letter

June, 1986 (P-22) are ordered to be

deleted.

3. The new record-of-rights pertaining to

the areas in question, prepared in the

current settlement in relation to

'Mohal-Bandi', 'Naksha Bartan',

`Wazib-ul-urs', classification of

land, proposed DPFs and UPFs etc., be

ignored and re-settlement be started

subsequent to the stage of Forecast

Report.”

6. Aggrieved by the abovementioned judgment

dated 13/01/1994 of the Division Bench in C.W.P.

No.206/1988, the State filed a Special Leave

Petition before this Court. Leave was granted and

the Civil Appeal No. 6025 of 1994 was admitted for

hearing by this Court. This Court while granting

the leave ordered a stay on the judgment of the

High Court dated 13/01/1994.

5

7. It was contended by the respondents herein

while the said special leave petition was pending

before this Court, the State, in order to nullify

the judgment of the High Court, dated 13/01/1994,

enacted the amendment Act of 1996, whereby Sections

4, 16, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 47, 117 and 171 of the

Principal Act were amended. The specific challenge

to the amendment Act of 1996 is that by amending

the Sections 32, 33, 34, 36, 38 and 47 contained in

Chapter IV of the Principal Act, the whole scheme

of Chapter IV of the Principal Act has been

disturbed and arbitrary powers have been conferred

on the Collector (Revenue). Such conferment of

arbitrary power, it is alleged, is

unconstitutional.

8. Thus, those provisions of the Act of 1996,

introduced by way of amendment in the Principal

Act, were challenged as being ultra vires the

Constitution of India and mala fide and also as a

6

piece of colourable legislation on the following

grounds:-

“(a)That the impugned legislation has been

intended to nullify the judgment of

this Court in C.W.P. No. 206 of 1988

dated 13.1.1994. In support of this

ground, it has been stated that the

apex Court has held that a legislature

has no power to render ineffective

earlier judicial decision by making a

law. Such powers if exercised would

not be legislative power but a judicial

power exercised by it, which

encroaches upon the judicial powers

of the State exclusively vested in

Courts. (See: case reported in 1995

(5) S.C.C. 96).

(b)That the impugned legislation

apparently seeks to validate the

record of rights prepared after 1976,

which is opposed to rule of law and

natural Justice. This ground is

purported to be supported by stating

that in the earlier writ petition,

there was a challenge to the errors in

the field maps and jamabandies

prepared during the settlement, which

cannot be validated as has been done

by the impugned legislation, this

amounts to denial of opportunity and

equal protection of law under Article

14 of the Constitution of India.

According to the petitioners, if the

impugned legislation stands, the land

owners will be rendered without any

remedy to redress their grievances,

hence the same is against the rule of

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law.

(c)That by making the impugned

legislation i.e. Act of 1996 effective

retrospectively from 1976, the same is

liable to be struck down as

unreasonable and arbitrary. Moreover,

it has been stated that the said

validation is bad in law inasmuch as

the executive instructions earlier

issued by the Settlement Officer,

Shimla and Kinnaur Districts,

respondent No.4, were held to be

without any authority of law by this

Court in its earlier decision because

the same were inconsistent with the

provisions of the Principal Act.

(d)That the Act of 1996 being

retrospective in its application

adversely affects the rights of estate

right holders of Rohru and Chirgaon,

which is unconstitutional. It has

also been highlighted in this ground

that the retrospective effect given to

the Act of 1996 is from the year 1976,

being for a period of about 20 years,

which itself is illegal.

(e)That there are inherent conflicts

between the original Sections of the

Principal Act and the amended

Sections of the Act of 1996.

Moreover, the same suffer from the

vice of excessive delegation and is

against the Scheme of the Principal

Act. This is sought to be shown by

giving the example that prior to the

amendment, only the State Government

and Financial Commissioner had the

rule making powers under the

8

Principal Act, whereas now by virtue

of Sections 4(5), 34-A and 47-A the

respondent-State has descended down

by one step whereby the Collector has

been empowered to issue executive

instructions, which are in the nature

of the delegated legislation. This

delegation of powers to the Collector

has been challenged as being against

the basic Scheme of the Principal Act.

It has also been stated that the

powers so delegated to the Collector

are unfettered and unguided and are

capable of being abused.

(f)That by virtue of the amendments made

by the Act of 1996, the sub-division of

estates styled as 'Upmahal' are sought

to be regularised and validated, which

has been questioned as being an act of

illegal splitting ab initio, making

the same illegal.

(g)Despite the directions of this Court

in the earlier case that fresh

measurement should be carriedout, the

earlier incorrect measurement and

assessment of land revenue, which was

held to be so by this Court, have

been declared as having been validly

prepared by the Act of 1996. It has

been stated that the petitioners

have apprehensions that respondent

No.4. Settlement Officer, will go

ahead with the assessment of the land

revenue of this area on the basis of

invalid records and complete the

settlement operations. This will

result in irreparable injury to the

rights of the petitioners.

9

(h)That the Act of 1996 takes away the

remedy of review under Section 16 of

the Principal Act, thus debarring the

Financial Commissioner to review the

order passed by him in revision. In

this manner, the impugned amendment in

Section 16 of the Principal Act has

deprived the public at large from one

channel from remedy of review, and on

the other hand, the highest authority

under the Principal Act has been

debarred from reviewing the order

passed in revision. The amendment in

question is against the principle of

natural justice besides being against

the basic structure of the

Constitution of India and the

Principal Act, as per the petitioners.

(i)Lastly, that the impugned amendments

by way of the Act of 1996 are in

direct conflict with the relevant

provisions of the Principal Act, if

they are allowed to stand, it will

result in changing the basic structure

of the Principal Act.”

9. Thus, the writ petition prayed before the

High Court for:-

“(i) Issuance of an order, writ or

direction declaring the Act of 1996

as ultra vires the law and as also

being violative of the basic

structure of the Constitution of

India.

10

(ii) For issuing a writ of mandamus directing

the respondents/State not to give

effect to Sections 2-B, 2-C, 3 to 6,

9, 10, 12 and 13 of the Act of 1996.

(iii)To declare the aforesaid Sections as

bad, in law, they being in direct

conflict with the original

Sections/provisions of Sections 4,

16, 32 to 35, 38 and 47 of the

Principal Act and as also being

against the basic Scheme of the said

Act.”

10. Same relief was also prayed for in the

other connected writ petition, namely, C.W.P.

No.851/1996.

11. In the impugned judgment, the Division

Bench of the High Court did not uphold all the

contentions mentioned above but came to a finding

that the Amendment Act of 1996 is ultra vires to

the extent that it has sought to nullify the

earlier decision of this court rendered in CWP

No.206/1988 dated 13.01.1994 between Thakur Gian

Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.

11

12. It may be noted that in the impugned

judgment there is no finding that the amendment Act

enacted suffers from lack of legislative competence

of the State.

13. It is nobody’s case that the State

legislature is incompetent to enact the said

amended Act. There is also no finding in the

impugned judgment that the amendment Act in any way

infringes or abridges any fundamental right of the

petitioner.

14. Normally the restrain on the sovereign

power of legislation of a State legislature is

limited. The legislature has to exercise its

legislative power, which is otherwise plenary, in

accordance with the distribution of legislative

power under Chapter Part XI Chapter I of the

Constitution and it has also to exercise such power

consistent with the mandate of Part III of the

12

Constitution and other Constitutional limitations.

15. Learned High Court did not find that the

impugned amendment Act transgresses either of these

limitations in any way. But the High Count found

that the impugned amendment Act is ultra vires the

Constitution as it seeks to nullify the previous

judgment.

16. This Court is not called upon to pronounce

on the correctness or otherwise of the previous

judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the High

Court dated 13.01.1994. The appeal from the said

judgment, being Civil Appeal 6025 of 1994, came to

be heard by this Court and was disposed of by a

judgment and order dated 16.07.1996 to the

following effect:-

“Learned counsel for the appellant

submits that the Himachal Pradesh Land

Revenue (Amendment and Validation) Act,

13

1996 (Act No.3 of 1996) has further

amended the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue

Act, 1954 and validated certain actions

taken in relation to the making or special

revision of record-of-rights in the State.

Learned counsel adds that the revision of

record-of-rights in the State is,

therefore, to be made in accordance with

the law so amended with retrospective

effect; and the directions to the contrary

in the impugned judgment of the High Court

rendered prior to enactment of Act No. 3

of 1996 have become infructuous. Learned

counsel also submits that no specific

relief has been granted to any individual

by the impugned judgment which merely

gives some directions regarding the

general revision of record-of-rights. For

this reason, learned counsel submits that

it is not necessary for the State

Government to pursue this appeal.

Learned counsel for the respondents,

while conceding that the effect of the

aforesaid Act No. 3 of 1996 is to 'amend

the law relating to revision of record-of-

rights, further submits that the effect

thereof is not to render infructuous all

the directions given in the impugned

judgment. According to learned counsel for

the respondents, some part of these

directions remains effective even after

the enactment of Act No. 3 of 1996. He

also states that the validity of Act No. 3

of 1996 has also been challenged by a

separate writ petition in the High Court

of Himachal Pradesh.

In view of the common ground emerging

from the above submissions, it appears to

us that it is needless to consider the

merits of the points raised in the appeal

14

since even according to the appellant

-State of Himachal Pradesh the directions

given in the impugned judgment are no

longer effective having been rendered

infructuous by the subsequently enacted

Act No. 3 of 1996. Moreover, there is no

relief granted to any specific individual

and the directions relate to the general

revision of record-of-rights in the state

which obviously has to be governed by the

existing law applicable at the time of

performance of the exercise. If any

grievance is made of non-compliance of any

of the al1eged surviving directions by the

State Government before the High Court, it

would be open to the State Government to

show that the same have become infructuous

for the reason given by them and in that

situation it would be for the High Court

to decide the contention on merits.

In view of the statement made on

behalf of the appellants that the

directions given in the impugned judgment

have become infructuous, the appeal is

disposed of accordingly, without deciding

any point on merits.”

17. The said order was passed after hearing

learned counsel for both the parties. From a

perusal of the aforesaid order, it is clear that

the appeal was disposed of as it was contended

before this Court by the learned counsel for the

State that in view of the subsequent amendment of

15

the law, the contentions of the appellant have

become infructuous. This court recorded the said

submissions and disposed of the said appeal as

such.

18. Therefore, the only question which

survives in this case is whether the State can in

exercise of its sovereign legislative power enact

an amendment Act seeking to remove and cure the

defects in the previous law despite there being a

judgment on the previous law.

19. In the instant case before we examine

these questions it would be appropriate to consider

the statement of objects and reasons for enacting

the amendment act. The statement is as under:-

“The volume of land records in each

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revenue estate has considerably increased

due to the increase in number of holdings

partially on account of increase in

population and partially on account of

decrease of extent of land holdings under

the agrarian reforms, to bring the volume

of the land records maintained in each

revenue estate within manageable size, it

has become essential to create more

estates or sub-estates. Apart from this,

with the enactment the Standards of

Weights and Measures Act, 1976, it is now

mandatory to convert the non-metric

measurements into metric measurements.

Due to different scales of measurements

prevalent in various parts of the State,

the conversion to metric system involves

the complete remeasurements of all the

revenue estates in the State. There is no

provision either in the Himachal Pradesh

Land Revenue Act, 1954 or in the Punjab

Settlement Manual, as applicable to

Himachal Pradesh, for the creation of

estates/sub-estates by the Collectors or

for the complete remeasurements of the

estates. In the absence of these

statutory provisions of the creation of

more estates or sub divisions of estates

and the complete remeasurement of the

estates for conversion into metric

measurements and the instructions/

directions given by the Collectors, during

the settlement operations are not

sustainable in the eyes of law.

Consequently the settlement operations

already carried out in various parts of

the State are likely to become infructuous

and resettlement operations are likely to

cause great public inconvenience and loss

to the State Exchequer. Besides this

certain other minor amendments in the Act

17

are essential in the changed

circumstances. It is also essential to

validate the action of the Collector

already taken by him during the special

revision of record-of-rights in relation

to the creation of estates/sub-division of

estates, complete remeasurement of all

estates based upon metric system, giving

directions/issuing instructions to carry

out the settlement operations and for the

effective implementation of the provisions

of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act,

1954.

This Bill seeks to achieve the

aforesaid objectives.”

20. From a perusal of the aforesaid statement

of objects and reasons it is clear that the

amendment has been necessitated in view of certain

factors which are predominantly in public interest

and the said amendment has been made in view of the

interest of land revenue, land settlement and for

the purpose of updating the same.

21. In fact the amendments have been made for

18

an effective implementation of the provisions of

the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954.

22. It is provided in sub-section (2) of

section 1 of the amendment Act that the said

amendment shall come into force at once except

section 2 (b), 5, 6 and 10 which shall be deemed to

have come into force on the 23

rd

of September 1976.

Section 13 of the said act provides for validation.

The said section runs as follows:-

”13. Notwithstanding anything contained

in the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act,

1954 and rules, instructions,

notifications made or issued thereunder,

or in any law for the time being in force

or in any judgment, decree or order of any

court or other authority, where at any

time after the 23

rd

day of September, 1976

and before the commencement of the

Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue (Amendment

and Validation) Act, 1996, if any record-

of-rights or special revision of record-

of-rights has been made in respect of the

lands, situated in the State of Himachal

Pradesh, such making or special revision

of record-of-rights shall, and shall be

19

deemed always to have been valid and shall

not be questioned on the ground that the

amendments made vide sections 2 (b), 5, 6

and 10 of this Act were not in force at

that time when such record-of-rights were

made or specially revised.”

23. An argument was, however, made before the

High Court that the aforesaid amendment is actuated

by a mala fide motive and is a piece of colourable

legislation. The aforesaid contention was,

however, not accepted by the High Court in the

impugned judgment. In fact such contention is not

tenable on principle.

24. Reference in this connection be made to a

decision of this Court in the case of K. Nagaraj &

others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another –

1985 1 SCC 523, wherein Chief Justice Chandrachud,

speaking for a three-Judge Bench said that the

legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having

passed a law for an extraneous purpose. Learned

20

Chief Justice held that the concept of “transferred

malice” is unknown in the field of legislation

provided the legislature enacts the law within its

powers.

25. The aforesaid principle in K. Nagaraj

(supra) has been accepted by this Court in many

cases and a reference in this connection may be

made to a decision of this Court in G.C. Kanungo

Vs. State of Orissa – (1995) 5 SCC 96.

26. The power of the Sovereign legislature to

legislate within its field, both prospectively and

retrospectively cannot be questioned. This position

has been settled in many judgments of this Court.

Some of them may be considered below.

27. In Bhubaneshwar Singh & another Vs. Union

of India & others - (1994) 6 SCC 77, the Court

21

expressly approved the aforesaid position in Para 9

at page 82-83. In so far as validating Acts are

concerned, this Court in Bhubaneshwar Singh (supra)

also considered the question in para 11 and held

that the Court has the powers by virtue of such

validating legislation, to “wipe out” judicial

pronouncements of the High Court and the Supreme

Court by removing the defects in the statute

retrospectively when such statutes had been

declared ultra vires by Courts in view of its

defects. This Court has held that such legislative

exercise will not amount to encroachment on the

judicial power. This Court has accepted that such

legislative device which removes the vice in

previous legislation is not considered an

encroachment on judicial power. In support of the

aforesaid proposition, this Court in Bhubaneshwar

Singh (supra) relied on the proposition laid down

by the Chief Justice Hidayatullah, speaking for the

Constitution Bench in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills

Ltd. and another Vs. Broach Borough Municipality

22

and others -(1969) 2 SCC 283.

28. Again in the case of Indian Aluminium

Company etc. etc. Vs. State of Kerala and others

-AIR 1996 SC 1431, this Court while summarizing the

principle held that a legislature cannot directly

overrule a judicial decision but it has the power

to make the decision ineffective by removing the

basis on which the decision is rendered, while at

the same time adhering to the constitutional

imperatives and the legislature is competent to do

so [See para 59 sub-para (9) at page 1446.]

29. In the case of Comorin Match Industries

(Pvt.) Limited Vs. State of Tamil Nadu – AIR 1996

SC 1916, the facts were that the assessment orders

passed under Central Sales Tax Act were set aside

by the High Court and the State was directed to

refund the amount to the assessee. As the State

failed to carry it out, contempt petitions were

filed but the assessment orders were validated by

23

passing the amendment Act of 1969 with

retrospective effect and the Court held that the

tax demanded became valid and enforceable. The

Court held that in such a situation the State will

not be precluded from realizing the tax due as

subsequently the assessment order was validated by

the amending Act of 1969 and the order passed in

the contempt proceeding will not have the effect of

the writing off the debt which is statutorily owed

by the assessee to the State. The learned Judges

held that the effect of the amending Act is

retrospective validation of the assessment orders

which were struck down by the High Court.

Therefore, the assessment order is legislatively

valid and the tax demands are also enforceable.

[See paras 33 and 35 at page 1925]

30. It is therefore clear where there is a

competent legislative provision which

retrospectively removes the substratum of

foundation of a judgment, the said exercise is a

24

valid legislative exercise provided it does not

transgress any other constitutional limitation.

Therefore, this Court cannot uphold the reasoning

in the High Court judgment that the impugned

amendment is invalid just because it nullifies some

provisions of the earlier Act.

31. The aforesaid principles have been

reiterated by a three-Judge Bench in Meerut

Development Authority etc. Vs. Satbir Singh and

others – AIR 1997 SC 1467, Justice Ramaswamy

speaking for the Court summed up the position in

para 10 as follows:-

“10. It is well settled by catena of

decisions of this Court that when this

Court in exercise of power of judicial

review, has declared a particular statute

to be invalid, the Legislature has no

power to overrule the judgment; however,

it has the power to suitably amend the law

by use of appropriate phraseology removing

the defects pointed out by the Court and

by amending the law inconsistent with the

law declared by the Court so that the

defects which were pointed out were never

on statute for effective enforcement of

25

the law. This Court has considered in

extenso the case law in a recent judgment

in Indian Aluminium Co. V. State of Kerala

(1996) 2 JT (SC) 85: (1996 AIR SCW 1051)

had held that such an exercise of power to

amend a statute is not an incursion on the

judicial power of the Court but is a

statutory exercise of the constituent

power to suitably amend the law and to

validate the actions which have been

declared to be invalid…”

32. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the

case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s. Arooran Sugars

Limited – AIR 1997 SC 1815, reiterated the same

principle after analyzing several cases on the

point. The Court has summed up the position as

follows:-

“16. ...It is open to the legislature to

remove the defect pointed out by the court

or to amend the definition or any other

provision of the Act in question

retrospectively. In this process it cannot

be said that there has been an

encroachment by the legislature over the

power of the judiciary. A court's

directive must always bind unless the

conditions on which it is based are so

fundamentally altered that under altered

circumstances such decisions could not

26

have been given. This will include removal

of the defect in a statute pointed out in

the judgment in question, as well as

alteration or substitution of provisions

of the enactment on which such judgment is

based, with retrospective effect...”

33. In Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India – AIR

2000 SC 498, Justice Jagannadha Rao speaking for a

three-Judge Bench explained the position by saying

that it would be permissible for the legislature to

remove the defect which is the cause for

discrimination and which defect was pointed out by

the Court. The learned Judge made it very clear

that this defect can be removed both

retrospectively and prospectively by legislative

action and the previous actions can be validated.

But where there is a mere validation without the

defect being legislatively removed the legislative

action will amount to overruling the judgment by a

legislative fiat and that will be invalid. In the

instant case the amendment Act has removed the

defect of the previous law and therefore, the

27

validation exercise is perfectly sound and cannot

be faulted with.

34. In Rai Ramkrishna and others etc. Vs.

State of Bihar – AIR 1963 SC 1667, a Constitution

Bench of this Court speaking through Justice

Gajendragadkar, as His Lordship then was, explained

the principle with characteristic clarity, which is

reproduced hereinbelow:-

“10. The other point on which there

is no dispute before us is that the

legislative power conferred on the

appropriate Legislatures to enact law in

respect of topics covered by the several

entries in the three Lists can be exercised

both prospectively and retrospectively.

Where the Legislature can make a valid law,

it may provide not only for the prospective

operation of the material provisions of the

said law but it can also provide for the

retrospective operation of the said

provisions. Similarly, there is no doubt

that the legislative power in question

includes the subsidiary or the auxiliary

power to validate laws which have been

found to be invalid. If a law passed by a

legislature is struck down by the Courts as

being invalid for one infirmity or another,

it would be competent to the appropriate

Legislature to cure the said infirmity and

28

pass a validating law so as to make the

provisions of the said earlier law

effective from the date when it was passed.

This position is treated as firmly

established since the decision of the

Federal Court in the case of United

Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum, 1940 FCR

110: (AIR 1941 FC 16).”

35. See the decision of this Court in Satnam

Overseas (Export) and others Vs. State of Haryana

and another – (2003) 1 SCC 561, para 52 where

reference was made to the ratio in Rai Ramkrishna

(supra).

36. Recently in the case of State of Bihar and

others Vs. State Pensioners Samaj – (2006) 5 SCC

65, this Court reiterated the same position in

paragraph 16 at page 71, which is reproduced

below:-

”16. ……It is always open to the

legislature to alter the law

retrospectively as long as the very

premise on which the earlier judgment

declared a certain action as invalid is

removed. The situation would be one of a

fundamental change in the circumstances

29

and such a validating Act was not open to

challenge on the ground that it amounted

to usurpation of judicial powers.

37. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court

finds that in the instant case the amending Act

read with its validation clause correctly passed

the tests laid down by this Court. The appeals are

allowed. The judgment of the High Court is thus

set aside with no orders as to costs.

.................J.

(MARKANDEY KATJU)

.................J.

New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

July 8, 2009

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