2026 INSC 132 Page 1 of 68

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7407 OF 2012

STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. ...APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

JAI HIND PVT. LTD. …RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

THE CHALLENGE

1. The present Civil Appeal has been preferred by the State of

West Bengal and Ors. (hereinafter referred to as “the

appellants”), being aggrieved by the impugned judgment

and order dated 17.05.2012, passed in WPLRT No. 43 of

2010 by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature

at Calcutta. The High Court, by the impugned judgment,

Page 2 of 68

allowed the writ petition preferred by Jai Hind Private

Limited, the respondent–company herein, and set aside the

judgment and order dated 31.03.2010 passed by the West

Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal (“the Tribunal”

for short), thereby allowing the respondent-company to

retain 211.21 acres of land.

2. By the said judgment, the High Court also upheld the

review order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the Block Land

and Land Reforms Officer (hereinafter referred to as “B.L. &

L.R.O.”), Bharatpur–II, Murshidabad, West Bengal, as well

as the Government Order dated 26.02.2008 issued by the

Principal Secretary, Land and Land Reforms Department,

Government of West Bengal. Consequently, the High Court

directed the concerned authorities, including the Revenue

Officer to accept land revenue and cess from the

respondent–company in respect of 211.21 acres of land

which it had been permitted to be retained pursuant to the

order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the B.L. & L.R.O.,

Bharatpur-II, Murshidabad under Sections 6(1)(j), 6(1)(a)

and 6(1)(e) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953

(“the WBEA Act, 1953”, for short) and Section 14Q(1) of the

Page 3 of 68

West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (“the WBLR Act,

1955” for short).

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The dispute has arisen from the respondent–company’s

claim to retain certain lands under the provisions of the

WBEA Act, 1953, which was allowed by the High Court in

the impugned judgment. The facts in brief essential for

adjudication of the present appeal are that the respondent–

company, incorporated in the year 1946 under the

provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 , had 23

shareholders as on 01.01.1952. It had purchased about

205.57 acres of agricultural land in its own name prior to

01.01.1952 and, subsequent to the aforementioned date,

purchased an additional 34.14 acres of land, including

agricultural land, homestead, ponds, etc.

4. The WBEA Act, 1953, enacted by the State of West Bengal,

which came into effect from 12.02.1954, allowed the State

to acquire the estates, the rights of intermediaries therein

and certain rights of raiyats and under-raiyats. An

intermediary is defined under Section 2(i) of the

Page 4 of 68

aforementioned Act as a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-

tenure-holder or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a

non-agricultural tenant and includes a service tenure-

holder and, in relation to mines and minerals, includes a

lessee and a sub-lessee. Under Section 4 of the said Act,

the State Government may, by notification, declare that all

estates and the rights of intermediaries in such estates

situated in any district or part of a district as specified in

the notification, shall vest in the State free from all

encumbrances. Further, Section 5 of the WBEA Act, 1953,

provides for the effect of such notification.

5. However, Section 6 (1) of the WBEA Act, 1953 preserves to

intermediaries a limited right to retain certain categories of

land, inter alia, (a) homestead land; (b) land comprised in

or appertaining to buildings and structures owned by

intermediary or by any person, not being a tenant, holding

under him by leave or license; (c) non-agricultural land in

khas possession up to certain area; (d) agricultural land in

khas possession, not exceeding 25 acres in area; (e) tank

fisheries, etc. Importantly, Section 6 (1)(j) of the WBEA Act,

1953 which assumes utmost relevance in the present case,

Page 5 of 68

permits a cooperative society registered or deemed to have

been registered under the Bengal Cooperative Society Act,

1940 or a company incorporated under the Indian

Companies Act, 1913 and engaged exclusively in farming to

retain agricultural land that was in its khas possession on

01.01.1952 and chosen for retention.

6. Rule 4A of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rules, 1954

(hereinafter referred to as “the WBEA Rules, 1954”) framed

under the WBEA Act, 1953, provides the procedure under

which an intermediary entitled to retain the land under

Section 6 (1) of the 1953 Act, can apply to the concerned

authority i.e., Settlement Officer or Revenue Officer

authorised by the Settlement Officer in this behalf before

the expiry of 30.04.1958, a statement in writing in Form ‘B’

appended to Schedule ‘B’ appended to these Rules.

7. In exercise of this right conferred under Section 6(1)(j) of

the 1953 Act, after the State Government issued the

notification under Section 4 of the WBEA Act, 1953, as

claimed by the respondent–company, it submitted the duly

filed Form ‘B’ on 14.08.1956 claiming entitlement to retain

the entire extent of land measuring about 239.71 acres

Page 6 of 68

under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953 on the ground

that the respondent–company was engaged exclusively in

farming, which according to the respondent-company was

permitted by the concerned Revenue Officer. However,

according to the appellants, the respondent-company failed

to produce any copy of the alleged order of retention said to

have been passed by the Revenue Officer, at any stage in

any of the proceedings before the High Court, or prior to it.

It may also be noted that the High Court also did not accept

the existence of any such order passed by the Revenue

Officer in 1956 in favour of the respondent-company.

8. Be that as it may, the genesis of the legal proceedings with

which we are directly concerned with is the issuance of the

notice dated 01.04.1968 by the Revenue Officer to the

respondent-company under Section 57 of the WBEA Act,

1953, requiring the respondent-company to file the return

in Form ‘B’, so as to determine the extent of the land which

the respondent-company was entitled to retain out of the

area vested in the State. The aforesaid notice was

challenged by the respondent-company before the High

Court by filing a writ petition, being CR No. 4256 (W) of

Page 7 of 68

1968. The said writ petition was disposed of by the High

Court on 15.02.1971, holding inter alia that the impugned

notice dated 01.04.1968 was merely a notice for

adjudication and for ascertaining as to what extent the

respondent-company would be entitled to retain lands in its

possession and that there can be no ground of

apprehension on the part of the respondent-company that

its right/claim for retention has been overruled by such a

notice.

9. After disposal of the aforementioned writ petition, the

concerned Revenue Officer, in continuation of the earlier

notice dated 01.04.1968, issued a second notice dated

04.08.1971 requiring the respondent-company to appear

for a hearing to determine its entitlement under Section

6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953. In the said proceedings, being

No. 1/1971, the Revenue Officer passed an order on

07.10.1971 holding inter alia that the respondent–company

failed to produce any evidence to prove that the company

was created exclusively for agricultural purpose or for

carrying on business connected directly with agricultural

Page 8 of 68

farming, and accordingly it is not entitled to get the benefit

under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953.

10. The aforementioned order of the Revenue Officer was

challenged by the respondent-company before the High

Court by filing a writ petition bearing C.R. No. 3266 (W) of

1971, in which a Civil Rule was issued, and an order

directing maintenance of status quo was passed on

02.11.1971. However, by a subsequent order dated

03.12.1971, the High Court declined to extend the status

quo order, holding that the order of the Revenue Officer was

prima facie legal. Thereafter, the respondent-company

challenged the High Court’s order dated 03.12.1971

declining to extend the status quo order by filing an appeal

bearing FMAT No. 3241 of 1971 (later re-numbered as FMA

686 of 1971). In the said appeal, a Division Bench of the

High Court passed an order dated 14.12.1971 directing the

maintenance of the status quo.

11. Subsequently, the Civil Rule issued in the main writ

petition, being C.R. No. 3266 (W) of 1971, wherein the

order of the Revenue Officer was challenged, was

Page 9 of 68

discharged by the High Court, on 23.09.1975, due to non-

appearance by the respondent-company.

12. Later, the respondent-company filed a separate application

seeking restoration of the main writ petition, C.R. No. 3266

(W) of 1971, which was dismissed for default on

23.09.1975. The said restoration application, however, was

rejected by the High Court on 11.03.1987 on the ground of

inordinate delay of nearly twelve years. Against the said

dismissal of the restoration application, the respondent-

company filed an appeal, FMAT No. 791 of 1987, which also

came to be dismissed for default by the High Court on

07.02.2002.

13. Consequently, the order of the Revenue Officer dated

07.10.1971, whereby the respondent-company was denied

the benefit under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953,

attained finality, and the respondent-company’s judicial

challenge to the said order stood concluded. Accordingly,

the respondent-company stood divested of the agricultural

land held by it, the same having vested in the State

Government under Sections 4 and 5 of the WBEA Act,

Page 10 of 68

1953. Therefore, the respondent-company ceased to have

any right, title, or interest over the said agricultural land.

14. After the dismissal of the writ petition, CR No. 3266(W) of

1971 on 23.09.1975, the Revenue Officer, Salar, District

Murshidabad, West Bengal issued another notice on

02.02.1996 to the respondent-company under Sections 57

and 14T(3) of the WBLR Act, 1955, on the ground that the

quantum of the land held by the respondent-company was

beyond the ceiling limit prescribed under the WBLR Act,

1955. It is to be noted that the aforesaid proceeding

initiated under the WBLR Act, 1955 were entirely separate

and distinct from the earlier proceeding under the WBEA

Act, 1953, which had culminated in 1975 upon dismissal

of the writ petition on 23.09.1975 filed by the respondent-

company. The aforementioned notice under the WBLR Act,

1955, was in respect of the land which was allowed to be

retained under the WBEA Act, 1953, but was found to be

in excess of the ceiling limit placed by the WBLR Act, 1955.

This notice, challenged by the respondent-company vide a

writ petition being C.O. No. 3569 (W) of 1996, was

transferred to the Tribunal and re-numbered as T.A. No.

Page 11 of 68

1410 of 2000. The Tribunal, by its order dated 09.04.2001,

dismissed the T.A. No. 1410 of 2000, reasoning that the

Revenue Officer has jurisdiction under Section 14T(3) of the

WBLR Act, 1955, to initiate proceedings and determine the

ceiling area.

15. Assailing the abovementioned dismissal order of the

Tribunal, the respondent-company preferred a writ

petition, WPLRT No. 763 of 2001, before the High Court.

The same was admitted and remained pending until 2008.

Subsequently, it was ultimately withdrawn by the

respondent-company in 2009, after it was permitted to

retain about 211.21 acres of land pursuant to a review

order dated 07.05.2008, and the said writ petition was

accordingly disposed of by the High Court as withdrawn.

16. What is of great importance is what had transpired during

the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, on the basis of

which the said writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn,

as the same would have a direct bearing on the decision in

this appeal.

17. During the pendency of the above-mentioned writ petition,

WPLRT No. 763 of 2001 before the High Court, it appears

Page 12 of 68

that the respondent-company submitted a proposal to

Chief Minister of the State of the West Bengal, seeking an

amicable settlement of the vested land in its favour, for

setting up an eco-friendly agro-based industry, and sought

review of the order dated 07.10.1971, passed by the

concerned Revenue Officer. Consequently, as claimed by

the respondent-company, the then Minister-in-Charge

made a note on the file as “Please discuss”. The erstwhile

Minister-in-Charge then recorded the following comments

on the file: “Discussed. This will be possible only when the

company first withdraws all the cases”. Accordingly, the

respondent-company submitted an affidavit on 22.02.2008

to withdraw all pending court cases, including the

aforementioned writ petition, WPLRT No. 763 of 2001 ,

pending before the High Court.

18. Acting on the aforesaid proposal of the respondent-

company which was apparently accepted by the State

government, the Land Reforms Commissioner -cum-

Principal Secretary on 26.02.2008, directed the concerned

Revenue Officer, Bharatpur -II, Murshidabad, West Bengal,

to take necessary steps for review of the proceeding No. 1 of

Page 13 of 68

1971 under Sections 6(1)(j), 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the WBEA

Act, 1953. The aforementioned government order dated

26.02.2008, being relevant, is reproduced in toto as follows:

“The Government of West Bengal

Land 85 Land Reform Department

Land Reforms Branch

Writers Buildings, Kolkata - 700001.

No. 984 – L.R. GE (M)

Dated 26.02.08

IL – 240/07 – LR…

Whereas ‘M/s. Jai Hind Private Limited a company

incorporated in the year 1946 under the Indian

Companies Act, 1913 purchased more or less

234.00 acres of land in Block Bharatpur-II in the

district of Murshidabad as revealed from the memo

no. 174/2709/C/2007 dtd. 30.8.07 of the DLRS

and Jt. LRC, West Bengal;

And whereas the said company purchased the

aforesaid 234 acres of land before and after the

date 01.01.1952 and that it had 23

members/shareholders as on 01.01.1952 and that

the said company has produced the Panchayat

certificate and panchayat Tax receipt (for the year

2006-07) in support of its claim of possession on

200 acres of land as on 19.02.2007, as revealed

from the memo no. 3362/X -6A/C/01 dated

22.6.2007 of the DL&LRO - Murshidabad.

And whereas a proceeding bearing no. 1 of 1971

u/s 6 (1) (J) of the WBEA Act, 1953 was drawn up

and disposed of with vesting of 205.44 acres of

land of the said company by the BL&LRO,

Bharatpur-II in the year 1971 vide order dtd:

07.10.1971;

And whereas the said land could not be distributed

till now due to series of court cases and

compensation was also not paid to the said

company. The said company is still in possession

of the said land and claims that proper opportunity

Page 14 of 68

of being heard was not given during the said

proceeding as revealed from the memo no.

174/2709/C/2007 dtd : 30.8.07 of the DLRS and

Jt. LRC, West Bengal;

And whereas the said company wants to establish

eco-friendly agro-based Industry on the said land

to produce 'Mentha Oil' and 'Mentha crystals' and

'Mentha Arvensis' plants. 'Metha oil' is also known

as 'Peppermint Oil' and this cash-rich cultivation is

being done for the first time in West Bengal. This is

really a good innovation in West Bengal which

cultivators may like to follow. There is a possibility

of employment generation for nearly 500 people in

the said project;

And whereas said company's project has already

been approved by The Small Industry Services

Institute' under the Ministry of Small Scale

Industries, Govt. of India vide report dtd. 6.6.2007.

The Deptt. of Food Processing Industries &

Horticulture', Govt. of West Bengal has also

requested for the clearance of the said company's

land within the provision of law vide their memo

no. 568/FPI & H/0-1/580 dtd. 19.9.2007. The

District Industries Centre-Murshidabad' has also

approved the aforesaid project vide their memo no.

356/1 (1) dtd. 15.6.2007. The Principal

Agricultural Officer-Murshidabad' has also

inspected the Trial cultivation of 'Menthal Arvensis'

plants on the said land by the said company and

found it to be very vigorous and satisfactory as

certified vide his memo no. 245/Dev dtd. 28.2.07;

And whereas the ‘Local Gram Panchayat' has

already issued 'no objection certificate in favour of

the said company vide their letter dated 25.4.2007

recommending that the experimental plant set up

so far to extract Mentha oil/peppermint oil is

successful in the area and is accepted by the local

people. It is 'eco friendly' also;

And whereas the said company has already

submitted before the undersigned an undertaking

to withdraw all the pending court case (s) by way

of Affidavit dated 22.2.2008. as applicable for the

withdrawal of all the pending court cases and this

Page 15 of 68

may be used by L.R. officials at the relevant forum

of the court;

And whereas the said company has submitted an

undertaking by way of Affidavit dtd. 22.2.2008 to

the effect that as on 1

st

January 1952 neither the

company nor any of its 23 members/shareholder

had owned any other landed property in West

Bengal except the aforesaid agricultural land and

that the company has all along been engaged

exclusively in agriculture farming on its aforesaid

land;

And whereas the State Govt. after due

consideration has taken the decision to Review

Afresh the said proceeding bearing no. 1 of 1971

u/s 6 (1)(J) of the WBEA Act 1953 as per the

applicable provisions of the WBEA Act 1953;

Now, therefore the BL&LRO, Bharatpur-II block in

the district of Murshidabad is hereby directed to

take necessary steps for fresh Review of the said

proceeding for more or less 205.57 acres of land

which were purchased by the said company before

1

st

January 1952 as well as more or less 0.29

acres of homestead and also more or less 8.52

acres of pond (s) etc. for consideration for

exemption u/s 6 (1) (J) read with Section 6 (1) (a)

and sec. 6 (1) (e) of the WBEA Act 1953. However,

an area of more or less 19.62 acres, which were

purchased by the said company after 1.1.1952

and which do not come under the purview of the

said section of the aforesaid Act will be vested to

the State. The company may be given the

opportunity to exercise the option to earmark this

more or less 19.62 acres of land on any side of the

total land and then this more or less 19.62 acres of

land may be distributed amongst the eligible

landless persons of the area as per norms.

Sd/

(Dr. P. K. Agarwal)

L.R.C. & Principal Secretary,

Land & Land Reforms Deptt.,

Govt. of West Bengal”

Page 16 of 68

19. In compliance with the above-mentioned order, the B.L. &

L.R.O. (Revenue Officer), by his final order dated

07.05.2008, allowed the review and set aside the earlier

order dated 07.10.1971 passed by the earlier Revenue

Officer, thereby allowing the respondent-company to retain

a total of about 211.21 acres of land and vesting nearly

28.50 acres in the State. In furtherance of the review order,

the respondent-company furnished a cheque to the

Revenue Officer towards payment of land revenue, which

was eventually returned by the Revenue Officer. Aggrieved

by the non-acceptance of the land revenue, the respondent-

company filed an application, being OA No. 1463 of 2009,

before the Tribunal seeking a direction to the concerned

authorities to accept the said land revenue and provide the

certified copies of the record of rights. The Tribunal, by its

judgment dated 31.03.2010, dismissed the respondent -

company’s application and quashed the review order dated

07.05.2008 by holding that the concerned Revenue Officer

was incompetent to undertake the review proceedings as no

such power of review was specifically given.

Page 17 of 68

20. Assailing the said judgment of the Tribunal, the

respondent-company filed a writ petition, being WPLRT No.

43 of 2010, before the High Court. The High Court vide

impugned judgment dated 17.05.2012 allowed the said writ

petition and directed the concerned Revenue Officer to

accept the land revenue and cess from the respondent -

company in respect of the lands in question, which were

allowed to be retained pursuant to the review order, dated

07.05.2008, passed by the Revenue Officer.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

21. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants can

be summarised, inter alia, as follows:

Firstly, it has been submitted that the Revenue Officer

had no jurisdiction to review the vesting order dated

07.10.1971. Relying on the judgment in Kalabharati

Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania & Ors.

1, it

was argued that the power of review must be statutorily

conferred, and in the absence of the same, the review

of an earlier order becomes ultra vires, illegal, and

without jurisdiction. Additionally, it was contended

that neither Section 57A nor any other provision of the

1

(2010) 9 SCC 437.

Page 18 of 68

WBEA Act, 1953, confers any power of review on the

Revenue Officer.

In addition, the appellants assailed the review

order by submitting that Sections 57A and 57B of the

WBEA Act, 1953, bar the Revenue Officer from

reopening/reviewing any decision which has already

been decided.

Thus, the appellants submitted that the

Government Order dated 26.02.2008 issued by the

Principal Secretary and the consequent fresh review

order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the B.L. & L.R.O.,

Bharatpur–II, Murshidabad, West Bengal were illegal.

Secondly, the vesting order dated 07.10.1971 passed

by the Revenue Officer earlier could not have been

reviewed as it had attained finality once the writ

petition filed by the respondent-company challenging

the same was dismissed on 23.09.1975, its restoration

rejected on 11.03.1987, and the appeal against the

same eventually dismissed on 07.02.2002.

Thirdly, since the review order passed by the Revenue

Officer on 07.05.2008 was bereft of any jurisdiction,

the plea of invalidity of the same can be raised at any

stage. In this regard, reliance was placed on decisions

in Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors.

2 and

Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu & Anr.

3.

2

(1954) 1 SCC 710.

3

1965 SCC OnLine SC 145.

Page 19 of 68

Furthermore, relying on Assistant Custodian E.P. &

Ors. v. Brij Kishore Agarwala & Ors.

4, and it was argued

that action taken by an officer without jurisdiction is

not binding upon the State.

Moreover, it was submitted by the appellants,

relying upon the judgment in the Maharishi Dayanand

University v. Surjeet Kaur

5, that the doctrine of estoppel

cannot override statutory provisions.

Fourthly, the review order dated 07.05.2008 was

passed on irrelevant considerations. As submitted by

the appellants, the respondent-company had been

granted adequate opportunities to establish its

entitlement under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act,

1953, which it failed to do.

It was further claimed that the documents relied

upon by the respondent-company, i.e., a resolution of

25.01.1951 and a certificate dated 12.10.1979, were

never produced during the earlier vesting proceedings.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

22. In response, the respondent-company has advanced the

following submissions:

Firstly, it was submitted that the respondent-company

had always engaged exclusively in ‘agricultural

farming’, as authorised by Clause 13 of its

4

1975 (1) SCC 21.

5

(2010) 11 SCC 159.

Page 20 of 68

Memorandum of Association (MOA). To support its

claim that it was engaged exclusively in ‘agricultural

farming’ as on 1

st January 1952, the respondent-

company relied upon various documents, i.e., a

certificate of the agricultural income tax officer, audited

balance sheets of the respondent-company, auditor’s

certificates for the years from 1951, income tax

scrutiny order for 2006-2007 and special resolution of

1951.

Secondly, the respondent-company had filed a return

in Form ‘B’, claiming entitlement to retain the entire

extent of land measuring 239.71 acres under Section

6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, on 14.08.1956, and that

it was permitted to retain such land by the concerned

Revenue Officer. The aforementioned status, as

claimed, remained in place for more than 15 years. To

substantiate the same, the respondent -company

placed its reliance upon the ‘finally published’ Record

of Rights, which is, as claimed, to be presumed to be

correct under Section 44(4) of the WBEA Act, 1953.

Thirdly, the vesting order dated 7.10.1971 was passed

by the Review Officer without considering the

aforementioned documents, such as the special

resolution of 1951 and Clause 13 of the MOA.

Fourthly, assailing the 1971 vesting order, the

respondent-company submitted that the notice

pursuant to the statutory requirement of Section 10(2)

Page 21 of 68

of the WBEA Act, 1953, was ‘not served’, and the

possession of the said lands was never taken over by

the appellants. Moreover, the compensation as

provided for under Section 23 of the WBEA Act, 1953,

was also not paid.

Fifthly, the 1971 vesting order was erroneous and a

nullity as it was itself a review order of the 1956

determination proceeding, recorded in the Record of

Rights for which the Revenue Officer was not even

authorised by the State government under Section 57

of the WBEA Act, 1953. Pertinently, the 1971 order as

submitted did not even set aside the 1956 proceeding.

Sixthly, the main writ petition challenging the 1971

vesting order was never decided on the merits.

Seventhly, the appellant-State duly recommended the

amicable settlement, which was approved by the

Minister-in-charge of the Land and Land Reforms

Department. Consequently, the B.L. & L.R.O. legally

passed his order in favour of the respondent-company.

Moreover, the final order dated 07.05.2008 and the

Government order dated 26.02.2008 were never

withdrawn at any point in time.

Eighthly, the appellants are hit by the doctrine of

estoppel and thus cannot retract the final order dated

07.05.2008 and the Government order dated

26.02.2008. Additionally, the respondent-company

withdrew the pending Court case and handed over

Page 22 of 68

28.50 acres of land, relying on the terms of the

amicable settlement. In support of the contentions,

reliance was placed on M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar

Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of UP

6.

Ninthly, the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by going

beyond the scope of prayers, as it quashed the review

order dated 07.05.2008, without any prayer or

application for the same. The respondent-company

placed its reliance on Akhil Bhartvarshiya Marwari

Agarwal Jatiya Kosh & Ors. v. Brijlal Tibrewal & Ors.

7

and Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan

Sindhi & Ors

8 in this regard.

Tenthly, the conferment of the power of review upon

the B.L. & L.R.O. under Sections 57A and 53 of the

WBEA Act, 1953, was in accordance with law.

Lastly, it was submitted that under Rule 19 of the

Rules of Business of the Government of West Bengal

framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution ,

decisions relating to a particular department are

required to be taken by the Minister -in-charge.

Moreover, any omission to make or authenticate an

executive decision strictly in the form contemplated

under Article 166 does not render such decision void or

illegal. In this regard, reliance was placed upon

6

(1979) 2 SCC 409.

7

(2019) 2 SCC 684.

8

(2010) 1 SCC 234.

Page 23 of 68

Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh

9,

and R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore

10.

ISSUES INVOLVED

23. As noted above, the genesis of the problem can be traced

to the act of the respondent-company in seeking to

resurrect the claim for retaining the agricultural land on

the ground that the company had been engaged exclusively

in agricultural farming by making an application before the

State Authorities sometime in between 2007-2008 after the

land had already been vested in the State pursuant to the

Revenue Officer’s order dated 07.10.1971 denying any

claim of the respondent-company to retain the agricultural

land as it failed to prove that it had been engaged

exclusively in agricultural activities. That apart, the

attempt of the respondent-company to judicially challenge

the said order of the Revenue Officer dated 07.10.1971 also

culminated in the closure of the same in 1975 after the

respondent-company’s writ petition was closed on

23.09.1975. Subsequently, its application for restoration of

9

AIR 2011 SC 3199.

10

AIR 1964 SC 1823.

Page 24 of 68

the writ petition was rejected on 11.03.1987, and its appeal

against the same was also dismissed on 07.02.2002.

24. However, the State Government directed the Revenue

Officer to review its earlier order dated 07.10.1971 by

passing the order on 26.02.2008, and the concerned

Revenue Officer passed the review order on 07.05.2008,

enabling the respondent-company to retain agricultural

land already vested in the State.

25. Having regard to the facts and circumstances as

mentioned above, we have to examine as to whether the

B.L. & L.R.O. (Revenue Officer) could have, by its order

dated 07.05.2008, reviewed the earlier order of the Revenue

Officer dated 07.10.1971.

26. The attending and consequential issue that arises for

consideration is whether the respondent-company had

fulfilled the conditions to be entitled to retain the lands in

question under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953 —

that is, whether it was “exclusively engaged in agricultural

farming” as on 1

st January 1952 to claim exemption from

vesting under the 1971 determination?

Page 25 of 68

THE FIRST ISSUE

27. Coming to the primary issue of whether the Revenue

Officer was competent to review its earlier order of 1971.

Notably, the respondent-company defends the power of the

Revenue Officer to review its earlier order by relying on

Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, and the order of the

State Government of 26.02.2008 directing the Revenue

Officer to review the earlier order. Section 57A of the Act

reads as follows:-

“57A. The State Government may by order invest

any authority referred to in section 53 with all or any

of the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil

Procedure. 1908.”

The Authorities referred to under Section 53 are as follows:

“53. (1) There shall be the following authorities for

the purposes of this Act, namely:-

(a) The Board or Revenue;

(b) Director of Land Records and Surveys;

(c) Settlement Officers;

(d) Assistant Settlement Officers;

(e) Compensation Officers;

(f) Revenue Officers;

(ff) Officers appointed by the State Government for

the purposes of sub-clause (iv) of clause (a) of sub-

section (I) of section 16;

(g) Mining Experts for the purposes of sections 32,

33 or 34.

(2) The State Government may appoint any person

as a Compensation Officer or a Revenue Officer or

may vest any officer with the powers of a

Page 26 of 68

Compensation Officer or a Revenue Officer under

this Act.”

28. It appears that in exercise of the powers conferred under

Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, the State Government

issued a notification bearing no. 340L, dated 09.01.1958,

by which all the Settlement Officers, Assistant Settlement

Officers and Revenue Officers were invested with all the

powers of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908. The said notification reads as follows:

“Land Reforms

ORDER

No.340L.Ref.-9

th

January 1958.- In exercise of the

power conferred by section 57A of the West Bengal

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal Act I of

1954), the Governor is pleased to invest each of the

authorities mentioned in the schedule below, being

authorities referred to in section 53 of the said Act, with

all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908):-

The schedule

1. All Settlement Officers.

2. All Assistant Settlement Officers.

3. All Revenue Officers.

By order of the Governor,

S. BANERJEE, Secy.”

29. Thus, according to the respondent-company, the Revenue

Officer, having been invested with all the powers of the Civil

Court, was competent and had jurisdiction to review the

earlier order dated 07.10.1971, as also directed by the State

Page 27 of 68

Government vide their order dated 26.02.2008. This is the

foundational claim of the respondent-company as regards

the competency of the Revenue Officer to review its earlier

order.

30. To examine this contention, which ex-facie appears to be

in order, we must minutely examine the scope of Section

57A of the WBEA Act, 1953 and also the power of review,

more particularly of quasi-judicial authorities, keeping in

mind that the Authorities mentioned under Section 53 of

the WBEA Act, 1953, are not judicial but administrative

authorities exercising certain quasi-judicial powers under

the WBEA Act, 1953, for the effective implementation of the

aforesaid Act.

31. It is well-settled that the power of review is not an inherent

power of the Court. It is also equally well settled that quasi-

judicial authorities can exercise only those powers which

are expressly conferred upon them by the statute. Hence,

the power of review, which is not inherent, must be

conferred upon the quasi-judicial authority by means of a

specific provision in the statute. Highlighting this principle,

Page 28 of 68

a three-judge Bench of this Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi

v. Pradyuman Singhji

11 had observed as follows:

“4. …It is well settled that the power to review is not an

inherent power. It must be conferred by law either

specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in

the Act was brought to our notice from which it would be

gathered that the Government had power to review its

own order. If the Government had no power to review its

own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have

reviewed its order….”

32. In the same vein, it was held by the Supreme Court in

Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania

12

that,

“12. It is settled legal proposition that, unless the

statute/rules so permit, the review application is

not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial

orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act

granting an express power of review, it is manifest

that a review could not be made and the order in

review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without

jurisdiction…”

33. This Court has time and again, through various

judgments, including in Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v.

Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar

13, Major Chandra Bhan

Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan

14, Patel Narshi Thakershi v.

Pradyuman Singhji Arunsinghji

15, State of Orissa and Others

11

(1971) 3 SCC 844.

12

(2010) 9 SCC 437.

13

AIR 1965 SC 1457.

14

(1979) 1 SCC 321.

15

(1971) 3 SCC 844.

Page 29 of 68

v. Commissioner of Land Records & Settlement, Cuttack &

Others

16, Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh

17, and Kuntesh

Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya

18, has

underscored that an order of review cannot be passed by a

quasi-judicial authority without a statutory jurisdiction

bestowed upon it.

34. In the light of the above well-settled principle, in our

opinion, unless a specific provision has been made in the

WBEA Act of 1953, investing the power of review in the

Revenue Officer or such other authorities mentioned under

Section 53 of the Act, these authorities could not have

possessed the power or authority to review an earlier order.

The omnibus expression used in the State notification

dated 09.01.1958 investing all the Settlement Officers,

Assistant Settlement Officers and Revenue Officers with all

the powers of the Civil Court, in our opinion, does not

amount to conferment of power of review as well to these

authorities.

16

(1998) 7 SCC 162.

17

AIR 1966 SC 641.

18

(1987) 4 SCC 525.

Page 30 of 68

35. In our view, there has to be a specific conferment of the

power of review to these authorities as observed by this

Court in a catena of decisions as referred to above, which

is absent in the present case.

36. In addition, there are other sound jurisprudential reasons

for holding so.

37. Separation of power and independence of the judiciary

have been considered integral parts of the basic structure

of our Constitution as propounded in Kesavananda Bharati

v. State of Kerala

19, and reiterated in subsequent decisions

of Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India

20, I.R. Coelho v. State

of T.N.

21, etc.

38. The French Philosopher Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the

Laws (1748), while propounding the theory of separation of

powers, argues that political authority must be divided

among distinct legislative, executive, and judicial branches

to protect liberty and prevent tyranny. He proposed that

each branch should have its own distinctive functions and

ideally be manned by different personnel, ensuring that no

19

(1973) 4 SCC 225.

20

(1980) 3 SCC 625.

21

(2007) 2 SCC 1.

Page 31 of 68

single person or body holds all three powers, thereby

creating a system of checks and balances to safeguard

against despotic rule, a concept crucial to modern

democratic Constitutions like ours. His theory finds

acceptance in the aforesaid doctrine of basic structure

propounded by this Court. Montesquieu said the following

in The Spirit of Laws:

“When the legislative and executive powers are united

in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates,

there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may

arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact

tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyran nical

manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary

power be not separated from the legislative and

executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life

and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary

control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were

it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave

with violence and oppression. There would be an end

of everything, were the same man or the same body,

whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those

three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing

the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of

individuals.”

39. Closely and intrinsically linked to the aforesaid idea is the

concept of the independence of the judiciary. Separation of

powers provides the guarantee for the independence of the

judiciary and also acts as a safeguard against arbitrariness,

upholding democratic values and the rule of law.

Page 32 of 68

40. The importance and applicability of these principles have

been reiterated from time to time by this Court, especially

in the context of the creation of Tribunals seeking to

supplement/substitute Courts. While tribunalisation in

India has been judicially recognised, this Court has

emphasised the need to ensure independence of the

judiciary and separation of powers in the functioning of

Tribunals and, wherever this Court has found that any

such tribunalisation has violated these core principles, this

Court has not hesitated to strike down such offensive

provisions or pass appropriate remedial directions.

41. In one of the earliest decisions of this Court on the

Tribunals jurisprudence in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of

India

22, the Constitution Bench of this Court, while

upholding the constitutional validity of the Administrative

Tribunals Act, 1985, which provided for the establishment

of administrative tribunals to adjudicate service disputes of

public servants, held that “the Tribunal should be a real

substitute of the High Court-not only in form and de jure

22

(1987) 1 SCC 124.

Page 33 of 68

but in content and de facto”. More importantly, the Bench

also decided that the Chairman of the Tribunal “office

should for all practical purposes be equated with the office

of Chief Justice of a High Court”, and that a retiring or

retired Chief Justice of a High Court or when such a person

is not available, a Senior Judge of proved ability either in

office or retired should be appointed. The Bench observed

that the position of Chairperson should not be held by an

individual who has merely served as a Secretary to the

Government of India. What weighed with the Court was the

necessity that the holder of the office must be an individual

whose decision-making is informed by the institutional

discipline of the judiciary, a quality that emerges from

adequate judicial training and judicial temperament and

experience rather than mere administrative exposure.

42. In R.K. Jain v. Union of India

23, a three-judge Bench of this

Court observed that the Tribunals set up under Articles

323-A and 323-B of the Constitution or under an Act of the

legislature are creations of the legislature and in no case

23

(1993) 4 SCC 119.

Page 34 of 68

can claim the same status as High Courts or their judges

or parity or as substitutes of the same. It was, however,

emphasised that as the personnel appointed to hold those

offices under the State are called upon to discharge judicial

or quasi-judicial powers, they must have a judicial

approach and also knowledge and expertise in that

particular branch of constitutional, administrative and tax

laws. The Court accordingly underscored that it is

necessary that those who adjudicate upon these matters

should have legal expertise, judicial experience and a

modicum of legal training.

43. Subsequently, the seven-judge Bench of the Supreme

Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and

Others

24, held that the High Courts’ power of judicial

superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals within their

jurisdiction forms part of the basic structure of the

Constitution. The Court held that although Tribunals

cannot exercise judicial review of legislative action to the

exclusion of the High Courts or the Supreme Court, they

24

(1997) 3 SCC 261.

Page 35 of 68

may perform a supplementary, though not a substitutive,

role in this regard. Further, the Court held Article

323A(2)(d) and Article 323B(3)(d) to be unconstitutional

insofar as they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts.

44. In Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn.

25, this Court

highlighted the importance of the independence of the

judiciary and observed as follows:

“64. Only if continued judicial independence is assured,

tribunals can discharge judicial functions. In order to

make such independence a reality, it is fundamental

that the members of the tribunal shall be independent

persons, not civil servants. They should resemble the

courts and not bureaucratic Boards. Even the

dependence of tribunals on the sponsoring or parent

department for infrastructural facilities or personnel

may undermine the independence of the tribunal (vide

Wade & Forsyth: Administrative Law, 10th Edn., pp.

774 and 777).”

45. Further, the Supreme Court, in the above case ,

emphasising the concept of separation of powers, also held

that:

“107. …if a Tribunal is packed with members who are

drawn from the civil services and who continue to be

employees of different Ministries or Government

Departments by 30 maintaining lien over their

respective posts, it would amount to transferring judicial

functions to the executive which would go against the

doctrine of separation of power and independence of

judiciary.”

25

(2010) 11 SCC 1.

Page 36 of 68

46. Later, the judgment in Madras Bar Association v. Union of

India and Another

26, etc., further strengthened judicial

independence by underscoring judicial primacy in

discharging judicial functions. Thus, this Court has been

emphasising the competence, ability, and independence of

the judicial mind for those who man the Tribunals clothed

with judicial functions for upholding the independence of

the judiciary and the separation of powers.

47. If we allow such executive authorities exercising quasi-

judicial power which draw their limited powers from the

statutes which create them, to review their earlier orders on

merit, it will tantamount to converting Tribunals to regular

Courts which eventually will undermine the independence

of the judiciary, which will ultimately affect the justice

delivery system and be contrary to the principles evolved so

far as the functioning of Tribunals is concerned.

48. We, therefore, must eschew any such interpretation of the

statute which seeks to confer a blanket power of the Civil

26

(2015) 8 SCC 583.

Page 37 of 68

Court, including the power of review to such administrative

authority in the exercise of quasi-judicial power.

49. Seen from the above judicial perspective, this Court must

be circumspect and ought not countenance any blanket

investing of all powers of the Civil Court, which would

include the power of review on such non -judicial

administrative functionaries like the Revenue Officer in

terms of Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, as the

respondent-company would insist. In our view, Section 57A

of the WBEA Act, 1953, cannot be construed to include

vesting of power of review in the absence of a clear statutory

provision to such quasi-judicial authority manned by an

executive functionary like the Revenue Officer, bereft of any

judicial training or judicial qualification, as it would run

contrary to the aforesaid judicial position adopted

concerning Tribunals.

50. In spite of the aforesaid provision under Section 57A of the

WBEA Act, 1953, that the legislature did not intend to

confer the power of review to the authorities provided under

the said Act is evident from the proviso to sub-section (3) of

Section 57B of the 1953 Act which provides that in deciding

Page 38 of 68

a dispute under this sub-section, the Revenue Officer shall

not re-open any matter which has already been enquired

into, investigated, determined or decided by the State

Government or any authority under any of the provisions of

this Act. Section 57B reads as follows:

“57B (1) Where an order has been made under sub -

section (1) of section 39 directing the preparation or

revision of a record-of-rights, no Civil Court shall

entertain any suit or Application for the determination or

rent or determination of the status of any tenant. Or the

incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of rights

relates, and if any suit or application, in which any of

the aforesaid matters, is in issue, is pending before a

Civil Court on the date of such order, it shall be stayed,

and it shall, on the expiry of the period prescribed for an

appeal under subsection (3) of section 44 or when an

appeal has been filed under that sub-section , as the

case may be, on the disposal of such appeal, abate so

far as it relates to any of the aforesaid matters.

(2) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application

concerning any land or any estate, or any right in such

estate, if it relates to---

(a) alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally

published, revised, made, corrected or modified under

any of the provisions of Chapter V,

(b) a dispute involving determination of the question,

either expressly or by implication, whether a raiyat, or

an intermediary, is or is not entitled to retain under the

provisions of this Act such land or estate or right in such

estate, as the case may be, or

(c) any matter which under any of the provisions of this

Act is to be, or has already been, enquired into, decided,

dealt with or determined by the State Government or

any authority specified therein.

and any such suit or application which is pending before

a Civil Court immediately before the commencement of

the West Bengal estates Acquisition (Second

Amendment) Act, 1973, shall abate so far as it relates

to all or any of the matters referred to in clause (a),

clause (b) or clause (c).

Page 39 of 68

(3) any dispute referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2)

may be decided by a Revenue Officer not below the rank

of an Assistant Settlement Officer, specially empowered

by the State Government in this behalf, who shall

dispose of the same in such manner a s may be

prescribed:

Provided that in deciding a dispute under this sub-

section, the Revenue Officer shall not re-open any

matter which has already been enquired into,

investigated, determined or decided by the State

Government or any authority under any of the

provisions of this Act.

(4) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Revenue

Officer made under sub-section (3) may appeal to the

prescribed authority not below the rank of a Settlement

Officer, within such time, in such manner and subject to

payment of such fees as may be prescribed.

(5) A decision made by an Appellate Authority under

sub-section (4) shall be final.

Explanation ----In this section, -----

(i) suit includes an appeal, and

(ii) an authority includes an authority to hear an

appeal.”

51. Having regard to the above-mentioned proviso in Section

57B (3) of the 1953 Act, it can be said that the 1971 vesting

order passed by the Revenue Officer after full inquiry and

adjudication, constitutes such a determination which also

attained finality after it was unsuccessfully challenged

before the Court of law. The concerned Revenue Officer

thus stood barred from re-opening, revisiting, or re-

deciding its earlier vesting order in view of the aforesaid

proviso.

Page 40 of 68

52. What is thus evident is that the scheme of the WBEA Act,

1953 does not contemplate any executive authority

reopening a vesting determination or substituting a

decision already rendered after due inquiry. It is also clear

that the authorities enumerated under Section 53 of the

WBEA Act, 1953, such as Revenue Officers, Settlement

Officers and Compensation Officers, among others, are

vested only with such limited adjudicatory powers as the

statute expressly confers upon them. To permit these

authorities to undertake a wholesale re-adjudication of a

vesting order by exercising the power of review would be to

attribute to them a power far wider than what the

legislature had envisaged. Such an interpretation would

render the carefully structured legislative framework otiose,

contrary to the settled principle that statutory authorities

must operate strictly within the bounds of the powers

conferred upon them.

53. In this context, we have also considered certain decisions

of the Calcutta High Court regarding the lack of power of

review qua executive authorities, such as the Revenue

Authority. The Calcutta High Court in Satyanarayan

Page 41 of 68

Banerjee v. Charge Officer and A.S.O. Birbhum

27, while

dealing with the question as to whether the successor

Assistant Settlement Officer could have any jurisdiction to

initiate proceedings for review for reopening an earlier

order by the previous Assistant Settlement Officer under

the WBEA Act, 1953, answered the aforesaid question in

the negative. It was held that:

“5. … There can be no dispute on principle now that a

Tribunal like the Assistant Settlement Officer possesses

no inherent power of review. This position is now well

settled by the three decisions of the Supreme Court,

namely, Chunibhai v. Narayanrao, AIR 1965 SC 1457,

Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641 and

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balkrishan Nathani, AIR

1967 SC 394.”

“7. … A successor Assistant Settlement Officer has

certainly no authority or jurisdiction to take a different

view and reopen the said proceeding for review on the

ground that all the lands of the endowment had not

earlier been taken into consideration…”

54. Relying on the above-mentioned judgment in the case of

Satyanarayan Banerjee in a later case of Ramaprasanna

Roy v. State of West Bengal

28, the Calcutta High Court held

that the successor Revenue Officer has no power and/or

jurisdiction to reopen the finding of the earlier Revenue

Office under the WBEA Act, 1953. It was held that:

27

1974 SCC OnLine Cal 1.

28

1987 SCC OnLine Cal 228.

Page 42 of 68

“14. But firstly, since the writ petitioners have a

“strong prima facie case”. In their favour that the

“successor Revenue Officer” has no power and/or

jurisdiction “to reopen” the finding of the earlier Revenue

Officer, having “concurrent jurisdiction”, the impugned

order of reopening and/or review was wholly

unwarranted since the very beginning and should be set

aside by issue of an appropriate writ in the nature

of Certiorari.

15. Secondly, in my view, as there is no provision for

“review” of the order passed under s. 5A(3)(ii) of the

West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, pari

materia to the provisions of s. 14T(3a) of the West

Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, which has been

inserted by way of legislative amendment, by the West

Bengal Legislature in 1978, and as such , in the

absence of any such enabling provision a

“Successor Officer” in any event is incompetent to

exercise such power of review as, such power is not

“inherent” in the Officer.

16. In this respect. I may rely on a Single Bench decision

of this Court reported in the case of Satyanarayan

Banerjee v. Charge Officer and A.S.O. Birbhum,

Suri reported in AIR 1975 Cal. 43 : (1974 CHN (N) 127)

where Anil Kumar Sen, J. (as His Lordship then was)

held that a “successor Revenue Officer” having

“concurrent jurisdiction” cannot reopen the finding of the

earlier Revenue Officer, having concurrent jurisdiction.

17. I, respectfully, agree with that view and hold that

the entire move including the reopening and/or vesting

of the land by successor Revenue Officer who is sitting

over the judgment of the earlier Revenue Officer, in this

matter was unwarranted and is accordingly set aside.”

55. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view taken by the

Calcutta High Court.

56. At a more fundamental level, allowing a Revenue Officer to

review its own concluded quasi-judicial order would trench

upon the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,

which constitutes part of the basic structure of the

Page 43 of 68

Constitution. Though vested with limited adjudicatory

functions, authorities under the WBEA Act, 1953, remain

essentially members of the executive branch and are

neither part of the judicial organ nor equipped with the

institutional safeguards that attend judicial office, such as

independence from executive control.

57. The power of review is essentially a core judicial function,

and conferring such a power upon executive authorities,

absent an express legislative mandate, would blur the

constitutionally mandated demarcation between the

executive and the judiciary, permit the executive

authorities to sit in judgment over their own decisions, and

erode the rule of law by diluting finality. Any contrary

construction would, therefore, be inconsistent with

legislative intent and would impermissibly encroach upon

the basic structure of the Constitution.

58. Therefore, the fresh order of review dated 07.05.2008 by

the Revenue Officer by setting aside the 1971 vesting order

is in direct contravention of the statutory command

embodied in the WBEA Act, 1953, and hence wholly void

and illegal.

Page 44 of 68

THE SECOND ISSUE

59. Even though we have held that the Revenue Officer did not

have the power of review, we have nevertheless examined

the order of review passed on 07.05.2008 to ascertain if

such a review undertaken conformed to the principles

governing law of review or not.

60. As regards the scope of review, it is well settled that it is of

a limited and narrow one, unlike the case of appeal, where

the appellate Court could revisit the entire facts and could

re-hear the complete matter on merits. On the other hand,

the purpose of a review is to rectify manifest or exceptional

wrongs. It is not for reappreciating facts or seeking a

different conclusion. Thus, a review could not be an appeal

in disguise by reappreciating the evidence and grounds

which have already traversed or come to a conclusion.

61. Review is essentially to strike a balance between the rule

of finality, which is crucial for maintaining legal certainty

and to avoid irremediable injustice caused by patent

mistakes, fraud, failure of natural justice or similar

exceptional situations, as was held in M/s. Northern India

Page 45 of 68

Caterers Limited v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi

29. It is for

this reason that the Courts have emphasised from time to

time that review must be exercised with great caution and

only when the requisite limited criteria are satisfied, in

which the error must be evident and not one which requires

elaborate arguments to discover.

62. One can find the basic legal postulates of the scope of

review in Section 114 read with Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the

CPC, which are applied in all proceedings in which the

power of review is exercised. Thus, only on the following

grounds, a review would lie:

i. Discovery of new and important matter or

evidence; or

ii. Mistake or error apparent on the face of the

record; or

Any other sufficient reason.

63. Before we proceed to discuss the applicability of the above

principles in the present case, we may recapitulate the

background in which the review was sought and exercised

by the Revenue Officer. The respondent -company had

29

(1980) 2 SCC 167.

Page 46 of 68

sought the review of the earlier order of the Revenue Officer

dated 07.10.1971 which denied the benefit of retention of

agricultural land by the respondent-company as

contemplated under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953.

Section 6(1)(j) reads as follows:

“(j) where the intermediary is a co-operative society

registered or deemed to have been registered under the

Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940, or a company

incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913,

engaged exclusively in farming (and in business, if

any, connected directly with such farming), -

agricultural land in the khas possession of the society

or the company on the 1

st

day of January, 1952, and

chosen by the society or the company, not exceeding in

area the number of acres which persons, who were the

members of the society or the company on such date,

would have been entitled to retain in the aggregate

under clause (d), if every such person were an

intermediary;

Provided that where any such person retains any land

under clause (d), such person shall not be taken into

account in calculating the aggregate area of the land

which the society or the company may retain.”

64. To get the benefit contemplated under Section 6(1)(j) of the

WBEA Act, 1953 a company incorporated under the Indian

Companies Act, 1913 must establish, inter alia, the

following two essentials: (i) that it was engaged exclusively

in farming (and in business, if any, connected directly with

Page 47 of 68

such farming); and (ii) that it was so engaged as on 1

st

January 1952.

65. In the instant case, records reveal that the respondent-

company even after being given sufficient opportunities,

failed to discharge its onus of proving the first condition

before the vesting authority (Revenue Officer) in the earlier

proceedings in 1971 under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act,

1953. Hence, it was not granted the benefit of exemption

from vesting in the vesting order dated 07.10.1971.

Highlighting the same, the concerned Revenue Officer in

the said vesting order rightly observed:

“The representative of the company has not produced

any evidence whatsoever to show that the company

after its creation adopted any resolution for carrying on

business exclusively connected with agricultural

farming.

The papers produced merely show that the company

has some agricultural lands and it is paying agricultural

income tax and others on account of the incomes that it

might have derived from such lands. These papers do

not prove that the company is not engaged with any

other business or trade in terms of memorandum and

articles of association.”

66. A careful examination of the 1971 vesting order reveals

that, although the respondent-company sought to rely on

its MOA — particularly clauses 7, 8 and 13 — to

demonstrate that it was engaged in agricultural activities,

Page 48 of 68

the Revenue Officer rightly declined to treat these clauses

as conclusive proof of “exclusive” engagement in farming.

Accordingly, as per the vesting order dated 07.10.1971, the

respondent-company’s about 205.44 acres of land were

then vested in the appellant-State, and an area of about 25

acres of agricultural land, nearly 0.25 acres of non-

agricultural land, and 0.24 acres of homestead were

allowed to be retained by the respondent-company.

67. In our view, the 1971 vesting order does not suffer from

any legal flaw, and it correctly concluded that the

respondent-company failed to prove the statutory pre-

condition of Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, despite

being given sufficient time. Most importantly, the records

reflect that the Revenue Officer afforded the respondent-

company ample opportunities to substantiate its claim. A

notice dated 05.07.1971 was duly served, calling upon the

respondent-company to produce evidence in support of its

assertion of exclusive engagement in agricultural farming

on the date of the hearing on 20.07.1971. At the

respondent-company’s request, the hearing was adjourned

first to 17.08.1971 and then to 30.08.1971.

Page 49 of 68

68. On 30.08.1971, when the final hearing was going on, in

spite of the opportunity given again, the respondent-

company failed to produce the requisite documents,

particularly its balance sheet, that it had itself adverted to

as material. Significantly, at the conclusion of the hearing,

the respondent-company expressly stated before the

Revenue Officer that it had nothing further to submit. Even

on the date when the vesting order was pronounced, the

promised balance sheet remained unproduce d in spite of

further opportunity granted to do so by the Revenue Officer.

In these circumstances, the finding by the Revenue Officer

that in spite of several opportunities granted, the

respondent-company could not prove the essential

statutory requirement was inevitable and unimpeachable,

and the vesting of the land in the State had to follow as a

natural consequence.

69. Even before this Court, nothing has been brought to our

notice by the respondent-company of the existence of

sufficient material evidence to establish the fact that it was

exclusively engaged in farming as on 01.01.1952. In its

Page 50 of 68

submissions before this Court, the reliance was again

placed on Clause 13 of its MOA. It reads as under:

“(13) To sell, improve, manage, develop or otherwise

exchange, lease, mortgage, disposed of turn to account

or deal in all or any part of the property and rights of the

company and to do agriculture farming and agri

business.”

70. The aforementioned Clause does not establish that the

respondent-company was established exclusively for

farming. It mentions agricultural and agri-business as one

of its activities. Its MOA reveals that the respondent-

company was incorporated with a host of business

objectives unrelated to agriculture, such as manufacturing

or selling of all kinds of machines, purchasing, selling,

taking on lease any movable/immovable property, patent

licences, among many others. The mere presence of

agricultural objectives in a company’s MOA does not

establish that such activities were, in fact, its sole or

predominant operation, nor does it rule out the pursuit of

other commercial objectives expressly permitted by the very

same document.

71. Moreover, after perusing the documents relied upon by the

respondent-company, viz., (i) Certificate of ‘Agricultural

Page 51 of 68

Income Tax Officer’ dated 12.10.1979, (ii) Audited Balance

Sheets dated 25.07.1952, (iii) Auditors’ Certificates dated

25.07.1952, 30.12.1971, 09.08.2007, 27.09.2007, and

11.04.2008. (iv) Income-Tax Scrutiny Order for the

assessment year 2007 -2008, (v) Special-Resolution’

submitted to ROC’ dated 25.01.1951, we are of the view,

without expressing any opinion on their veracity, that these

materials majorly do not support the claim of the

respondent-company that it was exclusively engaged in

agricultural farming as on 01.01.1952, as either these came

into existence long after the vesting order dated 07.10.1971

culminated or were not produced timely by the respondent-

company before the Revenue Officer at the time of the 1971

vesting proceedings, despite multiple opportunities being

granted. Consequently, these documents cannot furnish a

basis for the review of the 1971 vesting determination,

especially in the absence of any statutory provision allowing

the same. A belated reliance on such material, after a lapse

of nearly four decades, cannot constitute a legally

sustainable ground for reopening a concluded vesting

determination by a Revenue Officer.

Page 52 of 68

72. In addition to the above, the submission reiterated by the

respondent-company that it filed a return in Form ‘B’ on

14.08.1956 claiming entitlement to retain the concerned

land and that it was permitted to retain such land by the

Revenue Officer cannot be accepted, as neither any record

of acknowledgment of filing of Form ‘B’ nor any order

passed by the said Revenue Officer granting the retention

of the aforesaid land was ever produced by the respondent-

company. In any event, such a plea was rejected by the

High Court in the impugned judgment, as no copy of such

an order passed by the Revenue Officer was produced

before the High Court.

73. In view of the above discussion, it can be concluded that

the respondent-company is not entitled to retain the lands

in question under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, as

it could not prove its claim that it was “exclusively engaged

in agricultural farming” as on 01.01.1952. Therefore, the

1971 vesting order does not suffer from any legal infirmity.

74. Having held that the vesting order dated 07.10.1971 is

legally valid, we will now proceed to examine if any case of

review is made out or not by applying the facts of the case

Page 53 of 68

on the anvil of the legal principles governing the law of

review.

First, on the discovery of new and important matter or

evidence.

75. A review can be sought under this ground by an aggrieved

litigant on the discovery of a certain new and important

matter or evidence, which, after exercise of due diligence,

was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by

him at the time when the decree was passed. A review of a

judgment is a drastic step, and a reluctant resort to it is

proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or

a grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A

mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and

overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually

covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential

import, are obviously insufficient, as was rightly held in

Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib

30. The provision is not

meant to give a second chance to the aggrieved party who

has lost their case due to their own negligence.

30

(1975) 1 SCC 674.

Page 54 of 68

76. Now, if we apply this principle to the facts of the present

case, it cannot be believed that crucial documents such as

the 1951 Resolution and Audited Balance Sheets dated

25.07.1952, relied upon by the respondent-company in the

2008 review, were not within its possession and knowledge

earlier. The respondent-company failed to produce such

documents despite being afforded several opportunities

during the 1971 vesting process. A party cannot justify a

review by producing old documents lying in its own

custody, as this does not constitute “discovery” nor satisfy

the “due diligence” requirement.

Second, on a mistake or error apparent on the face of the

record.

77. This condition is also equally inapplicable in the present

case. It must be noted that the error under this ground

must be self-evident and should not require an exhaustive

examination or argument to establish it, as was held by a

three-judge Bench of this Court in the case of

Page 55 of 68

Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.

31 The material

portion of the judgment reads as under:

“7….A review is by no means an appeal in disguise

whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and

corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not

consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for

dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great

detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where

without any elaborate argument one could point to the

error and say here is a substantial point of law which

stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no

two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error

apparent on the face of the record would be made

out….”

78. In light of the facts and circumstances as noted above, it

can be conclusively said that the 1971 vesting order was

passed after issuing proper notice, granting multiple

adjournments on the request of the respondent-company,

conducting a full hearing, and recording the respondent-

company’s categorical statement that it had “nothing

further to produce.” The findings were based on the

respondent-company’s failure to prove exclusive

engagement in farming, which is the statutory requirement

under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953. No patent

error, self-contradiction, or legal misconception is visible on

31

1963 SCC OnLine SC 94.

Page 56 of 68

the face of the record. Accordingly, the second condition is

also not met.

Third, on any other sufficient reason.

79. Insofar as this ground is concerned, recently, this Court in

the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd.

32,

held as follows:

“45. With regard to (iii) (supra), we can do no better

than refer to the traditional view in Chhajju Ram, a

decision of a Bench of seven Law Lords of the Judicial

Committee of the Privy Council. It was held there that

the words “any other sufficient reason” mea ns “a

reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to

those specified immediately previously”, meaning

thereby (i) and (ii) (supra). Notably, Chhajju Ram has

been consistently followed by this Court in number of

decision starting with Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos

V. Mar Poulose Athanasius.

……….

106. Moving on further, we find that the attempt of

the review petitioners has been to draw inspiration

from the ground “any other sufficient reason”

appearing in Rule 1. There have been decisions of this

Court which have construed the words

“any other sufficient reason” expansively, like Netaji

Cricket Club and Jagmohan Singh, whereas there are

decisions, including Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos,

Shatrunji, Kamlesh Verma and S. Madhusudhan

Reddy, that have followed Chhajju Ram explaining

that the ground “any other sufficient reason” means “a

reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to

those specified immediately previously.

107. However, with utmost respect, we do not find

any of those decisions, which have taken an expansive

view, looking at such ground in the manner we propose

to look, for recording our concurrence with the view in

Chhajju Ram that has unhesitatingly been followed

over the years. If indeed “any other sufficient reason”

32

(2024) 7 SCC 315.

Page 57 of 68

were to take within its embrace any situation not

analogous to “discovery of new matter or evidence”

and “on account of some mistake or error apparent on

the face of the record”, we wonder why the legislature

chose to keep “any other sufficient reason”

immediately after the aforesaid two grounds. If “any

other sufficient reason” were to be read independent

of the said two grounds, we believe the long line in

Rule 1 after clauses (a) to (c) need not have been

drafted in the manner it presently reads. In lieu of

referring to the said two grounds as grounds on which

a review could be sought, the legislature could well

have kept it open-ended as in Section 5 of the

Limitation Act, 1963 where it is provided, without any

strings attached, that any appeal or any application

may be admitted after the prescribed period of

limitation if the appellant or applicant satisfies the

court that he had “sufficient cause” for not preferring

the appeal or the application earlier. If the intention of

the legislature were to give an expanded meaning,

Order 47 Rule 1 would have read somewhat like this:

any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree

or order or decision of the nature indicated in clauses

(a), (b) and (c) for any sufficient reason desires to

obtain a review of the decree or order made against

him, may apply for a review. But that is not what the

provision says and means. Reading Order 47 Rule 1 in

juxtaposition to section 5 of the Limitation Act drives

us to accept the view in Chhajju Ram as having

interpreted the law correctly and acceptance of the

same by this Court and High Courts over the years,

coupled with the fact that Parliament did not consider

it necessary to amend Rule 1 when it inserted the

Explanation in 1976. Giving a wider meaning to the

ground “any other sufficient reason” in Netaji Cricket

Club and Jagmohan Singh, therefore, must have been

intended and necessitated by this Court because the

justice of the cases so demanded but the same would

have no application in a case of this nature.”

80. Further, the Courts have time and again decided what can

fall under the term “any other sufficient reason”. For

instance, inter alia, where the Court omits to notice or

Page 58 of 68

consider relevant statutory provisions was held to be a

sufficient reason in Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta

33.

Additionally, an order arising out of a lack of jurisdiction

was held to be a sufficient reason in Budhia Swain v.

Gopinath Deb

34. However, in the case at hand, there exists

no such “sufficient reason” within the meaning of Rule 1 of

Order XLVII of the CPC.

81. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the

respondent-company failed to satisfy any of the

conditions for review as also contemplated under Order

XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. Consequently, even assuming

for argument’s sake that the Revenue Officer possessed

the jurisdiction to entertain a review, which he

demonstrably did not have, as already held above, the

review order of 2008 was devoid of any legal foundation.

The review was thus fundamentally misconceived,

contrary to settled principles governing the exercise of

review power

33

(1971) 3 SCC 189.

34

(1999) 4 SCC 396.

Page 59 of 68

82. As discussed above, the power of review is to be exercised

on the limited grounds recognised under law, as

postulated under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC. In the

present case, however, it is evident that the trigger for

reopening the earlier vesting order of 1971 was not the

existence of any legally permissible ground for review, but

was primarily based on the claimed “amicable settlement”

between the respondent -company and the State

government. It is the respondent-company’s own case

that during the pendency of WPLRT No. 763 of 2001

before the High Court, it submitted a representation to

the Chief Minister of the State seeking reconsideration of

the 1971 vesting determination for the purpose of

establishing an eco -friendly agro-based industry,

purportedly involving employment generation and

economic benefits. Acting upon this proposal, the State

Government proceeded to direct a review of the vesting

order dated 07.10.1971. The record thus clearly

demonstrates that the decision to initiate the review was

driven by considerations of perceived economic

advantage, such as prospective employment generation,

Page 60 of 68

rather than by any of the grounds recognised in law for

invoking the power of review. Such considerations,

however laudable in the executive or policy domain, are

wholly extraneous to the limited and strictly

circumscribed jurisdiction of review. A conclud ed

determination cannot be reopened on the basis of

subsequent policy preferences or economic expediency, in

the absence of a legally sustainable ground contemplated

under the law governing review.

83. As discussed above, it is also important to note that the

direction issued by the State Government vide

Government Order dated 26.02.2008 to review the earlier

vesting determination was made after an inordinate and

unexplained lapse of about four decades from the passing

of the vesting order dated 07.10.1971, which had attained

finality. While it is true that Constitutional Courts are not

strictly bound by limitation in exercising their

jurisdiction, the position is markedly different in respect

of the review jurisdiction of Civil Courts governed by the

CPC. Under Article 124 of the Schedule of the Limitation

Act, 1963, an application for review is required to be filed

Page 61 of 68

within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree

or order sought to be reviewed, subject only to extension

upon sufficient cause being shown. In the present case,

no sufficient explanation whatsoever has been offered for

the extraordinary delay of nearly forty years, except for

the observations contained in the Government Order

dated 26.02.2008, referring, inter alia, to non-distribution

of land due to a series of Court cases, non-payment of

compensation, and the respondent-company’s continued

possession of the land apart from the potential to generate

employment from the proposed project . None of these

reasons, in our view, constitutes a legally sustainable

ground to justify reopening a concluded determination

after such an inordinate lapse of time. Non-distribution of

land or continued physical possession by the respondent-

company cannot confer upon it any right, title, or interest

once vesting has taken place by operation of law.

Similarly, non-payment of compensation, even if

assumed, does not invalidate vesting but merely gives rise

to a statutory entitlement to compensation. Significantly,

the record does not substantiate the assertion of any

Page 62 of 68

pending litigation that prevented distribution of the land,

particularly when the writ petition challenging the vesting

order was dismissed on 23.09.1975, and subsequent

attempts to revive the proceedings failed on 11.03.1987

and 07.02.2002. There was thus no subsisting judicial

impediment as far as the respondent -company was

concerned. The proposed project of the respondent–

company, which had the potential to generate

employment, cannot be the reason for the review of the

earlier vesting order. In these circumstances, the exercise

of review jurisdiction in 2008 to reopen a vesting

determination that had attained finality decades earlier

was wholly impermissible in law.

84. Before we conclude, we may address other issues raised

by the respondent-company. It was submitted that the

Government order dated 26.02.2008 was never recalled by

the Government, and this order was the consequence of

the amicable settlement arrived at between the

respondent-company and the State Government. Hence, it

was contended that the order dated 31.03.2010 passed by

the Tribunal was illegal.

Page 63 of 68

85. As regards the Government order dated 26.02.2008

indicating the amicable settlement, it is to be noted that

there was no subsisting dispute per se between the

Government and the respondent-company concerning the

issue relating to retention of land under Section 6(1)(j) of

the WBEA Act, 1953 inasmuch as the said issue was

already settled by the earlier vesting order dated

07.10.1971 and the said order had attained finality upon

dismissal on default of the petition filed by the respondent-

company challenging the said order.

86. Thus, when the so-called amicable settlement was said to

have been arrived at, there was no subsisting dispute

between the parties at the relevant time. The claimed

amicable settlement was arrived at in a proceeding arising

out of the issue of the ceiling of land under a different

statute, i.e., WBLR Act 1955. Thus, the very foundation of

the passing of the Government order dated 26.02.2008 was

non-existent. It thus becomes irrelevant as to whether

such an order was recalled by the Government or not.

87. Additionally, it was also submitted by the respondent-

company that the plea of the appellant-State is hit by the

Page 64 of 68

doctrine of promissory estoppel, as the respondent -

company withdrew all the pending Court cases relying on

its amicable settlement with the State. Nevertheless, in our

view, once the 2008 review by the Revenue Officer is found

to be without jurisdiction and contrary to law, the question

of invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not

arise.

88. Moreover, the contention advanced by the respondent-

company that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by

going beyond the scope of prayers, as it quashed the review

order dated 07.05.2008, without any prayer or application

for the same, is without merit, because it is a well-

established law that a decree passed by a Court without

jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set

up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or

relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in

collateral proceedings. The Court in the case of Kiran Singh

v. Chaman Paswan

35 held as follows:

“6. …It is a fundamental principle well established that

a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a

nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever

and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon,

35

(1954) 1 SCC 710.

Page 65 of 68

even at the stage of execution and even in collateral

proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is

pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the

subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority

of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot

be cured even by consent of parties…”

89. In the instant case, as the Revenue Officer did not have

the jurisdiction to review the earlier vesting

determination, the 2008 review order strikes at the very

root of the matter and is a non -curable defect.

Importantly, “competence of a Court to try a case goes to

the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it

is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction”, as was held in

Hira Lal Patni v. Kali Nath

36. A decree or order passed by

a Court which lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing such

an order or decree is non-est and void ab initio, as was

held by this Court in the case of Balvant N. Viswamitra v.

Yadav Sadashiv Mule

37. In the said case, a three-judge

Bench of this Court held that:

“9…The main question which arises for our

consideration is whether the decree passed by the trial

court can be said to be “null” and “void”. In our opinion,

the law on the point is well settled. The distinction

between a decree which is void and a decree which is

wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in accordance with

law cannot be overlooked or ignored. Where a court

lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or

36

1961 SCC OnLine SC 42.

37

(2004) 8 SCC 706.

Page 66 of 68

making an order, a decree or order passed by such

court would be without jurisdiction, non est and void

ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to the

root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of

the court to pass a decree or make an order. Such

defect has always been treated as basic and

fundamental and a decree or order passed by a court

or an authority having no jurisdiction is a nullity.

Validity of such decree or order can be challenged at

any stage, even in execution or collateral proceedings.”

90. Another submission was made by the respondent -

company that the appellant-State had not taken physical

possession of the land, and no compensation was paid to

the respondent-company. This, in our view, does not alter

the nature of the status of land inasmuch as that vesting

order dated 07.10.1971 had attained finality, and mere

holding of some parts of the land would not endow any

right to the respondent-company to claim ownership or

title over the same.

CONCLUSION

91. For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the review

undertaken by the Revenue Officer culminating in the

fresh order dated 07.05.2008 was wholly without

jurisdiction and void ab initio. The WBEA Act, 1953, does

not confer any power of substantive review upon the

Revenue Officer, either expressly or by necessary

Page 67 of 68

implication. The Government Order dated 26.02.2008,

even though approved at the ministerial level, could not

create or confer such jurisdiction on the Revenue Officer.

The review further fails on merits, as none of the conditions

prescribed under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC were

satisfied.

92. The Tribunal, in setting aside the fresh review order dated

07.05.2008 and restoring the vesting determination of

1971, rightly appreciated the statutory scheme of the

WBEA Act, 1953, and well-settled principles governing the

limits of quasi-judicial power. The conclusion of the

Tribunal that the Revenue Officer lacked jurisdiction to

reopen by way of review of a concluded vesting order is

consistent with both legislative intent and binding

precedents.

93. The High Court, however, fell into error in reversing the

Tribunal’s decision. It incorrectly proceeded on the premise

that the Government Order issued under Section 57A of

the WBEA Act, 1953, having been approved by the

Minister-in-Charge, constituted sufficient authority to

confer review jurisdiction upon the Revenue Officer. This

Page 68 of 68

approach conflated executive direction with statutory

conferment of substantive power and treated review as a

mere procedural incident of Civil Court powers. The High

Court also overlooked the limits on vesting the judicial

function of review power in executive authorities.

94. Consequently, for the reasons discussed above, the appeal

filed by the appellant-State is allowed.

The impugned judgment of the High Court dated

17.05.2012, passed in WPLRT No. 43 of 2010, is set aside.

The order of the Tribunal dated 31.03.2010 is restored,

and the review order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the

Revenue Officer stands quashed.

The vesting order dated 07.10.1971 shall continue to

operate in accordance with the law.

……………………………J.

(M. M. SUNDRESH)

…………….…………………………J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 06, 2026.