1

2026:JHHC:11524-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Civil Review No.70 of 2021

1. Manoj Kumar

2. Ram Pravesh Rajak

3. Narendra Kumar

4. Amrendra Kumar Sinha

5. Aswini Kumar

6. Ram Pratap Mahto

7. Dineshwar Thakur

8. Shishir Kumar

9. Nandu Baitha

10. Kumar Masum

11. Bijendra Ram

12. Sudhansu Kumar

13. DasrathKapardar

14. Rabindra Nath Singh

15. Ashok Kumar Priayadarshi

16. Rajendra Kumar Mandal

17. Binay Kumar Choudhary

18. Amresh Kumar Srivastava

19. Jay Prakash Ram

20. Raja Ram Roy

21. Bijay Kumar Roy

22. Budhram Samanta

23. Dhananjay Kumar

24. Awadh Kishore Prasad

25. Devendra Kumar

26. Raj Kishore Ram

27. MarkandeyJonko ----- Petitioners

Versus

M/s Steel Authority of India Ltd., New Delhi having one of its

Steel Plants known as Bokaro Steel City through Sri Arvind

Upadhyay, Assistant General Manager (Law), Bokaro Steel Plant,

Bokaro.

----- Opposite Party

with

Civil Review No.73 of 2021

1. Anup Kumar Choubey

2. Devendra Prasad Singh

3. Vinay Kumar Singh

4. Ashok Kumar

5. Sadanand Mahato

6. Uma Shankar Sahay

7. Rabindra Nath Mukherjee

2

8. Surendra Singh Yadav

9. Satish Mohan Jha

28. Prabhat Kumar ----- Petitioners

Versus

1. M/s Steel Authority of India Ltd., New Delhi having one of its

Steel Plants known as Bokaro Steel City through Sri Arvind

Upadhyay, Assistant General Manager (Law), Bokaro Steel

Plant, Bokaro.

2. Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Heavy

Industries & Public Enterprises, New Delhi.

3. Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Steel, New

Delhi.

----- Opposite Parties

with

Civil Review No.74 of 2021

1. Murari Prasad

2. Rajiv Ranjan Prasad

3. Jai Krishna Pattnaik

4. Sudhir Kumar Singh

5. Sanjay Kumar Singh

6. Akshya Kumar Singh

7. Vinod Kumar Ojha

8. Ayodhya Prasad Mahto

29. Vijay Kumar ----- Petitioners

Versus

M/s Steel Authority of India Ltd., New Delhi having one of its

Steel Plants known as Bokaro Steel City through Sri Arvind

Upadhyay, Assistant General Manager (Law), Bokaro Steel Plant,

Bokaro.

----- Opposite Parties

with

Civil Review No.75 of 2021

1. Sidhnath Prasad Singh

2. Awadhesh Kumar Choudhary

3. Uday Chandra Kumbhkar

4. Deo Raj Pandey

5. Devavrata Kumar Saha

6. Binod Kumar

7. Chandra Shekhar Rai

8. Subir Kumar Sinha @ Subhir Kumar Jha

9. Shankar Mishra

10. Sharad Chandra Mahto

11. Vijay Kumar Gupta

12. Kamal Kishore Singh

3

13. Surendra Upadhyay

14. Bijendra Prasad

30. Lakshmi Kant Das ----- Petitioners

Versus

1. M/s Steel Authority of India Ltd., New Delhi having one of

its Steel Plants known as Bokaro Steel City through Sri

Arvind Upadhyay, Assistant General Manager (Law), Bokaro

Steel Plant, Bokaro.

2. Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Heavy

Industries & Public Enterprises, New Delhi.

3. Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Steel, New

Delhi.

----- Opposite Parties

with

Civil Review No.12 of 2023

1. Sunil

2. Ashok Kumar

3. Ashok Kumar Bhagat

4. Bijendra Kumar

5. Birendra Prasad Singh

6. Jai Prakash Mishra

7. Kaushal Kishore Singh

8. Md. Aftab Karim

9. Shashi Bhushan Singh

10. Sukhdeo Ram

11. Sunil Kumar Sinha ----- Petitioners

Versus

M/s Steel Authority of India Ltd., New Delhi having one of its

Steel Plants known as Bokaro Steel City through Sri Arvind

Upadhyay, Assistant General Manager (Law), Bokaro Steel Plant,

Bokaro.

----- Opposite Parties

------

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

-------

For the Petitioners : Mr. Kumar Harsh, Advocate

For the Opp. Parties : Mr. Radha Krishna Gupta, CGC

For the SAIL : Mr. VibhashSinha, Advocate

-------

17/15.04.2026 Heard Mr. Kumar Harsh, learned counsel for the

petitioners, Mr. Radha Krishna Gupta, learned Central

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Government Counsel and Mr. Bibhash Sinha, learned counsel

appearing for the respondent SAIL.

2. In these applications, the petitioners have prayed for

review of the order dated 02.02.2021 passed in W.P.(S)

No.2663/2019, W.P.(S) No. 2125/2019, W.P.(S) No. 2689/2019

and W.P.(S) No.2702/2019.

3. It is the case of the review petitioners that they were

working in different departments of Bokaro Steel Plant in non-

executive cadre and they were promoted to the post of Junior

Officer in the executive cadre as per the promotion policy of SAIL

through a selection process. The applicants being successful in

the selection process were appointed as Junior Officers in the

executive cadre from the non-executivecadre in two batches i.e.

2008 and 2010. The promotion in the executive cadre was given

on 27.03.2009 but notionally from 30.06.2008 and some of them

were promoted on 28.12.2010 but notionally from 30.06.2010. In

the case of non-executives, the periodicity of wage revision was 5

years. After the expiry of the wage revision tenure from

01.01.2007 to 31.12.2011 with the implementation of revised pay

scales w.e.f. 01.01.2012, the basic pay of the non-executives as

on 01.01.2012 became more than that of the executives as 100%

D.A was merged for the non-executives whereas in case of

executives, the 2007 salary structure continued. It is the case of

the review petitioners that before promotion to the post of Junior

Officers, they received the wage revision benefits of 21% minimum

guaranteed benefits as non-executives from 01.01.2007 but after

promotion as Junior Officers, they have not been paid the 10

years pay revision benefits like 30% minimum guaranteed

benefits for executives as prescribed in 10 years pay revision

benefit scheme meant for the executive cadre from 01.01.2007 to

31.12.2016. The non-executive employees who were the batch

mates of the juniors to the review petitioners, again received 17%

minimum guaranteed benefits on and from 01.01.2012 under the

5 year wage revision tenure meant for the non-executive cadres as

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a result of which the review petitioners, despite being in the

higher post as executives, were getting lesser pay than their batch

mates/juniors in the non-executive cadre. On representation

having been received with respect to the anomaly, an order was

issued on 29.12.2015 in which the difference between the present

salary of non-executive employees and the affected executive

employees was met by granting additional amount to the affected

executive employees who had raised the issue of anomaly. It was

also mentioned therein that the additional fixed amount shall be

granted to the affected executives from a prospective date i.e.

01.01.2016 and the said amount shall not be counted for any

other purpose for calculating any other benefits. Being aggrieved

with the cut-off date being fixed as 01.01.2016 to extend the

additional benefits to remove the anomaly and not from the date

when such anomaly occurred, the review petitioners had preferred

an application before the Learned Central Administrative

Tribunal, Kolkata in O.A. No. 350/2017 along with other

analogous applications, but the same were not entertained on the

ground of jurisdiction and vide order dated 04.01.2018, the

applicants/review petitioners were directed to approach the

Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench,Circuit Sitting at

Ranchi. Consequent to the same, the petitioners had approached

the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Circuit Sitting

at Ranchi in O.A./051/00214/2018 and its analogous cases and

the same were disposed of on 09.01.2019 by quashing Para-2(iv)

of the order dated 29.12.2015 with a direction to the respondents

to issue appropriate order to make the additional fixed amount

payable to the affected employees from the respective dates on

which the anomaly occurred. The Steel Authority of India Ltd.

challenged the order dated 09.01.2019 in W.P.(S) No. 2663/2019

and its analogous cases and vide order dated 02.02.2021, the

order dated 09.01.2019 passed by the learned Central

Administrative Tribunal was set aside. The review petitioners had

challenged the said order in Special Leave to Appeal Nos. 14762-

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14765/2021 which however was withdrawn on 24.09.2021 giving

a liberty to the review petitioners to prefer review applications and

this is how the matter has come before us.

4. It has been submitted by Mr. Kumar Harsh, learned

Counsel for the review petitioners that Para-2(iv) of the office

order dated 29.12.2015 has not been appropriately considered in

the order under review. It has been submitted that the order

dated 29.12.2015 is neither a policy decision nor an exercise in

pay fixation and even if it is assumed that the same was a policy

decision, it cannot be beyond the purview of a judicial review

considering the arbitrariness which is inherent in the office order

dated 29.12.2015. Mr. Harsh has submitted that there is no

rationale behind the cut-off date being fixed as 01.01.2016

despite the respondent SAIL acknowledging the fact that an

anomaly had indeed arisen and rectification was also made to the

said anomaly but not from a retrospective date and because of the

prospective date of 01.01.2016, the anomaly in the pay prior to

the said date continues to exist. It has been submitted that the

office order dated 29.12.2015 does not record financial burden as

a reason for fixing the cut-off date as 01.01.2016. The issue of

financial burden is irrelevant, if the order does not satisfy the test

of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Kumar Harsh, in

support of his various contentions, has placed reliance in the case

of Kallakkurichi Taluk Retired Officials Assn., Tamil Nadu

And Ors. v. State of T.N. reported in (2013) 2 SCC 772, Dr. P.

N. Puri and others vs. State of UP and others reported in

(1996) 7 SCC 493 and DDA And Anr. v. Joint Action

Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats And Ors. reported in (2008) 2

SCC 672.

5. Mr. Bibhash Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent SAIL has submitted that the petitioners have failed to

point out any error apparent on the face of the record in the order

dated 02.02.2021 which would entail the Court to review the said

order. It has been submitted that neither the review petitioners

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nor the learned Central Administrative Tribunal in its order dated

09.01.2019 have been able to show that the action of the

respondent SAIL in fixing a prospective cut-off date is arbitrary.

The fixing of a cut-off date as enumerated in the office order dated

29.12.2015 is a policy decision of the management while

rectifying and removing the anomaly which existed and it goes

without saying that financial implication would be one of the

rational in fixing a cut-off date prospectively and this issue has

been considered in the order under review dated 02.02.2021. Mr.

Sinha has, therefore, prayed for dismissal of these review

applications.

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective

sides and have also perused the affidavits on record.

7. The anomaly between the review petitioners and the

non-executive employees who were the batch mates / juniors to

them, was sought to be removed by the respondent SAIL by virtue

of issuance of an office order dated 29.12.2015, but a discordant

note was struck which is embedded in the said order itself and

which consequently became the pivotal issue to be decided. For

better appreciation of the case, we quote the office order dated

29.12.2015 which reads as under:-

"STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LIMITED

No/PER/EC/1213

29

THDecember 2015

Head of Personnel of All Plants/Units

Sub:- Anomaly in Pay of Junior Executives (JO) of 2010

Batch vis-à-vis Non executives (erstwhile batchmates)

Dear Sir,

Representations references have been received

through various channels, on the issue of pay anomaly of

Junior Officers (JO) of 2008 & 2010 batch vis-à-vis the

non-executives (their erstwhile batchmates) for early

rectification/settlement of anomalous situation.

The issue of pay anomaly for the aforesaid category of

executives was examined keeping in view the need to

settle the above anomalous situation of a peculiar nature

wherein a Junior executive (JO of 2008 & 2010 batch) is

presently drawing less salary (Basic + D.A.) compared to

a non executive employee who is junior to him.

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Accordingly, the following methodology has been devised

for addressing the issue.

i) In the context of aforementioned cases fulfilling the

following conditions may be considered as a Pay

Anomaly.

a) The affected executive (JO of 2008 & 2010 batch) is

senior to the non executive employee with respect to

whom the anomalous situation has arisen and is being

claimed by the affected executive. The affected executive

should have been an erstwhile batch-mate/senior in the

non executive cadre. Also compared to the non executive,

the affected executive had been drawing higher or equal

basic pay in the non executive cadre.

b) The affected executive (JO of 2008 & 2010 batch)

and the non executive with whom the affected executive is

comparing himself for the purpose of establishing

anomaly should belong to the same plant/Unit.

c) The affected executive (JO of 2008 & 2010 batch)

and the non executive being compared with had the same

channel of promotion when both of them were in non

executive cadre.

ii) In order to address the above mentioned peculiar

anomaly i.e. a senior employee (executive) presently

drawing less salary (Basic + DA) then his erstwhile batch-

mate/junior in non executive cadre, it is essential that the

present day salary (Basic + DA) of the affected senior

employee (executive) be made equal to the present salary

(Basic + DA) of non executive.

iii) Accordingly, the difference between the present

Salary (Basic + DA) of non executive employee and the

affected executive employee shall be granted as an

additional amount to the affected executive employee who

has raised the anomaly. The said amount once fixed shall

not undergo any subsequent upward revision."

iv) The said additional fixed amount shall be granted to

the affected executive from a prospective datei.e. 1.1.2016

and the said amount shall not be counted for any other

purpose for calculating any other benefit.”

8. Para-(iii) of the office order dated 29-12-2015

addresses the grievance of those affected executive employees who

were getting a lesser pay than the non-executive employees who

were their batch mates/juniors, but at the same time Para-(iv)

projects a new dimension as the entitlement for the additional

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amount to be at par with the non-executive batch mates/juniors

was from a prospective date i.e. 01.01.2016 and not from the date

when the anomaly occurred. The Learned Central Administrative

Tribunal in its order dated 09-01-2019 has decided the issue in

the following manner:-

6. After going through the pleadings and hearing the

arguments, it is clear that an anomaly did occur since the

Basic + DA of employees in the executive cadre became

less than those in the non-executive cadre. This fact is

accepted in Annexure A/3. It is also clear that this dispute

has mainly arisen because of making this order effective

prospectively. No reason is given, either in the

respondents' written statement or during the course of

arguments, about why the correction of anomaly was

implemented only from a prospective date. The learned

counsel for the respondents did argue that the subsequent

revisions in the pay and allowances of the executives

have more than covered the loss that they might have

suffered because of this anomaly. This cannot be

considered as a correct explanation since these

subsequent revisions were not limited to only the

employees affected by the anomaly. In the absence of any

logical explanation, for not correcting an accepted

anomaly, from the date from which the anomaly occurred,

we are constrained to quash para 2(iv) of the order dated

29.12.2015 (Annexure A/8) and direct the respondents to

issue appropriate orders, to make the additional fixed

amount as mentioned in the said order, payable to the

affected employees from the respective dates on which the

anomaly occurred. Needless to say, all the other

conditions mentioned in Annexure-8, for qualifying for

payment of additional fixed amount, will remain. The OA

is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.”

9. What would transpire from the findings recorded in

the order dated 09-01-2019 is that no reason has been given

either in the respondent’s written statement or during the course

of argument as to why the pay anomaly was removed from a

prospective date and not from the date when such pay anomaly

had occurred. The order dated 09-01-2019 was, however, set

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aside in W.P.(S) No. 2663/2019 and its analogous cases vide the

order dated 02-02-2021 and it has been held as follows:-

“13. On the part of the applicants, it has been argued

that the anomalies were noticed and addressed by the

employer, but made effective from a prospective date

rather than from the date the anomaly arose. Petitioner-

SAIL also failed to bring on record any materials to show

that the impugned directions entail huge financial burden

which their employer was unable to sustain. We are,

however, not impressed with this argument for the reason

that interference in the fixation of cut-off date in the

matter of implementation of pay revision by a writ court is

uncalled for as prescriptions of pay-scales or pay revision

or removal of pay anomaly are in the domain of experts

which the courts of law are not equipped to deal with

under powers of judicial review. Fixation of pay-scale or

removal of pay anomaly also entails financial burden

upon the employer which decision the employer is best

placed to take. Neither did the applicants place any

material to show arbitrariness in the fixation of cut-off

dates nor did the learned Tribunal considered it proper to

hold so while interfering in the decision of the employer-

SAIL in granting the additional benefits from a prospective

date. In the absence of such materials on record the order

of the learned Tribunal stands vitiated in law and may

cause a cascading effect on other related services in the

organization and also give rise to litigations in other units

of the SAIL with similar demands. This Court is therefore

satisfied that the order of the learned Tribunal calls for

interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction by this Court.”

10. At the time of hearing of these applications an order

was passed on 11-12-2025 directing the learned counsel for SAIL

to file an affidavit specifically stating as to the rationale behind

fixing the cut-off date as 01-01-2016. An affidavit has been filed

in compliance of the said order and the said affidavit reveals the

steps taken in removing the anomaly but only a fleeting reference

has been made regarding the cut-off date based on financial

implications. The review petitioners have sought review of the

order dated 02-02-2021 passed in W.P.(S) No. 2663/2019 and its

analogous cases, primarily on the ground that the Learned

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Division Bench has not considered Para (iv) of the office order

dated 29-12-2015, which on the face of it is arbitrary and has

perpetuated the pay anomaly albeit pre-01.01.2016. In support of

his contention reference has been made by the learned counsel

for the review petitioners to the case of P. N. Puri and others

(Supra) wherein it has been held as follows:-

“3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the

petitioners that the reason given by the respondents is not

relevant since the Anomaly Committee recommended that

they are performing the same duties on a par with the

Medical Officers. Therefore, the High Court ought to have

granted them the scale of pay from 1986. As stated

earlier, reasons given in the counter-affidavit may not be

the correct reasons but the Anomaly Committee had

recommended for payment of the same scale of pay to the

persons like the petitioners w.e.f. 7-11-1994. It is well-

settled law that fixing a date is not arbitrary violating

Article 14. It is settled law that the authorities cannot pick

up from their hat and fix a date. The question, therefore,

which arises for decision is: whether the date fixed is

arbitrary? The question was referred to the Anomaly

Committee to advise the Government as to the fixation of

the scale of pay to which persons like the petitioners

would be entitled to. The Committee had gone into the

question and recommended the scale of pay of Rs 2200-

4000 to persons like the petitioners and also

recommended to give effect from the date on which they

had decided, namely 7-11-1994. The Government having

accepted the same had given effect from that date. Under

those circumstances, it cannot be said that fixation of date

is arbitrary violating Article 14.”

11. In the case of Kallakkurichi Taluk Retired Officials

Assn. (Supra), it has been held as under:-

“31. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the

controversy in hand.

32. First and foremost, it needs to be understood that

the quantum of discrimination, is irrelevant to a challenge

based on a plea of arbitrariness under Article 14 of the

Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution of India

ensures to all equality before the law and equal protection of

the laws. The question is of arbitrariness and discrimination.

These rights flow to an individual under Articles 14 and 16 of

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the Constitution of India. The extent of benefit or loss in such

a determination is irrelevant and inconsequential. The extent

to which a benefit or loss actually affects the person

concerned, cannot ever be a valid justification for a court in

either granting or denying the claim raised on these counts.

The rejection of the claim of the appellants by the High Court,

merely on account of the belief that the carry-home pension

for employees who would retire after 1-6-1988, would be

trivially lower than those retiring prior thereto, amounts to

begging the issue pressed before the High Court. The solitary

instance referred to above, which is not a matter of dispute

even at the hands of the first respondent, clearly

demonstrates, that in a given situation, an employee retiring

on or after 1-6-1988 could suffer a substantial loss, in

comparison to an employee retiring before 1-6-1988. We are,

therefore satisfied, that the High Court clearly erred while

determining the issue projected before it.

33. At this juncture it is also necessary to examine the

concept of valid classification. A valid classification is truly a

valid discrimination. Article 16 of the Constitution of India

permits a valid classification (see State of Kerala v. N.M.

Thomas). A valid classification is based on a just objective.

The result to be achieved by the just objective presupposes,

the choice of some for differential consideration/treatment,

over others. A classification to be valid must necessarily

satisfy two tests. Firstly, the distinguishing rationale has to

be based on a just objective. And secondly, the choice of

differentiating one set of persons from another, must have a

reasonable nexus to the objective sought to be achieved.

Legalistically, the test for a valid classification may be

summarised as a distinction based on a classification

founded on an intelligible differentia, which has a rational

relationship with the object sought to be achieved. Whenever

a cut-off date (as in the present controversy) is fixed to

categorise one set of pensioners for favourable consideration

over others, the twin test for valid classification (or valid

discrimination) must necessarily be satisfied.

xxx xxx xxx

36. The only position adopted in the pleadings filed

before this Court for introducing a cut-off date for differential

treatment is expressed in Para 4 of the counter-affidavit filed

by the State of Tamil Nadu which is being extracted

herewith:

“With reference to the averments made in the grounds

of the special leave petition, I submit that the Fifth Pay

Commission has revised pay and pension with effect from

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1-6-1988. As per the recommendation of the above Pay

Commission, the Government had issued orders for the

revision of pension and family pension with effect from

1-6-1988 in GOMs No. 810, Finance (PC) Department

dated 9-8-1989. It is submitted that the Fourth Tamil

Nadu Pay Commission has recommended that at the end

of the period of three years, the dearness allowance

sanctioned up to that period could be treated as dearness

pay. The Fourth Pay Commission revision was given with

effect from 1-10-1984. Based on the above

recommendation, the Government has issued orders in

GOMs No. 371, Finance dated 30-4-1986, read with

Government Letter No. 124414/Pension/86-1 dated

11-2-1987, that the dearness allowance sanctioned up to

30-9-1987 shall be treated as dearness pay for the

purpose of pensionary benefit in the case of the

government servant retiring on or after 1-10-1987.

The orders issued in GOMs 371, Finance dated

30-4-1985 as amended in Government Letter No. 70707-

A/Pension/86-1 dated 8-7-1986 read as follows:

‘The Fourth Tamil Nadu Pay Commission have

among other things recommended that at the end of

a period of three years the dearness allowance

sanctioned up to the period could be treated as

dearness pay in order to ensure a reasonable

pension level. The Government accept the

recommendation of the Commission and direct that

in the case of government servant, who will be

retiring on or after 1-10-1987, the dearness

allowance sanctioned up to 1-10-1987 shall be

reckoned as dearness pay for the purpose of

pension in the case of death of a government

servant occurring on or after 1-10-1987 while in

service the dearness allowance sanctioned up to 1-

10-1987 shall be treated as dearness pay for the

purpose of computing family pension.’”

(emphasis supplied)

It is therefore evident that the State Government has

not disclosed any object which is desired to achieve by

the cut-off date. Most importantly, the financial

constraints of the State Government, were not described

as the basis/reason for the classification made in the

impugned Government Order dated 9-8-1989.”

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12. The learned counsel for the review petitioners have

sought to assail the order dated 02-02-2021 passed in W.P.(S) No.

2663/2019 and its analogous cases on the precinct of an appeal,

but it must be borne in mind that a review application has a very

limited scope and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.

Venturing into the scope of review, the same has been succinctly

explained in the case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal vs. State Tax

Officer And Anr. reported in 2023 SCC online (SC) 1406 ,

wherein it has been held as follows:-

“7. At the outset, it may be stated that the power to

review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court

by Article 137 of the Constitution of India. Of course, that power

is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or

the Rules made under Article 145. The Supreme Court in

exercise of the powers conferred under Article 145 of the

Constitution of India has framed the Supreme Court Rules,

2013. Order 47 of Part IV thereof deals with the provisions of

review. Accordingly, in a civil proceeding, an application for

review is entertained only on the grounds mentioned in Order

47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in a criminal

proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of

record. However, it may be noted that neither Order 47CPC nor

Order 47 of the Supreme Court Rules limits the remedy of

review only to the parties to the judgment under review. Even a

third party to the proceedings, if he considers himself to be an

“aggrieved person”, may take recourse to the remedy of review

petition. The quintessence is that the person should be

aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by this Court in

some respect. [Union of India v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar

Jagad, (2019) 18 SCC 586] In view of the said legal position,

the review petitioners who claimed to be the “aggrieved

persons” by the impugned judgment dated 6-9-2022 [State Tax

Officer v. Rainbow Papers Ltd., (2023) 9 SCC 545] , were

permitted to file review petitions and were heard by the Court.

8. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the

learned counsel for the parties, let us regurgitate the well-

settled law on the scope of review as contemplated in Order 47

of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 CPC.

9. In the words of Krishna Iyer J., (as his Lordship then

was) “a plea of review, unless the first judicial view is

manifestly distorted, is like asking for the Moon. A forensic

defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to have a second

look, hopeful of discovery of flaws and reversal of result. A

review in the counsel's mentation cannot repair the verdict once

15

given. So, the law laid down must rest in peace.” [Northern

India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. State (UT of Delhi), (1980) 2 SCC

167]

10. It is also well-settled that a party is not entitled to

seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for

the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The

normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is

final, and departure from that principle is justified only when

circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make

it necessary to do so. [Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1964

SCC OnLine SC 25 : AIR 1965 SC 845]

11. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [Parsion Devi v. Sumitri

Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715], this Court made very pivotal

observations : (SCC p. 719, para 9)

“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a judgment may be open

to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent

on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident

and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can

hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the

record justifying the court to exercise its power of review

under Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction

under Order 47 Rule 1CPCit is not permissible for an

erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review

petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and

cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.”

12. Again, in Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam

SEB [Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB, (2020) 2 SCC

677 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 788] , a three-Judge Bench of this

Court following Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [Parsion

Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715] dismissed the

review petitions holding that the scope of review is limited

and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be

permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have

already been addressed and decided.

13. Recently, in Shri Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar

Rawat [Shri Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat, (2021) 13

SCC 1 : (2023) 2 SCC (Civ) 686] , this Court restated the law

with regard to the scope of review under Section 114 read

with Order 47CPC.

14. In Arun Dev Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service

Ltd. [Arun Dev Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Ltd.,

(2023) 8 SCC 11 : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ) 123] , this Court

reiterated the law and held that : (SCC p. 21, para 35)

“35. From the above, it is evident that a power to review

cannot be exercised as an appellate power and has to be

strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule

1CPC. An error on the face of record must be such an error

16

which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should

not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the

points where there may conceivably be two opinions.”

15. It is very pertinent to note that recently the Constitution

Bench in Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar

Review-5 J.) [Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy

(Aadhaar Review-5 J.), (2021) 3 SCC 1] , held that even the

change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of

coordinate Bench or larger Bench by itself cannot be

regarded as a ground for review.

16. The gist of the aforestated decisions is that:

16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a

mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.

16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and

departure from that principle is justified only when

circumstances of a substantial and compelling character

make it necessary to do so.

16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be

detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be

an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to

exercise its power of review.

16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule

1CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be

“reheard and corrected”.

16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be

allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.

16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be

permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have

already been addressed and decided.

16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error

which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should

not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the

points where there may conceivably be two opinions.

16.8. Even the change in law or subsequent

decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself

cannot be regarded as a ground for review.”

13. In the present case, we have been called upon to

reconsider and reinterpret Para (iv) of the office order dated

29-12-15 as held in W.P.(S) No. 2663/2019 and its analogous

cases. The error, which is apparent on the face of the record, has

not to be glossed over or be given a different connotation than the

conclusion it has arrived at, but the error should be such which

can be conceivable at a solitary glance. It has been held in Sanjay

17

Kumar Agarwal (supra), the questions which have been

addressed, cannot be permitted to be re-agitated and re-argued.

However, in the present case, the main plank of argument centers

around the absence of any rationale in fixing the cut-off date as

01-01-2016. The learned Division Bench in its order dated

02-02-2021 has categorically come to a conclusion that “Removal

of pay anomaly are in the domain of expert which the courts of

law are not equipped to deal with under the powers of judicial

review.” It has also been held that “Fixation of pay scale on

removal of pay anomaly also entails financial burden upon the

employer which decision the employer is best placed to take”. The

absence of any rationale for not removing the anomalies from the

date they occurred and fixing an arbitrary and imaginary date of

01-01-2016 has been considered by the learned Division Bench

and considering the case in its entirety and even if two views are

possible, the same would be contrary to the principles of review

jurisdiction. The purposive interpretation of the order dated 02-

02-2021 of the learned Division Bench would not be in the

domain of review jurisdiction, but would encroach upon the

appellate jurisdiction which this Court is not exercising and upon

consideration of the fact that no error apparent on the face of the

order dated 02-02-2021 passed in W.P.(S) No. 2663/2019 and its

analogous cases is visible, all these review applications are hereby

dismissed.

14. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands

closed.

(Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J.)

(Deepak Roshan, J.)

Dated: 15

th April, 2026

Shamim/-

Uploaded on: 21/04/2026