2026:HHC:22023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Appeal No. 5 of 2014

Reserved on: 23.04.2026

Date of Decision: 05.06.2026.

State of H.P. ...Appellant

Versus

Kailash Chand ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes

For the Appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Advocate.

For the respondent : Mr Kashmir Singh Thakur, Senior

Advocate with Mr Harjeet Singh,

Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeal is directed against the judgment

dated 19.09.2013, passed by the learned Special Judge, Sirmour,

District at Nahan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the

respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was

acquitted of the charged offences (The parties shall hereinafter be

referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the

learned trial Court for convenience).

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned

Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences

punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d)

of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). It was

asserted that Jivnee, mother of the informant Nazakat Ali (PW-

1), had inherited 3 Bighas and 14 Biswas of land after her

mother’s death in Village Bogrian, Tehsil Nahan, H.P. A

mutation was to be attested in her favour. Accused (Kailash

Chand ) was posted as Patwari in Patwar Circle, Nahan, H.P. The

informant visited the office of the accused many times for

entering the mutation. The accused demanded ₹3000/- as a

bribe for entering the mutation. The accused called the

informant to Patwarkhana on 07.01.2012 with ₹3000/-. The

informant narrated the matter to the police by means of an

application (Ext.PW-1/A). FIR (Ext.PW-7/A) was registered by

Deputy Superintendent of Police (Dy.SP) Babita Rana (PW-10),

who joined Avtar Singh (PW-5) and Dalip Kumar (PW-4) with

the investigation. She constituted a trap party consisting of

Inspector Kulvinder Singh (PW -13). Inspector Madan Lal,

Inspector Vidya Chand, Sub –Inspector Joginder, HC Sudhir

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Chauhan, Constable Dev Raj (PW -8), informant Nazakat Ali

(PW-1), Mehmood Khan (PW-2), Avtar Singh (PW-5), and Dalip

Kumar (PW-4). Dy. S.P Babita Rana (PW-10) read over the

contents of the application (Ext.PW-1/A) to the members of the

trap party. Nazakat Ali produced four currency notes of ₹500/-

and ten currency notes of ₹100/-, which were counted by

Mehmood Khan (PW-2). Dy. SP Babita Ran prepared the solution

of sodium carbonate powder in a clean glass of water, and the

water remained colourless. Mehmood Khan (PW-2) was asked to

dip his fingers in the solution, and the solution did not change

colour. Serial numbers of currency notes were noted in a pre-

trap memo. Babita Rana (PW-10) dusted the currency notes with

Phenolphthalein powder and handed them over to Mehmood

Khan (PW-2), who counted them. Mehmood Khan (PW-2) was

asked to put the currency notes in the left pocket of Nazakat

Ali’s jacket. Mehmood Khan (PW-2) was asked to dip his fingers

in the solution of sodium carbonate, and the colour changed to

pink. The witnesses were told about the use of Phenolphthalein

powder and sodium carbonate. Mehmood Khan (PW-2) threw

the pink solution in the bathroom. He washed his hands with

soap. All the members of the trap party also washed their hands.

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Babita Rana was directed to deliver the currency notes to Patwari

Kailash Chand on his demand and not to shake hands with

anyone. Mehmood was deputed as a shadow witness and

instructed to hear the conversation between the accused and the

informant Nazakat Ali (PW-1) and give the signal to the mobile

number of Inspector Kulwinder Singh (PW-13) bearing No.

xxxxxxx504 by a missed call. Mehmood Khan (PW-2) was

directed to signal the trap party by putting his hand on his head

after coming out of the office of the Patwari if it was not possible

to make a missed call. The remaining Phenolphthalein powder

was kept in the Police Station in safe custody. Pre-trap memo

(Ext.PW-1/B) was prepared, and the signatures of the witnesses

were obtained. The members of the trap party took their position

near Patwarkhana. The informant and the shadow witness went

to the office of Patwari, who demanded the bribe money from

the informant. The informant paid the money to the accused ,

and the shadow witness signalled the trap party. The trap party

went towards Patwarkhana, and the accused was found present

outside the door. Inspector Kulwinder Singh caught hold of the

accused by his right wrist, and SI Joginder caught hold of the

accused by his left wrist. The accused was taken inside the office,

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and the money was found lying in a file on the office table. The

accused could not give any satisfactory explanation regarding

the currency notes. The hands of the accused were washed with

plain water, and the colour did not change. Sodium carbonate

was added to the hand wash, and the hand wash turned pink.

The pink solution was put into a nip, and the nip was sealed with

seal impression ‘X’. Currency notes lying on the file were taken

into possession. Their serial numbers were compared with the

serial numbers mentioned in the pre-trap memo, and they

matched each other. Currency notes were put into an envelope,

which was sealed with seal ‘X”. The envelop and the nips were

seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/C). Sample seal (Ext.PW-13/A) was

taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over

to witness Dalip Singh after use. The search of the house of the

accused was conducted, but no incriminating substance was

found in it. Memo (Ext.PW-4/A) was prepared. Inspector

Kulwinder Singh investigated the matter. He prepared the spot

map (Ext.PW-13/B). The envelop and the nip were deposited by

Kulwinder Singh (PW-13) with MHC, who deposited them in

Malkhana. Informant Nazakat Ali (PW-1) produced a copy of the

agreement (Ext.PW-1/D) on 12.01.2012, which was seized vide

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memo (Ex.PW-1/A). Nazakat Ali (PW-1) presented a memory

card (Ext.P-7), which was put into a parcel and was sealed with

the seal of DYSP ACZ, Nahan and taken into possession vide

memo (Ext.PW-1/F). The seal was handed over to HHC Dalip

Singh after its use. The case property was deposited with

Constable Rajan (PW-6), who made an entry in the register of

Malkhana at Sl. No. 48 (Ext.PW-6/A) and sent the case property

to FSL Junga through Constable Angrez Singh (PW-9). Kamal

Kishore Saini produced the appointment and posting order of

the accused (Ext.PW-3/A and Ext.PW-3/B), which were taken

into possession vide memo (Ext.PW-3/C). Copy of the mutation

No. 218 (Ext.PW-13/J) was received from the revenue

department. The result of the analysis (Ext.PW-10/A) was issued

after the analysis, mentioning that the traces of

Phenolphthalein and Sodium Carbonate were detected in the

hand wash. The result (Ext.PW-10/B) was issued stating that the

conversation of bribery was found present in the memory card,

which was preserved. The statements of witnesses wer e

recorded, and after the completion of the investigation, the

challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial

Court.

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3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused . When the accused appeared, he was

charged with the commission of offences punishable under

Section 7 & 13 (i) (d) and 13 (2) of the PC Act, to which the

accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its

case. Nazakat Ali (PW-1) is the informant. Mehmood Khan (PW-

2) is the shadow witness. Kamal Kishore Saini produced the

record regarding the appointment and posting of the accused.

Dalip Kumar (PW-4), Avtar Singh (PW-5), SI Joginder Singh

(PW-7) and Constable Dev Raj (PW-8) were members of the trap

party. Constable Rajan Thakur (PW-6) was working as MHC with

whom part of the case property was deposited. Constable Angrez

Singh (PW-9) carried the case property to FSL Junga. Babita

Rana was posted as Dy. S.P., who conducted pre -trap

proceedings. Constable Mohamad Khalid was posted as MHC

with whom the case property was deposited. Dr Jagjit Singh

(PW-12) was posted as a Scientific Officer, who analysed the

case property in FSL Junga. Inspector Kulvinder Singh (PW-13)

headed the trap party.

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5. The accused, in his statement recorded under section

313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the

prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that he had come out

of his residence to throw away the waste in the dustbin after

dressing the wounds of his son. The Vigilance officials caught

him by surprise. He was asked about the currency notes lying on

the table, and he told the police that he was not aware who had

placed the currency notes on the table. The police official had

asked him to pick up those currency notes, and his hands were

washed thereafter. He had put in 29 years of service as a Patwari.

He had received the papers from the Tehsil office regarding the

private partition of the land. He had entered the mutation on

19.12.2011, and the mutation was attested on 23.12.2011. He never

demanded any money for entering the mutation from Nazakat

Ali. Some revenue officials wanted to get posted in Patwarkhana

at Nahan and joined with the complainant and others to falsely

implicate him. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant had not

supported the prosecution's version regarding the demand for a

bribe. The shadow witness stated that the informant had put the

money on the table in the absence of the accused. Thus, the

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prosecution's version that the money was kept on the table at

the instance of the accused was not proved. Mutation No. 218

(Ext.PW-13/J) was entered by the accused on 19.12.2011, which

was compared by the K anungo on 23.12.2011. The learned

Assistant Collector sanctioned the mutation on the same day .

The informant’s mother had also agreed to sell the land, which

was registered in her name. The accused had no justification to

demand a bribe when the mutation had already been sanctioned

in his name. The prosecution's version was not proved beyond a

reasonable doubt. The voices on the memory card were also not

compared to show that these voices were of the accused and the

informant. Hence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused

of the charges framed.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the

learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal

asserting that the learned trial Court discarded the statements of

prosecution witnesses without any cogent reason . The

informant had specifically deposed about the demand of

₹3000/- made by the accused. The accused failed to explain the

bribe money lying on his table. His hand wash also turned pink,

clearly suggesting that he had dealt with the money. Learned

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Trial Court failed to appreciate all these aspects. Hence, it was

prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment

passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned

Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr

Kashmir Singh Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, with Mr

Harjeet Singh, learned counsel for the respondent.

9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General,

for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution's version

was proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the statements of the

informant and the shadow witness. Learned Trial Court erred in

rejecting the statements of prosecution witnesses without any

justification. Learned trial Court had taken a view that could not

have been taken by any person. Hence , he prayed that the

present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the

learned Trial Court be set aside.

10. Mr Kashmir Singh Thakur, learned Senior Advocate,

assisted by Mr Harjeet Singh, learned counsel for the

respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had

taken a reasonable view of the matter. It was admitted that the

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mutation had been sanctioned much before the alleged demand

for a bribe. The accused had no occasion to demand the bribe,

and the informant had no justification to bribe the accused when

the mutation had already been sanctioned. This fact was known

to the family members of the informant , as the informant’s

mother had agreed to sell the land. This Court should not

interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court

while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that

the present appeal be dismissed.

11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment

of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of

acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of

evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no

reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on

the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed

on page 438:

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“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position

that the interference with the finding of acquittal

recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by

the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers

from patent perversity; that the same is based on a

misreading/omission to consider material evidence on

record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and

only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is

possible from the evidence available on record.

13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v.

Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743 , wherein it was

observed:

21. We may note that the present appeal is one against

acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments

of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless

the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the

record and the only possible view based on the evidence is

consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an

event, should the appellate Court interfere with a

judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e.,

one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding

the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to

interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this

regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the

cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of

Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of

Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of

Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471.

14. A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of

Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed:

“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court,

it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are

possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the

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Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of

acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view

taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot

overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another

view was also possible. The following principles have to be

kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the

appeals against an order of acquittal:

(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from

patent perversity;

(b) whether the judgment is based on

misreading/omission to consider the material

evidence on record;

(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only

when there are “compelling and substantial

reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly

unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for

interference.’

(d) The appellate court, while deciding an appeal

against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence,

is required to consider whether the view taken by

the trial court is a possible view which could have

been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

(e) If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate

court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the

ground that another view was also possible; and

(f) The appellate court can interfere with the order

of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the

only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis

of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the

accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and

no other conclusion was possible.”

15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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16. Nazakat Ali (PW-1) stated that he, Mehmood Khan

(PW-2), Dalip Kumar and Avtar Singh went towards the

Patwarkhana. He alone went inside the Patwarkhana. Dalip,

Avtar Singh and Mehmood Khan remained outside the

Patwarkhana near the gate. The Patwari was not found sitting on

the official chair. The residence of the Patwari was adjoining to

his office. He peeped through the door, and Patwari was found

present inside the room. He put the currency notes on the

official file lying on the table of the Patwari. He came out of the

office of Patwari and told Mehmood Khan, Dalip Kumar and

Avtar Singh that he had put the currency notes on the official

table of Patwari. Vigilance officials were also informed. They

came to the office of Patwari, and Patwari was found near the

door outside his office.

17. Mehmood Khan (PW-2) made a similar statement.

He stated that he and the informant went to Patwarkhana in a

private vehicle. The members of the police party followed them

in another vehicle. Nazakat Ali (PW-1) entered the office of

Patwari and came out after some time. He revealed that Patwari

was dressing his son, and that Nazakat Ali had left the money in

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Patwari’s office. He returned with the police officials, and the

Patwari was found near the gate.

18. Dalip Kumar (PW-4) stated that informant Nazakat

Ali entered the office of Patwari, and he remained outside.

Nazakat Ali came out of the office and disclosed that Patwari

was not present in his seat, and he had kept the money on the

table. They returned with the police officials, and Patwari was

found outside the gate.

19. These witnesses were declared hostile and were

cross-examined by the learned Pubic Prosecutor; however, they

denied that Patwari was present in the office and that the

informant had handed over the currency notes to him .

Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the

prosecution had failed to establish the demand and acceptance

by the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

in State through the Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Dr Anup

Kumar Srivastava 2017(15) SCC 560 that demand and acceptance

are essential to prove offences under Section 7 and 13 (1)(d) of

the PC Act. It was observed: -

“7. The essential ingredients of Section 7 are:

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(i) that the person accepting the gratification should be a

public servant;

(ii) that he should accept the gratification for himself and

the gratification should be as a motive or reward for doing

or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or

forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official function,

favour or disfavour to any person.

8. Insofar as Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act is concerned, its

essential ingredients are:

(i) that he should have been a public servant;

(ii) that he should have used corrupt or illegal means or

otherwise abused his position as such a public servant and

(iii) that he should have obtained a valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person.

9. In the case of C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Government of India 1997

(9) SCC 477, this Court had an occasion to consider the word

"obtained" used in Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947 (now Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, 1988), and

it was held:

"12. The position will, however, be different so far as an

offence under Section 5(1) (d) read with Section 5(2) of

the Act is concerned. For such an offence prosecution has

to prove that the accused "obtained" the valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by

otherwise abusing his position as a public servant and

that too without the aid of the statutory presumption

under Section 4(1) of the Act as it is available only in

respect of offences under Section 5(1)(a) and (b) -- and

not under Section 5(1)(c), (d) or (e) of the Act. "Obtain"

means to secure or gain (something) as the result of

request or effort (Shorter Oxford Dictionary). In case of

obtainment, the initiative vests in the person who

receives, and in that context, a demand or request from

him will be a primary requisite for an offence under

Section 5(1) (d) of the Act, unlike an offence under Section

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161 IPC, which, as noticed above, can be established by

proof of either "acceptance" or "obtainment."

10. The legal position is no more res integra that the

primary requisite of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of

the Act is proof of a demand or request of a valuable thing

or pecuniary advantage from the public servant. In other

words, in the absence of proof of demand or request from the

public servant for a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage,

the offence under Section 13(1) (d) cannot be held to be

established.” (Emphasis supplied).

20. A similar view was taken in Aman Bhatia v. State (NCT

of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013, wherein it was observed:

52. It is well-settled that mere recovery of tainted money,

by itself, is insufficient to establish the charges against an

accused under the PC Act. To sustain a conviction under

Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act, respectively, it must be

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the public servant

voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe.

The courts have consistently reiterated that the demand

for a bribe is sine qua non for establishing an offence

under Section 7 of the PC Act.

53. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v.

State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731,

categorically held that an offer by bribe-giver and the

demand by the public servant have to be proved by the

prosecution as a fact in issue for conviction under

Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. Mere

acceptance of illegal gratification without proof of offer

by the bribe-giver and demand by the public servant

would not make an offence under Sections 7 and

13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The relevant

observations are reproduced herein below:

“88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely,

the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by

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the public servant, the following aspects have to be

borne in mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver

without there being any demand from the public

servant, and the latter simply accepts the offer

and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case

of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such

a case, there need not be a prior demand by the

public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant

makes a demand and the bribe-giver accepts the

demand and tenders the demanded gratification,

which in turn is received by the public servant, it

is a case of obtainment. In the case of

obtainment, the prior demand for illegal

gratification emanates from the public servant.

This is an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and

(ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by

the bribe-giver and the demand by the public

servant, respectively, have to be proved by the

prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere

acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification

without anything more would not make it an

offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and

(ii), respectively, of the Act. Therefore, under

Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the

offence, there must be an offer which emanates

from the bribe-giver which is accepted by the public

servant, which would make it an offence. Similarly,

a prior demand by the public servant when

accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a

payment made which is received by the public

servant, would be an offence of obtainment

under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.”

(Emphasis supplied)

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54. It was further explained by this Court in P.

Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152, as

follows:

“23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is

the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and

13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in the absence thereof,

unmistakably the charge therefor would fail. Mere

acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal

gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of

demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring

home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a

corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand

for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery

of the amount from the person accused of the offence

under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his

conviction thereunder.” (Emphasis supplied)

55. From the above exposition of law, it may be safely

concluded that mere possession and recovery of tainted

currency notes from a public servant, in the absence of

proof of demand, is not sufficient to establish an offence

under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, respectively.

Consequently, without evidence of demand for illegal

gratification, it cannot be said that the public servant

used corrupt or illegal means, or abused his position, to

obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage in

terms of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

56. The present case is not one of an “offer to pay by the

bribe-giver” where, in the absence of any demand from

the public servant, the mere acceptance of illegal

gratification would constitute an offence under Section 7

of the PC Act. The expression “offer” indicates that there

is a conveyance of an intention to give, which must be

communicated and understood by the recipient, leading

to the meeting of minds. Consequently, the offer is

accepted. For such an acceptance to constitute an offence

under Section 7, there must be clear and cogent evidence

establishing that the public servant was aware of the offer

and accepted it voluntarily, knowing it to be illegal

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gratification. In other words, even where there is no

express demand, the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker

must be shown to hav e been ad idem as regards the

factum of the offer of a bribe.

21. In the present case, the informant and the shadow

witness have not deposed about the demand and the essential

ingredients of the charged offences were not proved.

22. It was submitted that the recovery of the currency

notes would shift the burden to the accused to rebut the

presumption contained in Section 20 of the PC Act. This

submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Paritala Sudhakar v. State of Telangana, 2025

SCC OnLine SC 1072, that the presumption under Section 20 of

the PC Act will not be triggered without the evidence of the

demand. It was observed:

“21. As far as the submission of the State is that, the

presumption under Section 20 of the Act, as it then was,

would operate against the Appellant is concerned, as our

analysis supra would indicate that the factum of demand,

in the backdrop of an element of animus between the

Appellant and the complainant, is not proved. In such

circumstances, the presumption under Section 20 of the

Act would not militate against the Appellant, in terms of

the pronouncement in Om Parkash v. State of Haryana,

(2006) 2 SCC 250:

‘22. In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in the

prosecution case, we are of the opinion that the

defence story set up by the appellant cannot be said to

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be wholly improbable. Furthermore, it is not the case

where the burden of proof was on the accused in terms

of Section 20 of the Act. Even otherwise, where demand

has not been proved, Section 20 will also have no

application. (Union of India v. Purnandu Biswas [(2005)

12 SCC 576: (2005) 8 Scale 246] and T. Subramanian v.

State of T.N. [(2006) 1 SCC 401: (2006) 1 Scale 116])’

(emphasis supplied)”

23. In the present case, there is no satisfactory evidence

of the demand, and no advantage can be derived from the

provisions of Section 20 of the PC Act.

24. As per the prosecution, the mutation of inheritance

of the informant’s mother was to be entered , for which the

accused had demanded ₹3000/- from the informant. The copy

of the mutation (Ext.Pw 13/J) shows the name of Jivnee, the

informant’s mother, in the column of ownership. This falsifies

the informant’s version that a mutation of inheritance of his

grandmother was to be sanctioned in the name of his mother ,

for which the bribe was demanded.

25. Mehmood Khan (PW-2) stated that he had entered

into an agreement (Ext.PW-1/D) with Smt. Jivnee for the

purchase of the land in the name of his son, Salman Khan. Copy

of the agreement (Ext.PW-1/D) mentions that the agreement

was made on 27.12.2011 between Jivnee and Salman Khan. This

22

2026:HHC:22023

agreement is thumb-marked by Jivnee and signed by informant

Nazakat Ali. The informant made a complaint on 07.01.2012 that

mutation of inheritance had not been sanctioned in the name of

his mother. He has not explained that if the mutation of

inheritance was not sanctioned in the name of the informant’s

mother, how the name of Jivnee appeared in the revenue record

and how she could have entered into an agreement to sell the

land to Salman Khan.

26. The informant admitted in his cross-examination

that the land owned by his mother was jointly owned with other

co-sharers, who had made a private partition. He admitted that

Patwari had entered the mutation on 19.12.2011 and Tehsildar

had attested the mutation on 23.12.2011 in the presence of his

mother and co-sharer. He admitted that his mother had agreed

to sell the land after the attestation of the mutation. These

admissions make the informant’s case highly suspect that a

mutation of the inheritance was to be attested in favour of

Jivenee, and the accused had demanded money for entering the

mutation. The record shows that no such mutation was pending;

rather, Jivnee was recorded to be the co-owner of the suit land,

23

2026:HHC:22023

who had partitioned it and the mutation to this effect was also

attested.

27. It was laid down in Kanhaiyalal v. State of Rajasthan,

1998 SCC OnLine Raj 342: 1998 Cri LJ 3155, that when no work was

pending with the accused, no bribe could have been given to him.

It was observed at page 3159:

“13…It is proved by this negative evidence that no such

verification was made by the patwari. Hence, a form to

obtain a subsidy for Rukmani could not have been and

was not presented to the accused appellant. So no work

was pending, and the demand of Rs. 100/- could not have

been made by the accused appellant. When it is proved

beyond doubt from the record that no such application form

was submitted, it cannot be held that any work was pending

with the accused and any demand could be made by him in

relation to the sanction to be made with regard to the

deepening of the well. P.W. 1 Radhey Shyam has himself

admitted that he did not pay the money for the purpose.

According to him, instead, the amount was paid to the

accused appellant for the work which had already been done

and for which there is no charge against the accused

appellant.” (Emphasis supplied)

28. In Suryabhan v. State of Maharashtra, 1994 SCC OnLine

Bom 428: (1996) 1 Bom CR 46: 1995 Cri LJ 107 , mutation was

already entered by the accused, which was certified and

approved before the alleged demand of a bribe. It was held that

the essential ingredient that the money was demanded as a

24

2026:HHC:22023

motive or reward for doing an official act was missing. It was

observed at page 52:

“12...The copy of the extract of the mutation register

(Exh. 67) shows that the mutation has been effected in

the mutation register on 2 -1-1986 itself. The said

mutation was made on 2-1-1986, and it is recorded that

the concerned persons were intimated on 2-1-1986. It is

further apparent from the said document that the

mutation, which was effected in the names of Shankar

Ingole (P.W. 11), Dayaram Ingole (P.W. 7) and Bhaiya

Ingole (P.W. 9), was certified by the Revenue Inspector on

31-1-1986. Both Shankar Ingole (P.W. 11) as well his

brothers Bhaiya Ingole (P.W. 9) and Dayaram (P.W. 7) are

shown to be present at the time of verification and

certification by the Revenue Inspector. It is recorded in

the said register that the persons named Bhaiya (P.W. 9),

Dayaram (P.W. 7) and Shankar (P.W. 11) were present and

on verification of the will deed, they admitted that

Bhagirathibai has died. On that, the mutation which was

effected on 2-1-1986 by the accused was certified on 31-

1-1986. When the mutation was effected on 2-1-1986 by

the accused - appellant and it was duly certified by the

Revenue Inspector on 31-1-1986 in the presence of

Shankar Ingole (P.W. 11), Dayaram (P.W. 7) and Bhaiya

Ingole (P.W. 9), it becomes unbelievable and in any case

highly doubtful that the accused demanded the sum of Rs.

200/- in the month of May, 1986. It will be further seen

from the statement of P.W. 7 Dayaram Ingole that the

agricultural field was partitioned amongst the brothers,

namely, Dayaram (P.W. 7), Bhaiya (P.W. 9) and Shankar

(P.W. 11) in the month of February 1986. It is thus clear

that after the mutation was effected on 2-1-1986 and

duly certified on 31-1-1986, the partition of agricultural

land took place between the three brothers and thus it can

be inferred that Shankar Ingole (P.W. 11), Bhaiya Ingole

(P.W. 9) and Dayaram Ingole (P.W. 7) had knowledge that

the mutation was effected on 2-1-1986 and was duly

25

2026:HHC:22023

certified on 31-1-1986 by the Revenue Inspector. The

statement of these three brothers, namely, P.W. 7

Dayaram, P.W. 9 Bhaiya and P.W. 11 Shankar , to the

contrary that they were not present on 31-1-1986 before

the Revenue Inspector cannot be believed. This is further

fortified from the fact that on 5-5-1986 one of the

brothers Bhaiya (P.W. 9) has sold his share of agricultural

land to Ishwar Raut by the registered sale-deed (Exh. 98).

If the mutation had not been effected on 2-1-1986 and

certified on 31-1-1986 and was not in the knowledge of

these three brothers as alleged, Bhaiya could not have

sold his share on 5-5-1986 much before the date of

incident on 16-5-1986. From this evidence, it can be

inferred that the prosecution's case that Rs. 200/- was

demanded by the accused - appellant from Madhukar

Ingole (P.W. 1) as gratification as a motive or reward for

effecting the entries in the mutation register in favour of

Shankar and his brothers does not inspire confidence and

cannot be believed. On the face of the facts that the mutation

was already effected by the accused - appellant on 2-1-1986,

which was certified by the Revenue Inspector on 31-1-1986

and the post conduct of Shankar Ingole and his brothers of

partition of their respective shares in the month of February,

1986 and the sale of share by one of the brothers Bhaiya (P.W.

9), the prosecution story about the demand of Rs. 200/- by

the accused - appellant from Madhukar Ingole (P.W. 1) as

gratification as a motive or reward for effecting entries in the

mutation register in favour of Shankar and his brothers

becomes highly improbable and can be said to be suffering

from inherent improbabilities. There is no reason to doubt

the correctness and genuineness of the entries recorded

in the mutation register on 2-1-1986 and 31-1-1986

respectively….” (Emphasis supplied)

29. Similar is the judgment in Chandrasen v. State of

Maharashtra, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 277, wherein it was observed:

26

2026:HHC:22023

“36. Therefore, on going through the entire evidence

brought on record and more particularly, the evidence of

P.W.1 Laxman, complainant, it is clear that the

complainant and his two sons were released on bail in the

police station and on the next day their bail was accepted

in Chapter Case in Tahsil Office at Beed. This fact is also

corroborated by P.W.2 Vasant, who has proved Exh. 19/1

to 19/7. These documents would show that in Chapter

Case No. 1/91, the complainant and his sons were released

on furnishing P.R. bond of Rs. 500/- on 2.1.1991 and in

Chapter Case No. 3/91, they were released on furnishing

P.R. bond of Rs. 2000/- on 4.1.1991 by accepting surety.

Therefore, P.W.1 himself has stated that they were

released on bail six days prior to the date of the trap.

Therefore, one of the essential ingredients of section 7 of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, that the amount

of Rs. 300/- was received by the accused/appellant from

Laxman Arey P.W.1 as gratification as a motive or reward

for releasing him on bail, has not been proved by the

prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.”

30. In S.D. Amalraj vs. State Cr.A. no. 490 of 2002, decided

on 25.1.2008 (Madras High Court), the order was passed and

placed on file for issuing a license. It was held that the demand

for a bribe for issuing the license was not probable. It was

observed:

“10. When the accused has already passed an order to

issue a licence and sent the file to A.4 clerk even on

24.8.1998, nothing remains to be done by the accused

thereafter. It is the duty of A.4 Clerk to wait for three days

or one week, whether the applicant (P. W.2) comes and

gets the licence or otherwise, A.4 Clerk should have sent

the licence to the applicant by post. P. W.1 Collector

himself has admitted as follows: -... (vernacular matter

omitted).

27

2026:HHC:22023

11. Therefore, the payment of a bribe after completion of

the official favour is a serious lacuna in the prosecution

case, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U. P.

Vs. Jagdish Singh Malhotra, 2003 SCC(Cri) 1008. In the

present case, on the facts, there is no official favour

persisted at all when already the appellant has ordered for

an issue of a licence.

12. In Ram Smugh Mourya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,

2002 2 CurCriR 169, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has

held as follows:-

"17. In the present case, the purpose for which the

money was demanded as illegal gratification by the

appellant was already served much prior to the

alleged demand of Rs. 100/- to the appellant for

releasing the complainant and his son Mohan.

Complainant Rajaram was also gi ven notice for

appearance before the Court for filing the charge

sheet. In the circumstances, it would be difficult to

believe that the appellant was demanding money

for the work which had already been done. If the

money was not paid by the complainant, after his

release on surety, Deokaran (PW.5) was never called

and asked for the payment of money because , as

per the prosecution case, on his assurance, the

complainant Rajaram and his son were released on

bail. This fact is also tilting the balance of

innocence in favour of the appellant. "

13. In S. Suryanarayana Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, 2000

CrLJ 2377, the Karnataka High Court has held as follows:-

6. . . . Unless there is corroboration by other

materials, it is difficult to hold that the prosecution

has established beyond a reasonable doubt that

there was demand and acceptance. Moreover,

another hole in the jacket of the prosecution is that

the file was left on 22.7.1986 itself with P. W2 to

conduct the survey. In view of these facts and

circumstances of the case, naturally, the doubt

28

2026:HHC:22023

arises as to the genuineness of the prosecution's

story. Hence, the benefit of the doubt is extended to

the appellant"

14 In M. K. Shanmugasundaram Vs. The Inspector of Police,

V and AC, Salem, 2007 1 LW(Cri) 199, this court held that

"Like every other criminal case, a case of bribery is

subject to the rule that the accused is presumed

innocent and that the burden to discharge the said

innocence is paramountly on the prosecution.

However strong the suspicion against the accused,

if every reasonable possibility of innocence has not

been excluded, he is entitled to an acquittal. If,

therefore, the evidence regarding the demand and

acceptance of a bribe leaves room for doubt and

does not displace the presence of innocence wholly,

the charge cannot be said to have been established".

31. Similar is the judgment in Basavaraj I. v. State of

Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 1084, wherein it was observed:

“13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he

visited the appellant's office to request her to issue a final

assessment order. According to his case, at that time,

initially, the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs. 3000.

But she scaled it down to Rs. 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-

2000, the said Society was served with a notice informing

the said Society that an exemption had been granted from

payment of commercial tax to the said Society. Therefore,

the said Society was not liable to pay any tax for the year

1996-1997. The issue of the final assessment order was

only a procedural formality. Therefore, the prosecution's

case about the demand for a bribe made on 23-3-2000 by

the appellant appears to be highly doubtful.”

29

2026:HHC:22023

28. This position was reiterated in State of Lokayuktha

Police v. C.B. Nagaraj, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1175, wherein it was

observed:

“25. It is pertinent to note that till 05.02.2007, when the

Respondent had conducted the physical/spot inspection,

there was not even a whisper of there being any demand

for a bribe. Moreover, when the Complainant went back to

the Respondent's office at 5: 30 PM with the money, the

prosecution case itself, as per the deposition of its

witnesses, makes it clear that the Respond ent had

informed the Complainant that he had already forwarded

the concerned file. Thus, if the same is accepted, there

was no occasion for the Complainant to go ahead with

paying the amount, which he claims to be in the nature of

a bribe demanded by the Respondent, after the work for

which the bribe was purportedly sought had already been

done. The observation of the High Court to this extent is

correct that just because money changed hands, in cases

like the present, it cannot be ipso facto presumed that the

same was pursuant to a demand, for the law requires that

for conviction under the Act, an entire chain, beginning

from demand, acceptance, and recovery , has to be

completed. In the case at hand, when the initial demand

itself is suspicious, even if the two other components - of

payment and recovery can be held to have been proved,

the chain would not be complete. A penal law has to be

strictly construed [Md. Rahim Ali v. State of Assam, 2024

SCC OnLine SC 1695 @ Paragraph 45 and Jay Kishan v. State

of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 296 @ Paragraph 24]. While

we will advert to the presumption under Section 20 of the

Act hereinafter, there is no cavil that while a reverse onus

under a specific statute can be placed on an accused, even

then, there cannot be a presumption which casts an

uncalled-for onus on the accused. Chandrasha (supra)

would not apply as demand has not been proven. In

30

2026:HHC:22023

Paritala Sudhakar v. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine

SC 1072, it was stated thus:

‘21. As far as the submission of the State is that the

presumption under Section 20 of the Act, as it then was,

would operate against the Appellant is concerned, as our

analysis supra would indicate that the factum of demand,

in the backdrop of an element of animus between the

Appellant and the complainant, is not proved. In such

circumstances, the presumption under Section 20 of the

Act would not militate against the Appellant, in terms of

the pronouncement in Om Parkash v. State of Haryana,

(2006) 2 SCC 250:

‘22. In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in the

prosecution case, we are of the opinion that the

defence story set up by the appellant cannot be said to

be wholly improbable. Furthermore, it is not the case

where the burden of proof was on the accused in terms

of Section 20 of the Act. Even otherwise, where

demand has not been proved, Section 20 will also

have no application. (Union of India v. Purnandu

Biswas [(2005) 12 SCC 576 : (2005) 8 Scale 246] and

T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. [(2006) 1 SCC 401 :

(2006) 1 Scale 116])’ (emphasis supplied)’

(emphasis in bold is original, underlining is ours)

29. In the present case, no mutation was pending with

the accused. The informant was aware of the fact that the name

of his mother was recorded in the revenue record, and he had no

reason to pay any bribe to the accused. Therefore, the learned

Trial Court had rightly doubted the prosecution's case.

30. A heavy reliance was placed upon the conversation

stated to have taken place between the informant and the

31

2026:HHC:22023

accused. The informant has not said anything about this

conversation. The learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out

that the voices and the conversation were not identified, and the

conversation cannot be connected to the accused.

31. It was submitted that the hand wash of the accused

turned pink, which showed that the money was handled by the

accused. This submission will not help the prosecution .

Informant Nazakat Ali (PW-1) stated that the vigilance team told

the Patwari that he had taken the bribe, but the Patwari refused.

Patwari picked up the currency notes and counted them.

Mehmood Khan (PW-2) stated that the vigilance official went

inside the room and found the money lying on the table of the

Patwari, who was asked to count the money, the Patwari

counted the money, and the vigilance officials obtained the

handwash. Dalip Kumar (PW -4) stated that the vigilance

officials took the accused inside the office and asked him

whether he had taken the money . The accused replied in the

negative. The vigilance of officials asked about the money lying

on the table, and the accused showed his ignorance. Vigilance

officials asked the accused to pick up the currency notes and

count them. Avtar Singh (PW-5) stated that the accused was

32

2026:HHC:22023

asked whether he had taken a bribe, and he replied in the

negative. He was asked about the currency notes lying on the

table, and the accused showed his ignorance . The vigilance

officials asked the accused to count the notes, and thereafter his

hands were washed. Therefore, the witnesses to the spot have

consistently stated that the money was counted by the accused,

which provides an explanation for the hand wash turning pink,

and no advantage can be derived from the hand wash of the

accused.

32. No other point was urged.

33. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a

reasonable view that was possible based on the evidence led

before the learned Trial Court, and this Court will not interfere

with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if

another view is possible.

34. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is

dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also

stand disposed of.

35. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code

of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha

33

2026:HHC:22023

Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail

bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like

amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four

weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation

that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this

judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on

receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble

Supreme Court.

36. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court

forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

05

th

June, 2026

(ravinder)