2026 INSC 442 Crl.Appeal No…2026@SLP(Crl)No.1088 of 2026

Crl.Appeal No…2026@SLP(Crl)No.1133 of 2026 Page 1 of 19

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _______ OF 2026

(@ of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1088 of 2026)

SUJAL VISHWAS ATTAVAR & ANR. ...APPELLANT(S)

vs.

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA &

ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. _______ OF 2026

(@ of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1133 of 2026)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

Leave Granted.

2. The appellant(s) have preferred the present appeal(s)

against the impugned interim order dated 17.12.2025 passed by

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the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.5154

of 2025, whereby the High Court had directed the police to record

the statement of Director, Mrs. Asha Shivajirao Sanap, of E & G

Global Estates Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Complainant

Company’) and initiate necessary action as per provisions of law.

Pursuant to the said direction, FIR

1

No.0194/2025 came to be

registered against the present appellant(s).

3. Although the question raised in this appeal is one of

relative simplicity i.e., whether under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India a direction could be given to State

Authorities to register an FIR without the applicant first having

taken recourse to the alternative remedies provided in law. This

question however arises from a convoluted set of facts involving

various commercial transactions and as such it would be

important for the purposes of clarity to appreciate the same.

3.1 The property in question, bearing Gut No.82

situated at Mouje Talwade, Trimbakeshwar, District

Nashik, was purchased by the complainant Company

(Respondent No.2 herein) vide a Sale Deed dated

11.10.2010 and was thereafter developed into a leisure

resort named as ‘E&G Green Valley’ comprising of 22

1

Short for ‘First Information Report’.

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villas (Unit No.1 to 22) and a composite Unit No.23

consisting of studio apartments and allied structures.

3.2 Upon its completion, the complainant Company

executed an Agreement to Lease dated 31.03.2012 in

favour M/s. E & G Resorts Pvt. Ltd., a Company in which

respondent no.7

2

is the Director. It is alleged that a

registered Lease Deed dated 27.06.2014 was fraudulently

executed between the complainant Company and M/s. E &

G Resorts Pvt. Ltd., in respect of Unit No.23, pursuant to

which possession of the said unit was taken over by the

latter as a lessee.

3.3 Subsequently, since the complainant Company was

classified as a Non-Performing Asset, a Corporate

Insolvency Resolution Process

3

was initiated and vide

order dated 24.06.2020, a statutory moratorium under

Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016

4

came into force.

3.4 It is the case of the complainant Company that

during the subsistence of the aforesaid moratorium, M/s.

E&G Resorts Pvt. Ltd., executed a sub-lease deed dated

2

Mrs. Sheetal Vishwas Attavar – Appellant No.1 in Crl A@SLP (Crl) No.1133/2026.

3

Hereinafter ‘CIRP’.

4

Hereinafter ‘IBC’.

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14.10.2022 in favour of respondent no.7 – Mrs. Sheetal

Vishwas Attavar. Under the guise of said sub-lease deed,

respondent no.7 along with the present appellants(s) is

alleged to have asserted rights over the entire project

including Unit No.23 and began collecting maintenance

charge, creating third-party interests and carrying out

unauthorized constructions causing inconvenience to other

lessees.

3.5 Consequently, multiple civil suits were instituted

inter se the parties, including suits challenging the validity

of the sub-lease deed dated 14.10.2022 and seeking an

injunction from creating encumbrances or third-party

rights. It is not in dispute that such civil proceedings are

presently pending adjudication before competent Courts.

3.6 The genesis of the criminal allegations, however,

arise from certain events stated to have occurred between

December 2024 and April 2025. It is alleged that the

accused persons, including the present appellant(s),

submitted an application for measurement of the property

on 02.04.2025 in the name of the complainant Company

using forged documents and fabricated details and

signatures. It is further alleged that during the survey on

19.04.2025, a woman impersonated herself as the Director

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of the complainant Company, namely Mrs. Asha

Shivajirao Sanap, and misled the Revenue officials into

completing the measurement process. According to the

complainant Company, the aforesaid acts were undertaken

with an intent to regularize the alleged unauthorized

constructions and assert control over the property,

particularly after the complainant had, in September 2024,

directed certain lessees, including the appellant(s), to

remove encroachments and illegal structures.

3.7 Upon discovering these facts in June 2025, the

complainant Company, through Mrs. Asha Shivajirao

Sanap, filed complaints dated 13.06.2025 and 09.07.2025

before the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records Office,

Trimbakeshwar, alleging commission of forgery,

impersonation and fraud in the measurement application

and sought registration of FIR.

3.8 The matter was considered by the Land Records

Authority, and a hearing was conducted; however, by letter

dated 29.07.2025, the Authority declined to take any

coercive action and advised the complainant to seek

redressal from the competent authority. The relevant part

of the letter is extracted below:

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“Subsequently, in connection with your above

mentioned complaint application regarding the above

reference, the date of 16.7.2025 was fixed by giving

notice to the survey applicant and you/the complainant

to present your respective statements. … It was found

that you have not filed the survey application for the said

Gut No. 82 nor paid the survey fee. You stated in the

complaint application and during the hearing that the

said survey application should be disposed of without

action. Looking at the points mentioned in your

complaint application, it is your contention that a third

party has filed the application by providing forged

documents in your name. You have also mentioned in the

complaint application you/the company and the lessees

of the said property are in a court dispute and that sale of

the said property is mutual, etc. Despite being served

with the hearing notice, the holders who filed the survey

application were not present for the said hearing.

Therefore, considering your complaint application, the

statement filed by you at the time of the hearing, and all

the documents submitted, it would be appropriate for

you to seek redressal from the competent authority ,if

necessary, regarding the said property dispute”

(emphasis supplied)

3.9 On the same date, the Deputy Superintendent of

Land Records, Trimbakeshwar, also wrote a letter to the

Police Inspector, Trimbakeshwar, bringing to notice the

allegations of fake measurement and stated:

“Sir,

In the above-referenced complaint applications dated

13.06.2025 and 09.07.2025 of M/s E. and G. Global

Estate Ltd., it has been stated that a fake measurement

application for Gut No. 82 at Village Talwade (Tr) by

forging signatures and other documents, including

Aadhaar cards, has been uploaded online to the Office of

the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records,

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Trimbakeshwar. Looking at the contents of the

application, fake measurement applications and

documents are, mentioned therein. It is requested that

appropriate legal action be taken from your level

following the investigation of the facts as per the

complainant's demand.”

3.10 In response, the Police Authorities, by letter dated

01.09.2025, returned the matter to the Land Records

Department, for further inquiry stating that:

“… Upon reviewing the said complaint application, the

nature of the matter in the application is very serious and

since this matter is related to your office, it is necessary

that the redressal of this matter be done by your

department. If there is anything contrary to the rules in

this matter, a written complaint to that effect should be

given to this office by your office.

Therefore, the original complaint application and

photocopies of the referenced applications numbered 01

to 09 are being returned to your office for further,

inquiry.”

(emphasis supplied)

3.11 Aggrieved thereby, the complainant Company

invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia,

seeking:

“ … … …

b. pending hearing and final disposal of this Petition, this

Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct the Respondent No.3

Senior Police Inspector, Trimbakeshwar Police Station,

Nashik to forthwith register offence punishable under

Section 318, 336, 319 and other allied provisions under

Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, forthwith against the

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Respondent Nos.6 to 10 and such other persons who

have aided and abetted Respondent Nos.6 to 10 in

committing aforesaid offence;”

3.12 The High Court vide the impugned interim order

dated 17.12.2025, without issuing notice, directed the

Director of the complainant Company to appear before

the police for recording of her statement and further

directed that action be taken in accordance with law. The

order is extracted in toto as under:

“1) Learned APP on instructions from Mr. Mulane,

PC., Trimbakeshwar Police Station submitted that, let

the Director of Petitioner attend the Office of Senior

Inspector of Police, Trimbakeshwar Police Station,

District Nashik, tomorrow i.e. 18

th

December 2025, by

11.00 a.m., to record her statement.

1.1) That, after recording the statement of the

Director of Petitioner, necessary action as per the

provisions of law will be initiated.

2) At the request of learned APP, stand over to 22

nd

December 2025.”

3.13 Pursuant thereto, the police registered FIR

No.0194/2025 dated 23.12.2025 against the appellant(s)

under Sections 318(2), 318(4), 319, 335, 336(2), 336(3),

337, 338, 340(2), and 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita 2023

5

.

5

Hereinafter ‘BNS 2023’.

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4. In that view of the matter, the accused-appellant(s) are

before us contending that the registration of the FIR is a direct

consequence of the directions issued in writ proceedings, and is

therefore, contrary to law since alternative remedies available

under the statutory framework have not been exhausted. It is

further contended that the FIR has been lodged as a counterblast

to the civil disputes pending between the parties. We have heard

the learned senior counsel for the appellant(s) and learned

counsel for the respondent(s) as also perused the material placed

on record.

5. At the outset, it would be apposite to reiterate the settled

principle of law governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction. While

the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India is wide, it is well established that such

jurisdiction is extraordinary, discretionary and subject to certain

self-imposed restrictions. In Radha Krishan Industries v. State

of H.P.

6

, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has summarized the

principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High

Court in the presence of an alternative remedy and held as under:

“27. The principles of law which emerge are that:

27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue

writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of

fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.

6

(2021) 6 SCC 771

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27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ

petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High

Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the

aggrieved person.

27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a)

the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a

fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b)

there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c)

the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d)

the vires of a legislation is challenged.

27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court

of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an

appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be

entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by

law.

27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes

the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort

must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking

the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution.

This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy,

convenience and discretion.

27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High

Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition.

However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the

nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ

jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.”

(emphasis supplied)

[See also: Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes

7

and

Whirlpool Corporation. v. Registrar of Trade Marks

8

]

7

AIR 1964 SC 1419.

8

(1998) 8 SCC 1.

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5.1 Similarly, very recently this Court in Rikhab Chand Jain

v. Union of India

9

held as under:

“10. We may profitably refer, in this context, to the Constitution

Bench decision in Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of

Taxes [(1964) 15 STC 468 (SC); 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13; AIR

1964 SC 1419.] . In Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of

Taxes [(1964) 15 STC 468 (SC); 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13; AIR

1964 SC 1419.] , this court had the occasion to lay down a

principle of law which is salutary and not to be found in any

other previous decision rendered by it. The principle, plainly, is

that, if a remedy is available to a party before the High Court in

another jurisdiction, the writ jurisdiction should not normally be

exercised on a petition under article 226, for, that would allow

the machinery set up by the concerned statute to be bye-passed.

The relevant passage from the decision reads as follows (page

474 in 15 STC):

“… The jurisdiction of the High Court under article

226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and

the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions

except the territorial restrictions which are expressly

provided in the article. But the exercise of the

jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely

because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of

the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be

exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations.

Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an

alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained

in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute.

Ordinarily the court will not entertain a petition for a

writ under article 226, where the petitioner has an

alternative remedy, which, without being unduly

onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy.

Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a

determination of questions which demand an

elaborate examination of evidence to establish the

right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High

Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal

against the decision of a court or Tribunal, to correct

9

2025 SCC OnLine 2510.

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errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction

under article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy

provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is

open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another

Tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for

obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute,

the High Court normally will not permit, by

entertaining a petition under article 226 of the

Constitution, the machinery created under the statute

to be by-passed, and will leave the party applying to

it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.”

(emphasis ours)

12. That apart, the majority view in a previous Constitution

Bench in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of

Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani [1961 SCC OnLine

SC 16; AIR 1961 SC 1506.] reads thus:

“14… ., we must express our dissent from the

reasoning by which the learned judges of the High

Court held that the writ petitioner was absolved from

the normal obligation to exhaust his statutory

remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of the High

Court under article 226 of the Constitution. If a

petitioner has disabled himself from availing himself

of the statutory remedy by his own fault in not doing

so within the prescribed time, he cannot certainly be

permitted to urge that as a ground for the court dealing

with his petition under article 226 to exercise its

discretion in his favour. Indeed, the second passage

extracted from the judgment of the learned C.J.

in State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh [1957 SCC

OnLine SC 21; AIR 1958 SC 86.] with its reference

to the right to appeal being lost ‘through no fault of

his own’ emphasizes this aspect of the Rule.”

(emphasis ours)

In essence, this court was of the opinion that once a petitioner has

due to his own fault disabled himself from availing a statutory

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remedy, the discretionary remedy under article 226 may not be

available.”

6. In the same vein, this Court has duly considered the

question as to whether the remedy under Article 226 can be

availed of if there exists inaction and/or nonaction by the police

in registering the FIR relating to a cognizable offence. We may

refer to few such pronouncements:

6.1 In Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P.

10

, a co-ordinate

Bench of this Court observed:

“11. In this connection we would like to state that if a

person has a grievance that the police station is not

registering his FIR under Section 154 CrPC, then he

can approach the Superintendent of Police under

Section 154(3) CrPC by an application in writing.

Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in

the sense that either the FIR is still not registered, or

that even after registering it no proper investigation is

held, it is open to the aggrieved person to file an

application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the

learned Magistrate concerned. …

… … …

25. … we often find that when someone has a

grievance that his FIR has not been registered at the

police station and/or a proper investigation is not

being done by the police, he rushes to the High Court

to file a writ petition or a petition under Section 482

CrPC. We are of the opinion that the High Court

should not encourage this practice and should

ordinarily refuse to interfere in such matters and

relegate the petitioner to his alternating remedy…

26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not

been registered by the police station his first remedy

10

(2008) 2 SCC 409.

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is to approach the Superintendent of Police under

Section 154(3) CrPC or other police officer referred

to in Section 36 CrPC. If despite approaching the

Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to in

Section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can

approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC

instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ

petition or a petition under Section 482 CrPC.

Moreover, he has a further remedy of filing a criminal

complaint under Section 200 CrPC. Why then should

writ petitions or Section 482 petitions be entertained

when there are so many alternative remedies?

27. As we have already observed above, the

Magistrate has very wide powers to direct registration

of an FIR and to ensure a proper investigation and for

this purpose he can monitor the investigation to

ensure that the investigation is done properly (though

he cannot investigate himself). The High Court

should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition

or petition under Section 482 CrPC simply because a

person has a grievance that his FIR has not been

registered by the police, or after being registered,

proper investigation has not been done by the police.

…

28. It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute

bar to a writ petition, but it is equally well settled that

if there is an alternative remedy the High Court

should not ordinarily interfere.”

(emphasis supplied)

[See also: All India Institute of Medical Sciences Employees'

Union (Regd.) v. Union of India

11

; Aleque Padamsee v. Union

11

(1996) 11 SCC 582.

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of India

12

; M. Subramaniam v. S. Janaki

13

; and Anurag

Bhatnagar v. State (NCT of Delhi)

14

]

6.2 Following the law laid in Sakiri Vasu (supra), this

Court in Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant

Dhage

15

, observed as under:

“2. This Court has held in Sakiri Vasu v. State of

U.P. [Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409

: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440 : AIR 2008 SC 907], that if

a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been

registered by the police, or having been registered,

proper investigation is not being done, then the

remedy of the aggrieved person is not to go to the

High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India, but to approach the Magistrate concerned under

Section 156(3) CrPC. … We have said this in Sakiri

Vasu case [Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC

409 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440 : AIR 2008 SC 907]

because what we have found in this country is that the

High Courts have been flooded with writ petitions

praying for registration of the first information report

or praying for a proper investigation.

3. We are of the opinion that if the High Courts

entertain such writ petitions, then they will be flooded

with such writ petitions and will not be able to do any

other work except dealing with such writ petitions.

Hence, we have held that the complainant must avail

of his alternate remedy to approach the Magistrate

concerned under Section 156(3) CrPC and if he does

so, the Magistrate will ensure, if prima facie he is

satisfied, registration of the first information report

12

(2007) 6 SCC 171.

13

(2020) 16 SCC 728.

14

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1514.

15

(2016) 6 SCC 277.

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and also ensure a proper investigation in the matter,

and he can also monitor the investigation.”

(emphasis supplied)

7. Keeping in view the above exposition of law, we find that

the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India ought not to have been invoked when

alternative equally efficacious statutory remedies were available.

If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered

by the police, or having been registered, proper investigation is

not being conducted, then the remedy does not ordinarily lie in

invoking the writ jurisdiction in the first instance, but in seeking

recourse to the statutory framework, unless of course the urgency

of the circumstances warrant otherwise.

8. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023

16

(erstwhile

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

17

) provides a structured

sequential mechanism for initiating criminal prosecution. The

statutory framework contemplates that information relating to the

commission of a cognizable offence is first placed before the

officer-in-charge of the police station and an FIR is registered

under Section 173(1) BNSS. In the event of refusal to register the

FIR, recourse lies before the jurisdictional Superintendent of

16

Hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’.

17

Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’.

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Police under Section 173(4) BNSS and, thereafter, before the

Magistrate, under Section 175(3) BNSS.

9. In the present case, it is evident from the record that the

complainant Company initially approached the Land Record

Authority, by way of complaints dated 13.06.2025 and

09.07.2025, with copies thereof being sent to the police authority.

However, it did not avail any of the statutory remedies provided

under BNSS and instead directly invoked the writ jurisdiction of

the High Court, inter alia, seeking directions for registration of

FIR. In our considered view, such a recourse, in the first instance,

is contrary to the settled principles of law. Particularly in the

absence of imminent danger of violation of life or liberty of an

individual. Article 226 is not a panacea for all grievances.

10. It is not the case of the complainant Company that it had

approached the concerned Superintendent of Police or Magistrate

prior to filing the writ petition, nor has any material been placed

on record to show that such remedies were unavailable or

inefficacious. Entertaining a writ petition, in the said

circumstances, would in effect, result in the High Court, acting

as a forum of first instance thereby bypassing the statutory

scheme in its entirety. This is impermissible, save and except in

special circumstances as mentioned in Radha Krishan

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Industries (supra), which are conspicuously absent in the present

case.

11. The High Court is not bound to entertain a writ petition

merely because a case of alleged inaction or negligence is made

out against a statutory authority. Ordinarily, where a statute

provides a complete and efficacious remedy, the same must be

exhausted before invoking constitutional jurisdiction [See: Sakiri

Vasu (supra) and Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe (supra)]. In the

present facts, the complainant Company, has not exhausted the

sequential statutory remedies available under BNSS. There is,

therefore, no foundation to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction

of the High Court for the reason that efficacious and efficient

alternative remedies exists. Hence, at this stage, we find the

instant writ petition to be premature, and, therefore, not fit to be

entertained.

12. Considering the above, we set aside the impugned interim

order and quash FIR No.0194/2025 registered pursuant thereto.

Liberty is reserved for the parties to espouse alternative remedies,

as may be available, in accordance with law, if so advised. Any

recourse to such a remedy shall be considered on its own merits

by the competent forum.

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13. Nothing contained in the present judgment shall be

construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case or

as to whether or not the facts disclose the commission of any

criminal offence.

14. In view of the above, appeal(s) stand allowed. Pending

application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

…………………………………….J.

(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH )

New Delhi;

May 4, 2026