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CASE NO.:

Writ Petition (crl.) 237 of 1998

PETITIONER:

Sube Singh

RESPONDENT:

State of Haryana & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/02/2006

BENCH:

CJI, B. N. Srikrishna & R. V. Raveendran

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.

An undated letter from the petitioner, received by this Court

on 19.11.1998, alleging illegal detention, custodial torture and

harassment to family members was registered as a writ petition

under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The State of Haryana

and its Director General of Police, were arrayed as respondents 1

and 2 and the six Police Officers referred to in the letter-petition

were arrayed as respondent Nos.3 to 8.

PROLOGUE (According to Police)

2. On 10.3.1998, at about 10 a.m. Dharam Singh ASI, Police

Post Dhamtan Saheb (Narwana Tehsil, Jind District), along with

Police constables (Ramesh Chand, Jaldhir Singh and Baljit Singh),

while patrolling near Dhamtan Saheb Bus Stand, received

information that one Joginder Singh (son of petitioner) and his

associates were conspiring in his house, to apply pressure on some

tender-bidders. When the police party proceeded towards Joginder

Singh's house, they saw two young men coming from the opposite

side, on a motorcycle. On seeing the Police party, the motorcycle

suddenly turned back. On suspicion, the Police party gave chase

and stopped the motorcycle near a petrol-pump. The ASI asked the

motorcyclist and the pillion-rider to identify themselves. The

motorcyclist gave his name as Amrik Singh. The pillion-rider gave

his name as Joginder Singh, a Palledar at Tohana. When the ASI

asked Joginder Singh as to whether he was the same Joginder who

had jumped parole in a case, Joginder Singh started running. When

the Police party chased him, Joginder Singh turned back, whipped

out a pistol and fired at them. Baljit Singh, one of the Constables,

was hit and collapsed. In the ensuing confusion, both Amrik Singh

and Joginder Singh escaped. The injured Constable succumbed to

the bullet injuries. In this connection, FIR No.112 dated 10.3.1998

under Section 302/307/352/186 IPC was registered in P.S., Garhi,

against Joginder Singh and Amrik Singh. On receiving information

of the death of constable, the SP and the DSP rushed to the

hospital and later, went to the Dhamtan Saheb Police Post. In the

meantime, the Police party which had gone to the house of

Joginder, in search of him, did not find him and brought his father

Sube Singh (Petitioner) to the Police Station. According to police,

the SDM and the Chairman of Zila Parishad, Jind, were also present

at the Police Post at that time. The petitioner denied any

knowledge of the whereabouts of his son Joginder. The SP made

some enquiries with the petitioner and left. After inquiries, the

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petitioner was released.

2.1) The petitioner along with his brother-in-law Rattan Singh filed

W.P. (Crl.) No.416/1998 in the Punjab & Haryana High Court on

24.3.1998 alleging harassment, torture and illegal detention for

three days (from 10.3.1998 to 13.3.1998) and again for a day

(15.3.1998 to 16.3.1998) and prayed for action against the

concerned Police Officers and for a judicial enquiry. The High Court

by order dated 27.4.1998 disposed of the petition with an

observation that petitioners may file a criminal complaint in a

competent court.

2.2) The petitioner went underground for a few months. Further

enquiries by the police revealed that several cases had been

registered against the petitioner and his son Joginder Singh.

Joginder was declared as 'proclaimed offender' by order dated

12.6.1998 of S.D.J.M., Narwana. The petitioner published a notice

in 'Dainik Tribune' dated 6.8.1998 that he had disowned his son

Joginder and was not responsible for his actions.

2.3) The Police continued with their inquiries and in July, 1998,

ASI Satya Narayan and other Police Officers of Dhamtan Saheb

Police Post again tried to ascertain his whereabouts by making

enquiries with the petitioner and his relatives/friends.

The Letter (re : alleged torture and illegal detention)

3. The petitioner sent an undated letter to this Court (received

on 19.11.1998) wherein he alleged that ASI Dharam Singh, In-

charge of Dhamtan Saheb Police Post, along with some Police

Officers, came to his house on 10.3.1998 at about 11 a.m, to

enquire about the whereabouts of his son Joginder; and that when

he informed them that he was not aware of it, they started beating

him. Thereafter, the Police took him, his wife and two minor

daughters forcibly to the Police Post, through the bazaar. He was

beaten with sticks on the way. When they reached the Police Post,

K.P. Singh, Superintendent of Police as also the Deputy

Superintendent of Police, Narwana, were present. When ASI

Dharam Singh informed them that the persons brought were the

father, mother and sisters of Joginder, the S.P. directed that they

may be brought to 'correct mental attitude'. The ASI took him

inside and beat him for about 10 minutes and brought him back

before the SP again. By then, his wife and daughters were made to

sit in an uncomfortable posture (as students are made to sit in

schools by way of punishment). When the petitioner stated that he

was not aware of his son's whereabouts, the S.P. became furious

and ordered his men to remove his moustache, whereupon Dharam

Singh sat on his chest (with three policemen pressing his hands

and feet) and plucked his moustache. Again, they started beating

him, searched his pockets and took away Rs.2,350 which he was

carrying. Then the police took him back to his house and ransacked

the house. ASI Dharam Singh broke open the lock of his trunk and

seized his licensed gun, some cartridges and Arms licence, as also

some jewellery found in the trunk. Thereafter, the petitioner was

taken back to the Police Post. Though his wife and daughters were

sent back to the house, he was illegally detained in Police custody

for a day and then taken to P.S. Garhi where he was kept for 10

days and during the first 5 days of such detention, he was regularly

beaten. Because of such police harassment and torture, when he

was released he and his younger son Gurmail Singh fled from his

house.

3.1) On 8.7.1998, the petitioner returned to his house. Satya

Narayan, ASI, (who had succeeded Dharam Singh) and Munshi

(HC) of Dhamtan Police Post, came to his house, with four other

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policemen, handcuffed him and took him to the Police Post. He was

tortured in the Police Post by the ASI and Head Constable Munshi

by thrashing him thrice, each time continuously for 15 minutes.

When he requested for water, he was forced to drink hot water

with salt. The Munshi, Dhamtan Police Post kept him in a wooden

Shikanza for 5 days and he was not allowed to sleep. Then he was

taken to Jind. He also alleged that the Police forced him to bring

money for the vehicles to conduct raids (to catch his son, Joginder)

and he was forced to accompany them on such raids and was put

in wooden Shikanza at Tulvan Thana. When he begged that he

should be released, he was informed that he was being taken for

the raids on the instructions of Ranbir Sharma, S.P., Jind, and that

without the permission of the S.P., he could not be released. After

three days he was again taken back to Dhamtan Post and kept

there for 2 days. Thereafter, he was released with a condition to

visit the Police Post everyday in the morning and evening.

3.2) The Petitioner alleged that his friends and relatives who

wanted to meet him, when he was being illegally detained, were

not permitted to meet him and they were also tortured. He also

alleged that Munshi (HC) of Dhamtan Police Post was demanding

money from him.

3.3) He alleged that in view of such torture, he was forced to

leave his house and remain outside. He prayed for a direction to

the Police to stop the atrocities and torture. He sought

compensation for himself and his wife and daughters for the social,

physical and financial loss, and return of his licensed gun, gold

ornaments and other belongings. He also prayed for a thorough

inquiry into the atrocities and torture committed by the Police and

imposition of punishment to those who were responsible.

3.4) The letter of the petitioner was registered as a writ petition

and Rule was issued on 11.1.1999. On 13.9.2000, this Court

appointed Mr. S. Muralidhar, Advocate, as Amicus Curiae, to assist

the Court.

The alleged Second Round of Harassment :

4. Joginder was arrested in June, 1999 by Punjab Police. Before

his arrest, he was allegedly involved in two robberies (registered on

19.3.1999 with PS, City Yamunanagar, and on 21.3.1999 with PS,

Indri, Karnal District). On 25.1.2001, when he was being taken to

Ferozepur Court from Ambala jail, Joginder escaped from police

custody. It is further alleged by the police that on 13.2.2001,

Joginder and his associates murdered two residents of Tohana.

4.1) According to Police, on 29.1.2001, the SHO, Police Station,

Garhi along with other police officials visited the house of petitioner

in search of Joginder who had escaped from custody. Again in

February, 2001 after the double murder, the S.I. of Police Station,

Tohana along with the ASI in charge of Dhamtan Saheb Police Post,

and other Police officials visited petitioner's house in search of

Joginder. In that connection, petitioner and his brother were taken

to Police Station Tohana on 14.2.2001 for inquiries and were

released on the same day. They were again called for inquiries on

the next day. On 22.6.2001, the Officer in Charge of Police Post,

Patiala Chowk, Jind, searched the house of Minti Devi (sister of

Joginder), to find out whether Joginder was hiding there. On

24.6.2001, petitioner's younger son Gurmail Singh was arrested for

possessing illegal arms.

4.2) The petitioner filed an affidavit dated 22.2.2001 before this

Court on 3.3.2001 alleging interrogation by Police on 26.1.2001

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and 29.1.2001 in regard to escape of his son Joginder from Police

custody. He also alleged that on 14.2.2001 he and his brother

Narsi were handcuffed and taken to Tohana Police Station and

interrogated and released on 15.2.2001. The S.P. Jind filed a

detailed reply affidavit dated 11.8.2001. A further affidavit was

filed by the petitioner on 1.10.2001 wherein he alleged that his

younger son Gurmail Singh was forcibly taken from his sister's

house on 22.6.2001 and tortured. This brought forth a further

affidavit dated 20.11.2001 from the S.P., Jind, by way of reply

denying the allegations.

PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT :

5. Not being satisfied with the reply-affidavit filed on behalf of

the State, in regard to the letter-petition, this Court on 9.11.2000

directed the Chief Secretary of the State of Haryana to file a

detailed affidavit in regard to the steps taken on the allegations

made by the petitioner. In view of it, the State got the matter

inquired into by Dr. John V. George, Inspector General of Police,

(Law & Order), Haryana. He submitted a report dated 10.3.2001

stating that the allegations of the petitioner relating to police

torture, illegal detention, harassment to wife and daughters, and

removal of cash/licensed weapon/jewellery were not substantiated.

The said report, however, confirmed that petitioner and his brother

were called to the Police Station couple of times for interrogation

regarding the whereabouts of Joginder. Not being satisfied with the

said report, this Court on 17.10.2001 directed the CBI to inquire

into the matter with reference to the allegations made in the letter

as also the subsequent affidavits filed by the petitioner and his

relatives and the reply affidavits filed by the respondents.

5.1) The CBI held a preliminary inquiry and submitted the report

of the Inquiry Officer (A.K. Ohri, ASP) under cover of its letter

dated 22.7.2002. The findings in the said report are arrived at, on

the basis of the allegations made in the affidavits filed before this

Court, and the statements made by the petitioner, his family

members and others (nearly 100 witnesses) before the Inquiry

Officer. The CBI has concluded that some of the allegations of the

petitioner were substantiated while several others were not

substantiated.

5.2) On 16.9.2002, this Court directed that the State Government

to take appropriate action on the report of the CBI. In pursuance of

it, an FIR was lodged in Garhi Police Station, Jind District, (FIR

No.152 dated 17.10.2002 under Sections 323, 342, 343, 365 and

384 IPC) on the basis of the CBI report, naming the following 10

officers :-

1. ASI Dharam Singh (by then S.I.)

2. ASI Satyanarain 238/Jind

3. HC Om Parkash No.102/Jind (by then ASI)

4. Const. Dilbag Singh, No.59/Jind

5. HC Balbir Singh No.450/Jind

6. Const. Sudarshan Kumar No.811/Jind

7. Const. Mukesh Kumar No.99/Jind

8. Const. Dhoop Singh No.704/Jind

9. Const. Dharam Pal No.4/Jind

10. Const. Mohinder Singh 825/Jind (by then HC)

The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Narwana, filed an affidavit

dated 1.11.2002 confirming that FIR was lodged and that he was

investigating into the matter.

5.3) On 11.11.2002, this Court noted that the FIR was registered

and an appropriate chargesheet would be filed by the State in due

course, and that the officers concerned have been

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suspended/posted outside the district. This Court also took note of

the submission of the amicus curiae that in such cases, apart from

CBI inquiry and criminal prosecution, compensation has to be

awarded to the victims, and the submission of the State that

having regard to the facts of the case and having regard to the

registration of the FIR, the matter may have to await the result of

the prosecution. While adjourning the case, this Court observed

that the question of awarding any compensation at that stage, did

not arise.

5.4) The SP, Jind, by affidavit dated 9.6.2003 informed this Court

that the charge-sheet was filed in the Court of Ilaka Magistrate,

Narwana, and that the case was fixed for 18.7.2003 for framing of

charge. Thereafter, when the matter came up on 4.8.2003, the

amicus curiae again submitted that compensation should be

awarded. This Court directed hearing on the limited question as to

whether compensation should be awarded or not. The criminal

court was also directed to expedite the trial. The criminal case

against the Police officers, we are informed, is under progress.

5.5) Thereafter, arguments on the question as to whether

compensation should be awarded or not were heard on 6.10.2005

and written arguments were submitted by the Amicus Curiae and

the State on 19.10.2005 and 16.11.2005 respectively.

(Preliminary) Inquiry Report of CBI :

6. The findings contained in the report of CBI are summarized

below :-

Allegations by Petitioner (and his

relatives)

Finding by C.B.I.

1. Incident on 10.3.1998

1.1. Petitioner was tortured at

Dhamtan Saheb Police Post on

10.3.1998 on the directions of

Mr. K. P. Singh, Superintendent

of Police, Jind and Mr. Praveen

Kumar Mehta, DSP, Jind.

Not substantiated

1.2 On 10.3.1998 Dharam Singh ASI

took cash of Rs.2,350/- from the

pocket of the petitioner and

Rs.4,700/- from the pocket of his

friend Narender Singh.

Not substantiated

1.3 Dharam Singh, ASI, took away

the licensed gun, cartridges and

jewellery from the house of

petitioner, on 10.3.1998.

Not substantiated by

any independent

witness.

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1.4 Dharam Singh, ASI, Incharge of

Dhamtan Saheb Police Post along

with other Police officials picked

up the Petitioner and his friend

Sardar Narender Singh on

10.3.1998 and took them to the

Police Post and beat them on the

way.

Substantiated

1.5 Om Prakash (H.C., PS, Garhi) and

Dilbag Singh, Sentry, beat

petitioner on 11.3.1998.

Substantiated (But no

injury report or medical

report is available.)

2. Illegal detention.

2.1. Petitioner was arrested on

10.3.1998 and taken to Police

Station Garhi on 11.3.1998

where he was illegally detained

for 10 days and beaten during

first 5 days.

Detention of petitioner at

P.S. Garhi for some days

was substantiated by an

oral evidence of accused in

an Excise Case (Amarinder

Singh).

2.2. Rattan Singh alias Ratna

(brother in law of petitioner) was

picket up on 10.3.1998 and kept

illegally at P.S. Garhi and

tortured for 2 days. He was again

arrested on 16.3.1998, tortured

for 4 days and released on

20.3.1998.

Picking up of Rattan Singh

a few days after 10.3.1998

is established. However,

alleged torture and

wrongful confinement is

supported only by his self

statement and not by any

medical or other evidence.

[Note: However, in the writ petition filed by Rattan Singh and

petitioner on 24.3.1998 in the Punjab & Haryana High Court, it is

alleged that petitioner and Rattan Singh were kept in illegal

confinement from 10.3.1998 to 13.3.1998 and again from 15.3.1998

to 16.3.1998. There is no allegation of any torture at all. They only

alleged that they apprehended harassment and torture by Police.)

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3. Incidents between 8.7.1998 and 7.11.1998

3.1 Munshi (HC), in-charge of

Dhamtan Saheb Police Post

handcuffed petitioner and took

the petitioner to Police Post on

8.7.1998.

Substantiated

3.2 Satya Narayan, ASI, harassed

petitioner between 8.7.1998 and

7.11.1998.

Substantiated

3.3 Satya Narayan, ASI, demanded

money from the petitioner and

took money from petitioner, for

fuel for the vehicle used to

conduct raids.

Not Substantiated

3.4 Satya Narayan ASI took 10 kg. of

Desi Ghee from petitioner's

brother Narsi.

Not Substantiated

3.5 Satya Narayan, ASI, had

detained Shamsher Singh in

police custody.

Substantiated

3.6 Satya Narayan, ASI, tortured

Shamsher Singh and took

Rs.500/- to release him.

Not substantiated.

4. Re : Incidents in the year 2001

4.1 SHO, Police Station, Garhi along

with other police officials raided

the petitioner's house in January,

2001 and intentionally flashed a

torch light on the faces of his

young daughters.

Not substantiated.

(What is established is

that SHO, PS, Garhi raided

the petitioner's house on

the night of 31.1.01 to

check whether Joginder

who had escaped from

police custody was at the

house. A torch light was

used as there was no

electricity.)

4.2 On 14.2.01, SHO, Police Station

City, Tohana along with other

police officials had handcuffed

the petitioner and his brother

Narsi and detained for a day.

Not substantiated.

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(However, what is

established is that the

petitioner and his brother

were taken to PS City

Tohana on 14.2.01, for

inquiries in connection

with the report that

petitioner's son Joginder

Singh and his associates

had committed a double

murder on 14.2.01. After a

few hours of interrogation

they were released).

4.3 On 22.6.01, Gurmel Singh,

younger son of petitioner was

picked up (by Constables Mukesh

Kumar and Dhup Singh in a

vehicle driven by Constable

Dharampal). He was confined at

PS City, Jind and tortured.

Substantiated only to the

extent that Gurmel Singh

was picked up on 22.6.01

by police party and

wrongfully confined at PS

City, Jind. (In regard to

alleged torture, the

statement of Gurmel Singh

alone is available without

corroboration).

4.4 Yad Ram, Inspector, when he

was SHO, PS Alewa forcibly

picked up one Ramphal on

26.7.01 and harassed him when

Ramphal's house was raided on

29.7.01.

Not substantiated.

(What is established is Yad

Ram had taken Ramphal

on the instructions of ASP,

Jind and examined him for

an hour).

7. The report further shows that petitioner was involved in

several criminal cases from 1972 and his son Joginder was involved

in more number of criminal cases from the year 1991, as detailed

below :-

Cases in respect of petitioner :

1. FIR No. 275 dt. 13.10.72 u/s 61/1/14 Excise Act P.S.

Sadar Kaithal.

2. FIR No.59 dt. 13.2.78 u/s 379 IPC PS Sadar Kaithal.

3. FIR No.231 dt. 22.7.85 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act P.S.

Sadar Kaithal.

4. FIR No.141 dt. 20.7.86 u/s 61/1/14 Excise Act P.S.

Sadar Narwana.

5. FIR No.142 dt. 25.4.91 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act read with

section 5 TADA Act P.S. Sadar Kaithal.

6. FIR No.147 dt. 25.4.91 u/s 285/336 I.P.C. P.S. Sadar

Kaithal.

7. FIR No.219 dt. 17.7.91 u/s 324/323/506/34 IPC PS

Sadar Kaithal.

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8. FIR No.367 dt. 23.11.94 u/s 323/324/148/149 IPC PS

Garhi.

9. FIR No.277 dt. 25.6.2001 u/s 332/353/225/186/511 IPC

PS City, Jind.

(Note: The petitioner was convicted only in the first case. He

was acquitted in all other cases.)

Cases in respect of Joginder Singh :

a) FIR No.219 dated 17.7.91 u/s 323/324/506/34 IPC PS

Sadar, Kaithal.

b) FIR No.395 dated 5.7.97 u/s 324/34 IPC PS Civil Lines,

Hissar.

c) FIR No.242 dated 7.9.96 u/s 307/120-B IPC & 25/54/59

Arms Act, PS City, Tohana.

d) FIR No.245 dated 8.9.96 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS

City, Tohana.

e) FIR No.112 dated 10.3.98 u/s 302/307/353/86/34 IPC &

25/54/59 Arms Act, PS Garhi..

f) FIR No.57 dated 31.3.99 u/s 392/395 IPC & 25/54/59

Arms Act, PS Indri, Karnal.

g) FIR No.99 dated 19.3.99 u/s 393/394/397/307/452 IPC,

PS City, Yamunanagar.

h) FIR No.94 dated 21.6.99 u/s 399/401 IPC, 25/54/59

Arms Act, PS Malanwala, Distt. Firozepur, Punjab.

i) FIR No.8 dated 26.1.2001 u/s 223/224 IPC, PS GRP,

Ludhiana, Punjab.

j) FIR NO.48 dated 14.2.2001 u/s 302/307/34 IPC and

25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Tohana.

k) FIR No.100 dated 16.2.2001 u/s 307/332/353/216 IPC

and 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS Sadar, Fatehabad.

l) FIR No.38 dated 21.2.2001 u/s399/307/402 IPC and

25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Narwana.

m) FIR No.29 dated 16.3.2001 u/s 307, 120-B IPC and

25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Firozepur, Punjab.

n) FIR NO.149 dated 23.8.2001 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS

Sadar, Kapurthala, Punjab.

(Note : Joginder was convicted in regard to FIR 242/1996 and FIR

No.245/1996. Sl. No. (c) and (d) above on 31.1.2002 and

sentenced to undergo RI for six years and two years respectively)

Position emerging from the records/CBI Report/arguments:

8. A careful examination of the facts, lead to the following

inferences :

i) All allegations (relating to petitioner and his family

members being taken to Police Stations/Police Posts and

being questioned/beaten up/tortured) are in connection

with the effort of Police to find the whereabouts of

Joginder Singh, whenever he was involved in a serious

incident, that is (a) incident on 10.3.1998 when Joginder

was suspected of killing a Police constable, (b) incident

on 25.1.2001 when Joginder escaped from Police

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custody when he was being taken to court, and (c)

incident on 13/14.2.2001 when Joginder was suspected

of killing two persons at Tohana.

ii) Though there is some evidence of illegal detention and

beating of petitioner and his relatives, the allegations of

custodial torture are exaggerated and to a certain extent

false.

iii) There is no medical evidence nor any visible scars/

marks/disability resulting from the alleged torture,

either in the case of petitioner or his family

members/relatives.

iv) The complaints of petitioner and his relatives are against

different police officers of different police stations

(totally unconnected with each other) in regard to

incidents at different points of time, in March, 1998,

April, 1998, July, 1998, January, 2001, February, 2001

and June, 2001.

v) The case of Petitioner is that he and/or his relatives

were harassed, illegally confined, or tortured, to find out

the whereabouts of Joginder. The police contend that

the allegations by petitioner and his relatives, are by

way of a well conceived plot to prevent police

investigation in regard to misdeeds by Joginder and his

associates and to pre-empt any action by the police

against Joginder or his family members.

9. We will next refer to the factors which indicate that petitioner

and his relatives have made false and exaggerated claims in regard

to illegal detention, torture etc., apart from suppressing material

facts.

9.1) In his letter to this Court, petitioner has alleged that he was

illegally confined by the Police for 11 days from 10.3.1998 (one day

at Dhamtan Saheb Police Post and 10 days at Police Station,

Garhi). Rattan Singh (brother in law of petitioner) in his affidavit

dated 13.5.1999 alleges that he was illegally detained for 2 days

and again for 4 days. But in the writ petition filed by petitioner and

Rattan Singh in the Punjab and Haryana High Court on 24.3.1998,

it is alleged that the petitioner and Rattan Singh were confined by

Police between 10.3.1998 and 13.3.1998 (three days) and again

for a day between 15.3.1998 and 16.3.1998.

9.2) Petitioner, in the letter to this Court, alleges beating and

torture at Dhamtan Saheb Police Post on 10.3.1998 and at Police

Station, Garhi for five days in Police custody between 11.3.1998

and 16.3.1998. Rattan Singh alleges torture for 2 days (from

10.3.1998 to 12.3.1998) and again for four days (from 16.3.1998

to 20.3.1998). But in the writ petition filed in Punjab & Haryana

High Court on 24.3.1998 by petitioner and Rattan Singh, there is

no allegation of beating or torture, but only expression of an

apprehension that they may be arrested, harassed and tortured

(Note : Petitioner blames his counsel for not mentioning the facts

properly in the writ petition filed before the High Court).

9.3) In the letter petition, petitioner completely suppressed the

fact that he (along with Rattan Singh) had filed a writ petition on

24.3.1998 in the Punjab & Haryana High Court in regard to the said

incident (between 10.3.1998 to 21.3.1998) and the fact that the

said writ petition was disposed of on 27.4.1998 by the High Court

reserving liberty to file a criminal complaint.

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9.4) In the letter petition, the petitioner has alleged four

'misdeeds' of police on 10.3.1998 : (a) His torture at the police

post at the Dhamtan Saheb Police Post by Dharam Singh, ASI at

the instance of Superintendent of Police and DSP, (b) Mistreatment

of wife and daughters of the petitioner at the Dhamtan Saheb

Police Post, (c) Rs.2,350/- being taken from his pocket by ASI

Dharam Singh, and (d) Licensed gun, cartridges, arms licence and

gold ornaments being illegally taken by ASI Dharam Singh on

10.3.1998. The CBI report finds that none of these four allegations

is substantiated.

9.5) In the letter petition, the petitioner alleged that he had told

police that he was not on good terms with his son Joginder Singh,

that he had already disowned him and the family was having no

connection with Joginder. He even published a notice in 'Dainik

Tribune' in August, 1998 stating that he has no connection with his

son Joginder. In his affidavit dated 31.8.2001 (filed in this case on

1.10.2001), petitioner reiterates that he has disowned his son

Joginder and alleges that he did not have any contact with him;

and that in spite of it, the police were continuously harassing him

and his family members seeking information about the

whereabouts of Joginder and raiding his house and his relatives'

houses to find out whether Joginder was hiding there. But the CBI

inquiry has categorically found that petitioner and his family

members had not disowned Joginder. They were regularly meeting

Joginder when he was in custody. Petitioner was traveling to meet

his son Joginder whenever he was being produced in courts, in

respect of different cases. In fact petitioner received money from

the All India Food & Allied Workers Palledar Union, Tohana (Kacchi

Union) of which he was a member, to meet the expenses of the

travel (to meet his son) on 25.10.2000, 25.11.2000, 21.12.2000,

13.1.2001, 16.1.2001, 23.1.2001, 9.10.2001, 10.10.2001,

11.10.2001, 15.10.2001, 25.10.2001, 7.11.2001, 17.11.2001 and

20.11.2001. Further, the jail records showed that Joginder was met

by petitioner's wife on 26.8.1999, petitioner's brother Narsi on

17.11.1999, 18.11.1999 and 1.3.2002, petitioner's uncle Rama on

20.11.1999, and petitioner's brother-in-law Rattan Singh on

5.3.2002.

10. There was thus reasonable cause for the Police to think that

the family members of Joginder might know about his

whereabouts. The repeated questioning of the family members of

Joginder in the year 1998 and 2001, either at their houses or by

calling them to the Police Station/Post was part of investigation

process and cannot, per se, be considered as harassment or

violation of Article 21. Whether the police exceeded their limits in

questioning the petitioner or his relatives is of course a different

aspect. The report of the CBI shows that there is prima facie

evidence about petitioner and some of his relatives being illegally

detained in Police Station/Post and subjected possibly to some third

degree methods, to extract information regarding the whereabouts

of Joginder Singh. At the same time, the report makes it clear that

neither the illegal detention nor the alleged torture (if true) was of

an extent, alleged by the petitioner and his relatives. The claims

were clearly exaggerated and many a time false also. It is quite

probable that the allegations against Police were levelled and/or

exaggerated to avoid enquiries by the Police in regard to Joginder.

11. This leads us to the question whether, in addition to directing

CBI inquiry and prosecution of the officers concerned, on the facts

and circumstances of this case, compensation should be awarded

to petitioner and his family members, as a public law remedy for

the violation of their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the

Constitution.

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Compensation as a public law remedy :

12. Though illegal detention and custodial torture were

recognized as violations of the fundamental rights of life and liberty

guaranteed under Article 21, to begin with, only the following

reliefs were being granted in writ petitions under Article 32 or 226 :

a) direction to set at liberty the person detained, if the

complaint was one of illegal detention.

b) direction to the concerned Government to hold an

inquiry and take action against the officers responsible

for the violation.

c) If the enquiry or action taken by the concerned

department was found to be not satisfactory, to direct

an inquiry by an independent agency, usually the

Central Bureau of Investigation.

Award of compensation as a public law remedy for violation of the

fundamental rights enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, in

addition to the private law remedy under the Law of Torts, was

evolved in the last two and half decades.

13. In the Bhagalpur Blinding case, [Khatri (II) vs State of

Bihar \026 1981 (1) SCC 627], Bhagwati J., (as he then was),

speaking for the Bench, posed the following question while

considering the relief that could be given by a court for violation of

constitutional rights guaranteed in Article 21 of the Constitution :-

"... but if life or personal liberty is violated otherwise than in

accordance with such procedure, is the Court helpless to

grant relief to the person who has suffered such

deprivation? Why should the court not be prepared to forge

new tools and devise new remedies for the purpose of

vindicating the most precious of the precious fundamental

right to life and personal liberty."

The question was expanded in a subsequent order in Bhagalpur

Blinding case [Khatri (IV) vs State of Bihar \026 1981 (2) SCC

493), thus :-

"If an officer of the State acting in his official capacity

threatens to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty

without the authority of law, can such person not approach

the court for injuncting the State from acting through such

officer in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21

? Can the State urge in defence in such a case that it is not

infringing the fundamental right of the petitioner under

Article 21, because the officer who is threatening to do so is

acting outside the law and therefore beyond the scope of his

authority and hence the State is not responsible for his

action ? Would this not make a mockery of Article 21 and

reduce it to nullity, a mere rope of sand, for, on this view, if

the officer is acting according to law there would ex

concessionis be no breach of Article 21 and if he is acting

without the authority of law, the State would be able to

contend that it is not responsible for his action and

therefore there is no violation of Article 21. So also if there

is any threatened invasion by the State of the fundamental

right guaranteed under Article 21, the petitioner who is

aggrieved can move the court under Article 32 for a writ

injuncting such threatened invasion and if there is any

continuing action of the State which is violative of the

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fundamental right under Article 21, the petitioner can

approach the court under Article 32and ask for a writ

striking down the continuance of such action, but where the

action taken by the State has already resulted in breach of

the fundamental right under Article 21 by deprivation of

some limb of the petitioner, would the petitioner have no

remedy under Article 32 for breach of the fundamental right

guaranteed to him ? Would the court permit itself to

become helpless spectator of the violation of the

fundamental right of the petitioner by the State and tell the

petitioner that though the Constitution has guaranteed the

fundamental right to him and has also given him the

fundamental right of moving the court for enforcement of

his fundamental right, the court cannot give him any relief."

Answering the said questions, it was held that when a court trying

the writ petition proceeds to inquire into the violation of any right

to life or personal liberty, while in police custody, it does so, not for

the purpose of adjudicating upon the guilt of any particular officer

with a view to punishing him but for the purpose of deciding

whether the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 21

has been violated and the State is liable to pay compensation to

them for such violation. This Court clarified that the nature and

object of the inquiry is altogether different from that in a criminal

case and any decision arrived at in the writ petition on this issue

cannot have any relevance much less any binding effect, in any

criminal proceeding which may be taken against a particular police

officer. This Court further clarified that in a given case, if the

investigation is still proceeding, the Court may even defer the

inquiry before it until the investigation is completed or if the Court

considered it necessary in the interests of Justice, it may postpone

its inquiry until after the prosecution was terminated, but that is a

matter entirely for the exercise of the discretion of the Court and

there is no bar precluding the Court from proceeding with the

inquiry before it, even if the investigation or prosecution is

pending.

14. In Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar [1983 (4) SCC 141], the

petitioner therein approached this Court under Article 32 of the

Constitution alleging that though he was acquitted by the Sessions

Court on 3.6.1968, he was released from jail only on 6.10.1982,

after 14 years, and sought compensation for his illegal detention.

This Court while recognizing that Article 32 cannot be used as a

substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can

be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes of courts,

civil and criminal, raised for consideration the important question

as to whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32,

this Court can pass an order for payment of money, as

compensation for the deprivation of a fundamental right. This Court

answered the question thus while awarding compensation:-

"Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will

be denuded of its significant content if the power of this

Court were limited to passing orders of release from illegal

detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of

that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance

with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its

violators in the payment of monetary compensation.

Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of

fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other

method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to

compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of

instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest

and which present for their protection the powers of the

State as a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this

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country as it has perished in some others too well-known to

suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into

accepting that, respect for the rights of individuals is the

true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair

the damage done by its officers to the petitioner's rights. It

may have recourse against those officers."

Rudul Sah was followed in Bhim Singh vs. State of J&K [1985

(4) SCC 677] and Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights vs.

Police Commissioner, Delhi Police Headquarters [1989 (4)

SCC 730].

15. The law was crystallized in Nilabati Behera vs. State of

Orissa [1993 (2) SCC 746]. In that case, the deceased was

arrested by the police, handcuffed and kept in a police custody. The

next day, his dead-body was found on a railway track. This Court

awarded compensation to the mother of the deceased. J.S. Verma

J., (as he then was) spelt out the following principles :-

"Award of compensation in a proceeding under Article

32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article

226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public

law, based on strict liability for contravention of

fundamental rights to which the principle of

sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it

may be available as a defence in private law in an

action based on tort.

Enforcement of the constitutional right and grant of

redress embraces award of compensation as part of

the legal consequences of its contravention.

A claim in public law for compensation for contravention of

human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of

which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged

remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and

such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to

a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of

a fundamental right is 'distinct from, and in addition to, the

remedy in private law for damages for the tort' resulting

from the contravention of the fundamental right. The

defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and

alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights,

there can be no question of such a defence being

available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle

which justifies award of monetary compensation for

contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the

Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of

redress available for the contravention made by the State

or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers,

and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by

resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by

recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution."

[Emphasis supplied]

Dr. A.S. Anand J., (as he then was) in his concurring judgment

elaborated the principle thus :-

"... Convicts, prisoners or under-trials are not denuded of

their fundamental rights under Article 21 and it is only

such restrictions, as are permitted by law, which can be

imposed on the enjoyment of the fundamental rights by

such persons. It is an obligation of the State to ensure that

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there is no infringement of the indefeasible rights of a

citizen to life, except in accordance with law, while the

citizen is in its custody.

The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than

the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary

compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings

under Article 32 by the Supreme Court or under Article 226

by the High Courts, for established infringement of the

indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 is a remedy

available in public law and is based on the strict liability for

contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible

rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to

civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they

live under a legal system which aims to protect their

interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the

court moulds the relief by granting 'compensation' in

proceedings under Article 32 or 226 seeking enforcement or

protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public

law by way of penalizing the wrongdoer and fixing the

liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in

its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the

citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not

to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil

action for damages under the private law but in the broader

sense of providing relief by an order of making 'monetary

amends' under the public law for the wrong done due to

breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental

rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of

'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrongdoer for

the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the

rights available to the aggrieved party to claim

compensation under the private law in an action based on

tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent

jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal

law. "

16. In D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997 (1) SCC

416), this Court again considered exhaustively the question and

held that monetary compensation should be awarded for

established infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed under

Article 21. This Court held :-

"Custodial violence, including torture and death in the lock

ups strikes a blow at the Rule of Law, which demands that

the powers of the executive should not only be derived from

law but also that the same should be limited by law.

Custodial violence is a matter of concern. It is aggravated

by the fact that it is committed by persons who are

supposed to be the protectors of the citizens. It is

committed under the shield of uniform and authority in the

four walls of a police station or lock-up, the victim being

totally helpless. The protection of an individual from torture

and abuse by the police and other law enforcing officers is a

matter of deep concern in a free society.

Any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading

treatment would fall within the inhibition of Article 21 of the

Constitution, whether it occurs during investigation,

interrogation or otherwise. If the functionaries of the

Government become law-breakers, it is bound to breed

contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and

every man would have the tendency to become law unto

himself thereby leading to anarchy. No civilized nation can

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permit that to happen. Does a citizen shed off his

fundamental right to life, the moment a policeman arrests

him ? Can the right to life of a citizen be put in abeyance on

his arrest. ... The answer, indeed, has to be an emphatic

'No'.

Police is, no doubt, under a legal duty and has legitimate

right to arrest a criminal and to interrogate him during the

investigation of an offence but it must be remembered that

the law does not permit use of third degree methods or

torture of accused in custody during interrogation and

investigation with a view to solve the crime. End cannot

justify the means. The interrogation and investigation into a

crime should be in true sense purposeful to make the

investigation effective. By torturing a person and using third

degree methods, the police would be accomplishing behind

the closed doors what the demands of our legal order

forbid. No society can permit it."

17. It is thus now well settled that award of compensation

against the State is an appropriate and effective remedy for

redress of an established infringement of a fundamental right under

Article 21, by a public servant. The quantum of compensation will,

however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

Award of such compensation (by way of public law remedy) will not

come in the way of the aggrieved person claiming additional

compensation in a civil court, in enforcement of the private law

remedy in tort, nor come in the way of the criminal court ordering

compensation under section 357 of Code of Civil Procedure.

18. This takes us to the next question as to whether

compensation should be awarded under Article 32/226, for every

violation of Article 21 where illegal detention or custodial violence is

alleged.

Whether compensation should be awarded for every

violation of Article 21

19. In M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India [1987 (1) SCC 395], a

Constitution Bench of this Court while considering the question

whether compensation can be awarded in a petition under Article

32, observed thus :-

"We must, therefore, hold that Article 32 is not powerless to

assist a person when he finds that his fundamental right has

been violated. He can in that event seek remedial

assistance under Article 32. The power of the court to grant

such remedial relief may include the power to award

compensation in appropriate cases. We are deliberately

using the words "in appropriate cases" because we

must make it clear that it is not in every case where

there is a breach of a fundamental right committed by

the violator that compensation would be awarded by

the court in a petition under Article 32. The

infringement of the fundamental right must be gross

and patent, that is, incontrovertible and ex facie

glaring and either such infringement should be on a large

scale affecting the fundamental rights of a large number of

persons, or it should appear unjust or unduly harsh or

oppressive on account of their poverty or disability or

socially or economically disadvantaged position to require

the person or persons affected by such infringement to

initiate and pursue act in the civil courts. Ordinarily, of

course, a petition under Article 32 should not be used

as a substitute for enforcement of the right to claim

compensation for infringement of a fundamental right

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through the ordinary process of civil court. It is only

in exceptional cases of the nature indicated by us

above, that compensation may be awarded in a

petition under Article 32. ....

If we make a fact analysis of the cases where

compensation has been awarded by this Court, we

will find that in all the cases, the fact of infringement

was patent and incontrovertible, the violation was

gross and its magnitude was such as to shock the

conscience of the court and it would have been

gravely unjust to the person whose fundamental right

was violated, to require him to go to the civil court for

claiming compensation."

(emphasis supplied)

In Nilabati Behera (supra), this Court put in a word of caution

thus:-

"Of course, relief in exercise of the power under Article 32

or 226 would be granted only (when) it is established that

there has been an infringement of the fundamental rights of

the citizen and no other form of appropriate redressal by

the court in the facts and circumstances of the case, is

possible. ....Law is in the process of development and the

process necessitates developing separate public law

procedures as also public law principles. It may be

necessary to identify the situations to which separate

proceedings and principles apply and the courts have to

act firmly but with certain amount of circumspection

and self-restraint, lest proceedings under Article 32

or 226 are misused as a disguised substitute for civil

action in private law."

(emphasis supplied)

In D. K. Basu (supra), this Court repeatedly stressed that

compensation can be awarded only for redressal of an established

violation of Article 21. This Court also drew attention to the

following aspect :

"There is one other aspect also which needs our

consideration. We are conscious of the fact that the police in

India have to perform a difficult and delicate task,

particularly in view of the deteriorating law and order

situation, communal riots, political turmoil, student unrest,

terrorist activities, and among others the increasing number

of underworld and armed gangs and criminals. Many hard

core criminals like extremists, the terrorists, drug peddlers,

smugglers who have organized, gangs, have taken strong

roots in the society. It is being said in certain quarters that

with more and more liberalization and enforcement of

fundamental rights, it would lead to difficulties in the

detection of crimes committed by such categories of

hardened criminals by soft peddling interrogation, it is felt in

those quarters that if we lay too much of emphasis on

protection of their fundamental rights and human

rights, such criminals may go scot-free without

exposing any element or iota of criminality with the

result, the crime would go unpunished and in the

ultimate analysis the society would suffer. The

concern is genuine and the problem is real. To deal

with such a situation, a balanced approach is needed

to meet the ends of justice. This is all the more so, in

view of the expectation of the society that police must deal

with the criminals in an efficient and effective manner and

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bring to book those who are involved in the crime. The cure

cannot, however, be worst than the disease itself."

[Emphasis supplied]

In Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble

[2003 (7) SCC 749] and Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P.

[2005 (9) SCC 631], this Court warned against non-genuine

claims:

"But at the same time there seems to be a

disturbing trend of increase in cases where false

accusations of custodial torture are made, trying to

take advantage of the serious concern shown and

the stern attitude reflected by the courts while

dealing with custodial violence. It needs to be

carefully examined whether the allegations of

custodial violence are genuine or are sham

attempts to gain undeserved benefit masquerading

as victims of custodial violence."

In Dhananjay Sharma vs. State of Haryana [1995 (3) SCC

757], this Court refused compensation where the petitioner had

exaggerated the incident and had indulged in falsehood. This Court

held :

"Since, from the report of the CBI and our own

independent appraisal of the evidence recorded by

the CBI. we have come to the conclusion that Shri

Dhananjay Sharma and Sushil Kumar had been

illegally detained by respondents 3 to 5 from the

afternoon of 15.1.94 to 17.1.94, the State must be

held responsible for the unlawful acts of its officers

and it must repair the damage done to the citizens

by its officers for violating their indivisible

fundamental right of personal liberty without any

authority of law in an absolutely high-handed

manner. We would have been, therefore,

inclined to direct the State Government of

Haryana to compensate Dhananjay Sharma

and Sushil Kumar but since Sushil Kumar has

indulged in false-hood in this Court and Shri

Dhananjay Sharma, has also exaggerated the

incident by stating that on 15.1.94 when he

was way laid along with Sushil Kumar and

Shri S.C. Puri, Advocate, two employees of

respondents 6 and 7 were also present with

the police party, which version has not been

found to be correct by the CBI, they both have

disentitled themselves from receiving any

compensation, as monetary amends for the

wrong done by respondents 3 to 5, in

detaining them. We, therefore do not direct

the payment of any compensation to them."

[Emphasis supplied]

20. Cases where violation of Article 21 involving custodial

death or torture is established or is incontrovertible stand on a

different footing when compared to cases where such violation

is doubtful or not established. Where there is no independent

evidence of custodial torture and where there is neither medical

evidence about any injury or disability, resulting from custodial

torture, nor any mark/scar, it may not be prudent to accept

claims of human right violation, by persons having criminal

records in a routine manner for awarding compensation. That

may open the floodgates for false claims, either to mulct money

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from the State or as to prevent or thwart further investigation.

Courts should, therefore, while jealously protecting the

fundamental rights of those who are illegally detained or

subjected to custodial violence, should also stand guard against

false, motivated and frivolous claims in the interests of the

society and to enable Police to discharge their duties fearlessly

and effectively. While custodial torture is not infrequent, it

should be borne in mind that every arrest and detention does

not lead to custodial torture.

21. In cases where custodial death or custodial torture or

other violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21 is

established, courts may award compensation in a proceeding

under Article 32 or 226. However, before awarding

compensation, the Court will have to pose to itself the following

questions : (a) Whether the violation of Article 21 is patent and

incontrovertible, (b) whether the violation is gross and of a

magnitude to shock the conscience of the court, (c) whether the

custodial torture alleged has resulted in death or whether

custodial torture is supported by medical report or visible marks

or scars or disability. Where there is no evidence of custodial

torture of a person except his own statement, and where such

allegation is not supported by any medical report or other

corroboration evidence, or where there are clear indications that

the allegations are false or exaggerated fully or in part, courts

may not award compensation as a public law remedy under

Article 32 or 226, but relegate the aggrieved party to the

traditional remedies by way of appropriate civil/criminal action.

22. We should not, however, be understood as holding that

harassment and custodial violence is not serious or worthy of

consideration, where there is no medical report or visible marks

or independent evidence. We are conscious of the fact that

harassment or custodial violence cannot always be supported by

a medical report or independent evidence or proved by marks or

scars. Every illegal detention irrespective of its duration, and

every custodial violence, irrespective of its degree or magnitude,

is outright condemnable and per se actionable. Remedy for such

violation is available in civil law and criminal law. The public law

remedy is additionally available where the conditions mentioned

in the earlier para are satisfied. We may also note that this

Court has softened the degree of proof required in criminal

prosecution relating to such matters. In State of MP vs.

Shyamsunder Trivedi - 1995 (4) SCC 262, reiterated in

ABDUL GAFAR KHAN and MUNSHI SINGH GAUTAM (supra),this

Court observed :-

"Rerely in cases of police torture or custodial death, direct

ocular evidence of the complicity of the police personnel

would be available...... Bound as they are by the ties of

brotherhood, it is not unknown that the police personnel

prefer to remain silent and more often than not even pervert

the truth to save their colleagues.......... The exaggerated

adherence to and insistence upon the establishment of proof

beyond every reasonable doubt, by the prosecution, ignoring

the ground realities, the fact-situations and the peculiar

circumstances of a given case....., often results in miscarriage

of justice and makes the justice delivery system a suspect. In

the ultimate analysis the society suffers and a criminal gets

encouraged. Tortures in police custody, which of late are on

the increase, receive encouragement by this type of an

unrealistic approach of the Courts because it reinforces the

belief in the mind of the police that no harm would come to

them, if an odd prisoner dies in the lock-up, because there

would hardly be any evidence available to the prosecution to

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directly implicate them with the torture."

Improving the present situation

23. Unfortunately, police in the country have given room for

an impression in the minds of public, that whenever there is a

crime, investigation usually means rounding up all persons

concerned (say all servants in the event of a theft in the

employer's house, or all acquaintances of the deceased, in the

event of a murder) and subjecting them to third-degree

interrogation in the hope that someone will spill the beans. This

impression may not be correct, but instances are not wanting

where police have resorted to such a practice. Lack of training in

scientific investigative methods, lack of modern equipment, lack

of adequate personnel, and lack of a mindset respecting human

rights, are generally the reasons for such illegal action. One

other main reason is that the public (and men in power) expect

results from police in too short a span of time, forgetting that

methodical and scientific investigation is a time consuming and

lengthy process. Police are branded as inefficient even when

there is a short delay in catching the culprits in serious crimes.

The expectation of quick results in high-profile or heinous

crimes builds enormous pressure on the police to somehow

'catch' the 'offender'. The need to have quick results tempts

them to resort to third degree methods. They also tend to arrest

"someone" in a hurry on the basis of incomplete investigation,

just to ease the pressure. Time has come for an attitudinal

change not only in the minds of the police, but also on the part

of the public. Difficulties in criminal investigation and the time

required for such investigation should be recognized, and police

should be allowed to function methodically without interferences

or unnecessary pressures. If police are to perform better, the

public should support them, government should strengthen and

equip them, and men in power should not interfere or belittle

them. The three wings of the Government should encourage,

insist and ensure thorough scientific investigation under proper

legal procedures, followed by prompt and efficient prosecution.

Be that as it may.

24. Custodial violence requires to be tackled from two ends,

that is, by taking measures that are remedial and preventive.

Award of compensation is one of the remedial measures after

the event. Effort should be made to remove the very causes,

which lead to custodial violence, so as to prevent such

occurances. Following steps, if taken, may prove to be effective

preventive measures:

a) Police training should be re-oriented, to bring in a

change in the mindset and attitude of the Police

personnel in regard to investigations, so that they

will recognize and respect human rights, and adopt

thorough and scientific investigation methods.

b) The functioning of lower level Police Officers should

be continuously monitored and supervised by their

superiors to prevent custodial violence and

adherence to lawful standard methods of

investigation.

c) Compliance with the eleven requirements

enumerated in D.K. Basu (supra) should be ensured

in all cases of arrest and detention.

d) Simple and fool-proof procedures should be

introduced for prompt registration of first

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information reports relating to all crimes.

e) Computerization, video-recording, and modern

methods of records maintenance should be

introduced to avoid manipulations, insertions,

substitutions and ante-dating in regard to FIRs,

Mahazars, inquest proceedings, Port-mortem

Reports and Statements of witnesses etc. and to

bring in transparency in action.

f) An independent investigating agency (preferably the

respective Human Rights Commissions or CBI) may

be entrusted with adequate power, to investigate

complaints of custodial violence against Police

personnel and take stern and speedy action followed

by prosecution, wherever necessary.

The endeavour should be to achieve a balanced level of

functioning, where police respect human rights, adhere to law,

and take confidence building measures (CBMs), and at the same

time, firmly deal with organized crime, terrorism, white-collared

crime, deteriorating law and order situation etc.

CONCLUSION :

25. In this case, there is no clear or incontrovertible evidence

about custodial torture, nor any medical report of any injury or

disability. The grievance of the petitioner and his relatives is

against different officers in different Police Stations at different

points of time. More importantly, several of the allegations are

proved to be exaggerated and false. We, therefore, do not

consider this to be a fit case for award of compensation. All

reliefs which should be granted in such a case, have already

been granted by ordering an inquiry by the CBI and ensuring

that the Police Officers named are prosecuted. The law will have

to take own course.

26. This order will not come in the way of any civil court

awarding compensation in an action in tort or the criminal court

awarding compensation under section 357 CPC in the pending

prosecution against any of the officers, if the charges are

established. With the said observations, we dispose of this

petition, as no further reliefs/directions are called for.

27. We record our appreciation for the effort put in by Shri S.

Muralidhar, Amicus Curiae, in presenting the matter.