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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

W.P.(S) No. 221 of 2017

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Nitin Kumar Bhagat, s/o Sri Pramod Bhagat, R/o Karra Road, Khunti,

P.O. Khunti, P.S. Khunti, District-Khunti, Jharkhand.

… … Petitioner

Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Ministry of

Home, Office at Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District-

Ranchi (Jharkhand).

2. The I.G., Prison, Jharkhand, Office at Project Building, P.O. and P.S.

Dhurwa, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand).

3. The Superintendent of Sub-Jail, Khunti, P.O. and P.S.-Khunti, District-

Khunti (Jharkhand).

… … Respondents

With

W.P.(S) No. 339 of 2017

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Sumanjan Mundu, S/o Late Beeru Mundu, r/o Barudih, Khunti, P.O.

Khunti, P.S.-Khunti, District-Khunti, Jharkhand.

… … Petitioner

Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Ministry of

Home, Office at Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District-

Ranchi (Jharkhand).

2. The I.G., Prison, Jharkhand, Office at Project Building, P.O. and P.S.

Dhurwa, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand).

3. The Superintendent of Sub-Jail, Khunti, P.O. and P.S.-Khunti, District-

Khunti (Jharkhand).

… … Respondents

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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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For the Petitioners : Ms. Shivani Jaluka, Advocate

For the Resp.-State : Mr. Ashok Kumar Singh, AC to SC(L&C)-III

[W.P.(S) No.221 of 2017]

Mr. Devesh Krishna, SC Mines-III

Mr. Kumar Pawan, AC to SC Mines-III

Mr. Faisal Alam, AC to SC Mines-III

[W.P.(S) No.339 of 2017]

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16/Dated: 15

th

April, 2026

1. Since both the writ petitions are having common issues, as such, both the

writ petitions are being heard together and being disposed of with this

common order/judgment.

2. Both the writ petitions have been filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India praying therein the following relief(s):

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W.P.(S) No. 221 of 2017:

“That, by this application, the petitioner prays for Writ(s), Order(s),

Direction(s) particularly a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing

of the order contained in letter No.3825 dated 01/12/16 issued by the

Respondent Authority under the signature of I.G., Prison whereby and

whereunder the petitioner is terminated from his employment as V.C.

Operator even without issuing any show cause to him and without

affording any opportunity of hearing despite the fact that the petitioner

was engaged since 30/06/09 as daily wager against the sanctioned post

of V.C. Operator.

And/Or

The petitioner further prays that he may be reinstated in his employment

and may be allowed to continue to discharge his duty till the Respondent

states goes for regular employment on the abovementioned post of V.C.

Operator.

And/Or

Pass such Order/Orders as this Hon’ble Court may think just and proper

in the facts and circumstances of the case, doing conscionable justice to

the petitioner.”

W.P.(S) No. 339 of 2017

“That, by this application, the petitioner prays for Writ(s), Order(s),

Direction(s) particularly a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing

of the order contained in letter No.3825 dated 01/12/16 issued by the

Respondent Authority under the signature of I.G., Prison whereby and

whereunder the petitioner is terminated from his employment as

Sweeper/Driver even without issuing any show cause to him and without

affording any opportunity of hearing despite the fact that the petitioner

was engaged since 23/10/06 as daily wager against the sanctioned post

of Sweeper & subsequently in the year 2015 he was appointed to post of

Driver.

And/Or

The petitioner further prays that he may be reinstated in his employment

and may be allowed to continue to discharge his duty till the Respondent

states goes for regular employment on the abovementioned post of

Sweeper.

And/Or

Pass such Order/Orders as this Hon’ble Court may think just and proper

in the facts and circumstances of the case, doing conscionable justice to

the petitioner.”

3. The brief facts of both the cases as per the pleading made in the writ

petitions needs to be referred herein which is as under.

4. The case of the petitioner is that they had been engaged on daily wages

on the sanctioned post of V.C. Operator [petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 221

of 2017] and Sweeper [petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 339 of 2017] in the

Sub-Jail at Khunti on 29.07.2009 and 23.10.2006 respectively.

5. It is the case of the petitioners that the service in this regard is like

permanent employee. The status report with respect to services of the

Daily wager working in jail within state of Jharkhand are regularly

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furnished by concerned prison to the Office of I.G. Prison. Vide Letter

dated 02.06.2012, 14.08.2013, 17.10.2014 & 22.01.2015, the respondent

authorities were informed about the employees who were engaged on

daily wages. It is evident that the petitioners are continuously working

since the date of employment.

6. It is the also the case of the petitioners that the respondent authorities at

no point of time were having any grievance against the petitioners and

the authorities were fully satisfied with the services of the petitioners.

The petitioners were engaged against the sanctioned post and even

otherwise they were possessing requisite qualification as required for

appointment for the said post. The engagement of the petitioners were on

daily wages and they are serving the department for almost 8-10 years

before the impugned order of termination was passed

7. The respondent authority vide letter dated 01.10.2015 took a decision to

enhance the salary of the petitioners and others similarly situated daily

wages employee.

8. But, paying no heed to all this, the impugned order of termination vide

letter no. 3825 dated 01.12.2016 was issued terminating all the daily

rated employees working at Khunti Sub-Jail and in the said impugned

order of termination, there is a reference of letter No. 2109 dated

23.05.2009 and also letter No. 1168 dated 04.06.2009. The

recommendation preceding letter dated 23.05.2009 is dated 20.05.2009

wherein at para-3 it is indicated that in future no appointment on daily

wages shall be made on the sanctioned post.

9. It is the grievance of the writ petitioners that they have been appointed to

the post of V.C. Operator [writ petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 221 of 2017]

and to the post of Sweeper [writ petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 339 of 2017]

on 29.07.2009 and 23.10.2006 respectively and worked continuously up

till the date they have been terminated from service, i.e., on 01.12.2016.

10. The claim of the writ petitioners are that although they have been

terminated from service but they have again been allowed to continue in

service and by such continuation, both the writ petitioners have

completed 10 years of continuous service, as such, their cases come

under the fold of paragraph-53 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble

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Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs.

Uma Devi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1.

11. The writ petitioners when have not been regularized, the present writ

petitions have been filed.

Argument on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners:

12. Learned counsel for the petitioners has taken the ground that the action

of the respondent authorities in not regularizing the services of the

petitioners is highly arbitrary and illegal, i.e., contrary to the law laid

down in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi

(3) (supra) as also to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court

in the case of Jaggo vs. Union of India and Ors, 2024 SCC OnLine

3826 [S.L.P.(C) No. 5580 of 2024].

13. It has also been submitted by taking the ground that the writ petitioners

have been terminated only to break the chain of completion of 10 years

of service.

14. Learned counsel for the petitioners, based upon the aforesaid grounds,

has submitted that the both the writ petitions are, therefore, fit to be

allowed by quashing the letter no.3825 dated 01.12.2016.

Argument on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents:

15. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State has submitted that it

is not a case where the order of regularization is fit to be passed reason

being that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra) is not

applicable if the factual aspect of the present case will be taken into

consideration.

16. Such submission has been made based on the admitted fact that both the

writ petitioners have been terminated from service on the instructions

given at the level of department and only that, instruction has also been

issued to conduct inquiry regarding the conduct of the local authority in

engaging these petitioners in service.

17. The departmental proceeding has culminated into the order of

punishment of censure.

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18. It has submitted that further continuation in service after the order of

termination is, therefore, of no avail because that is at the local level for

which the local authority has already been punished on conclusion of the

inquiry by inflicting the punishment of censure.

19. The argument has been advanced that so far as the case of Secretary,

State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra) and Jaggo vs.

Union of India and Ors. (supra) are concerned, the same are also not

applicable in the facts of the present case since in both the cases,

continuity in service was taken into consideration but herein, the services

has not been continued said to be counting the period of 10 years of

continuous service as has been stipulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3)

(supra).

20. Learned counsel for the respondent, based upon the aforesaid grounds,

has submitted that both the writ petitions, therefore, lacks merit and are

liable to be dismissed.

Analysis:

21. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone

through the pleading made on behalf of the respective parties as

available on record.

22. The issue which has been raised on behalf of the petitioners regarding

the continuation of 10 years of service said to be regular even after the

order of termination as they were being allowed to continue in service

thereafter.

23. This Court, before considering the aforesaid issue, needs to refer herein

the underlying principle which has been propounded by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in its Constitution Bench judgment rendered in the case of

Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra).

24. The background upon which the Hon’ble Apex Court has propounded

the proposition to put restriction upon the back-door entry in public

employment by putting restriction of induction of the person concerned

on the daily rated capacity. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court by way of

one-time exercise, after taking into consideration the fact about the

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continuation of service of daily rated employee who have already

completed more than 10 years of service has come out with the

relaxation by carving out the guideline as under paragraph-53 thereof,

which is being reproduced as under:

“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where

irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V.

Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071] , R.N.

Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799] and B.N.

Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937]

and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly

sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have

continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of

orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the

services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the

light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to

and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the

State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to

regularise as a one -time measure, the services of

such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in

duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of

tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are

undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled

up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now

employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this

date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub

judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be

no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising

or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional

scheme.”

25. It is evident from the proposition as laid down under paragraph-53 for

consideration at the end of the State that the daily rated employees who

are to be regularized by way of one-time exercise are required to

complete 10 years of continuous service without any aid of interim order

passed by the Court such appointment if made against the sanctioned

post.

26. The said principle has been followed in the other judgments of the

Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Karnataka & Ors.

vs. M.L. Kesari & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 247; Narendra Kumar Tiwari &

Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., (2018) 8 SCC 238 and; Nihal Singh

and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (2013) 14 SCC 65.

27. The judgments rendered in the case of State of Karnataka & Ors. vs.

M.L. Kesari & Ors. (supra) has come out with the proposition that what

would be the meaning of the period of six months for completion of the

exercise which has been propounded as under paragraph-53 of the

judgment rendered in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors.

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Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra). It has been held therein that the period of six

months will be said to be in completion if the candidature of all the daily

rated employee has been considered by the State. If candidature of any of

the candidate has not been considered, then the period of six months will

be stretched. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment rendered in State of

Karnataka & Ors. vs. M.L. Kesari & Ors. (supra) is being reproduced as

under:

“10. At the end of six months from the date of decision in Umadevi

(3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , cases of several daily-wage/ad hoc/casual

employees were still pending before courts. Consequently, several

departments and instrumentalities did not commence the one-time

regularisation process. On the other hand, some government

departments or instrumentalities undertook the one-time exercise

excluding several employees from consideration either on the ground

that their cases were pending in courts or due to sheer oversight. In such

circumstances, the employees who were entitled to be considered in

terms of para 53 of the decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , will

not lose their right to be considered for regularisation, merely because

the one-time exercise was completed without considering their cases, or

because the six-month period mentioned in para 53 of Umadevi

(3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] has expired. The one-time exercise should consider

all daily-wage/ad hoc/casual employees who had put in 10 years of

continuous service as on 10-4-2006 without availing the protection of

any interim orders of courts or tribunals. If any employer had held the

one-time exercise in terms of para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] ,

but did not consider the cases of some employees who were entitled to the

benefit of para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , the employer

concerned should consider their cases also, as a continuation of the one-

time exercise. The one-time exercise will be concluded only when all the

employees who are entitled to be considered in terms of para 53

of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , are so considered.

11. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi

(3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] is twofold. First is to ensure that those who have

put in more than ten years of continuous service without the protection of

any interim orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision

in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] was rendered, are considered for

regularisation in view of their long service. Second is to ensure that the

departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the practice of

employing persons on daily-wage/ad hoc/casual basis for long periods

and then periodically regularise them on the ground that they have

served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the constitutional or

statutory provisions relating to recruitment and appointment. The true

effect of the direction is that all persons who have worked for more than

ten years as on 10-4-2006 [the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4

SCC 1] ] without the protection of any interim order of any court or

tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite qualification, are

entitled to be considered for regularisation. The fact that the employer

has not undertaken such exercise of regularisation within six months of

the decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] or that such exercise was

undertaken only in regard to a limited few, will not disentitle such

employees, the right to be considered for regularisation in terms of the

above directions in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] as a one-time

measure.”

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28. Another judgment has been rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the

case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.,

(supra) wherein by following the principle laid down by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs.

Uma Devi (3) (supra) wherein the period of 10 years was to be counted

till the date of pronouncement of the judgment. But the question arose

that how the period of 10 years will be counted in a situation where the

State of Jharkhand has been carved out w.e.f. 15.11.2000. The period of

10 years, therefore, has been modified by counting it from the date of

creation of the State, i.e., from 15.11.2000. Relevant paragraphs of the

judgment rendered in Narendra Kumar Tiwari & Ors. vs. State of

Jharkhand & Ors., (supra) is being reproduced as under:

“10. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the Regularisation

Rules must be given a pragmatic interpretation and the appellants, if they

have completed 10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the

Regularisation Rules, ought to be given the benefit of the service

rendered by them. If they have completed 10 years of service they should

be regularised unless there is some valid objection to their regularisation

like misconduct, etc.”

29. The State of Jharkhand, based upon the aforesaid proposition, as has

been laid down in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs.

Uma Devi (3) (supra) coupled with the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari

& Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Apex

Court has passed observation by giving liberty to the State to formulate a

rule for regularization and in turn thereof, a Rule has been formulated in

the year 2015 which has been made effective from 01.12.2015. The Rule

contains a provision of constituting a committee for consideration of the

case of one or the other daily rated employees on the basis of the

principle as laid down in the aforesaid judgment.

30. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is admitted that the writ

petitioners of both the cases have been appointed by the local authorities

without any advertisement.

31. The departmental authority has made a query and has instructed to

immediately dispense with the services of the writ petitioners being

inducted through back-door entry. The local authority, in pursuance of

the said direction, has dismissed the services of the writ petitioners by

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passing order as contained in letter no.3825 dated 01.12.2016, as

impugned in both the writ petitions.

32. The authority at the departmental level has also taken a decision to

initiate a departmental proceeding against the erring officials who have

inducted the writ petitioners to discharge their duty in daily rated

capacity. The departmental proceeding initiated has concluded on the

punishment of censure upon the local authority but most surprising thing

is that even after their termination, they have been allowed to continue in

service by the local authority.

33. The writ petitioners now want to take advantage of the services which

has been rendered by the writ petitioners after the termination from

services so that the period be counted of 10 years.

34. The purpose of such argument is to claim regularization by taking

instance of the completion of 10 years of service by considering the case

of the writ petitioners in view of paragraph-53 of the case of Secretary,

State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra).

35. This Court has also considered the judgment rendered in the case of

Jaggo vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra). The factual aspect of the said

case needs to be referred herein which is as under:

“3. The appellants before this Court, who were applicants before the

Tribunal originally numbered five. However, the fourth applicant before

the Tribunal has not approached this Court. Therefore, these appeals are

instituted by Applicant Nos.1, 2, 3, and 5 only. The sole Appellant in

SLP(C) No. 5580/2024 was applicant no. 2 before the Tribunal whereas

the Appellant no. 1, 2 and 3 in SLP(C) No. 11086/ 2024 were Applicant

Nos. 1, 3 and 5 respectively before the Tribunal. For ease of reference

and to maintain consistency, they shall continue to be referred to by their

original applicant numbers as before the Tribunal.

4. The appellants before this Court, being Applicant Nos.1, 2, 3, and 5

before the Tribunal, were originally engaged by the Central Water

Commission2 on part-time, ad-hoc terms. Applicant No.1 was appointed

as a Safaiwali in 1993, Applicant No.2 as a Safaiwali in 1998, and

Applicant No.3 as a Safaiwali in 1999. All three were primarily

responsible for cleaning and maintaining the office premises under the

CWC. Applicant No.5, appointed in 2004 as a Khallasi (also discharging

duties akin to a Mali/Khallasi), was entrusted with tasks such as

gardening, dusting, and other ancillary maintenance work. Throughout

their engagement, these individuals performed essential housekeeping

and support functions at CWC establishments, including its offices at

Faridabad, ensuring daily upkeep and contributing to the smooth

functioning of the Commission’s administrative operations.

5. Initially, the appellants sought regularization of their services by filing

Original Application No.2211/2015 before the Tribunal. They contended

that over the years, their roles and responsibilities had evolved beyond

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the nominal labels of “part-time” or “contractual” and that they were

performing ongoing and core functions integral to the CWC’s

operations. They relied on applicable government instructions and the

principle that long-serving employees, engaged against work of a

perennial nature, deserve fair consideration for regularization, provided

their appointments were not illegal or clandestine. The Tribunal, by its

order dated 17.04.2018, dismissed the appellants’ plea. It concluded that

the appellants were not engaged on what it considered “regular

vacancies,” that they had not completed what it termed as sufficient

“full-time” service (such as meeting a 240-days per year criterion), and

that their case did not attract the principles enabling regularization.

Within ten days after the dismissal of the original application, on

17.04.2018, the services of all these individuals were abruptly terminated

on 27.10.2018 by the respondent authorities without issuance of any

show-cause notice.

6. Aggrieved by the Tribunal’s decision and subsequent termination, the

appellants approached the High Court in W.P.(C) No. 6822 of 2018

praying for the following reliefs:

“a) Setting aside and quashing the impugned order dated 17.04.2018

passed by the Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal

Bench, New Delhi in O.A. No. 2211/2015 titled as Smt. Anita & Ors.

Versus Union of India & Ors., and

b) Directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioners to their posts

held by them prior to their illegal termination on 27.04.2018 and

further to regularize the services of all the petitioners in their

respective posts, from the date of their initial appointments with all

the consequential benefits, in the interest of justice.

c) Issue the writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ,

direction, or order, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in

the facts and circumstances of the case, in favor of the petitioners and

against the respondents.”

7. They urged the High Court to recognize their long and continuous

service, the nature of their work, and the lack of any backdoor or illegal

entry. They highlighted that they had functioned without any break,

performed tasks equivalent to regular employees, and had been assigned

duties essential to the regular upkeep, cleanliness, and maintenance of

the respondent’s offices. The High Court, after examining the Tribunal’s

decision and the submissions advanced, concluded that the petitioners

before it were part-time workers who had not been appointed against

sanctioned posts, nor had they performed a sufficient duration of full-

time service to satisfy the criteria for regularization. It relied on the

principle laid down in Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi3

holding that the petitioners could not claim a vested right to be absorbed

or regularized without fulfilling the requisite conditions. The High Court

further observed that the petitioners did not possess the minimum

educational qualifications ordinarily required for regular appointments,

and additionally noted that the employer had subsequently outsourced

the relevant housekeeping and maintenance activities. Concluding that

there was no legal basis to grant the reliefs sought, the High Court

dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved by this rejection, the appellants

have approached this Court by way of these appeals.

36. It is evident from the factual aspect that the concerned appellant was

allowed to continue in service for more than two decades and thereafter,

they have been terminated. The Hon’ble Apex Court, after taking into

consideration the fact of their continuous service of 20 years, has passed

an order that even though the post is not sanctioned but even then, the

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daily rated employee has been allowed to continue in service

continuously for two decades. The State Government cannot be allowed

to take advantage of the post being not sanctioned.

37. Similarly, in the case of Nihal Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and

Ors. (supra) the issue of regularization and issue of sanctioned post has

been discussed. For ready reference, relevant paragraphs of the said

judgment is being reproduced as under:

“20. But we do not see any justification for the State to take a defence that

after permitting the utilisation of the services of a large number of people

like the appellants for decades to say that there are no sanctioned posts to

absorb the appellants. Sanctioned posts do not fall from heaven. The State

has to create them by a conscious choice on the basis of some rational

assessment of the need.

21. The question is whether this Court can compel the State of Punjab to

create posts and absorb the appellants into the services of the State on a

permanent basis consistent with the Constitution Bench decision of this

Court in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4

SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] . To answer this question, the ratio

decidendi of Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006)

4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is required to be examined. In that case,

this Court was considering the legality of the action of the State in

resorting to irregular appointments without reference to the duty to

comply with the proper appointment procedure contemplated by the

Constitution: (SCC pp. 17-18, para 4)

“4. … The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities

have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs

of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper

appointment procedure through the Public Service Commissions or

otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular

appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to

continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to

apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to

compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed,

without the following of a regular procedure or even through the

backdoor or on daily wages, approaching the courts, seeking directions

to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular

recruitment to the posts concerned. The courts have not always kept the

legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular

process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even

directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed

into service. A class of employment which can only be called ‘litigious

employment’, has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the

constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of

the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Whether the

wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are intended to be

used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and

equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of

public employment as recognised by our Constitution, has to be

seriously pondered over.”

(emphasis supplied)

It can be seen from the above that the entire issue pivoted around the fact

that the State initially made appointments without following any rational

procedure envisaged under the scheme of the Constitution in the matters of

public appointments. This Court while recognising the authority of the

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State to make temporary appointments engaging workers on daily wages

declared that the regularisation of the employment of such persons which

was made without following the procedure conforming to the requirement

of the scheme of the Constitution in the matter of public appointments

cannot become an alternate mode of recruitment to public appointment.

22. It was further declared in Umadevi (3) case [State of

Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] that

the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32

cannot be exercised to compel the State or to enable the State to

perpetuate an illegality. This Court held that compelling the State to

absorb persons who were employed by the State as casual workers or

daily-wage workers for a long period on the ground that such a practice

would be an arbitrary practice and violative of Article 14 and would itself

offend another aspect of Article 14 i.e. the State chose initially to appoint

such persons without any rational procedure recognised by law thereby

depriving vast number of other eligible candidates who were similarly

situated to compete for such employment.

23. Even going by the principles laid down in Umadevi (3) case [State of

Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , we

are of the opinion that the State of Punjab cannot be heard to say that the

appellants are not entitled to be absorbed into the services of the State on

permanent basis as their appointments were purely temporary and not

against any sanctioned posts created by the State.

24. In our opinion, the initial appointment of the appellants can never be

categorised as an irregular appointment. The initial appointment of the

appellants is made in accordance with the statutory procedure

contemplated under the Act. The decision to resort to such a procedure

was taken at the highest level of the State by conscious choice as already

noticed by us.

25. The High Court in its decision in LPA No. 209 of 1992 recorded that

the decision to resort to the procedure under Section 17 of the Act was

taken in a meeting dated 24-3-1984 between the Advisor to the

Government of Punjab and senior officers of the various banks in the

public sector. Such a decision was taken as there was a need to provide

necessary security to the public sector banks. As the State was not in a

position to provide requisite police guards to the banks, it was decided by

the State to resort to Section 17 of the Act. As the employment of such

additional force would create a further financial burden on the State,

various public sector banks undertook to take over the financial burden

arising out of such employment. In this regard, the written statement filed

before the High Court in the instant case by Respondents 1 to 3 through

the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Welfare & Litigation) is

necessary to be noticed. It is stated in the said affidavit:

“2. That in meeting of higher officers held on 27-3-1984 in Governor

House, Chandigarh with Shri Surinder Nath, IPS, Advisor to the

Governor of Punjab, in which the following decisions were taken:

(i) That it will not be possible to provide police guard to banks unless

the banks were willing to pay for the same and additional force could

be arranged on that basis, it was decided that police guards should be

requisitioned by the banks for their biggest branches located at the

district and sub-divisional towns. They should place the requisition with

the District SSPs endorsing a copy of IG CID. In the requisition, they

should clearly state that the costs of guard would be met by them. It will

then be for the Police Department to get additional force sanctioned.

This task should be done on a top priority. In the meantime depending

upon the urgency of the need of any particular branch, the Police

Department may provide from police strength for its protection.

(ii) For all other branches guards will be provided by District SSP after

selecting suitable ex-servicemen or other able-bodied persons who will

[2026:JHHC:10806]

Page | 13

be appointed as Special Police Officer in terms of Section 17 of the

Police Act. Preference may be given to persons who may already be in

possession of licensed weapons. All persons appointed as SPO for this

purpose will be given a brief training for about 7 days in Police Lines

in the handling of weapons taking suitable position for protection of

branches. These SPOs will work under the discipline and control and

as per the Police Act, they will have the same powers, privileges and

protection and shall be amenable to same penalty as ordinary police

personnel.”

It can be seen from the above that a selection process was designed under

which the District Senior Superintendent of Police is required to choose

suitable ex-servicemen or other able-bodied persons for being appointed

as Special Police Officers in terms of Section 17 of the Act. It is indicated

that the persons who are already in possession of a licensed weapon are to

be given priority.

26. It is also asserted by the appellants that pursuant to the requisition by

the Police Department options were called upon from ex-servicemen who

were willing to be enrolled as Special Police Officer (SPOs) under Section

17 of the Police Act, 1861. [ Para 4 of the writ petition and at p. 34 of the

SLP paperbook:“That the Government made a policy to enrol the ex-

servicemen to guard the life and property of the government employees as

well as government employees. All the petitioners being ex-servicemen

enrolled themselves in the employment exchange. The Police Department

sent the intimation to the employment exchange and thereafter all the ex-

servicemen who were enrolled with the employment exchange were called

upon and got their option to be enrolled in as Special Police Officer

(SPOs) under Section 17 of the Police Act, 1861 (hereinafter called as the

SPOs). Those persons who were having armed licence were enrolled as

SPOs and this enrolment was made by the Superintendent of Police,

Amritsar.”]

27. Such a procedure making recruitments through the employment

exchanges was held to be consistent with the requirement of Articles 14

and 16 of the Constitution by this Court in Union of India v. N.

Hargopal [(1987) 3 SCC 308 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 227 : (1987) 4 ATC

51:“9. … We, therefore, consider that insistence on recruitment through

employment exchanges advances rather than restricts the rights

guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The submission that

employment exchanges do not reach everywhere applies equally to

whatever method of advertising vacancies is adopted. Advertisement in the

daily press, for example, is also equally ineffective as it does not reach

everyone desiring employment.”] .

28. The abovementioned process clearly indicates it is not a case where

persons like the appellants were arbitrarily chosen to the exclusion of

other eligible candidates. It required all able-bodied persons to be

considered by the SSP who was charged with the responsibility of

selecting suitable candidates.

29. Such a process of selection is sanctioned by law under Section 17 of

the Act. Viewed in the context of the situation prevailing at that point of

time in the State of Punjab, such a process cannot be said to be irrational.

The need was to obtain the services of persons who had some experience

and training in handling an extraordinary situation of dealing with armed

miscreants.

30. It can also be noticed from the written statement of the Assistant

Inspector General of Police (Welfare & Litigation) that preference was

given to persons who were in possession of licensed weapons. The

recruitment of the appellants and other similarly situated persons was

made in the background of terrorism prevailing in the State of Punjab at

that time as acknowledged in the order dated 23-4-2002 of the SSP. The

procedure which is followed during the normal times of making

recruitment by inviting applications and scrutinising the same to identify

[2026:JHHC:10806]

Page | 14

the suitable candidates would itself take considerable time. Even after

such a selection the selected candidates are required to be provided with

necessary arms and also be trained in the use of such arms. All this

process is certainly time-consuming. The requirement of the State was to

take swift action in an extraordinary situation.

31. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the process of selection adopted

in identifying the appellants herein cannot be said to be unreasonable or

arbitrary in the sense that it was devised to eliminate other eligible

candidates. It may be worthwhile to note that in Umadevi (3) case [State of

Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , this

Court was dealing with appointments made without following any rational

procedure in the lower rungs of various services of the Union and the

States.

…

37. We are of the opinion that neither the Government of Punjab nor these

public sector banks can continue such a practice consistent with their

obligation to function in accordance with the Constitution. Umadevi

(3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S)

753] judgment cannot become a licence for exploitation by the State and

its instrumentalities.

38. For all the abovementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the

appellants are entitled to be absorbed in the services of the State. The

appeals are accordingly allowed. The judgments under appeal are set

aside.

39. We direct the State of Punjab to regularise the services of the

appellants by creating necessary posts within a period of three months

from today. Upon such regularisation, the appellants would be entitled to

all the benefits of services attached to the post which are similar in nature

already in the cadre of the police services of the State. We are of the

opinion that the appellants are entitled to the costs throughout. In the

circumstances, we quantify the costs to Rs 10,000 to be paid to each of the

appellants.”

38. The admitted fact herein is that the writ petitioners have been appointed

to the post of V.C. Operator and Sweeper respectively and thereafter

terminated from service vide letter no. 3825 dated 01.12.2016, meaning

thereby, they were in service of the period which is less than the period

of 10 years.

39. So far as the claim of the writ petitioners to count the period of 10 years

of service after the termination since they have been allowed to work is

concerned, this Court is of the view that such continuation cannot be said

to be proper reason being that once the petitioners have been terminated

from service that too by the order passed by the departmental authority at

the departmental level and even though the local authority has been

punished with the punishment of censure allowing the petitioners to

continue in service cannot be considered for the purpose of consideration

for the purpose of consideration of the issue of regularization by adding

the aforesaid period to count the continuation period of 10 years.

[2026:JHHC:10806]

Page | 15

40. So far as the ground taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners that

the writ petitioners have been terminated only to break the chain is

concerned, this Court is of the view that once the order of termination

has been passed by the authority above than the local authority who have

allowed the petitioners to continue in service, it is not available to the

petitioners to take the ground that to break the chain, the order of

termination has been passed.

41. Further, while considering the entry of these petitioners by the local

authority without any policy decision to that regard or any cognizance by

the State Government, the departmental proceeding had already been

initiated against them, hence, it cannot be said that only to break the

chain, the order of termination has been passed.

42. That could have been considered, if further continuation of service

would have been made by the authority at the departmental level but that

is not the case herein.

43. Even if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners will be

accepted, then, there will be anomalous situation and everything will

come at the hand of the local authority.

44. This Court, in view of the aforesaid fact, is of the view that the case of

the writ petitioners is not coming under the fold of the judgment

rendered in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma

Devi (3) (supra) or under the fold of Jaggo vs. Union of India and Ors.

(supra) upon which the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied

upon.

45. This Court in view of the entirety of facts and circumstances and based

upon the reasons as referred hereinabove, is of the view that the both the

writ petitions lack merit and as such, the same stand dismissed.

46. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

15

th

April, 2026

Saurabh/-

A.F.R.

Uploaded on 21.04.2026