2026 INSC 53

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 120 OF 2026

SUJATA BORA APPELLANT

VERSUS

COAL INDIA LIMITED & ORS. RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

J. B. PARDIWALA & K. V. VISWANATHAN, J.J.

Lack of physical sight does not equate to a lack of vision.

- Stevie Wonder

1. An advertisement was published by Coal India Limited (CIL) for

recruitment of Management Trainees in 2019. The appellant applied for

the post under the Visually Handicapped (VH) category. appellant was

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selected for the interview. By a communication of 1

st

July 2021 appellant

was called for document verification (DV) and Initial Medical

Examination (IME). The appellant appeared for the IME in September

2021, however, she was declared unfit on the ground that she was not

only suffering from visual disability but also from residuary partial

hemiparesis. Aggrieved the appellant filed WPA No. 970 of 2023 before

the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta.

2. A learned Single Judge (Lapita Banerjee J.) after a thorough

analysis of the relevant provisions of the Rights of Persons with

Disabilities Act, 2016, (for short ‘RPwD Act’) and the relevant

notifications found that CIL being a Public Sector Corporation could not

refuse appointment in the multiple disabilities category and that it was

incumbent upon CIL to suitably modify the recruitment notifications.

The learned Single Judge found that the IME result of 23.09.2021 that

declared the appellant unfit, was liable to be quashed. However, since,

the appellant approached the Court after the completion of the

recruitment process. The Court allowed the appellant to participate in

the ensuing recruitment process (2023) in the reserved category for

persons with disability. The learned Single Judge made it clear that the

recruitment process of the appellant will be considered from the stage

of IME, and if found eligible she will be given appointment as

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Management Trainee upon compliance of all formalities. The learned

Single Judge’s judgment was dated 10.08.2023. It must also be pointed

out that pending the disposal of the writ petition, by an interim order

dated 27.03.2023, one post was ordered to be kept vacant in the cadre

of management trainee (personnel and HR).

3. CIL carried the matter to the Division Bench. The Division Bench,

by the impugned, order found that the writ petition was filed after the

expiry of the panel and even the interim order was passed after the

expiry of panel and hence, directing the authorities to consider the

candidature in respect of the same recruitment process or in the next

recruitment process was not tenable. The Division Bench set aside the

judgment of the Single Judge.

4. Aggrieved, the appellant carried the matter to this Court. This

Court, by multiple orders on 28.11.2025, 12.12.2025 and 18.12.2025,

directed the All India Institute of Medical Sciences to constitute a Board

of experts and for coopting Dr. Satendra Singh who has been working

on disability rights for a long time.

5. The order dated 18.12.2025 which incorporates all the earlier

orders reads as under.

“1. Our order dated 28-11-2025 reads thus:-

1. It is the case of the petitioner that she is a visually

handicapped person with 60% low vision in both eyes and

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also has residual functional partial Hemiparesis.

2. In terms of qualification, the petitioner has graduated with

the degree in Economics and pursued post graduation from

Assam Women's University in MBA (Human Resources).

3. The respondent no.1 is a Maharatna Public Sector

Undertaking under the Ministry of Coal, Government of India.

4. It appears from the materials on record that in pursuance

of the advertisement dated 16.12.2019 issued by the

respondent no.1- company, the petitioner applied for the post

of a Management Trainee in Personnel and HR discipline.

5. She applied as a reserved candidate in the Visually

Handicapped (VH) category.

6. It is her case that she produced two certificates dated

7.4.2012 and 2.1.2021 respectively, issued by the District

Social Welfare Officer, Jorhat, Government of Assam and the

Public Works Department, Government of Assam through the

Joint Director of Health Sciences, Jorhat, respectively, both of

which certified that the petitioner is visually impaired to the

extent of 60-70% visual disability.

7. On the other hand, it is the case of the respondent no.1

that the disability is not to the extent of 60-70% but is to the

extent of 30%.

8. What we have understood is that if it is the case of the

respondent no.1 that the disability is to the extent of 30%, then

the petitioner cannot be said to be falling within the ambit of

“person with benchmark disability”.

9. What is important in the present case is to ascertain

whether the disability is a functional disability or not.

10. For this purpose, we direct the Director of All India

Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi to constitute

a Board of experts and one of the members in the said Board

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should be Dr. Satendra Singh.

11. Dr. Satendra Singh has been working on disability rights,

since a long period of time.

12. Once, we receive the report of the Medical Board, we

shall proceed to pass further orders.

13. The petitioner shall appear before the Board on

05.12.2025 along with the copy of this order.

14. Registry shall inform the Director of AIIMS, New Delhi

about the order passed by this Court today and also furnish

full set of papers to the Director, AIIMS at the earliest.

15. Post this matter for further hearing on 18.12.2025.”

2. After the aforesaid Order, a further Order was passed

dated 12-12-2025. The same reads thus:-

“1. The matter was mentioned today in the morning bringing

it to our notice that despite there being a specific order passed

by this Court dated 28-11-2025, the Director of the All India

Institute of Medical Science (AIIMS), New Delhi has not

constituted a Board of Experts.

2. We had also stated in so many words that one of the

Members in the Board should be Dr. Satendra Singh.

3. The main matter is coming up for hearing on 18-12-

2025.

4. We once again remind the Director, AIIMS of our order

dated 28-11-2025. We are further informed that the petitioner

namely Sujata Bora is in Delhi past one week. She has been

examined so far only by two Doctors and not in accordance

with our Order dated 28-11-2025. The Director, AIIMS is

requested to look into the matter at the earliest.

5. The Registry shall communicate this order to the Director,

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AIIMS at the earliest.”

3. In pursuance of our Order dated 28-11-2025, referred to

above, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi

has forwarded the Medical Report.

4. The final impression in the Report dated 16-12-2025

reads thus:-

“The candidate is diagnosed with right sided 7

th

nerve palsy,

lagophthalmos, exposure keratopathy and 6

th

nerve palsy in

the right eye. The left eye visual acuity and visual field does

not correlate with the clinical examination findings and ocular

investigations, therefore visual disability cannot be assessed.

To confirm benchmark multiple disability because of

presence of right side facial paralysis, opinion may be taken

from PMR department/multiple disability board.

Neurosurgery department has review old available record,

but if current neurosurgical status evaluation is needed,

detailed neurological examination, new MRI and other

investigations will be required by them.”

5. According to the AIIMS, New Delhi for the purpose of

confirming the benchmark, multiple disability because of

presence of right side facial paralysis, opinion should be taken

from PMR department/multiple disability board, i.e., Physical

Medicine and Rehabilitation Department.

6. The report further reveals that the Neurosurgery

Department has looked into the old records available but for

the purpose of current neurosurgical status evaluation, a

detailed neurological examination with new MRI and other

investigations should be undertaken.

7. Let the needful be done at the earliest and a fresh Report

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be submitted before us.

8. One copy of this Report dated 16-12-2025 be furnished to

the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as for

the learned counsel appearing for the respondents – Coal

India Limited.

9. Post it on 8-1-2026 as part-heard.

10. The petitioner – Sujata Bora is personally present in the

Court today.

11. We are informed that she is in Delhi past couple of days.

12. We request the Director, AIIMS, New Delhi to undertake

the necessary further investigations of Ms. Bora from

tomorrow itself.

13. The Registry to inform about this order to the Director,

AIIMS, New Delhi at the earliest.

14. Dasti permitted.

15. Ms. Sujata Bora shall reach the office of the Director,

AIIMS, New Delhi tomorrow, i.e., 19-12-2025 by 10.30 a.m.”

6. In pursuance thereto, the appellant was medically examined by a

Committee of doctors appointed by the All India Institute of Medical

Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi. The examination was for the purpose of

assessment as regards disability.

7. We have received a report dated 01

st

January, 2026. According to

the report, the appellant suffers 57% of disability, which is above the

benchmark disability, i.e., 40%.

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8. The Division Bench on facts was not justified in setting aside the

judgment of the Single Judge merely because the panel had expired.

The appellant at the first instance was wrongly denied her employment

pursuant to the 2019 notification. The learned Single Judge moulded the

relief in view of the passage of time and directed her to be considered

from the IME stage for the 2023 recruitment. By interim order passed

earlier, one post was also kept vacant.

9. Today the situation is, the report from AIIMS finds her with 57%

disability, rendering her eligible for the appointment under the

reserved quota.

10. We had an opportunity to interact with the appellant, and we have

found her to be a lady of grit and determination. She wants to excel in

her field and work hard.

11. We heard Mr. Prashant Shrikant Kenjale, the learned counsel

appearing for the appellant, and Mr. Vivek Narayan Sharma, the

learned counsel appearing for the CIL.

12. We are of the view that the appellant qualifies for the appointment

to the post of Management Trainee.

CONCEPT OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION

13. This Court in a series of judgments has highlighted the concept of

“reasonable accommodation” - a concept enshrined in the RPwD Act

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and which emanates from Article 41 of the Constitution of India read

with Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In Omkar

Ramchandra Gond v. The Union of India, 2024 INSC 775, this Court

held as under: -

“40. …Section 2(y) of the RPwD Act, defines “reasonable

accommodation” to mean necessary and appropriate

modification and adjustments, without imposing a

disproportionate or undue burden in a particular case, to

ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or

exercise of rights equally with others. The concept of

reasonable accommodation would encompass within itself

the deployment of a purposive and meaningful construction

of the NMC Regulations of 13.05.2019 read with the

Appendix H-1 guidelines in a manner as to further the

objectives of the RPwD Act. The reasonable accommodation

as defined in Section 2(y) of the RPwD Act should not be

understood narrowly to mean only the provision of assisting

devices and other tangible substances which will aid

persons with disabilities. If the mandate of the law is to

ensure a full and effective participation of persons with

disabilities in the society and if the whole idea was to

exclude conditions that prevent their full and effective

participation as equal members of society, a broad

interpretation of the concept of reasonable

accommodation which will further the objective of the

RPwD Act and Article 41 of the Directive Principles of

State Policy is mandated.”

(Emphasis supplied)

14. Reiterating the holding in Omkar (supra) in Anmol v. Union of

India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387, this Court held as under: -

“20. As would be clear from the above, flexibility in

answering individual needs and requirements is an

essential component of reasonable accommodation. There

cannot be a “one size fits all” approach. However, in the

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guidelines appendix H-1 to regulations of 13.05.2019 of

“both hands intact, with intact sensations, sufficient

strength and range of motion” are considered essential to

be eligible for the medical course.”

15. In Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 3130, this Court while explaining how without the gateway

right of reasonable accommodation, a person with disability would be

excluded from the mainstream held as under: -

“29. The principle of reasonable accommodation is not

only statutorily prescribed but also rooted in the

fundamental rights guaranteed to persons with

disabilities under Part III of the Constitution.

Reasonable accommodation is a fundamental right. It is

a gateway right for persons with disabilities to enjoy all

the other rights enshrined in the Constitution and the

law. Without the gateway right of reasonable

accommodation, a person with disability is forced to

navigate in a world which excludes them by design. It

strikes a fatal blow to their ability to make life choices

and pursue opportunities. From mundane tasks of daily

life to actions undertaken to realise personal and

professional aspirations - all are throttled when

reasonable accommodations are den ied. Reasonable

accommodation is a facet of substantive equality and its

failure constitutes discrimination. In Vikash Kumar v.

UPSC, this Court adjudicated on whether a person with a

writer's cramp is entitled to a scribe for writing the

examination. Allowing the use of a scribe, this Court held

that the benchmark standard can only be applied where

expressly stipulated. Section 2(s) of the RPWD Act defines a

person with disability as a person with long term physical,

mental, intellectual or sensory impairment which, in

interaction with barriers, hinders their full and effective

participation in society equally with others. Therefore, a

person - to be considered as a person with disability - does

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not have to qualify any benchmark. The principle that the

rights and entitlements cannot be constricted by adopting a

benchmark as a condition precedent was also upheld by this

Court in Avni Prakash v. NTA.”

(Emphasis supplied)

16. In Ch. Joseph v. Telangana SRTC, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1592,

highlighting the concept of alternative employment as a facet of

reasonable accommodation, this Court held as under: -

“17. The Respondents' defence based solely on internal

circulars and a mechanical reading of Regulation 6A(5)(b)

cannot override this obligation. Retirement on medical

grounds must be a measure of last resort, only after the

employer exhausts all reasonable avenues for

redeployment. This principle is inherent in the concept

of “reasonable accommodation”, which is now

recognised as an aspect of substantive equality under

Articles 14 and 21. The failure to explore alternate

employment before resorting to medical retirement is

not merely a procedural lapse—it is a substantive

illegality that violates the Appellant's right to livelihood

and equal treatment.”

(Emphasis supplied)

17. In Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, (2024)16 SCC 654, explaining

how reasonable accommodation seeks to achieve individual justice by

encompassing dignity, autonomy, choice of the individual and furthers

non-discrimination, this Court held as under: -

“38. As highlighted by the Committee on the Rights of

Persons with Disabilities in General Comment 6, reasonable

accommodation is integral to the principle of inclusive

equality, acting as a facilitator for substantive equality.

[ General Comment on Accessibility, CRPD/C/GC/2, para

25.] The General Comment articulated the relationship

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between reasonable accommodation and accessibility as

follows:

“23. The duty to provide reasonable accommodation

is an ex nunc duty, which means that it is enforceable

from the moment an individual with an impairment

needs it in a given situation (workplace, school, etc.)

in order to enjoy her or his rights on an equal basis

in a particular context. Here, accessibility

standards can be an indicator, but may not be

taken as prescriptive. Reasonable accommodation

can be used as a means of ensuring accessibility

for an individual with a disability in a particular

situation. Reasonable accommodation seeks to

achieve individual justice in the sense that non-

discrimination or equality is assured, taking the

dignity, autonomy and choices of the individual

into account. Thus, a per son with a rare

impairment might ask for accommodation that

falls outside the scope of any accessibility

standard. The decision to provide it or not depends

on whether it is reasonable and whether it imposes

a disproportionate or undue burden.””

(emphasis supplied)

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF

STATE POLICY

18. Explaining how directive principles and fundamental rights are

two wheels of a chariot, this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of

India, (1980) 3 SCC 625, speaking through Chief Justice YV

Chandrachud in a memorable passage held as follows: -

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“56. The significance of the perception that Parts III and

IV together constitute the core of commitment to social

revolution and they, together, are the conscience of the

Constitution is to be traced to a deep understanding of

the scheme of the Indian Constitu tion. Granville

Austin's observation brings out the true position that

Parts III and IV are like two wheels of a chariot, one no

less important than the other. You snap one and the other

will lose its efficacy. They are like a twin formula for

achieving the social revolution, which is the ideal which

the visionary founders of the Constitution set before

themselves. In other words, the Indian Constitution is

founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III

and IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is

to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This

harmony and balance between fundamental rights and

directive principles is an essential feature of the basic

structure of the Constitution.”

(emphasis supplied)

19. Justice Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court in Barsky v. Board of

Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954), said:

“The right to work I have assumed was the most precious

liberty that man possesses. Man has indeed, as much right to

work as he has to live, to be free and to own property. To work

means to eat and it also means to live.”

20. It is the most precious liberty because it sustains and enables a

person to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. Life means

something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against

the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which

life is enjoyed. Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which, is a directive

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Principle of State Policy, provides that the State shall in particular,

direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women

equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood.

21. Article 41 reads as under:

“41. Right to work, to education and to public assistance in

certain cases

The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and

development, make effective provision for securing the

right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases

of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and

in other cases of undeserved want.”

22. Article 37 provides that the Directive Principles, though not

enforceable by any court, are nevertheless fundamental in the

governance of the country. The principles contained in Articles 39(a)

and 41 must be regarded as equally fundamental in the understanding

and interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental rights.

INTERSECTIONALITY OF DISABILITY WITH GENDER

23. In the present case, we are also concerned with the

intersectionality of disability with gender justice. Here is a case where

a single woman is before us who has the urge to succeed

notwithstanding the disability she encounters. Can technicalities like

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expiry of panel for the year or the factum of interim order reserving a

vacancy having come to be passed after the expiry of panel cannot

come in the way of our doing complete justice? We certainly do not

think so, especially when the denial of employment in 2019 was no fault

of her’s. We say this on the special facts obtaining in this case.

24. In Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2257, this

Court held as under: -

“85. Similarly, in M. Sameeha Barvin v. Joint Secretary,

Ministry of Youth and Sports, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad

6456, a female athlete with 90% loss of hearing and lack

of speech ability was denied participation in the World

Deaf Athletics Championship due to her female gender

and the additional vulnerability in travel associated with

her disability. In the said case, one of us (R. Mahadevan,

J.) discussed the concept of intersectionality to

emphasize that addressing difficulties and barriers

faced by a person from the perspective of only one axis

of discrimination may not ensure substantive equality

for them if they face multiple axes of discrimination.

Therefore, a study of equality from an intersectional

point of view subscribes to the understanding that

factors or markers of discrimination do not operate in

isolation. Hence, reasonable accommodation of persons

placed at the intersections of various grounds of

discrimination, can also not be unidimensional. The

relevant portions of the judgment are reproduced below:

“16. In the Indian context, it is often seen that the

factors like caste and gender are intrinsically

linked. Similarly, disability and gender are linked

in a way that make females with disabilities more

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vulnerable to such cumulative or compounded

disadvantage and resultant discrimination. Here, it

is important to emphasize that the difficulties and

barriers faced by a person facing any one axis of

discrimination, for example-gender, are different

from a person facing multiple axis of discrimination

like disability, caste and gender together. The

different identities within the same person intersect

and co-exist in a way so as to give the individual a

qualitatively different experience than any one of

the individual markers of discrimination or any of

the individual characteristics. Therefore, where the

axis of discrimination intersect, it is essential to

view such cases from the lens of intersectionality in

order to understand that the barriers, the

challenges, the stigma as well as the practical

difficulties faced by such persons are not only more

intense, but also different and unique which call for

a more in-depth and all-encompassing approach for

addressing their grievances and ensuring

substantive equality to them. Intersectionality,

therefore, rejects a narrow or limited understanding

of equality where the factors or markers of

discrimination are isolated or are in singular

spheres.

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24. In the Convention on the Rights of Persons with

Disabilities as observed by the Committee in General

Comment No. 6, “intersectional discrimination can be

direct, indirect, denial of reasonable accommodation,

or harassment”. This approach has also been reiterated

by the Supreme Court in Vikash Kumar v. UPSC

wherein, the supreme court has held that “disability-

based discrimination is intersectional in nature and

policy of reasonable accommodation thus cannot be

unidimensional”. The Convention on the Elimination of

Discrimination against Women Committee (CEDAW),

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which promotes action in order to support persons with

disabilities and their families and caregivers, also

recognises that the categories of discrimination cannot

be reduced to watertight compartments. In General

Recommendation No. 25, the CEDAW committee

suggests “the adoption of special measures for women

to eliminate multiple rounds of discrimination”.”

86. The aforesaid leaves no manner of doubt in our

minds that redressal of a disadvantage cannot be

devoid of an understanding of the other

impediments that an individual may face on

account of other identity markers that may cause

such an individual to be sti gmatized and

marginalized. The avowed objective of substantive

equality may be rendered unworkable if actions and

measures to achieve the said goal suffer from a

parochial understanding of discrimination.

(Emphasis supplied)

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILTY AND DISABILITY RIGHTS

25. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

(Guiding Principles), as endorsed by the United Nations Human

Rights Council in 2011, have the following to say on the aspect of “the

Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights”:

“12. The responsibility of business enterprises to respect

human rights refers to internationally recognized human

rights – understood, at a minimum, has those expressed in

the International Bill of Human Rights and the principles

concerning fundamental rights set out in the International

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labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental

Principles and Rights at Work.

… Depending on circumstances, business enterprises may

need to consider additional standards. For instance,

enterprises should respect the human rights of individuals

belonging to specific groups or populations that require

particular attention, where they may have adverse human

rights impacts on them. In this connection, United Nations

instruments have elaborated further on the rights of

indigenous peoples; women; national or ethnic, religious

and linguistic minorities; children; persons with

disabilities; and migrant workers and their families…”

(Emphasis supplied)

26. The working paper “Disability and CSR Reporting: An analysis

comparing reporting practices of 40 selected multinational

enterprises”, produced by the ILO Global Business and Disability

Network, concluded that:

“The rights of the people with disabilities are human

rights. Consequently, enterprises have an obligation to

respect these rights, avoid infringement, and address

adverse human rights impacts with which they are

involved. Thereby following the current approach of

CSR endorsed by the UN and the EU.

Providing equal rights to people with disabilities

implies addressing it from a non-discrimination angle,

and not exclusively as a diversity or inclusion issue.”

(Emphasis supplied)

27. Thus, it is abundantly clear that rights of persons with disabilities

have to be viewed from the prism of Corporate Social Responsibility in

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order to protect and further such rights. True equality at the workplace

can be achieved only with the right impetus given to disability rights as

a facet of Corporate Social Responsibility.

28. Disability inclusion is a vital component of the “Social” dimension

in the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) framework. In its

2024 guide on "Putting the ‘I’ in ESG: Inclusion of Persons with

Disabilities as Strategic Advantage of Sustainability Practices for

Corporates and Investors", the ILO Global Business and Disability

Network urged "companies and investors to view disability inclusion

not just as a compliance issue, but as a strategic advantage that

enhances business performance, resilience, and societal impact."

(Emphasis supplied)

29. The appellant qualified for the interview in 2019 selection and was

denied employment due to no fault of hers. Her disability exceeded the

benchmark disability and only because the notification advertising the

vacancies did not provide for “multiple disability” and the appellant

applied as a visually handicapped candidate, she was denied

employment.

30. Keeping in mind the above principle we direct that a

supernumerary post be created.

31. We are sure that the Chairman of Coal India will provide a

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suitable position/posting commensurate with the ability of the

appellant, and in such circumstances, she be provided a suitable desk

job with a separate computer and keyboard, as per universal design as

defined under section 2(ze) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

Act, 2016.

32. We request to the Chairman of Coal India Ltd. to post the

appellant at North Eastern Coalfields Coal India Ltd., having an office

at Margherita, Tinsukia, Assam.

33. We clarify that we have passed this order, in the peculiar facts and

circumstances of this case, keeping in mind Article 41 read with Article

14 & 21 of the Constitution.

34. We make it clear that we have passed this order additionally in

exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

35. We place on record our sincere gratitude to Mr. Vivek Narayan

Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the Coal India Ltd., for using

his good offices and bringing around a very happy end to this litigation.

36. We also express our deep and sincere gratitude towards all the

doctors who examined the appellant and also the Director of AIIMS,

New Delhi.

37. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the order of the

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Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, in MAT

2325/2023. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.

………….....................J.

[J.B.PARDIWALA]

…………...................J.

[K.V. VISWANATHAN]

New Delhi

13

th

January, 2026.