Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2831 OF 2009

(Arising Out of SLP (C) 11653 of 2008)

State of U.P. (Now Uttarakhand) …. Appellant

Versus

Rabindra Singh …. Respondent

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2832 OF 2009

(Arising Out of SLP (C) 25729 of 2008)

State of U.P. (Now Uttarakhand) & Anr. …. Appellants

Versus

Mohan Lal …. Respondent

JUDGMENT

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.This judgment will dispose of the SLP (C) 11653 of 2008 as also

SLP (C) 25729 of 2008 since both the appeals involve identical points

regarding the applicability of UP Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised

Occupants) Act, 1972 to the land possessed by the respondents, more

particularly, the lands vested in or entrusted to the management of the

Gaon Sabha and or any other local authority under any law relating to land

tenures.

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3.By way of the present appeal the State of Uttar Pradesh, now State

of uttarakhand challenges the judgment of the High Court whereby the

High Court has allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondent herein Shri

Rabindra Singh.

4.Factual scenario is as follows:

The dispute relates to a land measuring 4.10 bighas in Khasra Plot

No.1371/24/1 situated in village Saran. The said land was in possession of

the respondent since 1384 Fasli. The High Court has allowed the Writ

Petitions by these two judgments holding that such lands would not be

covered within the definition of “public premises” under the UP Public

Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972 (hereinafter

called the ‘Public Premises Act’, for short). Basically the question boils

down as to whether the lands which are covered by the definition in

Section 3(14) of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950

can be said to be public premises and, therefore, covered under the Public

Premises Act.

5.We shall take up the facts in this appeal arising out of SLP (C)

11653 of 2008. The respondent Rabindra Singh possessed

aforementioned land since the year 1384 Fasli. He claimed to be in

cultivating possession like other respondents. He was served with notice

under Section 4 (1) of the Public Premises Act directing him to show cause

as to why he should not be evicted from the land Khasra plot no.

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1371/24/1, measuring 4.10 bighas situated in village Saran, Tehsil Bazpur

as he was in unauthorized occupation of the land. He filed his written

statements before the prescribed authority, namely, Sub-Divisional

Magistrate, Kashipur contending that he was also in possession of land

measuring 26.13 bighas and the said land and the disputed land became a

compact plot and that he was in possession of the said plot since 1960,

and, therefore, he was prepared to get it regularized. Along with the writ

statement, he also filed the map and Khatauni of the land. In the evidence

led before the authority he supported his case by showing that the

disputed land was earlier in the shape of a drain and he had improved it

and made it capable of cultivation. There are two witnesses examined by

him to support his case of continuous possession. As against this, in his

evidence the Patwari of the village stated that the respondent was in

unauthorized possession since 1384 Fasli and was for public utility.

Without giving any reasons, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nainital

straightway recorded that the possession of Rabindra Singh was

unauthorized and, therefore, in exercise of the power under sub Section 1

of Section 5 of the Public Premises Act he directed to evict the writ-

petitioner within 30 days.

6.Writ petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge Nainital

wherein the District Judge without any discussion recorded that the

disputed land was public premise and the occupant of the appellant was

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under Class IV and since the appellant did not have any authority to

occupy he could not resist his eviction. The appeal was dismissed.

7.The matter was taken up before the Allahabad High Court by way of

a writ petition. Eventually since the land was in newly created State of

Uttarakhand the matter was transferred to the Uttarakhand High court. It is

contended that the High Court also noted the contentions raised on behalf

of the writ petitioner (respondent herein) that no notice could be issued in

respect of the land over eviction as the land was in cultivating possession

of the concerned cultivator. It was contended in the counter affidavit on

behalf of the State (appellant herein) that the land in dispute was not

allotted to the writ petitioner and, therefore, his occupation was

unauthorized and he was recorded as Class IV tenant since 1384 Fasli. It

was also pointed out that the writ petitioner had no right to regularization in

respect of the land of which he was in possession. The High Court,

however, relied on the earlier judgment dated 25.05.2006 passed in Writ

Petition No. 3235 of 2001, namely, Krishnakant v/ First Additional

District Judge, Nainital which was disposed of along with 41 other writ

petitions. There the Court had held that the agricultural land which was

occupied by a tenure holder hence the proceedings under the Public

Premises Act were not applicable and the said unauthorized occupant

could be evicted only under the provisions of the UP Zamindari Abolition

and Land Reforms Act, 1950. It was further noted by the High Court that

such a view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in Baldeo Raj V.

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State of UP & Ors. 1984 AWC 568 and Kripal Singh V. DJ Nainital &

Ors. 1988 RD 188. The High Court further took note of the definition of the

term ‘public premises’ as well as the term ‘land’ as defined in UP Jamindari

Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 covered by Section 3 (14) of the

Act. The High Court also took note that it was never denied by the State

that the land in question was in cultivating possession of the writ

petitioners. The High Court further noted that the land vested in or

entrusted to the Gaon Sabha and local authority or under any other law

relating to the land tenure was excluded from the operation of the Public

Premises Act and, therefore, the agricultural land belonging to the Gaon

Sabha could not be said to be the land covered under the Public Premises.

The High Court, therefore, chose to follow the aforementioned decisions in

Baldeo Raj’s case (cited supra) and Kripal Singh’s case (cited supra).

8.In the other case the judgment in Krishnakant’s case (cited supra)

with which as many as 41 other cases were decided and disposed of is

challenged. In Krishnakant’s case (cited supra) also the learned Single

Judge after discussing the provisions of both the Act referred to by us

earlier as also the definition of the term ‘premises’ in the Public Premises

Act came to the similar conclusion. The learned single Judge of the

Uttarankhand High Court, hence, relied upon the Baldeo Raj’s case

(cited supra) as also Kripal Singh’s case (cited supra). It is on that

basis that in both the cases the Writ Petitions filed by the cultivating

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possessors were allowed. Both these judgments have fallen for our

consideration.

9.Smt. Pinki Anand, learned Senior Advocate along with Shri P.N.

Gupta and Shri Vaibhav Jain assailed the impugned judgments. We had a

specific query to the learned Senior counsel as to whether the

aforementioned relied upon judgments in Baldeo Raj’s case (cited

supra) and Kripal Singh’s case (cited supra) were challenged by the

said judgment. The learned Senior counsel was unable to answer as to

what happened to these judgments. We, therefore, presume that those

judgments are still held good law and have been accepted as such by at

least the State of Uttar Pradesh. It must be noted that Baldev Raj’s case

(cited supra) continues to be dominating the scene since 1984 while

Kripal Singh’s case (cited supra) continues to be in the field from 1988.

It, therefore, goes without saying that the interpretation put forward by the

Allahabad High Court on these premises holds good for about 25 years on

the legal scenario. We must, therefore, take this factor also into account

as to whether it would be proper for us to disturb the settled law which is

ruling the field for last 25 years.

10. We have seen both the aforementioned decisions of the Allahabad

High Court in Baldeo Raj’s case as well as in Kripal Singh’s case (cited

supra). The factual situation regarding the position of the respondents is

absolutely identical. Therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the

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law laid down in both these cases squarely apply to the facts of the present

case.

11.We will now proceed to decide upon the correctness of these two

judgments. In Baldeo Raj’s case the learned Single Judge considered

the expression “public premises” in Section 2(e) of the Act as was

amended by the U.P. Act No.28 of 1976. It was found that the definition as

amended excluded the land vested in or entrusted to the management of a

Gaon Sabha or any other local authority under any law relating to land

tenures. This the learned Judge found on the basis of clause (i) of the

definition in that Section. The learned Judge then straightaway came to

the conclusion that the provisions contained in Section 4/6, U.P. Zamindari

Abolition and Land Reforms Act provided that the right, title or interest of

the intermediaries came to be vested in the State and State thereby also

acquired right, title or interest over the land held as ‘Talab’ or ‘Jheel’. The

learned Judge further rightly found that Section 117, U.P. Zamindari

Abolition and Land Reforms Act made it clear that the superintendence,

management and control of such land was vested in Gaon Sabha. It was

also noted that the State Government was empowered to transfer this

superintendence, management and control from Gaon Sabha to some

other local authority or vice versa. Relying on the Khatauni in 1383-85 fasli

the learned Judge found that the land in question was recorded as

Talab/Jheel. The learned Judge further noted that the names of the

petitioners in that cases were recorded in the Khasra of 1386 fasli under

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class 4 of the Khatauni. The learned Judge then proceeded to consider

the provisions of Section 122-B which provided for the eviction against

those who were in unauthorized occupation over such land. On that basis

the learned Judge correctly came to the conclusion that the definition of

“public premises” in the Public Premises Act deliberately excluded from its

purview the land vesting in Gaon Sabha or some other local authority for

which provisions existed in the law relating to land tenures and the

provisions of Public Premises Act could not be pressed in service for

ousting the tenure holder. More or less the same conclusion has been

reached in Kripal Singh’s case where the learned Judge specifically

referred to the pleadings of the parties and came to the conclusion that the

tenure holder therein was classified as Sirdar and had become a

Bhumidar. The definition of “premises” in the Public Premises Act given

under Section 2(b) came to be considered which is as under:

“2(b)“Premises means any land (including any forest land or

trees standing thereon, or covered by water, or a road

maintained by the State Government or land appurtenant to

such road) or any building and includes:

i)the garden, grounds, and out-houses, if any

appertaining to such building or part of a building, and

ii)any fitting or fixtures affixed to or any furniture

supplied with such building or part of a building for the

more beneficial enjoyment thereof:

but does not include any land which for the time is

held by a tenureholder under any law relating to

land-tenture (emphasis supplied)

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i)is vested in or entrusted to the

management, of Gaon Sabha or any other local

authority or

ii)is held by a tenure holder under the United

Provinces Tenancy Act, 1939, the Uttar Pradesh

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950,

the Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari

Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956, the

Jaunsar-Bawar Zmindari Abolition and Land

Reforms Act, 1956, the Kumaun and Uttarkhand

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960,

the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holidings Act,

1953, or the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling

on Land Holdings Act, 1960;”

Section 2(e) was also considered which is as under:

“2(e)Public premises means any premises belonging to or

taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the State

Government and includes any premises belonging to or taken

on lease by or on behalf of

i)any company defined

ii)any local authority;

iii)any corporation (not being a company as defined

in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, or a local

authority) owned or controlled by the State Government,

or

iv)any society…………….

And also includes

i)Nazul land or any other premises entrusted to the

management of a local authority (including any building

built with Government funds on land belonging to the

State Government after the entrustment of the land to

the local authority, not being land vested in or entrusted

to the management of a Gaon Sabha or any other local

authority under any law relating to land tenure);

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ii)any premises acquired under the Land Acquisition

Act , 1894 with the consent of the State Government for

a company (as defined in that Act) and held by that

company under an agreement executed under Section

41 of that providing for re-entry by the State

Government in certain conditions.”

Section 2(a) and 2(e) excluded the operation of Public Premises Act

in respect of the lands covered by U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land

Reforms Act, 1950. The learned Judge has further given a detailed

explanation as to why the said exclusion became clearer. The learned

Judge states:

“To me, it appears that the provision for excluding land of such

tenure holders has a special purpose. For a tenure holder this

land is generally a source of his and his family’s livelihood

particularly in our State of Uttar Pradesh where the majority of

citizens consists of Agriculturist. Needless to say, the Act has

a drastic method of ejectment. Though a trespasser can

certainly be ejected under the common law – whether it be civil

or revenue, the Act, however, sets aside those procedures and

instead empowers the prescribed authority to proceed in a

manner which lays down a much quicker and faster method of

ejecting a trespasser. In the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act we find

sufficient safeguards for the Gaon Sabha and other authorities

to eject a trespasser, if the land can be claimed to have vested

in them (see Section 122B) (Emphasis supplied by us). Thus

the land of such tenure holders as the petitioner should not be

governed by the provisions of the Act, appears to be one of

the main objectives, to attain which the exception has been

carved out in the definition clause by the legislature. Even

from the other provisions of the Act it is clear that the

possession alone whether of the original Adhivasi or of the

transferee Adhivasi has to be seen by the Prescribed Authority

and attempt to trace his title will be futile in the present

proceedings under the Act. Under the circumstances it must

be held that but for the stop which may be available under the

land tenure laws, the provisions of the Act will be wholly

inapplicable for the ejectment of the petitioner.”

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12.We have very carefully considered the judgments as well as the

provisions and we are in no doubt that the view taken by the Allahabad

High Court was a correct view of the matter. We fully agree with the

reasons given by the Allahabad High Court in both Baldeo Raj and Kripal

Singh’s cases and, therefore, hold that the land covered under the U.P.

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 would not be governed by

the Public Premises Act, more particularly in view of the specific exclusion

as provided in Sections 2(b) and 2(e) thereof. Even if Section 2(e) is

broadly read, the land held by Tenure holder is not covered. It is axiomatic

that if the land held by a tenure-holder under any law relating to land tenure

is not “premise”, then it cannot become “public premises” under Section

2(e) of the Act. We are satisfied with the impugned judgments which wholly

rely on the above mentioned two decisions of the Allahabad High Court.

13.Both the appeals filed by the State of Uttarakhand deserve to be

dismissed and they are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no orders as

to costs.

………………………………..J.

(Markandey Katju)

………………………………..J.

(V.S. Sirpurkar)

New Delhi;

April 27, 2009

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