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PETITIONER:

SUDHAKAR & ANR.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/07/2000

BENCH:

G.B. Pattanaik, J. R.P. Sethi, J. & Shivaraj V. Patil, J

JUDGMENT:

SETHI, J.

L....I..........T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

Ms.Rakhi, a young girl of about 20 years of age was

working as teacher in Zila Parishad Primary School at

Banegaon, Maharashtra at a monthly salary of Rs.300/-. The

appellant No.1 was the Headmaster and appellant No.2 was a

co-teacher in the same school. On one unfortunate morning

of Saturday, the 9th of July, 1994 Ms.Rakhi went to her

school in the morning as usual. When the school was closed

at about 12o Clock in the afternoon and all students had

gone back to their homes, the appellants came in the room

where Rakhi was sitting and closed the door and windows of

the room. She was forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse

by the appellants and her wailing cries did not have any

effect upon them. She was thus subjected to gang-rape by

the appellants. After the incident Ms.Rakhi went to her

house and narrated the incident to her mother Padmabai,

brother Prakash and uncle Balasaheb @ Balaji. The incident

was also narrated to the father of the prosecutrix who came

back home after two-three days. The matter was reported to

the police on 20th July, 1994. PW15 API Laxman Wadje

incharge police station Pathri recorded the statement of the

prosecutrix and on that basis Crime Report No.100/94 was

registered. Petticoat of the prosecutrix and the metal

bangles which she was wearing at the time of occurrence were

seized. After preparation of Panchanama, the seized

articles were sent to the Chemical Analyser for his report.

On 6.8.1994 statements of two child witnesses, namely,

Dnyaeshwar Mujmul and Dnyaneshwar Adhav were recorded under

Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the

Special Executive Magistrate. Ms.Rakshi was taken for

medical examination to Dr.Gauri Rathod, PW1 who reported

that the prosecutrix had been subjected to sexual

intercourse in the recent past. On completion of the

investigation the charge- sheet was filed against both the

appellants in the court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,

Pathri, who committed them to the Court of Sessions Judge to

stand their trial for the offences under Section 376 read

with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. After the matter

was reported to the police, the prosecutrix was sent to stay

with her married sister Saraswatibai PW14 as it was found

that she had lost her equilibrium of mind and was mentally

upset. Having failed to withstand the humiliation to which

she was subjected to on account of rape committed by the

appellants, Ms.Rakhi is stated to have committed suicide on

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22nd December, 1994 at about 10.30 p.m. at the house of her

sister Saraswatibai. Autopsy was conducted on the same date

and the cause of death was reported as poisoning. In view

of the subsequent development additional charge under

Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC was added against the

appellants on 8.5.1995. Both the accused pleaded not guilty

and claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined 18

witnesses. However, at the trial except PW1 Gauri Rathod,

PW2 Padmabai, PW3 Gangadhar, PW12 Dr.Anandgaonkar, PW13

Sanjay Deshpande, PW14 Saraswatibai and PW15 ASI Wadje, the

other witnesses turned hostile. The Trial Judge of the

Sessions Court, however, vide his judgment dated 12.7.1995

in Sessions Case No.135/94 convicted the appellants under

Section 376(2)(g) read with Section 34 of the IPC and

sentenced each one of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment

of seven years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in

default of payment of fine, the appellants were directed to

suffer further rigorous imprisonment for three months. The

appellants were also convicted and sentenced for the

offences punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34

IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a

period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each, in

default of payment of fine, they were to suffer rigorous

imprisonment for one month more. Both these sentences were

directed to run concurrently. Criminal appeal filed by the

appellants was dismissed vide the order impugned in this

appeal. Not satisfied with the findings of the Courts below

the appellants have preferred the present appeal with prayer

for setting aside their conviction and sentence and

acquitting them of the charges. Learned counsel appearing

for the appellants has submitted that though apparently the

nature of the crime appears to be heinous, yet, in the

circumstances of the case the appellants cannot be convicted

and sentenced as according to him the prosecution has

miserably failed to place any legal evidence against them.

It is contended that the evidence relied upon by the courts

below is inadmissible in evidence. The prosecution is

stated to have failed to explain the delay in lodging the

First Information Report and getting the prosecutrix

medically examined. It is submitted that in the absence of

exact cause of death of Ms.Rakhi the appellants could not be

held guilty for the commission of the crime punishable under

Section 306 IPC. It is not disputed that the prosecutrix

reported the matter at the police station Pathri on 20th

July, 1994 admittedly after about 11 days from the day of

occurrence. It is also not disputed that the statement of

the prosecutrix could not be recorded before any Judicial

Magistrate or the Criminal Court. It is, however, not

denied that her statement Exhibit 59 was recorded by PW15 on

20th July, 1994 in which she had narrated the whole incident

and explained the delay for not lodging the report earlier.

The courts below have relied upon the aforesaid statement

treating as dying declaration being admissible in evidence

under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Admissibility of the

statement of Ms.Rakhi is of paramount importance for

deciding the present appeal. If the statement is held to be

admissible in evidence, being the dying declaration of

Ms.Rakhi, the appellants may not escape of their liability

to conviction and sentence as there exists other

corroborative evidence against them. However, if the

aforesaid report/statement is not admissible in evidence,

the appellants may be entitled to all consequential legal

benefits. In that event the offence of rape may not be held

to have been proved against them and if rape is not proved,

the appellants cannot be held responsible for the commission

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of the offence under Section 306 of the IPC. Section 32 of

the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule of

exclusion of the hearsy evidence. Statement of a witness,

written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is

dead or cannot be found or who has become incapable of

giving evidence or whose attendance cannot procured without

an amount of delay or expense, are deemed relevant facts

under the circumstances specified in Sub- sections 1 to 8.

Sub-section (1) of Section 32 with which we are concerned,

provides that when the statement is made by a person as to

the cause of his death or as to any circumstances of the

transaction which resulted in his death, being relevant

fact, is admissible in evidence. Such statements are

commonly known as dying declarations. Such statements are

admitted in evidence on the principle of necessity. In case

of homicidal deaths, statements made by the deceased is

admissible only to the extent of proving the cause and

circumstances of his death. To attract the provisions of

Section 32 for the purposes of admissibility of the

statement of a deceased, it has to be proved that: (a) The

statement sought to be admitted was made by a person who is

dead or who cannot be found or whose attendance cannot be

procured without an amount of delay and expense or is

incapable of giving evidence. (b) Such statement should

have been made under any of the circumstances specified in

sub-sections 1 to 8 of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. As

distinguished from the English Law Section 32 does not

require that such a statement should have been made in

expectation of death. Statement of the victim who is dead

is admissible in so far as it refers to cause of his death

or as to any circumstances of the transaction which resulted

in his death. The words "as to any of the circumstances of

the transaction which resulted in his death" appearing in

Section 32 must have some proximate relation to the actual

occurrence. In other words the statement of the deceased

relating to the cause of death or the circumstances of the

transaction which resulted in his death must be sufficiently

or closely connected with the actual transaction. Due

weight is required to be given to a dying declaration

keeping in view the legal maxim "Nemo moriturus praesumitur

mentire" i.e. a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in

his mouth. To make such statement as substantive evidence,

the person or the agency relying upon it is under a legal

obligation to prove the making of a statement as a fact. If

it is in writing, the scribe must be produced in the Court

and if it is verbal, it should be proved by examining the

person who heard the deceased making the statement.

However, in cases where the original recorded dying

declaration is proved to have been lost and not available,

the prosecution is entitled to give secondary evidence

thereof. In this case the statement of the prosecutrix

Exhibit P-59 does not directly state any fact regarding the

cause of her death. At the most it could be stretched to

say referring to "circumstances of the transaction"

resulting in her death. The phrase "circumstances of the

transaction" were considered and explained in Pakala

Narayana Swami v. Emperor [AIR 1939 PC 47]: "The

circumstances must be circumstances of the transaction:

general expressions indicating fear or suspicion whether of

a particular individual or otherwise and not directly

related to the occasion of the death will not be admissible.

But statements made by the deceased that he was proceeding

to the spot where he was in fact killed, or as to his

reasons for so proceeding, or that he was going to meet a

particular persons, or that he had been invited by such

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person to meet him would each of them be circumstances of

the transaction, and would be so whether the person was

unknown, or was not the person accused. Such a statement

might indeed be exculpatory of the person accused.

"Circumstances of the transaction" is a phrase no doubt that

coveys some limitations. It is not as broad as the

analogous use in "circumstantial evidence" which includes

evidence of all relevant facts. It is on the other hand

narrower than "res gestae". Circumstances must have some

proximate relation to the actual occurrence: though, as for

instance, in a case of prolonged poisoning they may be

related to dates at a considerable distance from the date of

the actual fatal dose. It will be observed that "the

circumstances" are of the transaction which resulted in the

death of the declarant. It is not necessary that there

should be a known transaction other than that the death of

the declarant has ultimately been caused, for the condition

of the admissibility of the evidence is that "the cause of

(the declarant's) death comes into question".

The death referred to in Section 32(1) of the Evidence

Act includes suicidal besides homicidal death. Fazal Ali,

J. in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra

[1984 (4) SCC 116] after referring to the decisions of this

Court in Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1952 SCR

1091], Dharambir Singh vs. State of Punjab[Criminal Appeal

No.98 of 1958, decided on November 4, 1958], Ratan Gond v.

State of Bihar [1959 SCR 1336], Pakala Narayana Swami

(supra), Shiv Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh [Criminal

Appeal No.55 of 1966, decided on July 29, 1966], Mahnohar

Lal v. State of Punjab[1981 Cri.LJ 1373 (P&H)] and other

cases, held: "We fully agree with the above observations

made by the learned Judges. In Protima Dutta v. State

[1977 (81) Cal WN 713] while relying on Hanumant Case the

Calcutta High Court has clearly pointed out the nature and

limits of the doctrine of proximity and has observed that in

some cases where there is a sustained cruelty, the proximate

may extend even to a period of three years. In this

connection, the high Court observed thus:

The 'transaction' in this case is systematic ill-

treatment for years since the marriage of Sumana and

incitement to end her life. Circumstances of the

transaction include evidence of cruelty which produces a

state of mind favourable to suicide. Although that would

not by itself be sufficient unless there was evidence of

incitement to end her life it would be relevant as evidence.

This observation taken as a whole would, in my view,

imply that the time factor is not always a criterion in

determining whether the piece of evidence is properly

included within 'circumstances of transaction'...'In that

case the allegation was that there was sustained cruelty

extending over a period of three years interspersed with

exhortation to the victim to end her life'. His Lordship

further observed and held that the evidence of cruelty was

one continuous chain, several links of which were touched up

by the exhortations to die. 'Thus evidence of cruelty,

ill-treatment and exhortation to end her life adduced in the

case must be held admissible, together with the statement of

Nilima (who committed suicide) in that regard which related

to circumstances terminating in suicide'.

Similarly, in Onkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1974

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Cri.LJ 1200] while following the decision of the Privy

Council in Pakala Narayana Swami case, the Madhya Pradesh

High Court has explained the nature of the circumstances

contemplated by Section 32 of the Evidence Act thus:

The circumstances must have some proximate relation to

the actual occurrence and they can only include the acts

done when and where the death was caused....Thus a statement

merely suggesting motive for a crime cannot be admitted in

evidence unless it is so intimately connected with the

transaction itself as to be a circumstance of the

transaction. In the instant case evidence has been led

about statements made by the deceased long before this

incident which may suggest motive for the crime.

In Allijan Munshi v. State [AIR 1960 Bom 290] the

Bombay High Court has taken a similar view.

In Chinnavalayan v. State of Madras [1959 Mad LJ 246]

two eminent Judges of the Madras High Court while dealing

with the connotation of the word 'circumstances' observed

thus:

The special circumstances permitted to transgress the

time factor is, for example, a case of prolonged poisoning,

while the special circumstances permitted to transgress the

distance factor is, for example, a case of decoying with

intent to murder. This is because the natural meaning of

the words, according to their Lordships, do not convey any

of the limitations such as (1) that the statement must be

made after the transaction has taken place, (2) that the

person making it must be at any rate near death, (3) that

the circumstances can only include acts done when and where

the death was caused. But the circumstances must be

circumstances of the transaction and they must have some

proximate relation to the actual occurrence.

Before closing this chapter we might state that the

Indian law on the question of the nature and scope of dying

declaration has made a distinct departure from the English

Law where only the statements which directly relate to the

cause of death are admissible. The second part of clause

(1) of Section 32, viz., "the circumstances of the

transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which

the cause of that person's death comes into question" is not

to be found in the English Law. This distinction has been

clearly pointed out in the case of Rajindra Kumar v. State

[AIR 1960 Punj 310] where the following observations were

made:

Clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act

provides that statements, written or verbal, of relevant

facts made by a person who is dead,....are themselves

relevant facts when the statement is made by a person as to

the cause of his death, or as to why of the circumstances of

the transaction which resulted in his death... It is well

settled by now that there is difference between the Indian

Rule and the English Rule with regard to the necessity of

the declaration having been made under expectation of death.

In the English Law the declaration should have been

made under the sense of impending death whereas under the

Indian Law it is not necessary for the admissibility of a

dying declaration that the deceased at the time of making it

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should have been under the expectation of death.

Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above

and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act,

the following propositions emerge:

(1) Section 32 is an exception of the rule of hearsay

and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies,

whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the

statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits

circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as

indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the

peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature

and character of our people, has thought it necessary to

widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.

(2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally

construed and practically reduced to a cut-and- dried

formula of universal application so as to be confined in a

straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with

the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death

is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in

process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the

statement regarding each step directly connected with the

end of the drama would be admissible because the entire

statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not

torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or

furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as

being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest

that all these statements come to light only after the death

of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where

the death takes place within a very short time of the

marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more

than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under

Section 32.

(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is year

another exception to the rule that in criminal law the

evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given

an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would

be valueless because the place of cross- examination is

taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple

reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to

make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to

show that the statement was secured either by prompting or

tutoring.

(4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does

not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence

all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case

of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of

suicide.

(5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and

letters written by the deceased which are directly connected

with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale

story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four

corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The

distance of time alone in such cases would not make the

statement irrelevant."

In Ratan Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh [1997 (4)

SCC 161] this Court held that the expression "circumstances

of transaction which resulted in his death" mean that there

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need not necessarily be a direct nexus between the

circumstances and death. Even distant circumstance can

become admissible if it has nexus with the transaction which

resulted in death. Relying upon Sharad Birdhichand Sarda's

case (supra) the Court held that: "It is enough if the

words spoken by the deceased have reference to any

circumstance which has connection with any of the

transactions which ended up in the death of the deceased.

Such statement would also fall within the purview of Section

32(1) of the Evidence Act. In other words, it is not

necessary that such circumstance should be proximate, for,

even distant circumstances can also become admissible under

the sub-section, provided it has nexus with the transaction

which resulted in the death."

In Najjam Faraghi @ Nijjam Faruqui v. State of West

Bengal [1998 (2) SCC 45] this Court held that the death of

declarant long after making the dying declaration did not

mean that such a statement lost its value merely because the

person making the statement lived for a longer time than

expected. But to make the statement admissible, it has to

be shown that the statement made was the cause of the death

or with respect to the circumstances of the transaction

which resulted in his death. The facts mentioned in the

statement are, however, required to be shown connected with

the cause of the death whether directly or indirectly.

Rejecting the contention that as the injuries caused as

mentioned in the dying declaration were indirectly

responsible for the cause of death, the statement of the

deceased could not be admitted in evidence, this Court in

G.S. Walia v. State of Punjab [1998 (5) SCC 150] held:

"Therefore, there is no substance in the contention raised

by Mr.U.R. Lalit that the injuries were only directly

responsible for causing death of Balwant Singh and as his

death cannot be said to have been caused due to the injuries

caused, the statement made by him would not fall within

Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. In view of our

finding on this point the decision in Imperatrix v. Rudra,

[ILR (1900) 25 Bom 45: 2 Bom LR 331], Abdul Gani Bandukchi

v. Emperor [AIR 1943 Cal 465:47 CWN 332:45 Cril.LJ 71],

Mallappa Shivlingappa Chanagi, Re [AIR 1962 Mys 82: (1962)

1 Cri.LJ 619] and Moti Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964 SC

900: (1964) 1 Cri.LJ 727] relied upon by Mr.Lalit are of no

help to him. In all these cases, the court had held that

there was no evidence or that the evidence led was

insufficient to prove that the deceased had died as a result

of injuries caused to him. As the statement of Balwant

Singh related to the cause of his death it was admissible in

evidence under Section 32 and the High Court was in error in

holding otherwise."

In the light of the legal position noticed hereinabove,

let us examine the statement of deceased prosecutrix Exhibit@@

JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

P-59 to decide whether such a statement can be admitted in@@

JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

evidence, relied upon and made a basis for conviction and

sentence of the accused. In that statement, admittedly

recorded after 11 days of the day of occurrence, she had

stated: "I am serving in Balwade of Banegaon from 2.2.92 as

a teacher. The name of my mother is Padmabai and my father

is Gangadharrao. I have one brother namely Prakash and four

sisters. I am living with my brother Prakash at Banegon and

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my father and mother are living at Mazalgaon and my mother

had come to Banegaon before 15 days.

In Banegaon the classes of Zila Parishad Primary School

are held up to 4th Class from the Balwadi. There are two

teachers in our school namely (1) Sudhakar Gndapin Bhujbal

(2) Bhaskar Babwrao Kedre and I am working as a Balwadi

Teacher getting Rs.300/- per month. The timing of our

school is from 9.00 to 16.00' O Clock but the Balwade

classes work from 9.00 to 12.00' O clock. The headmaster of

our school is Sudhakar Bhujbal.

Eversince I have joined my service Sudhakar Bhujbal and

Bhaskar Kedre are teasing me. Sudhakar Bhujbal always says

that your sari looks very nice will you come to see the

picture with me? That by asking this they try to talk with

me. Before six months Sudhakar Bhujbal had touched my cheek

and waist. I was afraid at that time. But due to the fear

of defamation I did not tell anything to any person and

because of it they had been adoring to proceed.

On 1.7.94 on Saturday 8/9'O clock in the morning I had

gone to my school in a routine way Bhaskar Kedre and Sudhkar

Bhujbal had also come to the school. The school was closed

at 12'O clock in theafternoon. All the boys and girls had

went back to their home. That Bhaskar Kedre had closed the

windows of the school and Sudhakar Bhujbal had closed the

door and came near to me. Then he had removed his pant. At

that time he was wearing ready made underwear. Thereafter

Sudhakar Bhujbal had caught hold of me and put me on the

ground. And at that time Bhaskar Kedre had hold my hands.

I was crying for my mother and trying to get up. But they

did not allow me to get up. Sudhakar Bhujbal had removed

his under pant and had lifted up my sari and petticot and

pressed my breast. After that he has entered his male organ

into my vagina and had committed sexual inter course

forcibly with me. After that Sudhakar Bhujbal had hold my

hands and Bhaskar Kedre had removed his pant. At that time

he was earing reddish cotton underwear then he had removed

his underwear and caught my both breasts and entered his

male organ into my vagina and has committed sexual inter

course with me forcibly.

It was 12.30 in the afternoon at that time. Then both

of them had worn their pants and went I was crying and went

to my house and informed this incident to my mother Padmabai

brother Prakash and uncle Balaji. After this they had

called my father from Mazalgaon and narrated to him this

incident. We had not filed any complaint due to the fear of

defamation in the society. Bhaskar Kedre and Sudhakar

Bhujbal both of them have done sexual inter course with me

on 9.7.94 in the after noon at 12.30. Therefore inquiry

should be made against them."

There is no legal evidence on record that the

prosecutrix at or about the time of making the statement had@@

JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

disclosed her mind for committing suicide allegedly on@@

JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

account of the humiliation to which she was subjected to on

account of rape committed on her person. The prosecution

evidence does not even disclose the cause of death of the

deceased. The circumstances stated in Exhibit P-59 do not

suggest that a person making such a statement would, under

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the normal circumstances, commit suicide after more than

five and a half months. The High Court was, therefore, not

justified in relying upon Exhibit P-59 as a dying

declaration holding it that the said statement was in series

of circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the

death of the deceased on 21.12.1994. The conviction of the

persons accused of offences cannot be based upon

conjunctions and suspicions. Statement Exhibit P-59 if not

treated as a dying declaration, there is no cogent and

reliable evidence which can connect the accused with the

commission of the crime. In that event the other arguments

advanced on behalf of the appellants assume importance.

Other circumstances such as delay in lodging the FIR,

medical examination of the prosecutrix, the non examination

of material witnesses and turning hostile of witnesses

including the Dnyaeshwar Mujmul and Dnyaneshwar Adhav are

also required to be taken note of. It has also to be kept

in mind that after the incident on 9th July, 1994, the

prosecutrix is shown to have attended the school on 10th and

11th July, 1994 as well. Her mother in cross- examination

also stated that Ms.Rakhi had told her about the incident

only on 12th July, 1994 at about 5.00 p.m. PW3, the father

of the prosecutrix deposed in the court that: "Rakhi did

not tell me on 17th, 18th, 19th July, 1994 that she wanted

to file a complaint. I did not ask Rakhi whatever she

wanted to file a criminal complaint. I did not disclose

before the police on 20.7.1994 that Rakhi told me that she

wanted to file criminal complaint."

We are, therefore, of the opinion that prosecution has

failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the

appellants had committed forcible sexual intercourse with

Ms.Rakhi on 9.7.1994 under the circumstances as narrated in

Exhibit P-59 and relied upon by the courts below. The

appellants cannot be convicted and sentenced merely on

suspicion. In the absence of the charge being proved under

Section 376 IPC, the prosecution could not have asked for

conviction of the appellants under Section 306 of the IPC as

according to the prosecution it was the commission of the

rape on her person which resulted in the suicide of

Ms.Rakhi, allegedly on the abetment of the appellants. If

the cause for committing suicide is not legally proved, the

appellants cannot be held responsible for the abetment of

the ultimate offence of suicide. We are, therefore, of the

opinion that as the prosecution has failed to prove its case

against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt, they are

entitled to acquittal. Before parting with the judgment we

would, however, observe that in the present case the

investigating as well as the prosecution agency has not

acted promptly and diligently as was expected under the

circumstances. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the

judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appellants be

released forthwith unless required in some other case.