As per case facts, an FIR was filed against Respondent no.1 and others for illegal sex determination activities, leading to a chargesheet under IPC and PCPNDT Act provisions. The High ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
2026 INSC 901 Page 1 of 60
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2938 of 2025
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. ...APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
BRIJ PAL SINGH & ANR. ...RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL J.
Page 2 of 60
Contents
THE APPEAL ........................................................................................................... 3
THE BACKGROUND TO THE QUESTIONS .............................................................. 4
PROVISIONS OF LAW .......................................................................................... 16
SUBMISSIONS BY COUNSEL ................................................................................. 22
Ms. Mukta Gupta, Senior Counsel .................................................................... 22
Mr. Pramod Kumar Dubey, Senior Counsel ...................................................... 24
Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, Senior Counsel ......................................................... 26
Mr. Gyanendra Kumar, Senior Counsel ............................................................ 27
Ms. Sakshi Arora, Counsel ................................................................................ 29
Mr. Harshit Sharma, Counsel ............................................................................ 29
Mr. Vikalp Sharma, Counsel ............................................................................. 29
Ms. Meera Kaura Patel, Counsel ....................................................................... 30
Union of India ................................................................................................... 30
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare ............................................................. 32
ANALYSING THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT ........................................................ 33
Precedents Of This Court .................................................................................. 35
Similar Provisions in Other Legislations ........................................................... 37
Crucial Aspects to be Considered .................................................................... 45
ANSWERING THE REFERENCE ............................................................................ 58
Page 3 of 60
THE APPEAL
1. This appeal proceeds on a certificate issued by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad and under Article 134-A read with Article
134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India regarding the interpretation of the
provisions of the Pre-conception and Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques
(Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994
1
, arising out of a petition under
Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
2
filed by the
Respondent, seeking quashing of the chargesheet drawn against him
under Sections 315 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
3
and
Sections 4, 5(2), 6(a), 23 and 25 of the PCPNDT Act, flowing from FIR
No. 628 of 2017. The FIR was a consequence of secret information
having been received by the District Magistrate, Bulandshahar, who is
the appropriate authority
4
within the Act, of illegal sex determination
of foetus, being carried out by Respondent no.1 and others, who then
deputed the Tehsildar of the Khurja District as the Authorised Officer
5
to conduct a decoy operation to unearth the truth. Having found out
information through such operation, a raid was conducted at the
hospital, which led to the initiation of proceedings, the subject matter
of the quashing petition.
2. While the quashing petition ultimately came to be accepted, the
learned Single Judge undertook an extensive overview of the
provisions of the Act and the decisions given by other High Courts,
eventually to point out that contrary views had been taken on the same
question regarding the role of police in investigation and the
1
PCPNDT Act /the act
2
CrPC
3
IPC
4
AA
5
AO
Page 4 of 60
applicable procedure in PCPNDT Act offences. As such, considering
the importance of the questions involved, the learned Single Judge
issued the certificate of appeal, observing as under:
“Question 1 Whether, for offences under the PC & PNDT Act the
registration of FIR at the police station is permissible, merely
because the offences under the PC & PNDT Act have been made
cognizable and non-bailable?
Question 2 – Whether the police investigation is permissible for
the offences under the PC & PNDT Act? AND Who can investigate
the complaints, received for violation of the provisions of the PC
& PNDT Act?
Question 3 – Whether on the chargesheet submitted after the
investigation by the police, the competent magistrate can take
cognizance of the offence under the PC & PNDT Act?”
THE BACKGROUND TO THE QUESTIONS
3. The background to these questions is the difference of opinions
between High Courts on whether State Police is competent to register
FIRs and investigate offences under the Act and also whether the
concerned Magistrate can take cognizance of the chargesheet so filed.
The following two tables encapsulate the judgments considered by the
Learned Single Judge to frame the questions for consideration we
extracted above.
IN FAVOUR OF POLICE INVESTIGATION
S.NO
.
CASE NAME
AND CITATION
COURT DISCUSSION ON
POLICE
INTERVENTION
REASONING
1. “Dr. Varsha
Gautam vs.
State of U.P. and
others, 2006
SCC OnLine All
1611”
Page 22 of
Allahabad
High Court
(Division
Bench)
The statutory
prohibition against
taking cognizance
does not apply at the
initial stage of police
investigation. The
lodging of an F.I.R. and
subsequent police
investigation into a
cognizable offence
1.Relying on “M.
Narayan Das v. State of
Karnataka, (2003) 11
SCC 251”, it reasoned
that a statutory bar only
comes into operation at
the specific
chronological stage
Page 5 of 60
impugned
order, para 34
under the Act are fully
permitted.
when a Court intends to
take cognizance under
Section 190(1) Cr.P.C.
2.Section 28 of the Act
does not control or
circumscribe the
independent statutory
power of the police to
investigate an F.I.R. that
discloses a cognizable
offence in accordance
with Chapter XII of the
Cr.P.C.
2. “Dr. Rahul
Malik vs. State
of U.P. and 3
Ors.,2017 SCC
OnLine All
4589”
Page 23,24,5|
Para 10, 35, 37 of
impugned order
Allahabad
High Court
(Division
Bench)
Refused to quash an
F.I.R., flatly holding
that there is no bar to
the registration of an
F.I.R. and its
subsequent
investigation by the
police for offences
under the PC&PNDT
Act.
1.The court’s primary
reasoning was
anchored strictly to the
explicit text of Section
27 of the PC&PNDT Act,
which mandates that
every offence under
this Act shall be
cognizable, non-
bailable, and non-
compoundable.
2.Once a non-bailable,
cognizable offence is
reported via an F.I.R.,
the standard police
machinery is
automatically triggered
under general law. The
police have the
statutory power and
duty to investigate the
reported crime and
submit a report,
provided a prima facie
case is disclosed.
Page 6 of 60
3. “Manoj Krishan
Ahuja vs. State
of NCT of Delhi
and Another,
2023 SCC
OnLine Del
2303”
Page 27 | Para
41, 52, 54, 84 of
impugned order
Delhi High
Court
(Single
judge)
The registration of an
F.I.R. by the police is
not expressly barred
under the Act when
information is received
from the Appropriate
Authority
1.When the
Appropriate Authority
informs the police about
the commission of an
offence under the Act,
the police are duty-
bound, and it is
mandatory for them to
register an F.I.R. if the
allegations disclose a
cognizable offence.
2. Relying on “Rasila S.
Mehta v. Custodian,
2011 (6) SCC 220”, the
court applied a
purposive rule of
interpretation. It
reasoned that the
statutory purpose
cannot be defeated or
allow offenders to
“sneak out of the
meshes of law” based
on a narrow
construction or lack of
absolute clarity in the
text of the Act.
3. While a police
investigation is
permitted to ensure
cognizable offences are
documented, the bar
under Section 28
remains absolute
against taking
cognizance solely on
the police charge sheet.
Page 7 of 60
4.
“Dr. Anant Ram
vs. State of
Haryana, 2022
SCC OnLine
P&H 2284”
Page 25 | Para
40 of impugned
order
Punjab &
Haryana
High Court
(Single
judge)
Held that there is no
absolute bar under the
PC&PNDT Act against
the police
investigating a case.
1.The inclusion of the
words "as far as
possible" within Rule
18A(3)(iv) suggests that
while police
involvement should
ordinarily be avoided
due to the specialized
nature of the
equipment, it cannot be
interpreted as an
absolute statutory
prohibition against the
police.
2.'Cognizance by Court'
and 'Investigation of
offence' are two entirely
distinct legal concepts
operating in separate
chronological domains.
Investigation precedes
cognizance; therefore,
police action can
proceed during the
investigative stage
even if the final court
action requires a formal
complaint.
5.
“Dr. Aparna
Singhal v. State
of Haryana,
Criminal Misc.
No. M-421 of
2021”
Page 25 | Page
39 of impugned
order
Punjab &
Haryana
High Court
(Single
judge)
Affirmed that an F.I.R.
can be registered and
investigated by the
police, validating a
dual-track procedure
for filing reports.
Following the larger
Division Bench ruling in
Hardeep Singh, it
reasoned that after
completing an
investigation, the police
can validly compile
their report as a
Kalandra (police
report) and hand it over
directly to the District
Appropriate Authority.
Page 8 of 60
6.
“Dr. Randhawa
Ultrasonograph
y Imaging and
Research
Institute and
Others v. State
(NCT of Delhi)
and Another,
2025 SCC
OnLine Del
3389”
Para 79-91 of the
above
High Court
of Delhi
(Single
judge)
The police are legally
bound to register an
FIR for cognizable
offences, and their
powers of
investigation are not
completely ousted
under the PC & PNDT
Act. However, the
court cannot take
cognizance of the
police report/charge-
sheet alone.
1.Section 27 of the Act
makes offences
cognizable and non-
bailable, which
mandates the police to
register an FIR under
Section 154 CrPC.
2.The phrase "as far as
possible" in Rule 18-
A(3)(iv) implies that
police investigation is
discouraged but not
completely barred or
ousted.
3.Section 28 only bars a
court from taking
cognizance of an
offence except on an
Appropriate Authority's
complaint; it does not
bar the registration of
an FIR, police
investigation, or filing
of a charge-sheet.
7.
“Uravashi
Fakay v. State
of NCT of Delhi
(and connected
petition), 2023
SCC OnLine
Del 8091”
Para 62, 63, 68,
71, 72, 74 of the
above
High Court
of Delhi
(Single
judge)
Police registration of
FIR and subsequent
investigation are
legally permissible,
but taking judicial
cognizance based on a
police report/charge-
sheet is strictly
prohibited.
1. Under Section 4(2) of
the CrPC, all offences
under any special law
are to be investigated
according to the CrPC
unless an express
exception is provided.
Since offences under
the PC & PNDT Act are
explicitly 'cognizable'
under Section 27, the
registration of an FIR or
investigation by the
police as per law is not
barred.
Page 9 of 60
2.Absolute Bar on
Cognizance: Section 28
explicitly prohibits
courts from taking
cognizance of an
offence except upon a
complaint by the
Appropriate Authority
or an authorized
person. Because a
'police report' (under
Section 2(r) CrPC) is
legally distinct from a
'complaint' (under
Section 2(d) CrPC),
taking cognizance on a
police charge-sheet is
completely void and
bad in law.
3.Section 210 CrPC
requires a valid order
taking cognizance on a
police report, which is
impossible here due to
Section 28. Similarly, a
police report cannot be
treated as a Section 202
inquiry report because
Section 202 applies
strictly to inquiries
directed by the
Magistrate during
complaint proceedings,
whereas this
investigation was
independently
conducted via an FIR.
Page 10 of 60
8. “Ila Sood v.
State of Punjab,
2022 SCC
OnLine P&H
946”
Para 14-19 of the
above
High Court
of Punjab
and
Haryana at
Chandigar
h
(Single
judge)
An FIR is clearly
maintainable, and the
police can investigate
offences under the Act.
1.The Court relied on a
Division Bench
reference “Hardeep
Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2008) 12 SCC
39”, which resolved the
apparent conflict
between Sections 27
and 28 of the Act
2.Section 27 explicitly
mandates that every
offence under the Act is
cognizable, meaning
police registration of an
FIR and subsequent
investigation are legally
permitted.
3.Section 28 dictates the
mechanism for taking
cognizance (which is
restricted to an
Appropriate Authority's
complaint). Therefore,
a Section 173 report can
be submitted, but the
trial court will only take
cognizance if it is
accompanied by a
proper complaint.
4.If an accused faces
both an FIR and a
private complaint for
the same offence, they
can be clubbed under
Section 210 CrPC, and
the trial will then
proceed together as if
instituted on a police
report.
Page 11 of 60
9. “Dr.
Dhamayanthi
Rajkumar v.
State Rep. by
Inspector of
Police and
Another, 2022
SCC OnLine
Mad 9462”
Para 14, 20-27
of the above
judgement
High Court
of Madras
(Single
judge)
Police are bound to
register an FIR and
investigate cognizable
offences under the Act,
but cannot directly file
a final report for trial.
1.Section 17(4) confers
investigative powers on
the Appropriate
Authority, but this is not
an exclusive power and
does not automatically
strip the police of their
general power to
investigate cognizable
offences.
2.The Act does not grant
the power of arrest to
the Appropriate
Authority. If the police
were barred from
registering an FIR and
investigating, they
could not make
imminent arrests to
prevent ongoing
offences (like further
sex selection tests),
which would defeat the
core object of
preventing female
feticide.
3.Taking cognizance for
investigation (police
stage) and taking
cognizance for trial
(court stage) are
distinct. Section 28 only
restricts the court from
taking cognizance for
trial except on an
Appropriate Authority's
complaint; it places no
express bar on the
police during the
investigation stage.
Page 12 of 60
AGAINST POLICE INTERVENTION
S.N
O
CASE NAME AND
CITATION
COURT DISCUSSION ON
POLICE
INTERVENTION
REASONING
1. “Dr. Amritlal
Rohledar vs. State
of Chhattisgarh,
(2019 SCC OnLine
Chh 137)”
Para 46, Page 35 of
impugned order
Chhattisga
rh
High Court
(Single
Judge)
Police investigation
is completely
barred. No power or
jurisdiction has been
conferred on a
Station House Officer
(SHO) to investigate
offences under the
Act, despite them
being labeled
cognizable.
1.The statutory rules
mandate that, as far
as possible, the
police should not be
involved because
these are strictly
complaint cases
under the Cr.P.C.
2.Under Section 4
and Section 5 of the
Cr.P.C., when a
special law
prescribes its own
specific form/place
of investigation, it
carves out an
exception that
completely
overrides general
police powers.
2. “Ramesh Chandra
Naik v. State of
Orissa, (2018 SCC
OnLine Ori 480)”
Para 44, page 32 of
impugned order
Orissa
High Court
(Single
Judge)
Police FIR & Charge
Sheeting are invalid
for taking
cognizance. The
Magistrate commits a
distinct illegality if
they take cognizance
of PC&PNDT offences
based on a standard
police investigation
report/charge sheet.
Under Section 28 of
the Act, a court is
strictly restricted
from taking
cognizance except
on a formal
complaint. Under
Section 2(d) of the
Cr.P.C.,the definition
of a “complaint”
explicitly excludes a
police report.
Therefore, a police
charge sheet cannot
legally substitute a
statutory complaint
petition.
Page 13 of 60
3. “M/s Sujatha Scan
Centre vs. The State
of Telangana, (W.P.
No. 18904 of 2018 /
LAWS(APH) 2018 7
39)”
Para 45, page 34 of
impugned order
Telangana
& Andhra
Pradesh
High Court
(Single
Judge)
Registration of crime
and investigation by
the police is
completely illegal.
The police have
absolutely no role to
play in the
investigation of these
cases.
The investigation of
these offences relies
entirely on scientific
gathering of
evidence by
specialists with
medical knowledge
(doctors). The
ordinary police do
not possess the
competence to
collect or evaluate
scientific/technical
material in this field.
4. “Dr. Sai vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2016
SCC OnLine Bom
8812)”
Para 43, page 30 of
impugned
Bombay
High Court
(Aurangab
ad Bench)
Division
bench
Police have been
deliberately kept out
of the purview of
initiating
prosecution. The
absolute legal
process, from
receiving a tip-off to
full investigation,is
placed exclusively in
the hands of the
Appropriate
Authority
1.The legislature
intentionally drafted
Section 28(1)(a) to
insulate citizens and
medical practitioners
from the misuse of
the law by keeping
standard police
machinery out of the
prosecution loop,
despite the offences
being made non-
bailable and
cognizable under
Section 27.
2.Read together,
Sections 17, 17A, and
28 demand that the
Appropriate
Authority act as a full-
fledged independent
investigator rather
than just an agency
that forwards police
findings.
Page 14 of 60
5. “Manvinder Singh
Gill (Dr.) vs. State of
M.P., (2013 SCC
Online MP 10918/
ILR (2014) MP
1176)”
Para 47 - page 36,
Para 48- page 39 Of
impugned order
Madhya
Pradesh
High Court
(Indore
Bench)
(Single
Judge)
“Private complaints
filed under Section
28 by officers merely
nominated by the
District Magistrate
for ‘monitoring’
(Additional
Collectors), without
formal gazette
notification under
Section 17 as
Appropriate
Authority or
authorised officer,
are incompetent;
cognizance taken
thereon is
unsustainable.”
(para 13-14)
“Appointment of the
Appropriate
Authority or an
authorised officer
under Section
17/28(1)(a) must be
by formal Gazette
notification of the
Central/State
Government; an
internal
administrative
nomination order of
the District
Magistrate cannot
substitute for this and
cannot empower the
nominee to file a
complaint.” (Paras
11, 14, citing A.K. Roy
v. State of Punjab,
(1986) 4 SCC 326).
6. “Dr. Swaroop
Charan Sahu and
Another v. The State
of Madhya Pradesh
(and connected
petitions), M.Cr.C.
No. 11773/2013”
Para 48 - page 39 of
impugned order
High Court
of Madhya
Pradesh
(Jabalpur
Bench)
(Single
Judge)
Independent police
reporting (FIR) is
completely excluded
from the definition of
a valid complaint,
and police action
cannot bypass the
statutory channels.
“Same as above in
S.No. 5”
7. “Suo Motu vs. State
of Gujarat, (2008
SCC OnLine Guj
294)”
Page 42 para 29 of
impugned order
Gujarat
High Court
(Full
bench)
Cognizance is
limited strictly to a
complaint. A court
can only take legal
notice of an offence if
the action is brought
forward through a
complaint petition
filed under one of the
four categories
specified in the Act.
The Act and its rules
provide an intricate
surveillance
mechanism designed
to prevent lapses.
The power to set the
court machinery in
motion is restricted
solely to the
Central/State
Page 15 of 60
Governments, the
Appropriate
Authority, or their
specially authorized
delegates under
Section 28 to
preserve the
regulatory scheme.
“This case does not
directly address
police
FIR/investigation; it is
cited only for its
reaffirmation that
cognizance under
Section 28 is
restricted to defined
categories of
complainants.”
8. “Mohammad
Imtiyaz (Dr.) v.
State of Rajasthan &
Anr.,2022(4) RLW
2950”
Para 10, 11, 13, 14 of
the above
High Court
of Rajasthan
(SiSingle
Judge)
Police involvement is
strictly prohibited;
registering an FIR,
conducting an
investigation, and
making an arrest are
completely out of the
question
1.Rule 18A(3)(iv) of
the PCPNDT Rules
explicitly mandates
that the involvement
of police must be
kept to a minimum as
cases are to be tried
strictly as complaint
cases. When the
statutory text actively
discourages police
presence, an FIR or
independent police
investigation is
legally invalid.
2.Sections 27 and 28
of the PCPNDT Act
collectively outline a
legal scheme that
bars the interference
of external
authorities like the
police, providing
Page 16 of 60
only a specific
mechanism for courts
to take cognizance
through an
Appropriate
Authority’s
complaint.
9. “Dr. Vinod Kumar
Bassi vs. The State
of U.P. and Anr.,
2024 SCC OnLine
All 778”
Page 5, 23, 74 | Para
8, 36, 85 of
impugned order
Allahabad
High Court
(Single
judge)
This judgment
establishes a clear
limit on
permissibility by
holding that the court
has absolutely no
jurisdiction to take
cognizance of an
offence under the Act
except strictly on a
complaint made by
the validly
authorized
Appropriate
Authority.
1.Because the Act
explicitly restricts
who can set the trial
in motion under
Section 28, a
complaint initiated
by an unauthorized
officer (such as an
Additional Chief
Medical Officer who
is neither the
Appropriate
Authority nor a
validly authorized
delegate) is legally
incompetent.
2.If the initiating
complaint itself is
legally incompetent
from its inception,
the trial court is
completely stripped
of jurisdiction to take
cognizance or issue
summons against the
applicant.
PROVISIONS OF LAW
4. The provisions of law, relevant for the present discussion are as
under:
CrPC
Section 4
“4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other
laws.—(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt
Page 17 of 60
with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All
offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into,
tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions,
but subject to any enactment for the time being in force
regulating the manner of place of investigating, inquiring into,
trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.”
Section 5
5. Saving.—Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence
of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local
law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or
power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed,
by any other law for the time being in force.
Section 87
87. Issue of warrant in lieu of, or in addition to, summons.—A
Court may, in any case in which it is empowered by this Code to
issue a summons for the appearance of any person, issue, after
recording its reasons in writing, a warrant for his arrest— (a) if,
either before the issue of such summons, or after the issue of the
same but before the time fixed for his appearance, the Court
sees reason to believe that he has absconded or will not obey
the summons; or (b) if at such time he fails to appear and the
summons is proved to have been duly served in time to admit of
his appearing in accordance therewith and no reasonable
excuse is offered for such failure
PCPNDT
Section 2
2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,—
(a) “Appropriate Authority” means the Appropriate Authority
appointed under section 17;
Section 17
17. Appropriate Authority and Advisory Committee.- 1. The
Central Government shall appoint, by
notification in the Official Gazette, one or more Appropriate
Authorities for each of the Union
territories for the purposes of this Act.
2. The State Government shall appoint, by notification in the
Official Gazette, one or more Appropriate Authorities for the
Page 18 of 60
whole or part of the State for the purposes of this Act having
regard to
the intensity of the problem of pre-natal sex determination
leading to female foeticide.
3. The officers appointed as Appropriate Authorities under sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be,—
(a) when appointed for the whole of the State or the Union
territory, consisting of the following
three membersi) an officer of or above the rank of the Joint
Director of Health and Family WelfareChairperson;
ii) an eminent woman representing women’s organization; and
iii) an officer of Law Department of the State or the Union
territory concerned:
Provided that it shall be the duty of the State or the Union territory
concerned to constitute multimember State or Union territory
level Appropriate Authority within three months of the coming
into
force of the Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and
Prevention of Misuse) Amendment Act,
2002:
Provided further that any vacancy occurring therein shall be
filled within three months of that occurrence.
(b) when appointed for any part of the State or the Union
territory, of such other rank as the
State Government or the Central Government, as the case may
be, may deem fit.
4. The Appropriate Authority shall have the following functions,
namely:—
(a) to grant, suspend or cancel registration of a Genetic
Counselling Centre, Genetic Laboratory
or Genetic Clinic;
(b) to enforce standards prescribed for the Genetic Counselling
Centre, Genetic Laboratory and
Genetic Clinic;
(c) to investigate complaints of breach of the provisions of this
Act or the rules made thereunder
and take immediate action;
(d) to seek and consider the advice of the Advisory Committee,
constituted under sub-section
(5), on application for registration and on complaints for
suspension or cancellation of registration;
(e) to take appropriate legal action against the use of any sex
selection technique by any person at any place, suo motu or
brought to its notice and also to initiate independent
investigations in such matter;
(f) to create public awareness against the practice of sex
selection or pre-natal determination of sex;
(g) to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the Act
and rules;
Page 19 of 60
(h) to recommend to the CSB and State Boards modifications
required in the rules in accordance with changes in technology
or social conditions;
(i) to take action on the recommendations of the Advisory
Committee made after investigation of complaint for suspension
or cancellation of registration.
5. The Central Government or the State Government, as the case
may be, shall constitute an Advisory Committee for each
Appropriate Authority to aid and advise the Appropriate
Authority in the discharge of its functions, and shall appoint one
of the members of the Advisory
Committee to be its Chairman.
6 The Advisory Committee shall consist of—
(a) three medical experts from amongst gynaecologists,
obstericians, paediatricians and medical geneticists;
(b) one legal expert;
(c) one officer to represent the department dealing with
information and publicity of the State Government or the Union
territory, as the case may be;
(d) three eminent social workers of whom not less than one shall
be from amongst representatives of women’s organisations.
7. No person who has been associated with the use or promotion
of pre-natal diagnostic technique for determination of sex or sex
selection shall be appointed as a member of the Advisory
Committee.
8. The Advisory Committee may meet as and when it thinks fit or
on the request of the Appropriate Authority for consideration of
any application for registration or any complaint for suspension
or cancellation of registration and to give advice thereon:
Provided that the period intervening between any two meetings
shall not exceed the prescribed
period.
9. The terms and conditions subject to which a person may be
appointed to the Advisory Committee and the procedure to be
followed by such Committee in the discharge of its functions
shall be such as may be prescribed.”
Section 17A
“17A. Powers of Appropriate Authorities.- The Appropriate
Authority shall have the powers in respect
of the following matters, namely:-
a) summoning of any person who is in possession of any
information relating to violation of the provisions of this Act or
the rules made thereunder;
b) production of any document or material object relating to
clause (a);
Page 20 of 60
c) issuing search warrant for any place suspected to be
indulging in sex selection techniques or pre-natal sex
determination; and
d)any other matter which may be prescribed.”
Section 27
“27. Offence to be cognizable, non-bailable and non-
compoundable.-Every offence under this Act shall be cognizable,
non-bailable and non-compoundable.”
Section 28
28. Cognizance of offences.
“1. No court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act
except on a complaint made by—
(a) the Appropriate Authority concerned, or any officer
authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or State
Government, as the case may be, or the Appropriate Authority;
or
(b) a person who has given notice of not less than fifteen days in
the manner prescribed, to the Appropriate Authority, of the
alleged offence and of his intention to make a complaint to the
court.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this clause, “person” includes
a social organisation.
2. No court other than that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a
Judicial Magistrate of the first class
shall try any offence punishable under this Act.
3. Where a complaint has been made under clause (b) of
subsection (1), the court may, on demand
by such person, direct the Appropriate Authority to make
available copies of the relevant records in its possession to such
person.”
(emphasis supplied)
Section 30
“30. Power to search and seize records, etc. -
1. If the Appropriate Authority has reason to believe that an
offence under this Act has been or is being committed at any
Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic Laboratory or Genetic
Clinic or any other place, such Authority or any officer
authorised thereof in this behalf may, subject to such rules as
may be prescribed, enter and search at all reasonable times with
such assistance, if any, as such authority or officer considers
necessary, such Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic
Laboratory or Genetic Clinic or any other place and examine any
Page 21 of 60
record, register, document, book, pamphlet, advertisement or
any other material object found therein and seize and seal the
same if such Authority or officer has reason to believe that it may
furnish evidence of the commission of an office punishable under
this Act.
2. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974) relating to searches and seizures shall, so far as may be,
apply to every search or seizure made under this Act.”
Rule 18A(3) PCPNDT Rules 1996
“(3) All the Appropriate Authorities including the State, District
and Subdistrict notified under the Act, inter-alia, shall observe
the following conduct for processing of complaint and
investigation, namely-
(i) maintain appropriate diaries in support of registration of each
of the
complaint or case under the Act;
(ii) attend to all complaints and maintain transparency in the
follow-up
action of the complaints;
(iii) investigate all the complaints within twenty-four hours of
receipt of the complaint and complete the investigation within
forty-eight hours of
receipt of such compliant;
(iv) as far as possible, not involve police for investigating cases
under the Act as the cases under the Act are tried as complaint
cases under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).”
(emphasis supplied)
Object and Reasons
“Statement of Objects and Reasons.- It is proposed to prohibit
pre-natal diagnostic techniques for determination of sex of the
foetus leading to female foeticide. Such abuse of techniques is
discriminatory against the female sex and affects the dignity and
status of women. A legislation is required to regulate the use of
such techniques and to provide deterrent punishment to stop
such inhuman act.
2. The Bill, inter alia, provides for:-
(i) prohibition of the misuse of pre-natal diagnostic techniques
for determination of sex of foetus, leading to female foeticide;
(ii) prohibition of advertisement of pre-natal diagnostic
techniques for detection or determination of sex;
(iii) permission and regulation of the use of pre-natal diagnostic
techniques for the purpose of detection of specific genetic
abnormalities or disorders;
(iv) permitting the use of such techniques only under certain
conditions by the registered institutions; and
Page 22 of 60
(v) punishment for violation of the provisions of the proposed
legislation.
3. The Bill seeks to achieve the aforesaid objectives.”
(emphasis supplied)
SUBMISSIONS BY COUNSEL
5. Vide order dated 28
th
April, 2026, this Court had, considering the
importance of the issues involved, appointed Ms. Mukta Gupta,
learned senior counsel, through Mr. Nitin Saluja, learned Advocate-on-
Record, as amicus curiae and also made it open for any member of the
Bar to make submissions.
“…
6. We keep it open for any member of the Bar to assist the
Court. They may file written submissions on the email ID:
writtensubmissions.hmjsk@gmail.com.
7. Registry to send a copy of this order to the President of SCBA
for information and necessary action, along with digital copy
of the paperbooks forthwith.
…”
We have heard a number of senior counsels and counsels and have
greatly benefited from their in-depth submissions. In this section, we
record the same with the caveat that there is substantial overlap in the
submissions made; however, for the sake of completeness, we record
them in entirety.
Ms. Mukta Gupta, Senior Counsel
i. A combined reading of Sections 17, 17(4), 28 and Rule
18A(3)(iv) shows that the AA is the only authority entrusted
with investigation, legal action, and the filing of the complaint.
The police has no role to play qua the offences under this Act.
ii. The word with which Section 28 reproduced (supra) begins
creates a complete mandatory and prohibitory jurisdictional
Page 23 of 60
bar against cognizance except on a complaint made by the AA.
The AA can receive complaints only from a specified category
of persons. A person appointed in an assistance capacity does
not become an authorized person under this Section. [State of
Orissa v. Mamata Sahoo
6
] Only an officer appointed or
authorized by the AA can file a complaint along with the AA
itself and an AO on behalf of Central/State Government.
iii. Rule 18A(3)(iv) expressly states that the police shall not be
involved in investigating offences under this act “as far as
possible”.
iv. This Act, being a special law, the police can not derive their
power to register an FIR or investigate from the CrPC simply
because Section 27 thereof stipulates that the offences under
this Act are cognizable. Section 30(2) further makes this
position clear since it specifically provides for the provisions
of the CrPC to apply to this Act only as far as searches and
seizures are concerned.
v. Section 27 can not be read in isolation and in a manner so as to
override Section 28.
vi. Section 30 of the Act requires the Authority to have only
“reason to believe” that an offence is being committed. Only
after examining the relevant material can this be so
determined. This is different from the contents of the FIR,
needing to disclose a cognizable offence.
vii. The intent of the Act is highlighted as being protected towards
doctors. Excluding the police does not leave the authority of
the AA unchecked since Rules and Regulations made under
6
2019(7) SCC 486.
Page 24 of 60
this Act have to be placed before the Parliament; the AA must
act on the advice of the Advisory Committee; the Chairman of
the AA cannot act unilaterally – all of these are built-in
safeguards within the Act.
viii. The arrest of persons is not exclusively a function of the police.
There are further situations possible – surrendering upon the
orders of the Court, arrest by private persons, by public, by
Magistrate.
ix. There are two tracks provided for in the CrPC, one is upon a
police report and the other is by a complaint case. The way
this Act is structured, it follows the complaint case route. The
intent of making the offences non-bailable is only to ensure
that the police do not have the authority to grant bail and the
same is only with the Court. Arrest is not mandatory there are
other modes by which an accused can enter the constructive
custody of the Court and thereafter seek bail.
Mr. Pramod Kumar Dubey, Senior Counsel
i. The use of the word ‘cognizable’ cannot be read in isolation, in
effect repealing the specialised enforcement mechanism given
under the Act. It is only used to reflect the seriousness of the
offence and the need for effective intervention. Section 27 of the
Act can not override Section 28. It also cannot be read to confer
supremacy to the police.
ii. Rule 18A(3)(iv) makes the position clear that police involvement
is an exception and the noble enforcement of the Act is regulator-
led.
Page 25 of 60
iii. The offences, when registered under this Act, may, in certain
circumstances it disclose independent of offences under the
substantive criminal law, i.e., IPC or BNS; then the police can
separately investigate the same without displacing the
mechanism of this Act.
iv. Section 2(1) of the BNSS has defined the term ‘investigation’, and
it recognises that when a special act is inconsistent with the
provision of this general law, the former prevails. As such, the
CrPC (now BNSS) cannot displace the specialised investigative
functions of the AA.
v. Police can be involved to facilitate enforcement, i.e. for a limited
purpose which itself is traceable to Section 225 of BNSS. There are
no provisions in the Act that provide for supplementary or
successive police investigation, and accordingly once
cognizance of the complaint is taken by the AA under Section 28,
the role of the police is limited, if at all.
vi. The language of Section 28 is prohibitory and jurisdictional. It has
a filtering function. Cognizance can only be taken on a complaint
under this Act, and therefore there is no possibility of cognizance
upon a police report or chargesheet.
vii. References made to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954
and specifically Section 20(1) thereof. Similar to the present
matter, that section does not envisage further delegation of
powers to any person other than persons so authorised. [See:
A.K.Roy and Ors. V. State of Punjab and Ors.
7
]
viii. Proceedings under this Act are instituted on complaints made by
the AA and not police cases. The powers given to the AA are
7
MANU/SC/0156/1986
Page 26 of 60
mentioned in Section 17A, and that does not contemplate arrest
and since it is not contemplated, such powers cannot be
delegated to the police. In other words, there is no power of
arrest under this Act. Reference is made to Om Prakash
Chhawnika v. State of Jharkhand
8.
ix. Since Section 27 makes the offences non-bailable, with reference
to Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal
9, it is submitted
that the Magistrate can issue non-bailable warrants to secure the
presence of the accused. The classification as non-bailable
cannot, by implication, include the power of arrest and
registration of FIR. It is submitted that the Standard Operating
Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
support such a view since, while discussing the powers of the AA,
there is no mention of police led-arrest.
Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal, Senior Counsel
i. PCPNDT Act does not specifically exclude the application of
CrPC/BNSS. If such an exclusion had been provided, there would
be no reason for this Court to consider such reference. Since it is
not there, however, ordinarily the general procedural law would
continue to apply.Reference was made to Moti Lal v. CBI
10
.
ii. Reference is made to Section 45(1)(A) of the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 which specifically excludes the powers of
the police officers, on the one hand, and the Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957
11
, the Official Secrets
8
SLP (Crl.) No. 16221/2025
9
(2007) 12 SCC 1
10
(2002) 4 SCC 713
11
MMDR
Page 27 of 60
Act, 1923
12
, on the other, where in the absence of express
exclusion it has been held that the general powers under the
procedural laws can continue, save and except the Court taking
cognizance on the final report which can only be done when the
competent authority makes a complaint.
iii. A third kind has also been put forth where the exclusion of police
powers has been inferred despite absence of express exclusion
viz. Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994
13
and
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
14
.
iv. In conclusion, it is submitted that the scheme of this Act is similar
to the TOHO Act and the DC Act and as such it can be read to be
excluding the involvement of the police.
v. On the aspect of taking cognizance, in view of Section 28, the
Magistrate is incompetent to act upon the receipt of a Police
Report (chargesheet), as the Act provides an exclusive
mechanism for triggering prosecution via a complaint.
Mr. Gyanendra Kumar, Senior Counsel
i. The use of the word cognizable in the Act has to be given full
meaning. In a cognizable offence, the police can arrest without
warrant and Section 175 of the BNSS (Section 156 of the CrPC)
postulates that the police may undertake investigation without the
order of the Court. He further submitted the following chart:
12
OSA
13
TOHO
14
DC Act
Page 28 of 60
Page 29 of 60
Ms. Sakshi Arora, Counsel
i. The cognizable nature of the offence does not automatically
confer upon the police unlimited power to register FIRs. When an
FIR is registered and discloses offences under both the Act and
the IPC/BNS, then the police can not be restricted from
investigating the IPC offences.
ii. In view of the holding in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P.
15, the
police have a mandatory duty to record an FIR for a cognizable
offence; as such, they can do so and then refer the part of the FIR
that discloses offences under the Act to the AA to proceed as per
the procedures given under the Act.
Mr. Harshit Sharma, Counsel
i. The police can conduct investigations in aiding the AA.
Cognizance for the offences under this Act can be taken only as
per the procedure mentioned in Section 28 of the Act. The police
have two options – to transfer the Chargesheet in as much as it
relates to the offences under this Act, to the AA or, file the same
before the Magistrate with notice to the AA so that it may be
treated as a complaint for the purpose of Section 28.
ii. Since there is no express exclusion of the CrPC/BNSS within the
scheme of the statute, the power of the police to investigate has
to be held to be permissible.
Mr. Vikalp Sharma, Counsel
i. Giving permission to the police to investigate in view of the
word “cognizable” used under the Act, would dilute the
15
(2008) 14 SCC 337
Page 30 of 60
authority of the AA creating parallel, potentially conflicting
mechanisms, in effect rendering Section 28 of the Act nugatory.
ii. The interpretation of Section 27 has to be made harmoniously
with Section 17, 28 and 30. A single word used therein can not
replace the cumulative effect of all these other sections.
iii. The BNSS defines a complaint under Section 2(1)(h) and police
report separately under Section 2(1)(y). Merely because the
offences under this Act may appear alongside offences under
the BNS, does not dilute the special nature of the Act.
iv. The offences mentioned dealt with under this Act are materially
different from ordinary penal offences. Enforcement requires
technical scrutiny, and as such, Section 17 provides a
specialised regulatory structure supported by the Advisory
Committees, etc.
Ms. Meera Kaura Patel, Counsel
i. There is no application of the BNSS/CrPC to the offences under
this Act. The rules provide, under Rule 12, the procedure for
search and seizure, and Rule 18A(3)(iii) & (iv) specifically
empower the AA to investigate all complaints and not involve
the police “as far as possible,” respectively.
ii. When an act or offence is provided under Section 26 of the Act,
prosecution under identically worded provisions of the IPC/BNS
are excluded.
Union of India
i. Section 28 of the Act provides that only the AA can initiate
prosecution for the offences under the Act. That, in and of itself,
Page 31 of 60
does not exclude the police from conducting pre-cognizance
investigation or investigating offences under the IPC/BNS.
ii. The correct interpretation of Section 28 is posited to be one that
only restricts the Court’s power to take cognizance subject to
Rule 18A and the specialised scrutiny of the AA before a
complaint under Section 28 is filed.
iii. This is because investigation and cognizance are distinct legal
stages as recognised in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi
16, State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
17. Further, it is well recognised that no
provision of a legislation can be treated as surplus. Since Section
27 provides offences to be cognizable, non-bailable and non-
compoundable, it necessarily contemplates police powers of
registration of an FIR, investigation, arrest, search and seizure at
the pre-cognizance stage.
iv. It is posited that if a bar is held, where the predicate acts disclose
a violation of the Act, it would in effect confer “backdoor
immunity” upon the offender for grave offences which is not a
path that the law can envision. The dual investigation track has
been endorsed by this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay
18.
v. The use of the expression “as far as possible” is an indicator of
directory language. Reliance is placed on observations made in
Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana
19, which has termed the
language used in Rule 18A as directory.
vi. Offences under this Act involve deliberate, profit-driven
misconduct that obviously would have the requisite mens rea and
16
AIR 1955 SC 196
17
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
18
(2014) 9 SCC 772
19
2026 SCC OnLine SC 296
Page 32 of 60
as such, neither the protection laid down in Jacob Mathew v.
State of Punjab
20
nor the safeguards of Lalita Kumari would
apply here.
vii. Since procedural laws are not expressly displaced, they would
continue to apply. The Act, under Section 28, expressly modifies
only the aspect of cognizance.
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
i. When there is no power of arrest provided in the Act and yet the
offences therein are made ‘non-bailable’, aid of the police as per
the provisions of the CrPC/BNSS should not be ruled out. Police
assistance and delegation of powers is permissible in
exceptional circumstances and is consistent with the scheme of
the rules and the Act.
ii. The Act is oriented towards social welfare, and after the 2003 and
2014 amendments, section 28 only governs cognizance and
nothing further. If section 28 is taken to empower investigation by
police, it would render Section 27 ineffective.
iii. There are no express exclusion provisions of the CRPC. Further,
Rule 18A (3)(iv) expressly contemplates police assistance during
decoy operations. “As far as possible” is enabling, not
restrictive, and encourages coordination rather than exclusion.
iv. An FIR may be registered on information being supplied by the
AA, regarding an offence under the Act and the police may
investigate accordingly, but the Magistrate can take cognizance
only in terms of Section 28. When cognizance is taken,
mistakenly, upon a police report, the proper course would be to
20
(2005) 6 SCC 1
Page 33 of 60
regularise the proceedings by directing that the same be treated
the same like the complaint under Section 28 and not the entire
proceedings. This is in keeping with the fact that inherent powers
of the Court under Section 482 of the CrPC/528 of the BNSS have
to be exercised sparingly.
ANALYSING THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
6. The questions referred to this bench primarily revolve around
Sections 17, 27, 28, 30 of the Act and Rule 18A(3). Although we have
reproduced them in a preceding section, let us first understand the
scheme of the Act and then undertake an in-depth analysis of the
provisions themselves.
6.1 Chapter 2 deals with the regulation of Genetic Counselling Centres,
Genetic Laboratories and Clinics; Chapter 3 deals with regulation of
prenatal diagnostic techniques; chapter 4 constitutes the Central
supervisory Board, details the terms of office, procedure for its
meetings, temporary association of certain members, appointment of
officers and other employees and also disqualification from being
appointed a member of the board; the board’s functions among other
things. Chapter 5 details the particulars of the appropriate authority
and advisory committee, including, under Section 17A, detailing the
powers of the AA. Chapter 6 deals with the registration of Genetic
Counselling Centres, Laboratories and Clinics; Chapter 7 discusses
the offences and penalties, including offences by companies. It further
discusses the cognizance of offences, which is particularly relevant for
our purposes. Chapter 8 is miscellaneous and provides for the powers
to make rules and regulations; the powers for search and seizure; and
the particulars for laying of the rules/regulations before Parliament.
Page 34 of 60
6.2 With that overview, we now move to particular provisions of the
PCPNDT Act. Section 17 provides that both the Central and State
Governments shall appoint by notification one or more appropriate
authorities. Such AA shall consist of an Officer not below the rank of a
Joint Director of the Health and Family Welfare Department; and an
eminent woman representing a woman’s organisation and an officer of
the law department. Section 17 (4), from subclause (a) to (i) discusses
the functions of the AA, which importantly, include under sub-clause
(c) the investigation of complaints of breach of the provisions of the Act
or rules and taking of immediate action with regard to contravention of
provisions of the Act; sub-clause (e) which requires them to take
appropriate legal action against the use of any of the prohibited
techniques under this Act along with initiating independent
investigations.
6.3 Section 27 simply provides that every offence under this Act shall
be cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable. It is the use of
these words that was the subject matter of heavy discussions in the
course of arguments. We will refer to the import of these words at a
subsequent stage.
6.4 Section 28 prohibits taking of cognizance by a court except in two
scenarios, (a) The AA or the AO of the Central, State Government or AA
shall make the complaint to the Court; (b) on a complaint by any
person, not less than fifteen days’ notice to the AA of his intention to
make the complaint.
6.5 Section 30 (1) authorises the AA to enter, search, examine records,
seize and seal any place defined under this Act, such as Genetic Clinic
Page 35 of 60
or even any other place, with assistance as it considers necessary.
Section 30 (2) specifies that CrPC shall apply to search and seizure.
6.6 Rule 18A(3) discusses the conduct to be followed by the AA upon
receipt of complaints and conducting investigations. Sub-sub-clause
(iii) requires that the AA shall investigate all complaints within 24 hours
and complete such investigation within 48 hours. The next Sub-sub-
clause (iv) states that the police shall not be involved in investigating
the cases “as far as possible”.
OUR VIEW
Precedents Of This Court
7. It appears that this Court has not had extensive engagement with
this Act. However, it would be apposite to take note of the instances
where it has.
7.1 In State of M.P. v. Manvinder Singh Gill
21, the State mounted a
challenge against the findings of the High Court, where proceedings
had been set aside for the reason that the person instituting the matter,
was not one mentioned in Section 28(1)(a) of the Act. It was observed
by this Court that authority to file a complaint is restricted to specific
categories, the concerned Appropriate Authority (AA) notified under
Section 17(3), any officer authorized in that behalf by the Central or
State Government, or any officer authorized in that behalf by the AA
itself. Officers authorized merely to assist AA in monitoring
implementation cannot be construed as “officers authorized in this
behalf” for the purpose of filing a complaint.
21
SLP (Crl.) No. 2226/2014 (Order dated 03.08.2015)
Page 36 of 60
7.2 In State of Rajasthan v. Mohammad Imtiyaz
22, it was observed that
the High Court was correct in quashing proceedings initiated on the
basis of an FIR since the same was impermissible.
7.3 In Ravinder Kumar v. State of Haryana
23, this Court quashed a
complaint by the AA and an FIR by the police on the ground that the
search carried out at the clinic of the Appellant therein was illegal. This
was in view of the fact that the Chairman of the AA had taken a unilateral
decision to exercise powers under Section 30.
7.4 In Naresh Kumar Garg (Dr.) v. State of Haryana
24, this Court
observed, in regard to Rule 18A as follows:
“55. … It is the contention of the appellant that such duality of
role assigned to Dr. Saryu Sharma is illegal which not only
vitiated the raid but also the decision to file the criminal
complaint. Such a submission has no basis at all. Rule 18A lays
down certain guidelines in the form of code of conduct to be
observed by the appropriate authorities. As per Rule
18A(2)(ii), all appropriate authorities shall ensure that a
person who is part of the investigating machinery in cases
under the PCPNDT Act shall not be nominated or appointed as
a member of the advisory committee. Thus, Rule 18A(2)(ii) is
applicable only to a person who is part of the investigating
machinery in cases under the PCPNDT Act. Dr. Saryu Sharma
was never a part of any investigating machinery. Therefore,
there is no contravention of Rule 18A(2)(ii) of the PCPNDT
Rules. In any case, going by language of Rule 18A, those
guidelines can only be termed as directory being part of the
general code of conduct to be observed by appropriate
authorities, violation of which may render a proceeding
irregular but not illegal…”
8. From all these judgements it appears that the view of the Court
has been consistent, Sections 27 and 28 do not confer power on the
police, but granted the same has not been stated as an explicit position
in law, let us proceed further.
22
SLP (Crl.) No. 103 of 2023 (Order dated 28.03.2025)
23
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2495
24
2026 SCC OnLine SC 295
Page 37 of 60
Similar Provisions in Other Legislations
9. In the detailed submissions of the parties, extensive reference
was made to provisions similar to the ones housed in the Act in other
legislations. In effect, what was sought to be demonstrated was that the
specialized enforcement mechanism adopted by the Act in the present
case is not exceptional, but is present in many other legislations,
keeping in view the nature of the particular legislation in question.
9.1 Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994
“22. Cognizance of offences.—(1) No court shall take cognizance
of an offence under this Act except
on a complaint made by—
(a) the Appropriate Authority concerned, or any officer
authorised in this behalf by the
Central Government or the State Government or, as the case
may be, the Appropriate Authority;
or;
(b) a person who has given notice of not less than sixty days, in
such manner as may be
prescribed, to the Appropriate Authority concerned, of the
alleged offence and of his intention to
make a complaint to the court.
(2) No court other than that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a
Judicial Magistrate of the first class
shall try any offence punishable under this Act.
(3) Where a complaint has been made under clause (b) of sub-
section (1), the court may, on
demand by such person, direct the Appropriate Authority to
make available copies of the relevant
records in its possession to such person.”
Section 22 of the TOHO Act was considered by this Court in Jeewan
Kumar Raut & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation
25. The question
involved in the case was regarding the applicability of Section 167(2)
of the CrPC to offences under TOHO. Sub-section (2) of Section 167
deals with judicial remand and the power of a Magistrate to authorize
25
(2009) 7 SCC 526
Page 38 of 60
detention. Relevant paragraphs while concluding that the sub-section
would not apply, are as follows:
“25. Section 22 of TOHO prohibits taking of cognizance except
on a complaint made by an appropriate authority or the person
who had made a complaint earlier to it as laid down therein.
The respondent, although, has all the powers of an
investigating agency, it expressly has been statutorily
prohibited from filing a police report. It could file a complaint
petition only as an appropriate authority so as to comply with
the requirements contained in Section 22 of TOHO. If by
reason of the provisions of TOHO, filing of a police report by
necessary implication is necessarily forbidden, the question of
its submitting a report in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 173
of the Code did not and could not arise. In other words, if no
police report could be filed, sub-section (2) of Section 167 of
the Code was not attracted.
26. It is a well-settled principle of law that if a special statute
lays down procedures, the ones laid down under the general
statutes shall not be followed. In a situation of this nature, the
respondent could carry out investigations in exercise of its
authorisation under Section 13(3)(iv) of TOHO. While doing so,
it could exercise such powers which are otherwise vested in
it. But, as it could not file a police report but a complaint
petition only; sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code may
not be applicable.
27. The provisions of the Code, thus, for all intent and purport,
would apply only to an extent till conflict arises between the
provisions of the Code and TOHO and as soon as the area of
conflict reaches, TOHO shall prevail over the Code .
Ordinarily, thus, although in terms of the Code, the
respondent upon completion of investigation and upon
obtaining remand of the accused from time to time, was
required to file a police report, it was precluded from doing so
by reason of the provisions contained in Section 22 of TOHO.
28. To put it differently, upon completion of the investigation,
an authorised officer could only file a complaint and not a
police report, as a specific bar has been created by
Parliament. In that view of the matter, the police report being
not a complaint and vice versa, it was obligatory on the part of
the respondent to choose the said method invoking the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned for taking cognizance
of the offence only in the manner laid down therein and not by
any other mode. The procedure laid down in TOHO, thus,
would permit the respondent to file a complaint and not a
report which course of action could have been taken recourse
Page 39 of 60
to but for the special provisions contained in Section 22 of
TOHO.
29. It is one thing to say that the court could take recourse to
the procedure laid down in Section 202 of the Code or even
reject the complaint but then only because such a course of
action could be resorted to by the learned Magistrate, the
same, by itself, would not lead us to a conclusion that the
complaint petition should have been treated to be a police
report; the logical corollary whereof would be to invoke the
provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code.”
(emphasis supplied)
Similar to the present Act, the TOHO Act, also prohibits taking of
cognizance except in accordance with the procedure prescribed under
Section 22 thereof. It has been treated as a natural corollary that no
question of applicability of Section 167(2) of the CrPC would arise if that
is the case. CrPC would apply only to the extent that it is not inconsistent
with the provisions given in the Special Law.
9.2 Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
“32. Cognizance of offences—1
[(1) No prosecution under this Chapter shall be instituted except
by—
(a) an Inspector; or
(b) any gazetted officer of the Central Government or a State
Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central
Government or a State Government or by a general or special
order made in this behalf by that Government; or
(c) the person aggrieved; or
(d) a recognised consumer association whether such person is a
member of that association or not.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no court inferior to
that of a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under
this Chapter.]
(3) Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be deemed to
prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law
for any act or omission which constitutes an offence against this
Chapter.”
Page 40 of 60
In Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma
26, the question before the
Court was whether a First Information Report under section 154, CRPC
could be registered and whether a Magistrate could take cognizance
under section 190 thereof, insofar as the offences contained in the DC
Act are concerned. After a detailed judgment, the conclusions of the
Corded Bench, insofar as they are relatable to the question before this
bench, are as follows:
“170.1. In regard to cognizable offences under Chapter
IV of the Act, in view of Section 32 of the Act and also the
scheme of CrPC, the police officer cannot prosecute
offenders in regard to such offences. Only the persons
mentioned in Section 32 are entitled to do the same.
170.2. There is no bar to the police officer, however, to
investigate and prosecute the person where he has
committed an offence, as stated under Section 32(3) of the
Act i.e. if he has committed any cognizable offence under
any other law.
170.3. Having regard to the scheme of CrPC and also the
mandate of Section 32 of the Act and on a conspectus of
powers which are available with the Drugs Inspector
under the Act and also his duties, a police officer cannot
register an FIR under Section 154CrPC, in regard to
cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act and he
cannot investigate such offences under the provisions of
CrPC…”
(emphasis supplied)
The above decision was relied on in Rakesh Kumar v. State of
Bihar
27
.
9.3 Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957
“22. Cognizance of offences.―No court shall take cognizance of
any offence punishable under this Act or any rules made
thereunder except upon complaint in writing made by a person
26
(2021) 12 SCC 674
27
(2024) 12 SCC 473
Page 41 of 60
authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the State
Government.”
In Sanjay (supra) the Court was concerned with the question whether
Sections 21 and 22 primarily of the MMDR Act barred prosecution of a
person accused of offences under Section 379/114 IPC. The conclusion
was in the negative. In paras 69, 70 and 72, the Court observed as
follows:
“69. Considering the principles of interpretation and the
wordings used in Section 22, in our considered opinion,
the provision is not a complete and absolute bar for
taking action by the police for illegal and dishonestly
committing theft of minerals including sand from the
riverbed. …
70. .... In case of breach and violation of Section 4 and
other provisions of the Act, the police officer cannot insist
the Magistrate for taking cognizance under the Act on the
basis of the record submitted by the police alleging
contravention of the said Act. In other words, the
prohibition contained in Section 22 of the Act against
prosecution of a person except on a complaint made by
the officer is attracted only when such person is sought to
be prosecuted for contravention of Section 4 of the Act
and not for any act or omission which constitutes an
offence under the Penal Code.
…
72. …Hence, merely because initiation of proceeding for
commission of an offence under the MMDR Act on the
basis of complaint cannot and shall not debar the police
from taking action against persons for committing theft of
sand and minerals in the manner mentioned above by
exercising power under the Code of Criminal Procedure
and submit a report before the Magistrate for taking
cognizance against such persons….”
(emphasis supplied)
The scope of the MMDR Act and the bar postulated thereunder is
limited to the Act’s proscribed therein. It would not restrict the police’s
power to prosecute offences that are not in connection with this Act.
Page 42 of 60
9.4 Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972
“55. Cognizance of offences.—No court shall take
cognizance of any offence against this Act on the complaint
of any person other than—
(a) the Director of Wild Life Preservation or any other
officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government;
or
[(aa) the Member-Secretary, Central Zoo Authority in
matters relating to violation of the provisions of Chapter
IVA; or [(ab) Member-Secretary, Tiger Conservation
Authority; or
(ac) Director of the concerned tiger reserve; or]
(b) the Chief Wild Life Warden, or any other officer
authorised in this behalf by the State Government [subject
to such conditions as may be specified by that
Government]; or
[(bb) the officer-in-charge of the zoo in respect of violation
of provisions of section 38J; or]
(c) any person who has given notice of not less than sixty
days, in the manner prescribed, of the alleged offence and
of his intention to make a complaint, to the Central
Government or the State Government or the officer
authorised as aforesaid.”
In State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan
28, the appeal was regarding High
Court’s quashing of proceedings in the above referred legislation
which is referred to as WPA where the respondent was accused of
having shot and killed an elephant and removed their ivory tusks.
While allowing the State’s appeal, the Court through M.N.
Venkatachaliah J. (as he was then) observed as follows:
“13. What emerges from a perusal of these provisions is that
cognizance of an offence under the “Act” can be taken by a
court only on the complaint of the officer mentioned in Section
55. The person who lodged complaint dated 23-6-1986
claimed to be such an officer. In these circumstances even if
the jurisdictional police purported to register a case for an
alleged offence against the Act, Section 210(1) would not be
attracted having regard to the position that cognizance of such
28
(1988) 4 SCC 655
Page 43 of 60
an offence can only be taken on the complaint of the officer
mentioned in that section. Even where a Magistrate takes
cognizance of an offence instituted otherwise than on a police
report and an investigation by the police is in progress in
relation to same offence, the two cases do not lose their
separate identity. The section seeks to obviate the anomalies
that might arise from taking cognizance of the same offence
more than once. But, where, as here, cognizance can be taken
only in one way and that on the complaint of a particular
statutory functionary, there is no scope or occasion for taking
cognizance more than once and, accordingly, Section 210 has
no role to play. The view taken by the High Court on the
footing of Section 210 is unsupportable.”
The conclusion drawn here is similar to that drawn under the MMDR
Act. In so far as the offence given under the Act is in question, the police
have no role to play.
9.5 UP Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021
“4. Any aggrieved person, his/her parents, brother, sister,
or any other person who is related to him/her by blood,
marriage or adoption may lodge a First Information Report
of such conversion which contravenes the provisions of
section 3. ”
In Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P.
29, J.B. Pardiwala J., writing for the
Court, while dealing with the question of whether an FIR could be
registered for the offences under the UP Prohibition of Unlawful
Conversion of Religion Act, 2021
30
referred to, Ashok Kumar Sharma
(supra), and observed that, on a studied analysis of the Act in question,
there was no reason to hold that Section 154 CrPC should be given
primacy over Section 4 of the unamended version of the Act. It was held:
“116. We are inclined to adopt the reasoning as assigned in
Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) as discussed above for the
simple reason that the U.P. Conversion Act, being a special
legislation, has prescribed certain special procedural norms
as distinguished from the Cr.P.C. It is a settled position of law
that the intention of the legislature should be construed from
29
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265
30
PUCRA
Page 44 of 60
the plain text of the statute, and if the plain interpretation does
not result into any absurdity or is not unworkable, then the
courts should not depart from the meaning which is manifest
from the plain text. It is only in cases where the text does not
speak for itself, or more than one interpretation is possible,
that the courts should resort to tools of statutory interpretation.
In the case in hand, the words employed by the legislature in
the unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act are
abundantly indicative of the intent of the legislature to only
allow a certain specified category of persons to make a
complaint for the violation of Section 3 of the said Act. Thus, we
find no good reason to take the view that despite being a
special legislation, Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. should be given
primacy over Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act. We are also
not inclined to accept the submission of the learned AG that
Section 4 is a mere declaration and not a contradiction from
the general scheme of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. for the simple
reason that when the legislature has enacted special and more
stringent provisions as regards other aspects covered by the
said legislation, then a clause restricting the scope of initiation
of prosecution under the same enactment cannot be casually
construed as a mere surplusage. The specific declaration in
Section 4 cannot be understood as a mere procedural nicety
but has to be given its intended meaning to ensure that it fits
in with the overall scheme of prosecution provided under the
said legislation.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9.6 In summary, it can be stated with reference to the above judgments
that TOHO, UPPCR and DCA contemplate a complete prohibition on
police investigation and police report-based cognizance, whereas the
MMDR and WPA restrict the powers of the police only in regard to the
offences mentioned in the special law.
Page 45 of 60
Crucial Aspects to be Considered
10. There are three main aspects that we must consider in answering
the questions referred to us. (1) The phrasing employed in Section 27
and its interplay with Section 28 of the Act; (2) Whether the language
of Rule 18A(3) would imply statutory force or is it merely directory; (3)
What is the effect of the Act not having an express exclusion to the
applicability of the CrPC/BNSS? All of these aspects require
consideration under the overarching umbrella of the fact that the Act in
question is a special statute and the Statement of Objects and Reasons
for which such Act came to be enacted, which we have already
reproduced (supra).
10.1 The principle that Special law overrides General Law is a position
well understood. There can be no qualms with the position that the
PCPNDT Act is a special law. CrPC or its new version, BNSS, 2023, is a
procedural law. If the Act requires a particular procedure to be
followed, the same alone has to be done so. In Parvinder Singh v.
Enforcement Directorate
31
, (to which one of us, N Kotiswar Singh J. was
a party), the Court considered Sections 4 & 5 of the BNSS, which were
analogous to the prior legislation and are reproduced below, which
provide that the procedure contained thereunder will not apply in as
much as a particular legislation provides for a specified procedure.
They read:
Section 4 of the BNSS
“4. Trial of offences under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and
other laws.— (1) All offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and
otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter
contained.
31
2026 SCC OnLine SC 903
Page 46 of 60
(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated,
inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the
same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time
being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating,
inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.”
Section 5 of the BNSS, 2023
“5. Saving.— Nothing contained in this Sanhita shall, in the
absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any
special or local law for the time being in force, or any special
jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of
procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in
force.”
(emphasis supplied)
In light thereof, let us consider one of the arguments put forth by the
Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Aggarwal, appearing in this matter,
which was that since there is no express exclusion of the general
procedural law, it would apply. But, since the reading of the provisions
of the Act suggests otherwise, the conclusion was that it would not
apply. Reference was made to Moti Lal v. Central Bureau of
Investigation
32
. In this case, it was held that the procedural provisions
in the special law, insofar as they are inconsistent with the general
procedural law, would prevail, but the remainder of the latter would
continue to operate. However, we are of the view that the Act
specifically provides the manner in which certain aspects of the
execution of the Act are to take place. In the context of the specialised
purpose of the Act, it has to be treated as such. It has also to be noted
that where the legislature desired, they provided for the provisions of
the CrPC to apply, i.e., regarding search and seizure under Section
30(2). Clearly, the intention of the legislature cannot as such be
determined to be that those parts of the CrPC that are inconsistent with
32
(2002) 4 SCC 713
Page 47 of 60
the words of the statute, will not apply, but the rest of it, would. The
‘reason to believe’ standard, that is provided for in Section 30 (1), also
has been applied specifically to the AA, indicating thereby that the AA
is the one conducting the investigation. The reading of Section 28, put
forth by the Union, in our view, cannot be accepted since it limits the
effect of Section 28 only to cognizance. It is trite in law, however, that
provisions cannot be read in isolation. Section 17 clearly provides that
the power of investigation rests with the AA. The powers mentioned
in furtherance thereof are given in Section 17A. Upon completion of
investigation, the Court, upon receipt of a complaint by the AA, shall
take cognizance; the loop is therefore completed.
10.2 The use of the words cognizable, non-bailable and non-
compoundable within Section 27, as per the Union of India and others,
has to be followed through, since it is trite in law that the legislature
does not employ surplus words. We are of the considered view that
the “dual-track” analogy drawn by the Union, so far as distinct
offences in the IPC/BNS and the Act are concerned, none can dispute
the same. In Sanjay (supra), it has been observed:
70. There cannot be any dispute with regard to
restrictions imposed under the MMDR Act and
remedy provided therein. In any case, where there
is a mining activity by any person in contravention of
the provisions of Section 4 and other sections of the
Act, the officer empowered and authorised under the
Act shall exercise all the powers including making a
complaint before the Jurisdictional Magistrate. It is
also not in dispute that the Magistrate shall in such
cases take cognizance on the basis of the complaint
filed before it by a duly authorised officer. In case of
breach and violation of Section 4 and other
provisions of the Act, the police officer cannot insist
the Magistrate for taking cognizance under the Act
on the basis of the record submitted by the police
alleging contravention of the said Act. In other
Page 48 of 60
words, the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the
Act against prosecution of a person except on a
complaint made by the officer is attracted only when
such person is sought to be prosecuted for
contravention of Section 4 of the Act and not for any
act or omission which constitutes an offence under
the Penal Code.
In our view, the procedure under this Act, cannot, in any
circumstances, be taken to be restricting the function of the police in
so far as offences in other laws are concerned. However, the special
law in question restricts the use of particular techniques meant for
untoward purposes such as sex-selection. It does not circumscribe the
application of the substantive procedural law for other offences
mentioned in the latter. As such, that conclusion in our view is a given.
The difficulty arises because of the use of the word ‘cognizable’ on the
one hand and on the other the specific intention of the legislature for
offences under this Act to be treated as complaint cases. If the word
‘cognizable’ is taken to mean, as it is generally understood i.e., that
the police can, without the permission of the Court concerned,
undertake an investigation, it would, in our view, fall foul of the
specialized provisions of the special statute. It has been argued by the
Union of India that investigation and cognizance are distinct. That, of
course, is the correct position. But however, as already extracted
above, Section 17(4) declares the powers given to the AA, one of
which is to investigate the complaints of the breach(s) of the provisions
of this Act. Section 2(l) of the BNSS, also provides that when a particular
aspect has been provided for in the special statute, the same has to
prevail. Section 28, as observed, provides for the exclusive
cognizance procedure. When the legislature has specifically provided
for this, to give power to the Police, which is otherwise lacking in the
Page 49 of 60
requisite understanding and expertise when it comes to such an area
involving medical and technical know-how, the power to investigate
only because of one word, would be a stretch, and an impermissible
one at that. It could also be argued that the non-bailable nature of the
offences in this Act is also provided to restrict the power of the police
to grant bail. That word does not enable the police to play any
investigative role in the matter. The SOP of the concerned Ministry too
do not envision a role for the police, except for providing limited,
ancillary and necessary assistance to the AA.
10.3 One submission of the Union of India was that Section 28 of the
Act only restricted the Court's power to take cognizance and nothing
else. But the question that we put to ourselves is what would be the
logical conclusion of the investigation carried out by the police? Once
it undertakes an investigation, the police have two options available to
it. One, is to file a closure report, if it finds that no offence is made out,
or two, to file a chargesheet upon the completion of the investigation.
A chargesheet obviously is filed before a Court. To what end though?
The Court cannot take cognizance thereof due to the mandatory
jurisdictional bar under Section 28, and, as such, the effort made by
the police would result in being nugatory in the eyes of law. Can such
an interpretation be countenanced in law? Certainly not. Regarding
Section 28, we may further observe that it also provides for a ‘person’
to make a complaint, with notice to the AA of such complaint and of the
intent to make a complaint before the court. So, it provides two
methods for a complaint to be made under Section 28 (1) (a) & (b), and
in both scenarios the AA is indispensable. Still further, it is provided
in the Explanation to Section 28 that a ‘person’, within its meaning,
includes a social organisation. The legislature has taken care to
Page 50 of 60
explain the meaning of a person as being inclusive of only a social
organisation, and in all other scenarios a ‘person’ has to be
understood in its general meaning. In other words, it may be that a
police official, in his private capacity, can make a complaint to the
court or to the AA by following the requisite procedure but the police
as an institution have not been covered within the meaning of
‘person’. Given that, outside its ordinary meaning, a person may
include entities such as companies or individuals, but however in the
Act, only social organisations have been expressly included within its
meaning. We, therefore, find force in the submission that the language
of Section 28 impacts jurisdiction and is prohibitory.
10.4 The rules enacted under Section 32 of the Act have to be laid
before the Parliament under Section 34. The said Section, the way it is
structured, has a negative laying procedure embedded within it. The
rules come into force on the date that they are notified, but, remain
subject to change as the wisdom of the legislature which they may
deem fit. Post such change, actions taken under the Rules/Regulations
as it stood prior to the change are protected. Since these rules, or the
power to make the same, is provided within the Act itself, these
Rules/Regulations shall have statutory force. [See: PEPSU RTC v. M].
The Singh
33]. The holding in this case, albeit in the context of service
law, records the general position. It says:
29. … The regulations validly made under the statutory
powers are binding and effective as the enactment of the
competent legislature. The statutory bodies as well as general
public are bound to comply with the terms and conditions laid
down in the regulations as a legal compulsion. Any action or
order in breach of the terms and conditions of the regulations
shall amount to violation of the regulations which are in the
33
(2011) 11 SCC 702
Page 51 of 60
nature of statutory provisions and shall render such action or
order illegal and invalid.”
Consequently, Rule 18A (3)(iv), which states that “as far as possible”
the police shall not be involved, has statutory force. It cannot be taken
to be only indicative of a best-case scenario. Granted, it may be that
the language leaves open some possibility of the involvement of the
police, but this involvement cannot be there, unless AA so directs. We
draw our conclusion, based on the decision rendered by a three-
Judge Bench of this Court in State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao
Andolan
34. This phrase has been explained in Para 37 of the said
judgment as follows:
“As far as possible
38. The aforesaid phrase provides for flexibility, clothing the
authority concerned with powers to meet special situations
where the normal process of resolution cannot flow smoothly.
The aforesaid phrase can be interpreted as not being
prohibitory in nature. The said words rather connote a
discretion vested in the prescribed authority. It is thus
discretion and not compulsion. There is no hard-and-fast rule
in this regard as these words give a discretion to the authority
concerned. Once the authority exercises its discretion, the
court should not interfere with the said discretion/decision
unless it is found to be palpably arbitrary. (Vide Iridium India
Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. [(2005) 2 SCC 145 : AIR 2005 SC
514] and High Court of Judicature for Rajastha tbe the n v. Veena
Verma [(2009) 14 SCC 734 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 452 : AIR 2009
SC 2938] .) Thus, it is evident that this phrase simply means
that the principles are to be observed unless it is not possible
to follow the same in the particular circumstances of a case.”
(emphasis supplied)
Consequently, it can be held that there is discretion in the hands of AA
to involve the police as and when it is felt that their assistance is
required. The police, when asked to assist, will be required to do so
34
(2011) 7 SCC 639
Page 52 of 60
strictly in a supplemental or aiding capacity. If the powers of the police
are contemplated to be wide, it would step over the perceived
jurisdiction of the AA, diluting its powers and undermining the
legislative intent.
There is yet another question which we must ask ourselves- what is the
harm in largely excluding the police, or reducing their role, for the
specific purposes of this Act, to a supplemental body? There are
safeguards built into the Act. The Rules and Regulations of the Act
receive the consideration of the Parliament, a decision by the AA
cannot be the unilateral act of one of the members thereof. There is
also the Advisory Committee to keep matters in check. Therefore, the
AA is not an unregulated or unruly horse. There are sufficient checks
and balances provided in the statute itself for fulfilling its objects and
aims.
10.5 At this stage, we must consider the reliance on the judgment in
Lalita Kumari (supra). At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that
the reliance on this judgment is because it has been held therein that
the police have a mandatory duty to register an FIR for a cognizable
offence. The conclusions arrived at by the Constitution Bench are as
under:
“120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154
of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a
cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible
in such a situation.
120.2. If the information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry,
a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain
whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases where
preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of
Page 53 of 60
the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant
forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons
in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.
120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering
offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be
taken against erring officers who do not register the FIR if
information received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the
veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to
ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable
offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry
is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary
inquiry may be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating
criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in
reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the
reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all
conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.”
If it is the attempt of the Union of India, Respondent No. 2, to further the
case that the requirement of preliminary inquiries extends only to the
scenarios mentioned in para 120.6 quoted above, we are afraid that it
is a misreading thereof. The judges have themselves clarified that the
scenarios mentioned therein are non-exhaustive. It is also stated
therein that the preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity of the
information received but to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is
revealed; still further, it is stated that which type and in which cases a
preliminary enquiry is to be conducted has to be decided in the facts
and circumstances of each case. In our view, while it is true that the
preliminary inquiry is only limited to analysing the information
received for the presence therein, of a cognizable offence, the same
cannot be read so restrictively that Section 27 of the Act can be taken to
Page 54 of 60
be the whole answer. It would also be within the scope of the
preliminary enquiry to ascertain at the outset whether the police have
the jurisdiction to conduct an investigation at all or not. It is only after
this ‘entry hurdle’ is crossed would the question come up as to whether
the information received discloses a cognizable offence or not. The
necessary conclusion, in any scenario, insofar as it involves the
offences under this Act, despite Section 27, would be the negative,
since there is no power of police investigation to begin with as per the
specialized regulatory regime.
10.6 There is another argument of the Union of India that none of the
provisions of a statute are surplus and so, effect has to be given thereto,
in full force. On the other hand, the learned Amici have submitted that
there has to be harmonious construction of both the provisions. We are
inclined to accept the position advanced by the Amici. If we accept the
position advanced by the Union, the implied effect thereof is a
restrictive reading of Section 28 which would be illogical, irrational and
unjustified. It has to be noted, possibly by way of repetition, that
Section 27 merely indicates the qualifications of the offences under this
Act. However, Section 28 provides the mandatory and exclusive
procedure for cognizance. To put it differently, while Section 27
dictates that the offences under this Act be cognizable, non-bailable
and non-compoundable, whereas on the other hand, Section 28 clearly
indicates the complaint case route. If these two scenarios are somewhat
difficult to harmonise, then in such a scenario, it would be useful to refer
to Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 15
th
Edition, wherein it has been observed as follows:
Page 55 of 60
“If two sections of an Act cannot be reconciled, as there may
be absolute contradictions, it is often said that the last must
prevail. 45" But this should be accepted only in the last
resort. As observed by Lord Evershed, MR,
It is no doubt true that if two sections of an Act of
Parliament are in truth irreconcilable, so then
prima facie the later will be preferred. But these
are arguments of the last resort. The first duty of
the court must be, if the result is fairly possible,
to give effect to the whole expression of the
parliamentary intention.
…
In case of conflict between two sections of the same Act a
more logical approach is indicated by Lord Herschell, LC,
You have to try and reconcile them as best as you may. If you
cannot, you have to determine which is the leading
provision, and which the subordinate provision and which
must give way to the other.
…
In case of conflict between two sections of a statute which
can not be reconciled, the Court must determine which the
leading provision is, and which the subordinate provision is
and which must give way to the other… ”
The Privy Council in Salmon Plaintiff; And Duncombe And Others
Defendants.
35
, observed:
“It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the
main object of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a
nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of
law. It may be necessary for a Court of Justice to come to
such a conclusion, but their Lordships hold that nothing
can justify it except necessity or the absolute intractability
of the language used. And they have set themselves to
consider, first, whether any substantial doubt can be
suggested as to the main object of the legislature; and,
secondly, whether the last nine words of sect. 1 are so
cogent and so limit the rest of the statute as to nullify its
effect either entirely or in a very important particular.”
35
[L.R.] 11 App. Cas. 627
Page 56 of 60
The Constitution Bench of this Court in Shamarao V. Parulekar v. DM,
Thana
36, observed as under :
“10. ... Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the courts
sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary
sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and
inconsistency can be avoided. See the speech of Lord
Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson [Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6
HLC 61 at p. 106 : 10 ER 1216] quoted with approval by the
Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor [Pakala
Narayana Swami v. Emperor, (1938-39) 66 IA 66 : AIR 1939
PC 47 : 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1] ; also Salmon v. Duncombe
[Salmon v. Duncombe, (1886) 11 AC 627 at p. 634 (PC)] . The
rule is also set out in the text books : see Maxwell on the
Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn., p. 236 and Craies on
Statute Law, 5th Edn., pp. 89 to 93. The meaning of Section 3
is quite plain and only desperate hair splitting can reduce it
to an absurdity. Courts should not be astute to defeat the
provisions of an Act whose meaning is, on the face of it,
reasonably plain. Of course, this does not mean that an Act,
or any part of it, can be recast. It must be possible to spell
the meaning contended for out of the words actually used.
We hold that there is no difficulty of construction.”
Similar observations have been made by Arijit Pasayat J. in CIT v.
Hindustan Bulk Carriers
37
,
“14. A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has
to be avoided. A statute or any enacting provision therein
must be so construed as to make it effective and operative
on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat
quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon
written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and
carry into effect the intention of the parties. [See Broom's
Legal Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 361, Craies on Statutes (7th
Edn.), p. 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th Edn.), p. 221.]
15. A statute is designed to be workable and the
interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that
object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that
end unattainable. (See Whitney v. IRC [1926 AC 37 : 10 Tax
Cas 88 : 95 LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] , AC at p. 52 referred
to in CIT v. S. Teja Singh [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR
408] and Gursahai Saigal v. CIT [AIR 1963 SC 1062 : (1963)
48 ITR 1] .)
36
(1952) 2 SCC 1
37
(2003) 3 SCC 57
Page 57 of 60
16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will
defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though
there may be some inexactitude in the language used. (See
Salmon v. Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT
446 (PC)] AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin [(1889) 22 QBD 513 :
58 LJQB 174 : 60 LT 772 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh
case [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] .)
17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the
narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest
purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction
which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should
rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view
that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of
bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries [(1940) 3 All ER 549 : 1940 AC 1014
: 109 LJKB 865 : 163 LT 343 (HL)] referred to in Pye v. Minister
for Lands for NSW [(1954) 3 All ER 514 : (1954) 1 WLR 1410
(PC)] .) The principles indicated in the said cases were
reiterated by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union
of India [1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 455 :
(1992) 19 ATC 881 : AIR 1992 SC 1] .”
Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Vasant Ganpat Padave v. Anant
Mahadev Sawant
38
referred to the Golden Rule of Literal Interpretation
in the following words :
“26. In Grey v. Pearson [Grey v. Pearson, [L.R.] 6 H.L. 61 : 10 ER
1216] , what is referred to as the golden rule of literal
interpretation was stated as follows : (HL Cas p. 106)
“I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the
rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the courts
of law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and indeed
statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and
ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that
would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified,
so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. This
is laid down by Burton, J., in a very excellent opinion, which is
to be found in Warburton v. Loveland [Warburton v. Loveland,
(1831) 2 Dow & Cl 480 : 6 ER 806] (see ante, p. 76. n.).”
(emphasis supplied)”
38
(2019) 19 SCC 577
Page 58 of 60
In Govt. of T.N. v. Park View Enterprises
39, a co-ordinate Bench
observed that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between two
provisions of the same statute, the later provision shall prevail over the
earlier one.
Hence, we cannot allow the words ‘cognizable’ and ‘non-bailable’ in
Section 27 to water down the laudatory object of the statute, more so in
view of the later provision i.e., Section 28.
10.7 The view taken by us above, that insofar as the offences under the
Act are concerned, the AA is the only competent authority to conduct
investigation and the police, if involved, can only be so in a
supplemental capacity. In effect, there is a bar on the police being the
investigator under this Act. This would be in line with the interpretation
of other legislations referred to supra (such as the TOHO Act and the
DCA). The requirement of the legislation being socially beneficial in
nature and yet at the same time, there being a requirement to protect
doctors from being harassed or intimidated, requires us to take this
view. For the offences involving other Acts such as the IPC, obviously,
there is no restriction on police power in place.
ANSWERING THE REFERENCE
11. Although we have extracted the questions referred to us in
paragraph 2, for the sake of completion we may reproduce them here
also.
39
(2001) 1 SCC 742
Page 59 of 60
Question 1 – Whether, for offences under the PC & PNDT Act, the
registration of FIR at the police station is permissible, merely because
the offences under the PC & PNDT Act have been made cognizable and
non-bailable?
Answer 1 – The language of the statute, more particularly Sections 27
and 28 of the Act when read together, in light of the other provisions
and the socially beneficial nature of the Act as also the requirement of
sensitivity along with medical and technical know-how, indicates that
the police are not meant to be the investigators for the purpose of this
Act. This is further made clear by the fact that an FIR once registered
cannot be taken to its logical conclusion as per the procedures of this
Act. The restriction applies only to offences under this Act and does
not restrict the police’s power to investigate or prosecute independent
offences disclosed under substantive criminal law (IPC/BNS).
Question 2 – Whether the police investigation is permissible for the
offences under the PC & PNDT Act? And who can investigate the
complaints, received for violation of the provisions of the PC & PNDT
Act?
Answer 2 - Section 17(4) of the Act, while describing the functions of
the AA, clearly states that investigating the complaints is its
responsibility. Rule 18A(3)(iv), which has statutory force, also requires
that recourse to the police be avoided “as far as possible”. It
necessarily has to be concluded, therefore, that the police cannot be
the main investigating authority. At best, the police may play a
supplemental role, as and when required by the AA under its
supervision.
Page 60 of 60
Question 3 – Whether on the chargesheet submitted after the
investigation by the police, the competent magistrate can take
cognizance of the offence under the PC & PNDT Act?
Answer 3 – Section 28 of the Act envisions a complete statutory
embargo on the taking of cognizance except in situations and scenarios
provided thereunder. The answer has to be clear. The competent
Magistrate shall not be able to take cognizance upon the filing of a
chargesheet.
12. The reference is answered accordingly. The matter is remanded
to the High Court to take a decision in accordance with this judgment.
13. The appeal is disposed of, along with pending application(s), if
any.
………………………………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
……………………………………………….J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 20, 2026
Page 1 of 16
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2938 OF 2025
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
DR. BRIJ PAL SINGH & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.
1. I have had the benefit of reading the principal judgment
authored by my learned Brother Sanjay Karol, J. I respectfully
concur with the reasoning and conclusions recorded therein.
Though the questions referred to this Court have been clearly
answered in the principal judgment by delineating the respective
roles of the Appropriate Authority (“AA”) and the police under the
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition
of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (“PC & PNDT Act”), situations may
Page 2 of 16
nevertheless arise where offences under the PC & PNDT Act and
offences under the IPC/BNS or other general penal law may
emanate from the same, connected or related transaction. In such
a situation, both the AA and the police may possess their distinct
competence to investigate, within their respective statutory fields.
Keeping in view such situations, which are likely to arise in
practice in the light of the issues dealt in the principal judgment,
I consider it necessary to make the following clarificatory
observations on the interface between those two distinct
investigative agencies.
2. The same, single connected transaction may consequently
result in two parallel procedural tracks, one under the PC & PNDT
component, which may culminate in a complaint in the manner
contemplated by Section 28 of the Act, while an independently
constituted IPC/BNS offence may trigger police investigation. The
existence of a common factual transaction does not merge the
above distinct statutory routes and procedures under the
respective statutes.
The AA investigates the offence under the PC & PNDT Act,
and the police participation in that investigation is only
supplemental and when specifically required by the AA.
Page 3 of 16
Conversely, an independently constituted IPC/BNS offence arising
from the same or connected occurrence remains within ordinary
police jurisdiction where there is no statutory role of the AA. The
question here is how those distinct jurisdictions are to operate
when the underlying facts overlap arising out of connected
incidents forming the same transaction.
3. The statutory allocation under the PC & PNDT Act is
sufficiently clear when its provisions are read together. Section
17(4) of the PC & PNDT Act does not treat the AA as a mere
complainant who enters the picture only at the stage of cognizance,
but it expressly places investigation and other attendant legal
actions in its hands. Section 17A of the PC & PNDT Act equips AA
with powers directed to collection of information and material. The
relevant clauses read:
Section 17(4) of the PC & PNDT Act:
‘The Appropriate Authority shall have the following functions, namely:-
...
(c) to investigate complaints of breach of the provisions of this Act
or the rules made thereunder and take immediate action; ...
(e) to take appropriate legal action against the use of any sex selection
technique by any person at any place, suo motu or brought to its notice
and also to initiate independent investigations in such matter.'
Section 17A of the PC & PNDT Act:
'The Appropriate Authority shall have the powers in respect of the
following matters, namely:-
Page 4 of 16
(a) summoning of any person who is in possession of any information
relating to violation of the provisions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder;
(b) production of any document or material object relating to
clause (a);
(c) issuing search warrant for any place suspected to be indulging in
sex selection techniques or pre-natal sex determination; and
(d) any other matter which may be prescribed.'
(emphasis supplied).
4. Sections 27, 28 and 30 of the PC & PNDT Act makes the above
statutory architecture clearer. Section 27 classifies every offence
under the Act as cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable,
and Section 28 prescribes the controlled complaint route for
cognizance, thereafter Section 30 places the special search-and-
seizure power in the AA or an officer authorised by it, while
allowing the Authority to obtain assistance when necessary. This
may also include the assistance of the police. However, there is a
cautioning provision, that is, the Rule 18A(3)(iv) of PC & PNDT
Rules, 1996, which requires the AA, 'as far as possible', not to
involve police in investigating cases under the Act. It is also
pertinent to note that the PC & PNDT Rules, 1996 were also laid
before the Parliament and the rules have statutory force as held in
the principal judgment. The relevant statutory extracts are as
follows:
Page 5 of 16
Section 27 of the PC & PNDT Act:
'Every offence under this Act shall be cognizable, non-bailable and non-
compoundable.'
Section 28(1) of the PC & PNDT Act:
'No court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act except
on a complaint made by-
(a) the Appropriate Authority concerned, or any officer authorised in this
behalf by the Central Government or State Government, as the case
may be, or the Appropriate Authority; or
(b) a person who has given notice of not less than fifteen days in the
manner prescribed, to the Appropriate Authority, of the alleged offence
and of his intention to make a complaint to the court.'
Section 30(1) of the PC & PNDT Act:
'If the Appropriate Authority has reason to believe that an offence
under this Act has been or is being committed ... such Authority or any
officer authorised thereof in this behalf may ... enter and search ... with
such assistance, if any, as such authority or officer considers
necessary ... and seize and seal the same if such Authority or officer
has reason to believe that it may furnish evidence of the commission of
an offence punishable under this Act.'
Rule 18A(3)(iv) of the PC & PNDT Rules, 1996
‘as far as possible, not involve police for investigating cases
under the Act as the cases under the Act are tried as complaint cases
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)’.
(emphasis supplied).
5. The expression 'assistance' in Section 30(1) of the PC & PNDT
Act is significant. It enables the PC & PNDT Act to get the police
aid when genuinely required in instances like protection, tracing
the accused, other digital or forensic support, preservation of a
scene, or any in other situation where the AA may feel necessary.
But such assistance cannot have the effect of eclipsing the role of
Page 6 of 16
the AA to investigate. The decision to entertain complaints
regarding PC & PNDT offense, its investigation, to exercise the
special statutory powers, to assess the forms and
medical/technical material, and ultimately to decide whether the
statutory complaint should be instituted remains with the
competent AA. This is the line which the principal judgment draws,
and the following closest special-statute precedents show how it
should operate when another offence arises from the same set of
facts constituting the same transaction.
6. The first useful similar illustration is Jeewan Kumar Raut
v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526, under
the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994
('TOHO Act'). Significantly, in the said case, the FIR disclosed both
offences under the special health enactment and offences under
the IPC. It was held that the local police officer was not authorised
to investigate the TOHO component, and that component was
therefore required to move to the authorised agency. Paragraphs
21 to 23 of the said judgment would elucidate:
“21. … The FIR lodged before the officer incharge of the Gurgaon Police
Station was by way of information. It disclosed not only
commission of an offence under TOHO but also under
various provisions of the Indian Penal Code. The officer
incharge of the Police Station, however, was not authorized by
the appropriate government to deal with the matter in relation to
Page 7 of 16
TOHO; but, the respondent was. In that view of the matter, the
investigation of the said complaint was handed over to it.
22. TOHO being a special statute, Section 4 of the Code, which
ordinarily would be applicable for investigation into a cognizable
offence or the other provisions, may not be applicable. ...
23. TOHO being a special Act and the matter relating to dealing with
offences thereunder having been regulated by reason of the
provisions thereof, there cannot be any manner of doubt
whatsoever that the same shall prevail over the provisions of the
Code. The investigation in terms of Section 13(3)(iv) of TOHO,
thus, must be conducted by an authorized officer. Nobody
else could do it. For the aforementioned reasons, the officer
incharge of the Gurgaon Police Station had no other option but to
hand over the investigation to the appropriate authority .”
(emphasis supplied)
7. Jeewan Kumar Raut (supra) demonstrates the proper
response to mixed information where the police are not required to
ignore an IPC/BNS offence which they are otherwise competent to
investigate, but the presence of that offence does not permit them
to incorporate the offence under the Special Act.
Accordingly, the PC & PNDT aspect must move to the AA and
the general penal aspect will remain with the police. In this
manner, both the authorities preserve their both distinct
jurisdictions rather than encroaching upon each other's
jurisdiction.
8. A still closer analogy is found in the Union of India v. Ashok
Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674 , concerning the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940. There, notwithstanding the cognizable
character of the special-law offences, the Court held that the
Page 8 of 16
specialised statutory machinery displaced ordinary police
FIR/investigation for those offences, while expressly preserving
police jurisdiction over a cognizable offence under another law. The
conclusions most relevant therein are reproduced hereunder:
“170.1. In regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act,
in view of Section 32 of the Act and also the scheme of CrPC,
the police officer cannot prosecute offenders in regard to such
offences. Only the persons mentioned in Section 32 are
entitled to do the same.
170.2. There is no bar to the police officer, however, to
investigate and prosecute the person where he has
committed an offence, as stated under Section 32(3) of the Act
i.e. if he has committed any cognizable offence under any
other law .
170.3. Having regard to the scheme of CrPC and also the mandate of
Section 32 of the Act and on a conspectus of powers which are
available with the Drugs Inspector under the Act and also his
duties, a police officer cannot register an FIR under
Section 154 CrPC, in regard to cognizable offences under
Chapter IV of the Act and he cannot investigate such
offences under the provisions of CrPC.
...
170.5. It would appear that on the understanding that the police
officer can register an FIR, there are many cases where FIRs
have been registered in regard to cognizable offences falling
under Chapter IV of the Act. ... we direct that they should be
made over to the Drugs Inspector, if not already made over,
and it is for the Drugs Inspector to take action on the same in
accordance with the law.”
(emphasis supplied).
9. The precedential value of Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) for
the purpose of the present case is twofold. First, 'cognizable' does
not by itself transfer a specialist statutory investigation to the
Page 9 of 16
ordinary police. Secondly, exclusion from the special offence does
not disable the police from investigating a distinct cognizable
offence under another law, even if these offences arise out of the
same transaction. The direction in above paragraph 170.5 i n
Ashok Kumar Sharma (supra) is equally instructive, where it
directs that the information which has reached the police need not
be discarded, but it may be transmitted to the competent special
authority under the Special Act.
10. A similar issue was adjudicated by this Court in State (NCT
of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772. The same transaction of
removal of minerals could amount to a contravention under the
MMDR Act and, on additional ingredients, theft under the IPC. The
Court therefore distinguished the offences by their legal
ingredients rather than by the physical unity of the transaction.
Paragraphs 70 and 72 of the concerned judgment are instructive:
“70. ... In case of breach and violation of Section 4 and other provisions
of the Act, the police officer cannot insist the Magistrate for taking
cognizance under the Act on the basis of the record submitted by
the police alleging contravention of the said Act. In other words,
the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the Act against
prosecution of a person except on a complaint made by the officer
is attracted only when such person is sought to be prosecuted for
contravention of Section 4 of the Act and not for any act or
omission which constitutes an offence under the Penal
Code.
72. ... merely because initiation of proceeding for commission of an
offence under the MMDR Act on the basis of complaint cannot
Page 10 of 16
and shall not debar the police from taking action against
persons for committing theft of sand and minerals ... by
exercising power under the Code of Criminal Procedure and
submit a report before the Magistrate for taking cognizance
against such persons....'
(emphasis supplied).
11. The principle from Sanjay (supra) must be applied with care,
because it does not mean that the police may investigate the PC &
PNDT offence whenever a general penal provision is also cited, but
the practical inquiry is into, understand the pith and substance of
the allegation, tested by the ingredients of the offences.
If the offence is only sex determination, communication of
fetal sex, prohibited use of the diagnostic technique, or another
offence which clearly falls within the scope of PC & PNDT Act, the
police must keep their hands off that investigation unless the AA
seeks their assistance. Conversely, if a deliberate medical act
independently causes death, homicide, foeticide, or such other
connected offences, and the facts satisfy the ingredients in the
general penal law offence, the police may investigate those
offences. What they cannot do is use the general offence as a
gateway to take over the PC & PNDT inquiry and equally, the
Special Act cannot operate as a shield against investigation of a
genuinely distinct IPC/BNS offence.
Page 11 of 16
12. Once this distinction is clear, coordination must necessarily
ensue and be reciprocal. If the AA encounters the fact/ material
which reasonably discloses an independent IPC/BNS offence, it
may communicate the information and relevant material to the
jurisdictional police, who will act upon and investigate that offence
according to law. Conversely, if the police, while lawfully
investigating a general offence, encounters material indicating a
possible PC & PNDT violation, they should promptly place that
component before the notified AA to facilitate the AA to invoke its
statutory powers. However, until assistance is sought by the AA,
the police do not acquire jurisdiction to investigate the PC & PNDT
component merely because it arises in the same transaction.
Therefore, the two agencies may assist each other without
crossing the statutory line, where, for the IPC/BNS investigation,
the police may seek from the AA its inspection findings, statutory
forms, registration or seizure records, technical opinion and other
lawfully available material relevant to the general offence, whereas
the AA may seek police assistance, protection, tracing,
preservation, digital or forensic support, or other ancillary
assistance necessary for an effective PC & PNDT investigation.
Page 12 of 16
13. Accordingly, as a sequel to the conclusions in the principal
judgment, the following are to be kept in mind by the AA & Police
Authorities while exercising their respective jurisdictions under PC
& PNDT Act or Penal Statutes like IPC/ BNS, where the offending
transactions may have both the components falling under the PC
& PNDT Act and IPC/ BNS or any other statute:
13.1. Where information received by a police station, on its
reasonable reading, discloses only a contravention of
the PC & PNDT Act or Rules, the police shall make
appropriate station/diary entry and transmit the
information and accompanying material without
avoidable delay to the notified AA. The police shall not
commence an independent investigation of the PC &
PNDT offence. The AA shall thereafter act under the
applicable provisions of the PC & PNDT Act.
13.2. Where the same information also discloses the
ingredients of an independently constituted cognizable
IPC/BNS offence or offence under another general
penal law, the police may register and investigate that
distinct offence in accordance with law without
touching upon the PC & PNDT component. The PC &
Page 13 of 16
PNDT component shall simultaneously be
communicated to the AA. The mere fact that the same
facts, persons, premises or records overlap shall not
authorise police to investigate the PC & PNDT offence
itself.
13.3. If, during a lawful investigation of an IPC/BNS offence,
material reasonably indicates a possible contravention
of the PC & PNDT Act, the investigating officer shall
promptly notify the AA and place the relevant
information/material before it. The AA shall decide
whether and how to invoke its statutory powers. The
police may continue their independent IPC/BNS
investigation only in respect of the component involving
IPC/BNS offences and may assist the AA only when
such assistance is sought by the AA.
13.4. If the AA, while acting under the PC & PNDT Act, comes
across material disclosing a distinct IPC/BNS offence,
it shall promptly communicate the information and
relevant material to the jurisdictional police without
venturing into that arena. Such communication shall
not interrupt or transfer the AA's PC & PNDT
Page 14 of 16
investigation. On being communicated, the police shall
independently determine the course required by the
general criminal law.
13.5. Any police assistance in the PC & PNDT investigation
shall ordinarily arise from a specific request from the
AA, and shall remain supplemental to the AA-led
investigation. The police shall not venture into the
domain of the AA unless specifically requested by the
AA. The nature and purpose of substantial police
assistance should be recorded by the AA in its file and,
where appropriate, by the police in the relevant diary
as the statutory mandate is not to involve the police in
the investigation, as far as possible. Thus, the AA
cannot abdicate its functions, which essentially fall
upon it, on the pretext of seeking assistance from the
police. The statute contemplates only a minimal role for
the police in investigations relating to the PC & PNDT
Act. It also goes without saying that such assistance
rendered by the Police to the AA shall never be
converted into independent police investigation into the
Page 15 of 16
PC & PNDT case or culminate into the police
chargesheet.
13.6. In an IPC/BNS investigation arising from the same
medical transaction, the police may seek from the AA
inspection findings, statutory forms, registration
records, seizure records, technical opinion or other
material lawfully available with it. Likewise, the AA may
seek lawful forensic, digital, logistical or protective
assistance from police without surrendering its
statutory decision-making responsibility.
13.7. Neither agency shall assume a power merely because
the other offence arises from the same transaction. The
controlling question is whether the ingredients of the
offence being investigated and the statutory source of
investigative power place that subject within the
agency's lawful field. Doubt as to a possible PC & PNDT
contravention should be resolved by prompt reference
to the AA rather than by police assumption of the
special investigation, as the AA has been given the
exclusive authority under the Act to investigate. The
AA, because of the specialised nature of its
Page 16 of 16
composition, will be in a better position to ascertain
whether such an offence is covered by the PC & PNDT
Act.
14. With the above supplementary observations, I respectfully
concur with the judgment authored by my learned Brother Sanjay
Karol, J.
...........................................................J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 20, 2026.
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