2025 INSC 229 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 5001 OF 2024

(Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No(s). 13264 of 2024)

STATE OF KARNATAKA …….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

T.N. SUDHAKAR REDDY ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. The present appeal by special leave is preferred by

the appellant-State, challenging the judgment and final

order dated 4

th March, 2024 passed by the High Court

of Karnataka at Bengaluru

1, whereby the High Court

allowed the Criminal Petition No. 13460 of 2023, filed

1

Hereinafter referred to as ‘High Court’.

2

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

by respondent-accused

2 under Section 482 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973

3, and quashed the FIR

being Crime No. 56 of 2023 registered by the Karnataka

Lokayukta Police Station, Bangalore against the

respondent for the offences punishable under Section

13(1)(b) and Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

4

Brief facts:

3. The respondent is a public servant who joined the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited

5

on 3

rd August, 2007 as an Assistant Executive Engineer

(Electrical). In 2021, he was promoted to the post of

Deputy General Manager (Vigilance)/Executive

Engineer (Electrical) at BESCOM, Bengaluru, Vigilance

Squad, Bangalore and was discharging his duties in the

said capacity.

4. The Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta,

Bangalore, submitted a source information report dated

10

th November, 2023 to the Superintendent of Police,

Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore

6 alleging inter alia

that during his service tenure in various government

department units, the respondent had acquired assets

amounting to Rs. 3,81,40,246/-, which were

2

Hereinafter referred to as ‘the respondent.’

3

Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’.

4

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘PC Act.’

5

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘KPTCL.’

6

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Superintendent of Police’.

3

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

disproportionate and almost 90.72% more than his

known sources of income.

5. Based on the said source information report, the

Superintendent of Police issued an order dated 4

th

December, 2023, directing the Deputy Superintendent

of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore

7 to register

a case against the respondent for offences punishable

under Section 13(1)(b), and Section 12 read with

Section 13(2) of the PC Act, and further authorized the

said officer to conduct the investigation of the case. The

order dated 4

th December, 2023 around which the

controversy revolves is reproduced herein below for

ready reference: -

“KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA

No KLA/B'City(SP-2)/Source/02/2023

Office of the Superintendent of Police,

Karnataka Lokayukta,

Bengaluru City-2, Bengaluru,

Dated 04.12.2023

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUPERINTENDENT

OF POLICE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA

BENGALURU CITY-2

Sub Possession of properties disproportionate

to known source of income by Sri. T N

Sudhakar Reddy, DGM,(EE) Ele, BESCOM

Vigilance, Bangalore.

Ref Source Report submitted by Sri Balaji Babu

H N, Police Inspector-8, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City P S, Dated 10.11.2023

7

Hereinafter referred to as ‘Deputy Superintendent of Police.’

4

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

I have gone through the source report

submitted by Sri Balaji Babu H N, Police

Inspector-8, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru

City P S, relating to his receipt of credible

information that Shri T N Sudhakar Reddy,

DGM,(EE) Ele, BESCOM Vigilance, Bangalore

has acquired properties disproportionate to his

known source of income to the extent of Rs

3,81,40,246/- and thereby committed an

offence under section 13(l)(b) r/w 13(2) and 12

of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.

From the material placed before me and

with application of my mind I am satisfied that

a prima-facie case is made out against Sri T N

Sudhakar Reddy, D6M (EE), Ele, BESCOM

Vigilance, Bangalore Warranting a statutory

investigation for an offence under section

13(l)(b) r/w 13(2) & 12 of Prevention of

Corruption Act 1988.

ORDER NO. KLA/INV/BCD/SP-2/02/2023,

DATED. 04.12.2023.

Therefore by virtue of the powers vested

in me under provisions of Section 17 of the

Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, I, Dr. K

Vamsikrishna, IPS, Superintendent of Police,

Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City-2,

Bengaluru order that Sri. Tippeswamy H J,

Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karnataka

Lokayukta, Bengaluru City Police Station,

Bengaluru to register a case under Section

13(1)(b) r/w 13(2) & 12 of Prevention of

Corruption Act 1988 against Sri. T N Sudhakar

Reddy, DGM(EE), Ele, BESCOM Vigilance,

Bangalore and to investigate the said case. I

know Sri. Tippeswamy H J, Deputy

Superintendent of Police and he is having the

knowledge of investigation of the cases

registered under P.C. Act and also he is having

previous experience of investigation of

disproportionate of asset cases.

Further, I authorize Sri. Tippeswamy H J,

Deputy Superintendent of Police, Karnataka

Lokayukta, Bengaluru City Police Station,

Bengaluru under the provisions of the section

5

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

18 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to

inspect the bankers books in so far as it relates

to the accounts of the persons suspected to be

holding money on behalf of the said Sri. T N

Sudhakar Reddy, DGM,(EE) Ele, BESCOM

Vigilance, Bangalore and to take or cause to be

taken certified copies of the relevant entries

there from and the bankers concerned shall be

bound to assist the police officer Sri.

Tippeswamy H J, Deputy Superintendent of

Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bengaluru City

Police Station, Bengaluru in the exercise of the

powers under the said section of law.

(Dr. K Vamsirishna., IPS)

Superintendent of Police

Karnataka Lokayukta,

Bengaluru City-2,

Bengaluru.

To :

Sri. Tippeswamy H J,

Dy.S.P-4,

Karnataka Lokayukta

Bengaluru City-2, Bengaluru.”

6. On the same day, i.e., 4

th December 2023, an FIR

8

came to be registered against the respondent at the

Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station, Bangalore City, for

the offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and

Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.

7. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a Criminal

Petition

9 under Section 482 of the CrPC before the High

Court, seeking quashing of the aforesaid FIR. The High

Court, vide order dated 4

th March, 2024, allowed the

8

FIR in Crime No. 56 of 2003.

9

Criminal Petition No. 13460 of 2023.

6

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

criminal petition and quashed the FIR along with all the

consequential criminal proceedings arising therefrom.

The said order of the High Court is the subject matter

of challenge in this appeal by special leave.

Submissions on behalf of Appellant:

8. Learned counsel for the appellant-State vehemently and fervently argued that the High Court

grossly erred in allowing the quashing petition preferred

by the respondent. In this regard, he has advanced the

following submissions: -

(i) That it is not mandatory to hold a preliminary

inquiry when the secret information itself

discloses the commission of offences under the PC

Act. The scope of the preliminary inquiry is not to

ascertain the veracity of the information, but only

to check whether the information reveals the

commission of a cognizable offence or not.

Therefore, the necessity to conduct a preliminary

inquiry is dependent upon the factual matrix of

each case. Learned counsel in this regard has put

reliance upon the decisions of this Court in the

cases of CBI and Another v. Thommandru

Hannah Vijaylakshmi and Another

10 and

National Confederation of Officers Association

10

(2021) 18 SCC 135.

7

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

of Central and Public Sector Enterprises &

Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

11.

(ii) That the Superintendent of Police, upon

receiving the source information report from the

Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta,

Bangalore, thoroughly examined the same and

came to a conclusion that the information

provided in the said report disclosed a prima facie

case against the respondent for the offences

punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12

read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Thereupon,

he directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police to

register a case for these offences against the

respondent and to conduct investigation. Since

there is no legislative prescription as to the format

of the preliminary inquiry, the source information

report submitted by the Police Inspector,

Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore, which was

critically evaluated by the Superintendent of

Police, itself served the purpose of a preliminary

inquiry. The source information report not only

delineates the assets amassed by the respondent

but also lays out the expenditure made by him,

which is disproportionate to his known sources of

income. He thus urged that the source information

report must itself be considered as a preliminary

11

(2022) 4 SCC 764.

8

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

inquiry report. Hence, it would be incorrect to

conclude that no preliminary inquiry was

undertaken before the registration of the FIR.

Learned counsel in this regard has placed reliance

upon the decision of this Court in the case of State

of Telangana v. Managipet Alias Mangipet

Sarveshwar Reddy.

12

(iii) That once the Superintendent of Police, upon

receiving the source information report, was

satisfied that the said report disclosed the

commission of offences under the PC Act, he was

competent under Section 17 of the PC Act to direct

the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register an

FIR in respect of the offences disclosed in the

source information report. Further, it was

submitted that the Superintendent of Police was

well within his jurisdiction while directing the

Deputy Superintendent of Police to conduct the

investigation of the case. Learned counsel in this

regard has placed reliance upon the decision of

this Court in the case of Thommandru Hannah

Vijayalakshmi (supra).

(iv) That the order dated 4

th December, 2023

issued by the Superintendent of Police to the

Deputy Superintendent of Police was passed after

due application of mind to the facts of the case and

12

(2019) 19 SCC 87.

9

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

upon being satisfied that tangible material exists

which merits registration of the FIR. It is a

reasoned order which sets out the name of the

accused, the foundational facts pertaining to

acquisition of properties disproportionate to his

gross income, the information about all the

expenditures incurred by him, the nature of the

offence, the relevant provisions of the PC Act, and

most importantly, the power of the Superintendent

of Police to direct the Deputy Superintendent of

Police to register an FIR and investigate the case.

Thus, the High Court was not justified in

concluding that the Superintendent of Police did

not apply his mind while issuing the order of

registration of FIR and the consequent

authorization for investigation into the offences

thereunder. Reliance placed by the High Court on

the judgment in the case of State of Haryana &

Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors

13 is misplaced because

the present case does not fall within any of the

categories enumerated therein, justifying the

decision to allow the quashing petition filed by the

respondent.

On these grounds, learned counsel appearing for

the appellant-State implored this Court to accept the

13

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

10

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and restore

the FIR, registered against the respondent.

Submission on behalf of the Respondent:

9. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for

the respondent vehemently and fervently opposed the

submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant-State.

He advanced the following pertinent submissions,

imploring this Court to dismiss the present appeal:-

(i) That the High Court was fully justified in

quashing the FIR in Crime No. 56 of 2023

considering that the order dated 4

th December,

2023, issued by the Superintendent of Police, was

passed without conducting any preliminary

inquiry. It is a well-established principle of law

that before an FIR is registered against a public

servant for the offences punishable under the PC

Act, a preliminary inquiry must be undertaken by

the competent authority, considering the gravity of

accusations involved in such cases which have a

direct bearing on the accused/public servant’s

reputation and the reputation of the entire

department. Thus, a preliminary inquiry before

registration of an FIR is mandatory so as to avoid

abuse of the process of law considering that the

primary objective of conducting the preliminary

11

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

inquiry is to ensure that the criminal investigation

is not initiated on a frivolous and untenable

complaint. Learned senior counsel in this regard

placed reliance upon the decisions of this Court in

P Sirajuddin v. State of Madras

14; Lalitha

Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and

Ors.

15; and Charansingh v. State of

Maharashtra & Ors.

16

(ii) That any order issued under Section 17 of the

PC Act, directing investigation in the FIR, must be

passed with judicious discretion, based upon due

application of mind and supported by substantive

reasons. The second proviso to Section 17 of the

PC Act, which is an additional safeguard for public

servants, stipulates that any offence that is

punishable under Section 13(1)(b) of the PC Act

shall not be investigated without the order of a

police officer who is below the rank of a

Superintendent of Police. Thus, the

Superintendent of Police was under an obligation

to record reasons before directing the Deputy

Superintendent of Police to register the FIR and

conduct investigation thereupon. However, in the

present case, the Superintendent of Police passed

14

(1970) 1 SCC 595.

15

(2014) 2 SCC 1.

16

(2021) 5 SCC 469.

12

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

the order for registration of FIR casually and

mechanically, without assigning any reasons.

That a bare perusal of the order dated 4

th

December, 2023 reflects that the Superintendent

of Police mentioned having assessed the materials

i.e., the source information report dated 10

th

November, 2023, and applied his mind thereto.

However, the order fails to provide any clear

reflection of a comprehensive and substantive

examination of the said source information report,

which makes it evident that the approach of the

Superintendent of Police was totally mechanical

and laconic, vitiating the criminal proceedings

from the very inception i.e., the registration of the

FIR.

(iii) That the permission accorded by the

Superintendent of Police to register the FIR was

based entirely upon the source information report

and no verification whatsoever was sought in order

to adjudge the veracity of the allegations made

therein. Upon receiving the source information

report, an independent preliminary inquiry should

have been conducted, before directing registration

of the FIR. However, the Superintendent of Police,

influenced by the source information report,

straight away directed the Deputy Superintendent

of Police to register an FIR and simultaneously

13

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

authorised him to commence the investigation of

the case. Learned senior counsel for the

respondent further contended that the entire

procedure followed by the Superintendent of Police

is flawed and in teeth of the law laid down by this

Court in Lalita Kumari (supra), wherein it was

held that preliminary inquiry by the police is sine

qua non in offences related to corruption even if

the police are in possession of information that

discloses the commission of an offence. Hence, the

very initiation of the criminal process is vitiated as

it was biased and flawed from the beginning and

thus, the High Court has rightly allowed the

quashing petition preferred by the respondent.

On these grounds, the learned senior counsel for

the respondent urged that the present appeal against

the judgment of the High Court is liable to be dismissed,

and the High Court’s decision to quash the FIR and all

consequential proceedings arising therefrom, should be

upheld.

Discussion: -

10. We have given our consideration to the

submissions advanced at the bar and have gone

through the impugned judgment. With the assistance of

learned counsels for the parties, we have perused the

material placed on record.

14

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

11. There is no dispute that the respondent is a public

servant who started serving in KPTCL in 2007. He was

duly promoted to the post of Deputy General Manager

(Vigilance)/Executive Engineer (Electrical), at

BESCOM, Bengaluru, and has been discharging his

duties in the said capacity.

12. The primary allegation set out against the

respondent is that during his tenure of service in

various departmental units, the respondent had

acquired assets to the tune of Rs. 3,81,40,246/-, which

were disproportionate and almost 90.72% more than

his known sources of income. A detailed source

information report to this effect was submitted to the

Superintendent of Police who took cognizance of this

report and issued a composite Order (supra) dated 4

th

December, 2023, directing the Deputy Superintendent

of Police to register an FIR against the respondent for

the offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and

Section 12 read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act and to

investigate the same.

13. The core questions which arise for our

consideration in the present case are as follows: -

A. Whether a preliminary inquiry was

mandatory before directing registration of an

FIR under the PC Act in the facts of the case

at hand or whether the source information

15

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

report could be treated to be a substitute for

the preliminary inquiry?

B. Whether the Order dated 4

th November,

2023, passed by the Superintendent of Police

under Section 17 of the PC Act, is

sustainable in the eyes of law?

Issue A: Whether a preliminary inquiry was

mandatory before directing registration of an FIR

under the PC Act in the facts of the case at hand or

whether the source info rmation report could be

treated to be a substitu te for the preliminary

inquiry?

14. It is the case of the appellant-State that

preliminary inquiry is not mandatory before registration

of an FIR. Without prejudice to the above, it is

contended that the source information report submitted

by the Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta Police

Station to the Superintendent of Police, detailing

acquisition of assets by the respondent

disproportionate to his known sources of income, itself

serves as a preliminary inquiry report as it was

elaborate enough to disclose a prima facie case for the

offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and Section

12 read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.

15. On the other hand, learned counsel for the

respondent would urge that the Superintendent of

16

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

Police acted in gross violation of law while issuing an

order to the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register

an FIR as preliminary inquiry in ‘corruption cases’ is a

condition precedent for registration of the FIR. Further,

preliminary inquiry can only be conducted by a police

officer, who is competent to investigate the offence, and

thus, a source information report, however detailed,

cannot be taken to be a substitute for a preliminary

inquiry.

16. In addressing this issue, we must first consider

the legal framework established by this Court in a

catena of decisions, particularly in P. Sirajuddin

(supra), Lalita Kumari (supra), Thommandru

Hannah Vijayalakshmi (supra), and Managipet

(supra). This Court in P. Sirajuddin (supra) has held

that before any public servant is charged with any acts

of dishonesty, a preliminary inquiry ‘must’ be

conducted in order to obviate incalculable harm to the

reputation of that person. The relevant para from P.

Sirajuddin is extracted herein below:-

“17. Before a public servant, whatever be his

status, is publicly charged with acts of

dishonesty which amount to serious

misdemeanour or misconduct of the type

alleged in this case and a first information is

lodged against him, there ‘must’ be some

suitable preliminary inquiry into the

allegations by a responsible officer. The

lodging of such a report against a person,

specially one who like the appellant occupied

the top position in a department, even if

baseless, would do incalculable harm not only

17

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

to the officer in particular but to the department

he belonged to, in general...”

(emphasis supplied)

17. However, the authoritative pronouncement of law

in respect of registration of the FIR emerges from the

decision of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari

(supra) wherein, the issue before the Court was whether

a police officer is obligated to register an FIR upon

receiving information regarding the commission of a

cognizable offence under Section 154 of the CrPC

(corresponding Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

17) or whether it is essential to

conduct a preliminary inquiry to verify the information

before registration of the FIR. This Court held that

under Section 154 of the CrPC, a police officer is

required to register an FIR when the information

received by him discloses the commission of a

cognizable offence, without undertaking a preliminary

inquiry. However, the Court was also cognizant of the

possible misuse of the criminal law resulting in the

registration of frivolous FIRs. To address this concern,

it outlined specific ‘exceptions’ to the general rule,

which mandates the immediate registration of FIR upon

receiving information about a cognizable offence. The

Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari (supra) held: -

17

For short ‘BNSS’.

18

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

“119. Therefore, in view of various

counterclaims regarding registration or non-

registration, what is necessary is only that

the information given to the police must

disclose the commission of a cognizable

offence. In such a situation, registration of

an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable

offence is made out in the information given,

then the FIR need not be registered immediately

and perhaps the police can conduct a sort of

preliminary verification or inquiry for the

limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a

cognizable offence has been committed. But, if

the information given clearly mentions the

commission of a cognizable offence, there is

no other option but to register an FIR

forthwith. Other considerations are not

relevant at the stage of registration of FIR, such

as, whether the information is falsely given,

whether the information is genuine, whether the

information is credible, etc. These are the issues

that have to be verified during the investigation

of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR,

what is to be seen is merely whether the

information given ex facie discloses the

commission of a cognizable offence. If, after

investigation, the information given is found to

be false, there is always an option to prosecute

the complainant for filing a false FIR.”

(emphasis supplied)

18. The following guidelines were laid down by the

Constitution Bench governing the issues:-

“120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we

hold:

120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory

under Section 154 of the Code, if the

information discloses commission of a

cognizable offence and no preliminary

inquiry is permissible in such a situation.

120.2. If the information received does not

disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the

19

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry

may be conducted only to ascertain whether

cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

120.3. If the inquiry discloses the

commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR

must be registered. In cases where

preliminary inquiry ends in closing the

complaint, a copy of the entry of such

closure must be supplied to the first

informant forthwith and not later than one

week. It must disclose reasons in brief for

closing the complaint and not proceeding

further.

120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his

duty of registering offence if cognizable

offence is disclosed. Action must be taken

against erring officers who do not register

the FIR if information received by him

discloses a cognizable offence.

120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not

to verify the veracity or otherwise of the

information received but only to ascertain

whether the information reveals any cognizable

offence.

120.6. As to what type and in which cases

preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will

depend on the facts and circumstances of

each case. The category of cases in which

preliminary inquiry may be made are as

under:

(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes

(b) Commercial offences

(c) Medical negligence cases

(d) Corruption cases

(e) Cases where there is abnormal

delay/laches in initiating criminal

prosecution, for example, over 3 months'

delay in reporting the matter without

20

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

satisfactorily explaining the reasons for

delay.

The aforesaid are only illustrations and not

exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant

preliminary inquiry.”

(emphasis supplied)

19. It was held that a preliminary inquiry is not

mandatory if the information received by the police

officer/Investigating Agency discloses the commission

of a cognizable offence. However, if the preliminary

inquiry is conducted, its scope is limited to determine

whether the information prima facie reveals commission

of a cognizable offence and does not extend to verifying

its truthfulness. The necessity of a preliminary inquiry

depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each

case. For instance, corruption cases fall into a category

where a preliminary inquiry ‘may be made’.

20. The use of the term ‘may be made’ as noted in

Lalita Kumari (supra) underscores that conducting

such an inquiry is discretionary in nature and not a

mandatory obligation.

21. Following the rationale of Lalita Kumari (supra),

this Court in Managipet (supra) held that while the

decision in Lalita Kumari (supra) noted that a

preliminary inquiry was desirable in cases of alleged

corruption, this does not vest a right in the accused to

demand a preliminary inquiry. Whether the preliminary

inquiry is required to be conducted or not will depend

21

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case,

and it cannot be said to be a mandatory requirement,

in the absence of which, an FIR cannot be registered

against the accused in corruption-related matters.

22. The relevant paragraphs from Managipet (supra)

are extracted herein below: -

“33. In the present case, the FIR itself shows

that the information collected is in respect of

disproportionate assets of the accused officer.

The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to

screen wholly frivolous and motivated

complaints, in furtherance of acting fairly and

objectively. Herein, relevant information was

available with the informant in respect of prima

facie allegations disclosing a cognizable offence.

Therefore, once the officer recording the FIR

is satisfied with such disclosure, he can

proceed against the accused even without

conducting any inquiry or by any other

manner on the basis of the credible

information received by him. It cannot be said

that the FIR is liable to be quashed for the

reason that the preliminary inquiry was not

conducted. The same can only be done if upon

a reading of the entirety of an FIR, no offence is

disclosed. Reference in this regard, is made to a

judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]

wherein, this Court held inter alia that where

the allegations made in the FIR or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety, do not

prima facie constitute any offence or make out

a case against the accused and also where a

criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with

mala fides and/or where the proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive

for wreaking vengeance on the accused and

with a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge.

22

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

34. Therefore, we hold that the preliminary

inquiry warranted in Lalita Kumari [Lalita

Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014)

1 SCC (Cri) 524] is not required to be

mandatorily conducted in all corruption cases.

It has been reiterated by this Court in multiple

instances that the type of preliminary inquiry to

be conducted will depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case. There are no fixed

parameters on which such inquiry can be

said to be conducted. Therefore, any formal

and informal collection of information

disclosing a cognizable offence to the

satisfaction of the person recording the FIR

is sufficient.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. A three-judge bench of this Court in

Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi (supra)

extensively discussed the judicial precedents and legal

principles governing the requirement of conducting a

preliminary inquiry before registration of an FIR. The

Court affirmed the view taken by the two-judge Bench

in Managipet (supra), holding that a preliminary

inquiry may not be necessary if the officer recording the

FIR possesses relevant information which discloses the

commission of a cognizable offence. The relevant

extracts from Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi

(supra) are reproduced herein below: -

“32. [..]... we hold that since the institution

of a Preliminary inquiry in cases of

corruption is not made mandatory before the

registration of an FIR under the CrPC, PC Act

or even the CBI Manual, for this Court to

issue a direction to that affect will be

tantamount to stepping into the legislative

domain.

23

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

39. The precedents of this Court and the

provisions of the CBI Manual make it

abundantly clear that a preliminary inquiry

is not mandatory in all cases which involve

allegations of corruption. The decision of the

Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita

Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014)

1 SCC (Cri) 524] holds that if the information

received discloses the commission of a

cognizable offence at the outset, no preliminary

inquiry would be required. It also clarified that

the scope of a preliminary inquiry is not to

check the veracity of the information received,

but only to scrutinise whether it discloses the

commission of a cognizable offence. Similarly,

Para 9.1 of the CBI Manual notes that a

preliminary inquiry is required only if the

information (whether verified or unverified) does

not disclose the commission of a cognizable

offence. Even when a preliminary inquiry is

initiated, it has to stop as soon as the officer

ascertains that enough material has been

collected which discloses the commission of

a cognizable offence. A similar conclusion

has been reached by a two-Judge Bench in

Managipet [State of Telangana v.

Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 : (2020) 3 SCC

(Cri) 702] as well. Hence, the proposition

that a preliminary inquiry is mandatory is

plainly contrary to law, for it is not only

contrary to the decision of the Constitution

Bench in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State

of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524]

but would also tear apart the framework created

by the CBI Manual.”

(emphasis supplied)

24. Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is

perspicuous that conducting a preliminary inquiry is

not sine qua non for registering a case against a public

servant who is accused of corruption. While preliminary

inquiry is desirable in certain categories of cases

24

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

including those under the PC Act, it is neither a vested

right of the accused, nor a mandatory pre-requisite for

registration of a criminal case. The purpose of a

preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity of the

information received, but merely to ascertain whether

the said information reveals the commission of a

cognizable offence. The scope of such inquiry is

naturally narrow and limited to prevent unnecessary

harassment while simultaneously ensuring that

genuine allegations of a cognizable offence are not

stifled arbitrarily. Thus, the determination, whether a

preliminary inquiry is necessary or not will vary

according to the facts and circumstances of each case.

25. In the present case, the Police Inspector of the

Karnataka Lokayukta submitted a comprehensive

source information report dated 10

th November, 2023 to

the Superintendent of Police, which included

meticulous documentation and evaluation of the assets

acquired by the respondent, which were grossly

disproportionate to his known sources of income. The

respondent, during his tenure of service in various

departmental units, had acquired assets worth

Rs.3,81,40,246/-, which were disproportionate and

almost 90.72% more than his known sources of income.

Thereupon, the Superintendent of Police took

cognizance of the source information report and

concluded that the allegations made against the

25

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

respondent did constitute prima facie offences

punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and Section 12 read

with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.

26. It is clearly discernible that the source information

report dated 10

th November, 2023, was in the nature of

a preliminary inquiry in itself and nothing else. The

comprehensive nature of the said report took it beyond

a simple complaint, as it provided a meticulous

breakdown of the respondent’s monetary acquisitions.

Further, the report makes cross-referencing of official

income records with actual property acquisitions, bank

deposits, and other financial assets. In substance, the

source information report prime facie reflects a

systematic pattern of financial irregularities, wherein

the discrepancy in acquisition of assets was found to be

90.72% more than the known sources of income of the

respondent.

27. Thus, in our view the source information report

dated 10

th November, 2023, served as a critical piece of

information which not only documented the financial

discrepancies but also presented a clear, prima facie

picture of disproportionate assets accumulated by the

respondent but also demanded immediate and

thorough investigative action. As we have noted above,

the scope of preliminary inquiries is not to verify the

absolute truthfulness of information, and it is only to

ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or

26

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

not therefrom. The source information report in the case

at hand clearly satisfies this criterion by

comprehensively documenting the financial

irregularities committed by the respondent and

disclosed a prima facie case of commission of a

cognizable offence involving acquisition of

disproportionate assets, punishable under the PC Act.

Thus, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in

concluding that the FIR was liable to be quashed on

account of omission to conduct a preliminary inquiry.

Issue B: Whether the order dated 4

th

November

2023, passed by the Superintendent of Police under

Section 17 of the PC Act, is sustainable in the eyes

of the law?

28. It is the case of the appellant-State that since the

preliminary inquiry is not mandatory, the

Superintendent of Police, who took cognizance of the

source information report, has rightly exercised his

powers to issue an order directing the Deputy

Superintendent of Police to register an FIR against the

respondent and to commence the investigation.

29. Learned senior counsel for the respondent urged

that the Superintendent of Police, grossly erred in

issuing the order dated 14

th December 2023 under

Section 17 of the PC Act merely on the basis of the

source information report dated 10

th November 2023.

Vide this order, he directed the Deputy Superintendent

27

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

of Police to register a case against the respondent for

offences punishable under Section 13(1)(b) and Section

12 read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act and to

investigate the case. It was contended that the

Superintendent of Police failed to apply his mind while

appointing the investigating officer under Section 17 of

the PC Act, as in the absence of a formally registered

FIR, the permission of the Superintendent of Police

could not have been sought as required under second

proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act.

30. For the purpose of deciding this issue, it is

essential to make a reference to Section 17 of the PC

Act.

“Section 17: Persons authorised to

investigate.—

Notwithstanding anything contained in the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),

no police officer below the rank,—

(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police

Establishment, of an Inspector of Police;

(b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay,

Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in any

other metropolitan area notified as such under

sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an

Assistant Commissioner of Police;

(c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of

Police or a police officer of equivalent rank,

shall investigate any offence punishable

under this Act without the order of a

Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of

the first class, as the case may be, or make

any arrest therefor without a warrant:

28

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

Provided that if a police officer not below the

rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by

the State Government in this behalf by general

or special order, he may also investigate any

such offence without the order of a Metropolitan

Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as

the case may be, or make arrest therefor

without a warrant:

Provided further that an offence referred to

in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13

shall not be investigated without the order

of a police officer not below the rank of a

Superintendent of Police.”

(emphasis supplied)

31. Section 17 of the PC Act prescribes that no police

officer below the rank of an Inspector in the case of the

Delhi Special Police Establishment, an Assistant

Commissioner of Police in the metropolitan areas of

Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and any

other metropolitan area notified as such, and in any

other case, the Deputy Superintendent of Police or a

police officer of equivalent rank shall investigate an

offence punishable under the Act without prior order of

the Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the 1

st

Class, as the case may be, or make any arrest without

a warrant. According to the first proviso to Section 17,

if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of

Police as is authorised in this behalf by a general or

special order issued by the Government, he can also

investigate such offences without the order of the

Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the 1

st Class,

as the case may be, or make arrest thereunder without

29

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

a warrant. Further, the second proviso provides that

where an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section

(1) of Section 13 is sought to be investigated, such an

investigation shall not be conducted without obtaining

the order of a police officer not below the rank of a

Superintendent of Police.

32. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has

placed reliance on the decision of a Coordinate Bench

in the case Balakrishna H.N. v. State of Karnataka

and Ors.

18 and concluded that the failure to conduct a

preliminary inquiry before registering the FIR, and the

issuance of the order by the Superintendent of Police

under second proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act,

tantamounted to a clear violation of the legal mandate.

The High Court in the case Balakrishna (supra) held

that:-

“11. The Apex Court considers entire spectrum

of law and at sub-para 15.1 of paragraph 23

holds that an inquiry at pre-FIR stage is held to

be permissible; not only permissible but

desirable, more particularly in cases where the

allegations are of misconduct of corrupt practice

acquiring assets/properties disproportionate to

his known sources of income. This cannot be

demanded as a matter or right is what is

held, apart from holding that there cannot

be a hearing given to the accused prior to

drawing up of a source report or registration

of a crime. The Apex Court nevertheless

holds that the preliminary inquiry is not

only desirable but necessary in such cases.

At paragraph 33 the Apex Court holds that the

18

Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 15886 of 2022 (GM-RES).

30

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

superior officer thus has to verify whether the

developed source information prima facie would

result in the registration of a case; if yes, they

then will have to direct verification of such

information. Though the entire verification was

governed by the CBI manual which the Apex

Court had already held that it should be strictly

and scrupulously followed, the Apex Court

holds that preliminary inquiry would not be a

matter of right or necessary in every case.

12. If the reasons rendered by Apex Court

are noticed, two factors would emerge – one,

that the prosecution is required to draw up

source report after conducting some sort of

a preliminary inquiry to know the assets of

the Government servant and two, after the

source information report is placed before

the Superior Officer – Superintendent of

Police, he has to verify as to whether a crime

should be registered or otherwise. If these

principles that would emerge from the judgment

of the Apex Court are considered qua the facts

obtaining in the case at hand, the registration

of the crime would fall foul of the principles laid

down by the Apex Court and that of this Court

in the afore-quoted judgment.”

(emphasis supplied)

33. Therefore, according to the High Court, the

Superintendent of Police is not competent to pass an

order under Section 17 of the PC Act until a formally

registered FIR came into existence. In other words,

registration of the FIR is sine qua non for issuance of an

order to investigate the case. The High Court framed a

four-step procedure: first, the police must verify the

facts upon receiving the source information report;

second, a preliminary inquiry is to be conducted by the

police; third, the FIR is registered; fourth, the FIR, along

31

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

with the source information report and the preliminary

inquiry report, is to be forwarded to the Superintendent

of Police. Thus, it was concluded that it is only at the

4

th stage that the Superintendent of Police becomes

competent to issue an order directing investigation

under Section 17 of the PC Act.

34. From the discussion and conclusions drawn by us

on the first issue, it is clear that conducting a

preliminary inquiry is not an absolute mandate of law

in cases concerning offences under the PC Act. Hence,

the four-step procedure formulated by the High Court

to quash the FIR against the respondent is not

compliant with any prescription in law and is also

contrary to the law laid down by this Court. What

invites our consideration, therefore, is whether the

Superintendent of Police is competent to pass a

composite order for registration of an FIR as well as

directing investigation under Section 17 of the PC Act,

authorising the Deputy Superintendent of Police to

conduct investigation.

35. It is an established principle that the special law

overrides the general law. However, when a general law

and a special law address the same subject matter, the

rule of harmonious construction is to be applied.

32

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

36. In State of M.P. and Ors. v. Ram Singh

19, this

Court discussed the legislative intent of the PC Act and

held:-

“10. The Act was intended to make effective

provisions for the prevention of bribery and

corruption rampant amongst the public

servants. It is a social legislation intended to

curb illegal activities of the public servants and

is designed to be liberally construed so as to

advance its object.”

37. Chapter 3 of the PC Ac t deals with provisions

concerning offences, and the following chapter, i.e.,

Chapter 4 of the Act articulates procedural aspects with

regard to the investigation of the offences set out in

Chapter 3. With respect to other procedural aspects

inter alia registration of the FIR, the PC Act relies on the

CrPC. Since the PC Act only outlines the procedure for

investigation of offences, therefore, as a necessary

corollary, Sections 154 (corresponding Section 173 of

the BNSS) will be applicable for the registration of FIR

in relation to offences punishable under the PC Act.

38. The initiation of criminal proceedings requires

information that details the commission of an offence,

whether cognizable or not. It is trite that if the

information reveals the commission of a cognizable

offence, the police officials are duty-bound to register an

FIR, except in cases where individual reputation and

relations are at stake, wherein it is advisable to conduct

19

(2000) 5 SCC 88.

33

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

a preliminary inquiry. In this regard, reference may be

made to Paras 120.3 and 120.4. of Lalita Kumari

(supra)

20.

39. In the case of Kailash Vijayvargiya v.

Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri

21, this Court held as follows: -

“29. Drawing on several earlier judgments and

the language of Section 154 of the Code, it was

held that the Police is bound to proceed to

conduct investigation, even without receiving

information about commission of a cognizable

offence if the officer in-charge otherwise

suspects the commission of such an offence.

The legislative intent is to ensure that no information of commission of a cognizable

offence is ignored and not acted upon, which

would otherwise result in unjustified

protection of the alleged offender/accused.

Every cognizable offence must be promptly

investigated in accordance with the law. This

being the legal position, there is no reason

that there should be any discretion or option

left with the Police to register or not to

register an FIR when information is given

about commission of a cognizable offence.

This interpretation in a way keeps a check

on the power of the Police, which is required

to protect the liberty of individuals and

society rights inherent in a democracy. It is

the first step which provides access for justice

to a victim and upholds the rule of law,

facilitates swift investigation and sometimes

even prevents commission of crime and checks

manipulation in criminal cases.”

(emphasis supplied)

40. In the present case, the Superintendent of Police,

after forming an opinion that the source information

20

Refer to Para 18 of this judgment.

21

(2023) 14 SCC 1.

34

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

report dated 10

th November, 2023 prima facie disclosed

the necessary ingredients of the offences punishable

under the PC Act, directed the Deputy Superintendent

of Police to register an FIR against the respondent and

subsequently in the same order, authorised him to

investigate the case. We find nothing wrong in this

composite order which could justify the quashing

thereof. However, the High Court, taking exception to

the aforesaid order, found that the Superintendent of

Police had acted de hors the legal mandate and went on

to quash the FIR on the rationale that the act of issuing

the order under Section 17 of the PC Act while

simultaneously directing the registration of the FIR

violated the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra).

41. We are of the opinion that the High Court gravely

erred while imposing unwarranted fetters on the

investigation agency in corruption cases by carving out

a framework of administrative hurdles which may have

the potential of incapacitating law enforcement

agencies. By mandating elaborate pre-investigation

procedures and creating unwarranted procedural check

dams, the High Court’s approach has the potential to

render the effectiveness of law enforcement nugatory.

These additional procedural requirements which

virtually tantamount to framing a policy could not only

disrupt the smooth functioning of investigation

agencies, but also risk shielding corrupt public servants

35

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

from proper scrutiny, which would be in contravention

of the objective of the PC Act.

42. The legislative intent behind the PC Act is to

provide a robust mechanism for investigating

corruption-related offences, and to avoid the creation of

meandering procedural hurdles that shield corrupt

officials. While interpreting such procedural laws, it

must be borne in mind that the interpretation should

facilitate and not frustrate the investigation of potential

criminal activities, particularly in cases involving

serious allegations of corruption. The correct approach

in such cases is to bolster the system created to ensure

accountability and prevent arbitrary investigations, and

not as a means to create insurmountable procedural

barriers at the very inception. The purpose of fair

investigation is to ensure that the accused is afforded

all the rights guaranteed to him under the law. As a

corollary, an investigation which should be expected to

be fair, must focus on collecting evidence that leads to

the right conclusion and nothing else. A fair

investigation cannot be interpreted to cater to the

accused only, rather it must be such that the entire

investigation process has a backing of the law, and the

due procedure established therein. Thus, the ambit of

fair investigation tethers the procedural safeguards in

order to remain immune from arbitrary actions of

individual investigators.

36

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

43. The critical issue which requires clarity is what

would be the appropriate procedural mechanism when

a detailed source information report reaches the

Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent of Police

is entrusted with the administrative authority to direct

his subordinates to register an FIR upon receiving a

factual report which prima facie discloses the

commission of offences punishable under the PC Act.

The Superintendent of Police is conferred with the

responsibility of evaluating source information report(s)

and to determine whether the same prima facie

warrants further investigation. This administrative

command is not contingent upon a pre-existing,

formally registered FIR or an exhaustive preliminary

inquiry report, as we have held while answering Issue

A.

44. Under Section 36

22 of CrPC (corresponding Section

30 of the BNSS), police officers superior in rank to the

officer in charge of a police station are vested with the

same powers that the officer in charge may exercise

within their station. Section 154 of CrPC (corresponding

Section 173 of the BNSS) empowers the officer in charge

to reduce every piece of information, disclosing a

cognizable offence, into writing either personally or

22

36. Powers of superior officers of police.—Police officers superior in rank

to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers,

throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by

such officer within the limits of his station.

37

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

under his direction. A conjoint reading of Section 36

with Section 154 would make it clear that if the officer

in charge of a police station can direct the registration

of an FIR under Section 154, as a natural corollary by

virtue of Section 36 CrPC, superior officers, which in the

case at hand is the Superintendent of Police, are equally

competent to issue such directions for registration of

the FIR.

45. As a consequence of the above discussion, we are

convinced that the High Court erred in holding that the

Superintendent of Police must first direct the

registration of an FIR and only after it is registered, he

would be competent to issue an order for investigation

under Section 17 of the PC Act. This interpretation

could be permissible only if the subordinates of the

Superintendent of Police had a discretion to either

comply with or disregard the latter’s directive to register

the FIR. Under the scheme of the CrPC, the automatic

consequence of registration of an FIR is commencement

of investigation. The only deviation which Section 17 of

the PC Act creates is that the Superintendent of Police

must authorize a competent subordinate officer to

commence investigation. Since the subordinate police

officers are obligated to comply with the orders of the

Superintendent of Police, it cannot be argued that he

lacked the authority to issue directions under Section

17 of the PC Act simultaneously with the direction to

38

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

register the FIR. The former interpretation is against the

true intent of the PC Act and is liable to be discarded.

Hence, the composite order dated 4

th December

2023 issued by the Superintendent of Police under

Section 17 of the PC Act, directing the registration of the

FIR and authorizing investigation by the Deputy

Superintendent of Police is valid and compliant with

law.

46. Furthermore, it is the case of the respondent that

the Superintendent of Police passed the order

mechanically in typed proforma and did not provide

clear, comprehensive evidence of examining the source

information report, which suggests a perfunctory

approach that improperly set the criminal law into

motion. The High Court in the impugned judgment also

made a reference to Bhajan Lal (supra) to conclude

that the Superintendent of Police did not properly apply

his mind to the source information report and the

statutory requirements before directing the registration

of FIR.

47. In the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court

adjudicated an issue wherein the Superintendent of

Police had issued the order in a mechanical and very

casual manner. The Superintendent of Police, while

authorising the Station House Officer to investigate a

case, had only made an en dorsement to the effect

‘Please register the case and investigate’. The Court,

39

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

while quashing the investigation as well as the entire

proceedings, held that the Station House Officer is not

clothed with the valid legal authority to take up the

investigation and proceed with the same within the

meaning of Section 5-A(1) of the PC Act. The relevant

paragraphs from Bhajan Lal (supra) are extracted

below:-

“129. In the present case, there is absolutely

no reason, given by the SP in directing the

SHO to investigate and as such the order of

the SP is directly in violation of the dictum

laid down by this Court in several decisions

which we have referred to above. Resultantly,

we hold that appellant 3, SHO is not clothed

with the requisite legal authority within the

meaning of the second proviso of Section 5-A(1)

of the Act to investigate the offence under clause

(e) of Section 5(1) of the Act.

[..]

[..]

131. From the above discussion, we hold that

(1) as the salutary legal requirement of

disclosing the reasons for according the

permission is not complied with; (2) as the

prosecution is not satisfactorily explaining the

circumstances which impelled the SP to pass

the order directing the SHO to investigate the

case; (3) as the said direction manifestly seems

to have been granted mechanically and in a very

casual manner, regardless of the principles of

law enunciated by this Court, probably due to

blissful ignorance of the legal mandate and (4)

as, above all, the SHO has got neither any order

from the Magistrate to investigate the offences

under Sections 161 and 165 IPC nor any order

from the SP for investigation of the offence

under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act in the manner known to law, we

40

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

have no other option, save to quash that order

of direction, reading “investigate” which

direction suffers from legal infirmity and also

the investigation, if any, so far carried out.

Nevertheless, our order of quashing the

direction of the SP and the investigation

thereupon will not in any way deter appellant 1,

the State of Haryana to pursue the matter and

direct an investigation afresh in pursuance of

the FIR, the quashing of which we have set

aside, if the State so desires, through a

competent police officer, clothed with the legal

authority in strict compliance with Section 5-

A(1) of the Act.

(emphasis supplied)

48. The apparent distinction in Bhajan Lal (supra)

and the case at hand, is that the Superintendent of

Police in the instant case has demonstrably applied his

mind and passed a well-reasoned and a speaking order

directing registration of the FIR and authorised the

Deputy Superintendent of Police to begin with the

investigation. The Superintendent of Police received the

report on 10

th November, 2023, and issued the subject

order on 4

th December, 2023, i.e. after a gap of 24 days.

The said order not only provided details of the

respondent, but it also makes a reference to the

quantification of the disproportionate assets, nature of

the offence along with the provisions concerned. In

addition, it also referred to the provisions that

empowered the Superintendent of Police to authorise

his junior officer to investigate the case. The

Superintendent of Police assigned a palpable reason as

41

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

to why the particular Deputy Superintendent of Police

was directed to investigate the case. Reference in this

regard may be made to the judgment in Ram Singh

(supra), wherein this Court held as follows:-

“15. We are not satisfied with the finding of

the High Court that merely because the

order of the Superintendent of Police was in

typed pro forma, that showed the non-

application of mind or could be held to have

been passed in a mechanical and casual

manner. As noticed earlier the order clearly

indicates the name of the accused, the

number of the FIR, the nature of the offence

and power of the Superintendent of Police

permitting him to authorise a junior officer

to investigate. The time between the

registration of the FIR and authorisation in

terms of the second proviso to Section 17 shows

further the application of mind and the

circumstances which weighed with the

Superintendent of Police to direct authorisation

to order the investigation.

(emphasis supplied)

49. Moreover, this Court in the case of

Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta v.

B. Srinivas

23, adjudicated on a similar factual scenario

wherein the Superintendent of Police issued a verbatim,

similar order as in the present case. The Court opined

that the order passed by the Superintendent of Police is

elaborate and the reasons are clearly discernible

therefrom.

23

(2008) 8 SCC 580.

42

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

50. Therefore, in view of the discussion made

hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the order dated

4

th December, 2023, issued by the Superintendent of

Police under Section 17 of the PC Act, is fully compliant

with the law. The High Court erred in imposing

unwarranted administrative frameworks that could

potentially incapacitate the law enforcement agencies.

Thus, the Superintendent of Police’s authority to issue

a composite order directing registration of the FIR and

authorizing the officer to conduct an investigation is

valid in the eyes of law. The said order was issued

without undue haste and with due application of mind.

The reasons assigned in the order dated 4

th December,

2023 for entrusting the investigation to the Deputy

Superintendent of Police are manifest and obvious.

Conclusion

51. In view of the above discussion, we conclude that:-

a. The High Court erred in coming to the conclusion

that the order dated 4

th December, 2023, passed

by the Superintendent of Police, was directly

passed under Section 17 of the PC Act, thereby

violating the mandatory provisions of the PC Act.

b. The preliminary inquiry is not mandatory in every

case under the PC Act. If a superior officer is in

seisin of a source information report which is both

detailed and well-reasoned and such that any

43

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

reasonable person would be of the view that it

prima facie discloses the commission of a

cognizable offence, the preliminary inquiry may

be avoided.

c. Section 17 of the PC Act relates specifically to the

investigation process, and not the initial act of

registering the FIR, for which it relies on the

provisions of the CrPC. Hence, it places

limitations on only the investigation; it does not

impede the fundamental duty of the law

enforcement agency to record and register an FIR

for cognizable offences.

d. On a harmonious reading of the provisions of the

PC Act and the CrPC, it is manifest that the

Superintendent of Police is competent to direct

the registration of an FIR if he has information

about the commission of a cognizable offence,

punishable under the PC Act. The former is also

competent to simultaneously direct the Deputy

Superintendent of Police to register an FIR for the

offences under the PC Act, with the

understanding that the subsequent investigation

will be subject to the restrictions outlined in

Section 17 of the PC Act. A composite order to

register the FIR and conduct investigation aligns

with the statutory framework of the CrPC and the

PC Act.

44

Criminal Appeal No. 5001 of 2024

52. For the above reasons, we quash and set aside the

judgment and order dated 4

th March, 2024 passed by

the High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Writ Petition

No. 13460 of 2023 and restore the FIR in Crime No. 56

of 2003, pending before the 23

rd Additional City Civil

and Sessions Judge, Bangalore City.

53. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

54. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

….……………………J.

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

...…………………….J.

(SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 17, 2025.