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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 5847 of 2005

PETITIONER:

State of Punjab & Anr

RESPONDENT:

Balkaran Singh

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/10/2006

BENCH:

H.K. SEMA & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

[With C.A. No. 5854 of 2005 and C.A. No. 5853 of 2005]

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

1. These appeals by special leave are by the State of

Punjab and its Director of Agriculture. They challenge the

judgments and decrees in three different suits filed by three

officers of the Agricultural Department of the State,

essentially claiming pay at enhanced scale in two of the

suits and seniority over certain others in the third suit. Civil

Appeal Nos. 5847 of 2005 and 5854 of 2005 go together and

the issue involved in C.A. No. 5853 of 2005 is slightly

different though based on the same claim. The suits were

decreed by the trial court. The decrees were affirmed in

appeal. The Second Appellate Court declined to interfere.

Hence these appeals.

C.A. NO. 5847 OF 2005

2. The respondent herein, hereinafter referred to as

the plaintiff, filed Civil Suit No. 665 of 1993 on 20.12.1993

in the Court of Senior Subordinate Judge, Chandigarh

praying for a declaration that the Office Order dated

13.3.1980 passed by the Director of Agriculture, Punjab in

fixing the pay of the plaintiff in the scale of Rs. 940-1850/-

instead of in the scale of Rs.1200-1850/- is illegal, null,

void, arbitrary, without jurisdiction and against the

principles of natural justice and equity, for a declaration

that the plaintiff is entitled for the pay scale of Rs.1200-

1850/- as against Rs. 940-1850/-with effect from 1.1.1978

applicable to the post of Deputy Director of Agriculture and

entitled to the payment of all other service benefits including

yearly increments, arrears and interest thereon at the rate of

18 per cent per annum with effect from 1.1.1978 till the date

of payment with costs of the suit. At the time of the suit,

the plaintiff was working as a Joint Director, Agriculture and

was on deputation in The Punjab Land Development and

Reclamation Corporation Limited. The plaintiff was selected,

according to him, to the post of Deputy Director of

Agriculture. But the order of appointment produced by him

and marked as Exhibit P-1 shows that the plaintiff was

appointed to Punjab Agricultural Services Class-I

temporarily by direct recruitment in the time scale of

Rs.400-30-550/40-750/50-1250 and was posted as Deputy

Director of Agriculture (Pulses), Bhatinda. The plaint

proceeds on the basis that on the recommendations of the

Third Pay Commission, the Government of Punjab revised

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the pay-scales of its employees from 1.1.1978. The pay-

scale of Deputy Directors in all services was given as

Rs.1200-1850/- from the old scale of Rs.400-1250/-. When

this decision to revise the pay-scale was brought to the

notice of the Director of Agriculture, he found that in the

Agricultural Department there was no post of Deputy

Director as such and that the appointment of all those

working as Deputy Directors was only to Punjab Agricultural

Service Class-I and that the scale of pay of Class-I officers in

the original scale of Rs.400-1250/- had been enhanced only

to Rs. 940-1850/-. He therefore made an endorsement that

the revised scale of pay of Deputy Directors in the

Agricultural Department, they being officers of Class-I was

only Rs. 940-1850/- and consequently that amount alone

was payable. It may be noted that this endorsement was

made as early as on 13.3.1980. The plaintiff was being paid

salary only at that scale from 1.1.1978. The plaintiff came to

Court challenging that order only on 20.12.1993, more than

12 years after the order or endorsement. The case of the

plaintiff was that in the case of one Mewa Singh, who was

also a Deputy Director, the Court had passed a decree in the

year 1991 declaring him entitled to the pay-scale of

Rs.1200-1850/- and when that was done and the State

accepted the said decision and paid Mewa Singh, the

plaintiff issued a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil

Procedure and that notice not having been responded to by

the defendants, he was filing the suit. It is appropriate to

refer to paragraph 9 of the plaint in this connection. The

plaintiff pleaded:

"That cause of action firstly arose in 1980

when the plaintiff became eligible for the

revised pay scale of Rs.1200-1850/- with

effect from 1.1.1978 as per Annexure P-2,

thereafter the cause of action arose on

23.10.1992, when the pay of Shri Mewa

Singh Sonar was fixed in the scale of

Rs.1200-1850/- by Defendant No.2, but the

plaintiff was not given the same scale and

finally on 16.6.1993, when legal notice

under Section 80 of the Code of Civil

Procedure was served upon the defendants."

3. As noticed, the claim of plaintiff was that he had

been appointed as a Deputy Director even initially and the

revised scale of pay of Deputy Directors had been shown in

the concerned Order as Rs.1200-1850/- and consequently,

he is entitled to salary at that scale from 1.1.1978 as per the

recommendations of the Third Pay Commission accepted by

the State of Punjab and brought into effect.

4. The defendants filed a written statement denying

the claim of the plaintiff that he was appointed as a Deputy

Director. It was pointed out with reference to the Order of

appointment relied on by the plaintiff himself, that he was

temporarily appointed to the post of Punjab Agricultural

Service Class-I officer, on a scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/-

and that scale had been revised with effect from 1.1.1978

only to Rs. 940-1850/- and hence the plaintiff was not

entitled to the higher scale of pay as claimed by him. It was

further pleaded that the post of Deputy Director in which

the plaintiff was intermittently working was only an

interchangeable post manned by Class-I officers in the

Punjab Agricultural Service. It was also pleaded that going

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by Rule 11 of the Punjab Agricultural Service (Class-I) Rules,

1974, the position of Deputy Director was not a promotion

post for a Class-I Officer and consequently the claim of the

appellant that he was holding a post higher than that of a

Class-I officer, was untenable. It was an interchangeable

post that he was holding and he had himself worked as

Class-I officer during his career and had also occasionally

worked as Deputy Director. It was pleaded that the decision

in Mewa Singh's case had no application and could not be

made use of for grant reliefs to the plaintiff. It was also

specifically pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation,

the cause of action for the relief of declaration having arisen

as early as on 13.3.1980 and the suit having been filed only

on 20.12.1993. It was also pleaded that no decree could be

granted for so-called arrears from 1.1.1978 as claimed in the

plaint. We may incidentally notice that the plaintiff has not

quantified or valued any arrears as due to him.

C.A. NO. 5854 OF 2005

5. The facts of this case are also on a par with the

litigation giving rise to C.A. No. 5847 of 2005. Here, the

plaintiff, who was appointed as a Class-II officer was

promoted as Class-I Officer on a scale of pay of Rs.400-

1250/- by Order dated 10.6.1977 and was posted as Deputy

Director, Agriculture (I.C.D.P.), Mukhtasar. The Civil Suit

No. 894 of 1993 was filed on 25.11.1993. The prayers in the

plaint are identical with the ones in Civil Suit No. 665 of

1993 giving rise to C.A. No. 5847 of 2005. The claim is also

made on the same basis. The suit was resisted on the same

lines by the defendants. The question that has to be tackled

herein is the same as the one arising in C.A. No. 5847 of

2005 including the question of limitation and hence no

separate discussion is needed.

C.A. NO. 5853 OF 2005

6. The respondent- plaintiff filed Civil Suit No. 82 of

1993 on 6.5.1993 praying for a declaration that he was

legally entitled to be placed at Serial No. 12 instead of at

Serial No. 20 in the seniority list prepared in the year 1980

of the Punjab Agricultural Service Class-I (Administrative)

officers of the Agricultural Department issued by the Punjab

Government on 26.2.1980 and for a mandatory injunction

directing the defendant \026 State of Punjab, to fix the seniority

of the plaintiff at Serial No. 12 in the Seniority List of Class-I

Officers of the Agricultural Department prepared in the year

1980 and granting the plaintiff proforma promotions in

accordance with his actual seniority in the Department with

retrospective effect after placing him at Serial No. 12 in the

Seniority List. He also prayed for a mandatory injunction

directing the defendant to release the arrears of his pay and

emoluments along with interest at the rate of 18 per cent per

annum from the dates when they became due till their

actual recovery in view of his denied promotions to which he

was legally entitled to and also to grant him all the service

benefits and arrears from the back date to which he was

found legally entitled to in the facts and circumstances of

the case.

7. Subsequently, the plaint was amended and the

State of Punjab, the original Defendant was ranked as

Defendant No.1 and four other officers in the Agricultural

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Department were impleaded as Defendants 2 to 5. One

officer Sukhdev Singh, who was shown as senior and

promoted earlier and with reference to whom a specific relief

was claimed was not impleaded apparently on the basis that

he had since retired. The plaintiff also included in the

amended plaint a further prayer as regards the seniority list

of the years 1984 and 1985 and seeking the placing of the

plaintiff at Serial No. 15 instead of at Serial No. 21.

8. In addition to the factual position that was

identical with the other two suits, in that the plaintiff was

also recruited initially only as a Class-I officer in the Punjab

Agricultural Service, one further fact that was relied on by

the plaintiff was that though he had been placed in the

revised scale of pay at Rs.940-1850/-, he had filed a suit

being Civil Suit No.461 of 1991 challenging the order fixing

his revised scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- and claiming that

he was entitled to arrears of pay at the scale of Rs. 1200-

1850/- and the same was decreed in his favour, upholding

his prayer and directing that payment of salary including

arrears be paid to him in the scale of Rs.1200-1850/- and

that the said decision had become final. In view of the said

decision, it was the contention of the plaintiff that the first

defendant could not deny the seniority that would be due to

him based on the higher pay thus drawn by him as against

the officers who were placed in a lower scale of pay.

9. It may be noted that the plaintiff had pleaded that

the cause of action arose in his favour on the refusal of the

defendant-State to grant the relief claimed by him in the

plaint by sending a notice under Section 80 of the Code of

Civil Procedure and that the cause of action had also arisen

earlier on 3.10.1991 as the plaintiff's previous suit was

decreed by the trial court.

10. The suit was resisted by the first defendant-State

by contending that the plaintiff was recruited temporarily

only as an officer in Punjab Agricultural Service Class-I on a

scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/- and he could be fitted only in

the revised scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- and that his

seniority cannot be re-fixed as claimed by him since even in

the recruitment he was placed junior to those officers. The

State, no doubt, had to concede that the decree in Civil Suit

No. 461 of 1991 had become final. It was pleaded that the

present suit was barred by limitation and that the seniority

that was fixed in the year 1980 and in the years 1984 and

1985 could not be upset or revised in the suit filed in the

year 1993 and that merely because the State has been

forced to give the plaintiff a higher scale of pay, the plaintiff

could not claim seniority over other officers. All the

necessary parties have not been impleaded. The suit was

liable to be dismissed. Defendant No.2 was removed from

the array of parties. Two of the other defendants filed a

written statement, more or less, along the same lines as that

of the State.

11. In all the three suits, the trial court raised issues

as to whether the respective plaintiff would be entitled to the

revised scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- instead of at Rs.940-

1850/- and whether the suits were barred by limitation. In

the suits giving rise to C.A. No. 5847 of 2005 and C.A. No.

5454 of 2005, the trial court held that in view of the letter

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sanctioning the revised pay scale indicating the scale of pay

of Deputy Directors as Rs.1200-1850/-, the endorsement of

the Director of Agriculture that the revised scale of pay of

Rs.940-1850/- alone was payable was wrong. The court

shut its eyes to the contention that the plaintiffs were only

recruited as Punjab Agricultural Service Class-I officers on a

scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/- and the revised scale for that

pay was only Rs.940-1850/- and that the post of Deputy

Director held by the plaintiffs was an interchangeable post

and the plaintiffs themselves had held the post of Class-I

officers during all these years alternately and that in the

light of Rule 11 of the relevant rules, the plaintiffs could not

be considered to be holding any promotional post. The trial

court purported to rely upon the decision in Civil Suit No.

461 of 1991 and the fact that the State was forced to

concede the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- to Mewa Singh,

the plaintiff therein, to hold that all those officers of Class-I

who at one time or the other worked as Deputy Directors,

would be entitled to the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/-. It

was not borne in mind that Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 was

not a representative action, though of course it related to an

officer similarly situated and the decision in that suit might

have evidentiary value but could not be understood as

barring a proper enquiry into the contentions by the trial

court. On the issue of limitation, the trial court stated that

the relief of declaration was not barred by limitation because

the right to seek the fixation of pay as per rules could not be

held to be barred by limitation presumably on the ground

that it was a recurring cause of action. The issue was

disposed of in a most unsatisfactory and cursory fashion by

the trial court even without advertence to the relevant article

of the Limitation Act. In the third suit, the trial court relied

entirely on the earlier decree in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991

and proceeded to upset the seniority list of 1980 in the suit

of the year 1993 by a judgment dated 7.8.1997 and granted

a declaration that Mewa Singh, the plaintiff therein, is

entitled to be placed at Serial No.12 instead of at Serial No.

20 in the seniority list issued on 26.2.1980 and at Serial No.

15 instead of at Serial No. 21 in the seniority list prepared in

the year 1984-85. The State was directed to consider the

case of the plaintiff for fixation of seniority as claimed by the

plaintiff. In the event of grant of the said seniority, it was

directed that the plaintiff would be entitled to all the benefits

of service. He shall be posted as per the seniority. An order

was to be passed within two months from the date of the

decree.

12. The State appealed against these decrees. The

appellate court simply followed the line adopted by the trial

court without a proper and independent application of mind

and confirmed the decrees. It noticed that the seniority list

was issued in the year 1980 and in the year 1984, but

stated that at that stage it was not established that the post

of Deputy Director enjoys higher rank and status as

compared to the other officers and since a finding in that

regard was recorded only on 3.10.1993 in the prior suit, the

present suits could be held to be within time. Thus the

appeals were dismissed.

13. The State filed Second Appeals before the High

Court of Punjab and Haryana. The High Court, we are

constrained to point out, without a proper application of

mind, simply dismissed the Second Appeals, without even

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considering or attempting to answer properly the issues that

arose for decision in the case. It appears to us that in

matters relating to service, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court

cannot be considered to be so wide that it would enable it to

sit in appeal over disciplinary proceedings, over the

quantum of punishment imposed, over the entries in

confidential records, and so on, in respect of which reliefs

are seen to be freely granted by the courts in the States of

Punjab and Haryana. In the case of grant of reliefs in

matters relating to services, we feel that the High Court

ought to make a deeper scrutiny of the decrees to see

whether the Civil Court has overstepped its jurisdiction in

granting the reliefs instead of simply rejecting the Second

appeals on the basis that concurrent findings have been

rendered by the trial court and the first appellate court. In

the case on hand, the High Court made no attempt to see for

itself whether on the basis of the rules and the arguments

put forward on behalf of the State, the respective plaintiffs

could be fitted in the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- and in

the third suit where the earlier decree became final, whether

the reliefs claimed could be granted merely on the ground

that there was an earlier decree in favour of the plaintiff

therein granting him a higher scale of pay. Similarly, the

question of limitation was disposed of even without referring

to the relevant article in the schedule to the Limitation Act

that had application and without considering whether it was

open to any court to upset a seniority list of the year 1980 in

a suit of the year 1993 even when all the affected parties

were not impleaded or were not before the Court. It is for

these reasons that we are constrained to observe that the

Second Appeals were dismissed in a cursory and most

unsatisfactory manner by the High Court. The State has

challenged these decisions by way of these Civil Appeals.

14. The respondent in Civil Appeal No.5853 of 2005

died pending the appeal in this Court and his legal

representatives were brought on record. Their counsel was

also heard.

15. We shall first deal with the first two suits relating

to the declaration that the plaintiffs therein are entitled to be

placed in the revised scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/-. The

suits filed are for declaration that the order or endorsement

dated 13.3.1980 was illegal and void. The suits were filed

more than 12 years after the order fixing the revised scale of

pay at Rs.940-1850/-. A suit for declaration is governed by

Article 58 of the Limitation Act and the period is three years

and the terminus au quo is "when the right to sue first

accrues".(emphasis supplied) Clearly, the right to seek the

relief of declaration that they are entitled to revised scale of

pay of Rs.1200-1850/-, accrued to the plaintiffs on

13.3.1980, when the endorsement in that behalf was made

by the Director of Agricultural Services and the plaintiffs

were denied revised pay at Rs.1200-1850/- and were paid

only at Rs.940-1850/-. It was not the mere making of an

order, but an action that had immediate impact on the right

of the plaintiffs to recover a higher salary as per their claim.

The cause of action thus clearly arose for the first time.

Thus the suit for declaration was clearly barred by limitation

going by Article 58 of the Limitation Act. The fact that some

other officer had been given a decree for the enhanced

revised scale, does not furnish the plaintiffs in the first two

suits with a fresh cause of action. It is well settled that the

time does not stop to run once it has started to run.

Therefore, the reliance placed on the decree in Civil Suit No.

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461 of 1991 had absolutely no relevance on this question.

Strictly speaking, Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 also ought not

to have been decreed since that suit was clearly barred by

limitation, since the order sought to be challenged in that

suit of 1991 was also the order dated 13.3.1980. But in

view of the decree passed therein, it is not for us now to go

into the correctness or otherwise of the decision rendered

therein. Suffice it to say that the said decision cannot give

the plaintiffs a fresh cause of action. The time started to

run when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff and

that first accrual was clearly on 13.3.1980 and on expiry of

3 years therefrom, the suit for declaration became barred.

16. It was argued on behalf of the plaintiffs, as was

done in trial court, that the cause of action must be held to

be a recurring one and hence the suit must be held to be not

barred by limitation. Reliance was placed on the decision in

Amrit Lal Berry Vs. Collector of Central Excise, New

Delhi & Others [(1975) 4 SCC 714]. That decision arose

from a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution of

India. It was not a suit. There was no occasion for this

Court to consider the scope of Article 58 of the Limitation

Act in that Writ Petition. It was only stated that when a

citizen aggrieved by the action of the government

department had approached the Court and obtained

declaration of law in his favour, others, in like

circumstances, should be able to rely on the sense of

responsibility of the department concerned and to expect

that they will be given the benefit of this declaration without

the need to take their grievance to the court. This is hardly

a defence to a plea based on Article 58 of the Limitation Act

in respect of the relief of declaration with respect to an order

which was issued twelve years prior to the suit and which

immediately affected the pay receivable by them. In fact this

Court in S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh

(1989(4) SCC 582), a decision rendered by seven Hon'ble

Judges, has clearly held in suits relating to service matters,

that "yet, suits out side the purview of the Administrative

Tribunals Act shall continue to be governed by Article 58".

In a series of subsequent decisions, this Court has held that

a suit for declaration in matters relating to a service is

governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. { See for

instance, Mohd. Quaramuddin (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. State of

A.P. [(1994) 5 S.C.C. 118], Vasant Ramchandara

Deshpande Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [(1997) 11

S.C.C. 305], Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation

& Ors. Vs. Nand Lal [1999 S.C.C. (L & S) 658] }. In State of

Punjab & Ors. Vs. Gurdev Singh [(1991) 4 S.C.C. 1], a three

judge Bench of this Court held that a party aggrieved by the

order, even if it is found to be void, has to approach the

court for relief of declaration that the order against him is

inoperative and void within three years of the order. It is

one thing to say that the plaintiffs might make a claim that

they must also be paid in future at the revised scale of pay

of Rs.1200-1850/- in view of the decision rendered in favour

of another officer of the same department. But that does not

enable them to revive a claim for the relief of declaration

which had become long ago barred. A cause of action once

barred does not get revived in such a case. Moreover, the

decree that was granted in that case was only to the effect

that the plaintiff therein was entitled to the scale of pay of

Rs.1200-1850/- with effect from 1.1.1978, which was

attached to the post of Deputy Director of Agriculture

instead of at Rs.940-1850/-. As we have indicated that was

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not a suit in which Order I Rule 8 of Code of Civil Procedure

was invoked and there was no declaration granted that the

endorsement or order dated 13.3.1980 was illegal and void,

the prayer for which is made in the first two suits. It may be

noticed that Suit No.461 of 1991 was concerned more with

the effect of various disciplinary proceedings initiated

against the plaintiff therein on the claim made by him in

that suit. We are therefore constrained to hold that the

relief of declaration sought for by the plaintiffs in the first

two suits is clearly barred by limitation.

17. Once the prayer for declaration sought for in the

suits is found to be barred by limitation, it has to be noticed

that the prayer that follows is only consequential on the

relief of declaration. That prayer is to the effect that the

plaintiff is entitled to the pay scale of Rs.1200-1850/- as

against the scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- with effect from

1.1.1978 and entitled for payment of all other service

benefits including yearly increments, arrears and interest

thereon at the rate of 18 per cent per annum up to the date

of payment with effect from 1.1.1978. It must be noticed

that there is no independent prayer for recovery of arrears of

pay and the prayer is couched in such a manner that it can

be understood only as consequential on the grant of the first

relief. In other words, it is not an independent relief that

could be granted even if the main prayer is declined. In that

view, it has to be held that a consequential relief could not

be granted in view of the fact that the main relief of

declaration sought for has been held to be barred by

limitation.

18. Now coming to the merits of the contention

regarding the revised scale of pay, it has to be seen that the

plaintiffs are governed by the Punjab Agricultural Service

Rules, 1974. Going by the rules, under Rule 11, the post of

Deputy Director is not a promotional post for Punjab

Agricultural Service Officers Class-I. The orders of

appointment relied on by the two plaintiffs also clearly show

that one was temporarily appointed to Punjab Agricultural

Service Class-I, and the other was promoted as Officer

Class-I, but were posted as Deputy Directors. Therefore, the

appointment in one and the promotion in the other of the

plaintiffs are as Agricultural Officers Class-I. Their scale of

pay was Rs.400-1250/-. The said scale of pay has been

revised to Rs.940-1850/-. Therefore, they are entitled to

revised pay only at the scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/- and

not to any other higher pay. It is a fact that in the

communication of the Government, the cadre of Deputy

Directors are shown to be fitted in the revised scale of pay of

Rs.1200-1850/-. But, the Director of Agriculture, obviously

considering the nature of the service in the Agricultural

Department, rightly noting there was no cadre post of

Deputy Director in the department and some Agricultural

Officers, Class-I were posted as Deputy Directors and some

others as Chief Agricultural Officers, etc. only for

administrative reasons and the posts were interchangeable

and the concerned officer remained an officer of Class-I,

endorsed that the scale of pay of Rs.1200-1850/- does not

apply to those working as Deputy Directors in the

Agricultural Department. We find that the correct position

was adopted by the Director of Agriculture and the order or

endorsement made by him on 13.3.1980 was clearly correct

and legal and in the face of the orders of appointment

Exhibit P-1 produced by the plaintiffs, they cannot be heard

to say that they were appointed to a post other than that of

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a Class-I officer in the Punjab Agricultural Service. The

courts below have not considered the rules and the position

emerging therefrom and the position obtaining in the service

while considering this question and thereby they have gone

wrong in their conclusion.

19. It is argued that since in Civil Suit No. 461 of

1991 one other officer who was working as Deputy Director

was found entitled to the revised scale of pay of Rs.1200-

1850/-, all Class-I officers must be given the same pay

cannot be accepted. If such a plea is accepted, it will result

in equals being treated unequals in that those appointed

with the plaintiffs but who have been posted as Agricultural

Officers Class-I or as Chief Agricultural Officers holding

interchangeable posts would only be entitled to the scale of

pay of Rs.940-1850/- and certain persons among Class-I

officers who were fortuitously working as Deputy Directors,

would be getting the higher scale of pay at Rs.1200-1850.

Surely, such a situation cannot be brought about and the

result of the acceptance of the plea based on the decree in

Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 would be that. Moreover, this

Court cannot be controlled by a wrong decision of a trial

court, unless of course, it operates as res judicata.

Therefore, the plea based on the decree in Civil Suit No. 461

of 1991 is overruled. We have already pointed out that the

said suit was not a representative action. No doubt, the

Government cannot treat different officers of same cadre

differently. But, merely because a decree was passed in

favour of one of them \026 according to us wrongly \026 would not

mean that all others should be given the same relief, when

going by the relevant rules and orders of appointment it is

clear that the plaintiffs are only Class-I officers appointed in

the scale of pay of Rs.400-1250/-, whose pay has been

revised to the scale of pay of Rs.940-1850/-.

20. In the view we have taken, the argument of the

plaintiff based on the Punjab Horticultural Service (Class-I)

Rules, 1990, has no substance. Those rules cannot have

any application to the question involved here. The result of

this discussion would be that the decrees granted by the

courts below in the two suits, i.e., Civil Suit No. 665 of 1993

and Civil Suit No. 894 of 1993 are unsustainable in law and

the decrees deserve to be reversed.

21. Coming to the third suit, Civil Suit No. 82 of

2003, we have found that the prayer in the suit filed on

6.5.1993 is to set at naught the seniority lists published in

the year 1980 and in the year 1984. On the face of it, the

prayer for declaration is barred by limitation. The suit is

governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act and the impact

of the publication of the seniority list was felt by the plaintiff

on the issue of that list and when others were placed above

him. The cause of action therefore arose in 1980 and in

1984.

22. According to us, the suit is also barred by

acquiescence and estoppel. No one in a service can sleep

over the question of seniority for more than 12 years and

then come to court seeking a relief which will upset the

seniority of a number of persons who had been shown as

seniors in the respective seniority lists. Therefore, on the

face of it, a declaratory relief that will have the effect of

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altering a twelve year old and a nine year old seniority list

could not have been granted by the courts below.

23. Then the only question is whether in view of the

earlier decree in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 obtained by the

present plaintiff, he would be placed in a better position

regarding his entitlement to have the seniority list upset at

this distance of time. We have already indicated the scope

of the decree granted in the earlier suit. It merely found that

the disciplinary actions initiated against the plaintiff did not

affect his claim to be given the revised scale of pay of

Rs.1200-1850/- and that he was entitled to it

notwithstanding the endorsement made otherwise by the

Director of Agricultural Services. The fact that he had

obtained such a relief and that relief had become final would

not entitle him or enable him to seek the setting aside of the

seniority list merely on the ground that he had been put on

a higher pay scale than his colleagues who were otherwise

senior to him in service. All those, who will be affected have

also not been impleaded.

24. We do not think it necessary for the purposes of

these appeals to consider how far a Civil Court can enter

into the arena to decide upon the question of inter se

seniority in Government service. We also do not think it

necessary to go into the question of the extent of the

jurisdiction of the civil court, when they entertain suits

relating to matters of service, especially government service,

seeking the expunction of adverse entries, striking down of

punishments imposed by the authority after holding a

proper enquiry, as if the court was sitting in appeal, as to

which scale of pay a person should be fitted in, and so on.

Anyway, these questions will have to be examined as and

when the occasion for it arises. But, we may say that the

civil court cannot assume that it can freely enter the arena

as if it is sitting in appeal over the action of the authorities.

25. Other reliefs claimed in Civil Suit No. 82 of 1993

are consequential to the relief of redrawing of the seniority

list and since we have found that no relief of altering the

seniority list can be given to the plaintiff therein, those

reliefs also cannot be granted. Of course, the decree

obtained by the plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 461 of 1991 which

has become final would not be affected by whatever we have

said in this judgment. But the decree granted in Civil Suit

No. 82 of 1993 has to be reversed.

26. In the result, these appeals are allowed; the

judgments and decrees granted by the courts below are set

aside and all the three suits are dismissed with costs in the

trial court. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to

suffer their respective costs in the first appellate court, in

the second appellate court and in this Court.