Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1366 OF 2010

SULTAN SINGH ..... APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA ..... RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1.This appeal has been preferred against the conviction

and sentence of the appellant under Sections 304-B and

498-A of the Indian Penal Code (for short the “IPC”). Under

Section 304-B IPC, the appellant has been sentenced to

undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years while under

Section 498A, IPC he has been sentenced to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for three years, apart from sentence

of fine.

2.The appellant was married to the deceased Lavjeet

Kaur on 27

th

February, 1990. On 17

th

June, 1994, PW 4-

Gurmeet Singh lodged First Information Report to the effect

that Lavjeet Kaur was burnt to death by the appellant and

1

Page 2 his mother. It was further stated that she was harassed for

dowry soon before her death. Apart from other demands of

dowry, it was stated that 5-6 days before the death, the

appellant visited the parental house of the deceased and

made a demand of Rs.30,000/- for purchase of land. Since

the said demand was not met, he left the house under

protest. On the fateful day, when he (PW-4) visited the

house of the appellant he found that the appellant’s mother

poured oil from a ‘can’ on the deceased and the appellant

ignited the fire. He came to his parents and thereafter he

went to the Civil Hospital where he learnt that the accused

was referred to the PGI Chandigarh but she died on the way.

3.On the basis of this First Information Report, the

investigation was conducted by PW 6-ASI, Madan Pal Singh

and after investigation, the appellant and his mother (who

has been acquitted by the High Court) were sent up for trial.

4.The prosecution examined PW 4-Gurmeet Singh,

brother of the deceased, PW 5-Ujjagar Singh, father of the

deceased, apart from evidence of Investigating Officer and

the Medical Officer and other evidence.

5.The appellant denied the allegations and took the plea

that the deceased caught fire accidentally while working on

2

Page 3 a stove. He had gone to the school near their house for

giving his photo for the Identity Card for voting purpose.

When he learnt about the accident, he immediately took

Lavjeet Kaur to the hospital.

6.The trial Court held that though the version of PW 4-

Gurmeet Singh and PW 5-Ujjagar Singh that they had seen

the appellant setting the deceased on fire was not reliable,

their reversion of demand of dowry soon before the death

could not be rejected. Since her death was within seven

years of marriage, demand of dowry was proved and the

death was under the circumstances other than normal,

presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act

could be raised. Thus, the commission of offences under

Sections 498-A and 304-B, IPC was proved. It was

held that story of bursting of stove was not reliable. The

relevant discussion in this regard, is as follows :

“From the sworn testimony of PWs Gurmeet Singh

and Ujjagar Singh discussed above it has become

very clear that deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur was

subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused

persons for the demand of dowry right from the

beginning of her marriage till death. Even soon

before her death she was subjected to cruelty by

the accused persons when father of the deceased

could not pay a sum of Rs.30,000/- to accused

Sultan Singh 5/6 days prior to the death of

deceased. Deceased was married with accused

3

Page 4 Sultan Singh on 27.2.1990 and she died on

17.6.1994 on account of burn injuries at the

matrimonial home. The fact that the deceased

died on account of burn injuries is well proved

from the medical evidence consisting of the

statements of Dr. S.K. Gupta who medico-legally

examined the deceased immediately on arrival at

Civil Hospital Ambala Cantt., and also of Dr.

Gajinder Yadav PW-3 who conducted the post

mortem examination of the dead body of

deceased. The deceased Smt. Lavjeet Kaur aged

about 22 years had suffered 70% burn injuries and

died on account of the same. Thus, it has been

well established that the death of deceased Smt.

Lavjeet Kaur was caused by burns and she died

unnatural death. It has also been established that

she died within a period of seven years of her

marriage. As already discussed by me that it has

also been established that the deceased was also

subjected to cruelty by the accused persons for

the demand of dowry soon before her death. Thus

in view of the provisions contained in Section 113-

B of the Indian Evidence Act it can very well be

presumed that the accused persons have caused

dowry death. Since the deceased Lavjeet Kaur

was at the house of the accused and therefore now

it is for the accused persons to explain how she

died an unnatural death within a period of about 4-

½ years of her marriage.

The explanation furnished by the accused persons

with respect to the death of Smt. Lavjeet Kaur in

the form of their defence version to the effect that

the deceased died just by mere accident as she

caught fire on account of bursting of stove when

she was cooking meals cannot be accepted. The

investigating officer ASI Madan Pal took into

possession a plastic can Ex.P-1 smelling kerosene

oil and half burnt Gadda from inside the room of

the house. If Smt. Lavjeet Kaur had been caught

fire while working on the stove I fail to understand

as to how the Gadda lying in the bed room of the

house would have caught fire. Secondly if the

stove would have burst the same must have been

found lying at the place of occurrence, but the

same was not available to the Investigating Officer

when he visited the spot. It clearly negatives the

defence version that Smt. Lavjeet Kaur caught fire

on account of bursting of stove. The argument of

4

Page 5 the learned defence counsel to the effect that PW

Gurmeet Singh has deposed that he had seen the

accused setting Smt. Lavjeet Kaur on fire by

sprinkling kerosene oil upon her in the court yard

of the house does not effect the prosecution case

in any way, because I have already observed in

the earlier part of the judgment that the deposition

of PW Gurmeet Singh so far as he has given an

eye version account cannot be believed that

therefore the story of the court yard put forward

by him automatically goes. However, the fact

remains that the Investigating Officer found the

half burnt Gadda Ex.P-2 and the plastic can Ex.P-1

smelling kerosene inside the bed room of the

house. Thus, the non-availability of the burst

stove on the spot itself speaks that the defence

version is nothing but is simply made up story and

cannot be believed.

The medical evidence as pointed out by the

learned defence counsel also does not help the

accused persons in any way. It has been deposed

by Dr. Gajinder Yadav that there were deep burns

on legs and chest of the deceased. It has come in

the statements of both the medical officers that

the deceased suffered 70% burn injuries and died

as a result thereof. It has been categorically

stated by Dr. Gajinder Yadav who conducted the

post-mortem examination that the deceased died

on account of burn injuries which were sufficient to

cause death in the ordinary course of nature. I fail

to understand as to what help the accused could

take from the statements of the medical officers

by pointing out that the Medical Officers have

deposed that there was no smell of kerosene from

the body and clothes of the deceased. If it was so

then it also smashes the defence version, because

if the deceased had caught fire by bursting of

stove then also there must be smell of kerosene oil

on her clothes. In my view, the smell of kerosene

might have evaporated in between the time of

occurrence till the post mortem examination

because the occurrence had taken place on

17.6.1994 at about noon time, whereas the post

mortem examination was conducted on 18.6.1994.

Further, the deceased was unconscious when she

was admitted in the hospital and therefore, it is

not known how the deceased could tell Dr. S.K.

5

Page 6 Gupta that she had caught fire while working on a

stove. Another person from whom Dr. S.K. Gupta

derived this information was one Amar Nath a

private Medical practitioner, who accompanied the

deceased to the hospital. However, Shri Amar

Nath was not produced in defence to ascertain

whether he had told this fact to the Medical Officer

and if so how he acquired the said knowledge

whether from the deceased or otherwise.

Moreover, in the ruka Ex.PC sent by Dr. S.K. Gupta

to the police there is no mentioning of the bursting

of stove, nor it has been mentioned as to how he

learnt that the deceased caught fire while working

on a stove. It has simply been mentioned that the

deceased was alleged to have sustained burns

70% while working on a stove. The word ‘bursting’

is missing in this ruka, whereas, it was so stated by

Dr. S.K. Gupta when he appeared in the witness

box. If the story of bursting of stove came to his

knowledge it is not known why he omitted to

mention this fact in his ruka Ex. PC sent to the

police. Taking into consideration all the facts and

circumstances I am of the definite view that the

statement of Dr. S.K. Gupta to the effect that there

was the history of burns allegedly sustained by the

deceased due to bursting of stove while cooking

food is not legally sound because neither Amar

Nath was produced, nor deceased could speak

anything before her death.”

7.The appellant preferred an appeal. The High Court

upheld the conviction of the appellant while acquitting his

mother Mohinder Kaur, the co-accused, of the charge under

Section 304-B, IPC but upheld her conviction under Section

498A, IPC. It was observed that the allegation of demand of

dowry soon before the death was only against the appellant

and not against his mother. Rejecting the defence plea of

accidental burning, the High Court observed as under :

6

Page 7 “The accused or their persons might have

accompanied Lavjeet Kaur to the hospital. The

accused are naturally interested to save

themselves from legal punishment and such as the

said history might have been given by them or

Amar Nath to save the accused. PW-2 Dr. S.K.

Gupta has no personal knowledge about the

occurrence and has stated that there was history

of burns sustained by Lavjeet Kaur due to bursting

of stove while cooking food. So, that history was

given by the accused or Amar Nath, accompanying

the injured to the hospital.

One another circumstance which militates against

the case of the accused is that the police found the

blood sustained Gadda in the room where the

occurrence is stated to have taken place and not

in the kitchen, as per stand of the accused. That

fact belied the stand of accused.

The statement of Dr. S.K. Gupta that history was

given by the patient does not appeal to reason.

The deceased was having 70% burn injuries and as

such she was not in a position to narrate the

occurrence. The police had no reason to change

the place of occurrence from the kitchen to the

room as shown in the rough site plan. There were

singeing of the skull hair of Lavjeet Kaur besides

having burn injuries on the chest and lower part of

the body. The fact of bursting of stove and giving

the case history by Lavjeet Kaur is not mentioned

by Dr. S.K. Gupta in the record. The doctor is not

supposed to orally know all the facts. It seems

that Dr. S.K. Gupta has stated that the history of

the case was given by the patient simply to favour

the accused, moreso when there is nothing in this

regard on the record. So, no reliance can be

placed on the statement made by Dr. S.K. Gupta,

in this regard.

PW-3 Dr. Gajinder Yadav, has stated that there

was probability of the deceased receiving burn

injuries by accidental fire but he has not stated it

with confidence that in all probability, the death

could be accidental, in the present case. That

doctor has not seen the other circumstantial

evidence at the spot before arriving at the

conclusion. So, the learned trial Court has rightly

held that Lavjeet Kaur, deceased, has died due to

7

Page 8 unnatural injuries and not by accidental burn

injuries.”

8.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and

perused the evidence on the record.

9.The main question raised for our consideration is

whether the evidence of demand of dowry soon before the

death was reliable and whether it was a case of accidental

death as pleaded by the defence. The presumption under

Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act is attracted only in

case of suicidal or homicidal death and not in case of an

accidental death.

10.We are unable to accept the submissions advanced on

behalf of the appellant.

11.The brother and father of the deceased have made

categorical allegation of demand of dowry which confirmed

almost upto the date of death. Even though version of PW 4,

brother of the deceased, and PW 5, father of the deceased,

may be exaggerated to the extent of saying that they saw

the accused and his mother causing burn injuries, there is no

reason to disbelieve their version with regard to demand of

dowry. It is true that in case of accidental death

presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act

8

Page 9 is not available but there is no reason to hold that in the

present case, the burn injuries were by accident.

12.Apart from the following reasons given by the trial

Court and the High Court, namely;

(i) The Investigating Officer found the plastic can

(Exhibit P-1) smelling kerosene oil and a half burnt

mattress (Exhibit P-2);

(ii) The burst stove was not found at the place of

occurrence as stated by the Investigating Officer;

(iii) The deceased suffered 70% burn injuries which was

held to be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary

course of injury, there are other reasons to reject the

plea of accident;

there are other reasons to support the findings.

12.While in the case of homicidal death, if the victim is

caught unaware, a person may not be able to make any

effort to save himself/herself and in case of suicidal burn

injuries a person may take all precautions not to save

himself/herself, in case of accidental burn injuries, victim

makes all possible efforts to save himself/herself which may

leave evidence to show that the death was accidental. Such

a person may raise alarm and try to escape. The

Investigating Officer visiting the scene of occurrence can

notice the available evidence by recreating the scene. In the

present case, there are no probabilities to support the

defence plea of accident, particularly when relations

9

Page 10 between the deceased and the appellant were not

harmonious.

13.Thus, taking of plea by the accused to save

himself/herself is not enough. The contention in the present

case that PW 2-Dr. S.K. Gupta mentioned the history of burn

due to bursting of stove was given by the patient and one

Amar Nath who accompanied her is without any merit. In

the same statement the said witness states that the victim

was unfit to make a statement. Amar Nath, who is said to

have given this information, has not been examined by the

defence. Statement of Dr. S.K. Gupta that Amar Nath gave

this information is hearsay. Moreover, PW 2-Dr. S.K. Gupta

has been examined as an expert witness to give his opinion

about the health condition of the patient based on his

expertise. He is not a witness of fact. Similarly, contention

that PW 3-Dr. Gajinder Yadav who conducted the post

mortem made a statement in cross examination that there

was more probability of death being caused by accidental

fire as there was no smell of kerosene oil from the body of

the deceased and that the fire had started from the lower

parts of the body towards upper parts is equally without any

merit. Such statement of an expert witness without being

based on any specialized knowledge cannot be accepted.

1

Page 11 The opinion of expert witness on technical aspects has

relevance but the opinion has to be based upon specialized

knowledge and the data on which it is based has to be found

acceptable by the Court. In Madan Gopal Kakkad

versus Naval Dubey.

1

, it was observed as under :

“34. A medical witness called in as an expert to

assist the Court is not a witness of fact and the

evidence given by the medical officer is really of

an advisory character given on the basis of the

symptoms found on examination. The expert

witness is expected to put before the Court all

materials inclusive of the data which induced him

to come to the conclusion and enlighten the Court

on the technical aspect of the case by explaining

the terms of science so that the Court although,

not an expert may form its own judgment on those

materials after giving due regard to the expert’s

opinion because once the expert’s opinion is

accepted, it is not the opinion of the medical

officer but of the Court.

35. Nariman, J. in Queen v. Ahmed Ally.

2

, while

expressing his view on medical evidence has

observed as follows:

“The evidence of a medical man or other

skilled witnesses, however, eminent, as to

what he thinks may or may not have taken

place under particular combination of

circumstances, however, confidently, he may

speak, is ordinarily a matter of mere opinion.”

14.We may also note that the presumption under Section

113B of the Indian Evidence Act has been enacted to check

the menace of the dowry deaths and in appreciating the

evidence, the social background of the legislation cannot be

1

(1992) 3 SCC 204

2

(1998) 3 SCC 309

1

Page 12 ignored. In Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana .

3

, it was

observed:

“11. It is true, as argued by learned counsel for

the appellants, that in criminal jurisprudence

benefit of doubt is extendable to the accused. But

that benefit of doubt would arise in the context of

the application of penal law, and in the facts and

circumstances of a case. The concept of benefit of

doubt has an important role to play but within the

confines of the stringency of laws. Since the cause

of death of a married woman was to occur not in

normal circumstances but as a “dowry death”, for

which the evidence was not so easily available, as

it is mostly confined within the four walls of a

house, namely the husband’s house, where all

likely accused reside. Hence the aforesaid

amendments brought in the concept of deemed

“dowry death” by the husband or the relatives, as

the case may be. This deeming clause has a role to

play and cannot be taken lightly and ignored to

shield an accused, otherwise the very purpose of

the amendment will be lost. Of course, the

prosecution has to prove the ultimate essential

ingredients beyond all reasonable doubt after

raising the initial presumption of “deemed dowry

death”.

12. Explanation to Section 304-B refers to dowry

“as having the same meaning as in Section 2 of

the 1961 Act”, the question is: what is the

periphery of the dowry as defined therein? The

argument is, there has to be an agreement at the

time of the marriage in view of the words “agreed

to be given” occurring therein, and in the absence

of any such evidence it would not constitute to be

a dowry. It is noticeable, as this definition by

amendment includes not only the period before

and at the marriage but also the period

subsequent to the marriage.

13. When words in a statute are referable to more

than one meaning, the established rule of

construction is found in Heydon’s case

1

also

approved by this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd.

3

11 WR Cr. 25

1

Page 13 v. State of Bihar

2

AIR at p. 674. The rule is to

consider four aspects while construing an Act:

(a) what was the law prior to the law which is

sought to be interpreted;

(b) what was the mischief or defect for which

new law is made;

(c) what is the remedy the law now provides;

and

(d) what is the reason of the remedy.

14. The Court must adopt that construction which,

“suppresses the mischief and advances the

remedy”.

15. Applying this principle, it is clear that the

earlier law was not sufficient to check dowry

deaths hence aforesaid stringent provisions were

brought in, so that persons committing such

inhuman crimes on married women should not

escape, as evidence of a direct nature is not

readily available except of the circumstantial kind.

Hence it is that interpretation which suppresses

the mischief, subserves the objective and

advances the remedy, which would be acceptable.

The objective is that men committing such crimes

should not escape punishment. Hence stringent

provisions were brought in by shifting the burden

onto the accused by bringing in the deemed

clause. As aforesaid, the definition of “dowry” was

amended with effect from 19-11-1986, to include

the period even after the marriage.

16. The offence alleged against the appellants is

under Section 304-B IPC which makes “demand of

dowry” itself punishable. Demand neither

conceives nor would conceive of any agreement. If

for convicting any offender, agreement for dowry is

to be proved, hardly any offenders would come

under the clutches of law. When Section 304-B

refers to “demand of dowry”, it refers to the

demand of property or valuable security as

referred to in the definition of “dowry” under the

1961 Act. It was argued on behalf of the appellants

that mere demand of scooter or fridge would not

be a demand for dowry. We find from the evidence

on record that within a few days after the

marriage, the deceased was tortured, maltreated

1

Page 14 and harassed for not bringing the aforesaid articles

in marriage. Hence the demand is in connection

with marriage. The argument that there is no

demand of dowry, in the present case, has no

force. In cases of dowry deaths and suicides,

circumstantial evidence plays an important role

and inferences can be drawn on the basis of such

evidence. That could be either direct or indirect. It

is significant that Section 4 of the 1961 Act, was

also amended by means of Act 63 of 1984, under

which it is an offence to demand dowry directly or

indirectly from the parents or other relatives or

guardian of a bride. The word “agreement”

referred to in Section 2 has to be inferred on the

facts and circumstances of each case. The

interpretation that the appellant seeks, that

conviction can only be if there is agreement for

dowry, is misconceived. This would be contrary to

the mandate and object of the Act. “Dowry”

definition is to be interpreted with the other

provisions of the Act including Section 3, which

refers to giving or taking dowry and Section 4

which deals with penalty for demanding dowry,

under the 1961 Act and the Indian Penal Code. This

makes it clear that even demand of dowry on other

ingredients being satisfied is punishable. This leads

to the inference, when persistent demands for TV

and scooter are made from the bride after

marriage or from her parents, it would constitute

to be in connection with the marriage and it would

be a case of demand of dowry within the meaning

of Section 304-B IPC. It is not always necessary

that there be any agreement for dowry.”

Again in Hira Lal vs. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi .

4

, it

was observed as under :

8. Section 304-B IPC which deals with dowry

death, reads as follows:

“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a

woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or

occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances

within seven years of her marriage and it is shown

that soon before her death she was subjected to

cruelty or harassment by her husband or any

4

(2003) 8 SCC 80

1

Page 15 relative of her husband for, or in connection with,

any demand for dowry, such death shall be called

‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall

be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-

section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in

Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of

1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be

punished with imprisonment for a term which shall

not be less than seven years but which may

extend to imprisonment for life.”

The provision has application when death of a

woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or

occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances

within seven years of her marriage and it is shown

that soon before her death she was subjected to

cruelty or harassment by her husband or any

relatives of her husband for, or in connection with

any demand for dowry. In order to attract

application of Section 304-B IPC, the essential

ingredients are as follows:

(i) The death of a woman should be caused by

burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a

normal circumstance.

(ii) Such a death should have occurred within

seven years of her marriage.

(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or

harassment by her husband or any relative of her

husband.

(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or

in connection with demand of dowry.

(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have

been meted out to the woman soon before her

death.

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant

for the case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as

noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment)

Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the

increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B

reads as follows:

“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When

the question is whether a person has committed

the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that

soon before her death such woman had been

subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment

for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,

1

Page 16 the Court shall presume that such person had

caused the dowry death.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,

‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in

Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of

1860).”

The necessity for insertion of the two provisions

has been amply analysed by the Law Commission

of India in its 21st Report dated 10-8-1988 on

“Dowry Deaths and Law Reform”. Keeping in view

the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing

evidence to prove dowry-related deaths, the

legislature thought it wise to insert a provision

relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of

certain essentials. It is in this background that

presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has

been inserted. As per the definition of “dowry

death” in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the

presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act,

one of the essential ingredients, amongst others,

in both the provisions is that the woman

concerned must have been “soon before her

death” subjected to cruelty or harassment “for or

in connection with the demand of dowry”.

Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption

of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned

therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise

a presumption that the accused caused the dowry

death. The presumption shall be raised only on

proof of the following essentials:

(1) The question before the court must be

whether the accused has committed the dowry

death of the woman. (This means that the

presumption can be raised only if the accused is

being tried for the offence under Section 304-B

IPC.)

(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or

harassment by her husband or his relatives.

(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in

connection with any demand for dowry.

(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before

her death.

9. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the

Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that

there must be material to show that soon before

her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or

harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the

1

Page 17 possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to

bring it within the purview of “death occurring

otherwise than in normal circumstances”. The

expression “soon before” is very relevant where

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section

304-B IPC are pressed into service. The

prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the

occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and

only in that case presumption operates. Evidence

in that regard has to be led by the prosecution.

“Soon before” is a relative term and it would

depend upon the circumstances of each case and

no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what

would constitute a period of soon before the

occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any

fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a

proximity test both for the proof of an offence of

dowry death as well as for raising a presumption

under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The

expression “soon before her death” used in the

substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B

of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of

proximity test. No definite period has been

indicated and the expression “soon before” is not

defined. A reference to the expression “soon

before” used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the

Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court

may presume that a man who is in the possession

of goods “soon after the theft, is either the thief or

has received the goods knowing them to be stolen,

unless he can account for their possession”. The

determination of the period which can come within

the term “soon before” is left to be determined by

the courts, depending upon facts and

circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to

indicate that the expression “soon before” would

normally imply that the interval should not be

much between the cruelty or harassment

concerned and the death in question. There must

be existence of a proximate and live link between

the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and

the death concerned. If the alleged incident of

cruelty is remote in time and has become stale

enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of

the woman concerned, it would be of no

consequence.

1

Page 18 15.Having regard to the entirety of material, we do not

find any ground to interfere with the concurrent finding

recorded by the courts below that it was not a case of

accidental death but a death taking place in circumstances

other than normal. Thus, the presumption under Section

113B of the Indian Evidence Act has been rightly invoked

and the offence against the appellant has been proved.

There is no tangible circumstance to rebut the presumption.

17.For the above reasons, we do not find any merit in this

appeal. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant who is on

bail is directed to surrender to custody to undergo the

remaining sentence.

……..…………………………….J.

[ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]

.….………………………………..J.

NEW DELHI [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]

September 26, 2014

1

Page 19 ITEM NO.1B-For Judgment COURT NO.13 SECTION

IIB

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s). 1366/2010

SULTAN SINGH Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA Respondent(s)

Date : 26/09/2014 This appeal was called on for JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. D.P. Singh, Adv.

Mr. Sanjay Jain,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Manjit Singh, AAG

Mrs. Nupur Choudhary, Adv.

Mrs. Vivekta Singh, Adv.

Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel pronounced the

judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble

Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda.

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed order.

(VINOD KUMAR) (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)

COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)

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